[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-150]
THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 14, 2010
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
GLENN NYE, Virginia TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Hunter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
Megan Howard, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010, The United States Nuclear Weapons
Policy and Force Structure..................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010........................................ 51
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010
THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 7
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Energy........................................... 9
Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense................. 5
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State... 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P........................................ 64
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P.................................... 69
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 55
Miller, Hon. James N......................................... 58
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O....................................... 75
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Tri-Lab Directors' Statement on the Nuclear Posture Review... 85
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 91
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 89
Mr. Owens.................................................... 94
THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY AND FORCE STRUCTURE
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 14, 2010.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:35 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. The Armed Services Committee
meets today to receive testimony on the United States' nuclear
policy as well as the force structure in light of the recent
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as well as the signing of the New
Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty.
Joining us today is a very formidable witness panel, and in
the order of speaking, the Honorable Jim Miller, Principal
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kevin
Chilton, the Commander of the United States Strategic Command,
or what we call STRATCOM; the Honorable Tom D'Agostino, excuse
me, the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA).
And no stranger here, and we welcome her back, the
Honorable, fantastic Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security. It is a real
thrill to have you back. And we appreciate each one of you
appearing here today.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
required the Secretary of Defense to perform a review of our
nuclear posture in coordination, of course, with the State
Department and the Energy Department.
The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review seeks to
establish a bipartisan approach to nuclear policy and, in my
view, properly balances the role of our nuclear deterrent
forces with the goals of preventing nuclear terrorism and
weapons proliferation.
It contains exactly the balance that former Secretaries of
Defense Bill Perry and Jim Schlesinger recommended to our
committee a year ago when they presented the findings of the
bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States. ``This is a moment of opportunity,'' the
commission concluded, ``to reach consensus on U.S. nuclear
strategy, but it is also a moment of urgency.''
The urgency, according to these experts, arises
``internationally, from the danger that we may be close to a
tipping point in nuclear proliferation and, domestically, from
an accumulation of delayed decisions about the nuclear weapons
program.''
The Administration's Nuclear Posture Review offers us the
opportunity to act on the urgent issues, both internationally
and domestically, that the commission defined.
Following the path first outlined by President Obama in his
speech in Prague last year, the NPR calls for responsibly
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security
strategy. This action opens the door to stronger steps against
rogue states and those who would fail to protect nuclear
technology and materials.
The NPR's new approach recognizes that we live in a
complicated world that demands immediate action to protect us
from the threat of nuclear terrorism, such as locking down
loose nuclear materials in concert with other nations. And in
that regard, I want to congratulate the President on obtaining
the agreement of 47 nations here in Washington at the nuclear
summit to lock down these materials within four years. That is
good.
At the same time, the NPR is grounded in the strength of
our nuclear deterrent forces. It calls for retaining a nuclear
triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy
bombers.
I am also pleased that the review concluded that, as long
as nuclear weapons are around, they will be maintained safely.
They will be maintained securely as well as reliably, and
consistent with the Stockpile Management statute recommended by
this committee last year and codified in law by the Defense
bill.
In addition to the NPR, the Nation's nuclear posture and
force structure has recently been influenced by the
announcement and signing of a New Strategic Arms Reduction, or
START, Treaty with the Russians.
This new treaty comes at a critical time, as we approach
the May Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
by agreeing to reduce their nuclear stockpiles, and the U.S.
and Russia have sent a clear message to the rest of the world.
This action by the two largest nuclear powers will only
strengthen the President' efforts at the conference to impose
stiffer punishments on nations such as Iran that are accused of
violating the NPT.
The road before us to a world free of nuclear threats is
long and it will be, at times, difficult, but the signing of
the historic New START Treaty moves us miles ahead toward
reaching that final destination.
In his memoirs, Ronald Reagan noted, ``For the 8 years I
was president, I never let my dream of a nuclear-free world
fade from my mind.''
Like President Reagan, President Obama is aiming high with
his commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. But as I
read it, the President's nuclear posture and the New START
Treaty are deeply rooted in a common-sense strategy that will
enhance our national security by protecting us from the most
urgent nuclear dangers.
So before calling on our distinguished panel of witnesses,
let me recognize my friend, the ranking member, the
distinguished gentleman from California, Mr. McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to
extend a warm welcome back to our witnesses.
Before I begin, I want to express my deep condolences to
the Polish people. Saturday's tragedy leaves us at a loss for
words. Many of us here had met with President Kaczynski in
previous trips to Warsaw as well as the distinguished civilian
and military leaders who also perished in this unfortunate
accident. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families,
loved ones, at this time.
Today's hearing focuses on the Administration's changes to
U.S. nuclear policy and posture. We have seen much fanfare
accompany the release of the new Nuclear Posture Review, the
President's trip to Prague to sign a New START Treaty, and the
Nuclear Security Summit held earlier this week.
I commend the President's focus on these important nuclear
security issues. However, my objective today is to understand
how the policy has changed and why, as well as the consequences
and implications.
Along these lines, I would like to highlight my primary
concerns. First, the NPR appears to change our nation's
longstanding policy of ``calculated ambiguity.'' It adopts a
``Negative Security Assurance'' (NSA) policy, whereby non-
nuclear weapons states that aren't proliferating are assured
that the U.S. would never threaten the use of nuclear weapons
against them, even if the U.S. or our allies are threatened
with biological or chemical weapons.
At the same time, the NPR includes a caveat that
adjustments could be made if conditions change. Furthermore,
the NPR signals a desire to pursue a universal ``sole purpose''
policy by which the threat of nuclear use to deter a
devastating chemical or biological attack would be taken
entirely off the table.
Why embrace such muddled wording that sends mixed signals
to both our allies and adversaries? I hope our witnesses will
discuss why this policy change was made and the national
security benefits they believe it provides.
I worry that these changes to U.S. declaratory policy,
combined with the explicit signaling of what is yet to come,
will weaken our deterrence rather than strengthen it.
Second, the NPR indicates the President has already
``directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S.
nuclear weapons below New START levels.'' What would be the
strategic rationale for such reductions?
Without further assessments of the threat and understanding
of our military commanders' requirements, much less seeing how
the implementation of START goes, it would seem premature to
rush into deeper cuts.
We have been told repeatedly that START would permit
further development and deployment of U.S. missile defenses in
Europe and the U.S. But Russian leaders suggest such
deployments could lead to their withdrawal from the treaty.
How are these differing expectations being resolved,
especially when some are suggesting that missile defense and
conventional forces be included in the next round of
negotiations? I am concerned that our eagerness to do more arms
control may further cost us important conventional
capabilities. I hope our witnesses can assure us that this is
not the case.
Third, any decision to reduce our nuclear stockpile,
including those weapons we maintain in storage, should not be
made unless we have high confidence that the remaining arsenal
is highly reliable. This requires a sustained, long-term
investment to modernize our aging stockpile and infrastructure,
not just a one-year increase of funds.
Furthermore, how do we attract and retain top scientists
and engineers to an enterprise that is shrinking and, as the
NPR states, explicitly prohibits the development of new nuclear
warheads? General Chilton, as you told the committee last year,
our nuclear weapons are ``chemistry experiments on the shelf.''
What young, bright engineer wants to work on that? How does
the Administration propose to maintain required technical
competencies in an environment that does not allow them to be
exercised from start to finish?
Lastly, the NPR rightly places emphasis on addressing the
threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation. The
President has announced an intentional effort to secure all
vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years,
yet we have not seen any plans for how this would be
accomplished.
But there is another aspect to nonproliferation--U.S.
assurance to our over 30 allies and friends who have agreed not
to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for U.S. nuclear
guarantees. Will our policy changes, reductions, and signaling
lead to less confidence in our nuclear deterrent and, perhaps,
drive some of our allies and friends to consider developing
their own?
Fundamentally, the President appears to believe that U.S.
nuclear reductions will restore our moral leadership to
encourage others to do the same. However, it assumes regimes
like Iran and North Korea will curb their nuclear ambitions,
Pakistan and India will reduce their nuclear arms, and Russia
and China will be more inclined to support tough sanctions
against Iran, all as a result of U.S. stockpile reductions.
However, none of these have yet to be seen.
I would like to thank our witnesses again for being with us
today and for their dedication and service. And Mr. Chairman, I
would like to have my full statement included in the record,
please.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Without objection the entire statement will
be so ordered. Thank you, Mr. McKeon.
The order of testimony will be, as we face the witnesses
from left to right, Secretary Miller, General Chilton,
Secretary D'Agostino and finally then we are saving the best
for last, Secretary Tauscher. We thank each of you for
appearing before us today, and we have your written statements
and each will be incorporated for the record without objection.
So, Secretary Miller, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Dr. Miller. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join my
esteemed colleagues in discussing U.S. nuclear policy and
capabilities.
I will focus my remarks today on the recently completed
and, as you know, congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture
Review, or NPR. The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for
implementing the President's Prague agenda for reducing the
role and numbers of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of
a world free of nuclear weapons.
Because this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not
in our lifetimes, the NPR outlines specific steps needed to
sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as
long as nuclear weapons exist.
In the fiscal year 2011 budget requests from both the
Departments of Defense and Energy are the first installments in
this long-term effort.
As the chairman noted, the 2010 NPR identifies the most
urgent nuclear dangers today as arising from proliferation and
the potential for nuclear terrorism, and it outlines a
comprehensive approach for dealing with these challenges that
includes policy initiatives and increased investments in a
number of areas.
More broadly, the NPR identifies five key areas and five
objectives for U.S. nuclear policy and posture. First, and as I
noted, the top priority is preventing nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism.
Second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in our
national security strategy, and I will say more about that in
particular.
Third, maintaining strategic deterrents and stability at
reduced force levels.
Fourth, strengthening regional deterrents and reassuring
U.S. allies and partners and fifth, sustaining the safe, secure
and effective nuclear arsenal.
Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I
won't summarize all of its conclusions; focus my remarks
instead on declaratory policy and force structure issues. The
2010 NPR aims to make clear the benefits to other nations of
complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
potential consequences of not doing so.
It strengthens the existing U.S. nuclear--sorry, excuse
me--it strengthens the existing U.S. Negative Security
Assurance associated with the NPT and states, ``The United
States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in
compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.''
At the same time, the NPR does reflect continued concerns
about chemical and biological weapons, or CBW, and it affirms
that
``. . . any state eligible for this assurance that uses
chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its
allies or partners would face the prospect of a devastating
conventional military response--and that individuals
responsible for that attack, whether national leaders or
military commanders, will be held fully accountable.''
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons in
particular, and the rapid pace of biotechnology development,
the NPR notes that the United States reserves the right to make
any future adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by
the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons threat
and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.
This clarified Negative Security Assurance does not apply
to nuclear weapon states such as Russia or China, nor does it
apply to states not in compliance with their nuclear
nonproliferation obligations, such as Iran and North Korea.
For these states, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear
weapons still play a role in deterring not only nuclear attack,
but also conventional or CBW attack against the United States
or partners and allies. And as Secretary Gates noted recently,
for Iran and North Korea, all options are on the table.
Finally, to address the potential nexus of terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the NPR renews the ``. . .
U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state terrorist
group or other non-state actor that supports or enables
terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction,
whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or
safe haven for such efforts.''
This statement and the clarification of the U.S. Negative
Security Assurance associated with the NPT are both reflections
of the fact that the most urgent threats today are nuclear
proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
At the same time, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
U.S. must retain the safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal to deter an attack on the United States and our allies.
Therefore, one of the first tasks of the NPR, was continued
throughout the review, was to find positions for the New START
negotiations.
The Department of Defense (DOD)-led NPR team reached the
following conclusions about U.S. strategic nuclear force
structure. First, the U.S. should retain a nuclear triad of
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and dual-capable heavy bombers under
New START, and the fiscal 2011 budget request includes funding
for each leg of the triad.
Second, all U.S. ICBMs should be ``de-Multiple
Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)ed'' to a single
warhead each in order to reinforce strategic stability. And
third, an ability to upload non-deployed nuclear weapons on
delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise.
The Administration intends to provide additional details
for strategic forces under New START in a report required by
Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
2010. This report will include a 10-year estimate of budgetary
requirements for sustaining delivery platforms, the nuclear
weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons complex.
My statement deals with questions of non-strategic nuclear
weapons as well as long-range strike capabilities, and I would
like to ask that that full statement be submitted for the
record. And then, in order to make more time for questions of
the committee, I would like to just conclude by saying the
following.
And that is that a key premise of the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review was that an effective national strategy for reducing
nuclear dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent will
require support from a long succession of U.S. administrations
and Congresses.
Laying the groundwork for sustainable bipartisan consensus
has been and remains a central purpose of this NPR. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 58.]
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
General Chilton, please.
STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Chilton. Thank you, Chairman Skelton and Ranking
Member McKeon and members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to be before you today and to testify on these two
very important topics.
The United States Strategic Command was closely consulted
throughout the development of the Nuclear Posture Review and
during negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,
and I look forward to discussing them with you.
I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the
extraordinary work the Command performed in support of all
these efforts. We have an amazing team in Omaha and their
diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our
ability to deliver global security for America.
The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global
security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely,
different from the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes
the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers,
through the twin prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The
NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to
both sustain and strengthen USSTRATCOM's ability to conduct our
deterrence missions.
Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a
number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including
strengthening our nuclear command and control structure;
continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery
systems; maintaining a safe, secure and effective stockpile;
and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security Administration's
aging infrastructure.
America's triad of diverse and complementary delivery
systems provides unique synergies that make our deterrent
highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of
potential technological and geopolitical developments.
The NPR further endorses DOD efforts to explore future
triad systems, specifically, to extend the Minuteman III ICBM
through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a
follow-on land-based deterrent to replace the Ohio-class SSBN
at the existing ships' end of life, and to study future long-
range bomber capabilities. It also supports moving forward with
full-rate production for the W76-1 warhead for our submarine
leg of the triad. Full-scope--that is, nuclear and non-
nuclear--life extension of the B61 bomb to sustain its
strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles, and
initiating studies to develop life extension options for the
W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of also adapting
the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and,
thereby, reducing the number of warhead types.
Additionally the NPR and the President's budget recognize
the need to improve the nation's nuclear infrastructure and
address the challenges of human capital recruitment,
development, and sustainment. These investments are required in
order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while
sustaining the credibility of our nuclear weapons, which is
fundamental to effective deterrence.
Investments that revitalize NNSA's aging infrastructure and
intellectual capital strengthen our security with the
facilities and people needed to address technological
surprises, geopolitical change, and a range of cutting edge
national security challenges. The Administration's request for
a 13 percent increase in NNSA's funding for fiscal year 2011 is
an important first step in this process.
In regard to New START, the nuclear enterprise remains,
today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S.
deterrent strategy and defense posture. As the combatant
command responsible for executing strategic deterrence
operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for
nuclear capabilities, we are keenly aware of how force posture
and readiness changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and
overall strategic stability.
The New START agreement, in my view, retains the military
flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of
the treaty.
In support of the New START negotiations effort, U.S.
Strategic Command analyzed the required nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet current
guidance and provided options for consideration by the
Department.
This rigorous approach, rooted in both deterrent strategy
and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports
both the agreed-upon reductions in New START and
recommendations in the NPR.
Every day, U.S. Strategic Command remains focused on
providing the President and future presidents with the options
and flexibility needed to deter and respond to threats to our
nation and its allies. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure,
and effective.
Our forces are trained and ready, and the command is
faithfully and fully carrying out its missions each and every
day. I am confident that the NPR and New START outline an
approach that continues to enable the men and women of U.S.
Strategic Command to deliver global security for America today
and in the future.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
committee, and I look forward to your questions and future
discussions.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
The Chairman. General, thank you so much.
Secretary D'Agostino, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members
of the committee. I am very pleased to appear before you today
with General Chilton, the Honorable Ellen Tauscher and Dr. Jim
Miller to talk about the Nuclear Posture Review. I will focus
my remarks on the Department of Energy's equities in the
Nuclear Posture Review.
As you know, or as you may not know, that NNSA has been
actively engaged in the formulation of the NPR and we are
pleased, along with General Chilton, to have had the
opportunity to contribute significantly to the document.
The NNSA is actively engaged in direct support of the first
NPR objective: preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. The most important steps we can take to keep
terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear
device or a radiological ``dirty bomb,'' is to prevent them
from acquiring the nuclear materials or radiological materials
themselves.
This is not a new job to the NNSA. We have led this effort
for several years, and now we are accelerating and broadening
the scope of these efforts.
Current NNSA programs include securing nuclear materials,
including the most vulnerable nuclear materials, worldwide in
four years; disposing of excess U.S. and international fissile
materials; strengthening the international safeguard systems by
developing new safeguards technologies, expertise, policies,
concepts, and partnerships; developing an active nuclear and
radiological security dialogue and cooperation with key
domestic and international partners; and developing highly
sensitive and wide-area nuclear detection technologies.
NNSA programs are supporting the President's arms control
and nonproliferation agenda by using these technical
capabilities within the Nuclear Security Enterprise to
demonstrate the technical ability to support the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty and any follow-on arms control requirements.
The Department of Energy and NNSA are also actively engaged
in direct support of the fifth NPR objective, ``sustaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.'' For more than 65
years, our program has been able to do just that: assure the
nation that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and
effective in meeting the nuclear deterrent needs of the United
States.
The need to maintain the nuclear stockpile without nuclear
testing has been a national policy for close to 20 years, and
we will continue to do that into the future, consistent with
the key principles included in the NPR.
To that end, the United States will not conduct underground
nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads.
However, we will study all options for ensuring the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our nuclear warheads, and we
will do so on a case-by-case basis.
Applying these principles, the NNSA will fully fund the
ongoing Life Extension Program for the W76 submarine-based
warhead for completion in the year 2017 and the full-scope life
extension study for the B61 bomb to ensure first production
begins in 2017. And, as General Chilton also mentioned,
participate with the Nuclear Weapons Council on a study of life
extension options and approaches for the W78 ICBM warhead.
The NPR also concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize
the aging infrastructure and to renew our human capital, the
critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering
experts who carry out our stockpile management work and support
other missions.
To that end, the NNSA will strengthen the Science,
Technology and Engineering base needed for conducting weapon
system life extensions, weapons surety, certification without
nuclear testing, and providing annual stockpile weapons
surveillance.
NNSA will also fund two key facility projects, the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project at
Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year-
old CMR facility by 2021 and a Uranium Processing Facility at
the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on line for
production operations by the year 2021.
Responsible stockpile management requires not only the
supporting infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce
with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear
deterrent and to support the President's nuclear security
agenda.
The NPR noted the importance of recruiting and retaining
the human capital needed in NNSA for nuclear security mission.
In order to succeed in our mission, we need to be able to
recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security
professionals, because our highly specialized workforce is,
indeed, our greatest asset.
The President has now clearly outlined the importance of
nuclear issues for our national security and the importance of
keeping the U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective
for the future.
And the Administration's commitment to a clear and long-
term plan for managing the stockpile and comprehensive nuclear
security agenda ensures that the scientists and engineers of
tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in challenging
research and development activities.
I would also want to share with the committee a statement
from our national laboratory directors that provides their
views on the Nuclear Posture Review. The directors universally
state that ``We believe the approach outlined in the NPR, which
excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration
of the full range of life extension options, provides the
necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile
into the future with an acceptable level of risk.''
``We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the
recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical
infrastructure--comprised of nuclear security laboratories and
a complex of supporting facilities--and a highly capable
workforce.''
Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide that statement for
the record so the unanimity of support for the NPR is fully
understood and is clear.
This Nuclear Posture Review is an important step toward
adopting a 21st century approach to nuclear weapons and a
broader array of nuclear security issues. This path forward
will require a long term commitment from administrations and
from future Congresses to provide the support and resources
necessary to sustain our deterrent.
As a committee directed in 2010 language, we have
formulated, and will soon submit to the Congress, a Stockpile
Management Plan that will describe how the NNSA and the
Department of Defense will work together to implement the
policy strategy and force structure included in the NPR.
With the committee's endorsement, the Nuclear Security
Enterprise will have the science, technology and engineering
expertise to carry out the full range of nuclear security
missions, not just managing the stockpile but using those
capabilities to address that full spectrum of national security
efforts required.
Secretary Chu recently stated that ``the Department of
Energy must discover and deliver the solutions to advance our
national priorities.'' The NNSA and the Nuclear Security
Enterprise are poised to provide those solutions.
Thank you, Mr Chairman. I am pleased to respond to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary D'Agostino can be
found in the Appendix on page 69.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Secretary D'Agostino. Without
objection, the laboratory report to which you referred will be
made part of our record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 85.]
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Secretary Tauscher, we welcome you back, and
we look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, distinguished members of the
House Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the State Department's role in protecting the United
States and our allies from today's most pressing threats.
I am honored to appear today with my friends and
colleagues, Tom D'Agostino from the Department of Energy, Dr.
Jim Miller from the Department of Defense, and General Chilton.
Before I begin, let me thank you all for your service, and
I want you to know how much I miss serving on this committee.
It is an honor, however, to be part of the Obama Administration
and to work with President Obama and Secretary Clinton to
implement our arms control and nonproliferation agenda.
As you know, we have an ambitious agenda to reduce the role
and numbers of nuclear weapons to make the United States more
secure and the world more stable. The President set forth
several goals in his speech in Prague last year; three of which
have been advanced in just the last few days.
First, he wanted a new treaty that would make verifiable
and mutual cuts in the United States' and Russia's nuclear
arsenals. Second, he vowed to reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in our security posture. And third, he set a goal of
securing all vulnerable nuclear material within the next four
years.
At the same time, the President reaffirmed our commitment
to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent to
protect the United States and our allies so long as nuclear
weapons exist.
Mr. Chairman, the State Department, working with our
friends at the Department of Energy and Defense, and with the
rest of the inter-agency team and the Congress, are fully
engaged in implementing the President's agenda.
Last week, the Administration released a report of its
year-long Nuclear Posture Review. This review constitutes a
clear break from past reviews, both in terms of process and
scope. The Department of Defense led the review but, for the
first time, the inter-agency, including the Department of
State, fully participated in discussing the issues and making
recommendations to the President.
For the first time, the Nuclear Posture Review is an
unclassified document. The Obama Administration took a broad
whole-of-government approach to addressing the United States'
nuclear policy and identifying concrete steps to enhance our
national security.
Finally, last Thursday, President Obama traveled to Prague
to sign the New START Treaty. I spent much of March at the
table in Geneva and helped conclude the agreement.
The New START Treaty will improve United States and
international security by reducing and limiting U.S. and
Russian strategic nuclear forces, promoting strategic stability
by ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and
Russian nuclear strategic forces over the life of the treaty,
and advancing our nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
The treaty sets meaningful lower limits on deployed
strategic warheads and their delivery vehicles and launchers--
limits that the Department of Defense validated through
rigorous analysis in the early months of the Nuclear Posture
Review. The treaty's verification regime will provide each side
with confidence that the other is upholding its obligations.
The treaty gives our military the flexibility to structure,
deploy, and maintain our forces in ways that best meet our
national security interest. And, perhaps most importantly, the
treaty does not contain any constraints on testing,
development, or deployment of current or planned United States
missile defense programs, or current or planned United States
long-range conventional strike capabilities.
Let me make one final point. Under the new treaty, the
United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective strategic nuclear force to protect ourselves, our
allies, and our partners.
The United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear
forces because the threat environment has changed. Today's most
pressing nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional
countries seeking nuclear weapons, not the risk of a large-
scale nuclear attack, as during the Cold War.
The conclusions of our recent Nuclear Posture Review
reflect that reality. The NPR directs us to preserve the
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent for as long as it is
required, reduce the potential for conflict, enhance strategic
stability worldwide, and strengthen the nonproliferation
regime.
The NPR outlines a new approach that will ensure that our
defenses and diplomacy are geared toward those objectives. Our
updated Negative Security Assurance reinforces the President's
objectives of reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons
by making it clear that the United States will not use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation
obligations.
That is why we call it the NSA, because it is a very long
bite of an explanation of who they are. The purpose of this
change is to emphasize to non-nuclear states the security
benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and their nuclear nonproliferation
objectives.
Some have suggested this might lead such states to be less
fearful of consequences of using chemical or biological
weapons. Nothing could be further from the truth. Let me be
clear. No one should doubt the resolve and conventional
military capabilities of the United States to respond to such
aggression with devastating effect and to hold accountable
those responsible.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in
May is a critical opportunity to renew and revitalize all three
pillars of the treaty: nonproliferation, disarmament, and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of
the nuclear nonproliferation regime and an essential foundation
for progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament. All
nations must recognize that the nonproliferation regime cannot
survive if violators are allowed to act with impunity.
Along with our international partners, the United States is
pursuing diplomatic efforts to convince Iran and North Korea to
resolve the world community's concerns about their nuclear
programs, and to encourage them to cooperate in addressing all
outstanding questions about those programs.
We are working to build international consensus for steps
that will convince Iran's leaders to change course, including
new United Nations Security Council sanctions that will further
clarify their choice of upholding the NPT and safeguard
obligations, or facing increasing isolation and painful
consequences.
With respect to North Korea, we continue to send a message
that simply returning to the negotiating table is not enough.
Pyongyang must move toward complete and verifiable
denuclearization through irreversible steps if it wants a
normalized, sanctions-free relationship with the United States.
These steps send a clear message about this
Administration's priorities and resolve. Our commitment to
defend our national security interests and our allies and
partners in Europe, the Pacific and elsewhere has never been
stronger. In this regard, the NPR emphasizes close cooperation
with our allies around the world and maintains our firm
commitment to mutual security.
We will work with our partners to reinforce regional
security architectures such as missile defenses and other
conventional military capabilities. And I want to repeat what I
said earlier. The United States will continue to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for ourselves and
our allies so long as these weapons exist anywhere in the
world.
Last year, President Obama said he would seek the peace and
security of a world without nuclear weapons. He was also very
clear that it might not happen in his lifetime. The standards
for a world without nuclear weapons are very high, but we are
taking concrete steps in that direction which make us stronger,
safer, and more secure.
That is why we are working to halt nuclear proliferation,
to gain greater transparency into the programs and capabilities
of key countries of concern and to create verification methods
and technologies capable of detecting violations.
In order to reduce the risk of proliferation, we will
establish effective and internationally supported mechanisms to
address noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations.
Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here today. I am happy
to answer any questions that you have, and I look forward to
working with the committee on your bill. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found
in the Appendix on page 75.]
The Chairman. Certainly, thank you for your testimony and
your appearance.
General Chilton, under the Nuclear Posture Review, can we,
with certainty, say that America is safer because of it?
General Chilton. Mr. Chairman, what I can say with
certainty is that the United States Strategic Command, under
the construct of both the Nuclear Posture Review and the START
Treaty, is able to fully execute the missions assigned to this
command to provide adequate strategic deterrence for the United
States of America. Of that I am absolutely convinced. And so in
that respect we are secure.
And if I could add, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Please.
General Chilton. There is a particularly important point
that I think will strengthen us for the future under the NPR.
It is something that I have advocated for in the past, and that
is the funding and the commitment to funding and the focus on
improving the nuclear enterprise under the NNSA.
This will truly strengthen the deterrent, not only for
today but for 20, 30, 40 years from now. And the NPR's
endorsement of that, I think, is one of the most important
aspects of that for strengthening our deterrence posture for
the future.
The Chairman. Secretary Miller, the Administration rejected
the notion that deterring a nuclear attack is the sole purpose
for our nuclear stockpile. Why was that?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, the Posture Review closely
considered the option of establishing deterrence of nuclear
attack as the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, and
concluded that the conditions for making such a statement,
making such a declaratory policy, don't exist today.
Nuclear weapons continue to play an important role in
deterring non-nuclear attack, including conventional or
chemical-biological attack arising from a nuclear weapons
state.
So, Mr. Chairman, the NPR set forth an objective of trying
to establish conditions over a period of time that would make
it safe for the United States and, indeed, for others to
establish a doctrine and policy in which the sole purpose of
nuclear weapons would be to deter other nuclear weapons. We saw
clearly that those conditions did not exist today.
The Chairman. Secretary Tauscher, are there any constraints
of any kind on missile defenses within the New START Treaty?
Secretary Tauscher. No, sir. There are no constraints of
any kind in the New START Treaty.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for your testimony. It seems that much of the
Administration's policy is rooted in the view that if America
leads in reducing its nuclear arms, others will follow. What
evidence, if any, do any of you have that the moral leadership
argument actually impacts the behavior of countries we are
trying to change, such as Iran and North Korea?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the change and clarification of
declaratory policy is intended to affect more than one
audience. One is specifically those states that have not lived
up to their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
including, in particular, Iran and North Korea.
A second audience is the set of states that have lived up
to their obligations and expect that, in exchange for that,
that they would not be held subject to nuclear threats. In
making the changes that were made in our declaratory policy,
the U.S. has really resolved a longstanding contradiction in
our policy and updated it to correspond with the 21st century
environment.
The contradiction was between a Negative Security Assurance
that the United States first issued in 1978, reissued again in
2002 and several times in between, that stated that the United
States would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states, aside from states that were allied with a nuclear
weapons state.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that second part of
that previous Negative Security Assurance was no longer
relevant, so that was removed from the Negative Security
Assurance. And with the increased concerns about nuclear
nonproliferation and states that are--such as Iran and North
Korea--that are not meeting their obligations, in its place was
a statement that the U.S. would not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against those in compliance with their
nonproliferation obligations.
So we intend to affect the calculations of those states,
Iran and North Korea. We also intend to affect the calculations
of those states that are currently compliant but that might in
future consider proliferation. And to have them understand that
there are benefits to remaining non-nuclear and that there are
costs to going nuclear.
Mr. McKeon. Any evidence that moral leadership argument
actually impacts their decisions?
Dr. Miller. A number of states party to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty have made clear in previous review
conferences that the United States posture, sometimes called
deliberate ambiguity, but as I--or calculated ambiguity, but
also including a contradiction in a sense, makes it more
difficult for them to agree to the types of steps that the
United States has proposed to strengthen the Treaty--steps that
would include having the Additional Protocol applied to all
states that have nuclear energy capability. And so I think that
there is reasonable evidence that for those states that we need
support from for strengthening the treaty, for those states
that we need support from for ensuring compliance, that U.S.
leadership is important. They have said so many times in the
past.
Mr. McKeon. Okay. I hope that is the case. The NPR appears
to deliver a muddled message and sends mixed signals to both
the allies and adversaries. Why did the Administration deem it
necessary to change our nation's longstanding policy of
calculated ambiguity? What is the national security benefit of,
and what do we gain by making this policy change?
Secretary Tauscher. I think part of the reason that, and
what we want to make clear, Mr. McKeon, is that when we looked
at both the changing security environment and history, a number
of elements have significantly changed. The negative assurance
policy was developed partly because of the Warsaw Pact, which
doesn't exist any longer.
And it is there to make clear to non-nuclear weapons states
that are in compliance with the NPT that the United States
specifically, and as we work with Russia and the New START
Treaty, as the largest holders of nuclear weapons we have,
obviously, we project the biggest threat to other folks, and
that we wanted to make clear that we were not going to use our
nuclear weapons in a certain number of cases and that we value
people's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
significantly.
We want to get benefits from our adherence to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and we want other countries to maintain
their agreement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We, frankly,
want universal application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
So the decision was made to clarify the Negative Security
Assurance to make clear that non-nuclear weapon states, in
compliance with their NPT obligations, we were not going to use
nuclear weapons against them.
But we do have caveats, and one of them is about BW and CW,
biological and chemical weapons. But what it also does, and
that is why Negative Security Assurance is an interesting way
of calling what this is, it negates and exempts many, many
countries around the world.
At the same time, it makes very clear that all the nuclear
weapons states and countries not in compliance with the NPT,
specifically countries like North Korea and Iran, are not
exempt. So it is a way to satisfy countries that their
adherence to the NPT, which we believe is the cornerstone of
the nonproliferation regime and needs to be strengthened--and
those commitments need to be strengthened--but that is what we
are harkening to.
And secondly, countries not in compliance will pay a price,
and they pay the price of not being on the list of those
countries that are exempt, and it causes us to have a different
point of view about them. And those countries are,
specifically, North Korea and Iran.
Mr. McKeon. Am I correct to understand the Administration
will pursue a universal sole purpose policy where nuclear
weapons are only used to deter nuclear weapons? Does this mean
that the U.S. would take the threat of nuclear use to deter its
devastating biological or chemical attack entirely off the
table? Why is it in our national security interest to send such
a signal?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the NPR set an objective of setting
conditions so that the United States and, indeed, others, could
over time move to a posture where the sole purpose of nuclear
weapons is to deter nuclear use by others. It is stated
clearly, and was a result of detailed analysis and extensive
discussion, clearly, that these conditions do not exist today.
And as you have suggested, one of the big reasons that they
don't exist today is that we have nuclear weapons states that
have significant conventional and the potential, at least, for
chemical and biological capabilities. And both we and our
allies believe that sustaining the nuclear deterrent to cope
with these challenges is necessary at this time.
Mr. McKeon. I guess we are just going to have a difference
on that. It seems to me that deterrence should be the maximum
that you can provide; that no matter what they attack us with,
we will hit with our maximum use. A devastating chemical or
biological attack that we say ``we will just respond with non-
nuclear weapons,'' it just seems that we are taking a lot off
the table but I, you know, I understand that we have a
difference here.
Secretary Tauscher. Mr. McKeon, we have the largest nuclear
force matching the Russians. And we have the most superior
military in the world and the best conventional weapons in the
world.
Mr. McKeon. And we also have nuclear, and why we would take
that off the table if they only hit us with chemical or
biological, it just seems that, like I say, I think that is
something we are just going to have a difference of opinion on.
Dr. Miller. Sir, if I could add briefly, deterrence is a
combination of capability and credibility. And with respect to
non-nuclear weapons states, this NPR states explicitly that any
use of chemical or biological weapons would result in a
devastating conventional response and that the leaders,
including political leaders and military commanders, would be
held fully accountable.
That is a shift from calculated ambiguity. It is a very
direct statement and, as Under Secretary Tauscher indicated,
given the conventional military power of the United States, it
is not only credible but it has a tremendous amount of
capability behind it.
Mr. McKeon. But less capability than we have if we do not
use nuclear.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Spratt.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you all for your testimony, but more than
that, for what you have accomplished. I think it is monumental.
It is a step towards something we have been seeking for a long,
long time.
CTBT has been pending for years. It was submitted for
ratification, and the Senate didn't pass the test. My notes
here indicate that this Comprehensive Test Ban will be
resubmitted for ratification with additions. What are the
additions to the CTBT?
Secretary Tauscher. Right now the President is preparing
the START package to go to the Senate, and the first priority
of the Administration is to get the START Treaty ratified. The
advice and consent of the Senate is enormously important. It is
a supermajority needed to get START ratified.
As Vice President Biden, who is the head of the effort to
get the CTBT ratified has said, START goes first, and then we
will look at CTBT. Obviously, we are very much helped by the
Nuclear Posture Review and the fact that the Administration has
spent so much time making this debate a very public debate, one
that is informing the American people and our allies.
So what is important is that we get the START Treaty put
forward first. On whether we have additions to CTBT or not, we
will have to see as we look at the submission. But as Vice
President Biden has said, CTBT will not be submitted to the
Senate until it can pass, and that is an environment that we
are working on every day.
Mr. Spratt. It is also mentioned in the materials and in
your testimony of a nuclear materials cutoff. Is that treaty
drawn? Do we have the text of that treaty? That is an
interesting concept.
Secretary Tauscher. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
last May agreed in a very historic way for a program of work to
look at, begin negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty. There is one country, however, that is blocking the
going forward of the program of work in the Conference of
Disarmament.
We are all working hard to convince that country that this
is just the beginning of negotiations and that they should go
with what the majority has said under consensus to go forward
and begin negotiations, and not stand in the way of that. But
so far our efforts have been unsuccessful.
But once the FMCT, Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty begins
negotiations, which we believe will be a long, multi-year
process, eventually that will have to be ratified by the
Senate.
Mr. Spratt. So these things are not necessarily
interdependent. They can stand on their own?
Secretary Tauscher. Yes.
Mr. Spratt. I have been very much concerned about tactical
nuclear weapons and whether or not as we dealt with these large
systems, we have shown enough attention to the smaller systems
which, really, could be dangerous if the wrong people or
terrorists got their hands upon them. What do these agreements
do for effective tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons?
Jim.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Spratt, what we have said is that, after
ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, the
Administration would like to engage with Russian follow-on,
bilateral discussions that are aimed at addressing not just
strategic weapons but strategic and non-strategic weapons,
these tactical nuclear weapons and also deployed and non-
deployed weapons.
We would like to get that on the other side of ratification
and entry into force of New START and the President has asked
us to begin to develop potential negotiating positions and
objectives for that, including considerations of what are the
likely future requirements for deterrence, what are likely
postures of Russia and also we will begin a consultation with
allies to address that problem.
We also have suggested that we intend to continue strategic
stability discussions and expand them with Russia. And one of
the issues we would like to discuss in those is the question of
whether Russia might move back further into the interior of the
country its tactical nuclear weapons and ensure they are as
secure as possible.
Mr. Spratt. One final question. There is a substantial
increase in nonproliferation in this year's budget request. I
think it is $550 million. Could you tell us quickly or briefly
what these additional funds will go for?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Spratt, these funds were largely
focused on security work, material security work overseas.
There is a significant amount of work that we are involved in
converting research reactors from Highly Enriched Uranium
(HEU)to Low-Enriched Uranium. So a significant portion of those
funds will go towards agreements and discussions that we are
already looking at to make that happen.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all for your service. I note that
the Posture Review, specifically, states that we are going to
retain the triad. Relative to that, Dr. Miller, I note that the
Chinese have developed the capability of taking out a
satellite, and we can take out a ballistic missile.
This new deep strike bomber will fly considerably lower
than a satellite and considerably slower than a ballistic
missile. I know that they will be stealthy, but their radar
cross section area is not zero, and radars are being improved.
Are you sure that, in the development of this new bomber,
that the juice will be worth the squeezing, or is the jury
still out on specifically what we will do?
Dr. Miller. Sir, as a follow-on to both the Nuclear Posture
Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department is
currently looking at the mix of long range strike capabilities
that the military will need for the coming decade or two.
Included in that mix is a consideration of a future
penetrating bomber. Also included is an alternative standoff
bomber, the mix of cruise missiles, both air-launched and sea-
launched, for conventional capabilities and, finally, the
supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and
electronic warfare capabilities that are required as well.
We are also looking in that study at the appropriate scale
of any conventional Prompt Global Strike capability, which
could be either in the form of an ICBM or SLBM with a
conventional warhead, which does raise some stability
considerations, and/or Hypersonic Glide Vehicle, which is an
alternative approach, so it would have a very different profile
from the standard ballistic missile.
The Department is looking at those issues now and will
submit its recommendations as part of the fiscal year 2012
budget request.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
General Chilton, the location of our missile silos, I
gather, is pretty generally known?
General Chilton. I would suspect so.
Mr. Bartlett. Okay. It is also true, I believe, that they
were developed in an era where there was not much precision on
the part of nuclear weapons and that it was unlikely that there
would be a direct hit. They, in fact, are not really hardened,
are they, against a nuclear attack?
General Chilton. Well, they are hardened against a nuclear
attack, but as you point out, Mr. Bartlett, as certain
countries have increased their accuracy on some of their
delivery platforms, they put them more at risk than they were
in the past.
Mr. Bartlett. That, I think, is increasingly true, which
means that you either use them or you lose them. Doesn't this
markedly increase the probability of an exchange? And shouldn't
we be moving to something that is not vulnerable, like mobile
missiles?
General Chilton. Actually, the posture that we have our
ballistic missiles in, our land-based ballistic missiles in
today, is quite stabilizing because it makes the calculus of a
potential adversary much more difficult and much less likely
for them to be incentivized for a first strike.
Mr. Bartlett. But if we know, sir that----
General Chilton. It would be because a large number of----
Mr. Bartlett [continuing]. If we could take them out,
doesn't that mean that we have an incentive to use them
quickly, or we are going to lose them?
General Chilton. We have----
Mr. Bartlett. To me it does.
General Chilton [continuing]. Because of the large amount
of weapons that they would have to commit against this, it
disincentivized that attack. And also, because of the ability
to launch out from under attack and the uncertainty that exists
because of that, they are an essential part of the deterrent
today.
I would comment though, that your point on as we look
forward to the replacement for the Minuteman III someday post-
2030, that one of the things we ought to consider in that is
whether or not the follow-on would be more survivable than the
current force structure that we have today.
That is certainly the direction that the Russians went in
with their land-based mobile missiles. So I would agree that it
is something we need to consider as we look at the follow-on to
the Minuteman III.
Mr. Bartlett. Secretary Tauscher, I note that the new
posture report talks about counting actual missiles rather than
launchers, which is a big move forward because, in the past, we
counted only launchers. As you know, the Soviets and the
Russians now have a cold-launch capability where they can
launch more than one weapon from a single launcher.
We burn up our launchers. So if you count launchers, you
are equal in launchers. They would be superior in delivery
capability. I am pleased that this new regime now equalizes
that. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Spratt [presiding]. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. Ms.
Tauscher, welcome back. General Chilton, I am looking out 10
years, very much concerned about what the effect of the Ohio-
class replacement is going to have on the overall defense
budget.
If the Navy is estimating a ship that is going to cost $7
billion, it is probably going to cost $10 billion, based on the
way things have been going. I am told that one of the driving
factors on the Ohio replacement is that, within the Navy, the
decision was made to build a ship around the D-5 missile. That
the range of the missile is a factor of its width and length
and that, basically, the Navy said we are going to keep the
missile, change the ship.
To what extent has your command looked at options to that?
I was fortunate enough to have a great tour at Kings Bay on
Friday and, again, very professional. Everything was very
impressive, but it reinforced my opinion that the Navy has made
the decision already to build a ship to fit the missile, and
that missile is the D-5.
Have there been any analyses of alternatives to that
decision or are any planned because, again, you know, 2020 is
not that far away when it comes to ships that we have got to
start building in 2018. We have got to start budgeting even
before that.
General Chilton. Thank you, Mr. Taylor, and thanks for
visiting our folks down there at----
Mr. Taylor. Very impressive.
General Chilton [continuing]. Kings Bay. That is really
important for them to be recognized for the great duty they do
for our country, and I am sure they appreciated your visit. We
have been, STRATCOM has been working closely from a
requirements perspective, certainly, with the Navy and with the
Strategic Systems Programs, the office responsible for
developing the designs, maturing those designs for the follow-
on to the current Ohio-class Trident submarine fleet.
And although the follow-on will be able to carry the D-5,
part of the requirements are that it also be able to--
anticipating a life of 40 years--to be able to do something
other than just carry the D-5. And so as part of--and that, in
fact, was part of the initial thought when the Ohio-class was
built. The D-5 didn't exist.
Yet, the Ohio-class was built to accommodate a larger
missile than the Poseidon at the time, fortunately, because
that allowed us then to not have to build a new submarine as we
advanced missile technology to the D-5 level.
The same will be true for the follow-on to Ohio-class.
There will be room for growth and increased performance, either
of a missile beyond the D-5 or for alternative mission sets
that might be put into that platform should they be required.
Mr. Taylor. Well, I guess, to restate my question, is the
decision to stick with the D-5, is that written in stone--or
the closest thing to it within the Pentagon?
General Chilton. Well, I would say, in the current plans
that we are seeing that the Navy has, is to sustain the D-5
through the life of the current Ohio-class and to make it the
initial missile that would be deployed on the follow-on.
But there is a view that we need to design into that
follow-on a capability for some unknown future growth or
capability in the future as we did with the Ohio-class in its
original design. So right now my understanding of the plans is
that the D-5 would be the weapon that would be fielded first on
the replacement.
Mr. Taylor. But going back to my question about, can you
provide for me any sort of analysis of alternatives as to
whether or not it made more economic and national security
sense to build a ship that fits the missile, as opposed to
building a missile that might fit a Virginia-class, which has
been a very successful program, or some variant of a Virginia-
class?
General Chilton. With regard to studies, we certainly can
show you everything that we have done at STRATCOM and what the
Strategic System Program Office (SSP) has done as well, which
is the Office in the Navy that has worked on the design
trades----
Mr. Taylor. Okay.
General Chilton [continuing]. That are still going on. We
would certainly be willing to share that with you.
Mr. Taylor. I would welcome that, hopefully, sooner than
later, sir.
General Chilton. I will take that back to the Navy and talk
to them about it, Mr. Taylor, and we will get that to you.
Mr. Taylor. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Appreciate you all being with us today.
Virtually everybody agrees that an essential condition of
START, of this Nuclear Posture Review, of reassuring our
allies, is making sure that we have a strong, credible
deterrent and a modern, agile infrastructure--and with
infrastructure, I mean people, too.
I mean, if you don't have those things, the rest of this
seems to all fall apart, so I want to pose two questions,
probably for Secretary D'Agostino, but others may want to
comment. The first question is this. Every declared nuclear
power in the world is making new weapons all the time except
us, and probably the undeclared ones are doing the same--are
doing it as well.
France, for example, in 1995, 1996 decided that they saw
this non-testing regime coming. They conducted a series of
tests, specifically for designs that would be more robust and
that would last out in the future. We did no such thing.
Now, I know we have got lots of smart people and we have
got lots of fancy tools, but I have some doubt that we are that
much smarter than every other nuclear power in the world. This
Nuclear Posture Review says no more nuclear weapons--no new
nuclear weapons, a strong preference for refurbishment, and
only as a last resort would we replace any of the nuclear
components.
So my question is, isn't this putting a political agenda
ahead of the science with a certain degree of arrogance, maybe,
that we can do something indefinitely that nobody else can do?
My second question is this.
Paragraph after paragraph in this Nuclear Posture Review
talks about all the Administration is going to do for the
nuclear weapons complex. And there is no doubt funding is
significantly up, particularly as opposed to the last
Administration. Mr. Spratt mentioned a big chunk of it goes to
nonproliferation. But even in the complex, funding is up.
And yet for this year's budget, Y-12, as I understand it,
is about $100 million underfunded. Pantex is $125 million
underfunded, and they are talking about layoffs this year. As I
understand it, cuts in the test site budget, so my question is
why should we believe that this increased commitment to the
nuclear weapons complex is going to last any longer than the
START ratification?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Thornberry, I will start with
your first question and go to the second question. The Nuclear
Posture Review provides, absolutely provides the flexibility we
need to maintain our deterrent. That is the commitment to have
a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
The Nuclear Posture Review also provides for allowing all
options, and I want to reinforce that, all options to be
studied, including replacement options. Because the key is to
go back to just to focus on what Congress authorized last year
is the Stockpile Management Program, which says make sure that
we can maintain our deterrent and drive as much safety and as
much security and as much reliability into the warheads
themselves.
That is very challenging technical work, frankly. It is
also the kind of work that our scientists and engineers relish.
They want that flexibility and the lab directors feel, and
their statement that I mentioned earlier, describes that
capability.
It is a challenge. And it is hard work to do this, and our
scientists, and I have talked to many of them, feel that this
NPR gives them the flexibility to maintain that stockpile out
into the future. This is decades' worth of work that we have
identified in the NPR.
And what our scientists actually want is the understanding
that the Nation cares about the work, knows that it is
important, and that it is sustainable over multiple Congresses
and multiple administrations. And, in fact, that is the balance
that we feel that we appropriately struck here. So our focus is
moving forward consistent with the principles of the Stockpile
Management Program.
On your question on funding, what we typically do, what we
always do in a budget year when we submit a President's budget,
where we know for sure where our allocations need to go on a
site-by-site basis, we allocate those in the budget.
The last remaining category is what we call the
headquarters account. It is resources that will always be spent
out in the field, but because we are waiting for final
adjustments, we haven't allocated them yet to a specific site.
General Harencak is aware of adjustments that he needs to
make, moving of resources into these accounts to make sure that
the sites are appropriately maintained, and he is working with
the sites on that.
And, in fact, that is a key element of our consideration of
our fiscal year 2012 and out-year budgets, because as you know,
sir, we submit our program and budgets in 5-year increments.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, let me just say, I think if you are
going to really convey a commitment to the scientists and
others that playing these games about holding some money back
so that it can be allocated at the last minute to prevent
layoffs, doesn't provide that message. But let me get back to
the lab directors.
I heard what you said. They support the full range of
options. And I appreciate a Nuclear Posture Review is a
political balancing act, but you can't read these words about
no new nuclear warheads, no new nuclear components, strong
preference for refurbishment, and believe that the full range
of options is really there. It looks to me more like words than
real action, but I appreciate the response.
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Thornberry, if I could just
reply. I want to assure you that we don't play games with the
budget. We take it very seriously. And the headquarters account
line is merely to make sure that, when we allocate those
resources, we know they are going to the right spot as a result
of changes. And our focus, of course, is our people.
The one thing I would like to remind is that our key focus
is to focus on the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, on
the Stockpile Management Plan, which clearly outlines the
principles of maintaining safety, security, and reliability. No
new warheads, for new mission capability, no underground
testing, and the ability to put in place a confidence in the
stockpile that the country can actually start reducing the
total numbers of the stockpile. So that is our focus and that
is our plan.
Mr. Spratt. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being before us again today and it is nice to see my friend,
Ms. Tauscher, back and on the successful negotiation on that
START Treaty, so congratulations to you and to all on our
panel.
General Chilton, are you confident that the limitations on
the Russians in the New START Treaty actually can be verified,
and that the verification procedures imposed on the U.S. will
not interfere or jeopardize our operation of our nuclear
forces? And are there any inspection or verification challenges
that aren't addressed in this treaty that would concern you?
General Chilton. Verification is an important part of this
treaty, Ms. Sanchez, as you know, and it is one of the key
elements that I supported for having a treaty, is that we would
sustain some verification capabilities. The part of the
Government that really paid most attention to whether or not
the verifications were adequate or not in support of the
negotiations was the Intelligence Community.
So the Director of National Intelligence was consistently
brought in, his team, to be asked those questions, and I defer
to their expertise along that way on whether or not the
verification measures were adequate.
And my assessment in listening to the discussions along the
way and what has been included in the current verification
protocols in the proposed treaty, I think, will be adequate for
us over the life of the treaty to ensure compliance.
Ms. Sanchez. The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that the
threat of global nuclear war has become more remote, but the
risk of nuclear attack has actually increased, especially in
today's immediate and extreme danger, which is nuclear
terrorism, especially when we look at Al Qaeda and others
trying to gain access to nuclear weapons.
So I would like to ask Secretary Tauscher, how will the NPR
strengthen the President's ability to combat the threat of
nuclear terrorism, and the effects of rogue states in
particular, such as Iran or North Korea, from obtaining and
proliferating this nuclear technology?
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Congresswoman Sanchez. The
President relies on a number of tools in the toolbox to
persuade countries from not acquiring nuclear weapons and for
countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty's
guidelines in the most strictest way. The first is the Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review, which begins in the first week of
May.
And as we state in the Nuclear Posture Review, and as we
stated and both presidents stated when they signed the New
START Treaty, that these commitments that we make, both in the
New START Treaty bilaterally, with the reductions in the very
strong verification regime that we have, and with the Nuclear
Posture Review with the stronger Negative Security Assurance
and the declaratory policy, and the new role and the diminished
roles that the President has called for, what the President is
saying is that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most
important opportunity we have to galvanize the world community.
And for those countries that find themselves in
noncompliance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then they come
under the Negative Security Assurance in the most non-positive
way.
Ms. Sanchez. Mrs. Tauscher, the concern I bring up is
because we read today in the Washington Post, for example, that
Syria has transferred long-range Scud over to Hezbollah, which
is on our terrorist list.
So you know, when we look at that, our inability to really
stop some of this from going on, and the fact that Iran has
already declared, for example, that it wants to obliterate
Israel from the face of the earth. And, you know, North Korea's
posturing, continued posturing with the western world, in
particular with the United States, what real tools do we have
to----
Secretary Tauscher. We have the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
And what is important is, for countries like Syria, where we
have asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
fully investigate some of the allegations and rumors that are
aswirl about Syria, that is another important element where you
need to have a strong verification regime and then strong
inspection regime.
And that is why we have advocated for better funding and
better management of the IAEA. We have a new Director General
there, Dr. Amano. So there are a number of different things,
Congresswoman, that the President relies on.
But once again, what we have to do is stand up very clearly
for what we want to use nuclear weapons for, and make it very
clear that we have the strongest deterrence we have ever had.
That we are investing in the modernization of our stockpile in
a way that doesn't lead people to believe that we are outside
of our commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls on all
nuclear weapons states to disarm. And so we are keeping it very
much in mind with our commitments to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty at the same time that we say that we are going to
maintain our nuclear weapons for as long as there are nuclear
weapons, until we can actually disarm ourselves.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Secretary. And I will just
say to the gentlemen you didn't have time. I was going to ask
you all the same question about this issue of how, you know,
what do we really use? What are the tools we really have? And
of course, you will have different ones than maybe what Mrs.
Tauscher mentioned.
I will submit that question for the record because I would
love to get an answer back from you all. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of
you for being here. I have a great deal of respect for each of
you and, Ms. Tauscher, it is great to see you back again. I am
glad that you are visiting our committee.
Dr. Miller, the President, last May in Newsweek said, ``I
don't take options off the table when it comes to U.S.
security, period.'' Well, the NPR, the Administration's NPR,
clearly takes options off the table.
It provides assurances that the U.S. will not use nuclear
weapons defensively, even if we are attacked by an NPT-
compliant state and even if that attack is by bio or chemical
weapons. So an option is clearly being taken off the table.
When you were asked by Mr. McKeon the issue of why the
Administration didn't adopt the sole purpose doctrine, which
was signaled in the NPT, that maybe the Administration in the
future would like to go there--sole purpose being that a
nuclear weapon's sole purpose being to deter nuclear--you
answered that we did not go all the way to sole purpose because
nuclear weapons play an ``important role in deterring non-
nuclear attacks.''
How do you reconcile that, as your current statement, the
``important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks'' with this
policy? Because I agree with you, I think that they play an
important role in deterring non-nuclear attacks and, by taking
them off the table, you are eliminating that as a deterrent.
How do you reconcile those?
Dr. Miller. Sir, there are two very different cases. The
first is the case of a state possessing nuclear weapons or a
state not in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation
obligations. And in that case, the United States reserves the
right to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in response to
a biological attack or, indeed, as you suggest, to a
conventional or a chemical attack.
This includes nuclear weapons states. It also includes Iran
and North Korea. And, Mr. Turner, if you look at an assessment
of the states with significant WMD capabilities, you will see a
significant overlap between those different varieties of
nuclear, chemical, and biological.
And the assessment of the NPR and of our leadership was
that, where things stand today, the U.S. conventional
capabilities, including with a very clear statement that any
use of weapons of mass destruction would result in individuals,
including leaders and commanders, being held individually
accountable.
And including the statement that any use of WMD by a non-
nuclear weapons state would result in a devastating
conventional military response, the conclusion was that these
clarified and strengthened statements about the nature of the
U.S. response involving conventional capabilities were more
than adequate to deter chemical and biological weapons used by
that second category of states. And that is the states that are
non-nuclear weapons states and are in compliance with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
So it involved an assessment of where things stand today
with respect to the threat. And projecting forward, they
considered the possibility of future trends in chemical
weapons, future trends in biological weapons as well.
And the conclusion was that we should have a greater
concern about the future potential of biological weapons
because of trends in biotechnology. And that is the reason for
the caveat that----
Mr. Turner. Well, I want to reclaim my time here.
Dr. Miller [continuing]. In the future we reserve a right
to----
Mr. Turner. I appreciate your answer. I think there are a
great deal of people, a number of people who disagree with you,
that there is still a role for the deterrence that nuclear
weapons provide.
Secretary Tauscher, question for you. I had the opportunity
to travel with you to NATO, to Poland, to Czech Republic, and I
know of your commitment to missile defense that you have stated
clearly in hearings and in this committee and with our NATO
allies.
As we look to the START agreement, there is language in the
preamble that indicates that there is a relationship between
missile defense and the subject matter of the START agreement.
The Russian leaders have signaled that their view of that
relationship may be more direct than our view, maybe even more
significant.
They have gone as far as to indicate that they might
withdraw from the treaty, depending upon what the United States
does in deployment of missile defense. Now, Congress has yet to
receive the complete information about the Administration's
plans for the Phased, Adaptive Approach for missile defense
that includes both Europe and defense of the homeland.
So it is my expectation, and probably others, that the
Administration has not shared that with Russia yet. So the
question that we have is, you know, what is being done
currently to determine whether or not, as we are proceeding to
START ratification, if the Administration is pursuing currently
with the Phased, Adaptive Approach, a policy that the Russians
might view as terminal to START?
Secretary Tauscher. Let me just bring three things forward,
Mr. Turner. First and foremost, in the preamble of the START
Treaty, there is an interrelationship acknowledged between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons.
In Article 5, Paragraph 3, there is further conversation
about that and its relationship, very similar to what was in
the original START agreement; unilateral statements. When I
went to treaty school, before I went to Geneva just recently,
what is interesting about a treaty is, what is it? It is agreed
statements. It is what the two parties agree.
What are unilateral statements? Things that people don't
agree on. In the original START agreement in 1991, both the
United States and Russia included unilateral statements. The
interesting thing is that it was--the Russian statement was
very similar to what they are saying now, that if things that
we do, either conventionally or on our strategic side,
interfere with their strategic balance, they may withdraw from
the treaty.
What was interesting about what happened then is that we
also said something similar about, we are going to do whatever
we are going to do to protect ourselves, which is something
like what we said this time.
Interestingly, we abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and built missile defenses, and the Russians never left
the START Treaty. So I think that, while much is being made of
these unilateral statements, I think history shows us that
everyone is going to have statements, which are sometimes
political and, sometimes, are meant to indicate a red line.
On missile defense, there are no constraints to our missile
defense systems. The Phased, Adaptive Approach is what has been
up on the Internet since September and is what we have
discussed with the Congress. And I am happy to come back at any
time and refresh if I need to.
But it is a system that starts in 2011, as you know, in the
Mediterranean with Aegis ships, and then 2015 in Romania, who
has agreed to take Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), and then in 2018
in Poland with SM-3 land-based.
The Russians have read the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review. They have been briefed like everyone else. There are
always elements in each country that are more conservative than
others, that have specific issues and are concerned about
certain things.
We have done everything we can to convince the Russians
that our missile defense system is limited and regional in
scope. And what its architecture looks like and how it is not
adaptable or it threatens them.
But I think the most important piece of this is that as of
many of the good things that have happened in the START
negotiations and the resetting that President Obama and
Secretary Clinton embarked on last year with the Russians. We
are also discussing with Russians a missile defense
cooperation.
So there are many opportunities for us to move forward, but
we have made clear what exactly the Phased, Adaptive Approach
is. And it is not targeted against Russia, and it does not
threaten Russia's strategic balance right now.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for your service. I understand the NPR and START both take off
the table basically any additional research by the United
States in the development of either tactical or strategic
nuclear weapons. Is that correct understanding?
Dr. Miller. Let me just answer very briefly and then turn
it to Tom D'Agostino. What the policy statement in the NPR says
is that the United States will not develop new nuclear
warheads. That means that any warheads going forward will be
based on previously tested designs.
It says that within the range of Life Extension Programs
that are considered, which include refurbishment, reuse, and
potential replacement, that all options will be studied. And
the summary that we have received from the labs is that that is
more than adequate to ensure that we have a very strong
science, technology, and engineering base that is able to
support our stockpile over time.
Mr. Marshall. And is that reflected in the START Treaty,
that we will not be doing research on additional nuclear
weapons?
Dr. Miller. It is not addressed in the START----
Mr. Marshall. It is not.
Dr. Miller [continuing]. Treaty.
Mr. Marshall. Okay. So it is just the NPR. The Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) is something we have been discussing
for some time, and NNSA and Secretary Gates and others were
interested in moving forward with research and development.
Do I understand you to be saying, Mr. Miller, that that is
a possibility in the future depending upon--what? At the
moment, we are not going to continue research in a replacement
warhead, but we might in the future?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program
is terminated by Congress and is, in our view, it is not coming
back. We don't propose to bring it back.
What we do propose, as we think about the statement of the
stockpile over time, is to consider the full range of Life
Extension Programs in which replacement of nuclear components
is one of the options. Propose that all of the options be
studied, and that preference be given to refurbishment or
reuse.
Mr. Marshall. So whatever you call it----
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Mr. Marshall [continuing]. The NPR leaves open the
possibility that we conclude that it is advisable for us to
replace existing nuclear weapons?
Dr. Miller. That is----
Mr. Marshall. That we will continue to consider that and we
will maintain the engineering and intellectual capital that we
need in order to actually execute that if we conclude that is
necessary.
Secretary D'Agostino. If I could add to that, absolutely.
The NPR allows us to study the full range of options, which is
vitally important to extend the life of the stockpile. That
there are differences, actually, key differences between what
was proposed in the previous administration in RRW program and
what we have right now in stockpile management.
Dr. Miller said the RRW program has been canceled. In fact
it was canceled by Congress. In its place, we put in place the
Stockpile Management Program. In the context of the NPR of the
time, which was done in the year 2001, the RRW program sought a
total transformation of the stockpile where the Nuclear Posture
Review under Stockpile Management proposed to----
Mr. Marshall. Yes, I think I have got this. This START
Treaty, if we decide to move forward with the replacement
weapon, it wouldn't prohibit us from doing that?
Secretary Tauscher. The START Treaty is agnostic.
Mr. Marshall. On that subject.
Secretary Tauscher. Yes.
Mr. Marshall. Bunker busters, you know, those sorts of
things that we talked about in the early, you know, parts of
this decade, they are out?
General Chilton. Congressman, I have no new requirements
for new capabilities in our weapons. And, in fact, what we want
are increased safety, security, and reliability in these----
Mr. Marshall. Yes, I have got that, but I am just
wondering, in the START Treaty or NPR, are those things that we
don't have existing requirements, are we prohibited from at
some point in the future--hopefully this doesn't happen--but
are we prohibited at some point in the future either by treaty
or by this NPR from investing in a specific nuclear weapon
designed to accomplish a specific objective if we conclude that
we have that need?
General Chilton. START does not limit anything that we need
to do.
Mr. Marshall. NPR?
Dr. Miller. As a matter of policy, the NPR says that the
United States will not develop weapons for new military
capabilities or new military missions.
Mr. Marshall. If we wind up having a new military mission
or need we assess that we have a new need for a capability, NPR
could change?
Dr. Miller. The infrastructure and the intellectual capital
necessary to do that would be in place, so it would be a policy
choice.
Mr. Marshall. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen for
being here and Secretary Tauscher, delight to see you again,
thank you for being here today.
I would identify with the remarks of Mr. McKeon and Mr.
Turner about concerns of taking options off the table in
deterrence. And I am tempted to beat on that horse some more,
but I am not going to do that.
I would like to take advantage of the assembled presence
here. And I think probably principally Secretary D'Agostino
from the Department of Energy, to address another but somewhat
related issue.
And that is my concern that the Secretary of Energy and the
Administration have recently taken steps to terminate the Yucca
Mountain repository program and withdraw the license
application and put in zero funds for that program. And I was
wondering if any of you could address what the defense
community's plans are for the short- and long-term disposal and
storage of spent fuel--particularly defense, but any spent
fuel?
Secretary D'Agostino. Sure, Mr. Kline. The Secretary has
put together a Blue Ribbon Commission of experts, bipartisan
and across a wide variety of expertise--policy, programmatic,
technical.
Mr. Kline. And they are going to report in a couple of
years as I understand, is that right?
Secretary D'Agostino. Well, they are going to report in 18
months is when the final report comes out. We will have some
indication in less time than that. An element of that look by
the commission is not just this question about civil nuclear,
but the defense material is clearly identified in that.
We are keenly looking at that. We are aware of our
obligations to the states that we have right now. Admiral
Donald, as part of his requirements for the state of Idaho, for
example, we understand our obligations on moving the material
and taking care of that material.
So we are looking at the Blue Ribbon Commission to address
that, and I will be watching that. I am keenly interested in
that particular piece, and I am confident it will be addressed
very clearly as part of that.
Mr. Kline. I certainly hope so. I mean, this is very
frustrating for many of us and those who have been on the civil
side, nuclear waste piling up. In my case, I have got a nuclear
power plant on an island in the Mississippi River co-located
with an entire community. And we are just piling up the
caskets.
And it is very, very frustrating to see this program--after
all this time, all this money--terminated and now we have got
another blue ribbon committee, commission of some kind going to
study some more.
So just want to express my frustration and see if anybody
had anything, you know, any more current notion than that. So I
just express my frustration and hope this commission comes
forward and we get a solution to this. And we stop piling this
stuff up in places like Prairie Island.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spratt. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize
because I may be asking something similar, but I wanted to just
go back to the issue of the budget, because you spoke of the
modernization and the need to upgrade.
And yet I have constituents that, in their words, and I am
quoting, ``I am outraged by the 10 percent increase in nuclear
weapons funding at a time when so many other domestic programs
are subject to a spending freeze.''
And this particular individual, and we have a number of
letters like this, are a little confused right now because of
what we are doing and the changes that are being made.
Could you, in perhaps greater detail, and I apologize if
you have already addressed this, what exactly does that
modernization entail that we are spending the additional money
for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility
in New Mexico, the Uranium Processing Facility? What does that
do for our country?
Secretary D'Agostino. I would be happy to take that
question, ma'am, if I could. And others might follow behind.
The key thing that I look at is that there is an infrastructure
that we are maintaining, which includes the people, the
expertise. It is not just taking care of the deterrent. That is
a key and very important job, but that is the same expertise
that we need in order to do our nonproliferation work around
the world.
In any given point in time, we are operating in 100
countries, but these are people that are from the Department of
Energy and NNSA. These are experts in how to handle nuclear
material, radiological material. They are providing security
overseas. They are collecting U.S. material that is overseas
and bringing them back.
These two facilities that you just described are the only
places in the country where we will be able to work with those
materials, to characterize those materials and make sure they
are locked up tight. Not work for nuclear bombs, but work to
make the country safer, make the world safer.
But at the same time, so this 10 percent increase that we
talked about in the Weapons Activities account provides that
core infrastructure that addresses nuclear nonproliferation,
nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, nuclear emergency
management, that whole suite of nuclear security missions.
But of course, we are also spending some of that to take
care of our stockpile, because the stockpile was designed for
the large part in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s and it is
getting older and older year by year.
And we have a commitment--I have an obligation to General
Chilton, to the President, to make sure that the stockpile that
we have is as safe and secure as possible. And it requires some
work to do that.
General Chilton. If I could add to that? Besides the
important benefits to nonproliferation, counter-proliferation,
to the science base that the Secretary pointed out,
improvements to the infrastructure would support, in the 2020
time period, once they are complete, a strategy that could lead
to the reduction of the total number of nuclear weapons that we
maintain in our stockpile today. So it is another important
point.
But finally, I would emphasize that we are at a, I think,
appropriately characterized earlier, a tipping point with
regard to sustaining our nuclear stockpile deterrent for the
future.
And although it is safe, secure, and reliable today, what
we have to be thinking about is what investments we need to
make today to ensure that it will be safe, secure, and reliable
in 2020, 2030, 2040 and beyond, because it will be required in
that time period. And these weapons do support the safety of
Americans as well as the safety of others throughout the world.
Mrs. Davis. I think that people are looking to understand
if there aren't some savings as well that we are going to be
incurring so that, while these are very important facilities
and the people that we need to keep focused on these issues,
are there not some significant savings that we should be
incurring as well?
Secretary D'Agostino. I would be happy to jump in real
quick and then Dr. Miller. In fact, this is part of our overall
plan. It is a plan that is going to take a number of years to
put in place.
We want to shift from a Cold War nuclear weapons complex,
which is where we have been for many years, into what we
describe as a 21st Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. Much
smaller, much more focused; get ourselves out of having
plutonium facilities all over the country and focusing on
having one good one. Making sure that the material that we have
around the United States is in one place, in a place where we
know it can work, and it can work for many decades out into the
future as General Chilton described.
Jim. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. I would just add that, while we look to long-
term savings because of these investments, as Mr. D'Agostino
said, we are in a situation today where we systematically
underinvested over the last couple of decades in these
facilities, some of which date back to the Manhattan Project.
In order to sustain the stockpile and sustain the other
nonproliferation and other activities that both Mr. D'Agostino
and General Chilton have talked about, we really do need to
increase the investment level for the next coming years.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being here. Before I ask my questions I would like to make a
statement. I am very concerned about some of the issues
involved in the Nuclear Posture Review. And I have got five
major problems with it.
One, it seems to be based on the belief that our example
will influence the actions of bad actors in a positive way. And
I believe this has been refuted by recent history. The opposite
will occur because our actions will be viewed as weakness.
Number two, writing off nuclear retaliation in cases of
biological or chemical attack will invite bad actors to put
resources into these areas and to contemplate exactly these
kinds of attacks.
Three, making decisions about what kind of retaliation to
take based on compliance or not of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
will put undue importance on legal hair-splitting.
Four, swearing off all testing of existing nuclear weapons
and development of new nuclear weapons, even if these
capabilities only existed in undeveloped form within the
context of ``calculated ambiguity,'' weakens the nuclear
umbrella. This will invite development and proliferation of
nuclear weapons by our allies.
And fifth, reduction of delivery vehicles to the level
specified under the NPR will allow no margin for error, such as
a recall of equipment or platforms based on technological
problems that may arise. We shouldn't put ourselves in this
precarious position voluntarily.
So when I consider these kinds of concerns, it is hard for
me not to conclude that President Obama's views are dangerous
and naive. And that is, frankly, where I come down on this, and
I am very concerned.
To ask some questions here, I would like to start with
General Chilton. Number one, General Chilton, is there any way
that missile defense interceptors could be limited by the
proposed New START Treaty?
General Chilton. And Mr. Lamborn, good to see you again,
and I am happy to take your question. And I am sure Secretary
Tauscher will correct me 100 percent, but no. There are no
restrictions in START with regard to our missile defense
capability.
Mr. Lamborn. As a follow-up, are there any other missile
defense systems, either currently deployed or planned, or
related future technology that could be limited by the New
START Treaty?
General Chilton. For missile defense, no, there are none,
sir. And sir, if I could address one of your questions that is
right in my wheelhouse is--your concerns, I should say, about
reduction of vehicles. We looked very carefully and supported
the negotiations for START as far as vehicle limitations.
And I can tell you we are very comfortable with the limits
that have been set, and that we would be able to adequately
carry out the current deterrence mission that we have been
given, today and for the foreseeable future, with the limits of
800 total deployed and non-deployed and 700 deployed. So I am
comfortable with that.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, along that line, I am glad to hear your
reassurances on that, but along that line and for Secretary
Tauscher also or anyone else, it is true that while the
President has said we will deMIRV our ICBMs, are the Russians
required to do so?
General Chilton. They are not required to do so. We elect
to do that and I think it is the right thing to do. I think
deMIRVing our ICBMs will allow us, you know, under the warhead
limitations, to better utilize the warheads that we will have
within the warhead limitations.
At the same time, a single warhead, 450 or whatever the
number turns out to be ICBMs, still complicates the adversary's
decision calculus in an adequate fashion, in my view.
Mr. Lamborn. But isn't this another example of where we are
taking options off the table for ourselves that, you know,
needlessly in my view?
General Chilton. Not in deMIRVing, sir, because we still
will retain the capability to reMIRV should that be required.
And that is an important capability to retain to protect
against both a technological failure, say, in a submarine
weapon or a geopolitical change that would require us to add
more weapons to our delivery vehicles.
So it is absolutely important, and was retained, the
ability to reMIRV should we decide we need to do that.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, thank you for that. For anyone,
Secretary, or anyone else, the NPR suggests that increased
missile defenses and conventional forces will strengthen U.S.
deterrence as nuclear forces decrease. However, the Russians
believe that as nuclear forces decrease, missile defense
becomes more of a concern--if I could finish that question, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. Spratt. Finish quickly, and then we will move along.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Does this seem to be contradictory and
how do we resolve that? Thank you.
Secretary Tauscher. Well, I don't think it is
contradictory. The Russians have made clear that they are very
concerned about their strategic balance and that their ability
to rely on their nuclear weapons force. And they have a
different orientation between their nuclear and conventional
forces than we do. Some might say a dependence on them.
So what we have made clear in the START agreement is that
while there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive
and defensive forces, there are no constraints against our
missile defense forces, either already deployed or planned.
And, you know, we made it also clear that our missile
defense forces are not targeting the Russians. We have made
that clear, and we will consistently make that clear. But, you
know, I am happy to have a conversation with you, Mr. Lamborn,
as a sidebar, as to why we are not relying on our own good
example only to persuade people.
We are not trying to persuade those that, apparently,
cannot be persuaded, like Iran and North Korea, not to have
nuclear weapons. We are trying to persuade all those other
countries that for decades have not had nuclear weapons, that
you don't have to have nuclear weapons to be safe.
And that is why, you know, it is not legal hair-splitting
to rely on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is very important
for us to have a strong Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has kept
us at a limited number of nuclear weapons states for decades.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
witnesses for the historic work that you are engaged in. And
you know, listening to some of the questions about how this
document somehow weakens our defense systems or takes options
away or reduces vehicles, when I read it--and Mr. Taylor's
questions sort of alluded to it--I mean, the fact of the matter
is that the commitments that are being suggested in this
document are going to create huge budget challenges for future
Congresses. And coming from Connecticut, I mean, obviously,
where submarines are a big deal, the commitment to SSBNs in the
future is a perfect example of that. And the language could not
be more adamant about the fact that our country should--to
maintain an at-sea presence for the long term, the United
States must continue development of a follow-on to the Ohio-
class submarine. I mean, that is pretty strong language.
General, I don't know if you want to just elaborate why the
document is so forceful in making that recommendation?
General Chilton. Well, sir, I think we--throughout the
process the requirements for sustaining an adequate deterrence
for today and for the foreseeable future were looked at. And as
a result of that was a revalidation of the need for the triad
of forces that we have today.
Certainly, the submarines are a key element of that and,
certainly, our Ohio-class, we know, will time out at a time
certain in the late 2020s. I would also add that there is a
commitment to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030 and to
look at follow-on options to it, as well as a commitment to the
long-range bomber.
And so I think they are very strong and they are there
because they are needed, and I would defer to Dr. Miller from a
policy perspective on any other rationale.
Dr. Miller. I just second what General Chilton said and
note that our strategic submarines are the most highly
survivable element of our nuclear force posture. And we intend
to make the investments to ensure that that is true for the
indefinite future.
Mr. Courtney. And given the fact that, as Mr. Taylor
indicated, though, I mean these are big price tags that are
carried with the construction of these vessels which, at this
point, the guesstimate at Seapower Committee was about $6
billion a copy. And the fact that it, again, it is a survivable
deterrence unsurpassed, really, by any other part of the triad.
I mean, questions have been raised about whether or not we
need to, sort of, move that investment into its own sort of
budget place, a la the missile defense programs in the past.
And because the pressure it is going to put on other
shipbuilding programs, which Chairman Taylor is going to have
to juggle, is going to be pretty daunting in the future.
And I am just sort of throwing that out. I am not really
expecting a response. I don't know if the Under Secretary, I
know she has experience with that system, how it worked for
missile defense, but there is an interest level certainly, in
this committee, about not allowing, again, unnecessary
investment in Ohio-class to really end up damaging the overall
fleet size.
The other question I just was hoping to spend a minute on
was, the NPR states that ``China's nuclear arsenal remains much
smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States, but
lack of transparency raises questions about China's future
strategic intentions.''
And Secretary Tauscher, I don't know if you wanted to, sort
of, comment in terms of, you know, the conversations have
really not been engaged at the same intensity with China as it
has been with Russia. And how do you sort of see that given the
NPR's, sort of, editorial comment there?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, we engage with our Chinese
counterparts. I actually met with my Chinese counterpart this
morning on many issues on a day-to-day basis. I was impressed
that President Hu came to the Nuclear Security Summit
yesterday, and he and President Obama had a private meeting.
You know, I think what is important is that the nuclear
weapons states, those declared five, the P5, that the United
States and Russia still have 90 percent of the world's nuclear
weapons and the success of the New START Treaty is a very
important one. But we certainly can't stop here.
But we do have to work with our allies, because each of
them has a different force posture and a different strategic
vision and a different set of roles and declaratory policy for
their nuclear weapons. And these are issues that, in the
interagency, we work very strongly, including with our military
counterparts like General Chilton and Admiral Mullen.
So I think that what we want to do, and I think the case in
the NPR where we made those statements about China is one where
we are making clear that we want more transparency and we want
more verifiability. And we want to have more engagement as to
those confidence building measures that will reassure not only
the nuclear powers, but also the region and other people,
exactly what China is doing.
Mr. Spratt. Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. Specifically to Mr. Miller and
General Chilton, everyone has been talking about the broader
picture. I am going to go in the weeds of this manual with you
for just a second, specifically about the ICBM force and the
Minuteman III sustainment concept.
Page 23 of the report it says, ``The [Department of
Defense] will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program
with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as
mandated by Congress. Although a decision on [any] follow-on
ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform the
decision are needed now.''
Now, the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)
was concluded last year. And last year, also, the Air Force
recognized that there needs to be a warm line sustainment for
those solid rocket motors, for example, and other parts of
that.
That is why I have some concern, still, within the budget
there is money set aside for three solid rocket motor booster
sets per year, when the industrial base says six is the minimum
they need to maintain a warm line. And for fiscal year 2013 and
on, there is zero dollars for any kind of sustainment for that
program if we are going to go until 2030.
Assistant Secretary Flournoy assured us that this issue
would be addressed in the Nuclear Posture Review. So I want to
ask you, I think, four questions; three specific to this area.
So let me give you all three of those first.
I would like either of you to elaborate what you exactly
mean by the phrase ``Life Extension Program,'' because that is
a confusing terminology. Does that, indeed, mean that the
Propulsion Replacement Program will exist where the warm line
will be maintained that you will be concerned about the
maintenance of an industrial base to do that, especially in
view of the three, six, and zero numbers that I mentioned
earlier?
Number two, I want you specifically to talk about the
booster set concept and zero and years to come. Is there any
kind of recommendation of any kind of particular sustainment
program that gives a specific number for those Minuteman III
booster sets to make sure that the warm line is viable?
And the third one relates to it as well. As you know, the
President and National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) has suggested that the Ares rocket and the Constellation
program be discontinued. And that there are indeed dire
impacts, both on the space and defense side, if that were to go
through. The Augustine Commission on space recommended that
that was a serious issue and needed to be addressed ahead of
time. Obviously, NASA failed to do that.
So the question I have is, how we are planning for the
future? Both Secretary Carter administered that there is an
industrial base problem if, indeed, Ares III is canceled, or
even slowed down. General Kehler said in an article that was
published that he was not comfortable with the direction we
were going.
Secretary Payton asked for a study, but in page 23 he said,
``You will not have the capability of considering future ICBM
options that are involved with large scale solid rocket
propulsion systems if this capability is gone.'' So I would
like to know where you are moving in conjunction with what NASA
may do.
And I will give one final one, maybe for Mrs. Tauscher or
somebody up there, which simply means--this is the broader
picture one, if you guys get done with the weeds first--you
know, in our nuclear umbrella that we have, there are at least
30 countries that are depending on our assistance to provide
deterrence for them.
As we ramp our deterrence down, what impact does it have on
theirs and their credibility and their faith and what they may
actually try to move forward? But Mr. Miller, General Chilton,
if you could go to the weed issues first, I would be very much
appreciative.
General Chilton. Sure, Congressman, let me take a whack at
your concerns with regard to solid rocket motors. First of all,
the language for investment in Life Extension Program, I think,
is a commitment to the Congressional direction to make sure the
Minuteman III is sustainable through 2030.
The PRP, Guidance Replacement Program, the Single Reentry
Vehicle program, et cetera, address the missile itself, but
there was other things that needed to be addressed that weren't
fully funded to include support equipment, test equipment, et
cetera, to make sure that weapon system is viable. So that is
my understanding of what that language speaks to.
There are two different philosophies on producing solid
rocket missiles between the Navy and the Air Force. The Air
Force concept was to build them all once, all that you need,
including your test assets, and stop. And the Navy's was to
continue a warm production line of D-5s, which they do today.
That, as an issue, was not really brought up as far as
sustaining the technology, I think, until the realization that
Ares was going to go away. Well, as of now, the questions are
starting to be asked--and I am one of the ones asking the
questions--is do we have enough investment in the industrial
base to sustain that critical capability to make large solid
rocket motors, large solid rocket missiles?
And it is a unique capability. It is one the United States
knows how to do today, but one we want to make sure we preserve
for the future because it is critical for our defense.
And so I think you are asking some excellent questions
about, what is the right amount do we invest in sustaining that
industrial base? Secretary Carter and AT&L are looking at that,
and I would expect them to bring forward answers to that in the
fiscal year 2012 that is----
Mr. Bishop. Because I have two seconds, let me just
interrupt. And I appreciate your enunciation of what the issue
is. I would hope it would have been answered in this particular
document. We still have to go forward. Maybe deciding on what
NASA actually ultimately aims to do will have an impact on the
military side. And for the other question I will submit it in
writing for the record.
General Chilton. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
General Chilton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Langevin from Rhode Island.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I want to thank
our panel for the outstanding work that you have all done on
the NPR. And I thank you for the periodic updates that you have
been giving me along the way to--it certainly gave me
confidence that we are on track and this is being done
effectively.
Let me just say, in my opinion, the Nuclear Posture Review
offers a clear plan for focusing on nuclear policy on the
gravest threats to our security. It is the risk that nuclear
weapons might spread to other countries or to terrorists.
Along with new START agreement, the NPR, I believe, will
help increase U.S. leverage in pressing for the strength of
nonproliferation measures at the NPT, our Review Conference in
May, and beyond. And at the same time the NPR endorsed our
Congressional plan for managing the safety, security, and
reliability or effectiveness, if you will, of our nuclear
weapons.
It clearly seeks to establish a consensus on nuclear policy
and endorses the revitalizing the nation's Nuclear Security
Enterprise, too. And I quote Vice President Biden and ``reverse
the last decades' dangerous decline.''
The New START Treaty establishes a legally binding and
state-of-the-art verification process that allows us to track
Russia's nuclear activities and verify that they are complying
with their treaty obligations. And these verification measures,
I believe, will support U.S. intelligence and insight into
Russia's nuclear capability.
The treaty also establishes a significantly lower, legally
binding verifiable limits on deployed strategic warhead levels
not seen, really, since the days of the Truman and Eisenhower
Administrations. And this reduction and the limit of deployed
and strategic nuclear weapons increases stability, transparency
and predictability.
So, I just want to say that I applaud all of you for your
outstanding work to increase U.S. security and thank you for
your statements and your commitment to safeguarding national
security. I know for many of you this has been a lifelong
commitment and interest.
Specifically to the NPR, I know we have talked about some
of these issues today already, but my first question is for
Secretary D'Agostino. As you know, and as we have heard today,
there is much, really, confusion about what constitutes a new
nuclear weapon. And so could we for, you know, for the record,
for further clarification, would you provide the committee with
your views of this issue?
And as a follow up, General Chilton, could you discuss this
issue from the perspective of military capabilities;
specifically, how can we be sure that the stockpile maintenance
work won't result in new military capabilities? And, in fact,
General, for the record, do you need new military capabilities?
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to. I
think, in my view, a new nuclear weapon is a nuclear warhead
that is not based on previously tested designs. I mean, this is
a warhead that doesn't have a test pedigree, that takes us into
an area, a technical regime that drives us into some unknown
areas.
We may have some good theoretical reasons why it might
work, but it is not based on previously tested designs. Or it
is a warhead that addresses a new military capability. Right
now, the Stockpile Management Plan provides this guidance of
not adding new military capabilities.
We are consistent with that with what Congress had asked
for. You know, an example might be an enhanced electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) device, for example. It is a new capability. It is
not a capability that we currently have in our stockpile, but
it adds to it.
In this thinking, discussion about new nuclear weapons
versus not new nuclear weapons, we are very consistent, I
believe, with the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act,
which specifically excludes, when it discusses this concept of
new or not, and says ``life extension doesn't fall into this
category.''
Because what we are trying to do is extending the life and
maintain the capabilities that we have using, that whole test
base that we have. So, extending the life of an existing
warhead, and maintaining that military capability, does not
fall into that category.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
General.
General Chilton. And I would echo Secretary D'Agostino's
point that a new capability would be like a new EMP-focused
bomb, or a neutron bomb, or some large increase in yield, none
of which we need to meet our deterrent capabilities today.
I agree with you that the word ``new'' is one that has been
debated a lot. And at some extreme, someone would call a new
bomb one that we painted a different color. But that is not
what we are talking about here. We are talking about new
military capabilities.
And I am really encouraged by the language in the NPR that
allows refurbishment, reuse, and replacement to be studied by
our best and brightest engineers. To be put as options on the
table for consideration to do one really important thing: to
ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile
for future generations. And that is what is really important
here.
I think it would be a mistake to say ``you can't think
about these solutions.'' We want to have all the solutions on
the table to be examined and decided upon. And those decisions
about how we go forward in each weapon will be voted upon by
both the President and, of course, this body, who controls the
funding for them. So I believe there will be adequate
oversight, certainly, in whatever is brought forward as a
recommendation.
And one final point, the point on previously designed
components, are pretty important. The NNSA and the laboratories
have a great storage of test data from previously designed
nuclear components.
And those need to be the ones that we look at as we look at
replacement options, because we don't want to have to go off
into areas where we might argue for--some might argue for a
test.
So that is an important point as we go forward, is that we
make sure the nuclear components are based on previously tested
designs. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Spratt. All right, thank you, General.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here. General Chilton, always good to see you, sir.
And Secretary Tauscher, thank you. It is good to see you again.
And I extend my appreciation to the other two gentlemen.
Secretary Miller, I, you know, in earlier testimony you
spoke of the strategic ambiguity. And it occurs to me that the
time-honored purpose for strategic ambiguity was really of a
cautionary note to our enemies. It was to suggest that we might
do something more than they realize if they proceed to test or
to attack us.
And it appears to me that the new policy that you are
advocating here is really one of foreclosing certain options
and of going in the exact opposite direction, perhaps
emboldening our enemies.
The concern I have there is that if there is some type of
incursion or some type of where an enemy, being emboldened,
might be a little more aggressive than usual, that that
includes the possibility of that escalating, and even
increasing a larger conflict. So could you speak to that?
Dr. Miller. Yes. With respect to calculated ambiguity or
deliberate ambiguity, there is a reduction in that in this
Nuclear Posture Review, specifically with respect to non-
nuclear weapons states.
The United States has said since 1978 that we would not use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons
states. And what this Nuclear Posture Review does is remove
that ambiguity.
It also significantly reduces ambiguity about the nature of
our response, and that is that it would be devastating
conventional military response to any use of chemical or
biological weapons by a non-nuclear weapons state, and that the
leadership would be held accountable--both the military and
political leadership.
With respect to nuclear weapons states, essentially the
same degree of ambiguity is present today as it was prior to
this. And finally, with respect to those states, Iran and North
Korea in particular, that are not in compliance with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations, I believe the ambiguity
has been reduced. And as Secretary Gates said, we have made
clear that all options are on the table.
Mr. Franks. Well, related to Iran, of course, you know, it
occurs to me that we are missing, probably, the major rogue
elephant, as it were, in the room. The fact is, if Iran gains
nuclear capability all efforts to contain nuclear proliferation
are essentially dead.
You know, the Iranian president himself, Ahmadinejad, has
stated that, if gained this capability that they would supply
this to other Islamic nations ``according to their need.'' And
it just occurs to me that so much of our focus needs to be
there.
I have two little children, and I don't want to see them
face nuclear terrorism, but I am absolutely convinced a nuclear
Iran means exactly that.
That nuclear terrorism is loosed upon the world and it just
astonishes me that this Administration doesn't seem to be
focusing on that to the degree that they should. You mentioned
earlier that deterrent was a combination of capability and
credibility.
If you are an Iranian--if you are the Iranian president
right now and you see us reducing our capability, you can't cut
the equation any other way than that, regardless if we still
have sufficient capability perhaps, but we are reducing our
capability.
And if you are the Iranian president and you look at our
posture towards North Korea and this President has made some
strong statements toward North Korea in the past, and those
have not resulted in any demonstrable action on our part. And
so it occurs to me that our credibility has been diminished as
well with Iran.
So let me just ask you, what are we doing now, demonstrably
and specifically, to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear
capability?
Dr. Miller. Sir, let me answer in three parts, and others
may want to join in as well. First, this Nuclear Posture Review
did put nuclear nonproliferation and combating the possibility
of nuclear terrorism at the top of the agenda. And that is a
principal reason why you see some of the policy changes that we
have talked about.
Mr. Franks. But it essentially ignores the most dangerous
terrorist state in the world in that regard.
Dr. Miller. Second, with respect to the Negative Security
Assurance, Iran is not subject to that assurance because they
are not in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations
and, as Secretary Gates has said, and as I would like to make
clear, that means that all options are on the table with
respect to Iran.
And if they wish to position themselves so that they are
subject to that assurance, they need to make significant steps
to terminate their nuclear activities in a verifiable way and
subject themselves to the associated inspections.
And the third element, I would say, which we could spend
some time on is that the United States is currently working
hard to get strong sanctions in place on Iran and to press the
international community, including at the summit, working with
the Russians and the Chinese, to encourage them in as clear a
way as possible, to agree to strong sanctions on Iran in order
to push it to shift its policy and to meet its nonproliferation
obligations.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
I----
Secretary Tauscher. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make
clear that this Administration is using every one of its arrows
in its quiver to deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It
is as frustrated as the previous Administration was.
But I will say that we have had tremendous success, most
recently, in persuading members of the P5, the European Union,
and other countries to work with us to deter Iran, to persuade
them that having nuclear weapons is not something that we will
sustain.
And I think that the President has worked very hard on
this. It is a difficult situation because of the isolation of
Iran and its leadership. But I think that both on North Korea
and Iran this Administration has worked very hard to make clear
that their nuclear ambitions are not in line with our plans for
them.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I just
suggest, Mr. Chairman, as difficult as it is to deal with Iran
now, it will be much more difficult if we do not succeed in
preventing them in gaining nuclear weapons.
The Chairman [presiding]. As I understand, there are two
more members that wish to ask questions, but let me ask the
same question I asked the General of Secretary Tauscher. Does
the Nuclear Posture Review make us any safer?
Secretary Tauscher. I believe it does, Mr. Chairman,
because the Nuclear Posture Review clarifies our Negative
Security Assurance. It makes clear to non-nuclear weapons
states that compliance with their NPT obligations, that they
are not threatened by our nuclear forces. Secondarily, it makes
clear to countries that are not in compliance with their NPT
obligations, like North Korea and Iran, that we would use
nuclear weapons against them.
And I think it generally puts in balance what is a very
strong nuclear and conventional threat that the United States
has had for many years. Keep in mind that we haven't used
nuclear weapons in over 65 years. There is a very high bar that
every Commander-in-Chief would have to consider to use nuclear
weapons.
But we have conventional weapons and a military force
second to none, and it has kept us in relative peace and
security other than the asymmetrical threats that we faced
after September 11th, against allies and against other state
actors. It has kept us in relative peace and security for many
decades.
So I think that the Administration has moved forward with a
Nuclear Posture Review that is much more clarifying, much more
significant in its commitments to non-nuclear weapons states in
compliance with NPT, to strengthen the NPT. And I think it does
have a very strong nonproliferation piece which, in the end,
the President believes will make us all safer.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all
of you. I want to start just by commending the Administration
by moving us beyond the Cold War mentality that has gripped our
deterrent for a long time. We are two decades, now, beyond that
in terms of the reality on the ground.
And this begins to create a situation that is much more in
line with the threats that we face today. And I also want to
commend the Administration on really walking the walk versus
the kind of lip service we have received in the past when it
comes to investing in our infrastructure and, more importantly,
our personnel. I really appreciate that shift.
I want to get fairly specific. First off, Secretary
D'Agostino, I wanted to ask you what are the implications for
our national security of not having the B61 Life Extension
Program completed by 2017?
And how confident are you that the B61 Life Extension
Program will be ready to deliver finished systems required to
synchronize the weapon with the arrival of the new F-35 as a
delivery vehicle?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Heinrich, the B61 bomb is, as
General Chilton has noted previously in testimony and in other
discussion, is one of our oldest warheads. It is in need of
attention. It has got systems, electronic systems that need
specific attention associated with, you know, vacuum tubes and
the like. It needs some specific work--I'd prefer not to get
into the technical details here, in an open session. We would
be glad to provide you the details.
But it is very important for us to get started to work on
that warhead itself, or on that bomb. Various--all aspects of
it need a significant amount of attention. The other important
thing, frankly, on the B61 in addition to our desire to satisfy
the military requirements that I have asked General Chilton
talk to, the year 2017 is the date you heard me mention in my
opening remarks.
That date is important. Because of our infrastructure we
want to time in the studies that typically happen at
laboratories and the work that happened at laboratories as
opposed to the actual production work that has to happen.
And the first production unit of 2017 fits in very nicely
from our ability to layer in the work that we are currently
doing right now on the W76 warhead, which is in its production
stage, with the work when that work tapers off in 2017,
entering into the production stage on the B61 bomb. It
coincides nicely with the requirements of the Defense
Department as well.
General Chilton. Thanks. And if I could add to that, sir, a
lot of folks are linking 2017 to F-35. We need the B61 in first
production in 2017, regardless of the F-35, because the B61
also is a weapon that is used by the B-2, by our strategic
deterrent. And so it is an important weapon, also, to be part
of the F-35 as the dual capable aircraft strategy goes forward.
But any slip in the F-35 program should not say ``well, we
can take risk in the B61 program.'' We need to be on schedule
and get first production unit going. Complete W76, B61, both
nuclear and non-nuclear parts of that, so that then we can move
on to our next element of the stockpile that needs to be
addressed, the W78.
And I would close by saying I am so encouraged by this NPR
and the investment and the strategy and the latitude given here
to the labs to address this particular weapon. Because it will
be the model, I think, the first model for adding increased
security and safety and reliability to the stockpile.
The W76 was purely a refurbishment. No added safety or
security. No added reliability. The B61 will be an opportunity
for this model to be put in place that will then be carried on
throughout the rest of the stockpile.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, General. I couldn't agree more
with both of those points. So I appreciate you clarifying,
especially the aircraft issue and the kind of improvements that
can be made as we move forward to really increase safety and
reliability.
Secretary Tauscher, and I am still getting used to you
being down there as opposed to up there, but we heard a little
bit earlier about moral leadership, as if that was the only
outcome of the kind of leadership we have seen from the
Administration with respect to New START and the NPR.
I want to ask you a little bit more about pragmatic
outcomes. And I wonder if you can talk a little bit about the
direct impact that New START seems to already be having on how
Russia and China view issues like sanctions with some of the
countries that are out, who are not complying with their
international obligations?
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I think
when President Obama came into office, he had a different point
of view on engagement: to be tough but at the same time, as he
said, reach out your hand, but if you come back with a fist we
will not respond nicely.
And in both the case of Russia specifically, we had the
inconvenience of a START Treaty that was going to expire, no
matter what we did, on December 5th. And a little less than 10
months after the President came into office.
So the effort by the President and Secretary Clinton to
restart and reset the relationship with the Russians was
fundamentally important. And to get the atmosphere right to
begin to get the START Treaty negotiated.
The President made clear that even though we had this
inconvenient date of the START Treaty expiring that he didn't
want any treaty on December 5th. He wanted to make sure that we
took the time to get a treaty that was going to not only create
more stability in the relationship, but one that was going to
serve the American people and the people of the Russian
Federation for the 10 years of the life of the treaty, and also
help us make our case in our narrative for the dangers of
nuclear weapons. And while nuclear weapons still have a very
strong place in our deterrent posture and force posture, that
the President wants us to, in the role as part of the Nuclear
Posture Review, lessen the dependence of the United States on
nuclear weapons because we still have the strongest
conventional forces and weaponry in the world and the best
military in the world.
And we have not used nuclear weapons in 65 years. And the
bar to use them is extremely high. And we may not have a
circumstance where that test to use a nuclear weapon is
satisfied by the time we think we have to make some decisions.
So it is partly to have the moral leadership to have a very
strong Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the President is
committed to, to make sure that countries that, in the past,
over the last decades, have not had nuclear weapons because we
either extended our deterrence to them or because they had
decided not to--don't decide to have nuclear weapons and are
not reliant on them.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn for a question. Then we go to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I listened with
great interest to your earlier remarks about a perceived
connection between missile defense and the New START Treaty.
And I understand that there is no such intention on our part.
And I have read your comments in the press very carefully
previously, Secretary Tauscher, and I accept and believe that
that is our intention.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. So I have no question about that. I am
reassured about that. And General Chilton, I am reassured by
what you said about the language of the treaty and that there
is no platforms or missile defense weapons that would be
connected.
But my question and my concern is what is going on in the
minds of the Russians? And let me read to you a quote from an
official Kremlin statement regarding New START. New START ``can
operate and be viable only if the United States of America
refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities,
quantitatively or qualitatively.''
So in their mind, there does seem to be a connection. And
that is my concern. I understand our position and I accept
that. And there shouldn't be a connection because missile
defense is defensive, not offensive. And secondly, it is so
critical to our defense it should not be negotiable.
But if two parties to a treaty seem to have differing views
on an essential matter like that, doesn't that potentially set
up a possible failure of understanding and, therefore,
implementation? And if you could address that, please, I would
appreciate it.
Secretary Tauscher. Congressman Lamborn, I appreciate your
comments. Let me just say, again, for the record, there is
nothing in the New START Treaty that constrains any of our
deployed or planned missile defense systems. Full stop.
I don't know when that statement was made. I don't know if
it was made weeks and months ago or whether it was made in the
last 20 minutes. But I will tell you that the Russians not only
understand what our Phased, Adaptive Approach is, because it is
on the Internet. Anybody can understand what it is.
But every country has, inside of its very complicated
infrastructure and bureaucracy, folks that, for their own
reasons, don't like what their allies and friends and treaty
partners are doing. And everybody has a domestic audience that
they have to play to at times. And politics is a part of
everything.
President Obama has made very clear that this treaty was
never going to constrain us in any way when it came to
protecting the American people, our forward deployed troops and
our allies, specifically about missile defense. And when I was
in Geneva, part of my job in the negotiating was to make sure
that that was what the President got in the end of the deal.
What the Russians say and what certain Russians say, I
notice that that is not even a comment attributed to anyone.
You know, it is what it is. But we have every incentive and
every reason to believe that the Russians are serious about
maintaining the life of the START Treaty and their commitments
to it. Certainly in Prague I was very proud to sit and watch
President Medvedev and President Obama sign the treaty last
Thursday.
It is very clear that our relationship, while we don't
agree with the Russians on everything, we have a much improved
relationship. It is accruing to the American people and to the
things that we want to do, including things like Iran and other
issues.
This relationship is working for us and we are working
diligently to make sure that the stability created by a
positive American-Russian relationship is accruing to our
friends and allies at the same time.
So I think I am glad that you are reassured. That is
certainly our position. But once again, I don't know who this
Russian was that was quoted. It is not attributed and I don't
even know when the quote was made.
But I can assure you they know what our limited missile
defense systems are. They know what they are constituted to do.
They know they are not targeted against them, and we are very
satisfied that we are going to have a good relationship going
forward in the New START agreement.
Dr. Miller. If I could add very quickly, the Russians also
know now what is in our unilateral statement, which was put out
just a few days ago, which says ``The United States intends to
continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in
order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of
our collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key
regions.''
So, both for homeland defense and for regional missile
defense, it made absolutely clear that we intend to continue to
improve our capabilities.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I wish the members to
know that tomorrow at our hearing we will begin having the
junior members of the committee and we work backward in our
procedural order. And I hope the junior members will arrive on
time before the gavel starts.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the
challenges in serving on the committee is that when you are
dealing with important topics like these to get all your
questions in in 5 minutes, which is next to impossible.
But I would--one question I wanted to get to, and I would
be remiss if I didn't ask of Secretary Tauscher.
First of all, Ellen, it is great to have you back before
the committee again, and thank you for your years of work on
all these issues and your leadership on the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee that you chaired, and now that I was privileged to
succeed when you assumed your new role.
Yesterday, I had the privilege of attending the Nuclear
Security Summit. And obviously, many positive things have come
out of that summit already. In particular, I noticed the news
that the Chinese have pledged to work more closely with us on
the Iranian issue. And when I met with President Hu yesterday,
I first expressed my appreciation for his willingness to do
that.
Also, in particular, we saw over 47 countries come to come
together to begin to address threats of nuclear terrorism,
nuclear proliferation. And from my work both on this committee
and also on the Intelligence Committee, I certainly share the
President's concerns about the dangers from loose nuclear
material and rogue proliferators.
And I am certainly happy to see this issue take prominence
in this Administration. I give President Obama high marks in
his Administration for convening the summit, which is probably
long overdue and it is such an important topic.
Secretary Tauscher, can you elaborate on some of the
commitments from other nations that came from this conference?
And also, what progress needs to be made before nations
reconvene in South Korea in 2012?
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Chairman Langevin. It is my
pleasure to see you again, and congratulations on all your work
on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Yesterday, Monday and
Tuesday, the President convened 47 heads of state to talk about
an issue that particularly animates him, which is nuclear
terrorism.
And he made very clear that, while much has changed since
the end of the Cold War, that it is less likely that the United
States or our allies would be subject to a nuclear attack from
a big power.
Unfortunately, countries that are looking to acquire
nuclear weapons and terrorist organizations that are looking to
either find material or know-how or technology have increased.
And that has increased significantly our danger in the United
States.
So he brought these 47 heads of state together and there
was not only a communique that, I think, was very positive in
the commitment of these 47 heads of state to work together on
nuclear security and to eliminate nuclear terrorism, but there
were a number of what we call ``house gifts'' that some of
these heads of state brought along. Countries like Chile,
Canada, the Ukraine, and Mexico have agreed, for example, to
eliminate all of their HEU and to send it to the United States
and Russia for disposal.
The United States and Russia were--we seem to be signing
agreements almost every day these days--signed yesterday the
Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which Tom knows about. It was
10 years in the making, had been stalled for many years. But
this eliminates plutonium that could make 17,000 nuclear
weapons. The IAEA is going to help us monitor that agreement.
There were a number of other initiatives going on there,
and probably one of the anecdotes to the whole conference was
that, while you had 47 heads of state milling around, and many
of them brought their foreign ministers and their ambassadors
and members of their cabinets that deal with nuclear
nonproliferation issues, there were many side meetings that
were going on where there was a lot of very good work done.
And what was very clear while President Obama presided over
this for a day and a half and made some, I think, very eloquent
and very forceful statements, what was very clear was that this
was an issue that these heads of state--most of them non-
nuclear countries--believed was important, but it took the
United States and President Obama to put this issue in the
forefront of their minds and to convene them together.
And the good news is that the ``sherpas''--these are the
people that managed the process of doing the communique and the
work product that goes forward--they will continue meeting over
the next two years.
And South Koreans have agreed to convene what was meant to
be one meeting, now will have follow-on in 2012 for the South
Koreans to convene a similar kind of meeting where the work
product will be reviewed, and these efforts will continue.
There were billions of dollars committed by nuclear powers
to help do cleanups. So I think, overall, it was not only a
success in the material things that were committed to but, once
again, this is an issue that the President believes that
publics and parliaments and, certainly, the American people and
the Congress need to know more about.
For too long, these issues have stayed in the background;
they are very opaque and complicated and complex and sometimes
people say, ``oh, you know, that is hard to understand. I
didn't take physics in high school.''
The truth of the matter is, every American and every person
in the world needs to know these issues because this is the
biggest threat we have. And it is a life-changing event if
something bad should happen.
And their political will is important because they need to
tell their Congress or their parliament or their head of state
that this is important, that they want them to fix these
issues. They want them to work collaboratively, and they want
strong international regimes like the Non-Proliferation Treaty
to be protected.
So thank you. I was so glad to see you there yesterday, and
many Members of Congress came, but we all worked hard on it and
I am glad that it had such a good outcome.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Very good.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Again, well, thank you for that answer and to
all of you, I mean on the panel, thank you for the outstanding
work you have done on the NPR as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I appreciate the gentleman, and to the
excellent panel, and we certainly are grateful for your
testimony, for your hard work and for what you do for our
country.
And with that----
[Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 14, 2010
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Miller, the Administration has repeatedly
assured the Congress that no limits would be placed on missile defense.
However, Article 5 of the Treaty appears to restrict the conversion of
ICBM launchers for use as missile defense silos--as we did with the
Ground-based Interceptors at Vandenberg--and restrict the conversion of
submarine tubes to fire missile defense interceptors. Is this correct?
Why set such limits on missile defense?
Dr. Miller. The New START Treaty (NST) does not constrain the
United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses
possible, nor does the NST add any additional cost or inconvenience to
our missile defense plans. As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, our budget submission and projections, and the U.S. unilateral
statement made in connection with the NST all make clear, the United
States will continue to improve its missile defenses.
Article V, Section 3 of the Treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM
or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers and vice versa; that is,
the conversion of missile defense launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs.
This section also ``grandfathers'' the five former ICBM silos at
Vandenberg AFB that were converted for use within Ground Based
Interceptors (GBI) over the past several years. Should the decision be
made in the future to field additional GBIs, we will already have eight
extra, unused missile defense silos in the ground at Fort Greely,
Alaska. In the event that we would need even more missile defense silos
above and beyond the extra eight, we would build the smaller, much less
expensive, tailor-made GBI silos rather than perform more expensive
conversions of existing ICBM silos. Regarding SLBM launchers, the
Missile Defense Agency examined the concept of launching missile
defense interceptors from submarines and found it to be not cost-
effective and to present unique operational challenges.
Mr. Lamborn. I am concerned that the Administration may not fully
implement its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plans for missile defense
in Europe, or it may seek to slow down PAA implementation, to avoid
Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. What types of activities will the
U.S. avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will withdraw?
Dr. Miller. The United States has made clear to Russia, including
in the unilateral statement released in conjunction with the New START
Treaty, that U.S. missile defense systems do not and will not threaten
Russia's nuclear deterrent and that the United States intends to
continue to deploy improved missile defense systems to defend the U.S.
homeland from limited attacks and to defend its deployed forces,
allies, and partners against regional threats. Moreover, the United
States will not allow a Russian threat to withdraw from the New START
Treaty to influence any national security matter, including the
development and deployment of needed missile defense capabilities.
Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Miller, in your professional opinion what is
the number of warheads the U.S. needs to meet its nuclear deterrence
objectives? I have heard discussions of much lower numbers of nuclear
weapons in the future under a minimum deterrence strategy. Is it
possible for the U.S. to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, similar
to China, with 500 nuclear weapons or less in the future? Has STRATCOM
performed any force structure analysis based on a minimum deterrence
strategy?
Dr. Miller. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and
Russia have reduced operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by
approximately 75 percent, but today both retain more operationally
deployed nuclear weapons than needed for deterrence. The Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), with analytical support from USSTRATCOM, examined
the full range of factors that will allow reductions in U.S. nuclear
force levels. The NPR team provided this information to the New START
negotiators to guide negotiation of the recently concluded New START
Treaty.
The United States has no plans to pursue a minimum deterrence
strategy, and no analysis has been conducted by USSTRATCOM or elsewhere
in DOD to explore such a strategy.
Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Miller, as nuclear weapons are reduced and
conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities are developed, to
what degree can conventional capabilities substitute for nuclear
capabilities in providing deterrence? What are the limitations?
Dr. Miller. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capabilities,
as well as other conventional and missile defense capabilities, are not
intended to be a substitute for nuclear capabilities in providing
deterrence against nuclear attack. As long as nuclear weapons exist,
the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to
deter potential adversaries. However, these conventional systems and
other non-nuclear capabilities may allow the U.S. to fulfill deterrence
objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels with reduced
reliance on nuclear weapons.
The Administration is currently examining the appropriate mix of
CPGS capabilities needed to improve our ability to address regional
threats, without negatively affecting the stability of our strategic
relationships with Russia or China. Specific recommendations will be
made in the fiscal year (FY) 2012 Department of Defense budget.
Mr. Lamborn. General Chilton, in your professional opinion what is
the number of warheads the U.S. needs to meet its nuclear deterrence
objectives? I have heard discussions of much lower numbers of nuclear
weapons in the future under a minimum deterrence strategy. Is it
possible for the U.S. to pursue a minimum deterrence strategy, similar
to China, with 500 nuclear weapons or less in the future? Has STRATCOM
performed any force structure analysis based on a minimum deterrence
strategy?
General Chilton. The analysis STRATCOM was requested to perform in
support of the NPR and New START negotiations focused on our ability to
meet current employment guidance at various force levels. We were not
asked to examine the force requirements for a ``minimum deterrence''
strategy. Without knowing how ``minimum deterrence strategy'' is
defined in terms of targeting requirements under various conditions it
is not possible to answer the question ``how much is enough to deter''?
Mr. Lamborn. General Chilton, as nuclear weapons are reduced and
conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capabilities are developed, to
what degree can conventional capabilities substitute for nuclear
capabilities in providing deterrence? What are the limitations?
General Chilton. Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities can
provide the President additional options for striking targets promptly
at very long ranges without concern over active air defenses. Thus,
they can contribute to deterrence by helping to convince an adversary
that we can deny them some of the benefits they might seek by attacking
us or our allies, and impose costs on them in response to such an
attack. However, I do not believe that such conventional PGS
capabilities can effectively substitute for the deterrent effect
derived from our nuclear forces. Nuclear weapons pose a qualitatively
different threat than any conventional strike option. The scale,
duration, and inevitability of nuclear weapons effects have a unique
deterrent effect, as does the potential for escalation to a large scale
nuclear exchange. This is why I have repeatedly stated that
conventional PGS capabilities are not a one-for-one substitute, or even
a ten-for-one substitute, for nuclear capabilities.
Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Tauscher, the Administration has repeatedly
assured the Congress that no limits would be placed on missile defense.
However, Article 5 of the Treaty appears to restrict the conversion of
ICBM launchers for use as missile defense silos--as we did with the
Ground-based Interceptors at Vandenberg--and restrict the conversion of
submarine tubes to fire missile defense interceptors. Is this correct?
Why set such limits on missile defense?
Secretary Tauscher. The New START Treaty does not constrain the
United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses
possible, nor does it add any additional cost or inconvenience. Rather,
the Treaty enables the President to develop the missile defenses needed
to defend the homeland, our deployed forces abroad, and our allies and
partners from the threat of ballistic missile attack.
Indeed, Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), has testified that the New START Treaty places no
constraints on current and future plans for ballistic missile defense
development or deployment.
Lt. Gen. O'Reilly has made clear that the Article V, paragraph 3
ban on converting ICBM silos to house and launch missile defense
interceptors does not constrain MDA's plans. In 2002, MDA converted
ICBM silos to operational silos for launching GBIs because they had not
yet developed a silo specifically for GBIs at that time. Since then,
MDA has developed a GBI silo that costs $20M less than converting ICBM
silos and is easier to protect and maintain. Accordingly, should
additional missile defense interceptor launchers be needed, we would
build the smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made ground-based
interceptor (GBI) silos rather than pursuing the more costly approach
of converting ICBM silos.
Article V of the Treaty also prohibits the conversion of existing
SLBM launchers into missile defense launchers. As Lt. Gen. O'Reilly
stated in his testimony, MDA has examined the concept of launching
missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an
operationally unattractive and extremely expensive option in part
because submerged submarines are not easily integrated into our
nation's missile defense command and control network. In fact, the
United States already has a very good, significantly growing and proven
capability for mobile sea-based ballistic missile defense on Aegis-
capable ships, which are not constrained by the New START Treaty.
The exhibitions provided for in the Seventh Agreed Statement will
avoid ambiguities from arising with respect to converted ICBM silos
that now serve as missile defense interceptor launchers at Vandenberg
AFB, because the United States will be able to demonstrate that such
launchers are no longer capable of holding and launching ICBMs.
It is also important to note that this Treaty provides greater
flexibility for the missile defense program than did the START Treaty
in several areas. For example, MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target
booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate homeland defense
capabilities and components of the new European Phased Adaptive
Approach, was accountable under the previous START Treaty because it
employed the first stage of the now-retired Trident I SLBM. Under New
START, this missile is not accountable, and MDA will have greater
flexibility in conducting testing with regard to launch locations,
telemetry collection, and processing, allowing more efficient and
realistic testing.
Mr. Lamborn. I am concerned that the Administration may not fully
implement its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) plans for missile defense
in Europe, or it may seek to slow down PAA implementation, to avoid
Russian withdrawal from the Treaty. What types of activities will the
U.S. avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will withdraw?
Secretary Tauscher. None. The United States will take all necessary
steps to promote stability and foster cooperation while defending
ourselves, our allies and partners, and our interests. With respect to
ballistic missile defenses, the United States will continue to develop
and deploy missile defenses to defend the homeland against the threat
of limited ballistic missile attack and to defend against regional
missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners
and enabling them to defend themselves.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. On page 23 of the Nuclear Posture Review Summary, it
states, ``The DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension
Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as
mandated by Congress. Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM
development is not needed for several years, studies to inform that
decision are needed now.''
The Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) just
concluded in calendar year 2009. Last year, as part of the FY 10
authorization process, the Air Force acknowledged the military
requirement for a so-called ``warm line'' program to adequately sustain
the Minuteman III with regard to the solid rocket boosters. For FY 11,
the Air Force only proposes production of 3 Minuteman III boosters,
when industry maintains that 6 booster sets are minimally necessary to
sustain the industrial base. More disturbingly, the Air Force Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) contains $0 funding for Minuteman III Warm Line
sustainment in FY 13 and beyond.
At an earlier hearing this year, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, Ms. Michele Flournoy, assured me that the large scale solid
rocket motor industrial base issue would be addressed by this
Administration more fully in the NPR. However, in reviewing the
document made available to me, I cannot determine that it has been
addressed at all.
Please explain what is meant exactly by the phrase ``DoD will
continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program.''
Dr. Miller. The phrase refers to the requirements to sustain the
Minuteman III (MM III) weapon system through 2030 in accordance with
direction in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007. The
U.S. Air Force is fully committed to achieving that objective and has
budgeted over $1.3B in investments through the FYDP (FY10-FY15) to
sustain the MM III weapon system through 2030. Minuteman Solid Rocket
Motor (SRM) Warm Line terminates in FY2012 with funding provided only
for closeout/environmental cleanup. OSD plans to provide a report to
Congress on SRM industrial base sustainment in approximately September,
2010.
Mr. Bishop. Does the NPR address what number of Minuteman III
booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain a viable warm-line
sustainment program?
Dr. Miller. No. The 2010 NPR report does not address quantities of
Minuteman III boosters necessary to sustain a viable warm-line
sustainment program. It was decided to address this issue via an
interagency task force that includes representation from DoD (the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile
Defense Agency) and NASA. This task force will provide solid rocket
motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense for a subsequent report to Congress in approximately September,
2010.
Mr. Bishop. What specific impacts would termination of NASA's Ares
1 and Ares 5 rocket motors have on the defense solid rocket motor
industrial base?
Dr. Miller. Cancellation of the NASA Constellation program would
impact DoD programs that use Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) to include
strategic and tactical missiles, missile defense systems, and solid
booster programs for our space launch platforms. These impacts could
include cost increases, as component suppliers may have higher costs
associated with lower production rates. However, reduction in excess
production capacity may, in fact, ultimately create savings for the
Department over the longer term.
Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010
directed the Secretary of Defense to ``establish a plan to sustain the
solid rocket motor industrial base, including the ability to maintain
and sustain currently deployed strategic and missile defense systems
and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to support
next generation motors, as needed.'' The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task
force, including representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and
NASA, to address this issue. This task force will provide solid rocket
motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September,
2010.
Mr. Bishop. If NASA's proposal to terminate Ares 1 and Ares 5 is
approved by Congress, is the DoD confident that the solid rocket motor
industrial base will survive and be sufficiently robust to allow for
future ICBM modernization options involving solid rocket motors, and
what evidence would lead the DoD to having such an assurance?
Dr. Miller. If the current Minuteman III (MM III) solid rocket
motor (SRM) production capability is allowed to lapse, any requirement
for follow-on MM III SRM production would include the time and costs
required to reinstate a MM III SRM production capability.
Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010,
directed the Secretary of Defense to ``establish a plan to sustain the
solid rocket motor industrial base, including the ability to maintain
and sustain currently deployed strategic and missile defense systems
and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to support
next generation motors, as needed.'' The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task
force, including representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and
NASA, to address this issue. This task force will provide solid rocket
motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September,
2010.
Mr. Bishop. Is retention of a healthy large-scale solid rocket
motor industrial base of vital strategic importance to the Defense
Department of the United States?
Dr. Miller. DoD relies heavily on large solid rocket motors (SRMs)
to provide the propulsion for our strategic systems, missile defense
programs, and space launch. DoD relies upon SRMs for its strategic
missiles for three primary reasons: rapid employment capability, long-
term storability, and safety. The Department is evaluating its current
research development and production programs to determine how to adjust
the Department's SRM programs to the changing large SRM critical skills
and subtier supplier base. The Department is committed to sustaining an
adequate SRM industrial base to support both our strategic and tactical
needs.
Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010,
directed the Secretary of Defense to ``establish a plan to sustain the
solid rocket motor industrial base, including the ability to maintain
and sustain currently deployed strategic and missile defense systems
and to maintain an intellectual and engineering capacity to support
next generation motors, as needed.'' The Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task
force, including representation from DoD (the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency) and
NASA, to address this issue. This task force will provide solid rocket
motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense for a Subsequent report to Congress in approximately September,
2010.
Mr. Bishop. Approximately 30 nations rely upon the current U.S.
nuclear shield for shared deterrence. How will the security of these
U.S. allies be impacted by the U.S. downsizing both warheads and
delivery systems as contained in the new START treaty recently signed
by the President?
Dr. Miller. As President Obama stated in Prague last year, we are
committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal
to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to our allies.
Analyses conducted during the Nuclear Posture Review determined that
the future U.S. strategic force planned for the New START Treaty will
be sufficient to meet U.S. extended deterrence requirements. The
security of U.S. allies will not be diminished by the reductions in
U.S. strategic nuclear forces mandated by the New START Treaty. Allies
have welcomed the outcome of the NPR, as well as the signing of the New
START Treaty, with many seeing the Treaty as an important step forward
in global nonproliferation efforts. For example, on behalf of NATO
Allies, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomed the
agreement as an important contribution to arms control, and an
inspiration for further progress.
Mr. Bishop. On page 23 of the Nuclear Posture Review Summary, it
states, ``The DoD will continue the Minuteman III Life Extension
Program with the aim of keeping the fleet in service to 2030, as
mandated by Congress. Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM
development is not needed for several years, studies to inform that
decision are needed now.''
The Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) just
concluded in calendar year 2009. Last year, as part of the FY 10
authorization process, the Air Force acknowledged the military
requirement for a so-called ``warm line'' program to adequately sustain
the Minuteman III with regard to the solid rocket boosters. For FY 11,
the Air Force only proposes production of 3 Minuteman III boosters,
when industry maintains that 6 booster sets are minimally necessary to
sustain the industrial base. More disturbingly, the Air Force Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) contains $0 funding for Minuteman III Warm Line
sustainment in FY 13 and beyond.
At an earlier hearing this year, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, Ms. Michele Flournoy, assured me that the large scale solid
rocket motor industrial base issue would be addressed by this
Administration more fully in the NPR. However, in reviewing the
document made available to me, I cannot determine that it has been
addressed at all.
Please explain what is meant exactly by the phrase ``DoD will
continue the Minuteman III Life Extension Program.''
General Chilton. In the NPR, DoD committed to sustaining Minuteman
III through 2030. Analysis conducted by U.S. Strategic Command in
coordination with U.S. Air Force indicated Minuteman III is viable and
sustainable through 2020. Additional sustainment efforts will be needed
to extend operations to 2030. The Air Force is currently collecting
data for use in analysis to determine the proper course to sustain our
ICBM fleet to 2030. Once USAF completes the analysis, DoD will
determine the best set of options to extend Minuteman III to 2030.
Mr. Bishop. Does the NPR address what number of Minuteman III
booster sets are minimally necessary to sustain a viable warm-line
sustainment program?
General Chilton. No, however, the NPR does commit to sustaining
Minuteman through 2030. As you are aware, propulsion replacement
program was completed in 2009 and a warm-line minimum production
program was created to help sustain the industrial base while the Air
Force studied the path forward.
Mr. Bishop. What specific impacts would termination of NASA's Ares
1 and Ares 5 rocket motors have on the defense solid rocket motor
industrial base?
General Chilton. There are no concrete estimates of the potential
cost increases associated with the potential termination of Ares
production. There is the potential that DoD programs could be impacted
and share a larger portion of recurring costs. We look forward to
Secretary Carter's AT&L-led task force study on this issue to inform
the Department's investment strategy to ensure we can meet the nation's
strategic propulsion needs.
Mr. Bishop. If NASA's proposal to terminate Ares 1 and Ares 5 is
approved by Congress, is the DoD confident that the solid rocket motor
industrial base will survive and be sufficiently robust to allow for
future ICBM modernization options involving solid rocket motors, and
what evidence would lead the DoD to having such an assurance?
General Chilton. The United States is the world's premier
manufacturer of solid rocket motors. If the industry is required to
resize, special emphasis needs to be placed on managing risks and
ensuring adequate investment to exercise the entire design-to-
production life cycle so we are prepared to meet the demands of
strategic system sustainment and modernization. This is being examined
closely by Dr. Carter's AT&L-led task force and I defer to the results
of his study.
Mr. Bishop. Is retention of a healthy large-scale solid rocket
motor industrial base of vital strategic importance to the Defense
Department of the United States?
General Chilton. The solid rocket motor industrial base is being
reviewed by AT&L and will result in a full update report to the
Congress. A viable solid rocket motor industrial base is a critical
part of the broader industrial base needed to maintain safe, secure,
and effective strategic force. As is the case with the nuclear weapons
enterprise, we need to maintain sufficient and affordable capability
and expertise required to recapitalize our deterrent propulsion needs.
I am confident Secretary Carter's AT&L-led task force study on this
issue will inform the Department's investment strategy to ensure we can
continue to meet the nation's strategic propulsion needs.
Mr. Bishop. Approximately 30 nations rely upon the current U.S.
nuclear shield for shared deterrence. How will the security of these
U.S. allies be impacted by the U.S. downsizing both warheads and
delivery systems as contained in the new START treaty recently signed
by the President?
General Chilton. As part of the development of the U.S. negotiating
position in the New START negotiations, U.S. Strategic Command
conducted an analysis of our nuclear forces' capability to meet current
employment guidance at reduced force levels. The New START treaty will
allow the United States to deploy a nuclear triad capable of meeting
that guidance. That guidance was developed with our current extended
deterrence commitments in mind. Thus, from the perspective of the
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command the reductions required by the New
START treaty will not undermine our ability to provide extended
deterrence.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS
Mr. Owens. Former Secretary of State George Shultz, who served from
1982 to 1989, wrote in the Wall Street Journal that the recent Nuclear
Posture Review is ``more relevant'' than its predecessors that relied
on the stockpiling of nuclear weapons alone to deter threats against
our country. Would you agree that this Nuclear Posture Review better
addresses the modern-day threats facing America and our allies, and how
confident are you that it will address those threats ten years from now
when the next NPR is set for release?
Secretary Tauscher. I agree completely with Mr. Shultz's
characterization of the NPR. Our goal in developing our nuclear posture
was to refocus our strategy on the most pressing threats today--nuclear
terrorism and proliferation. We cannot address these threats through
large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. This Administration's NPR has
adapted our policies to the realities of today's world by placing these
issues of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of our nuclear
agenda. In addition, the NPR lays out a strategy for working more
closely with our allies, friends, and partners--including former
adversaries--to strengthen international security and stability;
increasing reliance on non-nuclear capabilities, including missile
defense, and providing a necessary increase in the funding for the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan that will ensure that the
United States retains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for
as long as nuclear weapons exist.
We are working hard to generate a close, durable relationship with
our Russian partners to set the stage for even further reductions. We
are also working with China to develop strong ties and mutual
understanding that will strengthen international and regional security.
However, it is likely that the threats of nuclear terrorism and
proliferation will endure over this timeframe. This NPR is a strategy
to address these long-term threats, and provides a ``roadmap'' for
continuity in our nuclear posture that future reviews will be able to
build upon.
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