[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-136]
THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 16, 2010
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
RICK LARSEN, Washington DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2010
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 16, 2010, The Status of United States Strategic
Forces......................................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 16, 2010.......................................... 41
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010
THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces..................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 3
WITNESSES
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 8
Miller, Dr. James, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense......................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P........................................ 67
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 45
Miller, Dr. James............................................ 53
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 48
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 95
Mr. Franks................................................... 96
Mr. Langevin................................................. 95
Mr. Larsen................................................... 95
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bishop................................................... 104
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 103
Mr. Langevin................................................. 99
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 100
THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 16, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Langevin
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Langevin. Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee will now come to order.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the strategic
posture of the United States and the status of our strategic
forces, including our nuclear weapons, missile defense systems
and military space programs.
These activities, which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, also track closely with
responsibilities of U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM. Thus,
we are pleased that General Kevin Chilton, the commander of
STRATCOM, agreed to appear before the subcommittee today.
Welcome, General Chilton.
General Chilton has testified before the subcommittee in
the past, and we thank him for coming back here this morning.
Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, has also agreed to appear before the
subcommittee today, and I would like to welcome him to the
committee this morning as well.
Welcome.
Dr. Miller's presence is particularly timely given the
release yesterday of the Interim Space Posture Review, the
release of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review last month and
the pending release of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Much has transpired in the realm of strategic forces and
strategic policy since the subcommittee took testimony on these
matters last March. On April 5th, 2009, President Obama
delivered a comprehensive address on nuclear security in Prague
in which he declared, ``I state clearly and with conviction
America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world
without nuclear weapons.''
He went on to say, ``As long as these weapons exist, the
United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective
arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to
our allies, including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the
work of reducing our arsenal.''
On July 9th, President Obama and Russian President Medvedev
issued a joint statement of understanding for establishing a
follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty that
included targets for the number of accountable warheads and
launchers under a new agreement.
Last summer, in response to the increasing challenges we
face in protecting our computers and networks from intrusion,
Secretary Gates announced his intention to create U.S. Cyber
Command, or CYBERCOM, as a subordinate unified command under
STRATCOM.
On September 17th, President Obama announced his plan for
strengthening missile defenses in Europe through a Phased,
Adaptive Approach (PAA) deploying defenses against the threat
of Iranian ballistic missiles.
Just a week later, the President revealed that the Iranians
had been building a covert uranium facility near Qom for
several years now.
In December, the START Treaty expired and Presidents Obama
and Medvedev issued a joint statement saying that the two
nations would continue to work together in the spirit of the
START Treaty following its expiration.
At the same time, the two presidents also expressed ``their
firm intention to ensure that the new treaty on strategic arms
enter into force at the earliest possible date.''
However, while the two presidents talked about this issue
last Saturday, the New START Treaty has yet to be completed.
The press reports suggest that it has been delayed by the
complex technical details involving data exchanges and
verification as well as the complicated political details
related to missile defenses.
On January 12th, 2010, China announced the successful test
of a ground-based mid-range missile interceptor. This
technology demonstration has implications not only for Chinese
missile defense but also for the safety of space systems in low
Earth orbit.
On February 1st, the Department of Defense released the
first Ballistic Missile Defense Review along with the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget. Notably, the Department
did not release either the Nuclear Posture Review or the Space
Posture Review, both of which were required to be released on
that date as well.
Now, the Department has informed the Congress that the NPR
will be delayed until March 1st and that the Space Posture
Review would not appear until later this summer.
Yet at the same--at the time, we were promised the early
submission of the preliminary Space Posture Review and were
also--and so we are pleased that the Interim Space Review was,
in fact, released yesterday.
However, the Nuclear Posture Review still has not been
submitted and appears to be delayed, if we can believe press
reports, by the President's deliberations on a few key issues,
including U.S. declaratory policy; specifically, for what
purposes might the use--might we use nuclear weapons and
whether and how many forward deployed weapons in Europe and
Asia are needed for extended deterrence.
Well, this morning we certainly look forward to hearing our
witnesses' perspective on the events of the past year and the
progress we have made toward addressing the key challenges that
we face.
As the witnesses are well aware, the subcommittee has had a
long record of seeking bipartisan approaches to the complicated
challenges that we face in the strategic arena. Through this
hearing, we hope to continue these critical discussions so that
we may together chart the right strategic path forward for the
United States.
So therefore, we look forward to your testimony here today
and your help in making progress toward that goal.
So before, though, turning to our witnesses, let me ask at
this time for my partner in this effort, our ranking member,
Mike Turner, for any comments that he may have.
Mr. Turner.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to extend a warm welcome to General
Chilton and Dr. Miller and thank you both for your leadership
and for your service to our Nation.
Today's hearing comes amid considerable change in our
strategic forces policy and posture. We anticipate the delivery
of a Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, within the coming weeks that
may significantly alter U.S. nuclear policy.
According to reports, the U.S. and Russia are near
completion on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START. We
have seen major changes in missile defense policy, including
plans for missile defense in Europe. And later this year, we
expect to see a new national space policy and Space Posture
Review.
Meanwhile, we continue to witness disturbing trends in
foreign strategic forces developments. Of particular concern,
Iran and North Korea continue very public nuclear and ballistic
missile programs.
China is preparing to field a next-generation maneuvering
ballistic missile and continues to develop counterspace
capabilities.
Russia possesses an overwhelming arsenal of tactical
nuclear weapons and continues to modernize its strategic
nuclear forces.
I would like to highlight today a few concerns that I hope
our witnesses will address here. First, let me start with U.S.
nuclear policy. The President seeks ``a world without nuclear
weapons.'' I think we all share this long-term vision.
But as French President Nicolas Sarkozy said last fall,
``We live in a real world, not a virtual one.'' The bipartisan
Strategic Commission similarly observed that it ``would require
a fundamental transformation of the world political order.''
Our national security policies must reflect this reality. To do
otherwise would be irresponsible.
It is, therefore, deeply concerning when Administration
officials and press reports suggest that our nuclear policy
will center on zero as the policy goal; that the NPR will
reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons, starting with
U.S. declaratory policy; and that another round of arms control
talks will commence after START to further reduce our nuclear
forces.
It is unclear what changes in the threat or security
environment are driving such deep reductions. What is the
strategic rationale behind this policy?
Do we expect others like North Korea, Iran, Pakistan,
Russia and China to give up their nuclear arms once the U.S.
reduces theirs?
Will allies who benefit from U.S. extended deterrence
commitments feel equally assured when the U.S. reduces its
nuclear deterrent and offers conventional forces as a
substitute? I hope our witnesses here today can address these
fundamental questions.
I was pleased to see a 13 percent increase in this year's
budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration's weapon and nonproliferation activities.
It appears that the Administration has embraced the
Stockpile Management Program established by this committee last
year and will fund more comprehensive life extension programs,
warhead safety and security enhancements, and infrastructure
modernization.
However, a commitment to the sustainment and modernization
of our Nation's deterrence capabilities cannot be measured with
a single year's budget request. As we all know, strategy,
programs and budgets are derived from policy.
Though we are seeing a one-year influx of funding, I am
concerned that a zero policy might lead to less program and
budget support in the out-years. Will it alter STRATCOM's
ability to effectively deter potential adversaries and lead to
greater risk in our strategic posture?
Second, while there is bipartisan support in Congress for
European missile defense, that support is contingent upon a
clear and detailed understanding of the Administration's plans,
which we have not seen. Ranking Member McKeon and I wrote the
President last week asking for such details.
The Phased, Adaptive Approach for Europe and the new
regional missile defense architectures outlined in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review, BMDR, have significant force
structure and inventory implications.
However, without a detailed understanding of these plans,
it is difficult to assess whether the budget is sufficient. One
thing is clear: demand exceeds supply.
How will STRATCOM manage these limited assets, particularly
Aegis ships? Will an increase in missile defense assets for
Europe result in less protection for other theaters?
I want to commend the Department on the BMDR and
restoration of some missile defense funding. It is a welcome
indication that the Administration took note of the concerns of
many of us that a top-line increase was necessary to sustain
our homeland missile defense capabilities, to fund the new
approach for Europe and expand missile defense inventories.
I do worry, however, that we are giving up on some
promising technologies while rushing to pursue others. The
Airborne Infrared (ABIR), Precision Tracing Space System (PTSS)
and SM-3 Block IIB are interesting concepts but still unproven
technologies.
Meanwhile, the Airborne Laser recently demonstrated a
successful missile shoot-down. Yet the budget request barely
keeps it going to support further development of directed
energy technologies.
Third, I would appreciate our witnesses' thoughts on space
and cyberspace. I am particularly concerned about the health of
our space industrial base and what it portends for the future
of our national space enterprise.
For example, NASA's recent termination of the Constellation
Program will leave DOD to carry the full cost of the solid and
liquid rocket engine supplier base, which could lead to the
doubling of program budgets in the out-years.
Much of the aerospace workforce is nearing retirement.
Young engineering and technical talent won't stick around to
build more of the same, nor should we want them to.
If our Nation is to retain its leadership in space and
defense technology, then we need a strategic, long-term,
interagency approach that encourages innovation, invests in
cutting-edge science and technology, and fosters new design and
development activities that can transition into mature programs
of record.
Any thoughts that you can share on how the Department is
tackling these strategic challenges would be appreciated, as
well as your thoughts on export control reform.
Lastly, if one assumes that our strategic forces
capabilities are interrelated, if there is a link between
offensive and defensive capabilities, then logic would say that
we should increase our missile defenses as our nuclear forces
decrease and prevent any limitations on those capabilities.
Such was the intent of Congress last year when we stated
that U.S. missile defense must not be limited in the START
follow-on treaty with Russia. I want to reemphasize that point
today.
General Chilton, Dr. Miller, thank you again for being with
us today. You each possess a tremendous amount of expertise and
insight on our Nation's strategic forces, and our Nation is
better off as a result of your service. I look forward to your
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 48.]
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner----
Mr. Langevin. Before we begin the testimony, if we could, I
just want to mention--and welcome members of the Armed Services
Committee that do not serve on the subcommittee but who are in
attendance at the hearing: Representative Bishop of Utah and
Representative Fleming of Louisiana. I want to thank them both
for joining us this morning.
And without objection, once each of the members has had the
chance to ask questions, you will, in turn, be able to ask
questions.
But at this time, I believe we are going to turn now to
General Chilton to begin the testimony. Is that what we agreed
upon?
Voice. [Off mike.]
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough.
Dr. Miller, then the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Miller. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Turner,
members of the subcommittee, Representatives Bishop and
Fleming, I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify
today on behalf of the Department of Defense on strategic
issues. And I also want to thank the committee for its strong
support for the Nation's strategic capabilities.
It is a pleasure to join General Chilton in discussing
these issues related to nuclear weapons, missile defense. I
will say a little bit about combating weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) as well, as well as space and cyberspace.
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of these
issues to the Nation. And each of these has been the topic of
in-depth study in the Department of Defense over the last year.
And indeed, some of that study, as was noted, is still ongoing.
In February, in addition to delivering the Ballistic
Missile Defense Report to Congress, the Department of Defense
provided the Quadrennial Defense Review report, which
emphasized the importance of both combating WMD and improving
our capabilities in cyberspace and outlined some important
steps that the Nation needs to take to improve capabilities
there.
As the chairman noted, DOD, working with the Office of the
Director for National Intelligence, recently submitted an
interim report on the Space Posture Review, and we continue to
work on a national security space strategy that we intend to
submit to Congress this summer.
And as was noted, working closely with the Departments of
State and Energy, as well as with the National Security
Council, we are nearing completion of the Nuclear Posture
Review, and I do expect that we will submit a report to
Congress within a month.
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to address in particular nuclear
issues, missile defenses and space, and I would like to say
just a few words about each, and I will be brief in this oral
statement.
The Nuclear Posture Review will be a foundational document
for this Administration. It is intended to be a practical work
plan for the agenda laid out by President Obama in his April
2009 Prague speech.
It will provide concrete steps to reduce the role and
number of nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal--of a world
free of nuclear weapons while sustaining, as the President said
in his speech--as long as nuclear weapons exist, sustaining a
safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.
One of its key aims will be to strengthen deterrence and to
strengthen assurance of allies and partners, and the report
will outline a number of specific steps to do so.
As mandated by Congress, the report will also address U.S.
arms control objectives, and the NPR in particular has focused
on the ongoing New START negotiations.
One of the review's early conclusions was that the United
States should retain a nuclear triad under a New START Treaty
comprised of intercontinental ballistic missiles, land-based;
submarine-launched ballistic missiles; and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers, and the fiscal year 2011 budget submitted to
Congress reflected this conclusion.
Ballistic missile threats, as noted by Mr. Turner, are
growing both in quantity and in quality, and we expect this
trend to continue over the next decade or more.
The Department's first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense
Review aims to align U.S. missile defense posture with near-
term regional missile threats while sustaining and enhancing
our ability to defend the homeland against a limited long-range
attack.
Broadly, our goal is to ensure an effective defense of the
homeland against limited missile attacks while creating an
environment in which the development, acquisition, deployment
and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries is
deterred and, if necessary, defeated. Strengthening
international cooperation with key allies and partners in
Europe, East Asia and the Middle East is critical to achieving
that goal.
And as was noted, the President announced in September 2009
that the Administration would pursue a Phased, Adaptive
Approach to U.S. missile defenses in Europe, and I am very
pleased that we have had robust cooperation with our European
allies for that effort.
I just want to note a couple of those. As you know, Poland
committed last year to host a land-based site for the Standard
Missile-3 or Aegis Ashore which would be deployed by 2018.
Recently, Romania agreed to host an Aegis Ashore site
starting in 2015.
And the Czech Republic continues to have a strong interest
in missile defenses, and we are discussing how they may be
involved in the new architecture.
At the same time, we are continuing discussions with our
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies about making
territorial missile defense a NATO mission and about next steps
to develop and deploy improved capabilities.
The Administration was clear from the outset about our
intent to move forward with both a northern site and a southern
site in Europe for Standard Missile-3, for Aegis Ashore, and
have worked to build broad support in NATO for this mission. At
the same time, I want to say today that things went much faster
than expected, with Romania in particular.
I understand the interest of Congress in these issues, as
does the Department of Defense, and want to say quite plainly
that the DOD recognizes the need to consult more effectively
with Congress going forward.
Finally, as discussed in the interim report of the Space
Posture Review, the space environment is increasingly
congested, competitive and contested. And to deal with these
challenges, the Administration is currently revising its
national space policy.
This ongoing national-level policy review will seek to
synchronize the broad U.S. equities in space, and it will span
national security, science and commerce issues.
Building from this revised national space policy, the
Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence
are working now to develop a national security space strategy.
We aim to complete this effort in June and then address its
implications for export control and investment in various types
of capabilities with an aim to principally affect fiscal year
2012 budgets and forward.
Our objective is to align the appropriate ends, ways and
means to help the Nation succeed in what is increasingly a
congested, competitive and contested space environment, and we
do look forward to reporting back to the subcommittee and to
Congress on these and other strategic issues.
I have a more detailed written statement which I would ask
to be submitted for the record. And with that, I will look
forward to joining General Chilton in answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Miller, for your
testimony.
General Chilton, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Chilton. Thank you. Chairman Langevin and Ranking
Member Turner, members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to
join you again this year and have this opportunity to testify
before you.
And it is also a particular pleasure to join Dr. Miller
here in this session, having worked so closely with him over
the past year.
I am privileged to showcase STRATCOM, which I am so
privileged to command, these joint teams of achievements,
discuss our requirements and highlight future national security
challenges across our diverse and global mission areas.
U.S. Strategic Command's active duty and Reserve military
members and civilians and contractors form a superb joint team
whose dedicated planning, advocacy and operational execution
efforts advance our warfighting priorities every day.
We continue to strengthen and sharpen our focus on
deterrence while at the same time focusing on preserving our
freedom of action in both space and cyberspace.
In all of these efforts, we greatly appreciate the support
of the members of Congress and your staff whose legislative
investments across our mission areas enable us to deliver
global security for America.
Over the past year, we have actively supported the
Administration's four major defense policy reviews which
uniquely impacted U.S. Strategic Command, to include the
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review and now the Space Posture
Review. We also provided analytical and intellectual capital to
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START,
negotiations.
While not all yet completed, these reviews will shape the
role of our strategic capabilities and define the investments
necessary to recapitalize and sustain them for the future.
Their focus areas also highlight U.S. Strategic Command's--
also highlight the emphasis that we put on--and the
participation we are a part of as the nexus of today's national
security challenges.
Global security in general and the United States in
specific face a myriad of challenges today from expected and
unexpected corners of the globe, by way of economic and
political turmoil, non-traditional threats to include
terrorism, and continuing overseas contingency operations.
Actors continue to seek the means to challenge the U.S. and
our allies not only in conventional but also in asymmetric
fashion.
U.S. Strategic Command remains committed to conducting
deterrent, space and cyberspace operations and advocating for
the capabilities our national leadership and geographic
combatant commanders need each and every day in the areas of
missile defense; information operations; intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and combating weapons of
mass destruction.
In the deterrence arena, our energetic exercise program
conducted this past year, called Global Thunder 2009, was
highly successful and was, indeed, the most extensive nuclear
command and control and communications field exercise in over a
decade.
Our forces' success proved America's well-placed confidence
in USSTRATCOM's strategic deterrent and demonstrated the
success of this Command's effort to reemphasize a culture of
excellence across the nuclear enterprise.
In space, our acceptance of the Space Situational Awareness
sharing mission expanded the Command's relationship with
international and commercial partners toward ensuring a safe
and responsibly managed space domain.
Future Space Situational Awareness efforts and space
investments must continue to build on recent advances,
including advances made in greater and more frequent
conjunction or collision analysis to ensure the availability of
essential space-based capabilities.
Moreover, the Department of Defense sustained its progress
in defending DOD information networks by unifying U.S.
Strategic Command's components for network warfare and global
network operations by increasing the training for our cyber
professionals and welcoming the standup of each of the
services' cyber components.
We carefully planned this past year for the standup of U.S.
Cyberspace Command and look forward to the confirmation of its
first commander.
Additionally, in the past year, we dramatically expanded
our military-to-military outreach program and were honored to
host such leaders as United Kingdom's First Sea Lord Admiral
Sir Mark Stanhope, Australia's Vice Chief of the Defense Force
Lieutenant General David Hurley, France's Chief of the Defense
Staff General Jean-Louis Georgelin, and the Vice Chairman of
China's Central Military Commission General Xu Caihou.
All of these meetings and discussions centered around
strategic deterrence, space, cyberspace, and missile defense,
and all advanced the dialogue between these countries and the
United States Strategic Command.
Although not contained within the DOD budget, I would like
to mention my support for the Administration's fiscal year 2011
request for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The
budget seeks a nearly 13 percent increase for NNSA, designed to
provide much-needed infrastructure and human capital
investments.
I have long advocated for such critical investments, which
will help keep our stockpile safe, secure and effective for
future generations. Our deterrence credibility rests on such
confidence, and I appreciate you and your colleagues' support
for this request.
In the year ahead, U.S. Strategic Command will address the
challenges I mentioned above as we focus on further developing
our workforce, sustaining a culture of excellence in the
nuclear enterprise, and integrating our global mission sets.
U.S. Strategic Command's uniquely global missions support
national objectives, whole-of-government solutions, and
enhanced international cooperation.
Our future success requires investment in the deterrent,
the standup of U.S. Cyberspace Command, and both expanding our
awareness and sustaining our capability investments within the
space domain.
As we move forward, I look forward to continuing to partner
with this committee and your staff. And again, thank you for
the opportunity to be with you here today, and I also ask that
my posture statement be submitted for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton can be found in
the Appendix on page 67.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General Chilton.
Thank you both for your testimony. Before we go to
questions, just for our guests in the audience, let me just
read a bit of the interesting bios of both of our witnesses
here today.
Dr. Miller was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on April
2nd, 2009, and he serves as the principal staff assistant to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and provides advice
and assistance to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary
of Defense on all matters concerning the formulation of
national security and defense policy and the integration and
oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security
objectives.
Prior to his confirmation, Dr. Miller, served as the Senior
Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New
American Security.
Previous positions--including serving as Senior Vice
President and Vice President at Hicks & Associates
Incorporated; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy; assistant
professor at Duke University; and senior Professional Staff
Member for the House Armed Services Committee from 1988 to
1992--a little plug there for the Armed Services Committee work
you have done.
Dr. Miller. Sir, you saved the best for last. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Absolutely.
General Kevin Chilton is Commander, U.S. Strategic Command,
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. He is responsible for the
global command and control of the U.S. Strategic Forces to meet
decisive national security objectives.
USSTRATCOM provides a broad range of strategic capabilities
and options for the President and Secretary of Defense. Command
mission areas include full-spectrum global strike, space
operations, computer network operations, Department of Defense
information operations, strategic warning, integrated missile
defense, global command operations, strategic warning,
integrated missile defense--again, global command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, the combating of weapons of mass destruction,
and specialized expertise to the joint war fighter.
General Chilton is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air
Force Academy, class of 1976, a Guggenheim fellow. He completed
a Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering at
Columbia University. He flew operational assignments in the RF-
4C and F-15 as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot
School.
General Chilton conducted weapons testing in various models
of the F-4 and F-15 prior to joining the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) in 1987. At NASA he flew on
three space shuttle missions and served as the Deputy Program
Manager for Operations in the International Space Station
program.
Quite a bio, General.
So thank you again. Welcome to you both.
I would like to turn now to questions. It is my intention
to do two rounds of questions and so we will stick to the five-
minute rule.
Dr. Miller, if I could, I would like to start with you.
Last September, President Obama announced his plan for
strengthening missile defenses in Europe through a Phased,
Adaptive Approach to deploying defenses in Europe. The PAA, as
it is called, supplanted the previous administration's plans
for 10 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and the X-
Band Radar in the Czech Republic.
Now, I am assuming that the Administration performed a
rigorous analysis of alternatives for addressing the evolving
Iranian threat and protecting U.S. interests before the
decision was announced. I would assume that--again, being that
the case--if so, when can we expect the Department to share
this analysis with the Congress?
Dr. Miller. Sir, yes, that is correct. The Department
conducted a quite extensive analysis of the threat from Iran
and potentially others to the European theater, and considering
also the possible contribution of any architecture to the
defense of the United States homeland as well.
I believe we have shared a good amount of that analysis
with the Congress. And I know that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) is currently doing a review of the
decision-making that led up to that. And as part of that, we
will be releasing information associated with the analysis and
the decision-making process.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. So it is a formal report that you will
be able to release to the Congress that details the analysis?
Dr. Miller. Sir, we are currently in discussions with GAO
about which parts of the decision--which parts of the--what was
a very lengthy decision-making and analytical process--should
be released and we are committed to providing the information
necessary for Congress to understand that decision.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Well, I clearly think that would be
helpful to the members of the committee and to the Congress in
giving greater confidence to the--again, the plan itself and
the need to supplant the previous administration's previous
plans on missile defense for Europe.
So we would look forward to that analysis.
Dr. Miller. Sir, I could say in open session right now that
there is no question that Iran in particular has significant
and increasing capabilities for short-, medium-range and
beginning to develop intermediate-range capabilities.
And a fundamental part of the assessment was to recognize
that 10 interceptors were likely to be woefully inadequate for
coping with the scale of the type of attack that Iran could
mount today, let alone in the future.
And so the ability to adapt the system, to bring it online
earlier, which we can with Aegis ships, and to be able to adapt
it over time with a more flexible architecture was really
fundamental to the decision-making.
I will also say we looked at the question of the
contribution of the Phased, Adaptive Approach and the previous
architecture to national missile defense, and both of them--
both of the architectures shared an important feature, which is
an early deployment of an X-Band Radar that will give us an
early look on any attack coming--that could come from Iran
toward the United States.
The plan under the Phased, Adaptive Approach is to deploy
that in 2011, which is earlier than previously planned, so we
moved that forward to look to improve the capabilities of our
ground-based interceptors.
And in addition, we looked at the tradeoff between adding
the same type of interceptor in Europe that we have in the
United States, a two-stage versus a three-stage, but
fundamentally the same interceptor, versus going for a
different type of phenomenology with ascent-phase intercept,
which we aim to provide in Phase Four.
And so the analysis--again, we have--I think we have
briefed it, but we can certainly share more about it. But the
analysis, to my mind, suggested very strongly that moving
assets there earlier to deal with today's threat and with the
possible future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
threat--possible future, but the 2011 deployment gets us
earlier capability.
And moving toward a different way of engaging that threat
through ascent-phase was going to contribute more, both to our
theater-based defenses and to our national defense. And happy
to follow up with more details, sir.
Mr. Langevin. That detail would be very much welcome.
If I could, continuing on on this topic, it was announced
that--more recently it was announced--and you have mentioned--
you touched on it this morning--that the Romanian government
has agreed to base missile defense interceptors, the so-called
Aegis Ashore system, on its soil as early as 2015 as part of
the second phase of the PAA.
Could you describe to the committee, or provide it for the
record if it is classified, the defended footprint of the SM-3
Block IB missile system that will be deployed in Romania and
the threats from Iran and the Aegis Ashore system it will
defend against?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I would like to provide that for the
record, if I can, and provide it in a closed session. We would
be happy to provide maps showing the estimated footprint for
the system for each of the four phases of the Phased, Adaptive
Approach.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 95.]
Mr. Langevin. Good enough. We would welcome that.
Then let me also, then, ask could you also describe any
discussions with NATO that preceded the announcement of an
agreement with Romania?
Can you assure this committee that the U.S. will, in fact,
work with our allies to ensure that we meet NATO's objectives
as adopted by the North Atlantic Council in April 2009 that
``any future missile defense system deployed in Europe should
be part of a comprehensive approach that addresses the most
likely threats on a prioritized basis''?
Dr. Miller. Sir, yes. We had multiple briefings with our
NATO allies prior to the meeting with Romania. As I said, that
particular meeting resulted in a conclusion more quickly than
many had expected.
But those meetings included briefings to the North Atlantic
Council by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, by the
Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs. I briefed on
the progress on the Nuclear Posture Review and made mention of
it, but didn't go into the same detail as they did.
And I also believe the Secretary engaged with our NATO
allies on these issues as well during that period.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Let me, if I could, just turn my final set of questions for
this round to General Chilton.
General, last summer Secretary Gates announced his
intention to stand up U.S. Cyber Command as a subordinate
unified command under STRATCOM. Secretary Gates made it clear
that CYBERCOM would be the focal point for cybersecurity
operations within the Department.
More recently, the standup has been delayed, as we all
know, by the fact that the designated commander has not yet
been confirmed by the Senate.
General, would you update the committee on STRATCOM's
progress toward establishing Cyber Command? And can you explain
also STRATCOM's role, if any, in the National Cyber Initiative?
General Chilton. Sure, happy to, Chairman. Last year when
the Secretary made the decision to stand up a sub-unified
command under U.S. Strategic Command, the other thing he asked
for is an implementation plan.
And over the months of 2009 we worked very closely with the
STRATCOM headquarters, with Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), as well as with our two components, the Joint Task Force
for Global Network Operations (JTFGNO) and the Joint Functional
Component Command for Net Warfare to pull together an
implementation plan for the standup of this new command.
We delivered that to the Secretary in the fall of last
year. He has reviewed it and made adjustments to it, and we
think we have complied with those. But we are holding off on
the signing and moving forward on the plan until we do have a
commander assigned for this command.
I was pleased to see that General Alexander received his
advance policy questions to address back to the Senate and so I
am hopeful that an opportunity for him to testify and have a
hearing will soon arise on the calendar. And then, once we have
a commander, it will be time to put the implementation plan
into action.
I don't want to suggest, though, that we have been standing
static in this mission area at all. We continue to robustly
operate the Joint Task Force for Network Ops and Network
Warfare.
We put JTFGNO under the operational command direction of
the Network Warfare Command, so we have already started to
unify those two mission areas, which I think is exactly the
right way to provide for a better defense for our military
networks, which we are chartered to do, and as well as more
secure operations.
So I am anxious to move forward in this area. I think it is
the right thing to do. And I think we will be in a much better
position to both operate and defend and be prepared to conduct
military operations in cyberspace in the future as we stand up
the subordinate command of U.S. CYBERCOM.
Mr. Langevin. And the National Cyber Initiative?
General Chilton. I am sorry, sir. In the National
Cybersecurity Initiative, the United States Strategic Command
benefitted from investments in certain technologies that I
believe will help us to do defense in a more real-time fashion,
rather than waiting until we know our computers are infected,
and then doing the forensics to figure out the malware and then
working our way backward up the threat, to actually have some
real-time--more real-time detection systems employed that will
allow us to look for threats coming into the networks and head
them off before they get to our computers.
So that type of technology is part of the investment
portfolio in the National Cybersecurity Initiative which will
support us.
Additionally, there is a good portion of that initiative
that supports National Security Agency (NSA), and NSA is one of
our key intelligence providers for this particular domain. We
rely on intelligence from all intelligence agencies, from the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, from Defense
Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, et cetera.
But NSA particularly is supportive in this area, and so
plus-ups to their ability to do their mission set also benefits
United States Strategic Command as well as the Department of
Homeland Security.
Mr. Langevin. Are the network defenses primarily designed
by NSA and given to STRATCOM, or is STRATCOM actually involved
with designing those defenses?
General Chilton. A lot of the technology comes to us
through contracts through NSA, but also Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA). You know, DISA is important to us, too,
because they design and build the networks. And so as much as
you can design and build in capability for ease of operation
and defense, that is important as well.
So they are really--DISA is a major trainer and equipper,
if you will, of the networks which we operate, and so their
part in that is equally important.
Of course, we have no acquisition authority and we do not
exercise that. We are about requirements and demanding the
things we need to conduct our mission sets.
Mr. Langevin. Good enough.
Then my last question before I turn to the ranking member,
for both our witnesses, what do you see as the key issues still
outstanding in the cybersecurity arena?
Dr. Miller. Late last summer, the Secretary of Defense
asked us to bring together a comprehensive approach for the
Department of Defense in dealing with cybersecurity, and we
have begun to do that, working closely with STRATCOM and with
others.
And quite frankly, there is a significant list of issues
that we need to deal with. It starts with thinking through the
problem from the perspective of strategy.
We have begun to do that within the Department,
understanding that we need to plug into the national effort
that is now under way to develop a new cybersecurity strategy,
and the Department of Defense is supporting that effort.
We are looking at the importance of personnel, of highly
trained, educated, talented personnel and whether the personnel
models that we have as a department and within the services are
appropriate for recruiting and retaining the types of people
that will be successful.
We are asking a question of how to accelerate the pace of
innovation both in the concepts we apply to cybersecurity and
in the technologies we use.
We would like to--you know, we are dealing with the
challenge of Moore's Law and with the rapidly changing
technology and the--frankly, the rapid innovation of people who
may try to get into our networks.
We need to continue to think about how to accelerate the
pace of technical change and present more of a moving target,
if you will, to people who might get into our networks.
And finally, we need--we are looking hard at what types of
cooperation make sense, what we can do to build on the work we
already do with the private sector and with other agencies and,
for that matter, internationally as well. We have begun to
reach out to some key allies and talk about their thinking and
capabilities on cybersecurity.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
General.
General Chilton. And I would just add that kind of looking
at it from the deck plate up, the things that we have been
focusing on in U.S. Strategic Command over the last year and a
half is--we call them the Three Cs: culture, conduct and
capability.
Trying to change the general culture of the way we look at
our networks in the military--it is not just--when there is a
problem with a computer, it is not just a technical--or
technician's problem, it is the commander's problem.
It should be the focus of every commander in the field, the
health and status of their networks, just as they are focused
on the health and status of their people, their tanks, their
airplanes, their ships, because the networks are so critical.
So changing that cultural mindset is really important.
Changing the way we conduct ourselves, providing the
appropriate training for all of our members in the military who
touch our networks--each one of them is really a gate guard to
the networks based on their behavior on their computer.
So changing their conduct, training them and then holding
people accountable for their behavior on the network is
important.
Operationalizing this domain such that we treat it like
other domains with operational concepts and orders that allow
us to be postured to readily protect and defend the networks I
think are also absolutely essential, and we are working that
problem hard.
And I have already mentioned the capability piece about
technologies that can help us better defend our networks.
But also, I think in addition to what I mentioned before,
the development, as we have asked for, in the space domain of a
common operating picture, situational awareness that we can
provide our commanders so they can see the health and status of
the network real-time, they can see attacks developing against
those networks, then take appropriate action, and then making
sure we are sharing that information as widely as possible not
only within the military but with the Department of Homeland
Security.
So these are some of the capability areas, too, that we
will continue to press for and look to advance in the future.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Well, thank you both. Obviously, the cybersecurity area is
a dynamic one and one--a threat that is ever-evolving. It seems
the challenge is to stay one step ahead of our adversaries, or
the bad guys, if you will.
And we have our--obviously, our work cut out for us. But
thank you for your work that you are doing in that area. I am
going to continue to--this is a particular area of interest to
me that I will continue to spend a great deal of time on and
oversight.
I am also fortunate to have Congresswoman Sanchez here, who
chairs the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee. I know it is an issue of great importance to her
as well as to many other members.
But with that, let me turn now to the ranking member for
his questions.
And thank you very much, gentlemen.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the chairman's questions. In fact, I am going
to be following up with you, in effect, on the questions that
he asked.
Dr. Miller, when the announcement was made for the
abandonment of the ground-based interceptors in Europe, many in
Congress were concerned because it was our understanding that
it was not a threat-based decision. As you indicated in your
comments, our ballistic missile threat is increasing, not
decreasing.
There is no information that anyone has provided to
Congress that would show that the threat from Iran is
diminishing. Nothing has changed in our understanding of their
intent and their programs or their current technical
capabilities.
And the chair asked you when is Congress going to receive
the information upon which the decision was based in looking at
the threat from Iran, and you gave an answer that I think we
need to clarify.
You said we are currently deciding what to release. And I
doubt that you are sitting in front of us telling us that you
are considering whether or not you give the information to
Congress that Congress is asking, because as you know, when the
Administration makes a decision and we ask for the information
upon which it is based, it is the Administration's
responsibility to provide it.
So perhaps you could embellish what that answer is in the
context of the chairman's question of when can we see the
information upon which the decision was based to abandon those
ground-based interceptors, which many of us believe are
essential to protect the United States?
Dr. Miller. Sir, yes, your summary of what my intent was is
correct. There were, I don't know, scores to, perhaps, more
than that, briefings developed by the staff. There is a lot of
analytical work that was completed by both the OSD staff, joint
staff working with STRATCOM and Missile Defense Agency.
There are reams and reams of documents. And quite frankly,
I don't think it--I don't think it makes sense--I wouldn't want
to go back through all of them, and what we want to do is
identify the most important milestone documents in the process
that identify where an assessment was made and, particularly,
where senior leadership was engaged.
And we are looking to do that so that Congress can see what
the basis of the decision was.
Mr. Turner. I appreciate that answer. And I know from many
in Congress, and including the members of this committee, we
are very eager for that process to be completed so that we can
review it, because again, all the information--in fact, all the
testimony that we have had in other hearings--has confirmed
that the threat is not diminishing from Iran.
And so how that can be correlated to a decision to diminish
our missile defense capability is where we are concerned.
To another question that the chair asked, he asked about
Romania, and I know a number of us have concerns about a
unilateral action on part of the Administration in working with
Romania, as opposed a NATO-ization of a missile defense system.
Because you know there was significant criticism of the
last administration for their approach with Poland and the
Czech Republic. The criticisms were that the bilateral
discussions were bypassing NATO and were preventing, really, a
NATO-ization of a missile defense system.
So we were all surprised when Romania was approached, when
we know that there has not yet been a NATO-ization. Now, you
answered the chair that there were a number of briefings with
NATO when he asked NATO's involvement.
But I am going to ask you the next step of that. It is my
understanding that the selection of Romania was not done in
conjunction with a process with NATO in determining the
strategic positioning and the needed assets for a joint U.S.-
NATO system, that this is the Administration that decided the
approach to this with Romania and informed NATO. Is my
characterization correct?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the Administration briefed NATO on the
overall architecture and the requirement in that architecture
for both a land-based site in southern Europe as well as a
land-based site in northern Europe.
There were several options for each of those that would
ultimately provide the possibility for a territorial--complete
territorial--defense of European countries and NATO.
It turned out that Poland was one in the north and, as I
think we have testified before, the priority was given to
reaching out to the Poles because of their earlier and
continued commitment to missile defense. It turned out to be
that Slupsk, the location we are likely to go to, is a good
location.
With respect to Romania, there were several countries as
well that were possible options, and the United States made
that clear--the Administration made that clear in our
discussion with allies.
It was always going to be necessary to conduct bilateral
negotiations with the hosting country rather than to try to
``NATO-ize'' that process, in order to reach closure on that.
But certainly, our allies were aware of the range of
possibilities with respect to both the southern side and the
northern side.
And I would also add that in considering the missile threat
and how it relates to the Phased, Adaptive Approach, I believe
the Phased, Adaptive Approach was based on a recognition that
the missile threat was both more urgent because it is here
today and because the United States needs to begin to--needs to
think about how to protect our forces that are deployed and our
capabilities to operate, as well, and a recognition that it is
growing and we need to have the adaptability to modify the
system.
A key downside of the former architecture is with 10 GBIs
and two-for-one targeting SRVs, five missile shots and you are
out of it. And there is no more capability to be provided.
Phased, Adaptive Approach is intended to address that
challenge.
Mr. Turner. Okay, a couple things. One, you know,
obviously, the concern with respect to NATO-ization is that,
you know, our goal to increase our relationships
internationally, to increase our relationships with our allies,
and to the extent that they are not brought to the table,
obviously, there is a communication of value that I think could
be enhanced if they are more at the table versus informed.
With respect to the interceptors, you know, obviously, a
concern that we have with the Phased, Adaptive Approach is that
many of the systems that are identified by the Administration
in it are paper systems--they don't currently exist--and that
the ground-based interceptors that were intended for Poland--
although you indicate their limitation in number, they truly
exist--would have existed and would have been something that is
available to us, which takes us to the Phased, Adaptive
Approach.
And that is that your evaluative statements, your review of
the Phased, Adaptive Approach and what its benefits are, is
something that Congress really isn't able to do right now
because we don't have from the Administration the Phased,
Adaptive Approach briefings, information, for us to be able to
evaluate.
We can't evaluate it based on its effectiveness and
compared to other systems or even, too, whether or not the
Administration is living up to its obligations in funding the
types of systems and research and development that will be
necessary to take what is not only unproven systems but non-
existent systems to deployable systems.
When will Congress be able to receive the Phased, Adaptive
Approach and be able to review it?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I had the opportunity to brief this
committee shortly after the announcement and in that did
include some maps that showed estimates of coverage. The
reality is that these are estimates and that the details of the
architecture will--in terms of the location of the systems--
change those.
So the ones that I showed to this committee--would have
been, I guess, last September--will look a little bit
different. They will still have about the same coverage. They
will--complete within the later phases the territorial coverage
of Europe.
Sir, I offered to come back and provide that briefing in a
closed session, if we could, at the convenience of the
committee.
Mr. Turner. Okay, great, because what we are looking for is
not just how the system might work. We want what systems you
are actually proposing. What are the timelines? What is the
development? What systems are going to have to be purchased and
acquired? What, of the systems that don't currently exist, are
there milestones that will have to be achieved in order for it
to be deployable or to bring it into existence? You know, we
certainly have seen, I think almost everybody on the committee,
the zone or scope of where these type of systems might provide
coverage, but certainly, we are looking for more than just
that. Dr. Miller, I hope that you can provide it.
One more question and, General Chilton, I am going to pass
to you for my second round since we have so many people here,
and I want to defer and make certain everyone gets to ask a
question.
But, Dr. Miller, I don't want to leave our discussion
without talking about your reference to the President's Prague
speech and the--I think in your comments you referred to it as
a `goal' of going to zero. I have heard it referred to as a
`policy' of going to zero.
And I am very concerned about that as it goes to--and I
believe your comments were how it is translated into policy to
affect the role and numbers of our nuclear weapons.
Now, I mean, let me tell you, I was a mayor of a community.
And as a mayor of a community, I look out at the community and
assess a threat, crime, and look to putting together a plan to
address that threat, crime.
My desire for there not to be crime in my community did not
result in me strategically reducing my police force. I wouldn't
have attacked crime by saying I am going to reduce my
deterrence to crime. In fact, I increased police. And we saw a
decrease in crime.
Now, we know that the threat of nuclear weapons is actually
increasing by the number of countries that are both seeking
and/or possessing nuclear weapons technology. That threat does
not appear to be decreasing.
So I am very concerned as we try to translate what perhaps
should be a stated dream into an actual goal or policy that
affects both the role and numbers of our strategic deterrent,
instead of it merely just being, you know, something that we
are advocating for on the national--on the international stage,
we are actually looking to our national policy and changing, as
you said, the role and numbers of our weapons.
Could you speak to that issue a moment and how that balance
can keep us safe?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. I will start by noting again that in
the President's April Prague speech he suggested the
elimination of nuclear weapons as a long-term goal and noted
that it might not occur within our lifetimes, that it, indeed,
is extremely challenging to imagine the situation in which
elimination of nuclear weapons is possible. It is clearly not
possible today.
And the President also said at Prague that as long as
nuclear weapons exist, the United States would retain a safe,
secure and effective nuclear arsenal to deter threats against
ourselves and our allies.
You see in the fiscal year 2011 budget and our plans that
follow it a commitment to that, a sustainment to a triad with
respect to our strategic forces and, as General Chilton and the
chairman noted, a 13 percent increase in overall funding for
NNSA to sustain our nuclear weapons infrastructure and
enterprise.
So understanding that it is a long-term objective, the
United States, in my view, ought to continue to sustain both
its deterrent and the infrastructure required to support that
over time. And in fact, that has been translated into policy.
With respect to the goal of zero nuclear weapons, it is a
goal that almost every president in the past has embraced,
including Ronald Reagan. It is, I think, generally understood
to be something that is not on the near-term horizon but
something that can help guide us as we go forward.
The United States has an obligation under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament. Again, it
is difficult to foresee the timeline under which that could be
possible. But to look to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear
weapons over time, as consistent with not just maintaining but
strengthening our deterrence posture is, in my view, a very
reasonable policy goal and one that this Nation can and should
pursue.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
I will save my questions for General Chilton if we are
doing a second round, since there are so many people who have
questions.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
I thank the ranking member for his questions.
We will be now operating under the five-minute rule, and I
am pleased to turn to Mr. Spratt for a round of questions.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you both for your testimony.
Dr. Miller, I wasn't sure he was going to reach the crucial
points in your past when he was outlining your curriculum
vitae, and your training here surely has propelled you into the
position you now hold. You don't need to reply to that.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Miller. Sir, I would just say the four years I spent
here were 10 of the best years of my life.
Mr. Spratt. [Off mike.]
Dr. Miller. I learned a tremendous amount. Thank you.
Mr. Spratt. You made a tremendous contribution here, and we
are pleased to see you where you are, because we know what your
potential is.
Tactical nukes--we haven't discussed them very much, but we
have discussed the greatest concern we have, and that is that
nuclear terrorists would get nuclear weapons of some kind in
their hands, and the likeliest weapon that they would be able
to lay their hands upon and also utilize would be tactical
nuclear weapons.
The arms control talks have largely focused upon the big
systems that do constitute a daily threat to us, and there are
lots of issues with respect to tactical nukes--are they stored
adequately? How many? Do we have a have a good inventory of
them?
To what extent are we taking steps with the Russians to
make this the forefront of our negotiations, because they do
constitute, in my opinion, a significant part of the non-state
terrorist threat today?
General Chilton. And if I could first talk about the----
Mr. Spratt. Please, yes, sir.
General Chilton [continuing]. The accountability of them,
we do have excellent--perfect accountability of our nuclear
weapons today, sir, and----
Mr. Spratt. How about the----
General Chilton [continuing]. And security for our weapons.
We don't have the insight into the Russian stockpile----
Mr. Spratt. Yes.
General Chilton [continuing]. Of tactical weapons that we
would like to see.
Mr. Spratt. There have been anecdotal accounts of these
weapons in insecure locations throughout the former Soviet
Union. Is there any effort on your part--are you engaged at all
in the process of trying to get a better, more rigorous count
of their nuclear--their tactical nuclear weapons and where they
may be located?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. As you know, since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Russia has moved its tactical weapons in
general back more towards the interior of the country. It has
improved the security associated with those weapons and reduced
them relatively significantly.
Our judgment would be that there is a good distance to go
both with respect to reductions and security, and that is a--
that has been a point of discussion, as you know, over the--in
fact, over the years with Russia.
Mr. Spratt. Is this an agenda item with respect to START?
Dr. Miller. Sir, it is not an item within the START
negotiations.
Mr. Spratt. Is it anywhere a formal item of discussion or
is it something we just deal with ad hoc from time to time?
Dr. Miller. It is something that has been a focus of the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and it is an issue with
respect to negotiations where, post-START, we would like to
look towards reductions.
But as you know, we have been engaged in discussions of
nuclear security, really, for the last almost two decades with
Russia.
Mr. Spratt. Dr. Miller, when you were here on the staff,
the Ballistic Missile Defense Program included something I
think then was called Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Low
and SBIRS High.
And it has gone through several permutations since those
days, but it is still not a deployed system. In fact, it has
taken on a different configuration. It is a space surveillance
system today, I believe. But clearly, if it works as intended
and is designed, it enhances missile defense.
Could you give us an update on where the latest rendition
of SBIRS lies?
General Chilton. Right, sir, I can take that. The----
Mr. Spratt. Yes, sir.
General Chilton [continuing]. SBIRS High program, which is
being managed by the United States Air Force--its latest
schedule for first launch of the geosynchronous satellite,
which will replace our Defense Support Program constellation,
is scheduled for the end of this year.
And that will be a welcome first launch of this capability.
Today we have in the highly elliptical orbits already airborne
the sensors--two of the sensors that will be part of the
geosynchronous belt as well. They are performing exceptionally
well, so that is a good news story. But we look forward to that
first launch of the SBIRS High geosynchronous.
SBIRS Low, as you pointed out, sir, has changed names and
moved from the Air Force into the Missile Defense Agency as an
experimental program. There is two satellites--Satellite
Tracking Surveillance System they are called now. They are not
for space surveillance.
They are, as you described, infrared satellites to support
missile defense-type operations. And they are going through
their test and checkout now to see the utility of them for
potential future architectures in support of missile defense.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
I have a couple more questions, but my time has expired. I
will come back on the next round.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Franks for five minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both of you for being here.
You know, General, I never want to miss the opportunity to
say a special word of thanks to people such as yourself that
have given their lives to this cause. Because you do your job
so well, a lot of the rest of us don't have to worry like we
perhaps should on an issue of this kind of gravity.
Let me, if I could, add my voice to both the ranking member
and the chairman related to the missile defense issue in
Europe.
I think Mr. Spratt pointed out a point that I have made on
a number of occasions here, that my greatest concern for at
least the immediate short-term, and what--I mean in the next
year or two or three--threat to this country is terrorists
gaining control or access to a nuclear capability. And he is
exactly right, a tactical nuke is probably the thing that is
most likely.
But it seems that sometimes we forget the connection. My
concern--and I hope that it will be part of your report to us,
Dr. Miller--what rationale went into the concern of trying to
work ourselves into Iran's calculus as to whether or not to
actually become a nuclear nation.
I think their intent is clear, but they have a great many
concerns out there. Israel, our own response--there is a lot of
things that speak against them moving forward here. But one of
those things would have been the ability to have met that
threat the day that it became operational.
And a lot of us are very happy with the idea of having
additional Phased, Adaptive Approach capability, but we are
concerned about not having the ground-based system in Europe in
time to be a part of Iran's calculus, because I think that by
the time we have the ability to truly do what the ground-based
system would--will be able to do, they will already become a
nuclear-armed nation.
And I think that all other issues at that point might have
to fall off the table. So that is just a commercial. I hope
that that will be part of the information that we receive.
General Chilton, in your testimony last year before this
committee you said, ``Within the nuclear enterprise, the U.S.
stockpile requires the most urgent attention. Without action,
our current weapons are not indefinitely sustainable. We
mitigate that risk today along with the risk from an inability
to respond through strategic surprise only by maintaining more
weapons than we would otherwise need.''
And I think you were absolutely right. We do need to do
that. But in light of the current Administration negotiating
with Russians on the follow-up to START, which may
significantly reduce our nuclear stockpile, a significant
reduction in our inventory concerns me, particularly if it
doesn't accommodate to concerns that you raised in your
testimony last year.
So what types of programs and what type of support would be
required to sustain or maintain our stockpile, in your mind, as
a professional, in your judgment, that would maintain those--
meet those concerns without abandoning the approach of
maintaining more weapons than we would ``otherwise need''?
General Chilton. Thank you, sir. Fundamental to that is an
investment in the nuclear enterprise infrastructure. To have a
first-class nuclear deterrent, you must have a first-class
plutonium production capacity and uranium production capacity.
And the investments in this budget that start to improve
the infrastructure at Los Alamos National Laboratory as well as
at Oak Ridge are absolutely fundamental to enabling the
capabilities that I have talked about that we need in the past.
Additionally, part of the focus of the budget increase is
to attract the quality people that we are going to need for the
future and hire the young people into the enterprise to make
sure that we can sustain the stockpile for the future.
And lastly, we need to continue to move out on the W76
production, get that up to full rate production, so that we can
complete that by 2017. Today, because of the issues with
infrastructure, we are only capitalized to handle one weapon at
a time. So it is a serial--we have to approach our problems
serially. Hopefully we will fix that in the future with the
investments.
But given the reality for the next 10 years until that can
be achieved, it is important to get the W76 done so we can move
on to the next weapon, which needs life extension attention,
and that would be the B61.
So the investments in these areas are absolutely critical
to follow that path that I outlined before.
Mr. Franks. Can I throw one last question to Mr. Miller
here?
Secretary Gates assured this committee that the START
negotiations with Russia would not be linked to missile defense
reductions for this country. Do you continue to assure us of
that as of today?
General Chilton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Franks. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Larsen is now recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome back, and a couple of questions. Can you
just go back to the nuclear infrastructure? Can you tell us
what in the budget--what the budget says about year 2012 and
about Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) that
gives you confidence about the nuclear weapons facilities
infrastructure and its ability to support a capable deterrent?
General Chilton. Sir, I would like to send that over for
the record, the specifics of that. It is in the NNSA budget,
and as we have looked at it, it is the start of exactly what I
believe we need to do as far as recapitalizing both those
facilities.
But I would like to take that for the record and make sure
we get you the exact numbers, how they are proceeding.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 95.]
Mr. Larsen. Yes, please do that.
Dr. Miller, can you address that from your end of things?
Dr. Miller. I would also like--sir, would like to take it
for the record, give you the exact numbers. I will say that
this was a focus of early work in the Nuclear Posture Review,
and the decision was taken to move forward with both of these,
both of these facilities, in parallel.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 94.]
Mr. Larsen. Great.
General, in regard to space policy, there is obviously
concerns about other space-faring nations, China in particular,
usually, and sometimes Russia. Are we headed towards--with
regards to space policy, are we being driven by a goal of
dominance in space, of control of space, or access to space?
General Chilton. Sir, I would defer the policy question to
my colleague here who is in charge of that.
But I can give you a war fighter's perspective----
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
General Chilton [continuing]. If I could.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
General Chilton. From a U.S. military perspective, it is
clear we are dependent on space for our military operations
today. My observation of other countries in the world is that
they are growing more and more dependent as well on space
because they see the advantages of utilizing space in both our
precision munitions and also our ability to globally
communicate and move information around.
So in the future, I have no doubt in my mind that we will
be challenged. Our forces will be challenged. Future
adversaries will seek to deny us the ability to use the
advantages we have in space. And that, from a military
perspective, is something we should anticipate and prepare for.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
So then, Dr. Miller, what does that mean for what drives
the policy: dominance, control or access?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the access to space is fundamental to day-
to-day military operations, as the general suggested. And in
fact, it is accurate to say that our dependency as well as
others' is increasing there.
One of the things that we were focused on very heavily in
the ongoing review of strategy is what should be the United
States' deterrence posture with respect to space. And this is
dealing with the--not just the reality that it is congested, as
I said before, but also increasingly contested.
We are looking at a number of elements. We start with the
resilience of our space-based capabilities. We look at the
requirement to hedge against the possibility of the loss of
some of those capabilities both with respect to the ability to
conduct operations in a degraded space environment but also be
able to provide capabilities from other domains, so--for
example, air breathers for both ISR and possibly for
communications relays.
And then part of the deterrence posture has to be to
consider how we would respond to various types of actions taken
against our space assets. And we have begun to work through
that problem relatively systematically.
I think that we will have a good bumper sticker, if you
will, for the objective. But the goal is going to be to assure
access to space and to ensure that we as a military and as a
country are able to continue to operate and to fulfill the
requirements that space provides for the warfighter and for our
economy and for our society.
Mr. Larsen. Well, we will look forward to the space policy
and the--and, for that matter, the NPR as well. I look forward
to all the reviews that are due, and delayed, getting up here.
Dr. Miller. Me, too.
Mr. Larsen. Us more so.
General, you are in charge of the Capabilities Based
Assessment on Electronic Warfare, and I wouldn't be--you know,
it wouldn't be fair for me to sit here and not take any of my
time to talk about Electronic Warfare.
So can you give me an update on where STRATCOM is on the
Capabilities Based Assessment on Electronic Warfare and what we
can expect to see as a deliverable this year?
General Chilton. Yes, sir. It was about a year and a half
ago that Admiral Keating came forward to the Joint Chiefs and
STRATCOM to express this concern about what he perceived as a
lack of attention in the electronic warfare area, and STRATCOM
was chartered to go off and do an Electronic Warfare
Capabilities Based Assessment, which the Joint Information
Operations Center did for us and completed this past year.
Our goal is always to get that done in time to inform the
budget that has just been submitted to the Congress this year,
and I think we achieved that.
You will see plus-ups in the acquisition plans for the
Growler, the F-18 Growler, as well as investments for
sustainment of the Marine EA-6B and an addition of an Air Force
Compass Call aircraft to this budget.
Where I would describe we are, Congressman, now is we have
analyzed and understand our capability shortfalls, defining
requirements and advising the budget, and I can see that
continuing to go forward. And it will be important for us to go
forward here because I think we got to where we were a couple
years ago by lack of attention in this area.
And I think, also, the exigencies of the fight we were in
in Iraq and Afghanistan--suddenly we started to see
interference between various elements of the services bringing
in Electronic Warfare to Counter-Improvised Explosive Device,
for example, so maybe that interfered with the Comm system from
another service, or maybe even in service.
So a better focus on integrating these capabilities as we
bring them forward is something we are going to have to keep
our eye on.
Mr. Larsen. Right. Well, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for five minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chilton, it is good to see you again.
And my question is what, or who, is the responsible agency
for missile defense training? And what joint requirements have
been established for such training? And has STRATCOM assessed
the need or the overall existence of training as it stands now
to identify possible shortcomings?
In my understanding, it is sort of scattered and diffuse
right now. What is your assessment? And is there a responsible
agency at this time?
General Chilton. Thank you, Congressman. The responsibility
for organizing, training and equipping belongs to the services.
With the accelerated time frame and the way that we rolled out
missile defense as quickly as we did, a lot of the
development--sort of the organization and development of the
systems was in MDA, the Missile Defense Agency.
And so now what we are seeing is transfer of those
capabilities over to the services. All of the various
capabilities in the missile defense arena have been assigned to
various services, I would say with the exception of the
Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication (C2BMC)
function, which is still yet to be assigned.
So as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) goes
forward, as Aegis goes forward, the Army will organize, train
and equip THAAD. The Navy will organize, train and equip Aegis.
The Navy has already taken on Sea-Based X-Band Radar, that
system, to do that function, to organize, train and equip that
radar platform.
And so we see these all transferring over to the services,
and they will have the responsibility for training the forces,
to provide them to the regional combatant commanders to execute
those weapon systems.
Mr. Lamborn. So it is fair to say that there is no overall
joint training at this time.
General Chilton. Not a formal joint organization that is
doing training. That is not to suggest that our operators are
not trained in their systems. They are today.
Mr. Lamborn. Oh, sure.
General Chilton. But the responsibility for long-term
training, growth of the force, recruitment, school sets, et
cetera, will be the responsibility of the services.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Okay, thank you.
And, Dr. Miller, I would like to take a step back and ask
more of a broader strategic question. Last year, the
Administration justified cuts to the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) System because the long-term threat was said to
be ``slower to develop than previously estimated.''
However, since then, we have all become aware of
significant threat developments in North Korea and Iran's long-
range missile programs.
At what point would the Department reevaluate either its
reductions to homeland defense and, specifically, cutting the
ground-based interceptors from 44 to 30, or to consider
accelerating the Phases Three and Four of the Phased, Adaptive
Approach?
What has to happen before we will take those steps now that
we see what is happening more with Iran and North Korea?
Dr. Miller. Sir, that was a question that was looked at in
some detail in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and you
are absolutely correct that there have been some developments
over the last year with respect to both North Korea and Iran
and their capabilities and the programs and activities that
underlie them.
The Department will continue to assess the requirements
associated with ballistic missile defense, including the GMD
system.
One of the things that the Secretary of Defense did in
order to hedge our position was to go ahead and finish off the
silos at Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely so that, in the event
that the threat does emerge in greater quantity than we
currently would anticipate, we are able to respond relatively
quickly by adding additional missiles. They would come from the
test program if that were necessary.
With respect to accelerating any Phased, Adaptive Approach
and the possibility of accelerating SM-3 Block IIA and IIB, as
you know, the IIA is just very early in its development at this
point, and the IIB is a program that is just about to--just
really getting under way.
I think at this time it would be premature to talk about
accelerating them. We have got some important milestones for
SM-3 IIA in the next couple of years. And at that point, it
would be possible to answer that question with more data.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
And along a similar line, some of us are concerned about
cuts in the resources for--Operationally Responsive Space. In
two years now, that has been cut by 59 percent, and just 24
percent of that was this year.
So we are concerned about that, given what is happening
with China's capabilities, for instance, and shooting down its
own satellite. So do you share our concern about those budget
cuts for Operationally Responsive Space?
General Chilton. Sir, I don't at this point. I think the
Operationally Responsive Space Organization Office, in general,
has made great progress along the lines which I think are
important, and that is developing the key enabling
technologies, concepts of operations, investments in the things
that would enable a responsive space program.
There are three phases. We broke it into three requirements
in STRATCOM: Tier 1, 2 and 3, Tier 1 being what can we do
faster and better with what we have today on orbit, and that, I
think, has matured quite well.
Tier 2 is a little more difficult, and that is, how do you
build the infrastructure and the systems and put them in place
so that you could rapidly launch, either to augment in crisis
or replenish in time of war, your satellites on orbit.
And of course, Tier 3 was to--how could you put a system in
place that would allow you to quickly implement new
technologies or new needs that might arise along the way.
Fundamental to that is launch systems, common buses, common
interfaces, et cetera, and I think the funding is supporting
that quite well. We saw some increases required because the
follow-on to the first four TacSats was Operationally
Responsive Satellite-1, which is a program that is moving
forward to be launched.
But you can expect to see a bump-up in that funding
requirement and then a bump-down, and so long as we see that
steady funding to support the enabling technologies, I am
comfortable.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
All of the members of the subcommittee have had their
chance to ask the questions in the first round, and I now turn
to Mr. Bishop for an opportunity to ask questions. He is a
member who is a member of the full Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate being invited back to the subcommittee on which I at
one time did serve, a long, long time ago.
Both Dr. Miller and General Chilton, once again, thank you
for being here.
Dr. Chilton, I appreciated your written testimony, even
though I only cared about pages 10 through 12, but those three
pages were great.
Let me ask you four questions that deal with the industrial
bases, if I could. Let me just give them to you out there. And
if I have time I would actually like to talk about some of your
comments about uranium development.
But the first four questions are based on the fact that
last year was the 50th anniversary of the ICBM. And as you said
on page 10, it is still the most responsive and cost-effective
leg of the triad, which I agree.
I am concerned, though, that the Department of Defense and
Air Force may be taking the ICBM for granted, in the way it
sustains its long-term financial support.
Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, only $46 million was
allotted to solid rocket motors for the Minuteman III, which
will produce three motor sets, even though the industrial base
has said they need to do six to maintain the warm line
facility.
In contrast, the Navy funds 12 motor sets for their D5 warm
line. Now, what really worries me is the Air Force in fiscal
year 2012 only has $10 million for that line and in fiscal year
2013 and beyond, it is zero. So the first question is,
obviously, do you have an opinion on how many motor sets for
Minuteman III you really need to sustain the solid rocket motor
industrial base. And since there seems to be a disconnect
there, how do you solve that one?
Number two goes into another area which is closer to you,
with your background obviously having been in space. We asked
both Secretary Gates and Donley if they had been consulted by
NASA before they came up with their naive decision to cancel
Constellation, and they answered in the negative, although the
Pentagon has sent us two reports and a letter from the Under
Secretary of Acquisition talking about the significant negative
impact on the military side even a slowdown of Constellation
may be.
And it goes into what Mr. Lamborn was asking that, you
know, if you don't have the industrial base and you want to
reevaluate GMD, you may not have the ability to do it. So
question number two is, did any high-level NASA officials talk
to you or USSTRATCOM about the impact to the industrial base?
Number three, if you would react to--I don't know if it is
General Payton or General Kehler. I think it was General Kehler
who last week testified over in the Senate that there is a
potential of at least doubling the cost to the Air Force of
future propulsion for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles
(EELVs) if, indeed, the industrial base is harmed in some way.
And the fourth one is how important is the solid rocket
motor industrial base to our national defense, and how are you
at STRATCOM involved with NASA and the Administration today in
trying to address that industrial base issue which Secretary
Donley did say was a concern that they had to address somewhere
in the future when he was in front of the full committee?
And if you can get through all of those, I have one on
uranium, but we will see what happens, okay?
General Chilton. Thank you, sir. I will give it my best
shot. First of all, United States Strategic Command and our
component, Air Force Space Command, are paying close attention
to the ICBM, the health of that force.
We are trying to make the--advocate for and make sure the
appropriate investments are made to sustain that capability
through 2030, and we are seeing those investments start to come
in to enable that currently.
With regard to the industrial base, I have raised concerns
about that in the past, and it is not just for--I would point
out, not just for solid rocket motor propulsion technology and
production, which is important, but I think, writ large, it is
appropriate for us to look at industrial bases for all of the
things that we need to conduct military operations, to include
large aircraft production, whether it be tankers or airlift or
bombers, to include space satellite productions, all of those
things.
Those are important that we, every now and then, pause and
look at those. And Secretary Carter in Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (AT&L), I know, is taking these issues very
seriously and looking at them.
I don't have an opinion on what is adequate to sustain the
industrial base in the solid rocket motor area, but I think
analysis needs to be done to do that. The Navy and the Air
Force had really two different approaches to their solid rocket
motor programs. The Air Force was, buy them all at once and end
the production. The Navy was to keep a warm line going.
The startup of a warm line for the Air Force this year is
actually a change to the way they had done business in the
past, and can no doubt assist the industrial base. But I don't
have a good answer for you on whether or not--I don't have the
knowledge base to assess whether that is adequate or not to
support it.
With regard to NASA, I was not consulted with regard to the
cancellation of the Constellation program before it was
announced.
And with regard to EELV costs, I think General Kehler is
the right person to talk to this. From an organize, train and
equip perspective, Air Force Space Command runs the programs
that support access to space and launch, and so I would be at
peril in arguing with his assessment of what the future costs
might be.
And lastly, I think kind of circling back as well, the--any
decision made on--by the part of NASA on how they would proceed
forward with their needs for solid rocket motors certainly
needs to be taken into the calculus of AT&L as they look at the
broader industrial base and our needs for solid rocket motors
for the strategic deterrent.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, General. I have got 10 seconds and I
will finish this up. I would appreciate for the record an
analysis of what you are going to do with the warm line if,
indeed, you go from 46 to 10 to zero million in maintaining a
warm line and, indeed, if the three that are in there for this
year--and the industry says you still need six to maintain the
warm line. That is a disconnect. I would appreciate for the
record if you could provide that.
And I also appreciate very much your answer to those other
questions, and we will talk about how Department of Interior's
canceling of some of our industrial--our development of uranium
in northern Arizona impacts you later on.
I yield back, sir.
General Chilton. Thank you, sir. And we will take those for
the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 95.]
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the gentleman.
We will now turn to our second round of questions for those
members who have further questions.
Let me turn to another issue that is of concern to me, and
that is our management of our weapons stockpile. As both
witnesses well know, last year Section 3113 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 created the
Stockpile Management Program.
The statute contains five objectives, which I am sure you
are well aware. Increase the reliability, safety and security
of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Two, further reduce the
likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear testing.
Three, achieve reductions in the future size of the nuclear
weapons stockpile. Four, reduce the risk of an accidental
detonation. And five, reduce the risk of a weapon being
diverted to a terrorist.
Now, the statute also contains three limitations. First,
any changes to the stockpile must be made to achieve the
objectives of the statute.
Second, any changes must remain consistent with basic
design parameters by including, to the maximum extent feasible,
components that are well understood or are certifiable without
the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing.
And third, any changes must use the design certification
and production expertise resident in the nuclear complex to
fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile.
So my question to you, General Chilton, is whether you are
comfortable with both of those objectives and limitations
contained within the statute. In particular, do you believe the
United States can achieve its nuclear deterrence mission while
limiting changes to those that ``fulfill current mission
requirements to the existing stockpile''?
General Chilton. Chairman, I am very comfortable with the
objectives of the Stockpile Management Program and with the
statement you just made with regard to--I need no new military
capabilities today for the weapons that are required for
providing the strategic nuclear deterrent for the United States
of America.
And I think the recommendations are prudent that we ought
not to develop changes that would necessitate testing, since
that is our goal, is not to test.
On the other hand, we should not constrain our engineers
and scientists in developing options on what it will take to
achieve the objectives of the Stockpile Management Program, and
let them bring forward their best recommendations for both the
President and for the Congress to assess as to what is the best
way forward.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Dr. Miller, did you have any comments?
Dr. Miller. Sir, my short answer is yes, the objectives
make good sense, and that the Nuclear Posture Review report
will describe, in part, how the Department of Defense and
Energy will move forward in meeting the guidelines of the
Stockpile Management Plan.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Well, Dr. Miller, then my question
to you is how the current Administration interprets the
statutory guidance.
And as you know, the bipartisan Congressional Strategic
Posture Commission identified a continuum of options that might
be used to manage the stockpile, that continuum being
refurbishment, reuse and replacement.
Further, the commission recommended that decisions
concerning the management of each weapon should be made on a
case-by-case basis within the basic limitation that the weapons
should not be designed to accomplish new missions.
With that in mind, do you expect that the Nuclear Posture
Review is going to limit options for managing the stockpile
along the continuum described by the bipartisan strategic
commission?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I would like to say that that has been a
central--an important question of discussion and of analysis in
the Nuclear Posture Review, and what I would like to do is come
back and brief or pre-brief the results of that review to the
committee.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. I would welcome that, and other
members would as well.
With that, I will turn to the ranking member for a
question.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chilton, then turning my questions to you, getting
back to this issue of our deterrent and how to strengthen our
deterrent, you know, many people are very concerned that when
you lessen the numbers of overall weapons, that it doesn't
strengthen but weakens the overall deterrent.
There are those that advocate that conventional weapons
have a role to play as a deterrent. And obviously, you know,
there are those, including myself--I am very concerned that the
tradeoff between conventional and strategic weapons do not play
the same role as a deterrent.
Could you speak for a moment as to whether or not
conventional weapons could be substituted as a deterrent?
General Chilton. Certainly, sir. First of all, with regards
to the numbers, as numbers decrease, I think it is instructive
to examine why we have the numbers we have and what is the
principal driving force, particularly in the deployment of our
strategic weapons.
And it has been carried over from the Cold War period,
looking at Russia's threat to the United States with their
capability and deterring that. And so as numbers go down in the
Russian arsenal, you know, we start feeling more and more
comfortable bringing our numbers down, which is why NPR and
START, et cetera, are so closely intertwined together as we
move forward.
So I think that is an important context to take when we
start looking at total numbers of deployed strategic weapons
anyway.
With regard to conventional weapons, I think there is a--
there is no doubt that conventional strength can be a deterrent
to misbehavior, so you can deter perhaps an invasion, let's
say, by North Korea of South Korea by a strong conventional
posture of both U.S. and South Korean conventional forces on
the peninsula. And I think we have been successful in deterring
in that fashion in the past.
However, we have to be careful when we start talking about
one-for-one substitutions of conventional weapons for nuclear
weapons, because when it comes to the deterrence mission--not
the warfighting mission necessarily, but the deterrence
mission--the nuclear weapon has a deterrent factor that far
exceeds a conventional threat.
And so we have to be very careful in our discussions and
dialogue on this. Are we talking about conducting warfighting
operations or deterrence operations when we start looking at
these options?
That said, when we start looking at Prompt Global Strike
and from a conventional perspective, I look at that as an
additional weapon in the quiver of the President to give him
options in time of crisis today in which he maybe only has a
nuclear option for a timely response.
And so I am an advocate for having a Prompt Global Strike
capability as an additional weapon set. But the connective
tissue between that and the one-for-one exchange for a nuclear
deterrent--I am not quite there.
Mr. Turner. I think, perhaps in even both of your comments,
the concerns with respect to the space industrial base and how
it is supported were reflected--the committee and its members
certainly have concerns.
Could you tell us, you know, your concerns and what we need
to be doing to strengthen the competitiveness and the future of
our space industrial base and, really, how critical that is in
supporting our future capabilities?
General Chilton. Sir, I believe our space industrial base
is absolutely critical, as I mentioned, as well as our solid
rocket industrial base and an aircraft production industrial
base, for our mission sets.
Last year in my testimony I raised the issue of
International Traffic in Arms Reductions (ITAR) not because I
am an expert on ITAR but because I had heard enough
conversations in the space community of--that it seemed logical
that we should take a close look at that, because there was
debate as to whether that was helping us or hurting us in a
broader sense with regard to our industrial base.
And I am happy to see that the Department is starting to
take a look at those regulations along with the State
Department to see--to have a healthy debate and discussion on
what is the best thing forward to ensure we preserve our
industrial base to provide the capabilities we know we will
need in the future.
And there is quite a bit of policy involved in that as
well, so I will turn it over to Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. If I could just add very briefly, export
control reform is a very high priority of the Secretary of
Defense. We have had a number of high-level inter-agency
meetings on this.
And last week on March 11th the President gave a speech to
the Ex-Im Bank, Export-Import Bank, in which he talked about
long-term goal of--a goal of increasing our exports
substantially. He also noted in that speech that the Secretary
of Defense would be giving a talk within the next couple of
weeks on export control reform. And that is, indeed, the case.
It is a priority. It is important for the space industrial
base. And it is also--has, obviously, broader implications as
well.
I would just add that we want to think about--as we go
forward with our national security space strategy, we want to
think about the appropriate role of the private sector in
providing both the assets and the services in some space
mission areas. And we will be looking hard at the appropriate
balance there.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Spratt is now recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Spratt. I thought that Mr. Larsen would raise the
matter of the ABL, the airborne laser, but he didn't, and I am
curious as to know what is your assessment of its potential in
light of the recent feasibility test that indicated it may be
feasible. And what remains before we can consider this a
deployable system?
Dr. Miller. I will go first on this one. The concerns about
the ABL were not--that led to its--to the restructuring of the
program in fiscal year 2010 were not about the technical
abilities of the laser but, really, centered around the
operational concept and the ability of the platform to survive
in a realistic threat environment, and for us to affordably
procure enough of them to provide effective missile defenses
relative to other options.
Sir, I think the future on laser capabilities is more
likely to be in solid state, and we are learning things from
the ABL program about that. That is now part of our technology
effort. And I expect we will see that move forward
substantially over the coming several years.
Mr. Spratt. Another question. Reading quickly both your
testimonies while you were testifying, I didn't notice anywhere
any reference to something called a Replacement Warhead Program
(RRW). Is there still such a program ongoing?
Dr. Miller. Sir, there is no such program under way. I will
say that I just discovered yesterday that the Air Force
apparently inadvertently had a line in its budget submission
that said RRW. It had all zeroes, but it is--that program has
been terminated since, I believe, fiscal year 2008. And there
are no plans to bring it back.
Mr. Spratt. Towards the end of your testimony, you
indicated that things were happening so rapidly in the cyber
world that you needed--you are--at least to some kind of
extraordinary procurement authority to waive the ordinary time-
consuming procedures of procurement.
Could you elaborate on that? And are you asking us to do
something to give you a special dispensation from the rules so
that you can quickly respond to developments in that world?
Dr. Miller. Sir, no, I am not at this time asking for any
additional acquisition authority on the part--on behalf of the
Department--an observation that with the rapid cycling of
technology that we are often challenged, given how our
acquisition system works typically, to be able to innovate.
And what we will be looking at as part of our strategy
development is not just the possible changes to acquisition,
which you would then--we would then request changes if
necessary to Congress, but also how we can get innovation to
happen more quickly.
Some of the changes we most need may be with respect to
software rather than any hardware that has to be procured.
Mr. Spratt. General Chilton, in your testimony, you
indicated that talking about rebuilding or refurbishing the
nuclear production complex--you mentioned, first of all, Y-12
at Oak Ridge. And then you mentioned Los Alamos.
Were you referring there to the possibility that building
TA-55 would be the production source for plutonium pits in the
future?
General Chilton. It is the CMRR, the investment at Los
Alamos that I was referring to, and that is--and that details
what we will provide from the NNSA on what exactly their
fundings will go into there, sir, the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement facility there.
Mr. Spratt. Would you give us in a wrap-up where we stand
on the START negotiation? To what extent are the Russians
proving to be cooperative and----
Dr. Miller. Sir, with recognition of--that this is an open
forum and those are ongoing negotiations, I do think it is fair
to say that over the past several weeks and the beginning of
the new year there were some bouncy patches in the
negotiations.
I think there has been substantial progress over the last
couple weeks and, in fact, very substantial progress last week
at the negotiations in Geneva. I think it is realistic to think
now about concluding a treaty within the next several weeks.
It does not mean that that is going to be done. It is still
the subject of negotiation. But the differences have narrowed
substantially over the last week or so.
Mr. Spratt. What is the range of likely deployed systems
you are negotiating, numerically?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the last range that was discussed publicly
was between 1,500 and 1,675 nuclear weapons, and then a very
wide range with respect to delivery vehicles, between 500 and
1,100. That range is, needless to say, much narrower today in
the negotiations.
And because it is the subject of ongoing negotiations, I
would prefer to answer in closed session to be any more
precise.
Mr. Spratt. That is fine. Thank you much.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. I thank the gentleman.
Before turning to Mr. Franks for the next question, I am
going to turn the gavel over to Chairman Spratt right now as I
depart, and want to thank both Dr. Miller and General Chilton
for your testimony and for your great service to our Nation.
Thank you for the work you are doing.
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chilton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. With that, the chair now recognizes Mr.
Franks for five minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, while we are waiting on the ratification by our
partners in Czech Republic and Poland to begin the Phased,
Adaptive Approach for missile defenses in Europe, you know, it
is clear that the first phase, 1A, was scheduled to be
implemented by 2011; the second phase, 1B, by 2015.
But if you look at the numbers of interceptors we are
buying--and I know this point has been made before, but the SM-
3 Block IB inventory buy in 2011 includes only eight additional
SM-3 Block IB interceptors.
And of course, one of the critiques of the former Missile
Defense Plan in Poland and Czech Republic was that it was
expected to only cover 75 percent of our European allies by
2013.
So, Dr. Miller, I will direct my first question to you. How
does the Phased, Adaptive Approach compare, coverage-wise, by
the percentage of allies supported by--I will say 2013, but you
can add additional timelines there? How is it covering us as
opposed to the ground-based system?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I don't have the precise numbers, and it
will differ by phase. It expands from Phase One to Two to Three
to Four, and the most significant coverage does come in the
later phases.
What I will say is we can come back in a closed session and
I will not just have the sort of lay-down but those numbers as
well.
I do want to note with respect to the Standard Missile-3
that we are currently coming toward the end of procurement on
the Standard Missile-3 Block IA and in the transition phase
over to the IIB--I am sorry, to the Standard Missile-3 IB.
Mr. Franks. Right.
Dr. Miller. And consistent with our approach of essentially
fly before you buy, that the Department made a decision not to
ramp up this year in fiscal year 2011 substantially the SM-3
Block IAs, but just the numbers that we are looking to buy SM-3
IB deliveries--324 by fiscal year 2017.
And once we have gotten to this development of the program,
we are basically going to be pedal to the metal on that. And
current plan--buy just of those two types is 436 of the IA and
IB types. Additional interceptors will be of IIA and IIB.
Mr. Franks. All right.
General Chilton, in terms of deterring Iran in the
immediate future, what do you think are our best strategies and
our best capabilities to do that, deterring them from moving
forward with their nuclear program, rather than defending them
after?
My great concern is that the Administration may have come
to the conclusion at this point that Iran is going to become a
nuclear nation and that their strategy is toward containment in
the future.
And I am terrified of that possibility. What opportunities
do we have to deter Iran from gaining that capability in the
first place on the table now?
General Chilton. Well, this question is probably a little
more appropriate for Dr. Miller. I will tell you, though, from
my perspective, I have never--I have not seen any sense of
giving up on any type of effort to encourage Iran not to
develop a nuclear weapons program.
I think the Administration is foursquare behind that
effort, and it is a whole-of-government approach. It can't just
be a military approach. I mean, if we look back, we could say,
``Well, you know, our nuclear might did not deter North Korea
from developing a nuclear capability. Our nuclear might did not
deter Pakistan and India from developing capabilities.''
Nation-states develop capabilities for their own reasons
independent, I think, of our nuclear posture. It is not to say
that our defense, both conventional strength in the region and
our nuclear posture, is not an important element, but it is
much broader than that, I believe.
And I would turn it over to Dr. Miller to comment on that.
Dr. Miller. I will just say very briefly that Iran had an
opportunity in the negotiations that were undertaken over
preceding months to come forward with and to agree to a
proposal that I think was very reasonable with respect to the
Tehran research reactor and with respect to coming into full
compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
As you know, sir, to date it has not taken those steps, and
we are working with our allies and with others in the
international community to really shift to what is, frankly, a
pressure trap with respect to Iran and to look to try to change
their incentives to bring themselves into compliance with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
At the same time, the development of capabilities for
missile defense, for counter-WMD and the improvement of
conventional capabilities of our partners in the region will
both help to dissuade Iran from pursuing this path, because it
will reduce the benefits of them moving forward with their
nuclear program.
And we want to continue to develop the capabilities of
ourselves and of our partners to cope effectively with whatever
capabilities Iran may pursue to discount their value.
And this dissuasion, this different form of deterrence, is
really a fundamental purpose of the types of capabilities we
are developing today.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I am hoping
that the gentleman might take for the record a question related
to directed energy programs in the future.
I mean, I meant to get to ABL. I think that the
accomplishment there was pretty profound and that we would love
to hear what your thoughts are for directed energy applications
in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 96.]
Mr. Spratt. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Chilton, as a follow-up to my question earlier this
morning about missile defense training, you mentioned that
C2BMC training is currently unassigned. Why is that the case?
And do you have an opinion as to where that should be assigned
for that type of training?
General Chilton. I think we are at the phase in the program
where it is maturing to the point that we need to--and the
Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) has recognized that in
our last meeting that it is time to go off and decide who
should be assigned that authority.
I don't have an opinion on who should take that, but
clearly one of the services should do that, and the MDEB is
taking a look at that, and we will make a--there will be a
committee--there is a group studying that and they will make a
recommendation back to the MDEB.
But I think it is a matter of maturity of the system and
the timing of it.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
And, Dr. Miller, I would like to ask you a question about
declaratory policy. According to some press reports, there are
White House principals who believe that the U.S. should declare
that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons and that
it will only employ them against nuclear targets--for example,
writing off the possibility of ever using them against chemical
and biological types of WMD attacks.
What is the current declaratory policy? And what would be
the rationale for changing it?
Dr. Miller. The President has been presented with a wide
range of options for considerations with respect to declaratory
policy. And I think it would be inappropriate for me to discuss
each of those in--certainly, in open session today.
Our current declaratory policy, I think, has accurately
been characterized as calculated ambiguity. Since 1967 we have
had a policy called our negative security assurance that says--
that has said that the United States will not use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are in
compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
At the same time--so that is one side of it. At the same
time, multiple administrations have broadly hinted at the
possibility--and done it in different ways, but broadly hinted
at the possibility of nuclear threats associated with other
activities.
So, for example, administrations have talked about the
possibility of a devastating and overwhelming response to the
use of weapons of mass destruction without necessarily ruling
out explicitly the use of nuclear weapons in that response.
Again, that has been described as calculated ambiguity.
Others have different names for it, but that is what has been
provided.
And at this point, I can say, again, that the President has
been provided with a number of options to consider for
declaratory policy, and it has been a point of some significant
amount of analysis, both with respect to its impact on those we
wish to deter and its impact on potential perception by allies
and partners whom we wish to assure of our commitment.
Mr. Lamborn. Are you saying--and if you can't answer this,
I would understand, but that he is anticipating--the President
is anticipating making a change in policy?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I am saying that the range of options is
under consideration and staying with the current policy would
be--is one of those options.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
Dr. Miller. The range is under consideration. That is
really all I can say.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, I appreciate that. Thank you.
Mr. Spratt. Gentleman yields back his time?
Any further questions? Mr. Franks, did you have a question?
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, other than just asking them to
take the ABL and just the entire subject of directed energy for
the record. I would like to get some insight, because we
really, really haven't had a hearing on that test result yet,
and I would love to hear that. Thank you, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 96.]
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much for your testimony and for
your responsive answers, and if you will also respond in due
time to the questions for the record, and on some occasion we
may take you up on the offer for a confidential hearing.
Thank you very much indeed, and thank you for your service
to our country.
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman.
General Chilton. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 16, 2010
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March 16, 2010
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 16, 2010
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Dr. Miller. Representatives from OSD Policy and the Joint Staff are
working with the House Armed Services Committee staff to schedule a
briefing for professional staff members early in April 2010. That
briefing will show the notional coverage footprints of each phase of
the European Phased, Adaptive Approach. [See page 13.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
General Chilton. The FY 2011 President's Budget (PB) begins a
multi-year funding increase for critical plutonium and uranium
infrastructure improvements needed to sustain stockpile credibility. It
is critical that we complete these projects as soon as possible. NNSA
plans call for achieving full operations at the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement, Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and the
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) by 2022.
Refurbishment of Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4) in Technical Area 55
(TA-55) is one of two critical components required to support plutonium
processing. The FY11 NNSA Plutonium Sustainment ($190M) and TA-55
Reinvestment Project ($20M) budget lines reflect needed PF-4 funding
for safety improvements and configuration modification to improve
manufacturing efficiencies.
Completion of CMRR-NF is required to provide plutonium R&D and
analytical capabilities in support of surveillance and stockpile
management. It will also support nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament, arms control treaty monitoring, nuclear forensics and
counterterrorism, and emergency response capabilities. The CMRR-NF FY11
budget request of $225M funds design completion and begins
construction. When complete, activities that were transferred from
closed portions of the aging CMR facility to PF-4 will move to CMRR-NF.
This should free space within PF-4 needed to meet stockpile management
capacity requirements.
The FY11 PB request of $115M for UPF at Y-12 funds design and
construction planning activities. When complete, the UPF will support
production, surveillance, and dismantlement of highly enriched uranium
components. [See page 24.]
Dr. Miller. Funding for nuclear weapons facilities infrastructure
is in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget. The
President's FY2011 budget request for the NNSA includes the following
for Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) construction
specifically and total NNSA new facility construction projects for FY
2010-2012:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2010 Appropriated FY 2012 Out-year Target
$M FY 2011 Request $M ($M)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CMRR Construction.................... $97.0M $225.0 $305.0
Total for all NNSA Construction $303.9 $399.0 $542.3
Projects.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Defense (DOD) has reviewed the budget information
for the major NNSA construction projects. This budget starts the
recapitalization of nuclear facilities that are essential to support
DOD requirements.
The NNSA will deliver its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
to Congress in spring, 2010. This document will identify a plan for
evolving and sustaining the nuclear stockpile. [See page 24.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
General Chilton. Our entire strategic defense enterprise faces
industrial base sustainment issues. Unfortunately, solid rocket motor
industry concerns are more acute because of the significant expected
reduction in defense and NASA demand for these propulsion systems in
the coming years. As you know, when an industry faces reduced demand,
substantial downsizing in capacity generally follows. As the Combatant
Commander responsible for strategic deterrence, I am concerned with the
prospect of an irrevocable loss of sufficient capacity to recapitalize
systems which rely on solid rocket motor propulsion.
The Navy and Air Force have taken different approaches to ensuring
they have sufficient capacity to recapitalize their force structure.
The Navy has stated confidence that their low-rate D5 missile
production model, delivering a planned 12 missiles annually, will
ensure production skills are protected into the future. While I cannot
comment on how many Air Force motor production units is sufficient to
sustain industrial capacity, the Air Force FY11 budget submission does
not make a similar a long-term commitment to help preserve solid rocket
motor production and related industrial capacity.
The Air Force is developing a plan to protect sufficient capacity
to recapitalize the Minuteman force, and I look to their FY12 POM
submission to articulate and adequately resource such a plan to meet
this critical need. [See page 30.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Dr. Miller. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program was transitioned from
a weapons acquisition program to a technology demonstration test-bed
because of affordability concerns, and serious questions about the
survivability and military utility of the ABL. On February 11, 2010,
the ABL had a successful test where it destroyed a boosting ballistic
missile. The successful test validates the decision to preserve the ABL
test-bed program as a pathfinder for the Nation's directed-energy
program.
In the FY2011 budget request, directed energy research programs are
funded for $98.7 million in the Missile Defense Agency budget. This
includes funding for solid-state laser technology that is showing
promise. Solid-state lasers would have much higher power than the
current chemicalbased lasers in a much smaller package. This could
allow laser technology to be used on more survivable and operationally
practical platforms. [See page 37.]
Dr. Miller. USSTRATCOM supports the continued research and
development of directed energy projects, although the actual technology
development is not a combatant command responsibility. For the Airborne
Laser Test Bed (ALTB), USSTRATCOM stands ready to make recommendations
for possible emergency activation of the ALTB if we believe it could
prove effective in an emerging crisis.
This revolutionary technology holds the most promise for boost-
phase intercept and to address different raid sizes, and it offers an
offsetting strategy from a missile vs. missile approach, which is cost
imposing. [See page 38.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 16, 2010
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Section 912 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 made permanent the pilot program that has allowed
the Department to provide space situational awareness information to
non-U.S. government entities. This statute also contained additional
protections for those non-U.S. government entities that might provide
data to the U.S. Given STRATCOM's responsibility for this so-called
``commercial and foreign entities program,'' and for space situational
awareness in general, could you provide the committee with an update on
your efforts to implement this statute?
General Chilton. USSTRATCOM assumed responsibility for sharing
space situational awareness from the USAF in December 2009. We
transitioned the existing services which consist of 1) catalog and
satellite information posted to the www.space-track.org Web site, and
2) SSA services under a sharing agreement that offers conjunction
assessment support (predictions of close approaches between satellites)
and launch support (closure windows to avoid collisions with orbiting
objects, and early orbit satellite for launching satellites).
Additionally, we offer additional services to entities which includes
conjunction assessment support to satellite maneuver planning, re-
entering and deorbiting objects, and disposal and end-of-life
operations. We also support anomaly resolution and interference
resolution when it is in the national security interest, and when
resources are available.
We are evaluating the spectrum of services we offer, and the
quality and utility of that information. We are in the process of
finalizing efforts to provide more detailed conjunction assessment
predictions that will enable satellite operators to refine their
probability of collision calculations and afford them more information
to support their decision to maneuver or not. A goal is to reduce the
number of unnecessary satellite avoidance maneuvers conducted.
Additionally, we submitted a request to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff for the authority to negotiate and conclude SSA sharing
agreements with non-U.S. governments. The AFSPC pilot program did not
support requests from foreign governments. Our request is currently in
interagency coordination. Once approved, we will engage with Allies and
other nations and intergovernmental organizations to establish SSA
sharing agreements to provide them services to promote safe
spaceflight, and to receive SSA information in return to improve USG
SSA.
Mr. Langevin. What, in your view, are the most important steps the
U.S. needs to take to improve our Space Situational Awareness
capabilities?
General Chilton. Our current Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is
inadequate and thus impacts the ability of USSTRATCOM to predict,
detect, and characterize orbiting objects and to attribute anomalies
and attacks on space systems. We must implement several investment
strategies to meet our SSA requirements and thus enable access to and
freedom of action in this domain.
We must first continue our investment in the critical legacy
elements that include service life extensions, maintenance, and
upgrades of the dedicated, collateral, and contributing sensors of our
Space Surveillance Network. Secondly, USSTRATCOM will advocate for
prudent investments in future capabilities like Space Based Space
Surveillance, Space Fence, Space Surveillance Telescope, and Joint
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) upgrades to ensure more accurate,
timely, and operationally relevant SSA.
Finally, we must continue working with satellite owners/operators
who share orbital information on their satellites in order to automate
the exchange of satellite positional information. We will leverage the
JSpOC Mission System program to foster collaborative data-sharing
across USG Agencies and Departments, our allies, and the commercial
sector to enhance global coverage and awareness, which improves our
ability to combine a space operational picture with effective C2
systems.
Mr. Langevin. Yesterday, the Department of Defense and the Office
of Director for National Intelligence delivered to the committee an
interim Space Posture Review. And you have testified that you are
nearing the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review. Can you give us
any insight into how, as you think about deterrence against 21st
century threats, the Administration plans to achieve deterrence in
space?
Dr. Miller. Deterrence in space domain, as elsewhere, depends on a
combination of denying the hoped for benefits and increasing the costs
to a would-be attacker, and effectively communicating both capabilities
and intent. The potential benefits of attacking U.S. space systems can
be reduced, for example, by increasing systems' survivability and
resilience, by having complementary capabilities (e.g., air-breathing
systems), and being prepared to operate with denied or degraded access
to space for some period of time.
Achieving deterrence in space against 21st century threats requires
a whole-of-government approach. The Administration is currently
reviewing the existing (2006) national space policy. The resulting
revision of this national policy will seek to synchronize the broad
U.S. equities in space, spanning national security, diplomacy, science,
and commerce.
Building from this new national space policy, DOD and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) will develop a National
Security Space Strategy (NSSS). The NSSS effort is intended to help us
better align the ends, ways, and means to succeed in the congested,
contested, and competitive space environment.
Concurrent with NSSS development, DOD is continuing to develop
concepts for best practices in space, and in May 2010 the Air Force is
conducting a ``Schriever'' series war game that will include a
simulated Code of Conduct to assess the operational implications of a
voluntary Code. ``Schriever'' series outcomes will bolster NSSS
development and address questions of rules of the road/codes of conduct
and declaratory policy.
Mr. Langevin. Specifically, can you talk about how we might deter
others from holding our space systems at risk? How might we respond to
attacks against our space assets, and how do we manage the risk of
escalation?
Dr. Miller. Deterring others from holding our space systems at
risk, and managing escalation risk if the situation warrants it,
require a whole-of-government approach. The Administration is currently
reviewing the existing (2006) national space policy. The resulting
national space policy will seek to synchronize the broad U.S. equities
in space, spanning national security, diplomacy, science, and commerce.
Building from this new national space policy, DOD and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) will develop a National
Security Space Strategy (NSSS). This effort, building upon the findings
of the interim Space Posture Review, will help us better align the
ends, ways, and means to succeed in the congested, contested, and
competitive environment of space.
Deterrence in space domain, as elsewhere, depends on a combination
of denying the hoped for benefits and increasing the costs to a would-
be attacker, and effectively communicating both capabilities and
intent. The potential benefits of attacking U.S. space systems can be
reduced, for example, by increasing systems' survivability and
resilience, by having complementary capabilities (e.g., air-breathing
systems), and being prepared to operate with denied or degraded access
to space for some period of time.
U.S. responses to any attacks on our space systems would, as in
other domains, be consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, including
proportionality and discrimination. Such responses may or may not be
limited to the space domain. The risk of escalation would have to be
considered in the specific context on the conflict at hand.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. General Chilton, in your testimony you state that,
``Increasing the safety, security, and long-term confidence in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal remains a top priority.'' Last November, the Global
Security Newswire quoted you as calling our current nuclear weapons
complex infrastructure ``inadequate;'' and, citing last year's Perry-
Schlesinger Report, ``genuinely decrepit.'' Can you elaborate on your
statements and discuss, in your view, the current state of the weapons
complex and what you see as key challenges and shortfalls with complex
infrastructure modernization?
General Chilton. I agree with the Nuclear Posture Review conclusion
that today's nuclear complex ``. . . has fallen into neglect.''
Facilities that process plutonium and uranium date back to the
Manhattan Project era. They have emerging safety, security and
environmental concerns and are subject to unplanned shutdown with no
backup capability. In addition, the skilled human capital base has been
underdeveloped over the last decade making it difficult to attract and
retain the best and brightest scientists and engineers. A strong
national commitment to sustaining warheads and nuclear technical
capabilities is essential to counter these trends. A modern nuclear
infrastructure and highly skilled workforce is consistent with our
nation's arms control and nonproliferation objectives and can provide
the capability to respond in a timely manner to technical or
geopolitical surprise. Investments outlined in the 2011 President's
Budget request will strengthen the science, technology and engineering
base and begin to address physical infrastructure and human capital
problems.
Mr. Thornberry. General Chilton, U.S. Cyber Command was recently
set up as a sub-unified component of U.S. Strategic Forces Command.
What is the role of the U.S. military in cybersecurity, computer
network attack, defense, and exploitation? When should America act
under Title 50 authorities, and at what point Title 10? How does the
War Powers Act affect the use of force in cyberspace? The U.S.
military's #1 priority is homeland defense; should the military defend
America's networks, even private networks?
General Chilton. The military is responsible for the operation,
security, and defense of Department of Defense networks. If directed by
the President or Secretary of Defense, the military will support other
executive agencies and departments in the defense of non-Department
information networks and infrastructure. Further, the military is
responsible for fielding offensive cyberspace capabilities, and as
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, employing those
capabilities as traditional military activities.
The armed forces leverage the intelligence community for all source
intelligence, including computer network exploitation, in accordance
with the National Intelligence Priority Framework and in support of
combatant commander requirements. These foreign intelligence activities
are reportable to Congress under Title 50. The terminology ``Title 10''
and ``Title 50'' are frequently used to describe the division between
military operations and intelligence community activities. This is not
an entirely accurate characterization, as Title 10, entitled ``Armed
Forces'' and Title 50, entitled ``War and National Defense'' both
contain wide-ranging laws covering their respective topics--both of
which are directly connected to military operations. Neither Title 10
nor Title 50 contain any specific reference to the use of cyberspace
for cybersecurity, computer network attack, defense, or exploitation.
As to the division of intelligence activity, Title 50 contains a
section that broadly assigns different intelligence activities to the
National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office and Defense Intelligence Agency (all DOD
organizations). The section ends, however, noting ``the military
departments maintain sufficient capabilities to collect and produce
intelligence'' to meet the requirements of, among other needs, ``the
requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands and of
joint operations.'' Clarification of this division of authorities and
responsibilities come from a variety of documents, perhaps most
notably, Executive Order 12333, addressing U.S. intelligence
activities, but also a number of other documents, including, among
others, Department of Defense Instructions, Directives, and Manuals,
the Unified Command Plan, and the Standing Rules of Engagement.
The constitution gives the President authority for both sets of
activities--military operations and foreign intelligence activities. In
cyberspace there is the potential for some overlap, as ``computer
network exploitation,'' an activity conducted by the National Security
Agency is vital to conduct of military operations under ``computer
network defense'' and also ``computer network attack.'' It is also very
similar to the military mission of ``operational preparation of the
environment.'' Dual hatting the commander of U.S. Cyber Command as the
Director of the National Security Agency, has allowed close integration
of these two organizations, allowing them to appropriately leverage
each other to fulfill national security requirements.
As to the War Powers Resolution, 50 USC 1541 et seq., by its own
terms it ``will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities, is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.'' 50
USC 1541(a).
Further, ``The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.'' 50 USC 1541(c).
Pursuant to this Act, Congress passed the ``Authorization for use
of military force against those responsible for attacks launched
against the United States on Sept. 11, 2001.'' This authorization,
pursuant to the War Powers Act, provides in relevant part: ``[t]he
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.'' This can be
seen as Congressional approval of our military operations in our on-
going fight against terrorism. Current efforts in cyberspace play an
important role in this struggle against our adversaries, a role that is
consistent with the Congressional authorization under the War Powers
Resolution.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for the
defense of non-DOD Federal networks and coordinating with private
industry and providers for the defense of the private networks. U.S.
Strategic Command, and the Department of Defense, supports the defense
of critical infrastructure networks in response to a request for
assistance from DHS. That assistance could include technical assistance
and recommendations for immediate defensive actions; as well as
technical assistance and recommendations for more systemic mitigation,
such as improvements in network configurations and improvements in
information assurance measures or best practices.
Mr. Thornberry. Dr. Miller, U.S. Cyber Command was recently set up
as a sub-unified component of U.S. Strategic Forces Command. What is
the role of the U.S. military in cybersecurity, computer network
attack, defense, and exploitation? When should America act under Title
50 authorities, and at what point Title 10? How does the War Powers Act
affect the use of force in cyberspace? The U.S. military's #1 priority
is homeland defense; should the military defend America's networks,
even private networks?
Dr. Miller. To first consider cybersecurity and network defense,
the U.S. military will defend and secure its networks and systems to
ensure that our forces are able to conduct their operations and
missions with access to and use of cyberspace. The security of the U.S.
military's networks requires a whole-of-a-government approach. We need
to build robust relationships with interagency, industry, and
international partners. DOD is working closely with the President's
Cybersecurity Coordinator, and with our interagency partners as we
develop a way forward on cyber issues. DOD is also collaborating with
the private sector, through two main channels: the Enduring Security
Framework and the Defense Industrial Base. The Enduring Security
Framework is a public-private partnership between the Director for
National Intelligence, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and
the private sector; its goal is to provide a permanent forum for USG-
industry dialogue. The Defense Industrial Base offers another platform
for public-private partnerships; it is a critical infrastructure
partnership council established by DOD to facilitate coordination
between USG critical infrastructure programs and private sector owners
and operators.
DOD conducts military operations and intelligence activities,
including those in cyberspace, under Title 10 and Title 50 authorities,
respectively. USCYBERCOM's mission focuses on Title 10 military
activities: ``USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes,
and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of
specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to,
and when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations
in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of
action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.'' The
National Security Agency's mission will not change as it will both
continue to protect U.S. national security systems through information
assurance and through the production of foreign signals intelligence
information. The NSA capabilities will help enable USCYBERCOM to direct
the operation and defense of the DOD information networks and conduct
full-spectrum military cyberspace operations.
Whether DOD acts under Title 10 or Title 50 depends upon the nature
of the operation or activity being executed. DOD does not engage in
covert action, as defined by 50 U.S. Code Sec. 413b(e). Assuming that
all are otherwise legally available and appropriate options, it is the
President's option to conduct appropriate military activities in
cyberspace under Title 10 or Title 50 authorities, and/or to direct
covert action under Title 50.
Cyber capabilities are much like any other DOD capability or
weapon, i.e., they may be employed in support of the deployment and
operation of U.S. Armed Forces around the world. Their use alone,
however, does not implicate the provisions of the War Powers
Resolution.
How and when the U.S. military acts is at the discretion of the
President. The Department of Defense will provide the support directed,
requested or required to defend the United States and its assets,
whenever and wherever required, at the direction of the President.
There are mechanisms in place to provide Defense Support to Civil
Authorities, under which the Department is able to provide support
requested by the Department of Homeland Security to help defend and
secure those assets determined to be vital to National Security.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Our potential adversaries have shown the capability
and willingness to deny our forces access to satellite communications
either through the use of anti-satellite weapons or communications
jamming. While anti-satellite technology is a very real threat, proven
by China's January 2007 shoot down of one of their aging satellites,
the technology to interfere with satellite communications is simple and
readily available worldwide from any local Radio Shack store. What
specific measures has STRATCOM taken to ensure missile defense command
and control in a satellite communications denied environment? I
understand if parts of your answer are classified, but I encourage you
to share what you can with this committee today and in classified
follow-ups.
General Chilton.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
Mr. Lamborn. In 2004, STRATCOM conducted a Military Utility
Assessment (MUA) of the initial set of Ground-based Missile Defense
(GMD) capabilities deployed in California and Alaska to determine their
militarily effectiveness. How confident are you in current GMD system
capabilities? Do you have any plans to conduct another MUA of the GMD
system? If so, when do you expect to have the MUA completed?
General Chilton. I am confident the current GMD system provides
sufficient capability to protect the U.S. from a North Korean threat.
Version 2009 (fifth version) of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
MUA was completed 5 Aug 2009 and subsequently forwarded to SecDef via
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Version 2010 (sixth version) of
the Ballistic Missile Defense System MUA is in the final stages of
staffing and expected to be completed by August 2010.
Mr. Lamborn. What is our national and military policy if our space
assets are attacked? How have military operational plans and
contingency plans changed to reflect the possibility that those
satellites may be unavailable during times of crisis and war?
Dr. Miller. The United States considers space systems to have
rights of passage through, and operations in, space without
interference. This is consistent with U.S. law, applicable
international law including the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and existing
(2006) national space policy. The United States views purposeful
interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights
and will take those actions necessary to preserve its freedom of action
in space. The United States reserves the right to take the full range
of appropriate responses, including military action as consistent with
the Law of Armed Conflict.
The Administration is reviewing the 2006 national space policy and
will update Congress accordingly on any changes. On 15 March 2010, the
Department of Defense (DOD) provided Congress with an ``Interim'' Space
Posture Review, which provided our initial thinking on national
security equities in space.
The DOD is addressing the possibility that space systems may be
unavailable during times of crisis and war via its operational and
contingency planning processes. Numerous war games, such as the
``Schriever'' wargame series (the sixth in the series will be conducted
in early May 2010) have shown that testing ourselves in a framework of
diminished access to space is an important part of our strategy
development. Each of the Services conducted a ``day without space''
study to understand the impact of losing critical space capabilities;
the results were stark and highlight the importance of your question.
The DOD is currently working with the office of the Director of
National Intelligence to develop a National Security Space Strategy
that will provide a basis for further delineating guidance for space-
related plans and programs.
Mr. Lamborn. Do we have clear red lines or thresholds for attacks
against our space assets? What are the merits of a declaratory policy
that signals our intent and lays out consequences? Do you see merit in
establishing international rules of the road and/or codes of conduct in
space?
Dr. Miller. The United States stated that space systems have rights
at passage through, and operation in, space without interference. Our
current national Space Policy states that our space capabilities are
vital to our national interests, and we will preserve our rights,
capabilities and freedom of action in space, including if necessary
military action as consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict.
There may be merits in employing voluntary, non-treaty approaches
(e.g., international rules of the road and/or a code of conduct) for
the space domain. Over the past two years, the United States engaged in
dialogue with European experts regarding the European Union's proposal
for a ``Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.'' In addition, the
United States is participating in a multi-year study of ``long-term
sustainability of space activities'' within the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This study is examining
the feasibility of voluntary ``best practice guidelines'' to help
reduce operational risks to all space systems; it should serve as a
valuable cooperation opportunity with established and emerging members
of the space-faring community and with the private sector to enhance
spaceflight safety and preserve the space environment for future
generations. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) is continuing
to develop concepts for best practices in space, and in May 2010 the
Air Force is conducting a ``Schriever'' series wargame which will
include a simulated Code of Conduct to assess the operational
implications of a voluntary Code.
The DOD is currently working with the office of the Director of
National Intelligence to develop a National Security Space Strategy,
which will further address questions of rules of the road/codes of
conduct, and declaratory policy.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP
Mr. Bishop. The Air Force FY11 proposed budget only provides $46
million for production of three Minuteman III (MMIII) motor sets as its
``Warm-Line'' effort to sustain MMIII begins. The Air Force's current
Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) only provides $10 million in FY12, and $0
in FY13 for MMIII warm line. The imperiled Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
industry maintains that 6 motor sets for MMIII is the bare minimum
required to sustain a viable MMIII warm line, which is fewer than the
12 D-5 ICBM motors that are currently produced annually under the
Navy's comparable warm-line effort. What is your opinion on what the
proper level of Air Force funding is required in FY11 and in the FYDP
to adequately sustain the MMIII weapons system and its SRM industrial
base?
General Chilton. U.S. Strategic Command has not done analysis to
assess funding required to adequately sustain a viable SRM Warm-line.
However, looking ahead, we do anticipate new challenges across the
industrial base which could impact both the capacity and costs
associated with supporting the Minuteman III in the future. Secretary
Carter's AT&L-led task force study on the SRM industrial base will
inform our investment strategy to ensure we can meet the nation's
strategic propulsion needs.
Mr. Bishop. Specifically, how many MMIII motor sets do you believe
are minimally necessary to adequately sustain the warm line and the SRM
industrial base?
General Chilton. I do not have an opinion regarding what production
level is adequate to sustain the SRM industrial base. However, given
the complexity associated with solid rocket motor technology, we cannot
afford to lose the expertise required to recapitalize our deterrent
force in the future. Secretary Carter's AT&L-led task force study on
this issue will inform our investment strategy to ensure we can meet
the nation's strategic propulsion needs.
Mr. Bishop. How important is maintenance of a viable SRM industrial
base to the strategic and military interests of the United States,
particularly in light of the Administration's decisions to terminate
NASA's Constellation and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets, and last year's
decision to also terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and
Ground Midcourse Defense (GMD) ground-based missile interceptor
programs, which, when combined with the end of the Space Shuttle
program, the end of MMIII Propulsion Replacement program, and the total
lack of any new ICBM modernization or follow-on programs, means that
the U.S. does not have any large-scale defense or space SRM program in
full-rate production for the first time in 50 years?
General Chilton. Until the OSD/AT&L study is complete, it is
premature to speculate on the extent of the impact to our industrial
base and intellectual capital as the solid rocket motor industry
adjusts to the Constellation Program cancellation and other significant
program changes. We believe Secretary Carter's AT&L-led task force
study on the SRM industrial base will inform our investment strategy to
ensure we can meet the nation's strategic propulsion needs.
Mr. Bishop. How does the Interior Department's recent decision to
revoke uranium mining leases on public lands in the Western United
States negatively impact the long-term strategic interests of the
United States in maintaining a domestic supply of raw nuclear materials
in its defense strategic stockpiles?
General Chilton. Planning, analysis and forecasting of overall
weapons related nuclear materials is provided by the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA). I am advised by NNSA that the recent
Department of Interior decision to suspend issuing uranium mining
leases on public lands in the Western U.S. for two years has no near-
term impact on the domestic supply of raw materials needed to meet
national defense needs. Any future Interior Department decision to
withdraw these or other lands for a longer period of time will need to
be assessed for long-term impacts.
Mr. Bishop. What is your estimate of the percentage of raw nuclear
materials which will now have to be imported into the United States to
meet national defense needs in the future because of the Interior
Department's actions in revoking uranium mining leases on public lands
in the Western United States?
General Chilton. I am advised by the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) that there will be no near-term change in the
percent of raw nuclear materials imported into the U.S. to meet
national defense needs. I understand the decision does not prohibit
ongoing or future mining operations for valid pre-existing claims. Any
future Interior Department decision to withdraw these or other lands
for a longer period of time will need to be assessed for long-term
impacts.
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