[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-151]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 14, 2010
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-837 WASHINGTON : 2010
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TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
ADAM SMITH, Washington JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JIM COOPER, Tennessee K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
Eryn Robinson, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and Chemical Biological Defense Program and
Counterproliferation Initiatives............................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010........................................ 15
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
PROGRAM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California,
Chairwoman, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee................................................... 1
WITNESSES
Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense..................... 4
Scarbrough, Brig. Gen. Jess A., USA, Joint Program Executive
Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense........................................... 6
Weber, Andrew, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense........................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking
Member, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee............................................... 21
Myers, Kenneth A., III....................................... 36
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 19
Scarbrough, Brig. Gen. Jess A................................ 59
Weber, Andrew................................................ 22
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
PROGRAM AND COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 14, 2010.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Sanchez. The subcommittee will now come to order.
I would like to welcome all of you, and to thank you again
for joining us today to receive the testimony on the budget
request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA] and the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program for fiscal year 2011.
During this hearing, the assistant to the secretary of
defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense
Programs will provide the context for the investment to be made
by these two organizations, along with the updates on the
current and future counterproliferation initiative. And I
believe that this hearing comes at a good time, considering
that we just saw the Nuclear Security Summit this week in
Washington; and, of course, the release of our Nuclear Posture
Review.
As you all know--that the United States is facing new and
more challenging non-traditional threats on a daily basis,
including the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spreading
of chemical agents, and the increasing biological threat that
faces our global community. We live in this interconnected
world, where technology allows the transfer of information to
be quick and easy; however, this high-tech environment we all
live in also makes it more difficult for us to respond to
weapons of mass destruction in a more timely manner.
And as I was saying earlier to our panelists, one of my
greatest fears is that one day we are going to detect a non-
traditional agent or unknown pathogen in a certain part of the
world, and before we can be able to figure out what it is and
how we counteract that, it has already reached the United
States' soil.
And for this reason, the Department of Defense and
interagency partners have articulated their commitment to
expanding their capabilities to counter the threat posed by
weapons of mass destruction. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report, or the QDR, as we know it, provides policy
guidance on combating weapons of mass destruction.
And the secretary of defense has directed that several
initiatives be undertaken, including research and
countermeasures to, and defenses against, non-traditional
agents to counter the growing possibility of non-traditional
chemical agents being used against the United States and on our
soil; and securing vulnerable nuclear materials through the
president's Global Lockdown Initiative; expanding the
Biological Threat Reduction Program to create a global network
for disease and pathogen surveillance and response.
So we don't know what is going to come up in the future,
but we do know that we need to be prepared for whatever may
come forward.
The Department of Defense has to have a reliable concept of
how it would respond, what type of operations--should we face
something--even something that, to this date--we have no idea
or it is an unknown. It is also vital that we develop a firm
and secure form of communication with our allies around the
world in order to maintain good situational awareness of
possible threats that may emerge, in particular, with respect
to the security of our nation.
Today, we have three witnesses before us that are key to
the execution of these initiatives. First, we have Mr. Andrew
Weber, who is the assistant to the secretary of defense for
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. Welcome. And
along with him, we have Mr. Kenneth A. Myers III, Director of
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And we have Brigadier
General Jess A. Scarbrough, Joint Program Executive Officer for
Chemical and Biological Defense.
So, again, I would like to thank the three of our witnesses
for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. I will
tell you that we are very interested in your concepts today and
what you have to tell us from an operational standpoint, and
how you all work together.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 19.]
Ms. Sanchez. And, having said that, I am going to yield
to----
Mr. LoBiondo. Lobiondo----
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Lobiondo--I was looking for Mr. Miller,
but I didn't see him.
Mr. LoBiondo. No, he is not here, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you have an opening statement--I would
assume--from the other side?
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ranking Member Miller apologizes. He was not able to be
here for the beginning of the hearing. He has a statement he
has asked me to have submitted for the record--if I could make
that request, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. So ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 21.]
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Well, thank you very much.
And I thank the panel for being here today.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. I thank the gentleman.
And without objection, the witnesses' prepared testimony
has been submitted and accepted for the record. I will remind
you that you each have five minutes or less in which to
summarize your statements, or tell us something else that you
want us to know that isn't in your statement.
So we will begin with Mr. Weber.
We will lead off with you, for five minutes.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW WEBER, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE
PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Weber. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be
here today. I welcome this opportunity to discuss Department of
Defense efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction [WMD].
The president is determined to implement a comprehensive
strategy to prevent, deter and defend against weapons of mass
destruction. His leadership over the past two days, hosting the
Nuclear Security Summit, clearly has demonstrated the priority
he places on this issue.
As he said this week, ``The danger of nuclear terrorism is
one of the greatest threats to global security.'' From the
outset, the president committed the United States to take
``concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons,'' and
to ensure a safe, secure and effective arsenal for as long as
such weapons are needed.
In his national strategy for countering biological threats,
the president warned that, ``Fanatics have expressed interest
in developing and using biological weapons against us and our
allies. Addressing these unique challenges requires a
comprehensive approach that recognizes the importance of
reducing threats from outbreaks of infectious disease, whether
natural, accidental or deliberate in nature.''
Secretary Gates restated this strategic direction regarding
the full set of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
threats. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the secretary
directed the department to rebalance its policy, doctrine and
capabilities to better support six key mission areas. One of
these is to prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
destruction.
We are working diligently within the department to
implement a comprehensive strategy to counter weapons of mass
destruction. The president's fiscal year 2011 budget request
seeks an 18 percent increase for the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, which is the U.S. government's resource for countering
weapons of mass destruction. These additional funds are focused
on high-priority efforts that will advance the nation's ability
to counter WMD.
They fund significant increases in programs, as you
mentioned, to secure biological pathogens and vulnerable
nuclear materials around the world, as well as to pursue
technologies to strengthen arms-control monitoring and
verification. In addition, the president announced, in his
State of the Union Address, that we are launching a new
initiative that will give us the capacity to respond faster and
more effectively to bioterrorism or an infectious disease.
The department is involved in shaping this White House
initiative, which builds on the excellent work conducted by the
Department of Defense Transformational Medical Technology
Initiative, biodefense work at the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, DARPA, and other organizations throughout the
department.
My colleagues here today, and I, are responsible for
executing much of the DOD countering-WMD effort, in partnership
with other actors across the department, the interagency, the
United States Congress, and our friends and allies abroad.
Mr. Ken Myers, here on my left, serves as the director of
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and he reports through me,
to the under secretary of defense for Acquisition Technology
and Logistics, Dr. Ashton Carter. Brigadier General Jess
Scarbrough, to my far left, serves as the joint program
executive officer for Chemical and Biological Defense, which is
the office that develops and procures chemical and biological-
defense equipment for the department.
The WMD threat poses an immense challenge. Our war fighters
and our fellow citizens are vulnerable to WMD attack. We must
shape our defense programs to more effectively prevent, deter
and defeat this threat. To strengthen these programs, I ask for
your support of the president's fiscal year 2011 budget
request. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you
today, and would be pleased to answer any questions you may
have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weber can be found in the
Appendix on page 22.]
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
And, now, we will hear from Mr. Myers for five minutes or
less.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee,
it is an honor to be here today to address the
counterproliferation programs performed by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency. The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and
military personnel of DTRA worldwide is to safeguard the United
States and its allies from chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear weapons, as well as high-yield conventional
explosives. We do this by providing capabilities to reduce,
eliminate and counter the threat, and mitigate its effect.
I am also the director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center
for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The center is
responsible for the synchronization of planning and advocacy of
related activities across the combatant commands. It is co-
located with DTRA and fully integrated within the daily
activities of the agency.
All studies that have looked at the WMD challenge,
including, most recently, the QDR, have concluded that
countering WMD capabilities are crucial to our security. The
department considers this to be among its top priorities; and,
therefore, the DTRA fiscal year 2011 budget request is 18
percent higher than last year's appropriation. This is the
first significant increase requested by DTRA since the agency's
establishment nearly 12 years ago.
I would like to explain how this increased funding responds
to the president's non-proliferation goals and the QDR.
In response to the president's initiative to secure
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, DTRA is requesting an
increase of $74.5 million in Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Funding, and $14.5 million in critical support
funding for program execution. This will accelerate related
efforts in the Russian Federation and the establishment of
Centers for Nuclear Security Excellence in countries outside
the borders of the former Soviet Union.
In response to the president's initiative to counter
biological threats, DTRA is requesting an additional $59
million to accelerate ongoing efforts across the former Soviet
Union, and to permit biosecurity upgrades and implement
globally integrated disease surveillance and reporting systems
in Asia and Africa.
To implement the president's strategy of revitalizing arms
control as a tool for countering weapons of mass destruction,
DTRA is requesting $9 million to establish a technology-
development program for monitoring and verification of lower
nuclear-warhead levels, a prohibition on fissile-material
production, and a ban on nuclear testing.
We are requesting $48 million to expand and accelerate our
development of technologies and other support to the U.S.
Special Operations Command for its Combating Weapons of Mass
Destruction Terrorism Activities.
We are also requesting $24 million to accelerate technology
development, provide expanded training, and procure equipment
to improve the war fighter's capabilities to search for, locate
and interdict nuclear and radiological threats.
Lastly, we are requesting $38 million for expanded DOD and
interagency information-sharing--provide rapid response to the
combatant command's request for technical and WMD effects
analysis; expand collaboration between WMD technical and
intelligence expertise; and provide for reliable connectivity
for the execution of the DTRA global mission.
DTRA is contributing to many other capabilities, including
nuclear forensics, chemical-biological defense, the
Proliferation Security Initiative, the International
Counterproliferation Program, system survivability against WMD
effects, and force protection.
For example, DTRA recently completed a series of tests in
support of a massive ordnance penetrator, or MOP, the largest
air-deliverable conventional weapon available for use against
underground facilities, many of which are associated with WMD.
The MOP program transitioned from DTRA to the Air Force, due to
the close teamwork between our offices at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, Eglin Air Force Base, in Florida, Kirtland Air Force
Base and White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
The MOP is just one example of the teamwork seen across
DTRA and our other partners every day.
Before concluding, I would like to express my commitment to
the efficient and effective management of the additional
funding that DTRA is requesting. Our past performance indicates
that we can obligate and extend funding made available to us.
We have a steady track record of efficient program execution.
Recently, we effectively implemented a significant increase in
nuclear-mission support that has produced real results.
Second, we have contracts in place with sufficiently high-
funding ceilings to permit the rapid obligation and expenditure
of additional funding. Third, efforts are ongoing to
aggressively monitor and refine implementation plans to ensure
timely and effective execution, and eliminate any potential
obstacles.
I urge your support for the DTRA fiscal year 2011 budget
request, the first significant increase in resources sought by
the agency in some twelve years. We will put these resources to
good use to better equip, train and protect our war fighters,
and safeguard the American people. Thank you for your support
of DTRA and the Strategic Command [STRATCOM] Center for
Combating WMD [SCC-WMD] in prior years, and for the opportunity
to be here today. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Myers.
And, now, we will hear from General Scarbrough for five
minutes or less.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JESS A. SCARBROUGH, USA, JOINT PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
General Scarbrough. Madam Chair and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, I am honored to testify on behalf of the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I will identify what
the program contributes in the areas of biosurveillance,
medical countermeasures and non-traditional agents. Before I
conclude, I will speak briefly about acquisition reform.
The Chemical and Biological Defense Program is uniquely
positioned to leverage its enterprise capabilities for
biosurveillance. We produce Food and Drug Administration [FDA]-
approved medical diagnostics and develop and field systems that
monitor the environment for biological threats.
For example, we have succeeded in tying medical diagnostic
and surveillance capabilities together with biological
detectors to provide a common operating picture within the
United States Forces Korea theater of operations. Another
example is our capability for medical response and
preparedness, an important element of biosurveillance.
In 2009, working with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, we added identification of H1N1 flu as a capability
on a system we developed that provides the war fighter a way to
identify and diagnose human disease.
The Food and Drug Administration granted our emergency-use
authorization request in short order. We are continuing to
expand this diagnostic capability to include other infectious
diseases.
With respect to medical countermeasures, we partner with
government, industry, academia and international organizations
for material development and manufacturing of Food and Drug
Administration approved products and systems. We have
interagency agreements with the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention to share licensed anthrax and smallpox vaccines from
the Strategic National Stockpile. The agreements establish the
framework for the acquisition, storage, management and delivery
of these vaccines to meet Department of Defense operational and
inventory requirements.
Another example of collaboration and coordination is the
Integrated National Biodefense Portfolio Initiative, also known
as the One-Portfolio, which synergizes efforts of the
Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human
Services, as well as other agencies whose missions involve
addressing the same challenges; the vision of government-wide
coordination of research and development of medical
countermeasures for biological threats.
Regarding innovation, the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program's Transformational Medical Technologies Initiative
continues to gain momentum. Over the next 24 months, we will
continue clinical studies in support of licensure of maturing
hemorrhagic fever virus therapeutics and submit Investigational
New Drug applications for additional medical countermeasures
against intercellular bacteria pathogens and hemorrhagic fever
viruses.
With respect to non-traditional agent threat, we are
working to field solutions in the areas of detection, medical
countermeasures, decontamination and protection, along with
associated doctrine, equipment and training. We are planning to
rapidly field, in the near term, capabilities, in fiscal year
2011, and will continue to improve upon those capabilities and
provide them to other units.
Changes to the Defense Acquisition System, directed by
Congress, are refocusing the way we manage acquisition
programs. These are new requirements for analysis of
alternatives prior to initiating the acquisition process:
increased competition, competitive prototyping, and the
evaluation of technology maturity so that our acquisition
programs are ready for the next phase of development.
In order to reduce the risk of failure, we are applying the
tools of acquisition reform to programs that pose particular
technical challenges.
The bottom line for us remains providing capability to the
war fighter. In fiscal year 2009, we fielded over 1.3 million
individual pieces of equipment to our servicemen and women
around the globe, representing improvements and capabilities
they depend on for protection.
While our investments in biosurveillance, medical
countermeasures and non-traditional agents are the focus, we
must neither underfund nor deemphasize the range of investments
that establish the layered defense-in-depth strategy we employ
to protect and inform our personnel. This strategy requires
significant investment, as reflected in the president's fiscal
year 2011 budget request for our program, which consists of
$370 million for procurement, $812 million for advanced
development, and $396 million for science-and-technology
efforts, for a total of $1.578 billion.
Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee, I greatly
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scarbrough can be found
in the Appendix on page 59.]
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, General.
And, now, as is the custom, I will remind the members that
each of us will have five minutes to ask questions. And I will
start with myself.
Mr. Weber, when we met earlier, I asked you, ``What
questions should I ask you guys?'' And you said, ``Ask us what
keeps us awake at night.''
So I will ask it in a different way: What threat to the
homeland--chemical, biological, nuclear--has the highest
likelihood of happening in the next five years, and why? What
do you see as the hardest-hitting thing towards the U.S.?
Mr. Weber. The----
Ms. Sanchez. Is your mic on?
Mr. Weber. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay.
Mr. Weber. The threat that I worry about--the two threats
that I worry about most are the delivery by violent extremists
of a ten kiloton blast with an improvised nuclear device in an
American or allied city, and also a biological attack, for
example, with one kilogram of anthrax, in a city.
Each one would have potentially catastrophic consequences.
And the Congressional Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction
that Senator Graham and Congressman Talent co-chaired evaluated
the risk of the different types of weapons of mass destruction.
Their conclusion was that the biological-terrorist threat was
the most likely.
In terms of the accessibility of the technology and the
materials--the seed materials--that would be required for a
terrorist group to obtain a biological-weapons capability--I
agree with that conclusion.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Are we appropriately allocating our budget with respect to
that understanding? And, if not, what would you change?
Mr. Weber. Okay. I will answer that, and ask my colleagues
to add to that.
But what you see in the president's fiscal year 2011 budget
request is an increase in each of these areas. I believe this
is the beginning of a trend.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which is the
Department of Defense--really, the U.S. government's Center of
Excellence for the Countering WMD mission was more or less
flat-lined during the last ten years, even after the 9/11
attacks on the United States. So the Obama administration has,
in its budget, proposed an 18 percent increase, which reflects
the increased priority on this mission set.
Those increases are at a level that we can absorb and
execute responsibly. And I would ask my colleague, Ken Myers,
the director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to
elaborate further. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Great, because that is the question I had for
him.
What are you going to do that--with that 18 percent, and is
it enough? And----
Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, the 18 percent is a
significant increase in the funding that we will have available
to confront the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.
As the QDR lays out, one of our major strategies is erecting
layers or lines of defense between the sources of these threats
and the American people.
The most effective place for us to counteract and eliminate
these threats before they adversely affect the U.S. war
fighter, as well as the American people, is at the source,
which is why I think the president has focused a lot of
attention on global nuclear lockdown, eliminating these
problems before they spread, and for countering biological
threats, again, at their source.
If our programs and our efforts at the source are incapable
of stopping these threats before they leak out--before they
begin moving to harm the American people--we will seek to
engage governments and countries at the borders, increasing
their ability to interdict, to detect and, if need be, destroy
these weapons and these materials, before they threaten the
American people.
We are working to address the problem at each layer, each
line of defense, that we are possibly able to erect between the
threats and the American people. And I believe the 18 percent
increase that we are requesting as part of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency budget is a good spread across all of the
opportunities and all of the capabilities that we have to bring
to bear against the threat.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Myers.
General, as of February, 08, 2010, less than two percent of
the fiscal year 2010 Chemical and Biological Defense Program
[CBDP] procurement, or Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation [RTD&E] funds have been expended. And only about
half of the fiscal year 2009 procurement have been expended.
Why is the execution rate at these levels? And is the low
execution rate impacting our chemical and biological-defense
capabilities? And can you provide updated information that
demonstrates that the execution of CBDP funds is improving?
General Scarbrough. Madam Chair, first I would like to
thank you for your support to the Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. We have significantly improved our obligation
and expenditure rates for both procurement and RDT&E in fiscal
year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. And we exceed the established
Department of Defense goals in both of those appropriations.
With respect to fiscal year 2010, we are a little bit
behind. We have just received our allocation just a couple of
months ago. But we are rapidly catching up, and we should be
exceeding our goals by July of this year.
Ms. Sanchez. So, at the last point where we saw it, it was
at two percent appropriation expenditure. Are you saying that
you have--how far have you caught up, when you say that, ``We
have been working on this''?
General Scarbrough. With respect to the fiscal year 2009?
With respect to fiscal year 2009 expenditures, for the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program, we are 60.8 percent
expended for fiscal year 2009, which is above the established
DOD goal of 43 percent.
Ms. Sanchez. And for 2010?
General Scarbrough. For fiscal year 2010, we are at--for
expenditures, we are at 4.5 percent, and the goal is 11.5
percent. So we are below the goals, but we are rapidly catching
up, given that we received our allocation authority a couple of
months ago.
Ms. Sanchez. Is your inability to--is this a problem? It
seems to me like what you are saying is, ``Well, we didn't know
the amounts--for maybe that way--we didn't really know what we
had to spend, so we didn't really fully go into what we were
going to do.'' Is that a problem as we try to gear up this
program to face the threats that we have out there?
General Scarbrough. Ma'am, I would say it is not a problem.
We have been operating at the pace that has been approved by
the Department of Defense and Congress. And, then, once we got
our funding-allocation documents, once the budget was approved
in fiscal year 2010--in January, we, then, accelerated that.
And, as I mentioned to you earlier, we have contractual
vehicles in place, or will be in place, to be on pace to exceed
the DOD goals, you know, by July.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Thank you, General.
I will now recognize the gentleman from New Jersey for his
question.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
This could be, basically--be for anyone on the panel.
What is the current plan for weapon-system survivability
from a chemical or biological attack?
General Scarbrough. Sir, may I ask for you to repeat the
question again, please?
Mr. LoBiondo. What is the current plan for weapon-system
survivability from a chemical or biological attack?
General Scarbrough. First off, sir, we have delivered, as I
said in my oral statement, over 1.3 million individual pieces
of equipment to our war fighters across all of the services--
Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine. Those pieces of equipment
have included decontamination detection, medical diagnostics
and individual protection such as masks, boots, gloves and
suits. So we feel that we have equipped our soldiers, airmen,
sailors and Marines with the capability to operate if they were
to get hit with a chemical or a biological attack.
Mr. LoBiondo. Anybody else that is----
Mr. Myers. Much of the work that the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency does, sir, in that area, is with regard to
Electromagnetic Pulse [EMP] and nuclear potential. In that
area, we perform technology assessments. We provide technical
assistance to our war fighters, and to our systems.
We recently developed simulators and specialized equipment
for testing of missiles, aircrafts or ships. We routinely
provide support to STRATCOM, Northern Command [NORTHCOM], and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] on a wide range of
EMP threats. And we are also actively involved in assessing the
impact of such an attack on the U.S. power grid, our
telecommunications systems, as well as emergency-service
infrastructures.
Mr. LoBiondo. Can you, in an open setting like this, talk
any more about how we prepare for EMP attack, and the--there is
a lot of talk about what that may mean, and how we go about
this. I don't know if we are in the right setting for that or
not.
Mr. Myers. I can talk--very general terms, obviously. We
are seeking to harden all of those capabilities to the point
where they would be, if not immune, able to withstand those
types of strains and pressures that we--put on by that type of
attack. Beyond that, sir, I would not----
Mr. LoBiondo. Okay. Well, maybe can--talk to Mr. Miller,
and talk to you, Madam Chair, about a closed session to talk
about that a little bit more?
By which mechanisms are the intelligence community
coordinating and sharing information pertaining to WMD threats
with appropriate officials in the Department of Defense or
other key U.S. agencies? Is that where it should be? Is it up
to snuff? Does more need to be done?
Mr. Weber. Congressman, we get briefed on a daily basis by
the intelligence community on the whole range of WMD threats.
In addition, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence [ODNI] participates in the Counterproliferation
Program Review standing committee so we can align resources and
investments that are being made in the countering-WMD area.
I would say that the reporting that we get on the threats
from state programs is excellent and extremely helpful in
helping us prioritize where we should be expending resources.
Generally, reporting on nuclear threats is quite good.
There is, I would say, as a consumer of intelligence, room for
improvement on collection and analysis on biological-weapons
threats, which are a very difficult target.
Mr. Myers. If I may just add very quickly--one of the
efforts that is currently underway between the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency is working
together in co-located spaces to work together on some of the
potential WMD threats; in other words, bringing the
intelligence analysts together with the technology experts,
with those systems engineers that are responsible for designing
the approaches that we would take in dealing with those WMD
threats.
So, as the assistant secretary mentioned, there is work to
be had, and to move forward and improve. But I think one of the
things that we have found is that bringing the experts together
at a working level is a good step in the right direction.
Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Sanchez. Considering that most of our membership is not
here today--I don't know if you have any other questions. I do
know that they are about to call votes on the House floor. So
if you have finished yours, I will end with one last question.
And I will also let you gentlemen know that I am sure that the
members will be submitting questions for the record. I don't
know where they are. I am going to have to go round them up and
push them a little bit about getting here to meetings.
So they will be submitting, I am sure, by writing some
questions. We ask that you answer them quickly so that we can
glean as much as we can from this. Again, I appreciate you
coming before us today.
So my last question for you all would be: If there is
something we should have asked, but we didn't ask about?
Let us start with Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. Well, you mentioned at the opening, our
discussion about--you know, ``What do we lose sleep over?'' And
what I worry about is the day after an attack using weapons of
mass destruction. Is there something that we should have been
doing faster and more effectively to have prevented that? Or I
worry as much--is there something that we should have been
doing, but weren't.
And that is where we look to--certainly, we do some
thinking internally within the U.S. government, but we also
look to our partners in Congress to identify potential program
areas where we don't have programs to address key gaps.
I would say that one question that, by the nature of these
threats, is a good one to ask, is: How are we working across
the interagency because these are, by definition, crosscutting
problems? The biological threat is one that the Department of
Health and Human Services plays a very important role in
countering. And the Department of Defense works very closely
under the White House leadership. We have been meeting once a
week with the Department of Defense and counterparts--the
director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Tom
Frieden, and the FDA administrator, Peggy Hamburg--Tony Fauci,
from the National Institutes of Health, and my counterpart in
the Department of Health and Human Services, Doctor Nicole
Lurie.
In the countering-nuclear-terrorism arena, we work on a
daily basis with the Department of Energy--again, with very
strong leadership from the White House, from the WMD czar and
the so-called WMD czar, Gary Samore, and his staff, and also
from the Homeland Security side, under John Brennan's
leadership.
So there is, I would say--having spent some time in
Washington, working on these problems--there is better-than-
ever integration of effort and high-level attention on this
problem. And it certainly makes our jobs easier having a
president of the United States who understands and has made
these threats a very, very high priority. Thank you.
Mr. Myers. Madam Chairwoman, the one item I think that I
would enunciate a little bit more is our role as a combat-
support agency--our support for our servicemen and women.
Many don't consider the connection between the agency and
our men and women in uniform because of our role in WMD. But we
do our very best to support them in a number of ways--first and
foremost, our role in helping them synchronize their planning
and their activities to dealing with a WMD emergency or threat.
Secondly, we provide 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week reach-back
support. If the war fighter or combatant commander is in need
of information analysis, we are a telephone call or a ``send''
button away in terms of being able to do everything from plume
analysis to various different types of information provisions.
Thirdly, we help them with consequence management, force-
protection assessments. We have teams that go out to our men
and women in uniform, deployed abroad, and provide them with
the assessments they need to improve the security surrounding
their facilities.
And lastly, we do an awful lot of--provide an awful lot of
support for both the functional as well as the combatant
commands in terms of targeting; in terms of identifying the
best planning that is necessary to take down these potential
threats before they manifest themselves.
General Scarbrough. Madam Chairman, I would also like to
add to what Mr. Weber and Mr. Myers stated with respect to
interagency coordination. Within the CBDP program, we do a lot
of interagency coordination with the Department of Health and
Human Services, specifically on the recent H1N1 outbreak, where
we worked a diagnostic assay that we built for a biodefense
mission set, but we applied it to diagnosing infectious human
disease--a dual-use capability.
At the same time, we were able to test potential broad-
spectrum therapeutics via the Transformational Medical
Technologies Initiative, to get capability out quickly to the
war fighter, as well as to the population.
The other thing I would say with--the Department of
Homeland Security--we work very closely with them, with our
Installation Protection Program, and support them with respect
to BioWatch, as well as supporting the weapons of mass
destruction civil-support teams, and providing capability to
the National Guard to support those homeland missions.
And, then, the last thing, ma'am, is I would highlight that
we--one of my biggest priorities as a joint PEO [Program
Executive Officer] is acquisition reform. And we work every day
to improve our ability, taking the acquisition-reform
initiatives before us under the Weapons Systems Acquisition
Reform Act of 2009, to mitigate risk--do more work early on in
the acquisition lifecycle to mitigate risk down the road.
Ms. Sanchez. Great.
I notice that Mr. Murphy, of New York, came in. Do you have
any questions for our panel?
Well, welcome.
As I said, votes are ready to be called any moment. So I
thank the gentlemen for being before us today. I thank you for
your testimony. As I said, we will have, probably, some written
questions from some of the members who weren't able to attend.
And, again, I thank you, and thank you for the service to our
country. And the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 14, 2010
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 14, 2010
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