[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING
BIOLOGICAL THREATS: DIPLOMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 18, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-91
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee CONNIE MACK, Florida
GENE GREEN, Texas JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
LYNN WOOLSEY, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas TED POE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
VACANT
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade
BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia TED POE, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
RON KLEIN, Florida
Don MacDonald, Subcommittee Staff Director
John Brodtke, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member
Tom Sheehy, Republican Professional Staff Member
Isidro Mariscal, Subcommittee Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 7
Barry Kellman, J.D., President, International Security and
Biopolicy Institute............................................ 37
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies........................................................ 47
The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Member, Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism, Senior Counsel, BGR Group (Former Assistant
Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation).............................................. 60
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen: Prepared statement....................... 10
Barry Kellman, J.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 40
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 50
The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement........... 63
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 76
Hearing minutes.................................................. 78
The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade: Extracted pages from a report by
the International Security & Biopolicy Institute entitled,
``United States Foreign Policies and Programs to Reduce Bio-
Dangers,'' dated March 2010.................................... 79
Written response from Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen to question
submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman......... 88
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.: Comments for the record............... 89
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING BIOLOGICAL THREATS: DIPLOMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad J. Sherman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Sherman. We are going to have a special treat at
today's hearings. In the past, witnesses have been confined to
only 5 minutes. Today's witnesses will be speaking for 7
minutes or less. That will bring a special entertainment value.
We are in tough competition on C-SPAN for higher ratings. The
questioning period will be 5 minutes and opening statements
will be five or seven or however long we take.
There has been much recent attention to the threat that
bioterrorism poses to our national security. Today's hearing
provides a broad overview of our diplomatic and international
effort to counter that threat. Earlier this year, the Weapons
of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Senators Graham and
Talent, issued a report card that included an assessment of our
progress in biodefense.
Their initial report found biological weapons are more
likely to be acquired and used by terrorist groups than nuclear
weapons. Although I might add that it is my belief that
bioweapons would cause a lesser number of casualties; a smaller
though more likely disaster.
Indeed, the commission found that unless the world
community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more
likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction would be used
in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
2013. Since we have already seen the use of anthrax and the use
of chemical and biological weapons in Japan over recent
decades, this seems to be relatively safe prediction.
The report further identified several weaknesses in our
national biodefense, including the need for stronger
Congressional oversight. This hearing is part of that
oversight, and follows my request that the International
Security and Biopolicy Institute prepare a report on our
international efforts to counter biological threats.
Without objection, I would like to put that study into the
record of this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
The hearing also provides us an opportunity to examine the
Obama administration's national strategy to address biological
threats.
When the Graham/Talent Commission issued its assessment and
report card on national progress in the WMD area, it contained
sharp criticism of our national efforts to improve biodefense.
The commission issued a failing grade, a grade of F, for
U.S. efforts to mitigate the effects of biological attack. I do
not fully agree with this grade. And it found that our
international efforts, personified by our first witness here
deserved a grade of between A and B; considerably better than
most other aspects addressed in the report.
It is important to note that others have countered that the
commission has over-estimated the threat of biological attack.
Some critics contend that we have spent too much on domestic
preparedness, some $64 billion since 9/11 and the anthrax
attacks.
I have often said that the use of the term WMD is
misleading, because it lumps into one category mustard gas and
hydrogen bombs, along with all chemical, radiological and
biological and nuclear threats.
Even a crude nuclear explosive with a small yield could
kill tens of thousands of people. Those uses of biological and
chemical weapons against first world countries--here in the
United States, Japan, and elsewhere, have involved dozens of
casualties, rather than tens of thousands.
I would hope our witnesses would be able to describe how
they believe biological threats could lead perhaps to a mass
casualty event; and it is important that we understand the
nature and the possible casualties of different types of
biological attacks.
When it comes to biological threats confronting us today,
we must consider the parallel threats from state-sponsored use
of biological weapons, and from biological attacks perpetrated
by terrorist groups. One of the longest-standing efforts to
counter state-sponsored biological weapons programs is the
Biological Weapons Convention, the BWC, which went into effect
in 1975. Since that time, the BWC has not had a verification
regime anywhere similar to the verification regimes we have for
nuclear and chemical weapons.
Some, including past administrations, have argued that
traditional verification protocol could not keep pace with
rapid developments in biological research; that basically
biological weapons can be created in so many different
facilities, legitimate facilities like the vaccine plant, ``too
hard to detect,'' say some.
Most recently in December, our good friend, Under Secretary
for Arms Control, deg. Ellen Tauscher, reaffirmed the
U.S. position on BWC compliance without seeking a verification
protocol. The administration instead--and I think this is
somewhat controversial--is trying to control biological weapons
by disclosing the bioresearch that we are doing in Maryland and
elsewhere.
Some were saying this is telling the terrorists what
defenses we have. Others would say that this is reassuring
other countries in the world that our bioresearch is only for
defense and constitutes a confidence-building measure (CBM).
I look forward to learning more about how the United States
can promote greater BWC compliance and verification without
letting the bad guys know what our defenses are.
The threat of a biological attack from a terrorist group
presents a more amorphous problem, and they have argued that
recent progress in biological research has greatly reduced the
barriers to the development of bioweapons by relatively small
groups and even individuals; provided they have the necessary
technical competence.
United States Government programs seek to engage foreign
scientists and give them something to focus on, and not be up
for hire by those seeking to create proliferation, now focus on
the biological sciences as well as the nuclear sciences.
I am eager to hear about the State Department's efforts in
this regard through the Biosecurity Engagement Program and
other diplomatic efforts.
Finally, the ability to detect and assess infectious
disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or intentionally
instigated, is both important from a global public health
standpoint, and from the standpoint of mitigating the impact of
a biological attack.
The internal health risk posed by H1N1 and SARS indicate
that pathogens show little regard for national borders, and
modern jet travel can transport these infectious agents from
anywhere in the world to the United States.
The Obama administration's national security strategy to
counter biological attacks emphasizes the need for global
disease surveillance as part of our national defense.
Similarly, instruments like the International Health
Regulations provide a framework for improving disease
surveillance and reporting worldwide.
In this regard, I continue to be concerned that Indonesia
is not cooperating with the United States, particularly by not
providing samples of avian flu found in that country; and I
will address that in the questioning of the witnesses.
Such efforts can simultaneously improve health, even in the
most impoverished parts of the world; while at the same time
fostering international biosecurity. I think I will conclude
now, since my time has expired, and hear the words of our
ranking member, Mr. Royce, from the great State of California.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this hearing. I think that bioterrorism really demands a lot
greater attention by the administration, by the Congress,
frankly, by everyone.
This biological warfare really dates back to the beginning
of recorded history. The world's first true historian,
Thucydides, almost lost his life as a result of a technique
that Persians and Greeks and Romans used of throwing carcasses
down a well to poison it.
And I think Athens lost a greater percentage of its
population in the war with Sparta to this biological effect,
than they did to the Spartan war machine. So it has a long
history of being used in warfare.
And today, germs present really a mass destruction threat,
if we think about it. Scientists have been able to assemble
infectious viruses, including the formerly extinct 1918
influenza strain. That strain killed 30 million people.
So every advancing technology and biotechnology just
continues to proliferate. Several years ago, just outside of
Moscow, I met with the so-called Father of the Plague; and I
think his moniker might have been a bit overstated. But that is
how the Russians referred to him. He was the top Russian
scientist, and he had allegedly developed a genetically altered
pathogen that had no antidote.
He wanted us to meet with him, because he had been able to
at least put an alarm system into the Moscow subways. He had
never been outside of the country. But presuming we used
subways, he wanted us to have this technology.
You know, he really was sort of an insight. He wanted Jim
Saxton and I to know the extent of what they had done. They had
50,000 people in the Soviet biological weapons program at one
point; a massive USSR violation of its BWC Treaty commitment,
by the way. And he shared with me his concern that some of this
legion had sold their expertise to Middle East countries.
It is regrettable that the Russians have lessened their
cooperation with our joint efforts to contain this
proliferation. Over 10 countries today may have bioweapons
programs.
Al-Qaeda has sought biological weapons. Evidence seized in
the 2003 arrest of Operations Chief Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
revealed impressive technical sophistication, including
information on weaponizing anthrax. Now that is one of those
subjects that I discussed with the Russian scientist.
That was 7 years ago. By the way, one of his students
subsequently defected, and we had a chance to talk with him
here in the United States. He confirmed what his professor had
taught him; or what his mentor had taught him in this
technology, and he was now trying to help us better understand
what had been developed.
Unfortunately, I am afraid that there is a great deal of
complacency; and maybe complacency is normal. But the 2001
anthrax attack--that little fiasco--cost us $6 billion and some
American lives. Local officials speak of having to fight
citizens' indifference to bolster our resilience to attack;
that is just a realty.
Ringing an alarm is the Bi-Partisan Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and
Terrorism. It concluded that ``our margin of safety is
shrinking; not growing.'' The commission believes that unless
decisive and urgent action is taken, then a WMD terrorist
attack is likely to occur somewhere within 4 years. ``This
attack'' the commission speculates, ``is more likely to be
biological than it would be nuclear.''
The commission reports that each of the last three
administrations have been slow to recognize and respond to
bioterrorism. The Obama administration, it found, lacks a sense
of urgency. The commission gave the administration an ``F'' for
not improving our biological attack response capabilities.
I am looking forward to hearing from the administration
today about why it thinks the commission gave it too tough a
grade. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sherman. We will now hear an opening statement, if he
chooses to give one, from our vice chair, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very timely
hearing; very important hearing. I think we do face a serious
probability and possibility of a bioterrorist attack.
In my capacity as chairman of our Agriculture subcommittee
on food safety, it is an issue of soaring magnitude. Largely
because of our food supply, the nature of it, the free movement
of it, the international aspects of it, the fact that we are,
in fact, the bread basket of the world certainly looms very
large in terms of the attractiveness as a target by terrorist
groups.
So as scientific progress marches on, we certainly have the
potential and increasingly the capabilities to address many of
the threats that we are facing. From developing new strains of
rice to address world hunger; for vaccines that prevent the
spread of disease like H1N1, scientific knowledge can and
largely has led to the betterment of mankind, and continues to
raise our living standards for all.
But, however, like any knowledge, there is the potential
for those who would wish us harm to unleash devastating
attacks. We must not only prepare for that chance; but do our
very best to prevent.
Our most recent attack from a chemical biological weapon
shows the sophistication and the change of tactics of
terrorists, from our Christmas Day underwear bomber over a
plane in New York. Who would have thought that a mere mixing of
a chemical in one's under garments could blow a plane out of
the sky?
But this very serious scientific technological knowledge
that we have to unleash great goodness across the world is the
same technology that can be used in a warped backward evil
sense, to cause us great harm. And we have got to be prepared
to do everything we can to prevent this.
In my travels to Russia and to Africa, every part of the
nation we have been in, in the part of the world that we have
been in, it just alarms me as to the laxness of our
international approach; and trying to get an international
cooperation, to understand the urgency of it; and our food
supplies are so interchanged nationally.
Just to take one example, 90 percent of all of the tomatoes
that we use in this country come from outside this country. We
are so inter-dependent internationally that we must move very
rapidly to understand.
As I said, biological science has led to great advances in
addressing our food shortages and develop famine resistant
crops. However, the agriculture sector in our nation's food
supply overall can be very enticing targets for acts of
bioterrorism.
As our agriculture sector, as I mentioned, is known as the
bread basket of the world, it is important to note that any
attack on our food supply could have the devastating effects
for the rest of the world.
And then I mentioned, we are moving very rapidly in our own
home state of Georgia, where the University of Georgia's very
prestigious agriculture department is putting first a world
class food supply, food security process that we are all going
to be taking a closer look.
And while, of course, we must make sure to address
preventing the spread of disease outbreaks and protecting our
water supply, or counter or avert direct attacks like the 2001
anthrax attack, which we thought was a systematic, well
orchestrated attack from multi-faceted approaches. But we come
to find out, it was by one man; one man responsible for that
devastating anthrax attack.
So this looms big, Mr. Chairman; and I am very delighted
that you put this together. I think we can get some answers to
some questions. We need to have uniform definitions. What
constitutes a biological weapon; and is that constitution
accurate for every country? How can we tighten our
international cooperation? Because that is the key.
They are very, very serious questions. I look forward to
the witnesses; and thank you, Mr. Chairman for putting this
together.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. At this point, we will hear from
our first witness. Oh, excuse me, Ambassador Watson has come,
and we wish to hear her opening statement.
Ms. Watson. I would say good morning to the chairperson;
and thank you for convening today's hearing to review our
national and international response to countering biological
threats.
It is never too early to discuss and review the
effectiveness of current policies and practices, so that we
might learn what works; evaluate what does not; and revise or
strengthen national and international efforts to prepare for
and hopefully prevent the next biological attack.
In recent history, when we think of a biological terrorist
attack, it is not hard to forget the aforementioned anthrax
attacks here in Washington, after the tragedy of September 11,
2001; where five people were killed and 17 others infected.
Since then, agencies across Federal, state, and local
governments have taken steps to address issues of prevention,
training, evaluating resources, and coordinating efforts; as
well as increasing public education, participation and
awareness.
Some have noticed that while there are many agencies in
departments that have resources dedicated to prevention and
mitigating damage and harm to the public, there is still a
large gap in inter-agency and inter-governmental communications
and coordinations.
Others have also noted that while it is important to have
regulation and oversight of bi-containment technologies and
control of high containment laboratories, the Federal
Government must not stifle or inhibit international academic
collaboration in order for the scientific community to continue
its study on biological chemicals.
In this committee, we have addressed export controls and
review of the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export
Administration Act, which operates on the principal that the
export of certain goods requires licensure specifically denying
such licenses if the items will contribute to biological
weapons proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, as lawmakers, we have a responsibility to
evaluate policy and close gaps in order to strengthen and
protect our citizens. We also have an obligation to work toward
international transparency and diplomatic efforts.
I appreciate the panel for taking time to appear before
this committee. I look forward to hearing and listening to the
witnesses testimony. And I do indeed want to thank you, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Sherman. I thank the Ambassador for joining us here and
for that opening statement. We now turn to our first witness. I
want to introduce Vann Van Diepen. Mr. Van Diepen has been the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, PDAS, for
International Security and Nonproliferation since June 2009.
The International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau
spearheads U.S. efforts to promote consensus on WMP
proliferation through bilateral and multi-lateral diplomacy;
Mr. Van Diepen?
STATEMENT OF MR. VANN H. VAN DIEPEN, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear
today. The President's new National Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats signals a major development in our
international efforts to combat those threats. And today, I
would like to share more information on the activities that we
conduct at the State Department to implement that strategy.
I would like to request that my prepared testimony be
included in the record of today's hearing; and I will present a
shorter version here in my oral statement.
What I intend to do is to take a moment to outline the
threat, and then describe some key activities that the State
Department is undertaking internationally to implement the
strategy.
As already indicated in many of the opening statements,
Congress is keenly aware that there is a real and present
danger of biological attack, given the 2001 anthrax attacks.
The most obvious and recent danger comes from terrorist groups
that have expressed an intent to obtain biological weapons,
especially al-Qaeda. And we are also concerned about the
ambitions of some nation states to develop biological weapons.
A successful attack using a pathogenic agent could not only
result in sickness and death; but could cause panic, loss of
public trust, and enormous economic damage.
The President's strategy complements our preparations to
respond to biological events, by placing more emphasis on
efforts to prevent such events; or at least to reduce the
likelihood that they will take place.
State's efforts to implement the strategy internally are
focused on reducing the likelihood that terrorists or states
interested in biological weapons could obtain the experience or
materials to develop and use them. Working with the
international community to transform the dialogue on biological
threats is a key objective in the strategy; and State plays a
critical role in achieving this objective by working through
existing multi-lateral mechanisms.
Today, I am going to highlight our work in the Biological
Weapons Convention, the State Department's Biosecurity
Engagement Program, and in the G-8 Global Partnership against
the spread of WMD.
In each of these areas, there is a new-found urgency
related to the need to work together to strengthen our
collective security against biological threats.
A key element of the strategy is revitalizing the Biologic
Weapons Convention, which we intend to use to promote and
globally advance our biosecurity objectives, through using the
BWC as our premier forum for global outreach and coordination.
In particular, we will tighten the linkage between global
security against infectious disease; through strengthening
basic health capacities on the one hand, and on the other hand,
the security community's need to counter man-made disease
threats.
Last year, the Biological Weapons Convention States,
Parties and experts from a wide range of health, science, and
security organizations focused on disease surveillance and
related capacity building, with a particular emphasis on
implementation of the World Health Organization's International
Health Regulations.
The focus of BWC meetings in 2010 is on providing
assistance in the event of an unusual disease outbreak or an
alleged use of biological weapons. On our part, we are going to
have the FBI and the Centers for Disease Control brief on their
efforts on training for joint criminal epidemiological
investigations.
And there will be several U.S. sponsored conferences on
bio-risk management and on scientific and technical
breakthroughs that can be applied to disease surveillance. And
we are looking forward to the seventh 5-year BWC Review
Conference in 2011 as an opportunity to further the objectives
of the strategy.
In addition to BWC, State's Biosecurity Engagement Program
(BEP) is working to reduce the threat of bioterrorism through
cooperative activities to prevent terrorist access to
potentially dangerous biological materials and expertise, while
supporting legitimate efforts to combat infectious disease and
enhance public and animal health worldwide.
Since 2006, the BEP program has matured into a $37-million-
a-year effort, focused on regions and countries where there is
a nexus of terrorism, emerging infectious disease, and rapid
growth in biotechnology in high containment laboratories.
BEP provides support for and closely coordinates activities
abroad with other U.S. departments and agencies, particularly
Defense, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, to
directly address several key objectives of the strategy.
BEP provides assistance to improve laboratory biosecurity
and biosafety best practices, improves capacity for infectious
disease detection, surveillance and control, and engages
biological scientists and public and animal health experts to
reduce the potential for exploitation of biological expertise,
information, and material. And BEP not only improves
international security; but provides a dual-benefit of
improving global health.
We are also addressing another key challenge identified in
this strategy; that of reinforcing norms for safe and
responsible conduct of biological activities.
For example, we are sponsoring biological safety
associations across Southeast Asia and in the Middle East that
can provide a sustained mechanism for countries to provide
training to life scientists and public and animal health
professionals on bio-risk management and responsible scientist
conduct.
State also coordinates and promotes additional cooperative
international efforts to counter the biological threat via the
G-8 Global Partnership; a 10-year, $20-billion nonproliferation
effort that was launched in 2002, and has thus far focused on
programs in the former Soviet Union.
This year, we are working closely with the Canadian G-8
Presidency and with the other G-8 partners, to extend the
partnership beyond 2010. This expanded program will bring
additional resources from partner countries to bear on
addressing global biological threats and also threats beyond
those in the former Soviet Union.
We are also working to help U.N. member states manage
biological security threats by helping them implement U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all U.N.
members to have proliferation export controls and to secure
dangerous materials.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that I have been able to provide you
with a better understanding of the serious efforts by the
Department of State against the biological threat. I have
appreciated the opportunity to outline for the subcommittee
what we are doing in concrete terms to implement the
international aspects of the national strategy.
State, of course, does not work alone, and relies on its
close working relationship with other U.S. Government agencies,
the Congress, and the international community to expand these
efforts and make them more successful; thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen
follows:]Vann Van Diepen deg.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sherman. Thank you; I am going to recognize the other
members of the subcommittee for questions first, and do my
questioning last. So I first recognize Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much; welcome Mr. Van Diepen. Let
me ask you this question if I may. In one respect, we have been
very fortunate that we have not had a biological terrorist
attack since 2001 and with the anthrax scare. How do you
account for that? Why do you say that has happened?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I think there is probably a complex
of answers to that question, Congressman. First of all there,
of course, has been a very intensive U.S. counter terrorism
effort, assisted by international partners, and various
biological related activities have been disrupted, such as the
anthrax activities in Afghanistan that are noted in my written
testimony.
Likewise, I think biological attack is more difficult for a
terrorist to perpetrate, especially significant ones, than the
kinds of conventional attacks that they are used to
perpetrating.
And of course, there has been a lot of effort to try and
improve our export controls, border surveillance, other kinds
of activities to try and inhibit and deter such activities. So
I think it is probably a complex of a variety of different
things that have been happening since 2001.
Mr. Scott. How would you describe for us, and as a matter
of fact, I would like for you to describe for us how the
Federal Government works, from a standpoint of inter-agency
cooperation? How do you coordinate what you do with other
agencies, and what are the other agencies who work together
with you to form this very strong front line defense of our
country from a biological attack?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, that, of course, is something that is
a center piece of the President's new strategy to improve that
inter-agency coordination.
But in terms of the international activities that we engage
in, everything that we do is very thoroughly inter-agency
coordinated. In fact, many of the implementers of the State
Department programs in this area are, in fact, other agencies
such as HHS and Agriculture.
There are various standing working groups where we try and
coordinate and de-conflict our various programs. To help
implement the strategy, the National Security Counsel staff has
put together an ongoing effort to come up with detailed inter-
agency implementation plans for each aspect of the strategy and
those are in development right now.
Also, we have in place a new special coordinator for
cooperative threat reduction in the Department, Ambassador
Bonnie Jenkins. And part of her job is to make sure that State
Department programs are well coordinated with those of other
agencies, as well as with similar activities that other
countries conduct.
Mr. Scott. Now let me ask you about the funding level. Do
you believe that we, in Congress, are giving you the necessary
amounts of resources to get the job done; or are there areas or
is there more funding that you feel we need to provide for you?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, Congressman, I suppose every
bureaucrat would be remiss if he did not say that he could use
more money.
But I think realistically, in terms of the absorptive
capacities of a lot of the countries that we are dealing with,
in terms of trying to make sure that we apply our resources in
places where there are clearly identified threats, and
recognizing that there are all sorts of other tradeoffs and
opportunity costs involved in these decisions, I think that we
have got, you know, sort of a fair and reasonable amount of
money allocated to these activities.
And I would say that Congress has been very supportive of
the BEP and, in fact, has had certain earmarks to make sure
that certain amounts of money are spent on BEP.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask you about our level of international
cooperation. If you could describe for us what that is, how
would you rate it, and where are the weak links around the
globe that we have to be concerned about--what countries, what
areas are our most significant worries?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I think probably the areas of the
highest direct threat potential are the areas that we in fact
are working in in the BEP, because it is a threat directed
program.
Places where you have got a nexus of terrorist activity and
substantial biotechnology--places in the Middle East, South
Asia--sort of fall into that category. But bioterrorism is
something that, for better or for worse, can happen almost
anywhere, almost any country has within its borders a hospital
or a scientific facility that has pathogens.
And so where we can, we are reaching out to try and improve
things in those areas, as well. So we have a new focus, for
example, in trying to do some operations in Africa and Latin
America, to help deal with that aspect of the problem, as well.
Mr. Scott. And one of the areas that, as I mentioned, I am
very much concerned about, of course, as the subcommittee
chairman for Food Safety in Agriculture, is to keep our food
supply safe.
Does your agency work in collaboration with our Agriculture
Department, especially in very critical areas where we are
moving forward to help with this in the area, for example,
animal ID, which we feel is very important? And how do you feel
about that? Do you believe that we should have mandatory animal
ID; or should we continue to leave that on a voluntary basis?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, Congressman, I would have to say on
that specific issue, that that really, you know, has not fallen
into my area of responsibility. So I am not sure I am in a
position to give you a meaningful response.
But on the larger question, I am very glad that you
identified the potential threat of biotechnology against the
food supply; because oftentimes, the discourse on this issue
only focuses on the human aspect of it. And because of the
indirect human aspect and the very significant economic impact
of the agricultural part, I am very glad that you raised that.
Because of that, that has always been a focus of our
activities. Whether it is securing dangerous pathogens, those
have always included pathogens against food crops and
livestock. Whether it is building a culture of safety and
security, we include the animal agriculture health communities
in those activities.
Mr. Sherman. The time of the gentleman has expired. Let me
now recognize Mr. Royce from California, our ranking member.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Chairman Sherman. At least one of our
witnesses today is going to speak of the importance of
intelligence and the inadequacy of our intelligence in
bioterrorism. And this is an issue that the chairman and I were
very involved in at the time. But in 2007, the intelligence
community produced a National Intelligence Estimate, which you
were certainly involved with. You were the National
Intelligence Officer for Nonproliferation.
That NIE concluded with high confidence that Iran had
halted its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2003; and it
assessed with moderate confidence that Iran had not re-started
this program.
In a report last month, the IAEA recited a number of
concerns about military related nuclear activity in Iran; and
asserted that these activities seem to have continued beyond
2004.
Now at the time the NIE was released, the chairman and I
denounced it as naive and harmful; and you were centrally
involved in that. I remember at the press hearing with Chairman
Brad Sherman, holding up the Time magazine cover that
exonerated the Iranians; exonerated them on the basis of your
assessment, which turned out to be wrong.
My question is, what went wrong? Is now the time maybe to
re-visit the issues addressed in the NIE? I do not think the
stakes could be any higher. Let me ask you that question.
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, thank you, Congressman. I guess the
starting point on that is, of course, that is not the business
I am in any more. But I think the fair way to answer that
question is, the intelligence community right now is preparing
a follow-on National Intelligence Estimate on that subject.
And I think the thing to do is to wait for that to come out
and see the extent to which that assessment differs from the
one in the 2007 NIE. I would suggest that that should probably
be the basis of deciding what was right and what was wrong.
Mr. Royce. I think the covert illegal enrichment facility
at a military base outside Qom, that was disclosed last fall to
all the world. So I think the case is pretty clear. Surely you
agree that something went wrong, in your assessment.
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, and one thing that is inherent is by
definition. Information comes in after you publish. The
intelligence business is one of working with the information
you happen to have at hand at any particular time; comparing it
to the old information, and trying to then project both what is
actually going on, since objective reality is difficult to
determine, and what you think is likely to happen in the
future. And by definition, new information keeps coming in. It
does not respect publication dates of NIEs.
Basically, in the intelligence community, you are in the
business of trying to predict the outcome of a movie that you
only get to see glimpses of. You do not know how long the movie
was going on before you started glimpsing. You do not know how
long the movie is going to be going on; and half of your
glimpses actually come from other people's glimpses of the
movie. So you have to sort of put all that together and put
together a picture.
I think that NIE was very clear and very responsible in its
use of so-called intelligence trade craft--confidence levels;
descriptions of alternative scenarios. In fact, I think there
were eight alternative scenarios beyond the main line estimate
that were included in that assessment. There was a very
extensive discussion of, what if we are wrong; how could we be
wrong?
Mr. Royce. I think part of your argument basically was, the
burden of proof to determine proliferation activity should be
as high as in the average U.S. court room; at least that is the
way I recall your assessment of the situation.
As one press report said afterwards, there was never a
sanction that Van Diepen liked, never, said one official. It
was a point of religion for him. He thought anything we did
outside of teacup diplomacy was counterproductive and wrong.
There are decisions we are going to make, in terms of
sanctions, on the basis of assessments which you helped make,
that frankly turned out to be wrong. I would like to just add a
couple of other concerns I have.
I brought up Russia. The WMD Commission noted that over the
last several years, Russia has been less and less interested in
cooperating with U.S. Biological Threat Reduction Programs that
had some success in re-directing former Soviet bioweapons
scientists to peaceful activities.
The commission expressed concern that ``the large cadre of
former bioweapons scientists remains a global proliferation
concern.''
You barely mentioned Russia in your testimony. And I was
going to ask you, can you explain the Russian position and the
United States response; and is there still a role for these
programs?
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Congressman; first of all, I do
not think I can let go the first part of what you had to say;
and frankly those quotes against me are utter nonsense.
I, in fact, have been involved in sanctioning more entities
and more countries for more acts of proliferation than any
human being on the planet. So I am quite comfortable with----
Mr. Royce. But the bottom line, for the chairman and me,
who were involved on the other side of the table from you in
your last position, was a very, very different conclusion about
what was going on in Iran and what we should do about it. So we
just disagreed at the time.
I think that all that is in the papers subsequently bear
out the chairman's and my observations on this. But you have
got your opinion and I have got mine. But let us go to the
question on Russia and the role of these programs.
Mr. Van Diepen. I am very happy to do that. Anyway, yes,
clearly, there is still an issue. You know, there is a fair
amount or a substantial amount of biological weapons applicable
material, equipment, and expertise in Russia. And you, in your
opening statement, mentioned some examples of that being the
case.
And one of the long-standing objectives of our various
engagement programs, including the Science Centers Program, the
BEP and others, has been to work with the Russians to try and
put in place better barriers to make sure that that expertise
does not go to BW programs in other countries or to BW
terrorism.
You know, Russia now, however, is different than the Russia
we dealt with in the early 1990s, in the sense that it is much
more economically viable than was the case before. It is much
more nationalist and resurgent than it was before.
You know, frankly, the Russians are less interested in
looking like they are supplicants and recipients of aid, than
looking like they are partners. And they are less interested in
looking like they are a potential source of proliferation; than
they are looking like they are partners.
And so the challenge that we face in continuing to pursue
these programs in Russia, which we are doing and which we think
we still need to do--because again, that repository of
expertise is, you know, unquestionably there--is to try and
work within the parameters set by the current Russian
Government and the current situation within Russia, to continue
to try to make progress.
Mr. Royce. Let me ask you one last question. Why is it that
a bi-partisan panel gave an ``F'' grade--there was a bi-
partisan panel of nine experts. Why were they wrong; the WMD
Commission in January, that gave you that grade? What grade
would you give yourself, I would ask?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, as I recall, the ``F'' grade mostly
focused on the domestic side of things which, of course, the
State Department does not have responsibility for. As the
chairman noted in his opening statement, the State Department's
end of this actually got relatively high grades.
I guess what I would say is that it should be less of an
issue of grades than to realize that this is an extremely
daunting and challenging problem. The fact is that since
bioterrorism ranges from everything from a disgruntled
individual putting salmonella in a salad bar; all the way up to
an all-out, strategic level attack by another country using
ICBMs filled with genetically engineering pathogens.
There are a lot of potential opportunities for a biological
attack against the United States. And because we are
sophisticated and inter-dependent with other countries, there
are a lot of vulnerabilities that we have.
And so, given all those opportunities for potential threat,
given all the vulnerabilities that we have, it is a very
daunting task to try and totally protect ourselves against
every aspect of such a threat.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much; thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you; before I recognize Ambassador
Watson, just a minute of personal privilege, since my name was
so mentioned.
I agree with the ranking member. I may even overstate his
position by saying that the NIE was perhaps the worst example
of a political document masquerading as an intelligence
document.
I do not know the degree to which our witness was involved
in it. But we, in the Legislative Branch, are utterly helpless
when it comes to missing the facts or mischaracterizing the
degree of confidence. But it has the facts, and so we have to
accept what the Executive Branch does in those two areas; and I
cannot quibble with the NIE on that.
But what makes a document political is where certain facts
that are important are brushed off to the side, and facts that
are not important are emblazoned as major reasons to affect
U.S. policy. In that NIE, the most important fact was pushed to
the side and mentioned in the first footnote, and most of the
document, including the first three paragraphs, were all
focused on facts that not only turned out to be irrelevant but
were obviously irrelevant at the time.
The key to developing a nuclear weapon is getting the
fissile material; and only a political document would focus on
other, far less important aspects of a nuclear program.
With that, I yield to the gentlelady from not only
Hollywood but so many other outstanding neighborhoods in the
Los Angeles area.
Ms. Watson. Which will soon be addressed by--thank you so
much, Mr. Chairman. Speaking of other nations and continents, I
would like to go to Africa and talk about the October 2005
Kampala Compact, resulting from an African meeting.
It states that it is illegitimate to address biological
weapon threats without simultaneously addressing the enormous
health crisis in Africa, such as HIV AIDS, TB, Malaria, and
other infectious diseases.
So what can the United States do to help African nations
achieve the duo goals of improved global health and
biosecurity? Can you just bring us up on that?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, to start off with, I guess I would
not use the descriptor illegitimate. But certainly, we have
always tried to take advantage----
Ms. Watson. Oh, that was the State in quoting from the
compact. But clearly we understand that we can get
nonproliferation value out of help in global health; just as
there can be global health value gotten out of doing BW
nonproliferation.
And so as I indicated in my testimony, you know, we are
looking for opportunities to do both; and particularly where we
are trying to promote improved disease surveillance, improve
public health--you know, we are doing that specifically because
it also provides an important collateral benefit to protect us
against potentially man-made biological threats.
One example of an activity that we have conducted--in
cooperation with DoD's cooperative threat reduction program and
with the United Nations, we organized an African Regional
Workshop on biosafety and biosecurity. Experts from 20 African
nations discussed the kinds of assistance they need in
implementing better biological controls, pursuant to U.N
Security Council Resolution 1540.
And we work not only with other agencies; but also the
World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture
Organization. So I think that is a good example of how we are
trying to do exactly that.
Ms. Watson. Well, thank you; because the need is so great,
as you know, on the continent. In addition to an overarching
Federal strategy, many agencies have developed their own
strategic documents to address their responsibilities with
respect to bioterrorism threats.
Coordinating these strategies across multiple agencies is a
challenge. So how is State working to harmonize its strategies
with other agencies, so as to reduce unnecessary duplication
and close security gaps; and let me just go on to my next. You
can answer them all together.
How did State determine the optimal level of funding
against bioterrorism threats; and are there any areas that you
feel are currently under-resourced or should otherwise be
emphasized?
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Congresswoman; in terms of
coordination, I think the two main things we are doing is
participating in the National Security Council-led process to
come up with specific implementation plans for the President's
new bio-strategy.
And then we participate and run a number of standing inter-
agency working groups that deal specifically with the kinds of
international assistance programs like our Biosecurity
Engagement Program.
In addition, under this administration, a new coordinator
for cooperative threat reduction has been appointed, Ambassador
Bonnie Jenkins. She works to make sure that our programs are
well coordinated with those of other agencies and with other
countries.
In terms of determining the levels of funding, you know,
that is a very complex issue. But I think the critical thing is
what we try to do; to determine where we put that funding,
based on a very clear assessment of the risk, informed by the
U.S. Government scientific experts and by the intelligence
community. So we are trying to identify and address the highest
risks as a priority in our funding. Then, I am sorry, the last
question?
Ms. Watson. The last question, are there any other areas
that you feel are currently under-resourced or should otherwise
be emphasized? And I want to just ask, do you work with NGOs or
do you work with their State Departments in these various
countries?
Mr. Van Diepen. A mix--we work with not just State
Departments; but Ministries of Health, Ministries of
Agriculture, as well as NGOs and international organizations
like the World Health Organization.
Ms. Watson. Well, as we look at AIDS and look at the
funding we have given, we are finding that a small amount of
money in a village can go a long way when you use the NGOs.
They know the customs, traditions. They know the people and
how they respond. And I am finding that it looks like when we
work through the actual inhabitants of a particular area, $1
goes a long way. So if you can respond to how the State
Department looks at that, and will we do more business with the
NGOs?
Mr. Van Diepen. Again, a critical part of this new strategy
is the idea of international partnership, and that is
international partnership not just with countries; but with
relevant organizations within countries.
Ms. Watson. I thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you; I will take a minute to address the
witness's statement that he has done more sanctions than anyone
else. That may, in fact, be true; but it is pitiful. You are
comparing yourself, for example, to the German Foreign
Ministry. Their idea of sanctions is, let German businesses do
everything they want.
You are comparing yourself to the rest of the State
Department. You are basically bragging about being the tallest
jockey at the race.
We are now being told by the State Department that they
favor smart sanctions, by which they mean dumb sanctions, which
is to say they are in favor of sanctions so long as it does not
actually hurt the economy of Iran.
And in fact, no one at the State Department has been able
to point to a single publicly traded corporation anywhere in
the world that is selling for one cent per share less as a
result of American sanctions. So our idea is we are for
sanctions as long as they do not inconvenience anyone or at
least they do not inconvenience anyone that has the slightest
amount of political clout.
My best example is that we continue to import caviar from
Iran because why should American Epicureans have to make due
with Northern Caspian caviar? So you may be the tallest jockey.
But that is hardly a reason for personal celebration.
With regard to these hearings, putting aside the state
sponsors of terrorism countries and looking at the countries
that we would hope would be cooperative, which country is least
cooperative, in terms of controlling biological proliferation;
and is the most troublesome, as far as complying with U.S.
Security Council Resolution 1540?
Mr. Van Diepen. I am not sure that----
Mr. Sherman. Aside from the state sponsors of terrorism,
they are all doing a great job?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I think it is less an issue of being
troublesome, than the fact that for a lot of countries, the
1540 mandates are a much lower priority than things like, you
know, keeping the population fed, you know----
Mr. Sherman. Okay, which country is giving the lowest
priority to meeting its obligations under Resolution 1540?
Mr. Van Diepen. Again, I would not single out a particular
country. But clearly, in places like sub-Saharan Africa, you
know, you have got countries that, again, just are not in a
position to put that kind of priority on that.
Mr. Sherman. Of those countries that are at least in the
middle tier of wealth of countries, which ones are giving the
least cooperation or priority to Council Resolution 1540?
Mr. Van Diepen. I think probably the thing to do is to try
and get back to you with a considered answer to that, Mr.
Chairman. Off the top of my head, I am not sure I am able to.
Mr. Sherman. Okay, now of those countries, how long will it
take for you to get back to us with an answer on that?
Mr. Van Diepen. A week?
Mr. Sherman. A week is fine. Of the countries that are
state sponsors of terrorism, which is the greatest biological
terrorism concern, or biological weapons concern?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I think because of the nexus with
terrorism, I think Iran would probably be near the top of my
list of concerns. Because you have got the issues not only of
the potential nation-state angle of that; but because they are
a state sponsor of terrorism, and have provided other kinds of
weapons to terrorists groups, you know, they would certainly
be, for me, a concern.
Mr. Sherman. I mean, there are two areas in the State
Department. One is trying to coordinate our response to the
spread of disease, such as avian flu. The other is your
efforts. The pathogens do not even know whether they were
deliberately created or not.
How closely do you work in a coordinated way, so that we
can respond internationally to the outbreak of a pathogen,
whether it is intentional or unintentional?
Mr. Van Diepen. That is exactly a key part of the
philosophy behind much of our Biosecurity Engagement Program
activity; the idea that if we can assist in the detecting,
surveillance, and fighting of disease regardless of its origin
by definition, we are helping ourselves out in the biological
weapons area.
Mr. Sherman. Now Indonesia has refused to let any of the
developed countries in the world get adequate samples of avian
flu. They have taken the peculiar position that this is a
property right of theirs; which means they claim it as property
on the theory that they can get money for it.
But all legal systems provide that if an animal is your
property and it causes damage, you are responsible for the
damage; and a pathogen is an animal.
So from that standpoint, is Indonesia willing to claim not
only the rights of ownership of these strains of avian flue;
but also to claim responsibility for the harm done by the avian
flu; and have they adequately set up reserves to reimburse the
world for the harm that may be done by the avian flu and their
failure to provide developed nations with the samples necessary
to develop a vaccine?
Mr. Van Diepen. I am really not in a position to answer
that question, Mr. Chairman. I just am not aware of what the
answers to those questions might be.
Mr. Sherman. Well, it is pretty apparent that we could see
hundreds of thousands of innocent deaths because of the
position of the Indonesian Government; a government where tens
or hundreds of thousands of people were saved by the world
aiding Indonesia after the tsunami. And the fact that the State
Department is not making a bigger deal of this non-deliberate
possible Indonesia-caused holocaust is surprising to me; and I
will look forward to seeing the State Department making a
bigger deal of this issue.
With that, I do not think there is interest in a second
round with our first panel. After all, America does not
torture; and accordingly, we will allow you to leave.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Sherman. Let us bring up the second panel; and thank
you for your testimony.
First, I would like to introduce Barry Kellman, president
of the International Security and Biopolicy Institute. Mr.
Kellman is a professor of international law and director of the
International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University
College of Law.
He has prepared for the subcommittee a report on United
States foreign policies and programs to reduce bio-dangers. I
want to thank you for that work.
Our next witness is Jonathan Tucker, who is a senior fellow
at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the
CNS, of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where
he specializes in the control of biological and chemical
weapons. He joined CNS's main office in March 1996 as founding
director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Program.
And finally, we will hear from Stephen Rademaker. I will
try to pronounce your name correctly. It is not that tough. In
2008, he was appointed by the congressional leadership to the
U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Proliferations of Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Terrorism. He currently serves as
senior counsel for BGR Group Government Affairs; Mr. Kellman?
STATEMENT OF BARRY KELLMAN, J.D., PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND BIOPOLICY INSTITUTE
Mr. Kellman. Chairman Sherman, Congressman Scott, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss policies for preventing for the
violent infliction of disease.
Envision 10 terrorists spreading highly weaponized anthrax
in 10 cities around the world: Nairobi, Warsaw, Tokyo, Mexico
City, et cetera. Assume not a single American is touched by any
of these attack, none of which happen on American soil. Would
anyone suggest that we are unharmed?
If instead, a smallpox pandemic is ignited, killing perhaps
millions worldwide, if Americans are effectively immunized,
does that mean that we are okay?
If I might, Mr. Chairman, I have to take issue with your
opening statement that biological weapons will not kill more
people than any nuclear weapon. I simply disagree, and we can
come back to that, if you like.
Bioattacks that devastate allies, transform developing
societies into chaos, stop transport and trade cause trillions
of dollars of losses; and so worldwide panic would
catastrophically wound the United States.
As to biothreats, Homeland Security is international
security and vice versa. We cannot wall ourselves off from
worldwide bioattacks.
Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, global preparedness must be a
high foreign policy of the United States, working with our
allies and the international system. By global bio-
preparedness, I mean having a global network of stockpiled
medicines, linked to delivery systems, to get them where they
are needed quickly, with effective plans to ensure their
distribution.
A principal value of global bio-preparedness is deterrents.
Why weaponize pathogens to populations can be effectively
immunized or treated. The best outcome of global bio-
preparedness is having medicines and delivery capabilities that
are ready but never used; precisely because our enemies cannot
advance their horrific goals by committing bioattacks.
Moreover, allow me to say as the lead author of the Kampala
Compact, global bio-preparedness can and must be a boon to
public health. Global bio-preparedness is, in effect, a highway
system. Once built, it can carry any medicines for any diseases
rapidly and effectively.
Consider the diplomatic implications of the United States
making global bio-preparedness a top policy priority, as the
United States approaches the seventh review conference of the
Biological Weapons Convention next year. Strengthen security
from biothreats; strengthen the convention; strengthen global
public health--altogether, exercise U.S. leadership for
multiple benefits.
But there are challenges. In small part, there is a supply
challenge; having sufficient drugs for the spectrum of
potential agents. But at least with regard to anthrax
antibiotics and vaccines, there is vast, untapped capacity.
The greater challenger is delivery. If we turn to the
hypothetical anthrax in tent cities around the world. The white
powder must be collected and sent to diagnostic facilities for
analysis. Once confirmed as anthrax, vaccines and antibiotics
must be transported perhaps thousands of miles to the target
site, where they must be dispensed to victims. All this must
happen in less than 72 hours; outside perhaps two dozen
countries in the world, mere fantasy.
Of greater significance, I posit, is that the are legal
potholes scattered all over this topic. Allow me to highlight a
mere handful.
There are legal challenges that disincentivize the bio
defense sector from participating. Licensing requirements vary
radically from country to country. How should medicines for
weaponized pathogens be tested? What standards are there for
emergency use authorization?
Also, there is the prospect of ruinous liability for the
manufacturers of such medicines, if they have adverse
consequences. These issues must be resolved now, if we want the
private sector to supply a bio-preparedness network.
Two, there are legal challenges associated with stockpiling
medicines. Regional stockpiling requires binding agreements, so
that victimized nations can get what they need, when they need
it. Also, stockpile managers must have proper authority for
maintaining the surety of their contents.
Three, there are legal challenges associated with delivery.
What carriers will be involved? What are their rights and
responsibilities? Who is authorized to decide how to allocate
scarce supplies?
A clear command and control architecture is imperative.
Without elaborate planning, what will be the authority of
public health officials to commandeer resources and triage
patients? How will medical records be accessible? How will
quarantines be enforced?
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of bio attacks, we cannot
tolerate delay, as officials question their legal authority to
act. We would not tolerate such delays, challenges to domestic
preparedness; and our Government deserves commendation for
addressing many of these challenges inside the United States
since 9/11.
To call domestic preparedness a failure unjustifiably
derogates the enormous effort of dedicated public servants, and
suggests to our allies that they should not emulate our example
when precisely the opposite message is required and
appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, global bio-preparedness is not about
generosity. It is about protecting the American people from
international threats in an inter-connected world. Taking the
benefits of our experience and capacity to the international
community epitomizes what America does best; promoting the rule
of law.
By building global bio-preparedness, we would engage all
nations that share concern about biothreats. We would advance
public health readiness, and we would establish a security
framework upon which additional positive initiatives can be
built for meeting evolving threats.
Moreover, we would accelerate the development of
biotechnology with positive implications for our economic
recovery.
I ask this subcommittee to consider three questions. One,
does the State Department have all the authority it needs to
plan, negotiate and implement global bio-preparedness?
Two, does the State Department have the authority,
resources, and capacity to develop optimal answers to the many
legal challenges confronting global bio-preparedness? If not,
how can these issues be addressed?
Three, I have already mentioned the importance of taking
global bio-preparedness to the BWC. But there are many
opportunistic venues for advancing this objective, including
the U.N. Security Council, NATO, the World Economic Forum and
the G8. How precisely to do this is a matter for the
subcommittee to consider.
Finally, allow me to ask you all, what would Congress do,
in the wake of biocatastrophies that relegate every other
policy priority to insignificance? What would Congress do to
prevent a second series of attacks? Amid mass deaths and huge
economic losses that demonstrate the horrific implications of
procrastination, what will you do?
I respectfully ask you not to wait for the first attacks to
prepare for the second attacks. Thank you very much for your
attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kellman
follows:]Barry Kellman
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, JAMES
MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Tucker. Chairman Sherman and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before
you today.
Last November the Obama administration released a National
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, containing broad
guidelines for U.S. policy. The challenge facing the
administration and Congress in the months ahead will be to
translate these guidelines into a set of concrete policy
initiatives and to give them the political and budgetary
support they require for effective implementation.
A key strength of the national strategy is that it
integrates public health and security concerns into a single
paradigm. This approach makes sense from a policy standpoint
because it promotes efforts to strengthen global public health
infrastructure in a way that bolsters U.S. defenses against
both natural epidemics and bioterrorist attacks.
The national strategy also emphasizes the potential risks
associated with emerging biotechnologies. Synthetic genomics,
for example, provides the capability to synthesize long DNA
molecules from scratch and assemble them into the genome of a
virus. This ability raises security concerns because it could
potentially enable sophisticated terrorist groups to circumvent
stringent controls on select agents of bioterrorism concerns,
such as Ebola virus. Because the gene synthesis industry is
international, the United States will have to work with other
countries to harmonize measures to prevent the misuse of this
technology.
Other international measures to enhance biosecurity revolve
around the Biological Weapons Convention, which remains the
cornerstone of efforts to prevent biological weapons
proliferation and terrorism.
The Obama administration's assessment that biological
verification is not currently feasible is no excuse for
inaction or complacency. To move beyond the legacy of the
failed BWC Protocol, a package of bold, innovative measures
will be needed to build confidence in compliance and to deter
violations.
One critical element is to increase the transparency of
biodefense research programs, which have expanded dramatically
in the United States and other countries since the terrorist
attacks of 2001 and could theoretically serve as a cover for
offensive bioweapons development.
Enhanced transparency is in the United States' interest for
two reasons. First, it offers greater insight into the BWC-
related activities of other countries, providing greater
confidence that they are complying with their treaty
obligations. Second, it mitigates international suspicions
about U.S. biodefense programs that might drive other nations
to pursue questionable research.
Another useful approach to increasing the transparency of
BWC-related activities is to build cooperative relationships
between biodefense scientists and institutions in the United
States and those in countries of proliferation concern.
In recent years, the Defense Department's Biological Threat
Reduction Program and other U.S. biological engagement programs
have reduced their activities in Russia because of bureaucratic
and political difficulties in dealing with the Russian
Government. Nevertheless, these engagement efforts are crucial
for transparency and should be reinstated.
Another important biosecurity measure lies with the United
Nations. Because of the failure to conclude the BWC Protocol,
the only option for investigating an alleged use of biological
weapons is a long-standing mechanism under the auspices of the
U.N. Secretary-General.
At present, however, the U.N. lacks the resources to
rapidly field teams of suitably trained and equipped
investigators. To remedy this problem, the United States should
lead efforts to update and strengthen the Secretary-General's
mechanism. This capability would have an important deterrent
effect by making it more likely that a covert biological attack
will be attributed to a state or non-state actor.
Yet another way to strengthen global biosecurity is to
improve systems for infectious disease surveillance and
response. In today's globalized world, an outbreak of serious
epidemic disease anywhere in the world poses a potential risk
to Americans here at home.
Global networks for infectious disease surveillance and
response provide an extended defense perimeter for the United
States by making it possible to detect and snuff out epidemics,
whether natural or human-caused, before they reach our shores.
But existing disease-surveillance networks still contain many
gaps in coverage, preventing the timely detection and
containment of outbreaks close to the source.
The International Health Regulations, which were revised in
2005, require the member countries of the World Health
Organization to report in a timely manner all public health
emergencies of international concern that could potentially
affect more than one country. Nevertheless, because many
developing countries lack the financial and technical resources
to establish effective national disease surveillance and
response capabilities, the United States and other advanced
countries must be prepared to help out.
A critical event for advancing all of these biosecurity
objectives will be the Seventh Review Conference of the
Biological Weapons Convention, which will convene late next
year in Geneva, Switzerland.
This comprehensive review of the treaty's implementation
will be a make-or-break political opportunity for the United
States. But the U.S. delegation will also have to navigate some
treacherous political shoals.
It is likely that several BWC member states, including Iran
and Russia, will seek to revive the protocol negotiations as a
means to pursue their negative agenda of attempting to weaken
the convention itself. To block these efforts, the United
States will have to offer an alternative package of bold and
compelling measures to strengthen the BWC.
Given the high stakes involved in the review conference, it
is imperative that the State Department resolve the current
internal dispute over which Bureau is responsible for the BWC
and begin preparing for next year's meeting as soon as
possible.
Another important task for the Seventh Review Conference
will be to address the institutional deficit of the BWC. The
last review conference in 2006 established an Implementation
Support Unit consisting of three people at the U.N. Office in
Geneva. But this entity has limited authority and a temporary
mandate that must be renewed by member states in 2011. The
Obama administration should push to make the unit permanent,
while expanding its staff and responsibilities.
In conclusion, implementing the National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats will require the White House to
give the same level of political attention to biological
security that it has devoted to crafting and promoting its
nuclear security initiatives. It will then be up to Congress to
review the administration's agenda and pass legislation and
funding needed to implement it effectively. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker
follows:]Jonathan Tucker
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Rademaker?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, MEMBER,
COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM, SENIOR COUNSEL, BGR GROUP (FORMER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
NONPROLIFERATION)
Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Royce, and members
of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to again
appear before your subcommittee.
I served as one of the House appointees on the Commission
on the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Terrorism. Therefore, I especially welcome the
opportunity to appear here to report to you and the other
members of the subcommittee on the findings and recommendations
of our commission.
I have a prepared statement, which I have submitted for the
record; and mindful of your observation that we do not condone
torture in America, I will not sit here and read my prepared
statement to you. Rather, I will summarize it. I also have
copies of our commission report, which I would be pleased to
distribute, if you have a clerk who wants to bring them to you.
They are sitting right here.
Mr. Sherman. Do you have enough copies for all members of
the subcommittee?
Mr. Rademaker. I have about a dozen copies, sir.
Mr. Sherman. That will cover the whole subcommittee, even
those who are not in attendance; thank you.
Mr. Rademaker. Yes, I have them.
The mandate of our commission extended to all weapons of
mass destruction. But in our work, we focused on biological
weapons and nuclear weapons, because it was our conclusion that
those were the two classes of weapons of mass destruction that
would most likely be used by terrorists if there is a WMD
attack by terrorists against the United States.
As I think you observed earlier in your opening remarks,
one of our conclusions was that as between biological and
nuclear weapons, we thought the greater likelihood was that
biological weapons would be used by terrorists in any WMD
attack on the United States.
At the outset of my remarks, I want to stress a key point
that informs the rest of our commission's analysis. That is
that nuclear weapons and biological weapons are very different.
As a nation, we spend a lot more time thinking about nuclear
weapons and the nuclear weapons threat; and a lot less time
thinking about biological weapons.
If we apply some of the lessons that we have drawn from the
nuclear area to the biological area, we will make some big
mistakes. So it is important to bear in mind the differences
between the two.
The most important difference is that nuclear weapons
inflict their damage the moment they are used. The destruction
is immediate. It is irreversible. Mitigation measures are of
extremely limited utility in dealing with the consequences. The
damage has been done.
Biological weapons, on the other hand, do not inflict
damage immediately. The damage will manifest itself fairly
quickly. But there is a window during which mitigation measures
can minimize, and if done properly, perhaps even eliminate the
physical damage caused by a biological weapons attack.
That window is of critical importance to us, and it affords
an opportunity to basically reduce the utility of these weapons
to terrorists or others who might consider using them against
us. If we can construct a mechanism within our country to
promptly detect and promptly take steps to counteract a
biological weapons attack against us, the idea of using these
weapons against us will be much less appealing to terrorists
and to others.
So that was really the principal recommendation of our
commission: That the United States needs to take advantage of
that window to make sure that we have measures in place that
will minimize the consequences of a bio attack.
The ``F'' grade that our commission gave in its report card
in January to the efforts of the United States Government in
this area was really focused on the domestic steps that have
been taken to build up mitigation measures. Fundamentally, it
was our judgment that not enough money was being put into the
development of vaccines and other needed measures to permit us
to minimize the damage caused by a bio weapons attack.
Our focus today, however, is in the international area; and
so I wanted to turn to that issue. As a commission, we looked
at the question of the Biological Weapons Convention. We judged
that it remains critically important as part of our
international strategy for combatting the bioweapons threat.
Our principal recommendation with regard to the Biological
Weapons Convention was to re-double efforts to universalize the
convention; to persuade other governments to adhere.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--today, all but four
countries in the world have ratified the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. The picture is substantially less
satisfying if we look at the Biological Weapons Convention.
There is still about 40 or 50 countries that have yet to
ratify.
We also looked at the question of the inspections protocol
that was negotiated during the late 1990s; and as Dr. Tucker
indicated, something was likely to come back. The Bush
administration killed the Biological Weapons Convention
protocol that had been negotiated in the 1990s. But certainly
efforts will be mounted to revive it.
As a commission, we considered what the proper policy of
the United States should be on this question of establishing an
international inspections regime for biological weapons.
As you know, this has been a very controversial issue. I
headed the U.S. delegation to the continuation of the fifth
review conference in 2002, and this was the focus of the entire
review conference. Passions ran extremely high on the issue.
Therefore, to me, it was surprising that within our
commission, we came to the unanimous conclusion that the Bush
administration had acted properly in killing the protocol in
2001, when it announced its policy on the protocol. And we also
reached the unanimous conclusion that it would be a mistake for
the next U.S. administration, meaning the Obama administration,
to agree to revive the inspections protocol.
I was very pleased to see that the Obama administration
accepted our commission's advice on this issue. In December of
last year, Under Secretary Tauscher announced in Geneva that
the Obama administration will not support the revival of an
inspections protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.
I think this was a difficult decision for the Obama
administration to come to. I think they were under a lot of
political pressure to go in a different direction. So I have
very high praise for them for taking the courageous and correct
step to defy that pressure and to do what is right on policy
grounds.
I see that my time is about to expire, and so I think I
will stop there and submit myself to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker
follows:]Stephen Rademaker
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sherman. I will recognize Mr. Scott first, if he
prefers.
Mr. Scott. Let me start where you left off there for a
moment, Mr. Rademaker; is that correct? The issue of the
protocols, why do you say we are doing the right thing by
refusing to engage in the protocols? What are the benefits and
what are the downfalls for us doing so?
Mr. Rademaker. Perhaps first I should explain what the
protocol would be. It would establish an inspections mechanism.
There would probably be an international organization created.
It would have inspectors working for it.
And it would be their mission to conduct regular
inspections of biological facilities; facilities all over the
world where biological research is taking place. It would be
their objective to seek to detect potential violations of the
Biological Weapons Convention.
There might also be a mechanism for challenge inspections.
In other words, if there was a suspicion of cheating on the
Biological Weapons Convention, there might be a way to dispatch
inspectors to look into whether those allegations are well
founded or not.
On paper, all of this sounds very good. Our concern with
it--both in the Bush administration and now I think I can
probably speak for the Obama administration on it because they
have embraced the policy of the Bush administration--it was our
judgment that this idea simply would not work in the biological
area.
So a great deal of money would be spent. A false sense of
security would be created. And there were also very
considerable risks to the U.S. biotechnology industry.
I do not know if you have ever talked to an executive of a
biotech firm. But I have never spoken to one of them who, when
he understood what was being proposed here, did not immediately
jump to the conclusion that what was being proposed was
international industrial espionage; that foreign inspectors
were going to come to his firm to try to steal the intellectual
property that they were creating.
I have heard this from so many business executives that I
am quite confident that we cannot dismiss that concern out of
hand.
There was also great concern about false positives; that
unlike the nuclear area, unlike the chemical area, the things
that biological weapons inspectors would be looking for--you
know, an anthrax spore.
Mr. Scott. Right.
Mr. Rademaker. These things occur in nature. Highly
enriched uranium does not occur in nature. If an inspector goes
to a lab and finds highly enriched uranium, there is not a
legitimate explanation for that. It did not occur naturally.
Somebody put it there, and there is a reason why they created
it.
In the biological area, when we are dealing with
essentially germs of one type or another, they could be man
made or they could be naturally occurring. So the fact that
inspectors detect something really does not tell you much.
Mr. Scott. Right; thank you for that explanation. So then
what alternative do we have? What would you recommend we do in
place of that, to ensure international compliance with the
Biological Weapons Convention, if we do not use the protocols?
What do we do?
Mr. Rademaker. Our commission's report is full of
recommendations about what should be done in this area to
increase assurance and to increase the protections against the
production of biological weapons.
The range of measures required mostly are in the area of
domestic implementation. Other nations need to do the kinds of
things that we have started doing, but we have not finished
doing, here in the United States.
At labs where research in this area is done, we need
increased protections against diversion of biological material.
It used to be that you could essentially order this stuff on
the Internet.
Mr. Scott. Let me just mention, I want to get another point
of view. I want to ask Mr. Kellman, because he raised some
issues about our lacks in this area, and it was very alarming
in his assessment.
Do you agree with Mr. Rademaker? Is this the way to go, or
is there an other alternative to kind of get the international
compliance?
Mr. Kellman. The verification protocol would be an
unnecessary and unproductive use of very limited resources. It
would help us confirm where biological weapons are not being
produced. It would not tell us anything about where they are
being produced.
So it would give us some security about information that we
are really pretty secure about without the verification
protocol. It would not really tell us anything about the
threats that we face. If I might, Congressman----
Mr. Scott. Yes.
Mr. Kellman [continuing]. I gave a presentation at the
Biological Weapons Convention expert meeting that summer on the
use of other techniques to detect non-compliance--to verify
compliance.
But rather, the important thing, I think, is to detect non-
compliance. International law affords us a number of tools, and
we do not have to go down the same road. And on this, I think
all three of us agree. That road is not a productive road. But
there are other ways that we can think about detecting non-
compliance that could be advanced at the Biological Weapons
Convention.
Mr. Scott. All right; thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you; our current nonproliferation policy
with regard to nuclear weapons is obviously a manifest failure.
If we continue it, or even if we adopt those changes that are
currently under discussion in the administration--either of
those, I think it assures that Iran will have nuclear weapons
this decade, and that will be the death knell of the NTP.
I say that only because when you then come kind of
collectively as witnesses and say our efforts to control
biological weapons are the under-funded stepchild of our
efforts to control nuclear weapons, it is indeed harsh
criticism that our efforts in that area are worse than the
manifest failure previously mentioned.
Now, Mr. Tucker, we are dealing with this issue of
confidence-building measures. The theory is, we provide this
information voluntarily, more or less. This inspires certain
countries, say Russian or China, to over-brim with confidence
and then do less to develop ugly pathogens.
Now Mr. Rademaker pointed out, this is already a problem
from an intellectual property perspective. It is also a problem
with regard to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist
groups.
To what extent would these confidence-building measures
provide information useful to terrorists and terrorists states?
Looking at this threat from that angle, the confidence-building
measures do not do any good. Ahmadinejad is not sitting there
saying, well, gee, if only they had some confidence-building
measures, I would not want weapons of mass destruction.
So how do you confidence-build, vis-a-vis Russia and China,
while disclosing no information to Iran and North Korea?
Mr. Tucker. Well, I think you have identified a very
difficult problem. But I do think the types of information that
are, for example, included in the confidence-building measure
data declarations, which are part of the Biological Weapons
Convention process, are not particularly sensitive. They are
not providing cookbooks on how to produce anthrax. They are
simply identifying activities and facilities that are relevant
to BWC compliance.
And I think the argument can be made, as I said in my
presentation, that if the United States demonstrates leadership
with respect to the transparency of our activities, that puts
us in a strong position to----
Mr. Sherman. A strong position to affect Russia and China--
absolutely not a strong position to, in any way, affect the
terrorists states.
Mr. Tucker. Russia and China are very serious----
Mr. Sherman. Yes, I mean, that begs the question that we do
not have time for; and that is, what is our nightmare
scenario--Russia or China or the terrorist states? I would say
if Russia and China want to kill 1 million Americans, they
already have a guaranteed way to do so without further
research. It is called nuclear weapons.
So my concern is these terrorists states confidence-
building measures do nothing to diminish the threat from the
terrorist states, and do give them a view or at least a road
map to our counter efforts.
Mr. Kellman, you say that our domestic preparedness
deserves a grade far better than ``F,'' and Mr. Rademaker was
part of the commission that gave it an ``F.'' We have spent $68
billion on this, and I think you correctly point out that if we
spent $68 billion and get an ``F,'' other countries are hardly
going to be inspired. But if it deserves an ``F,'' it deserves
an ``F.'' How did they get it wrong? What grade to do you give
our domestic prepardness, and why do you reach such a different
grade?
Mr. Kellman. In an op-ed, I used the term ridiculous with
regard to the ``F'' grade. Let me see if I can justify that.
I think what the commission was trying to get at was that
we are extremely vulnerable to bio attacks; that probably each
of us at this table--certainly, I can envision attacks against
the United States for which our preparedness would be
unsuccessful. There is no question about that.
Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt, there are two types of
attacks; those that are not deterrable. I mean, we have no
counter measures to the Russian nuclear program.
Mr. Kellman. Right.
Mr. Sherman. So can you embellish a little and say, ``Are
there attacks for which we have no defense?,'' and as to which
we will not be able to effectively retaliate?
Mr. Kellman. Absolutely, yes; so in the ultimate sense, we
are not. And unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I do not think we
seriously can be prepared. I think that what we have to think
about here is risk management. I think what we have to think
about is a combination of prevention measures and preparedness
measures.
But it would be folly of me and certainly disingenuous to
testify before you today to say that there is a way to make
America safe from biological threats. That cannot be done
today.
Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt, you seem to be saying we
should grade America on a curve; and if a series of counter
measures that we have adopted would limit the deaths under a
particular scenario to 100,000, rather than 100 million; that
you can not give that an F and say, well, that is 100,000 dead.
You have to say, well, that is 99.9 million saved.
Are you saying that our counter measures are useful--not in
preventing terrible results; but preventing a terrible result
from being even more catastrophic?
Mr. Kellman. I am saying that government officials must
operate in the real world with real conditions. So yes, what
the United States Government has done since the anthrax attack
of 2011 [sic], it put us in a substantially better capability
to save many American lives.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Rademaker, obviously, we are not safe. We
spent $68 billion; but we are not safe. But have we done a good
job of putting ourselves in a position where the deaths are
catastrophic; but dramatically less than they would otherwise?
Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Chairman, I think we have made a good
start. But there is a enormous amount of work that remains to
be done; and that was the basis of the commission's grade.
To be able to mitigate the consequences of a bioattack, we
need detection capabilities. We need a way to mobilize state
and local authorities to act in response to the attack. We need
vaccines, and we need a way of dispensing the vaccines to the
effected population. We need a national plan for responding,
should something like this happen.
Today, we have no national plan. We have invested a fair
amount of money in this. But the commission found that the
annual requirement for vaccines in this area, to be fully
prepared, would come to over $3 billion a year to prepare the
vaccines.
Mr. Sherman. That is a year. So you prepare them, and then
you have got to prepare them again and again.
Mr. Rademaker. Well, we are spending probably 10 percent of
that today.
Mr. Sherman. Okay, the issue did come up. It is a bit
outside the jurisdiction of the subcommittee. But I am going to
go further and ask each of you that feel that it is within your
competence to submit how we would spend $10 billion or $20
billion a year to prepare. Because it is easy to come in and
say, well, $68 billion total expenditures is not enough. You
ought to be spending $168 billion a year.
I need a budget responsible approach to bio-preparedness;
and hopefully, for the $10 billion to $20 billion a year, we
are getting not only a capacity to respond to bio weapons; but
also to disease pathogens, as well.
And many of the things that I think we should be doing do
not cost us money. We would have to go to the American people
and tell them, you honestly face a threat. In an emergency,
your government will take the following highly controversial
actions. You will not be as free the day after a biological
attack as you were the day before. And as long as none of these
are said in my district, I am fine.
So we have to not only spend money on this; but we have to
spend political capital. We have to overcome in-bred
ideological dispositions, and that may be even more difficult.
But I hope that the program you lay out is not just a list of
things to spend money on; but a list of things to do that do
not cost money, or cost only modest amounts, and where the
reason we are not doing them is not budgetary, but political
and psychological.
With that, we have our ranking member, Mr. Royce, who is
now recognized for 5-ish minutes.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask Mr. Tucker--
you argue that actions by the United States to increase the
oversight and transparency of its own biodefense program would
not only demonstrate international leadership by providing a
model for other countries to follow, but would put the United
States Government in a position to demand greater openness from
others. I am just wondering what evidence you will base that
on. Is that a hunch?
Mr. Tucker. I would say it is a logical supposition that if
we demonstrate leadership in this area, that puts us in a
stronger position to pressure other countries to follow suit.
Now I should clarify that confidence-building alone is not the
solution. It is one of a complex of measures that will work
together, that are synergistic.
Mr. Royce. Apparently not, because, you know, I opened with
my comments about the Russian scientist that Congressman Saxton
and I met with. And in response to my questions, he said, no,
we had been told in 1969 Nixon abandoned the program. The
chemical weapons convention, that dates from 1972, right?
So he told me that after 1972, they were pedal to the metal
on this. He even told me a funny story, which is not all that
funny, but it is definitely unique from the ones I have heard
about him taking an elevator up to Andropov's office, because
Andropov wanted to make sure that he really had developed
something for which there was no antidote.
He said he was carrying the petri dish in there, going up
the elevator; and then putting it on the desk and saying, do
not open it. I mean, it really gave me an insight into what
these 50,000 employees were doing.
But given the fact that you testified that Russia is moving
away from transparency in its labs; and given the fact that in
the face of the convention, he is telling me that they were
doing that, are you suggesting that Russia today is responding
to our lab policies?
Is that what has happened? Because that sounds fantastic to
me given the dialogue that I had. I just do not sense a
connection here between what you say and what was really going
on in Russia then or now.
Mr. Tucker. Well, I think if you read, for example, Ken
Alibek's memoir----
Mr. Royce. Yes.
Mr. Tucker [continuing]. He was the deputy director of a
large component of the Soviet biological weapons program.
Mr. Royce. I knew Alibek. He was a student of this.
Mr. Tucker. He claims that Soviet bioweapons scientists
were led to believe that the United States was secretly
violating----
Mr. Royce. That is what the Soviet state told them, right?
Mr. Tucker. And it was only when he came to the United
States under the trilateral process, which was a series of
reciprocal visits to suspected biological warfare facilities,
that he suddenly realized that he had been misled and that the
United States did not have an offensive program.
Mr. Royce. But it was the collapse of the Soviet system
that gave us the opportunity basically to swing him.
Mr. Tucker. He came before the collapse of the Soviet
system. He came in early December 1991 under the trilateral
process.
Mr. Royce. Right.
Mr. Tucker. And then he later defected to the United
States. But when he came to the United States for those
transparency visits, he was still a Soviet official.
Mr. Royce. Right, but here is the point. There was a
window, as the Soviet Union was breaking up, when I got access
to this scientist. That window is closed. I am just telling
you. China is not going to open its labs. The Russians are not
going to open their labs.
You testified that expanding international research
partnerships and personal exchanges can provide valuable
insight into foreign biodefense programs. And I would like to
ask if you speak from personal experience? Because cannot such
exchanges also result in foreigners acquiring intelligence we
would rather not have them acquire?
I am thinking about China right now; and how much down this
road we have already gone and what a cul-de-sac it has been for
us, in terms of the consequences of it.
Mr. Tucker. I think obviously these programs involve a
weighing of cost and benefits. They have to be very carefully
designed so that they provide insights into foreign programs
and the extent to which those programs are treaty-compliant,
while limiting the risk of technology transfer. But I think
they can be structured in that way. I believe it is important
to engage with Russia. Because if we disengage----
Mr. Royce. Listen, I agree with you about engaging with
Russia. But I just wonder about the naivete with respect to
what I have found is going on, in China and Russia.
Mr. Tucker. I have spoken to many people who say that the
best source of intelligence or information about what is going
on in foreign laboratories of concern is the scientists
themselves. And establishing personal relationships with these
scientists makes them much more likely, if they are aware of
something untoward, to contact their former colleagues that
they met during an exchange program.
Mr. Royce. Do you think that might happen in China?
Mr. Tucker. I think it is very possible that it would
happen in China.
Mr. Royce. Let us look at A.Q. Khan and what happened with
our programs with Pakistan. How is that working out for us? I
mean, anyway, let me ask Mr. Rademaker a question here.
You served in the Bush administration, Mr. Rademaker. Dr.
Tucker testifies that the Bush administration wrote off
bioterrorism prevention efforts as too difficult. Would you
care to respond to that?
Mr. Rademaker. I guess I do not know where to begin in
responding to that. I think it is very rare for anyone to
accuse the Bush administration of not doing enough to combat
terrorism generally. Specifically, with reference to
bioterrorism, that was a very high priority.
Most of what the chairman was talking about--the billions
of dollars that have been spent in this area--were spent during
the Bush administration. So to say that the Bush administration
wrote this off, I think I could bring in a whole raft of
officials from the Department of Homeland Security who I think
would take great offense at hearing such a comment.
Mr. Royce. Let me ask you another question. Last question,
the commission discussed the role of the citizen, and called
for better engagement of the populace to combat the threat of
bioterrorism.
The commission found that the U.S. public has become
complacent. What is the commission's message to the average
American, going about his daily business? What is the take-
away?
Mr. Rademaker. I will tell you, that recommendation was
something felt very strongly by the chairman of our commission,
former Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who had a long career in
public service, as you know.
He felt, and persuaded the other members of the commission,
that public engagement is critically important for our efforts
against terrorism to succeed--civic involvement, neighbors
looking after the neighborhood, being aware.
When we start talking about this, the specific measures
that would be needed to respond, for example, to a biological
attack, an organized community is really the best preparation--
a community in which it is possible, where mechanisms are in
place to distribute vaccines if that needs to happen; where a
public health infrastructure is in place to detect outbreaks
when they occur; and citizen awareness of and involvement in
all these matters. Senator Graham, I think, would speak very
passionately on this subject if he were here today.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rademaker. I think I am out of
time.
Mr. Sherman. Is there anyone still here, listening from the
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation?
[No response.]
Mr. Sherman. The chair sees none. Is there anyone here from
the State Department?
[No response.]
Mr. Sherman. The chair sees none--one more demonstration of
what the Executive Branch thinks of the Legislative Branch. I
am going to send a copy of the transcript of these hearings to
Mr. Van Diepen; and I am going to be asking him to confirm to
me that he has read every word.
The fact that we would put on a seminar directly relevant
to his operation--and those of us who have responsibilities
that go from A to Z and from Southern California, we are on
different committees, I am missing Financial Services right
now--that I have got the time to be here when this is a part of
my job, and he does not have the time to be here or even have
his number two here, that seems to indicate that he does not
believe--and I realize that this is typical of the entire State
Department--that anything useful happens here in Congress; that
the sole purpose of Congress is to give them money after
getting false information as to why we should do it.
So in the future, we will comment on whether the State
Department at least bothers to humor us by pretending to listen
to hearings that we have.
Is somebody indicating that they with the State Department?
Oh, because I asked earlier, and I saw no response. Please
identify yourself for the record--deputy director for what?
Okay, well, then I hope that you will report to the PDAS
and others what happened here. And I hope in the future that
you will overcome your shyness when I ask whether there is
someone here from the State Department, and perceptively
identify yourself; and I do thank you for being here.
I only partially take back my view of what the State
Department thinks of what goes on in Congress. But the fact
that they at least have you sit here and report back is
slightly more positive than the statements I just made. We
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Extracted
pages of
report--
Sherman
__________
Pages from a report by the International Security & Biopolicy Institute
submitted for the record by the Honorable Brad Sherman, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade
[Note: The full report is available in committee records or on the
Internet at:
http://biopolicy.org/sites/default/files/documents/
ISBI%20Congressional%20Report
%20Final.pdf.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Sherman Tucker
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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