[Senate Hearing 111-331]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-331
THE PROPOSED U.S.-UAE AGREEMENT ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
McFarlane, Dr. Harold, chairman of the International Nuclear
Energy Academy, former president of the American Nuclear
Society, and Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear
Science and Technology, Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls,
ID............................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator from Idaho, opening statement. 4
Sanderson, Hon. Janet, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........... 8
Prepared joint statement..................................... 10
Van Diepen, Vann H., Acting Assistant Secretary for International
Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State, Washington,
DC............................................................. 9
Prepared joint statement..................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., supplemental prepared statement....... 26
Responses of Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen to questions
submitted by Senator John F. Kerry............................. 26
Responses of Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen to questions
submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold....................... 28
(iii)
THE PROPOSED U.S.-UAE AGREEMENT ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Feingold, Kaufman, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. Thank you very much for being here this
morning. The hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations'
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian
Affairs will now come to order.
In 2 weeks time, the U.S.-UAE 123 Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement could go into effect unless Congress takes action to
block its inception. Today, the subcommittee meets to assess
the ramifications, both positive and negative, that this
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement may have on future agreements,
the international system, and the long-term security of the
United States and our allies.
As many of you know, since 1952, more than 2,000 bilateral
civilian nuclear cooperation agreements have been signed and
implemented worldwide. Nuclear cooperation agreements
inherently include certain opportunities and risks--the U.S.-
UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement before us today is no
different. However, what has changed over the past 50 years are
the stipulations and standards that those receiving
technological and materiel nuclear assistance must uphold in
the execution of these nuclear cooperation agreements.
The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement has been hailed
as the strongest bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that
the United States has ever concluded.
The UAE, already a partner to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, has voluntarily signed and pledged--signed and
pledged--to accede to the International Atomic Energy
Agency's--as we know, is the IAEA--the UAE has acceded to the
IAEA's Additional Protocol, which allows for short-notice
inspections of any facility and remote monitoring of declared
facilities.
The United States, the IAEA, and the U.N. Security Council
all agree that the Additional Protocol should be universally
adopted; and for the first time in a bilateral U.S. agreement,
the United States and the UAE have agreed that the United
States will not export nuclear technology until the UAE brings
its Additional Protocol into force.
The UAE is now participating in several U.S.-led
initiatives to strengthen export controls. More importantly,
the UAE has declared that it will forgo all domestic enrichment
and reprocessing of nuclear material in its territory. This
last provision is not merely a pledge, but it is explicitly
prohibited in Article 7 of the agreement.
And like other nuclear cooperation agreements, the United
States may terminate the deal and require the return of all
nuclear materiel and technology if the UAE fails to adhere to
any aspect of agreement, especially if it acquires sensitive
nuclear technology related to enrichment or reprocessing.
While this may be the strongest nuclear cooperation
agreement the United States has ever concluded, I also
recognize that its inception at this moment in history gives
some pause. At issue is the UAE's legal right to obtain nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes, as enshrined in the nuclear
technology--I'm sorry, as enshrined in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, versus the risk incurred by introducing
nuclear technology in the world's most volatile region.
The ongoing controversy regarding Iran's nuclear program is
also relevant here. With the largest oil reserves in the world,
there's no doubt that Iran's neighbors seriously take Tehran's
nuclear ambitions into their nuclear security and energy
calculations. Because some civilian nuclear technology can be
used for a military nuclear program, there are concerns--there
are also concerns that the spread of civilian nuclear programs
to the region may spark a nuclear arms race. While there is a
possibility that a proliferation domino effect could occur in
the Middle East, this prospect could happen even without--even
without--U.S. involvement.
On January 16, 2008, France and the UAE signed a nuclear
cooperation agreement. The UAE is also pursuing nuclear
cooperation agreements with Russia, Germany, China, the U.K.,
Japan, and South Korea. In light of other nuclear suppliers
moving forward with their agreements, the U.S.-UAE Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement could help reshape the standard by which
nuclear agreements are conducted in a world going through a
nuclear energy renaissance.
This agreement may very well be the model--the model--
needed to conclude civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with
Middle Eastern countries and set on obtaining this technology.
It could also serve as a new standard operating procedure for
members of the nuclear suppliers group and other export control
regimes.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on the
regional implications of the UAE 123 Agreement and how the
agreement can possibly serve as a model for future such
agreements.
The UAE's willingness to explicitly forswear uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing for plutonium production
is a legally binding standard--a legally binding standard--that
we should seek in all nuclear cooperation agreements. On this
point, a few of my colleagues in the Senate and the House have
expressed their concern that the agreement does not do enough
to ensure that the UAE strengthen its export controls, and
we'll be talking about that today. Members of the
administration have argued that strengthening one's export
controls must be implemented over time and that the UAE has
taken significant steps to rectify this problem. As we discuss
this nuclear agreement today, it will be helpful to know what
steps the UAE has taken to strengthen its export controls and
how the United States will continue to leverage its
relationship with the UAE to reduce the illicit trafficking of
goods through its territory.
President Obama continues to express his desire for a
nuclear-weapons-free world. We know that a nuclear-weapons-free
world does not mean a nuclear-energy-free world.
Nonproliferation is not about creating rules that prohibit the
peaceful use of nuclear energy, but rather nonproliferation is
about setting rules based on the current threat environment to
prevent the irresponsible use--the irresponsible use--of
nuclear technology. To say we will not support the peaceful use
of nuclear energy by the UAE could support the false Iranian
charges that we seek to prevent access to nuclear technology in
Muslim nations--or to Muslim nations, I should say.
This agreement sends a message that the United States is
willing to deal with an array of countries on the basis of
their commitment to peaceful nuclear energy and compliance with
international norms and safeguards. Therefore, I believe the
United States must be a leader, not only on nonproliferation,
but on how to use nuclear energy responsibly. Energy insecurity
and climate change are problems that will continue to drive
nuclear energy production. The question before us today is
whether or not this nuclear cooperation agreement provides the
United States the opportunity to start reshaping
nonproliferation norms in an era when countries are seeking
energy diversification and hedging against external security
threats.
We are pleased to have an excellent group of witnesses
today to explain the dimensions of this nuclear cooperation
agreement and its effect on nonproliferation regimes as more
nations explore the need for civilian nuclear programs. Each of
our witnesses has more than 20 years experience in either arms
control or Middle East policy.
Our first panel features the Honorable Vann Van Diepen, the
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Security
and Nonproliferation. He is joined by the Honorable Janet
Sanderson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
Affairs, as well as, today, the Idaho National Laboratory
Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science and
Technology, Harold McFarlane. I'm sure that their testimony
will provide insights into this nuclear cooperation agreement
and how it can serve as a model for future agreements.
I want to welcome all of our witnesses and commend them for
their work, and thank them for their willingness to appear
today.
And with that, let me turn to our ranking member, Senator
Risch, for any opening statement that he might have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Senator Casey, thank you very much.
First of all, let me say that I had the honor and privilege
of traveling in the UAE this spring. I met with the sheikh in
Dubai, and numerous government officials there, and I can't
tell you how impressed I was with, not only the commitment, but
the sincerity of the people in the UAE to pursue goals that are
shared both by the UAE and by this country, as far as the use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. I was so impressed
with their commitment and their sincerity to enter into
negotiations whereby nuclear power would be used and they would
forsake the enrichment.
Having said that, I want to say, Senator Casey, thank you
so much for holding this very important hearing. And I want to
thank the State Department witnesses, also, who are here to
testify. I want to welcome Dr. McFarlane, from the great State
of Idaho. I've had the honor and privilege of working with Dr.
McFarlane, both when I was Governor of the State of Idaho, now
as United States Senator, and he is certainly a preeminent
expert in these areas that we're going to talk about today.
As we go forward--and, Senator Casey, as you mentioned--the
agreement with the UAE could very well be a model used, not
only in the region, but around the world, for the development
of nuclear energy, which will be important to us as we strive
to put less carbon into the atmosphere, and as many of the
other 200 countries in the world strive to convert to nuclear
energy. And the United States is well-poised to help. The
United States is well-poised to take the economic advantage
that's available to us to export that type of technology. And
we, in Idaho, are excited about, and doing our best to
encourage, the establishment and construction of a domestic
enrichment plant, known as the Eagle Rock facility, in
Bonneville County, ID.
So, with that, I look forward to hearing all of you
testify. And again, thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch. And we're always
happy to have more Idaho talent in the Nation's Capital. I just
hope the trip here wasn't too long for the Doctor.
But, thank you very much, Senator Risch, and thank you for
your staff's help, as well, in arranging and working on this
hearing.
I know that we will have other Senators joining us during
the question period, but I thought what we would do now is go
to our witnesses' opening statements.
Dr. McFarlane, we'll start with you and move from left to
right.
If you could keep your statements around 7 minutes, I have
a gavel, but I'm hesitant to use it on witnesses. [Laughter.]
We'll have a joint effort on the gavel. But, as best you
can. Your full statements, if they're longer than that and you
want to highlight or summarize them, will be made part of the
record. So, without asking for that, we're making sure that you
know you can have that as part of the record.
So, Dr. McFarlane, why don't we start with you, and then
we'll conclude with our witnesses and get to questions.
STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD McFARLANE, CHAIRMAN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ENERGY ACADEMY, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE
AMERICAN NUCLEAR SOCIETY, AND DEPUTY ASSOCIATE LABORATORY
DIRECTOR FOR NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, IDAHO NATIONAL
LABORATORY, IDAHO FALLS, ID
Dr. McFarlane. Well, Chairman Casey and Ranking Member
Risch, thank you for this opportunity today to testify before
the subcommittee on this U.S.-UAE agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation.
I believe that this agreement will set a positive example
for the more than 30 countries that, for the first time, are
considering nuclear energy as a strategic component for meeting
their projected growing demand for reliable, clean, baseload
electricity. It will also establish expectations of strong
nonproliferation assurance for other nations with nuclear
energy ambitions in the region. Given the ongoing challenges
the international community has faced with Iran, the UAE's
voluntary agreement to forgo the sensitive technologies of
uranium enrichment and reprocessing while applying IAEA
safeguards to all nuclear activities will usher in a landmark
standard of nonproliferation, safety, and transparency in the
Middle East and other parts of the world.
The UAE has expressed a willingness to make the investment
in capital, time, and human resources that is necessary to
implement a responsible nuclear energy program. The UAE has
already contributed $10 million toward an international fuel
bank that will help create a low-enriched uranium reserve as
insurance against supply disruptions in the global uranium
market. Preparation for irreplaceable U.S. cooperation and
advice in developing a robust regulatory safety framework has
begun with initial discussions about arrangements for technical
exchanges.
For 60 years, aspiring and established nuclear energy
states have turned to the U.S. education system to train their
future leaders in nuclear research, regulation, and
commercialization. This is a critical role that the United
States can serve in nurturing the UAE's development of an
educational framework for the nuclear workforce that it will
need to create and sustain a safe and reliable nuclear energy
infrastructure.
Among the countries with existing peaceful nuclear energy
programs, I have found a consistently high level of desire for
U.S. engagement and leadership in international nuclear
matters, an interest that has been sustained through periods
when the U.S. nuclear energy policy was less defined. The
cooperation agreement with the UAE sends a strong signal that
the United States is engaging with clear policy objectives for
nonproliferation, safety, and responsible international
expansions of the benefits of clean nuclear energy.
This action will have positive impacts beyond this specific
agreement. Failure to act would be detrimental to U.S.
nonproliferation and economic objectives. It has been estimated
that the UAE will spend some $40 billion over the next few
years to create and operate their nuclear energy supply system.
Under the umbrella of the 123 Agreement, U.S. industry will be
able to compete for some of that business, with a high
expectation of success. Although some U.S. firms are currently
providing evaluation and advisory services to the UAE without a
nuclear cooperation agreement in place, the large supplier
contracts will depend upon this agreement.
Given this agreement's affirmation of U.S. policy
objectives and its apparently broad support from all branches
of government, the resulting creation of thousands of high-
quality U.S. jobs will be a well-earned outcome.
The Department of Energy's national laboratories provide an
unparalleled technical resource that can be called upon to
assure that terms of this agreement are effectively implemented
and monitored. The national labs work closely with the
International Atomic Energy Agency to develop and implement
effective compliance monitoring technology. For example, Los
Alamos took the lead in designing and testing equipment for
assuring safeguards compliance in the soon-to-be-commissioned
Rokkasho Mura reprocessing plant in Japan. Oak Ridge has helped
return highly enriched uranium from areas of the world where it
is no longer--has a viable use. Oregon and Idaho have developed
low-enriched research reactor fuel to convert both foreign and
domestic research reactors from high-enriched uranium without
any noticeable loss of capability.
National laboratory and Department of Energy personnel also
work with the IAEA to develop resource information on the
complex institutional and technical framework needed by nations
with emerging peaceful nuclear energy ambitions.
National laboratories work together with their industry,
academia, and regulatory counterparts on harmonizing
international nuclear safety standards with the IAEA and other
international organizations, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency and
the Generation-IV International Forum.
National laboratories, universities, and the nuclear
industry have a large cadre of personnel who actively
participate in international professional organizations. This
type of unofficial engagement provides additional insight into
the ambitions of other countries while projecting our safety
and nonproliferation values in an effective and positive venue.
Last year, a UAE representative with a nuclear engineering
degree from Perdue University explained their approach to
developing nuclear energy to a meeting of the American Nuclear
Society. In a healthy, compliant nuclear program, we would
expect to see this type of engagement by the UAE increase and
be expanded to include active participation in other relevant
organizations, such as WANO, the World Organization for Nuclear
Operators.
In summary, my 37 years in national and international
nuclear energy arenas leads me to support the agreement for
cooperation between the Government of the United Arab Emirates
and the Government of the United States of America concerning
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. My international experience
has convinced me that U.S. engagement and leadership are
effective tools for positively influencing nuclear programs
abroad. In the case of the UAE, our assurance of an
international nuclear fuel supply in exchange for their
renunciation of sensitive nuclear technologies reinforces that
conviction.
This concludes my statement, and I'd be happy to take any
questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McFarlane follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Harold McFarlane, Chairman, International
Nuclear Energy Academy; Former President of the American Nuclear
Society; and Deputy Associate Laboratory Director for Nuclear Science
and Technology, Idaho National Laboratory, Idaho Falls, ID
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South and Central Asian Affairs, on the U.S.-UAE Agreement for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. I believe that this agreement will set a
positive example for the more than 30 countries that for the first time
are considering nuclear energy as a strategic component for meeting
their projected growing demand for reliable, clean baseload
electricity. It will also establish expectations of strong
nonproliferation assurance for other nations with nuclear energy
ambitions in the region. Given the ongoing challenges the international
community has faced with Iran, the UAE's voluntary agreement to forgo
the sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing while
applying IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities will usher in a
landmark standard of nonproliferation and safety transparency in the
Middle East and other parts of the world.
The UAE has expressed a willingness to make the investment in
capital, time, and human resources that is necessary to implement a
responsible nuclear energy program. The UAE has already contributed $10
million toward an international fuel bank that will help create a low-
enriched uranium reserve as insurance against supply disruptions in the
global uranium market. Preparation for irreplaceable U.S. cooperation
and advice in developing a robust regulatory safety framework has begun
with initial discussions about arrangements for technical exchanges.
For 60 years aspiring and established nuclear energy states have turned
to the U.S. education system to train their future leaders in nuclear
research, regulation, and commercialization. This is a critical role
that the United States can serve in nurturing the UAE's development of
an educational framework for the nuclear workforce that it will need to
create and sustain a safe and reliable nuclear energy infrastructure.
Among the countries with existing peaceful nuclear energy programs,
I have found a consistently high level of desire for U.S. engagement
and leadership in international nuclear matters, an interest that has
been sustained through periods when U.S. nuclear energy policy was less
defined. The cooperation agreement with the UAE sends a strong signal
that the United States is engaging with clear policy objectives for
nonproliferation, safety and responsible international expansion of the
benefits of clean nuclear energy. This action will have positive
impacts beyond this specific agreement. Failure to act would be
detrimental to U.S. nonproliferation and economic objectives.
It has been estimated that the UAE will spend some $40 billion over
the next few decades to create and operate their nuclear energy supply
system. Under the umbrella of the 123 Agreement, U.S. industry will be
able to compete for some of that business, with a high expectation of
success. Although some U.S. firms are currently providing evaluation
and advisory services to the UAE, without a nuclear cooperation
agreement in place, the large supplier contracts will depend upon this
agreement. Given this agreement's unprecedented affirmation of U.S.
policy objectives and its apparently broad support from all branches of
government, the resulting creation of thousands of high-quality U.S.
jobs will be a well-earned outcome.
The Department of Energy's national laboratories provide an
unparalleled technical resource that can be called upon to help assure
that terms of this agreement are effectively implemented and monitored.
The national labs work closely with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to develop and implement effective compliance monitoring
technology. For example, Los Alamos took the lead role in designing and
testing equipment for assuring safeguards compliance in the soon-to-be-
commissioned Rokkasho Mura reprocessing plant in Japan. Oak Ridge has
helped return highly enriched uranium from areas of the world when it
no longer had a viable use. Argonne and Idaho have developed low-
enriched research reactor fuel to convert both foreign and domestic
research reactors from high-enriched uranium without noticeable loss of
capability.
National laboratories and Department of Energy personnel also work
with the IAEA to develop resource information on the complex
institutional and technical framework needed by nations with emerging
peaceful nuclear energy ambitions. National laboratories also work
together with their industry, academia, and regulatory counterparts on
harmonizing international nuclear safety standards with the IAEA and
other international organizations such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency and the Generation-IV
International Forum.
National laboratories, universities, and the nuclear industry have
a large cadre of nuclear personnel who actively participate in
international professional organizations. This type of unofficial
engagement provides additional insight into the ambitions of other
countries while projecting our safety and nonproliferation values in an
effective and positive venue. Last year a UAE representative, with a
nuclear engineering degree from Purdue University, explained the UAE's
approach to developing nuclear energy to a meeting of the American
Nuclear Society. In a healthy, compliant nuclear program we would
expect to see this type of engagement by the UAE increase and be
expanded to include active participation in other relevant
organizations such as WANO, the World Organization of Nuclear
Operators.
In summary, my 37 years in national and international nuclear
energy arenas leads me to support the Agreement for Cooperation between
the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. My
international experience has convinced me that U.S. engagement and
leadership are effective tools for positively influencing nuclear
programs abroad. In the case of the UAE, our assurance of an
international nuclear fuel supply in exchange for their renunciation of
sensitive nuclear technologies reinforces that conviction.
Senator Casey. Doctor, thank you very much.
Ambassador Sanderson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET SANDERSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Sanderson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the
subcommittee, I want to thank you very much for the opportunity
to testify today.
Mr. Chairman, the proposed agreement under review today
should be seen in the context of the close and very important
bilateral relationship that has developed between the United
States and the United Arab Emirates in the past several years.
The United States and the UAE have established strong
partnership, and we share a common vision for a secure, stable,
and prosperous Middle East.
The UAE is a strong supporter of the Palestinian authority.
It was the first Arab State to send an ambassador to Baghdad
and to support Iraq's engagement and reintegration into the
neighborhood. It has also committed to cancel $7 billion of
Iraqi debt.
The United States and the UAE are working closely to bring
peace and stability to Afghanistan, where the UAE has deployed
combat troops. The UAE provides the United States and coalition
forces access to its ports and territories, as well as other
critical logistical assistance, and it is working vigorously to
support Pakistan, pledging $300 million in assistance at the
Tokyo Conference in April 2009.
The UAE, we believe, has been a responsible and reliable
partner of energy to world markets, with the sustained
involvement of U.S. companies in the UAE oil and gas sector for
more than 40 years. The UAE has made sizeable investments in
the development of renewable energy, and, on June 29 of this
year, was selected to host the headquarters of the
International Renewable Energy Agency, also known as IRENA.
The proposed agreement on peaceful nuclear energy further
strengthens cooperation between our two countries. In addition,
as Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen will note, the
agreement is a significant nonproliferation achievement.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, the proposed agreement under review
today should be seen in the context of our expanding and very
close bilateral relationship with the United Arab Emirates. By
signing this agreement, the United States and the UAE will
continue to strengthen this already vibrant and multifaceted
relationship, and we believe that the proposed agreement
deserves the support of Congress.
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, thank you very much
for the opportunity to testify in support of this
groundbreaking agreement. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Ambassador Sanderson.
Mr. Van Diepen.
STATEMENT OF VANN VAN DIEPEN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Van Diepen. Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch,
members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for this
opportunity to testify today in support of the proposed U.S.-
UAE agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. And thank you
for agreeing that our formal testimony will be incorporated
into the record.
This proposed agreement is a significant nonproliferation
achievement. And, as Ambassador Sanderson noted, it represents
a further strengthening of cooperation between the United
States and the UAE.
For the first time in such an agreement, a U.S. partner has
voluntarily agreed to forgo enrichment and reprocessing. The
proposed agreement also provides, for the first time, that
prior to U.S. licensing of exports for nuclear material,
equipment, components, or technology, the UAE shall bring into
force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. It
also allows the United States to require the removal of special
fissionable material from the UAE and its transfer either to
the United States or a third country if exceptional
circumstances of concern, from a nonproliferation standpoint,
so require.
The UAE's expressed commitment not to pursue enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities represents a marked contrast to Iran,
which has failed to comply with its international obligations
and seeks indigenous nuclear capabilities unnecessary for civil
nuclear power, but critical for the development of nuclear
weapons.
It is well known that the UAE has been a transshipment hub
for sensitive items, and was used by the A.Q. Khan network for
some of its activities. In the past several years, however, the
UAE has taken critical steps to address this problem. It helped
the United States expose and shut down the Khan network by
taking actions against firms and financial activities on its
territory. The UAE has declared it the high--at the highest
levels, that its territory should not be a source of
proliferation in the future.
More work remains to be done to implement this decision,
but the UAE has made considerable progress. Just a few days
ago, the UAE adopted a civil nuclear energy law that
domestically prohibits uranium enrichment, creates a Federal
authority for nuclear regulation, and develops a nuclear
material licensing and control system. It is taking steps to
implement U.N. Security Council resolutions against North Korea
and Iran. It has taken actions to prevent the abuse of its
financial system by proliferators. It has worked closely with
the United States to prevent the diversion of U.S.-origin goods
and technology through its territories. It is taking action
against companies engaged in proliferation-related activities,
and it has indicated that it has stopped shipments of WMD-
related goods to countries of concern.
The United States is committed to working with the UAE on
further steps toward establishing a comprehensive export
control regime and effective export control practices. Earlier
this year we held our annual bilateral counterproliferation
task force, in which we discussed additional ways to address
proliferation issues.
We are assisting the UAE through the Department of State-
coordinated Export Control and Related Border Security Program,
as well as other U.S. Government programs, in establishing a
comprehensive export control regime and effective export
control practices. While the UAE still has work to do, we
believe that it is taking the necessary steps to implement an
effective export control system. As a result, the UAE has
become one of our strongest nonproliferation partners. It
genuinely shares our concern over the proliferation of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials, as well as over
WMD financing.
In closing, I would like to ask the committee and the
Congress to consider the proposed agreement on its own merits.
It is in some ways a groundbreaking agreement. It contains all
the necessary nonproliferation conditions and controls that
Congress has written into law. It does not commit either party
to transfer any nuclear commodities, technologies, or services
to the other. Those are decisions for the future and will be
handled only on a case-by-case basis according to the usual
stringent U.S. licensing practices.
As President Obama has formally determined, the agreement
will promote, and not constitute unreasonable risk to, the
common defense and security. By signing this agreement, the
United States and the UAE have taken an important step in
building a long and mutually beneficial partnership to enhance
nonproliferation and energy security in the region. The
proposed agreement deserves the support of the Congress.
[The joint prepared statement of Acting Assistant Secretary
Van Diepen and Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van
Diepen and Deputy Assistant Secretary Janet Sanderson, Department of
State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, thank
you for this opportunity to testify today before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in support of the proposed U.S.-UAE Agreement for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, which President Obama submitted to the
Congress on May 21 for review pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. As shown by last month's visit of
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces to
Washington to see President Obama and other officials, this important
agreement reinforces a particularly strong and mutually beneficial
political, security, and economic bilateral relationship. The UAE is a
valued partner, cooperating with us on issues related to the
Palestinian Authority, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.
In connection with approving the proposed agreement and authorizing
its execution, the President made the determination required by section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act that performance of the proposed agreement
will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the
common defense and security.
Our purpose today is to discuss with the committee the principal
factors that the President considered before making his statutory
determination, and to urge the Senate to give the proposed agreement
favorable consideration.
A GROUNDBREAKING ACHIEVEMENT
Let us say at the outset that the administration recognizes the
nonproliferation value of this unique agreement. The UAE has made a
principled decision that it will abide by the highest nonproliferation
standards. The U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement recognizes these commitments and
achievements of the Government of the United Arab Emirates and provides
the basis to expand our existing cooperation into areas of peaceful
nuclear energy.
Consistent with the UAE's commitments to the highest
nonproliferation standards, the proposed agreement contains some
unprecedented features for agreements of this type. For the first time
in an agreement of this type, the UAE has voluntarily agreed to forgo
uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel. This will supplement
in a legally binding international agreement the UAE's recent
pioneering law to prohibit uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent
fuel. Additionally, for the first time, the proposed agreement provides
that prior to U.S. licensing of exports of nuclear material, equipment,
components, or technology pursuant to the agreement, the UAE shall
bring into force the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement
with the IAEA. The agreement also allows for the United States to
remove special fissionable material subject to the agreement from the
UAE either to the United States or to a third country if exceptional
circumstances of concern from a nonproliferation standpoint so require.
The proposed agreement has a term of 30 years and permits the
transfer of nuclear material, equipment (including reactors), and
components for civil nuclear research and civil nuclear power
production subject to subsequent individual export licensing. It does
not permit transfers of Restricted Data, sensitive nuclear technology,
sensitive nuclear facilities, or major critical components of such
facilities. It limits the special fissionable material that may be
transferred under the agreement to low enriched uranium except for
small amounts of special fissionable material for use as samples,
standards, detectors, targets or other purposes agreed by the Parties.
If the agreement is terminated, key nonproliferation conditions and
controls will continue with respect to material, equipment, and
components subject to the agreement.
In sum, the robust nonproliferation features of the UAE 123
Agreement are a significant achievement. The UAE is an example of a
country that has concluded that indigenous fuel cycle capabilities are
not needed to fully enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear energy.
Mr. Chairman, please let us expand on some of the key points I have
just made.
Once the proposed agreement enters into force, it will establish
the necessary legal framework for the United States and the UAE to
engage in subsequent, individually authorized forms of cooperation in
the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to assist the
UAE in meeting its growing energy demand. In addition to being
indicative of our strong partnership with the UAE, the proposed
agreement is a tangible expression of the United States desire to
cooperate with states in the Middle East, and elsewhere, that want to
develop peaceful nuclear power in a manner consistent with the highest
nonproliferation, safety and security standards.
THE UAE'S STRONG NONPROLIFERATION CREDENTIALS
We have spoken of the UAE's commitment to the highest
nonproliferation standards. We shall summarize the UAE's strong
nonproliferation credentials in a checklist form:
The UAE acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
on September 26, 1995, and its IAEA Safeguards Agreement
entered into force on October 9, 2003. It has signed the
Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA
and is committed to bringing it into force.
The UAE ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material on November 15, 2003, and deposited its
instrument of acceptance for the 2005 Amendment strengthening
the Convention on July 31, 2009.
It acceded to the International Convention on the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on January 10, 2008.
The UAE is implementing UNSC 1540--a resolution that, among
other things, requires U.N. Member States to take and enforce
effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means
of delivery and related materials.
UAE Federal Law 6 issued in 2009 prohibits uranium
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, creates a Federal
Authority for Nuclear Regulation, and develops a nuclear
material licensing and control system.
UAE Federal Law 13 issued in 2007 provides a strong basis on
which to build an effective export control system for
commodities that are subject to import and export control
procedures.
The UAE actively participates in the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security
Initiative, and the Container Security Initiative.
The UAE is a key counterterrorism partner and actively works
to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
The UAE has stated it intends to implement export and import
control rules for nuclear and nuclear-related equipment and
technology in strict accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers
Group Guidelines for nuclear transfers. This will enhance the
UAE's current basis for an export control system and assist its
government in preventing illicit transshipments of sensitive
nuclear technologies through the UAE.
In March 2008, the United Arab Emirates published its policy for
the development of nuclear energy in a report entitled, ``Policy of the
United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of
Peaceful Nuclear Energy.'' In it, the UAE committed itself inter alia
to ``pursuing the highest standards of nonproliferation'' and ``the
highest standards of safety and security.'' In signing this agreement,
the UAE has demonstrated its commitment to develop civil nuclear energy
in a responsible way, in full conformity with its nonproliferation
commitments and obligations. U.S. cooperation with the UAE will also
serve as a distinct counterpoint to those countries that have chosen a
different path, in particular Iran.
The UAE's commitment not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities is in marked contrast to Iran, which has continued to defy
its international obligations and is continuing to develop technical
capabilities that could be applied to nuclear weapons development.
The UAE recognizes the value of international cooperation for
establishing a nuclear power program as well as the need to develop
domestic human resources. The UAE is expected to hire a foreign
consortium to construct, operate, and perhaps partially own its first
nuclear powerplants while local expertise is developed. U.S. industry
is poised to assist with the development of a nuclear power program in
the UAE, but the Agreement for Cooperation is necessary to allow its
full participation. U.S. technology in this area is leading-edge, and
the United States anticipates that the UAE will give it strong
consideration as the UAE moves forward in implementing its plans.
U.S. PRIOR APPROVAL FOR RETRANSFERS
The Agreed Minute to the proposed agreement provides U.S. prior
approval for retransfers by the UAE of irradiated nuclear material
subject to France and the United Kingdom, if consistent with their
respective policies, laws, and regulations. Such retransfers would
provide the UAE opportunities for management of its spent fuel, subject
to specified conditions, including that prior agreement between the
United States and the UAE is required for the transfer to the UAE of
any special fissionable material recovered from any such reprocessing.
Plutonium recovered from reprocessing could not be returned under the
agreement (with the exception of small quantities for the uses
described above, but even then only with the further agreement of the
Parties). The transferred material would also have to be held within
the European Atomic Energy Community subject to the Agreement for
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between the United
States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
In view of the fact that this retransfer consent would constitute a
subsequent arrangement under the Act if agreed to separately from the
proposed agreement, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy
have ensured that the advance approval provisions meet the applicable
requirements of Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act. Specifically,
they have concluded that U.S. advance approval for retransfer of
nuclear material for reprocessing or storage contained in the Agreed
Minute to the proposed agreement is not inimical to the common defense
and security. An analysis of the advance approval given in the Agreed
Minute is contained in the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
(NPAS) submitted to Congress with the agreement.
CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons we would ask the subcommittee, and the
Senate, to consider the proposed agreement on its merits. It is, in
some ways, a groundbreaking agreement. It contains all the necessary
nonproliferation conditions and controls that Congress has written into
law. It does not commit either Party to transfer any nuclear
commodities, technology or services to the other. Those are decisions
for the future and will be handled on a case-by-case basis according to
the usual stringent U.S. licensing procedures. As President Obama
determined, the agreement will promote, and not constitute an
unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. By signing this
agreement, the United States and the UAE have taken an important step
in building a long and mutually beneficial partnership to enhance
nonproliferation and energy security in the region. The proposed
agreement deserves the support of the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you. We look forward
to your questions.
Senator Casey. Thanks very much.
Let me start. We'll do 7-minute rounds, and probably
several rounds.
Let me start with both of our State Department witnesses
with questions from two different areas. First of all, if
you're making a determination about something as grave and as
serious as this, obviously there's a cost-benefit analysis that
has to be undertaken. And I know both the Obama administration
as well as the Bush administration engaged in some level of
cost-benefit analysis to make determinations about how to
proceed here. I'd ask you first to make the case for this
agreement, in terms of our own national security interests, in
particular, as well as concerns beyond the scope of our own
security to delve into the concerns that we have about
nonproliferation and what that means for the rest of the world.
Make the case in terms in terms of proliferation and to use
this agreement to leverage other strategies.
And then I want to ask you some questions about major
concerns that I and others have about another aspect of the
agreement.
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that it's
a pretty straightforward thing, from our standpoint.
As noted in your opening statement and in my statement,
this agreement has some very important nonproliferation
features--the requirement to accede to the Additional Protocol,
forgoing enrichment and reprocessing technology--that not only
handles well the nonproliferation issues involving the UAE, but
serves as a positive example for the responsible development of
civil nuclear power throughout the Middle East. And it
underscores our objective of limiting the spread of
proliferation-sensitive enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities in favor of promoting reliable international
nuclear fuel supply arrangements.
In addition, as Ambassador Sanderson noted, this agreement
reinforces the already strong relationship between the United
States and the UAE, including on nonproliferation, and
including on nonproliferation issues involving not just the
UAE, but regionally and globally, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism.
And then, finally, as Dr. McFarlane noted, the agreement
will provide a framework for potential commercial sales of
civil nuclear commodities to the UAE by U.S. industry under
agreed nonproliferation conditions and controls, good both for
the United States--and again, setting the standard for safe,
secure, and safeguarded peaceful nuclear cooperation that we
hope countries around the world will follow.
Senator Casey. Ambassador Sanderson, do you want to add to
that, or----
Ambassador Sanderson. I would just add that this is part
and parcel of our overall relationship with the UAE, which--as
I noted and I think that the Senator, during his trip to the
UAE, saw firsthand--that the very cooperative and collaborative
relationship that we have had over the last--I'd say the last 5
to 7 years--it's a very different place, in many ways, the UAE,
than it was 25 years ago, when I was the desk officer. It's a--
they are taking charge of their future. They have very
seriously looked at what their energy needs will be down the
road--the fact that they do not want to be totally dependent on
their oil and gas resources; the fact that in 20 years or so,
they're going to have their energy needs--they're going to see
their energy needs almost triple--and they have decided to make
a safe and secure choice, and do it within a framework which is
acceptable, they believe, to their own needs as well as to the
international community.
Senator Casey. Thank you. I'll get into further aspects
surrounding making the case, because one of the things we have
to do here is make the case to the American people; and they're
hearing a lot about proliferation issues right now, especially
in the context of the controversy as it relates to Iran's
nuclear program.
Let me move, in the few minutes I have left in this round,
to raise an important concern that I and others have about
export controls. And I know we've addressed it. I know, for
example, that, in the joint testimony, you have several pages
worth of examples of how the UAE has engaged--or has, I should
say--strong nonproliferation credentials, and I know, on page
7, you refer, at least in two parts, two sections, to export
controls.
Here's the concern. And there are a lot of ways to express
it. But, the Port of Dubai is a major transshipment point for
illicit goods bound for Iran. In the past, A.Q. Khan used the
UAE to trade nuclear black-market goods to Iran. If this
agreement goes into effect, the United States may--some would
argue--may lose some of the leverage that it currently has to
push the UAE to further strengthen export controls.
Tell us how you deal with that concern. And, in particular,
is there a risk that entities that will use this cooperation as
a cover for proliferation shipments through the UAE to other
countries? Please address that question. And we may have one
more before my time is up.
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, on the last issue, Mr. Chairman, I
don't think there's any substantial risk of any cooperation
that we conduct under this agreement being misused and finding
its way outside the UAE. Not only is the U.S. export control
licensing system very thorough, including the potential for on-
site end-use checks, and not only do we have very close
intelligence coverage of nuclear-related matters, but the
substantial items that we would provide to the UAE under this
agreement would be under International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards. And so, I think the complex of those various
measures, taken together, would really deal pretty effectively
with that possibility.
On the larger question of dealing with illicit activity
going through places like Dubai, obviously, given the
geographic proximity of Iran to the UAE, to a longstanding
history of smuggling that goes back decades, if not centuries,
in that area, it's always going to be difficult to completely
control that problem. But, as Ambassador Sanderson noted, over
the past several years the UAE government has taken these
issues especially seriously. They've passed new export control
legislation, they've been extremely cooperative with us on
specific cases of problematic shipments, they've shut down
companies, they've monitored problem entities, they've done a
lot of concrete activity, and we are working with them to help
them go the rest of the way that they need to go.
Senator Casey. Well, I'll push you a little more on that to
get more detail on those steps, but my time is up.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
First of all--Ambassador Sanderson and the administration
generally--really, to see that the administration has reached
the same conclusion, I guess, I did, personally, after my
discussions there, that indeed these people are dealing with us
in good faith. I mean, this is not one of these gamesmanships
things, or--where they're taking us to the brink, and what have
you. I mean, they are, in very good faith, wanting to do just
what they're telling us they want to do, and that is develop,
for the future and to meet their energy needs, this nuclear
power.
As far as the proliferation issue, I think that that's one
of the things that encourages me about all this, is that in our
dealings with the UAE, we've really gone beyond proliferation.
I think all of us in America have been rightfully consumed by
the proliferation issues, because of things that happened in
other countries. But, this really takes us beyond that. And
indeed, the conclusion I reached, Senator Casey, in response to
your question, was that yes, indeed, the trade between Iran and
the UAE, long before it was the UAE or anything else, goes
back, as you pointed out, centuries. But, I think that the
agreement, indeed the contract, that we're going to enter into,
will give us a better insight into what's happening there, and
probably better control as to what's happening there, when it
comes to nuclear issues.
So, that was the conclusion I reached, and I'd be
interested to hear the response of the people from the State
Department for that.
But, I have one minor question. I don't want this to be a
stumbling block or make it appear partisan, but I noted that
the negotiations were completed in November, I think, of 2008,
and an agreement was signed January 15, 2009. But, then the new
administration went to renegotiate, and there was a
renegotiation, and a reexecution, in May 2009. And I never
really did understand the reason for that, or the niceties of
it. Could one of you maybe enlighten me on that? Again, I don't
want to make more--I don't want to make more of this than what
it is. I'm glad the agreement is here. But, I do have little
more than a curiosity as to steps to how it got here.
Mr. Van Diepen. Yes, Senator. Basically, the reason for the
renegotiation was to add into the agreement the provisions
under which the UAE would forgo enrichment and reprocessing
capability, and specifying that there would not be transfers
until its Additional Protocol had entered into effect. So, the
key nonproliferation features that had been noted in the
chairman's statement basically were the things that we added in
that renegotiation.
Senator Risch. So, was it more procedural than substantive?
Is that what you're telling me, about the add-on to the
contract?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, they were very substantive, but I--
you know, they weren't problematic. Maybe that's a good way to
answer your question.
Senator Risch. All right. As I close out my time here,
maybe both of you from State could comment on my view that we
may be better off with the agreement, when it comes to
proliferation, than we would be without the agreement with the
UAE.
Ambassador Sanderson. Well, let me, if I may--let me, if I
may, Senator, tell you that your sentiments, I think, have been
replicated, time and time again, in dealing with the UAE. They
have assured us that they want to go forward in this process in
the most transparent, safe, and secure manner. And we are
hopeful that this will open doors for us, in terms of our
dealings with the UAE.
I must tell you that we have a very frank, useful, and
collaborative dialogue on proliferation issues, on
transshipment issues, on the issues that we are talking about
today, with the UAE. But, I hope that this will give further
context to those discussions.
Senator Risch. Mr. Van Diepen, could you comment on that?
Mr. Van Diepen. And again, just to echo what Ambassador
Sanderson has said, I think that both the specific
nonproliferation provisions of the agreement itself, as well as
the strengthening of the overall bilateral relationship that
the agreement represents, both of which will help us pursue
more effectively this nonproliferation issue that we have with
the UAE, and I think it'll prompt the UAE to do more, and it
would also make our ability to assist them more effective.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. It's an important issue that needs to be
publicly debated.
There is no clear line between a civilian nuclear energy
program and a nuclear weapons program. So, I think it's vital
that Congress exercise its oversight power and hold hearings to
carefully consider the terms and implications of every nuclear
cooperation agreement that comes before us.
The United Arab Emirates and the United States have an
important relationship, one that I hope will continue to
strengthen. I also understand the growing energy needs that all
countries face, and appreciate the interest of the UAE in
seeking alternative and diversified sources of energy.
However, I do have strong concerns about expanding the use
of nuclear energy, particularly in this volatile region, before
we have an international regime in place to ensure that
countries will not export enrichment and reprocessing
technologies. And if an effective international agreement
prohibiting the transferring of these technologies is not
forthcoming, I think we do have to have a serious discussion
about whether we should continue following the current course
of promoting nuclear energy and entering into these cooperation
agreements.
I am concerned that an increased reliance on nuclear energy
will lead a growing number of countries to seek the ability to
produce nuclear fuel. While we may receive assurances today
that this is not the intent, the history of nations relying on
foreign fuel supplies is not an encouraging one. We need to
look no further than Iran to find a country which the United
States used to provide nuclear fuel, that now insists on having
its own fuel supply for what it claims are civilian purposes.
Any nation with enrichment or reprocessing capabilities
poses two threats. First, it can spark what amounts to an arms
race as regional adversaries seek to have their own
capabilities. Second, it increases the risk that weapons-grade
materials could fall into the hands of terrorists.
In the case of this particular agreement, we must also be
certain that the UAE is committed to ensuring that its
territory is never used again as a transit point for illicit
nuclear trade. This will require ensuring that adequate export
controls exist. And I want to emphasize that my concerns are
obviously not just targeted at the UAE. Rather, I have serious
reservations about committing to any nuclear cooperation
agreement until there is an international agreement that
effectively prohibits the transfer of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies.
Mr. Van Diepen, I'm pleased that the UAE has promised to
forgo developing enrichment or reprocessing capacity pursuant
to the proposed agreement. But, since the agreement also
provides for renegotiation in the event that we sign a more
generous agreement with a regional neighbor, I'm curious
whether we're having success in extracting similar promises
from other countries. For example, are we likely to get a
similar commitment from Jordan, with whom we have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding?
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Senator. I think that--excuse
me--all of these things are works in progress, and they're
country-specific negotiations. But, if, in fact, this agreement
goes into effect and we have a legally binding provision such
as this with the UAE, it will certainly serve as an example
that will make it easier for us to try and get similar
provisions with other countries.
The critical thing, I think, is--more critical is the idea
of coming up with whatever practical and appropriate limits we
can on the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology,
which you've made a very articulate case for, than the specific
form of that agreement with any specific country. With Jordan,
for example, we already have a Memorandum of Understanding that
contains that provision.
In terms of the UAE, in addition to the legally binding
provision in this agreement, the UAE has just passed domestic
legislation that would--in a domestic legal way, would have
them forgo enrichment or reprocessing capability. So, that's
another potential tool.
And in terms of your larger question about controlling
exports of enrichment and reprocessing capability, again, to
the extent that we have provisions in--we have commitments from
countries like the UAE not to have enrichment and reprocessing
at all, that then provides a safeguard in terms of any
shortcomings in our ability to get controls over exports of
E&R, because the UAE has committed not to import E&R from
anyone, not just from the United States.
And it's these very provisions in this UAE agreement that
we think help establish another example, another method,
another brick in the wall, of this overall effort of trying to
get constraints on enrichment and reprocessing technology, both
from the supply side, if you will, and the demand side.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. When can we expect the Nuclear
Suppliers Group to vote on a final agreement to limit the
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies? And are
you optimistic that they will approve such an agreement?
Mr. Van Diepen. I'm optimistic that one will ultimately be
approved, but it's going to take continued time. The couple of
countries that have raised objections have raised objections
of, kind of, broad sovereignty principle at very high levels
that it's going to take us some time to work around. But, these
same countries are very much committed to nonproliferation, and
so, I'm optimistic that we can work that through.
In terms of a time prognosis, I'm really not in a position
to give one at this point.
Senator Feingold. The criteria-based approach under
consideration by the NSG does not appear to significantly limit
the number of countries eligible to purchase enrichment and
reprocessing technologies. How many countries would be eligible
under this approach, and what is the administration's position
on a criteria-based approach?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, we support a criteria-based approach,
in part because that's realistically what's achievable in the
NSG, as the history of the past few years has demonstrated.
But, we think that that is an effective way.
But, more importantly, beyond the specifics of the
criteria, it's important to look at the history, and there
basically have been very, very, very few authorized exports, by
NSG countries, of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
So, we're already operating in an environment characterized
by a high degree of constraint and restraint. And so, I think
that we have to take that into consideration in working this
issue.
Also, it's important to note that the G8 countries have
agreed to go ahead and abide by that not-yet-agreed NSG policy,
even though it is not agreed----
Senator Feingold. Let me just follow up. The UAE arguably
satisfies the criteria included in past proposals, despite the
potential presence of a terrorist threat within its borders.
Would it trouble you if a final agreement permitted the
transfer of technologies to produce weapons-grade material to
countries where al-Qaeda might operate? And how can we
strengthen the potential NSG agreement to better safeguard
against the risk posed by al-Qaeda?
Mr. Van Diepen. Again, Senator, I think we've got to make a
distinction between whatever the specific words in the
agreement ultimately say and the actual behavior of Nuclear
Suppliers Group countries. And again, there's a long history of
a great deal of constraint and restraint by NSG countries.
There's, you know, clear understanding amongst NSG countries of
the sensitivity of this technology, and the fact that the
United States and other countries would look askance and engage
in counterpressure against any interest in selling that
technology in an irresponsible way, which again, historically,
has not been the case.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Are there any--currently any plans for
peaceful nuclear cooperation with other gulf states?
Mr. Van Diepen. We've concluded Memoranda of
Understanding--not 123 Agreements, Memoranda of
Understandings--with a number of gulf states. The UAE is really
the farthest along, in terms of their degree of interest and
commitment and preparation for peaceful nuclear activity, as
Dr. McFarlane noted. We don't have any concrete plans right now
to engage in such activities with other countries in the gulf.
But, I think, frankly, it--their processes on this are probably
too early along to get to the point where that really becomes a
realistic consideration.
Senator Kaufman. And I assume that this 123 Agreement with
UAE is a model for what you'd be thinking for, for other
countries?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, the words that we've been using are a
``positive example,'' again recognizing that, once you start
getting into specific negotiations with specific countries in
specific contexts, you may not be able to skin the cat exactly
the same way each time. But, certainly the idea that we want to
have the best possible controls on enrichment and reprocessing
technology will absolutely be part of the mix.
Senator Kaufman. Can you talk a little bit about the--I
know the UAE signed an agreement with France. How is their
agreement different from our agreement?
Mr. Van Diepen. I'm not familiar with all the details, but,
in general, it does not contain a lot of the nonproliferation
protections that ours do, because many of our provisions were
pursuant to United States domestic law, for which there's not a
counterpart in France.
But, in terms of French policy, and in terms of the sort of
commercial framework, it's not part of that envisaged
commercial framework that there would be any transfers of
enrichment and processing technology by France to the UAE.
Senator Kaufman. And I know Chairman Casey talked about the
benefits--cost benefits of this, and one of them is--Is there
any discussion about talking to the UAE in regard to this,
about the promotion of democracy, human rights, women's rights,
freedom of the press, all those issues?
Ambassador Sanderson. Senator, if I may, I'll take that
question.
Senator Kaufman. Sure.
Ambassador Sanderson. Those are discussions that we have
with the UAE all the time. They're part and parcel of our
broader dialogue. We have not done them in specific reference
to this agreement. We look at this agreement as standing alone.
But as we pursue our diplomatic discussions with the UAE, we
discuss a wide variety of issues, and they have a very forward-
leaning young leadership in the UAE now, very determined to
ensure that this country remains a modern stabilizing element
in the region. And so, we are able to talk about what's next
with regard to opening up the political process, what's next
with regard to democratization in the region, and in the UAE in
particular. It's a good dialogue, and we continue that.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Risch [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Casey had to step out to cast another vote, but
will be back rather quickly.
I wish Senator Feingold had remained, because I was hoping
we could have a dialogue about some of the remarks that he's
made.
I think--first of all, let me say that I think everyone
shares the objectives that Senator Feingold stated, and that is
to prevent proliferation. But I think--one of the disagreements
I had was, I don't think that you can in any way compare UAE's
view of using nuclear material with that of Iran's. I think
that they are--you're talking about the difference between
night and day, the attitude of the regime, the attitude of the
people toward the United States, the attitude of using nuclear
for peaceful purposes versus nonpeaceful purposes.
And I wonder, Ambassador, if you could comment on that,
briefly, as far as the attitude of the two nations toward the
use of nuclear material.
Ambassador Sanderson. Senator, I would agree with you
wholeheartedly. On one hand you have Iran, which has not lived
up to its international obligations, has not lived up to
requests from the international community to give it a sense of
where Iran intends to go with its nuclear program; in fact, has
not given the international community the confidence that it is
not going to engage in further proliferation and development of
nuclear weapons or other items.
You have, on the other hand, the UAE, that is trying to do
this in a very transparent manner. It has made a conscious
political decision to go with peaceful nuclear power. But, it
wants to do it right. And I think that's something that the UAE
leadership deserves a great deal of credit for. They are
working with us very closely. They understand our concerns
about proliferation, about issues related to transshipment,
about issues related to terrorism. They are working very much
to clean up their own system and to put into place regimes
necessary to deal with those issues. But, they want to do it
right. They've seen the example of Iran. And frankly, as Mr.
Van Diepen said, they are offering the international community
an alternative example of how to move forward on peaceful
nuclear power.
Senator Kaufman. Senator, can I just follow up?
Senator Risch. Yes, please.
Senator Kaufman. Yes, and I think that's right, and I think
that's clear, and I think it's a good comment. But, I think--I
know Senator Risch has raised this before--if Iran gets, and
has, a nuclear weapon, and everybody in the gulf knows they
have a nuclear weapon, then these attitudes about whether a
country cannot develop nuclear weapons is going to become more
and more important, and proliferation is going to be more of a
problem.
So that, right now, I think the UAE is right where we would
like them to be, but you have--I mean, I think that if Iran has
a nuclear weapon, the whole gulf state situation, with all the
states in the gulf state, changes. Is that a correct analysis?
Mr. Van Diepen. Well, I think, to the extent that becomes a
possibility, it's all the more important that we try and lock
countries into the proper path now. And so, the kinds of
legally binding--internationally legally binding constraints
that we have in this arrangement are exactly the kind of thing
we'd want to have in place to deal with that potential
contingency and help us manage it better.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you.
Senator Risch. Senator Kaufman and I have discussed this at
length, about the fact that he--it becomes a real game-changer
in region if indeed Iran does develop a nuclear weapon.
One--another comment I have about Senator Feingold's
questions or--and statement--and I'm not exactly sure what he
meant by this, but he said there was no bright line, or no--the
line between peaceful domestic use of nuclear material, versus
nonpeaceful use, was not very clear. And I'm not exactly sure
where he was going with that.
But--maybe, Dr. McFarlane, you could comment on this--but
it seems to me the step between highly enriched--the step
making highly enriched uranium, versus simple enrichment of
uranium for development of power, is indeed a very bright line
that inspectors can determine quite quickly if a country is
stepping over that line. Am I right or am I wrong on that,
Doctor?
Dr. McFarlane. Senator Risch, I think, given the type of
technology that UAE is going to have, which is commercial
nuclear reactors with low-enriched uranium fuel, I think that's
very easy, yes, to monitor and account for, and it is quite far
removed from having highly enriched uranium or separated
plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. So,
I think there's a lot of room there. Even if we don't know
exactly where the line is, we do know that the technology that
they're going to have available will be quite far removed from
that line. And the safeguards that should be in place, I think,
will be completely effective for that.
Senator Risch. You would agree, then, that something like
that is relatively easily monitorable, if, indeed, they allow
international inspectors into the country to review what's
going on. Am I right or am I wrong there?
Dr. McFarlane. Yes, Senator Risch, you are correct. For the
technology they have, it's very simple, and monitoring
techniques for simply counting--it's just unit accountability--
and then, there are more sophisticated techniques that are
available through the IAEA and with inspectors on the ground,
so it should be very straightforward.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
I wonder if maybe I could get each of you to comment on
the--and again, I think Senator Feingold raised some very
legitimate, debatable points, and one of those has to do with
our participation in this. And after going there, it seemed to
me--and discussing with the people in the UAE, where they want
to go--it seems to me it would be very, very naive for us to
believe that if we just walked away from this, the UAE would
abandon their efforts to do this. It seems to me the French are
ready to jump in, and other countries are ready to jump in to
take advantage of a financial situation. So, it seems to me
that our better place is at the table, versus being a critic of
what's going on.
Could you comment on that? Mr. Van Diepen, perhaps starting
with you.
Mr. Van Diepen. I think that's right. In particular, given
the fact that, although the agreement we have with the UAE is
bilateral, it governs UAE activity across the board. And so,
the UAE commitment not to possess enrichment and reprocessing
technology applies not just to E&R technology it might get from
the United States, but to any E&R technology from any source.
Likewise the requirement that it have in force the Additional
Protocol, once that protocol is in effect it will give the
U.N.--give the IAEA inspection rights not just on U.S.-provided
nuclear equipment, but nuclear equipment provided from any
source.
And so, this bilateral agreement actually has a broad
global applicability, vis-a-vis the UAE, that would be, you
know, very useful in terms of dealing with the issue that
you've raised.
Senator Risch. Ambassador.
Ambassador Sanderson. I certainly would agree. I would also
note that this project of the UAE has attracted a great deal of
commercial interest around the world; and so, there are
countries out there that are looking at this as a commercial
possibility. And the fact that, as they go with the 123
Agreement, there will be a regime in place that will help
govern where they end up, it's certainly very useful. But, yes,
it's going to be a competitive market.
Senator Risch. Dr. McFarlane.
Dr. McFarlane. I believe that they will go forward, and I
think if we look at the risk to the United States, we are far
better off to be engaged and understand what is going on and
have some say in what they're doing, versus being disengaged
and not having an influence on how they go forward. So, it's a
fairly simple equation, I think, and it is important, I think,
that the United States be a player.
Senator Risch. Thank you. Let me just conclude, Mr.
Chairman.
I think that--after this hearing and after my trip and what
have you, I think all of us should compliment the UAE, No. 1,
for being a friend of America in the region, being as open and
transparent as they are, and including the United States in
their efforts to do what they are trying to do. So, I think we
should embrace that. I think certainly we should continue to
negotiate and work in good faith with them, to help them
accomplish what they want to, because what they want appears to
be in the best interest of the United States also.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the hearing.
Senator Casey [presiding]. Thank you Senator Risch. And I
appreciate your insight, having spent some time in the area,
and also the insight you bring to this hearing today.
And I don't know if Senator Risch asked for this, in my
absence, that Idaho be represented at every subcommittee
hearing henceforth, but we'll see what we can do about that.
And thank you for your patience. I had to run down the
hallway to vote in another committee.
I wanted to go back to some of the concerns that have been
raised, just to highlight a few more questions.
A related concern, in terms of the movement of goods or
services commerce, really through the region, involves
financial institutions and financial--for lack of a better
phrase, financial flows--to Iranian banks with important ties
to the Iranian proliferation efforts including Bank Melli, that
carries out activities in UAE. I guess I'd ask you to restate,
or enunciate further, steps that the UAE has taken to deal with
these concerns about Iran, but also about the region.
And I think Senator Risch made a good point about the fact
that an agreement like this could provide better opportunities,
strengthened opportunities for us to be able to pay even closer
attention, and get even more intelligence and more information.
But, I wanted to have you address that again, our State
Department witnesses.
Mr. Van Diepen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The UAE has taken a number of concrete steps to implement
the U.N. Security Council resolutions that impose sanctions on
Iran. And these are really the international legal basis that
they and other countries have to try and deal with the problem
of Iranian banking and proliferation finance.
For example, the UAE was one of the first gulf states to
alert its financial institutions this year to the perils of
doing business with Iran. This is consistent with the
statements of the so-called Financial Action Task Force, an
international financial body. And it's our understanding that
these actions have resulted in increased scrutiny, by the UAE's
financial sector, of transactions with Iran.
And as I noted before also, the UAE has passed and has
started implementing new export control legislation, and we see
them taking steps to enforce this law, and they've actually
been prosecuting cases under that law.
And again, as you've noted, the improvement in our
bilateral relationship that'll be facilitated by this 123
Agreement will, I think, give us a better basis to assist them
to do even more in trying to deal with this very thorny
problem.
Senator Casey. Ambassador.
Ambassador Sanderson. Senator, if I may?
I would also note that over the last 5 to 7 years the UAE
has put into place a series of laws and regulations that are
regulating the movement of money through and in its territory.
That includes a money laundering law, that includes adhering to
the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force that
Mr. Van Diepen referred to. They have implemented a
counterterrorism law; they have set up a sensitive financial
intelligence unit to look at money laundering and the passage
of money through banks; they have worked very closely with
the--the government has worked very closely with the Central
Bank of the UAE to train and to put the banking system under
increased regulation and scrutiny.
It's still a work in progress, but these have been
significant efforts by the UAE government, and they're--also
been complimented by the fact, in certain instances, they have
shut down financial entities, as well as companies that are
involved in transshipment and the diversion of dual-use items.
Senator Casey. So, you're confident that they've taken, to
date, all the necessary and appropriate steps to deal with the
broader question of export controls, as well as any other
related concern that have been raised here.
Ambassador Sanderson. Mr. Chairman, it certainly remains a
work in process, and as we've noted earlier, we are helping
that through training, through exercises, and other endeavors
as part and parcel of our partnership. But, they are putting
into place the legal framework, and they are going after
individuals and entities that they believe are involved in
proliferation, transshipment, and other money-laundering-
related issues.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Dr. McFarlane, I didn't have a chance to ask you a question
before. I wanted to ask you--based upon your significant
experience in the national and international nuclear energy
arena--can you--and you've referred to this, I know, but I
wanted to have you review or amplify--can you give us your
sense of the commercial opportunities for U.S. companies here,
in terms of, not just the opportunity, but the ability to
compete as a result of this agreement.
Dr. McFarlane. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, there
are some small contracts in place for consulting that currently
is to help the UAE get into position to be able to start
importing nuclear reactors for power and to regulate them
effectively once they have them.
But, these are fairly minor, compared to the opportunity
that the U.S. companies will have to compete for both being
major suppliers of components for the nuclear powerplants, as
well as the fuel for the plants. And I'm very confident that
U.S. technology is highly competitive in the world market and
that there is a very high probability of success for some
significant portion of those contracts.
Senator Casey. And what would the component parts that you
see potential in, in terms of what we could export be? Can you
list or identify some of those?
Dr. McFarlane. Well, for one thing, we have--as I'm sure
you're aware, Senator--we have nuclear reactor vendors, such as
Westinghouse from your State----
Senator Casey. Right.
Dr. McFarlane [continuing]. Home State. And we have--in
addition to the reactor itself, there are many different, kind
of, hardware components, such as steam supply systems and
generators and things, which can be part of that export--on
that export list. I mean, there's quite a lot of hardware, and,
in addition, there is engineering and construction expertise
available from the United States that I think is a good
opportunity to compete for some of that--some of that design
work.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
I wanted to highlight one last thing, one last theme that
we've heard before. But, it's interesting that--every once in a
while in Washington, it's good to point to a source outside of
the four walls, so to speak, of the Senate.
I was looking at a July Congressional Research Service
report that was very informative on this agreement, and the
background, and the process. But, I thought it was interesting,
on page 6 of the report, it did highlight the two new
provisions that are significant. And we mentioned these before,
but I think it bears repeating, because when the American
people are asked to review, or to at least be aware of, what
this agreement means for the country--and it's obviously not in
the headlines every day we need additional assurances that I
think these two provisions provide.
``First''--and I'm quoting from the Congressional Research
Service Report, on page 6, ``First, the agreement provides that
the UAE bring into force'' the Additional Protocol to its IAEA
safeguards agreement before the United States licenses,
``exports of nuclear material, equipment, components, or
technology,'' pursuant to the agreement. That's significant.
And we can't highlight that enough, especially for Americans
who are just beginning to tune into the ramifications of this
agreement. So, it's important that Additional Protocol is
highlighted on the record.
Second, as the CRS report notes, the agreement states that
the UAE--and I'm quoting here from the report--``shall not
possess sensitive nuclear facilities within its territories or
otherwise engage in activities within its territory for or
relating to the enrichment or reprocessing of material, or for
the alteration in form or content of plutonium, uranium 233,
highly enriched uranium, or irradiated source or special
fissionable material.''
So, those two new provisions are significant. And I know
you've highlighted those, or our witnesses have. But, I think
it's critically important that the American people know the
lengths to which both administrations--the Bush administration
and the Obama administration--have gone to insist upon as
substantial and as airtight an agreement that we could
negotiate, because it's vitally important that we do this the
right way.
And I thought it was interesting that both administrations
have used--in one way or another, have used the word ``model''
to describe this. Because it's not enough for us to be able to
make the case against what the Iranian regime has been doing.
We have taken steps, and we'll take more steps, to hold them
accountable. And I think the international community will, as
well. It's also important that we can point to another model--
not just a theory, not just a hope--but another model that
other governments can try to live up to.
So, it's not by way of a question, but it's by way of an
observation, that these new provisions are vitally important.
And with that, let me ask any and all of our witnesses if
you'd like to add anything or to make any final remarks before
we conclude.
Anyone?
[No response.]
Senator Casey. OK.
And we will leave the record open for other Senators on the
subcommittee, or even beyond our subcommittee, to submit
questions, and we would ask that our witnesses do your best to
reply to those in writing.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Supplemental Prepared Statement of Hon. Russell D. Feingold,
U.S. Senator From Wisconsin
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing on the U.S.-UAE
nuclear cooperation agreement. It is important to vigorously debate
whether this agreement--and our practice of pursuing this type of
agreement with other countries--is a sensible policy from a
nonproliferation perspective.
Today's hearing made clear that there are many willing buyers and
sellers of the technology needed to make nuclear fuel and weapon-grade
materials. We should not pretend that a bilateral agreement with one
government will change that fundamental reality. We must directly
address this problem if we want to prevent terrorists from one day
gaining the materials they need to acquire a nuclear weapon.
I would like to address two issues that my colleagues raised at
today's hearing:
The first issue is whether it is appropriate to compare the risks
of nuclear cooperation with the UAE to the danger posed by Iran's
nuclear program.
I do not believe that the UAE poses an Iran-style proliferation
threat right now. I am concerned, however, that if we continue to
encourage countries to pursue nuclear energy, it is only a matter of
time before one of them decides to acquire an enrichment or
reprocessing capacity to guarantee a nuclear fuel supply. It is common
sense that any country relying on nuclear energy will want its own fuel
supply notwithstanding any promises that it is willing to make today.
Iran is just one of several countries that have illustrated this
danger.
While I applaud the UAE's promises to forgo an enrichment and
reprocessing capacity, there is a risk that a future regime could walk
back that promise. The Iranian example is particularly relevant here:
after all, the United States helped launch the Iranian nuclear program
under the Atoms for Peace program, only to see it turn in a dangerous
direction after the Iranian Revolution.
Finally, I am not convinced that the UAE has taken the necessary
steps to restrict illicit transfers to Iran. I understand they have
passed a national export control reform law, but that implementation
has been slow.
The second issue is whether there is a clear line between a
civilian nuclear energy program and a nuclear weapons program.
I am not suggesting that the nuclear cooperation that would occur
under the proposed agreement would be sufficient to support a nuclear
weapons program. I am concerned, however, that this agreement--and
others like it--may facilitate or encourage a nuclear weapons program.
Even a civilian nuclear energy program involves dual-use technology,
which can also be used to support a weapons program.
Further, countries that depend on nuclear energy may eventually
covet a domestic enrichment and reprocessing technology to ensure a
reliable nuclear fuel supply. Lack of progress on an agreement in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group that would meaningfully restrict the transfer
of these technologies suggests that countries want to retain the right
to transfer and receive enrichment and reprocessing technology for the
financial and energy benefits that technology may bring. Given this
reality, the promises in this bilateral agreement provide little
comfort.
______
Responses of Acting Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question. The proposed U.S.-UAE agreement breaks new ground by
requiring the UAE (a) not to construct uranium enrichment or plutonium
reprocessing facilities on its territory; and (b) to bring into force
an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA before
the United States will permit exports. But what happens if other
countries in the region refuse to accept these conditions, and other
nuclear supplier countries nevertheless agree to engage in cooperation?
What is the administration doing to keep the United States from
being isolated and undercut as it tries to establish these standards
for cooperation?
Press reports indicate that Jordan has already signed agreements
for nuclear cooperation with France, the United Kingdom, China, and
Russia. Do any of those agreements have conditions similar to the U.S.-
UAE agreement?
Answer. The U.S.-UAE agreement obligates the UAE not to assume
enrichment or reprocessing facilities from any suppliers, not just the
United States. While we cannot control the specific conditions in
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that other nuclear supplier
states make with other countries, we are working actively in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to institute stricter guidelines for the
transfer of civil nuclear technologies, including that recipient
countries have put in place an Additional Protocol to their safeguards
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
We also have ongoing discussions with bilateral partners regarding
appropriate supply conditions. For example, we work regularly with
France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and with all Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) participating governments to ensure that all
nations maintain stringent standards for any transfer of proliferation-
sensitive technologies. And we are focusing our efforts on furthering
agreement among supplier states about the importance of encouraging
customers to rely the market rather than developing their own
enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. With specific regard to
Jordan, we applaud the fact that Jordan has brought into force the
Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Question. What specific actions has the United States taken to get
other supplier countries--particularly including France and Russia--to
ask for the same conditions in the bilateral agreements that they sign?
Doesn't United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 require
this, when it ``Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls
for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel
cycle?''
Will this be an issue at the next meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers'
Group?
Answer. As a result of U.S. efforts in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group
(NSG), NSG participating governments (including France and Russia) will
discuss the adoption of stricter export control measures for sensitive
enrichment and reprocessing technologies in November 2009, and will
continue to press the NSG to reach consensus on appropriate guideline
amendments. We also have ongoing discussions with bilateral partners
regarding appropriate supply conditions. (If you would like additional
information regarding these discussions, we would be pleased to brief
you and your staff in a classified setting.) Additionally, all
enrichment and reprocessing technology holders in the NSG already apply
stringent export controls to these technologies, and the de facto
commercial standard for enrichment transfers requires ``black box''
conditions; that is, transfers that do not provide the recipient
country with access to technology enabling replication of such
facilities.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 reflects the
international community's agreement about the importance of adopting
stricter national export controls on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle
technologies, and Resolution 1887 calls on states to increase their
efforts in this regard. We are working both bilaterally and
multilaterally in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to limit the spread of
these technologies. We have also worked bilaterally with many states to
strengthen their nuclear export control regimes.
Question. Both the United States and, now, the U.N. Security
Council have called for universal application of the IAEA Additional
Protocol. Will the administration make this a requirement in all future
cooperation agreements, including with countries outside of the Middle
East, before U.S. nuclear exports commence?
Answer. We do support the universal adoption of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/153) and are
working actively to achieve that objective. The majority of countries
that are potential nuclear trading partners of the United States have
already brought an Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards
agreements into force, and we will consider whether a state has an
Additional Protocol in force when negotiating any future nuclear
cooperation agreements.
Question. What other agreements for nuclear cooperation are
currently being negotiated, or have been completed and are awaiting
submittal to Congress?
What new Memoranda of Understanding on nuclear cooperation are
being negotiated or have been completed in the last few months?
Answer. A nuclear cooperation agreement with Jordan remains under
negotiation, and we continue to work to finalize the agreement. A
nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia was signed in 2008, but
former President Bush made a subsequent determination that effectively
terminated Congressional review of that agreement following the Russia-
Georgia conflict. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev have
issued statements indicating that both sides plan to work together to
bring the agreement into force; however, no decision has been made on
its resubmission to Congress.
No nuclear cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) have been
completed within the last few months. The text of a nuclear cooperation
MOU with Vietnam has been agreed upon at the expert-level. It awaits
only final approval of senior officials within both governments.
Additionally, the United States proposed a draft civil nuclear
cooperation MOU with Qatar in June 2008. This MOU is still under review
by the Government of Qatar.
______
Responses of Acting Assistant Secretary Vann H. Van Diepen to Questions
Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. If the UAE were to back out of this agreement and seek
its own enrichment or reprocessing technology, isn't it true that other
nations are not bound to cut off technological assistance or fuel
supplies?
Answer. As a general rule, bilateral international agreements
cannot bind third parties to take particular actions if one party
withdraws from an agreement. However, a UAE withdrawal from this
agreement and subsequent pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing,
despite its numerous public pronouncements to the contrary, would
potentially have extremely significant economic and political
consequences on future cooperation between the UAE and other supplier
nations.
Question. What efforts are being made to coordinate with our allies
to ensure that they place similar restrictions on enrichment and
reprocessing capacity in their bilateral nuclear cooperation
agreements, both with the UAE and with other prospective countries?
Answer. While we cannot control the specific language in bilateral
nuclear cooperation agreements made by other nuclear supplier states,
we work regularly with bilateral partners and with all Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) participating nations to ensure that all nations
maintain rigorous standards for any potential transfers of enrichment
and reprocessing-related technologies. Further, the UAE has committed
to follow strictly the NSG Guidelines, the application of which will
provide it with stronger tools to prevent proliferation and illicit
transshipments of sensitive nuclear technologies through the UAE.
Question. What are the security implications if numerous additional
countries were to acquire enrichment or reprocessing capabilities? Does
it increase the danger that terrorists will acquire the materials
needed to make an improvised nuclear device or a dirty bomb?
Answer. We recognize these potentially significant security
implications of numerous additional countries acquiring enrichment and
reprocessing capabilities. As a consequence, we are seeking to limit
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies through
strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group controls over such transfers and
through bilateral consultations with key technology holders.
Question. I am concerned about the role that the UAE may play as a
hub for the illicit transfer of nuclear materials to Iran or as a
financial conduit for terrorist organizations. I understand that the
UAE has passed a national export control reform law, but implementation
had been slow. Has the regulatory regime been made operational with
implementing regulations yet? And has the national control body
established by the law been fully staffed?
Answer. The UAE has made significant progress in the area of export
controls and preventing transshipments of proliferation concern. The
national export control law is being enforced. The UAE, as part of its
enforcement efforts, formed the ``UAE Committee on Commodities Subject
to Import and Export Control,'' an interagency committee chaired by the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs that reports directly to the
Council of Ministers. This committee has already met and its goal is to
facilitate effective implementation of the export control law. The UAE
is also adding additional staff to the export control office and is
working to complete implementing regulations; we are actively engaged
with the UAE on these issues.
Question. Mr. Van Diepen, you suggested that our memorandum of
understanding with Jordan on nuclear cooperation includes a provision
requiring Jordan to forgo an enrichment or reprocessing capacity. But
it is my understanding that the delay in proceeding with the 123
Agreement centers on Jordan's unwillingness to give up its right to an
enrichment and reprocessing capacity, which it considers to be
nonnegotiable. Have there been recent developments in negotiations, or
new language in the agreement, that suggest otherwise?
Answer. During the hearing, we attempted to convey that the United
States-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding contains language noting
Jordan's intent to rely on the international markets for fuel services
as an alternative to developing sensitive enrichment or reprocessing
technologies. We continue to discuss with the Government of Jordan the
possibility of concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement, and we
intend to employ those mechanisms that are most appropriate to achieve
our goal of limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies.
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