[Senate Hearing 111-84]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-84
IRANIAN POLITICAL AND NUCLEAR REALITIES AND UNITED STATES POLICY
OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 3, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-190 WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Fitzpatrick, Mark, senior fellow for nonproliferation,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United
Kingdom........................................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John Kerry....... 52
Haass, Hon. Richard N., president, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, NY................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, statement..... 4
Sadjadpour, Karim, associate, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC............................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Wisner, Frank G., II, former U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Egypt,
the Philippines, and India, New York, NY....................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Gillibrand, Hon. Kirsten, U.S. Senator from New York, prepared
statement...................................................... 51
(iii)
IRANIAN POLITICAL AND NUCLEAR REALITIES AND UNITED STATES POLICY
OPTIONS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present. Senators Kerry, Menendez, Casey, Kaufman, Lugar,
and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Thank you
very much for being here to join us today.
And we're very pleased to welcome an outstanding panel of
witnesses for this hearing. These witnesses, frankly, have a
tall order today, because we've asked them to help us
understand the way forward in dealing with one of the most
urgent challenges that currently faces all of us. I can't
imagine a better group to kick off the first of 3 days of
public and classified briefings and hearings on Iran's nuclear
program and the policy options facing us.
I'm particularly happy to welcome back a couple of very
familiar faces. Ambassador Frank Wisner has been here many
times, in many capacities. And, Frank, we appreciate your
willingness to share the insights you've gained from a very
long and distinguished career in public service.
Ambassador Wisner. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I'm pleased also to have Richard Haass here
across the table from us once again. There are few people
better qualified to provide us with a strong perspective on
where Iran fits into the world's geopolitical map. And we
appreciate your leadership on the Council on Foreign Relations.
Mark, thank you, also, for joining us here. You bring a
long experience in the field of nonproliferation, and an
analyst's keen eye on just how far down the road Iran has
gotten since its secret nuclear program was exposed 6\1/2\
years ago.
Nobody has to emphasize, but I suppose we ought to restate,
that we are living through a very difficult and uncertain time.
And we are rightly focused heavily on the state of our economy.
But, as a nation, and particularly on this committee, we cannot
afford to ignore the challenges outside of our borders.
Right near the top of that list of challenges is Iran and
its troubling nuclear program. The impact of Iran's steady
nuclear progress is real. When I was in the Middle East, just a
few days ago, I encountered deep worries in every Arab capital
about Iran's ascendancy and the possibility that it will build
an atomic weapon. And, of course, in Israel the anxiety is not
just high, it is an existential threat.
What we know about Iran's nuclear missile progress raises
grave concerns for us and our allies. Iran has built a uranium
enrichment plant approximately 75 feet underground at Natanz,
where nearly 4,000 centrifuges are spinning away, enriching
uranium, with hundreds more centrifuges apparently ready to
start up soon. Just 2 weeks ago, the International Atomic
Energy Agency reported that the plant has enriched enough
reactor-grade uranium to, theoretically, allow Iran to make an
atomic bomb.
On Sunday, ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, confirmed the IAEA report, saying publicly that the
United States believes Iran has amassed enough uranium to build
an atomic bomb, if its leaders were to take the reckless step
of further enriching that stockpile to weapons grade. We are
determined--and I believe it is the appropriate policy--to stop
Iran from taking that very dangerous next step.
At the same time, Iran continues to defy the United Nations
Security Council by constructing a reactor at Arak, that, if it
were completed, looks to be very well suited for producing
weapons-grade plutonium. The IAEA reports that Iran has
recently impeded its access to this facility. And Iran
continues to test ballistic missiles and to launch so-called
space-launch vehicles that Iran can learn from to expand its
ballistic missile capability.
But, what we do not know about Iran's program is even more
alarming. For 6 years, the IAEA has been asking Iran to answer
questions about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear
program. The questions have grown more substantive and pointed
as time has passed, and Iran has grown more defiant, ignoring
sanctions by the U.N. Security Council and obstructing the
IAEA.
Because of its history of concealment and deception, we
cannot afford to take Iran at its word that its nuclear
ambitions are solely civilian. Its leaders must answer the
IAEA's questions fully and quickly, and should comply, as other
nations have complied that are signatories to the NPT.
These gaps in what we know about Iran's nuclear program are
significant, and they are dangerous. I hope our witnesses will
help fill some of them in.
For me, some of the most troubling unanswered questions
were raised in documents that were reportedly found on a laptop
computer obtained by the CIA in 2004. Among the thousands of
pages of data from that computer are, according to press
reports, documents that appear to show blueprints for a nuclear
warhead and designs for missiles to carry it. One of those
designs apparently tracked the flight of the missile and showed
the detonation of its explosives 600 meters above the ground.
Well, folks, that's a lousy height for a conventional weapon,
but it's a devastating altitude for a nuclear weapon intended
to wipe out a city.
Iran has refused to answer the toughest of these questions.
And just last week, a U.N. official acknowledged to my staff
that talks between the IAEA and Tehran have reached an impasse.
The official said he didn't know what comes next.
Well, we do know what comes next. The Obama administration
has said that it wants to open direct talks with Iran. This is
the right first step, and I applaud the President for taking
it. But, we also need to be honest with ourselves: Just talking
will not solve this problem, even direct talks between
Washington and Tehran. While Iran was ``just talking'' to the
IAEA and the Europeans, it deftly sidestepped every redline
laid down by the international community. While Iran was ``just
talking'' to the world, it moved to the threshold of becoming a
nuclear state.
I point this out, not to lay blame; I point this out,
because we cannot move forward to a solution without
understanding how we got to this dangerous juncture in history.
The time for incremental steps and unanswered questions is
over.
Talking with Iran is the right starting point. I have
supported this idea for many years, and I'm glad that the day
is coming. But, the fact is that the United States must open
these talks from a position of strength. The President's recent
announcement of a responsible redeployment plan for Iraq is a
step in the right direction, but we need the full backing of
our allies in Europe, as well as Russia, China, and other
countries, as we sit down across the table from the Iranians.
This is not just an American problem, and it will not be just
an American solution. Our friends and allies need to understand
this.
And Iran needs to understand that these will not be drawn-
out negotiations. That's a scenario that would give Tehran a
green light for more progress on enrichment and other nuclear
projects, some still being carried out in the dark.
We need to set a timetable for substantive progress, and we
need to make sure that Iran's leaders understand that the full
weight of the international community will come down on them if
this issue is not resolved. And by ``full weight,'' I mean
tougher economic sanctions, such as further restrictions on
trade and finance, which will apply meaningful pressure on the
Iranian regime at a time when oil prices have plummeted and its
economy is hurting.
The solution to this problem does lie within our reach.
With our friends and allies, we need to act boldly and wisely
to engage Iran, backed by real consequences for its continued
noncompliance.
I look forward to the guidance that we're going to receive
from our distinguished panel this morning, and from GEN Brent
Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski on Thursday morning.
And let me welcome, now, our one other witness who is here,
Karim Sadjadpour, now an associate at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, whose intimate knowledge of Iran's
senior officials, clerics, and dissidents offers the committee
a genuine insider's perspective. Frankly, we've operated
frequently without understanding fully the realities on the
other side of this critical issue, and I think--we welcome your
contribution to that.
With that, let me turn now to Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Why, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important hearing on our policy toward Iran.
Two weeks ago, as you pointed out, the International Atomic
Energy Agency released a report on Iran that reached four major
conclusions.
First, the report said that, ``There remains a number of
outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about the
existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear
program.''
Second, Iran has refused to permit IAEA inspectors access
to additional locations related to the manufacture of
centrifuges, research and development on uranium enrichment,
and uranium mining and milling.
Third, unless Iran implements transparency measures and the
additional protocol, the IAEA will not be in a position to
provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran.
Last, the report said Iran has not suspended its
enrichment-related activities or its work on heavy-water-
related projects.
The exact status of Iran's nuclear program and the degree
of progress Iran has made toward a potential nuclear weapon
have been debated extensively, but, as the IAEA report
underscores, Tehran clearly is not complying with international
nonproliferation regime, and there is widespread agreement that
Iran has not been truthful about its nuclear program or its
missile development. Its decision to move ahead with uranium
enrichment was condemned by the international community. Iran's
intransigence has triggered United Nations Security Council
sanctions on three occasions.
In recent weeks, Tehran announced the launching of its
first domestically produced satellite into space. Iran has also
announced that the Russian-built nuclear powerplant at Bushehr
will undergo testing prior to beginning operations this year.
Despite these steps, the international community's leverage
with regard to Iran has increased significantly in recent
months. The Iranian regime is under economic pressure due to
falling oil prices and multilateral sanctions. Iran's isolation
has contributed to lagging investments in its oil and natural
gas industries. The National Academy of Science speculates that
this trend could lead to sharply lower Iranian energy exports
by 2015.
United Nations sanctions have also encouraged foreign
governments and banks to curtail or end commercial ties to
Iran.
It is clear that Tehran would like to split the
international community, or at least delay concerted action.
The task for American diplomats continues to be to solidify an
international consensus in favor of a plan that presents the
Iranian regime with a stark choice between the benefits of
accepting a verifiable limitation on its nuclear program and
the detriments of proceeding along the current course.
And even as we pursue sanctions or other joint action, it's
important we continue to explore potential diplomatic openings
with Iran. I strongly supported the Bush administration's
decision to send Under Secretary of State Bill Burns to
participate in negotiations, hosted by our European allies,
with Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, the so-called ``P5+1.'' I
believe we must be open to some level of direct communication
with Iran. Even if such efforts do not produce agreements, they
may reduce risk of miscalculation, improve our ability to
interpret what is going on in Iran, and dispel anti-American
rumors among the Iranian people, and strengthen our efforts to
enlist the support of key nations in responding to Iranian
threats.
Despite the Iranian Government's provocative policies, the
young and educated people of Iran are among the most pro-
American populations in the Middle East. Most Iranians favor
greater economic and social integration with the rest of the
world, access to technological advancements, and a more open
political system. Positive transformation in Iran is inhibited
by the lack of accurate information reaching the Iranian people
about what their government is doing and about the
international community's efforts to resolve the current
crisis.
The United States and other nations must work to broaden
the information available to Iranians. Among other steps, the
possibility of establishing a United States visa office or some
similar diplomatic presence in Iran should be on the table, and
such an outpost would facilitate more exchange and outreach
with the Iranian people.
Regardless of its precise strategy on Iran, the Obama
administration must make execution of an Iran policy a
priority, and this will require focused diplomacy, with
European allies and with other partners, on constructing a
multilateral program that intensifies the costs to Tehran if it
resists transparency and continues its nuclear weapons
activities.
I welcome, along with our chairman, the distinguished
witnesses that we have before us, and look forward to their
testimony.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thanks so much, Senator Lugar. And I
appreciate, without collaboration, the sort of synchronicity of
our comments. And I think it's important.
Normally by, sort of, rank, we would start with you,
Ambassador Wisner, but we want to, if you don't mind, lay out,
sort of, first--we're going to ask Mark Fitzpatrick to start
with his testimony to sort of look inside. Then we'd like to
ask Karim Sadjadpour to look inside the nuclear issue, and
then--Karim will sort of lay out--and then both of you can
really lay out the policies, sort of, in response to that. And
I think it would be great.
So, if we could begin with you, Mark, we'd appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF MARK FITZPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW FOR
NONPROLIFERATION, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC
STUDIES, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
other Senators. It's an honor to be asked to testify today on a
matter that I've been following for almost 12 years, in and out
of government. Iran today has reached a status I have long
dreaded. It operates a semi-industrial-scale uranium enrichment
facility and is building up a stockpile of enriched uranium
that is of no current use to its civil nuclear energy program,
but that could be put to weapons purposes. Meanwhile, Iran is
also building a research reactor that will be ideal for
producing plutonium, the other path to nuclear weapons.
Whether or not Iran chooses to go down the weapons route,
its persistence in developing such capabilities could have
profoundly disturbing consequences, including by potentially
sparking a proliferation cascade in the Middle East and beyond.
The danger is compounded by Iran's failure to cooperate
with the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigation of
past Iranian nuclear activities and its verification of new
undertakings.
Iran refuses to answer questions about the strong evidence
of past nuclear weapons development work, including, for
example, evidence of foreign help with experiments on a
detonator suitable for an implosion-type weapon. Iran has also
unilaterally and illegally rejected its treaty obligation to
provide advance declarations of new nuclear facilities, and to
allow inspectors regular access to facilities under
construction, such as the research reactor at Arak. What Iran
chooses not to disclose is difficult to discover.
According to the latest IAEA report, as of mid-February
Iran was operating almost 4,000 centrifuges at its underground
uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, and was getting ready to
begin operating about 2,000 more. The piping is being installed
for an additional 9,000 centrifuges, which would bring the
total to 15,000 at some unspecified future date. All the
centrifuges operating in the underground facility so far are of
the P-1--that is, Pakistan first generation--model, although
Iran continues to experiment with more efficient later model
centrifuges in an above-ground pilot plant at Natanz.
By the end of January, Iran had produced a metric ton of
gasified uranium enriched to the 3-percent U235 isotype level
needed to fuel most nuclear powerplants. The IAEA estimates
that Iran was adding about 100 kilograms a month to its
stockpile. If it is further enriched--and that is a big
``if''--the uranium content of the Natanz production to date is
sufficient, in principle, to provide the fissile material for
one nuclear weapon. Iran thus has a latent breakout capability.
The accumulation of this much low-enriched uranium makes
the Iran challenge more acute, but several caveats are in
order, including the range of uncertainty in the variables that
feed into the equation of how much is enough for a weapon.
Because the low-enriched uranium is under IAEA's surveillance,
further enriching it could not be done without tipping off
inspectors.
And the basic truth bears repeating, that having a
stockpile of enriched uranium is not the same as having a bomb.
Treating Iran's enrichment capabilities as equivalent to
nuclear-weapon status would empower its hardline leaders and
exaggerate the perception of danger among Iran's neighbors,
increasing whatever security motivations they may already have
for keeping open a nuclear weapons option of their own.
For a weapon, the low-enriched uranium first would have to
be further enriched to 90 percent or more. Although it may be
counterintuitive, about two-thirds of the effort required to
produce weapons-grade uranium has already been expended by the
time it is enriched to just 4 percent. Nevertheless, the
further enrichment to weapons-grade would still take several
weeks.
Based on public information, it is impossible to say how
long it would then take Iran to reconvert the gaseous highly
enriched uranium to metal and fashion a weapon from it, but a
rough estimate might assign at least 6 months or more to the
task. Other nations would then have some time to react.
Having just enough enriched uranium for one weapon, even
once enriched to weapons-grade, cannot be said to confer
nuclear weapons status. A real deterrent capability would
require more. Most countries also feel the need for a test to
ensure reliability, although this perhaps would not be
necessary if Iran received a proven weapons design through the
black market. The notorious Pakistan black-marketer, A.Q. Kahn,
sold a nuclear weapons design to Libya at the beginning of the
decade, and other members of his network made digital copies of
the blueprints.
There is no publicly available evidence that Iran obtained
a weapons design, as well. It is noteworthy, however, that the
Libya blueprints have been described as being from the same
family as the documentation that Iran admitted it did receive
from the Kahn network in 1987 on the casting of uranium in
hemispherical shapes.
As has been widely reported, the U.S. intelligence
community assessed that Iran was working on a nuclear weapons
development up until late 2003. What has not been reported, and
is probably unknown, is how far Iran got in this research. The
publicly available evidence suggests that it was at the
developmental, not yet operational, stage.
Whether Iran has actually made a decision to build nuclear
weapons is uncertain, but its purpose in pursuing uranium
enrichment clearly seems to have a weapons options for the
future. It is hard to reach any other logical conclusion, based
on the secrecy and deception behind the program, the military
connections, and evidence of weapons development work, and the
economic illogic of investing in these expensive technologies
without having any powerplants that can use the enriched
uranium.
With regard to this last point, for example, the Bushehr
reactor that underwent a startup test last week, can be run
safely only on fuel made in Russia. Iran's claims about the
purpose of its enrichment program obfuscate this point.
Iran's main justification has been an argument for self-
sufficiency. The argument breaks down, on several grounds,
however, including that Iran's known uranium reserves are
insufficient for the nuclear power program it envisions. Iran
already has exhausted most of its stock of uranium concentrate,
known as ``yellow cake,'' in order to produce 357 metric tons
of uranium hexafluoride at its facility at Esfahan. This is far
from sufficient for a power program, but is enough feed
material for at least three dozen weapons.
A key policy challenge is how to build a barrier between
the latent nuclear weapons capability and actual weapons
production. This is difficult when, in Iran's case today, the
distinction is blurred almost to the point of invisibility. The
United States and its allies do, however, have several policy
tools to help keep Iran's enrichment program from unlimited
expansion. If Iran continues to defy the Security Council, its
enrichment program can be constrained by export controls,
sanctions, financial pressure, interdiction, and other means of
exploiting Iran's vulnerabilities.
Among the dangers presented by Iran's nuclear program is
the risk that it will start a domino effect in the region. Many
of Iran's neighbors are concerned about its growing weapons
capability. For some states, such as its gulf neighbors, an
Iranian nuclear weapon would present a direct and dire threat.
For others, such as Egypt and Turkey, the threat is indirect
and more tied to concerns about the power balance and loss of
relative status and influence in the region. Together, these
concerns have contributed to a surge of interest in nuclear
power in the region, almost certainly, in part, to signal to
Iran and to their own populations that they have a hedging
strategy.
Since 2006, 15 countries in the Middle East have announced
new or revived plans to explore civilian nuclear energy.
They've justified their interest in terms of electricity needs,
energy diversification, a desire to conserve oil and gas for
export earnings, and the role of nuclear energy in retarding
global warming. They do not talk openly about it in strategic
terms, and certainly do not say they want nuclear energy as the
building block for an atomic bomb, but they do see nuclear
energy as a status symbol and a way to keep technological pace
with Iran. The question is how to keep this interest confined
to purely civilian nuclear programs. Keeping Iran from getting
nuclear weapons is the best preventative.
Nuclear power, in itself, is not a proliferation threat. It
can contribute to proliferation risks by providing cover for
clandestine activities and an industrial and personnel
infrastructure that could be useful to a weapons program.
However, it is only the sensitive areas of the fuel cycle,
primarily uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, that
present the problem. If states agreed to forgo these
technologies and to accept enforceable transparency measures,
then nuclear power can contribute to their economic development
without sparking proliferation concerns.
A good example of this is the decision by the United Arab
Emirates to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, and to accept
the IAEA safeguards additional protocol. This sets a positive
model for the region and beyond, in stark contrast with Iran.
If such a stance helps the UAE to acquire state-of-the-art
nuclear technology from the West, the Iranian people might well
ask their leaders why they persist with policies that lead to
increasing political and economic isolation while their gulf
neighbors can freely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear
cooperation.
Mr. Chairman, I'll stop here and submit the rest of my
testimony and prepared remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fitzpatrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-
Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London,
United Kingdom
It is an honor to testify before this hearing on a matter that I
have been following for almost 12 years, both in and out of government.
Iran today has reached a status I have long dreaded: It operates a
semi-industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility and is building up a
stockpile of enriched uranium that is of no current use to its civil
nuclear energy program but that could be put to weapons purposes.
Meanwhile Iran is also building a research reactor that will be ideal
for producing plutonium--the other path to nuclear weapons. Whether or
not Iran chooses to go down the weapons route, its persistence in
developing such capabilities could have profoundly disturbing
consequences, including by potentially sparking a proliferation cascade
in the Middle East and beyond.
The danger is compounded by Iran's failure to cooperate with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s investigation of past
Iranian nuclear activities and its verification of new undertakings.
Iran refuses to answer questions about the strong evidence of past
nuclear weapons development work, including, for example, evidence of
foreign help with experiments on a detonator suitable for an implosion-
type weapon. Iran has also unilaterally and illegally rejected its
treaty obligation to provide advance declarations of new nuclear
facilities and to allow inspectors regular access to facilities under
construction, such as the research reactor. What Iran chooses not to
disclose is difficult to discover.
According to the latest IAEA report, as of mid-February Iran was
operating almost 4,000 centrifuges at its underground uranium-
enrichment facility at Natanz and was getting ready to begin operating
about 2,000 more. The piping is being installed for an additional 9,000
centrifuges, which would bring the total to 15,000, at some unspecified
future date. All the centrifuges operating in the underground facility
so far are of the P-1 model (Pakistan first generation), although Iran
continues to experiment with more efficient later model centrifuges in
an above-ground pilot plant at Natanz.
By the end of January, Iran had produced a metric ton of gasified
uranium enriched to the 3.5-percent U235 isotope level needed to fuel
most nuclear powerplants. The IAEA estimates that Iran was adding about
100kg a month to its stockpile. If it is further enriched, the uranium
content of the Natanz production to date is sufficient in principle to
provide the fissile material for one nuclear weapon. Iran thus has a
latent breakout capability.
The accumulation of this much low-enriched uranium makes the Iran
challenge more acute. But several caveats are in order; including the
range of uncertainty in the variables that feed into the equation of
how much is enough for a weapon. Because the low-enriched uranium is
under IAEA surveillance, further enriching it could not be done without
tipping off inspectors. And the basic truth bears repeating, that
having a stockpile of enriched uranium is not the same as having a
bomb. Treating Iran's enrichment capabilities as equivalent to nuclear
weapons status could empower its hard-line leaders and exaggerate the
perception of danger among Iran's neighbors, increasing whatever
security motivations they may already have for keeping open a nuclear
weapons option of their own.
For a weapon, the low-enriched uranium first would have to be
further enriched to 90 percent or more. Although it may be
counterintuitive, about two-thirds of the effort required to produce
weapons-grade uranium has already been expended by the time it is
enriched to just 3.5 percent. Nevertheless, the further enrichment to
weapons-grade would still take several weeks. Based on public
information, it is impossible to say how long it would then take Iran
to reconvert the gaseous highly enriched uranium to metal and fashion a
weapon from it, but a very rough estimate might assign at least 6
months or more to this task. Other nations would then have some time to
react, provided they could muster the political will to do so.
Having just enough enriched uranium for one weapon, even once
enriched to weapons-grade, cannot be said to confer nuclear-weapons
status. A real deterrent capability would require more. Most countries
also feel the need for a test to ensure reliability, although this
perhaps would not be necessary if Iran received a proven weapons design
through the black market. The notorious Pakistani black marketer, A.Q.
Khan, sold a nuclear weapons design to Libya at the beginning of the
decade, and other members of his network made digital copies of the
blueprints.
There is no publicly available evidence that Iran obtained a
weapons design as well. It is noteworthy, however, that the Libya
blueprints have been described as being from the ``same family'' as the
documentation that Iran admitted it did receive from the Khan network
in 1987 on the casting of uranium in hemispherical shapes.
As has been widely reported, the U.S. intelligence community
assessed that Iran was working on nuclear weapons development up until
late 2003. What has not been reported, and is probably unknown, is how
far Iran got in this research. The publicly available evidence suggests
that it was at the developmental--not yet operational--stage.
Whether Iran has actually made a decision to build nuclear weapons
is uncertain. But its purpose in pursuing uranium enrichment clearly
seems to be to have a weapons option for the future. It is hard to
reach any other logical conclusion, based on the secrecy and deception
behind the program, the military connections and evidence of weapons
development work, and the economic illogic of investing in these
expensive technologies without having any powerplants that can use the
enriched uranium. With regard to this last point, for example, the
Bushehr reactor that underwent a startup test last week can be run
safely only on fuel made in Russia. Iran's claims about the purpose of
its enrichment program obfuscate this point.
Iran's main justification has been an argument for self-
sufficiency. The argument breaks down on several grounds, however,
including that Iran's known uranium reserves are insufficient for the
nuclear power program it envisions. Iran already has exhausted most of
its stock of uranium concentrate, known as yellowcake, in order to
produce 357 metric tons of uranium hexafluoride at its facility at
Esfahan. This is far from sufficient for a powerplant, but is enough
feed material for at least three dozen weapons.
A key policy challenge is how to build a barrier between a latent
nuclear weapons capability and actual weapons production. This is
difficult when, as in Iran's case today, the distinction is blurred
almost to the point of invisibility. The United States and its allies
do, however, have several policy tools to help keep Iran's enrichment
program from unlimited expansion. If Iran continues to defy the
Security Council, its enrichment program can be constrained by export
controls, sanctions, financial pressure, interdiction, and other means
of exploiting Iran's vulnerabilities.
Among the dangers presented by Iran's nuclear program is the risk
that it will start a domino effect in the region. Many of Iran's
neighbors are concerned about its growing weapons capability. For some
states, such as its gulf neighbors, an Iranian nuclear weapon would
present a direct and dire threat. For others, such as Egypt and Turkey,
the threat is indirect, and more tied to concerns about the balance of
power and loss of relative status and influence in the region.
Together, these concerns have contributed to a surge of interest in
nuclear power in the region, almost certainly in part to signal to
Iran--and to their own populations--that they have a hedging strategy.
Since 2006, 15 countries in the Middle East have announced new or
revived plans to explore civilian nuclear energy. They have justified
their interest in terms of electricity needs, energy diversification, a
desire to conserve oil and gas for export earnings, and the role of
nuclear energy in retarding global warming. They do not talk openly
about it in strategic terms, and certainly do not say they want nuclear
energy as the building block for an atomic bomb. But they do see
nuclear energy as a status symbol, and a way to keep technological pace
with Iran. The question is how to keep this interest confined to purely
civilian nuclear programs. Keeping Iran from getting nuclear weapons is
the best preventative.
Nuclear power in itself is not a proliferation threat. It can
contribute to proliferation risks by providing cover for clandestine
activities and an industrial and personnel infrastructure that could be
useful to a weapons programme. However, it is only the sensitive areas
of the fuel cycle--primarily uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing--that pose the problem. If states agree to forgo these
technologies and to accept enforceable transparency measures, then
nuclear power can contribute to their economic development without
sparking proliferation concerns.
The introduction of nuclear energy elsewhere in the Middle East
should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. To date, no commercial
contracts have been signed; no irreversible decisions have been made,
and most of the national plans have been limited to feasibility
studies. Indeed, there is reason to doubt the will and ability of many
of the states in the region to follow through with the large technical,
financial and political challenges of nuclear-energy development. These
hurdles have postponed many nuclear energy plans in the past and are
likely to do so again. From a technical standpoint, most of these
states are starting from a very low base, lacking the necessary
physical infrastructure, legal systems, and trained scientific and
engineering personnel. Those states that do go ahead will take 10-15
years before nuclear power becomes a national reality. There is time,
therefore, to put in place a robust regime of policies and practices
that can serve as a bulwark against a proliferation cascade in the
region.
In a book-length assessment last year of ``Nuclear Programmes in
the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran,'' the International Institute
for Strategic Studies concluded that if any one of Iran's neighbors
were to seek to acquire nuclear weapons in response, this would put
additional pressure on others to do the same. A proliferation cascade
would become more likely if Israel felt obliged to relinquish its
longstanding doctrine of nuclear ``opacity'' or ambiguity, whereby it
refuses to confirm or deny any aspect of its nuclear activities.
The policies and practices adopted by the next states to embark on
nuclear power projects can set a new standard to help correct the
damaging Iranian precedent. Central to this new standard should be a
shared understanding that the proliferation risks of nuclear energy are
manageable as long as countries accept full transparency with
enforceable verification and concentrate on the technologies they
really need for nuclear power, while relying on more economical imports
of nuclear fuel, rather than indigenous development of sensitive parts
of the fuel cycle. A good example of this is the decision by the United
Arab Emirates unequivocally to forgo enrichment and reprocessing and to
accept the IAEA safeguards Additional Protocol. This sets a positive
model for the region and beyond, in stark contrast with Iran. If such a
stance helps the UAE to acquire state-of-the-art nuclear technology
from the West, the Iranian people might well ask their leaders why they
persist with policies that lead to increasing political and economic
isolation while their gulf neighbours can freely enjoy the benefits of
peaceful nuclear cooperation.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Fitzpatrick, thank you. It's very
important testimony, very detailed, and we are very, very
appreciative for that update, and look forward to some
questions.
Mr. Sadjadpour.
STATEMENT OF KARIM SADJADPOUR, ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sadjadpour. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Lugar. It's an honor to be here----
The Chairman. Is your mike on?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I believe it is, yes.
The Chairman. There it is, yes.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I will speak louder.
I will be uncharacteristically brief for a Persian. I will
be brief in my oral testimony, and I've gone into much greater
detail in my written.
We're here to talk about the nuclear proliferation threat
from Iran today, but I would submit that Iran has a sizable
influence on six major U.S. foreign policy challenges. There is
nuclear proliferation, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli
conflict, energy security, and terrorism.
And starting with this premise, I would argue, as you said,
Mr. Chairman, that shunning Iran is no longer an option. I
would argue confronting Iran militarily will exacerbate each of
these issues I just mentioned. And the option we're left with
is talking to Iran. But, the devil is in the details.
I think the first question which the Obama administration
must probe is a seemingly simple one, and that is, Why does
Iran behave the way that it does? Is Iranian behavior driven by
this immutable ideology which was born out of the 1979
revolution and is really incapable of changing? Or is Iranian
behavior somehow a reaction to punitive United States measures?
Meaning, could a different approach--namely, a diplomatic
United States approach--beget a more conciliatory Iranian
response? I don't think we know the answers to these questions,
but the only way to test these hypotheses is with direct
dialog.
I would argue that the nuclear issue, which we're here to
talk about today, is a symptom of the mistrust between the
United States and Iran, but is not an underlying cause of
tension. And for this reason, I don't believe that there exists
a technical solution to this nuclear dispute. If President
Ahmadinejad were to announce a press conference tomorrow
declaring that Iran has put its nuclear program to rest, no one
would believe him, nor should we. And I believe that, again,
there does not exist a technical solution to this issue; it
will require a broader political accommodation between the
United States and Iran, whereby Washington reaches a modis
vivendi with Tehran and Iran ceases its hostile approach toward
Israel. And we can go into more detail about this.
Now, I would make three points with regards to policy
recommendations. And the first point is to commence the dialog
with Iran by aiming to build confidence on areas of common
interests. And of the six issues that I mentioned initially, I
believe that Afghanistan and Iraq are the two best forums in
which to build confidence with Iran. These are two areas where
there are broad overlapping interests. There are certainly some
competing interests as well, but there are broad overlapping
interests between the two countries; namely, in Afghanistan.
Iran does not want to see a resurgence of the Taliban, a Sunni
fundamentalist cult which they almost fought a war with a
little more than a decade ago. Iran, like the United States,
wants to see drug trafficking curtailed. And Iran, having
received over 2 million Afghan refugees in the last few
decades, certainly does not want to see continued instability
in Afghanistan. And likewise, we have common interests with
Iran in Iraq.
So, I would say the first--the best step to begin this
conversation, after 30 years of cumulative mistrust, is to try
to allay this mistrust by working on these areas of common
interest. And I think those conversations, in and of
themselves, could have an impact on Iran's nuclear disposition.
If the United States is able to set a new tone and context for
the relationship in Afghanistan and elsewhere, I think that, in
and of itself, could change the calculations--the nuclear
calculations--of Iran's leadership.
The second point I would make is to focus on the supreme
leader in Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, not the President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. Ayatollah Khamenei's constitutional authority
dwarfs that of the President. He has authority over the main
levers of state--the judiciary, the military, the media; and,
in the last several years, he has emerged more powerful than
he's ever been. If you look at the most influential
institutions within Iran, the Revolutionary Guards, the
Guardian Council, the Presidency, the Parliament, they're all
currently led by individuals who were either directly appointed
by Khameini or unfailingly loyal to him.
So, I think the focus should be on Ayatollah Khamenei. And
I've gone into much greater detail in my testimony--my written
testimony, about Khamenei. But, if I had to describe him in one
word, it would be ``mistrustful.'' He is deeply mistrustful of
U.S. intentions. He believes that U.S. policy is not behavior
change, but regime change. And he is reluctant to show any type
of compromise, because he believes that if you compromise, you
project weakness and it will invite even more pressure. So, I
think one of the great challenges of the Obama administration
will be to (a) deal directly with Khamenei, and (b) try to
allay his profound sense of mistrust, and see how that might
affect Iran's nuclear calculations.
The third point I would make--which is very much in line
with Senator Lugar's initial comments--is that it's absolutely
imperative that we maintain an airtight international approach.
That includes not only the Europeans, but also the Russians,
the Chinese, and others. What's absolutely critical is that
each country approaches Iran with the same talking points, with
the same redlines, because if different countries approach Iran
with diverging redlines, I believe the entire diplomatic
approach could unravel. Iran is very adept at exploiting rifts
within the international community and it's absolutely critical
that they receive the same talking points from all of our
allies.
Now, I see two major obstacles to any type of confidence-
building or potential thawing in the relationship. And the
first obstacle I describe as the ``spoilers.'' These are
factions, entities, and individuals who would not benefit from
a warming of the United States-Iran relationship. Many are
hard-liners in Tehran who thrive in isolation, in the sense
that they have quasi-monopolies on economic power, on political
power, and they recognize that, were Iran to open up to the
world, it would dilute the hold they have on power now. And in
the past, these spoilers have been incredibly adept at
sabotaging or torpedoing any type of confidence-building. They
will send arms shipments, meant to be discovered, to Hamas, to
Hezbollah. They will commit gratuitous human rights abuses. One
of my friends, Roxana Saberi, who's an Iranian-American
journalist, was imprisoned last month in Tehran. She's been in
Evin prison for the last month. And I believe these types of
actions are meant to gratuitously sabotage any hope for
confidence-building.
And I think we, the United States, should not react by
ceasing dialog with Iran, because that's precisely what these
spoilers are hoping to achieve. And it's going to be tough, but
I think we need to continue forward.
And the big question is the will and the opinion of
Ayatollah Khamenei himself. And despite his hostile rhetoric,
we don't know, deep down, whether he's interested in having an
amicable relationship or not with the United States. But, I
would argue that if we reach out to Tehran, and he rebuffs our
overtures, it will create major issues and problems for him in
Tehran, because, as Senator Lugar mentioned early on, he's
presiding over a population which is overwhelmingly in favor of
a normalization with Iran, and even amongst the political elite
in Tehran, behind closed doors the majority recognize that the
``Death to America'' culture of 1979 is obsolete in 2009. So, I
think that even if Iran's senior leadership rebuffs our efforts
at overtures, it could create problems for them, and could
create cleavages in Tehran.
The second big obstacle I see is the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. And I see this as the biggest point of contention
between the United States and Iran, not the nuclear issue. And
what I would argue is that some type of a parallel-track
negotiation--Arab-Israeli negotiations, headed by Senator
Mitchell--could do a great deal in forwarding United States-
Iran confidence-building.
Iran's position toward Israel is incredibly rigid. I don't
see them changing that position anytime soon, but the important
caveat is that Iran's leadership has long said that they will
accept any agreement which the Palestinians themselves accept.
I truly believe forward progress on the Arab-Israeli peace
front could do wonders for United States-Iran confidence-
building.
The last point, which I will end on, is human rights and
democracy, because I think there's a valid concern among some
that if we talk to the Iranian regime, we're somehow selling
out the demands of the Iranian people, or by dealing with the
Iranian regime--engagement with the Iranian regime will be at
the expense of the Iranian people. And on this issue I would
simply defer to Iran's human rights and democracy activists
themselves; Iranian Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi argues
that allaying the threat perception of the regime in Tehran,
and trying to reintegrate Iran into the international global
economy, will really expedite political and economic reform in
Iran by creating more fertile ground for democracy and human
rights.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]
Prepared Statement of Karim Sadjadpour, Associate, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of the
committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today.
Given Iran's sizable influence on issues of critical importance to the
United States--namely Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict,
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and energy security--the longstanding
Washington policy debate about whether or not to ``engage'' has been
rendered obsolete. Continuing to shun Iran will not ameliorate any of
the above challenges, and confronting Iran militarily will exacerbate
all of them. The option we are left with is talking to Tehran.
Advocating dialogue is easy, but the devil is in the details. With
whom in Iran should we talk? What should we talk about? How should we
go about talking? When should we talk? I hope to address these
questions today.
That Iran continues to be a primary national security concern is
evidence of the failure of our steadfast attempts to alter Tehran's
behavior by isolating it politically and economically. Thirty years
after the 1979 revolution, Iran remains the State Department's ``most
active'' state sponsor of terrorism, fervently opposes Israel's
existence, defiantly moves forward with its nuclear ambitions, and
continues to represses its own population. More than any previous U.S.
President, George W. Bush redoubled efforts to counter Iranian regional
influence and weaken its government. Yet Iran's international reach is
greater today than ever, and Tehran's hard-liners are firmly in
control.
In charting a new strategy, the Obama administration must first
probe a seemingly simple but fundamental question: Why does Iran behave
the way it does? Is Iranian foreign policy rooted in an immutable
ideological opposition to the United States, or is it a reaction to
punitive U.S. policies? Could a diplomatic U.S. approach beget a more
conciliatory Iranian response? The only way to test these hypotheses is
direct dialogue.
Engagement with the Iranian regime need not, and should not, come
at the expense of the Iranian people. According to activists like Nobel
Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi, the United States can more effectively
strengthen Iranian civil society and human rights with policies that
allay Tehran's threat perception and facilitate, rather than impede,
the country's reintegration into the global economy. To be sure, there
are no quick fixes or panaceas. The Islamic Republic is not on the
verge of collapse, and an abrupt political upheaval could well produce
an even worse result. The only groups in Iran that are both organized
and armed are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the
Bassij militia.
Our first steps vis-a-vis Iran are critical, for they will set the
tenor for the next 4 years.
While the nuclear dispute dominates the headlines, recent history
has shown an approach that focuses primarily on punitive measures is
the best guarantor of hostile Iranian policies aimed at
counterbalancing the United States. What's needed is a comprehensive
approach that aims to build confidence, moderate Iranian policies, and
subtly create more fertile ground for political reform in Tehran, all
at the same time.
I. IRANIAN POLITICAL AND NUCLEAR REALITIES
Understanding Ayatollah Khamenei
American policymakers have often struggled to understand where and
how power is wielded in Tehran, and for good reason. After the fall of
the Shah in 1979, the father of the revolution, Ayatollah Khameini,
aimed to set up the nascent Islamic Republic's power structure in a way
that would make it impervious to foreign influence. This meant creating
multiple power centers whose competition would provide checks and
balances to prevent one branch or individual from becoming too powerful
and potentially susceptible to outside influence. The result has been
frequent political paralysis, an inability to make big decisions, and a
tendency to muddle along with entrenched policies.
It is within this context that Khameini's successor, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, governs as the most powerful individual in a
highly factionalized, autocratic regime. Khamenei may not make national
decisions unilaterally, but neither can any major decisions be taken
without his consent. He rules the country by consensus rather than
decree, with his own survival and that of the theocratic system as his
top priorities.
Despite the outsize attention paid to Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, Khamenei's constitutional authority dwarfs that of the
President. He controls the main levers of state, namely the judiciary,
the military, and the media. His power base has expanded considerably
over the last several years as the country's most important
institutions--the elite Revolutionary Guards, Guardian Council,
Presidency, and Parliament--are all currently led by individuals who
were either directly appointed by Khamenei or remain unfailingly
obsequious to him.
A careful reading of three decades worth of Khamenei's writings and
speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian
domestic and foreign policy aims and actions. They reveal a resolute
Leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent--though highly cynical
and conspiratorial--world view. Four themes dominate his political
discourse--justice, independence, self-sufficiency, and Islamic piety--
and he interweaves them seamlessly: Islam embodies justice,
independence requires self-sufficiency, and foreign powers are hostile
to an independent, Islamic Iran. From Khamenei's perspective, Iran's
enmity toward the United States and Israel as well as the rationale for
its nuclear ambitions can be explained within this framework.
Despite his hostile rhetoric, Khamenei's 20-year track record
depicts a risk-averse figure who has courted neither confrontation nor
accommodation with the West. His distrust of the United States is
profound, believing strongly that U.S. opposition to Iran is not
motivated by Tehran's external behavior--its nuclear ambitions,
opposition toward Israel, or support for Hezbollah--but because Iran's
strategic location and energy resources are too valuable to the United
States to be controlled by an independent-minded Islamic government.
Washington's ultimate goal, Khamenei believes, is to restore the
``patron-client'' relationship with Tehran that existed under the Shah.
In this context, whether U.S. officials announce that they wish to
isolate Iran or have a dialogue with it, Khamenei presumes nefarious
intentions. He holds strongly that Tehran must not compromise in the
face of U.S. pressure or intimidation, for it would project weakness
and encourage even greater pressure: ``If the officials of a country
get daunted by the bullying of the arrogant powers and, as a result,
begin to retreat from their own principles and make concessions to
those powers, these concessions will never come to an end! First, they
will pressure you into recognizing such and such an illegitimate
regime, then they will force you not to call your constitution Islamic!
They will never stop obtaining concessions from you through pressure
and intimidation, and you will be forced to retreat from your values
and principles step by step! Indeed, the end to U.S. pressure and
intimidation will only come when Iranian officials announce they are
ready to compromise Islam and their popular government of the Islamic
Republic, and the United States may bring to power in this country
whoever it wants!''
Given that Khamenei perceives Washington to be hostile to the
Islamic Republic's very existence, challenging U.S. interests has
become an important foreign policy priority for the Iranian Government.
This has motivated Tehran to seek out curious alliances with faraway
countries, such as Venezuela and Belarus, and to offer support to
groups with whom it has little in common apart from enmity toward the
United States, such as the Sunni fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan
(against whom Iran nearly went to war a decade ago).
Based on his reading of Washington's cold war policies, Khamenei's
primary concern with respect to the United States is not a military
attack, but rather a political and cultural onslaught intended to
create cleavages among the country's political elites. This onslaught
would spread ``Western vice'' and cultural influence to undermine the
roots of Iran's traditional society, create popular disillusionment
with the Islamic system, and foment ethnic and sectarian unrest.
Notwithstanding Khamenei's mistrust of the United States, the role
of both ideology and political expediency are important to his anti-
American worldview. A conciliatory approach toward the United States
and a nonbelligerent approach toward Israel would be parting ways with
two of the three ideological symbols of the Islamic Republic (the other
being the mandatory hejab for women). For Khamenei, if the Islamic
revolution was all about momentous change, the years since have been
about maintaining the revolutionary status quo.
Nor is Khamenei's rationale purely ideological; his writings and
speeches suggest he agrees with myriad Iran scholars and analysts who
argue that if Iran were to open up to the United States, it would spur
major cultural, political, and economic reform. Given that Khamenei's
selection as Supreme Leader was based on his fealty to revolutionary
ideals and the vision of Ayatollah Khameini--whose political views
crystallized in the 1970s during the time of the Shah--the chances of
him being willing, or able, to reinvent himself at age 69 do not appear
strong.
Nuclear politics
A strong consensus exists within the nonproliferation community
that Tehran aspires for a nuclear weapons capability. What's less clear
is the precise impetus for Iran's nuclear ambitions. Does Iran want a
nuclear weapons capability to dominate the Middle East and threaten
Israel? Or is Iran a misunderstood, vulnerable nation driven by a need
to protect itself from unstable neighbors and a hostile U.S.
Government? Or could Tehran simply moving forward with its nuclear
program to gain leverage with the United States?
The Iranian state limits the scope of the public nuclear debate in
order to project an appearance of national unity. Talk of suspending
uranium enrichment, or pursuing the development of nuclear weapons, is
taboo. Instead, the debate permitted pits ``moderates'' who advocate
confidence-building with the West in order to pursue a full fuel cycle
against ``hard-liners'' who favor continuing forward without delay or
compromise in order to present Iran's nuclear capability as a fait
accompli. Any debates which probe the efficacy of suspending uranium
enrichment or building a nuclear bomb happen behind closed doors, among
a small coterie of officials.
By all accounts Khamenei is the most influential figure in
determining nuclear policy, and for the Leader the nuclear issue has
come to symbolize the core themes of the revolution: The struggle for
independence from unjust foreign powers, the necessity of self-
sufficiency, and Islam's high esteem for the sciences. He has
consistently and unequivocally stated that while Iran is opposed to
nuclear weapons, it has no intention of forsaking its ``inalienable''
right to a full fuel cycle.
Khamenei's vision of an ideal Iran is a country that is
scientifically and technologically advanced enough to be self-
sufficient, self-sufficient enough to be economically independent, and
economically independent enough to be politically independent. In this
context, he believes that the United States is not opposed to Iran's
nuclear ambitions because of the proliferation threat, but rather
because of the potential independence and economic leverage that Iran
would derive from it: ``[The United States] does not want an Islamic
and independent country to achieve scientific progress and possess
advanced technology in the Middle East region, a region which possesses
most of the world's oil and which is one of the most sensitive regions
in the world. They are worried about anything that can help the
regional nations to achieve independence, self-reliance and self-
sufficiency . . . They want Iran's energy to be always dependent on
oil, since oil is vulnerable to the policies of world powers. They aim
to control other nations with invisible ropes.''
Despite U.N. Security Council resolutions, heightened sanctions,
and military threats from the United States, Tehran's approach to the
nuclear issue has remained defiant. According to Khamenei, this is a
concerted strategy: ``Rights cannot be achieved by entreating. If you
supplicate, withdraw and show flexibility, arrogant powers will make
their threat more serious.''
For the last several years, soaring oil prices and an
internationally unpopular Bush administration, together with U.S.
difficulties and Iranian leverage in Iraq, have bolstered Iran's
nuclear position. It remains to be seen how the contraction of oil
prices, changed dynamics in Iraq, the global economic recession, and a
diplomatic approach by the Obama administration may alter Iran's
nuclear calculations.
The nuclear issue and popular opinion
As previously mentioned, Iran enjoys no open, honest debate about
the nuclear issue. State-controlled media outlets--still the number one
source of information for most Iranians--have been warned not to veer
outside the framework of government-mandated talking points. The
country's ruling elites have made a tremendous effort to appeal to
Iranians' keen sense of nationalism, pointing out Western double
standards, extolling the virtues of nuclear energy, and praising the
country's scientists. Despite all of this, however, popular opinion
regarding the nuclear issue is more nuanced than what the Iranian
Government would like the world to believe.
Certainly many Iranians, even those unsympathetic to the regime,
support their country's nuclear ambitions for a variety of reasons:
National pride; the belief that Iran needs to prepare for life after
oil; the resentment of Western double standards which permit India,
Pakistan, and Israel to have nuclear programs; and the perception that
because Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, it needs not only a
nuclear energy program but also a nuclear weapon.
What's questionable is how deep, informed, and widespread Iranian
popular support for the nuclear program is. As the former Economist
correspondent in Tehran best put it: ``It would be quite remarkable if
a populace increasingly disengaged from politics were suddenly
energized by something as arcane as nuclear fuel and its byproducts . .
. For most Iranians, the price of food and the government's failure to
lower it are more important [than the nuclear program].''
Some among Iran's political elite have conceded that nuclear pride
has been manufactured by the government. In the words of Mohammed
Atrianfar, a close adviser to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani:
``People have been hearing these things about having the right to have
or to possess this [nuclear] capability. And, naturally, if you ask an
Iranian whether [they] want this right or not, they would say they do
want it. But if you ask, though, `What is nuclear energy?' they might
not be able to tell you what it is.''
After suffering 500,000 casualties in the horrendous war with
Saddam Hussein's Iraq, few Iranians romanticize the idea of conflict or
militarization. In a strikingly candid opinion piece in the Financial
Times, former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Abbas Maleki, dismissed
the notion that the nuclear program is driven by popular demand:
``Reports suggest that Tehran's official joy over the nuclear
breakthrough is shared by a large segment of Iranian society. Such
reports should not be taken as evidence that the Iranian people share
their government's views, and should not be used as a pretext for using
force against Iran's population . . . The general public does not
consider the nuclear issue to be of vital importance. Nuclear
technology will do little for the average Iranian; it cannot create
more jobs for a country that needs 1 million jobs annually, it cannot
change the chronic low efficiency, productivity, and effectiveness of
the economy and management, and it will do nothing to improve Iran's
commercial ties with the rest of the world.''
Public opinion is clearly an important component of Tehran's
nuclear strategy, and the government is capable of mobilizing large
crowds in order to project an appearance of national unity. Up until
now, popular opposition to the government's nuclear posture has been
negligible. This will likely remain the case as long as Iranians
continue to perceive corruption and mismanagement--not an isolation-
inducing foreign policy--to be the primary cause of domestic economic
malaise. If and when domestic economic conditions deteriorate to such a
degree that has a drastic impact on people's daily lives, however,
Ayatollah Khamenei may well decide to change course. When push comes to
shove the paramount concern of the country's theocratic elite is the
regime's survival, not its ideology.
II. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
While the primary focus of today's hearings is Iran's nuclear
ambitions, it is important to understand that the nuclear issue is a
symptom of the deep mistrust between Washington and Tehran, not the
underlying cause of tension. Given that neither side trusts the other's
intentions, there are no technical solutions to this nuclear dispute,
only political ones. If a resolution is to be found, it will require a
broader diplomatic accommodation between Washington and Tehran, whereby
the United States reaches a modus vivendi with Iran, and Tehran ceases
its hostile approach toward Israel.
Before any substantive discussions or negotiations take place, an
initial meeting--held in private--simply reacquainting the U.S.
Government with the Iranian Government is in order. Washington should
make it clear to Tehran that the United States is genuinely interested
in establishing a new tone and context for the relationship. To
increase the likelihood of success in engaging with Iran, the Obama
administration should adhere to seven prescriptions in framing a
process of engagement. I briefly examine each, below.
1. Build confidence on issues of common interest
Once serious discussions commence, building confidence with Iran
will be easier if efforts initially concentrate on areas of shared
interest, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than those of little or
no common interest, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
nuclear issue. Constructive discussions in Kabul and Baghdad could have
a positive spillover on the nuclear dispute. If Iran's nuclear
ambitions do indeed reflect a sense of insecurity vis-a-vis the United
States, building cooperation and goodwill in Iraq and Afghanistan could
help to allay Tehran's threat perception and compel its leaders to
reassess their nuclear approach.
2. Focus on Khamenei, not Ahmadinejad
Successful engagement with Iran will require a direct channel of
communication with the Supreme Leader's office, such as former-Foreign
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, one of Khamenei's chief foreign policy
advisers. Khamenei must be convinced that Washington is prepared to
recognize the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and must be disabused
of his conviction that U.S. policy aims to bring about regime change,
not negotiate behavior change. He will never agree to any arrangement
in which Iran is expected to publicly retreat or admit defeat; nor can
he be forced to compromise through pressure alone. Besides the issue of
saving face, he believes deeply that compromise in the face of pressure
is counterproductive, because it projects weakness and only encourages
greater pressure.
After three decades of being immersed in a ``death to America''
culture, it may not be possible for Khamenei to reorient himself. But
if there's one thing that is tried and true, it's that an engagement
approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei
is guaranteed to fail.
3. Begin cautiously
Notwithstanding private, introductory discussions, as well as
ambassadorial-level meetings in Kabul and Baghdad, we should refrain
from making any grand overtures to Tehran that could redeem Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's leadership style and increase his popularity ahead of the
country's June 2009 Presidential elections. Since assuming office in
August 2005, Ahmadinejad has used his influence to amplify
objectionable Iranian foreign practices while curtailing domestic
political and social freedoms and flagrantly disregarding human rights;
his continued presence could serve as an insurmountable obstacle to
confidence building with the United States.
Though they are not totally free or fair, Iranian elections are
notoriously unpredictable. Just as Ahmadinejad's 2005 election shocked
seasoned observers, given his considerable mismanagement of the
economy, his defeat in 2009 is certainly a possibility. As such, it is
better for Washington to begin cautiously until Iran's domestic
situation becomes clearer.
Such an approach should not, and need not, be interpreted by Tehran
as a U.S. effort to ``game'' Iran's Presidential elections. To be
clear, Washington should refrain from commenting on the Iranian
campaign, and should certainly refrain from expressing a preference for
any particular candidate.
4. Speak softly
While threatening violence against Iran has become a way for U.S.
politicians to appear tough on national security, such rhetoric has
empowered Tehran's hard-liners and enhanced Iran's stature on the
streets of Cairo, Ramallah, and Jakarta as the Muslim world's only
brave, anti-imperialist nation that speaks truth to power.
Additionally, when oil prices jump with each threat against Iran,
Iran's nuclear program and its financial patronage of Hezbollah and
Hamas become more affordable.
While the Iranian Government is certainly complicit in engaging in
bellicose rhetoric, the United States should not take its behavioral
cues from an insecure, repressive, and undemocratic regime. Instead of
reciprocating threats and name calling, the Obama administration should
project the dignity and poise of a superpower. A hostile rhetorical
line allows Iran's leadership to paint the United States as an
aggressor--both internationally and domestically.
5. Don't let the spoilers set the tenor
Small but powerful cliques--both within Iran and among Iran's Arab
allies--have entrenched economic and political interests in preventing
United States-Iranian reconciliation. Within Iran these actors--
including powerful septuagenarian clergymen and nouveau riche
Revolutionary Guardsmen--recognize that improved ties with Washington
would induce political and economic reforms and competition and
undermine the quasi-monopolies they enjoy in isolation. Among Iran's
Arab allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, the prospect of United States-
Iranian accommodation could mean an end to their primary source of
funding.
For this reason, when and if a serious dialogue commences, the
spoilers will likely attempt to torpedo it. Their tactics will vary.
They may commit gratuitous human rights abuses (such as the recent
imprisonment of my friend Roxana Saberi, an Iranian-American
journalist), issue belligerent rhetoric, or target U.S. soldiers and
interests in Iraq or Afghanistan. Though staying the course in tough
diplomacy with Iran will require heavy expenditures of both personal
leadership and political capital, if Washington pulls back from
confidence-building with Tehran in retaliation for an egregious act
committed by the spoilers, they will have achieved their goal.
6. Maintain an international approach
Tehran is highly adept at identifying and exploiting rifts in the
international community, and diplomatic efforts to check Iran's nuclear
ambitions will unravel if key countries approach Iran with competing
redlines. A common approach by the European Union and the United States
is absolutely imperative.
Uniting China and Russia behind the U.S. position will prove more
difficult given divergent national interests, though Moscow certainly
has an interest in avoiding a nuclear-armed Iran within missile range.
A more robust U.S. effort at direct dialogue with Tehran will send the
signal to Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing that Washington is serious
about reaching a diplomatic resolution to this dispute, which should
strengthen the health of the coalition.
7. Be Discreet
When it comes to United States-Iranian interaction, the record
shows that ``secret'' or ``private'' discussions out of public earshot
have a greater success rate. Building confidence in the public realm
will be difficult, as politicians on both sides will likely feel the
need to use harsh rhetoric to maintain appearances. Moreover, the
likelihood that spoilers can torpedo the process either through words
or actions is more limited if they do not know what is going on.
Recognizing that its regional influence derives in large measure
from its defiance of the United States, Iran would likely prefer not to
publicly advertise its discussions with the United States unless or
until real progress has been made. Discreet discussions are also a more
effective forum for Washington to raise concerns over Iranian human
rights abuses, as public criticism has done little to improve Iran'
record over the last three decades.
III. WHAT'S REALISTIC?
Given three decades of compounded mistrust and ill will, the
results of any process of United States-Iran engagement will not be
quick, and antagonism will not melt away after one, two, or perhaps
even many meetings. While the initial pace will likely be painfully
slow--as each side assesses whether the other truly has good
intentions--no realistic alternative would serve U.S. national security
imperatives on issues ranging from Iraq, Afghanistan, nuclear
proliferation, energy security, and terrorism.
Mindful of the potentially enormous implications that a changed
relationship with Washington would have for the Islamic Republic's
future, however, there are a variety of reasons why even a sincere,
sustained U.S. attempt at dialogue may not initially bear fruit:
Historically, the Islamic Republic has tended to make
difficult decisions only under duress. Iran's overconfident
hard-liners may not currently feel compelled to make any
compromises;
Paralyzed by the competing ambitions of various factions and
institutions, the Islamic Republic may prove incapable of
reaching an internal consensus, falling back on long-entrenched
policies;
If it remains unconvinced of U.S. intentions, the Iranian
regime may shun increased ties with Washington, believing the
overture to be a Trojan horse for a counterrevolution;
Fearful of the unpredictable domestic change which an
opening with the United States might catalyze, Iran's
leadership may well perceive reconciliation with Washington as
an existential threat.
None of these, however, are arguments against engagement. On the
contrary, an outright rejection of a U.S. overture would prove costly
for Iran's leadership. Behind the scenes, a sizable portion of the
country's political and military elite recognizes that the ``death to
America'' culture of 1979 is obsolete today. Together with Iran's
disillusioned population, they know the country will never be able to
fulfill its enormous potential as long as its relationship with the
United States remains adversarial.
During the Bush administration, many Iranians came to believe it
was the United States, not Iran, which opposed an improvement in
relations. When and if it becomes evident that a small clique of hard-
liners in Tehran is the chief impediment, internal political and
popular opposition could build and potentially large, unpredictable
cleavages could be created within the Iranian political system. In
essence, the Obama administration may well face the unique challenge of
simultaneously creating unity in the United States and divisions in
Iran.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Sadjadpour. It was
very interesting testimony. I know there'll be considerable
followup.
Ambassador Wisner, I should introduce you, probably, as
Ambassador to Everywhere. [Laughter.]
You've had about as many ambassadorships as anybody I know.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. WISNER II, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
ZAMBIA, EGYPT, THE PHILIPPINES, AND INDIA, NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Wisner. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, gentlemen,
I'm, as my colleagues on the dais are here today, extremely
pleased to return to the committee and have a chance to engage
with you on this extraordinarily important subject.
Like my colleagues, I, too, will enter my written testimony
for the record and give you, instead, a brief summary of the
principal points I made, and address, in addition, the nuclear
issue and its effect on the region and the international
community, the principal focus of your hearing.
I'm going to start, however, roughly in the same direction
that Karim Sadjadpour just undertook to provide a political
context, for if we do not figure out exactly where we are and
where we're headed, then engaging on the nuclear question is a
much more complicated exercise.
So, first, let me open with a core contention. Senator
Kerry, it matches your opening remarks. And that is, Iran is
important, Iran is dangerous, Iran is urgent, and we have no
choice but to deal with Iran, despite the negatives, for Iran
is vitally important to the region, it touches on every issue
that we face in the Middle East, and every interest of every
one of our friends and allies. In short, if we're to make any
progress with the questions we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, over
the nuclear question, energy issues, Israel, Palestine, we have
to be able to take Iran into account and deal with it.
I reached that conclusion over a decade ago, when I was
sent to deal with the Russians on the question of nuclear
technology flight to Iran. I haven't budged for a moment since.
Engaging Iran diplomatically--not just plain talking, but
engaging and finding grounds for negotiations--is a political
imperative.
The second point I would make is similar, as well, to my
colleagues', and that is, I do not believe in a military
option. I have grave questions about its utility in the nuclear
case, and, I believe, in all the other issues that we would
face--we face with Iran, there is no room for a military
response. In fact, the opposite is true. The engagement on the
military--on a military option with Iran would set us back, not
only with Iran and our ability to make progress on the many
issues with which we need traction, but beyond Iran, throughout
the Muslim world.
My third point is that I am a relative optimist about the
possibility of political engagement with Iran, including on the
nuclear issue. I don't limit my remarks to my sense of the
situation to recent signals received from the leadership in
Tehran or other Iranian diplomatic representatives, nor do I
limit myself to the generally favorable reaction our new
President has had when he--after his advent in his White House,
throughout the region.
I look more closely at the enormous vulnerabilities that
Iran has today: Her political isolation, the weakness of her
economy, her internal political divisions. But, I look further
than that, at the long traditions of Iranian statecraft, which
are based on realism, a sense that Iran has got to survive in a
very difficult world, and that Iran is a nation that must
manage its national security, and that is its overwhelming
imperative.
It's those issues, the issues of national survival, that
are first and foremost on Iran's mind. And that gives me some
hope that we can get traction if we choose to engage, and
engage fully. But, I won't pretend, for a moment, that dealing
with the Iranians will not be extremely tough. There will be
many setbacks, many deceptions. Iran is a tough adversary
across any negotiating table.
My fifth point is that I personally welcome, as I'm certain
all of us do, the appointment of a new special representative
to take a hard look at Iran and our foreign policy, Dennis
Ross, a man with great experience in the region, an expert in
the field of statecraft. And I can only wish him well.
But, as we approach the question of engagement with Iran, I
think there are some questions we've got to keep in mind, so
let me add a few thoughts to the list my colleagues have
already outlined.
I believe that you cannot pick and choose issues with the
Iranians. And I include the nuclear issue. If you try to take
one issue out of the cherry pie, you will not succeed in
addressing it. We must have a global approach to the questions
we deal with Iran. All are related to Iranian perceptions of
national dignity and national security.
Second, I believe that it is vitally important to get the
political context right, at the top. If you don't have the
Ayatollah, the Supreme Leader, engaged with the President of
the United States, an agreement on what constitutes the terrain
of engagement, you won't be able to engage on any single issue,
including the nuclear issue.
In short--and I cite it in my testimony the example of
President Nixon and Chairman Mao--if you don't have an
understanding, at the top, of what constitutes an acceptable
political engagement, you cannot pick apart the issues and be
able to sustain a negotiation.
The third point I'd make is, it's a long ways from here to
where we need to end up with Iran. The outcome, at the end of
the day, is full restoration of diplomatic relations, but there
are many steps along that way. They could start, literally,
very shortly, Senator Kerry, with our diplomats being able to
speak to Iranians around the world. That's now not possible. It
can go beyond, to very careful reconsideration of the
commitments we made in Algiers in 1981, not to interfere in
Iran's internal affairs. We could deal with the dangers we face
every day in the gulf, where our Navy and Iranian ships come
uncomfortably close to one another, air flights between the
United States, Iran, cooperation on mutual issues, like
narcotics, diplomatic travel--all--all, in my judgment, ways on
a way station to build both confidence and create an
environment in which we can deal with the tough questions,
including the nuclear one.
I further advise great caution in coming close to any
question related to Iranian domestic politics. I do not believe
our pretensions to regime change have done anything but set the
prospect of diplomacy back and created enormous complexities.
It shows us, in fact, doubling back on our own word that we
struck in 1981.
But, I don't recommend we make any apologies, either. We
don't need to apologize for our past history, and Iran has
every reason to stay in the bounds of propriety in speaking
about us.
We need not try to figure out who's going to be on top in
Iran. Our job is to deal with Iran as a nation. It is not a
problem, or a cluster of problems, a nation, a country with
major regional influence, a nation with which the United States
must come to terms.
I, finally, believe that it is vitally important we broaden
our diplomacy. If we engage Iran, we can't do it alone. We've
got to be prepared to sit down and do business with Syria, with
the Palestinians, with the range of interests we face elsewhere
in the Middle East. We also have to take into account the
extraordinary sensitivities of those we are close to in the
region, the Sunni Arabs, Israel, that rightly feels disobliged
by the threats that Iran has sent, our European allies, the
Russians, the Chinese, Japan. Their interests, in each case,
are at play. There is no way we can proceed in any engagement
with Iran without great transparency, without making it clear
where we're headed and how we're going to go about it. Tactics
are a different matter. We can engage in timing and in our
meetings on grounds of secrecy, but strategic transparency is
vital.
So, let me turn, then, with a couple of thoughts on the
nuclear question. I warn, however, in addressing it, not to
look at it in isolation, for it is not one issue between the
United States and Iran, but part of the whole, and has to be
dealt with in a context. But, it is so vitally important.
However old and however longstanding the Iranian program is--
and yes, it goes back to the time of the Shah--and however worn
the Iranian arguments of legality, the Iranian nuclear
pretensions are inherently destabilizing. There is so little
trust between Iran and ourselves and the region that one can
look at it in no other way.
No nation in the region is unaffected by what Iran has
attempted to do with its nuclear capability. And as we think
about the NPT regime, a breakout by Iran is truly worrying. As
Henry Kissinger is wont to argue, if you think of Russia in the
old days, and the United States, and then China, Russia, and
the United States, and then Europeans, and now India and
Pakistan, how many miscalculations each time you increase the
circle of nuclear weapons-holders can we face without a severe
nuclear problem occurring?
So, I would prefer, like everyone, not to have a nuclear
Iran, but I also believe, as we approach it and try to contain
the Iranian issue, we must not break ranks with the Europeans
or our Security Council partners, the Russians and the Chinese.
Getting together and having common points are going to--is
going to be very tough, and it will, by necessity, mean we'll
have to water down the lines we use.
Sanctions, of course, have their place. Trade controls,
financial controls set a standard of concern about how we see
the nuclear issue. But, I think, like each one of you, I sense
we need a new approach, a different way of looking at the
issue. We need to be talking to the Iranians, more than the
one-off appearance of Bill Burns under the previous
administration. We need to be sustained. We have to deal with
the Iranians within the strategic situation that they face.
And that means we're going to have to manage our
relationships with our friends in the region very carefully,
including defensive measures. We have to think about enhancing
antimissile systems among our Arab friends. We have to think of
security guarantees. We're going to even have to think about
ways--special ways we can deal with Israel's well-founded
concerns.
But, in the end, I've come, in my own mind, to a question
that troubles me, but has to be on the table, and that is Iran,
for reasons of its own, both reasons of pride and national
security, is determined to produce a nuclear weapons
capability, and it is not going to be dissuaded in any easy
manner.
I, therefore, have come to believe that the line of
argument Ambassador Luers and Ambassador Pickering advanced in
the New York Review of Books several weeks ago, of arguing that
we, in the end, have to accept a degree of Iranian uranium
enrichment inside of Iran, under international ownership and
supervision, intense IAEA scrutiny, is a line of approach that
is worth pursuing.
Finally, gentlemen, let me close by noting that I believe
it's not only the nuclear issue that drives us to conclude to
engage with Iran. We've put off the question of dealing with
Iran for much too long, and the stakes have gone up. The
miscalculations that could occur, the possibility of violent
confrontation, and the opportunities lost by not engaging, the
costs are simply too high.
We need a political engagement, and we need one that keeps
the international community alive to the fact that the United
States is capable of conducting diplomacy.
And search--search, as Iranians are beginning to hint these
days, for common ground. Don't know if we'll find it.
We won't get there easily, but we have to try.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wisner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank G. Wisner, Former U.S. Ambassador to
Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines, and India, New York, NY
No issue on our national security agenda is more urgent nor more
fraught with danger than the United States deeply troubled and
potentially violent relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The crisis between the United States and Iran is longstanding. For
better than the past quarter century, we and the Islamic Republic have
been at odds. From the early days of the Iranian revolution, that
government's assertion of a radical Islamic identity and its
determination to reassert. Iran's national standing and influence have
given the United States, Iran's neighbors, and many others around the
world cause for grave concern.
In recent years, Iran's actions, and its position on questions
which go to the heart of the stability of the Middle East, have
continued to stoke suspicions and tensions. Since 2005, Iran's decision
to proceed with a nuclear enrichment program has been of special
concern to the United States and the international community. Iran has
been largely deaf to entrities from the Security Council and
governments around the world. Iran is endowed today with 5,000
centrifuges and is moving toward the capability to produce nuclear
weapons. It has failed to satisfy world opinion that its nuclear
intentions are benign.
Iran's espousal of Hezbollah and Hamas is a direct threat to
Israel's security; the atmosphere between Israel and Iran has been
further embittered by the Islamic Republic's questioning of Israel's
right to exist and its President's denial of the Holocaust. All of us
recall how close the region came to all out warfare as a result of the
summer war in Lebanon. Iran's ties to Hezbollah and Syria played an
important part. In a word, Iran and Israel stand virtually with daggers
drawn.
The United States stands today. in dangerous proximity to Iran. Our
ships sail near Iran's coast and incidents on the high seas between the
two of us are always a possibility. Given tensions in the gulf,
conflict resulting from an incident could spread rapidly and endanger
international shipping and especially the export of the region's
hydrocarbons. Our soldiers are stationed on Iran's borders in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Iranians have often been associated with actions which
endanger American forces. The airwaves are filled with charges and
countercharges of subversion and interference. In a word, we are too
close to one another for comfort, especially since there are no
adequate mechanisms for managing misunderstandings and incidents.
At the same time, we have come to realize that without Iran there
is no way to address the most important issues the United States faces
in the Middle East. As the region's largest state, Iran plays a key
role in Iraq, Afghanistan, in regional energy markets, in the security
of the gulf, in the question of nonproliferation and in the
confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians. Iran's relationship
with the Palestinians, Shiite communities in the Middle East, with
Syria and its reach into the Arab nations of the gulf make Iran a truly
important force in virtually every state and every issue in the Middle
East. In fact, the questions which join the United States and the
Islamic Republic of Iran are so broad and so interconnected that
addressing them singly is not possible.
At the same time, I am convinced that the use of force will not
solve any of the issues in contention between the United States and the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Specifically, I believe that military strikes
against Iran's nuclear facilities would be the height of folly. I am
unpersuaded a military strike would be decisive and the damage to our
interests in Iraq, Afghanistan and the gulf would be huge. The effect
on United States standing in the Muslim world would be massive, wiping
out the goodwill our new administration has generated. Our ability to
deal across the board with Iran would be fatally compromised.
I arrive at these conclusions, having followed closely the
situation in Iran and the history of our ties to Iran, since the fall
of the Shah. I was never privileged to serve in Iran during my 37 years
as a diplomat and representative of the United States. But I lived and
worked in the Middle East and I was persuaded throughout my career than
Iran was central to the calculation of our interests in the region.
How important Iran is to the United States came home directly to me
in 1997 when I was asked to discuss with the Russian Government the
flow of missile technology from the Russian Federation to Iran. It
became clear to me that there was no way to stop Iran from seeking
missile technology unless we could address Iranian national security
concerns and this would have meant dealing directly with the Iranian
Government. Talking with Russia alone was not sufficient and threats
and sanctions did not and could not contain Iran's determination to arm
itself and deter the threats it believed it faced.
In meeting with your committee today, I do not bring to the table
privileged information, based on official intelligence. My sources are
different. I have met frequently with Iranians, including members of
the Iranian Government over the past 10 years. I have followed the
literature and worked with institutions like the UNA-USA, the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Asia Society which have organized
exchanges with Iranian officials and private citizens. The views I
express at this hearing are entirely my own.
In the course of my remarks, I will make a case for engagement with
the Islamic Republic of Iran. I will outline points we should consider
in the weeks and months ahead as the United States shapes its
diplomacy. As difficult as our recent history with Iran has been, I
believe we and Iran are fated to engage one another and that engagement
will begin in the next year or so. I am an optimist, even though I
recognize we and Iran have been estranged, frequently bitterly so.
Unlike other crises in which nations and peoples are divided on grounds
of principle, faith, or ethnicity or assert overlapping claims to
territory, our differences with Iran are largely political and can be
addressed and resolved by political leaders.
In this regard, I welcome the decision of Secretary Clinton to
appoint Dennis Ross as her adviser for West Asia. Mr. Ross will bring
to his duties and the question of Iran, years of experience in the
region. He is a man of deep intellect, an accomplished diplomat and one
of the leading experts of his generation on the practice of foreign
policy and statecraft.
A WORD OF BACKGROUND
Many have argued in recent years that Iran has an upper hand when
it comes to dealing with the United States in the Middle East. Iranians
know we are bogged down in difficult conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Those who hold this view further argue that by destroying Saddam and
ejecting the Taliban from Afghanistan, we have strengthened Iran
immeasurably. Their argument runs that we have failed to force Iran to
abandon its nuclear ambitions and our failure to move Iran has
emboldened Iran's leaders to defy the United States. The ground is not
favorable, therefore, to diplomatic engagement, they assert.
I do not agree with this contention. In fact, I believe we and the
Iranians approach each other with a mutual sense of vulnerability. No
nation is more sensitive to its weaknesses than is Iran. Iran knows
that it is isolated in its region and many of its neighbors are
hostile. Internationally, Iran enjoys very little support. Iran's
religious expression, Shiite Islam, is a minority faith and it survives
in the Muslim world more by sufferance and accommodation than
confrontation.
Iranians know their economy is weak and the current downturn in
petroleum prices has left Iran vulnerable. GDP has shrunk; deficits
have ballooned; unemployment runs high and inflation is rampant.
Iranian politics are deeply contentious. While few Iranians contest the
legitimacy of their Islamic Republic, many have doubts about their
cleric's ability to lead a modern nation-state.
All Iranians recognize Iran's body politic is riven with factions.
In addition, Iranians look at their history with pessimism. For the
past 200 years, they believe Iran has been a victim of foreign
interference; Iran, they feel, has been humiliated. Iranians also know
they would pay a terrible price if the Islamic Republic and the United
States were ever to go to war. The memories of Iran's huge losses on
the battlefields with Iraq are painfully fresh in Iranian minds.
As we set out to engage Iran, it is essential to keep a core
thought in mind: Iranians will not be humiliated. But Iranians are also
realists. Iran is not only a great nation, borne of an ancient
civilization; it is a proud one. Although Iranians espouse their
religious faith with passion, I believe their leaders have long set
aside pretentions to champion a Shiite revolutionary ideology. Of
course, the majority of Iranians care about the fate of their
coreligionists but they are more intent in seeing their nation
recognized for its many accomplishments. They believe that they live in
a hostile world and they must be able to defend themselves or deter
their opponents. Iran wants its influence in the region restored in
large part because a strong and respected Iran will be a secure Iran.
Part of the reason for the hold of the Islamic Republic over Iranian
opinion has been its ability to identify itself with the cause of
Iranian national security and Iranian national dignity.
At the same time, Iran recognizes facts and among those facts is
the United States. Whatever language they choose in public, Iran's
leaders know that the United States is a power in the Middle East and
that Iran and the United States must, one day, come to terms with one
another. In recent weeks, spokesmen for the Islamic Republic have begun
to say it is in Iran's interest that her government and the United
States look for common ground and seek to manage disagreements. This
disposition reinforces my view that there is promise in engaging Iran
and moving soon to find a basis for pursuing diplomacy. Bluntly put,
Iran has reacted well to the advent of the Obama administration.
But I argue that we must be realistic and cautious. There will be
no rapid breakthroughs with Iran. Reaching understandings will take
years and will be plagued with setbacks. Statecraft, as defined by
Iranians, places great store on careful calculation and caution. It
also recognizes the imperatives of power. No Iranian will approach a
negotiation if he believes that he is playing a weak hand. In addition,
the history of our relationship is such that Iran's leaders will not
take us at our word anymore than we will take Iran's word at face
value. Iran's leaders hold deeply to the view that the United States is
committed to ``regime change.'' That attitude runs as deep in Iran as
do our suspicions of Iran's nuclear ambitions. There is little
confidence between the United States and Iran. Overcoming the divide
will not occur easily nor quickly; neither can force the other to
accept its point of view. Neither we nor Iran will accept promises;
both of us will require facts.
HOW TO PROCEED
In the proceeding paragraphs, I have attempted to set the stage for
the conduct of diplomaty. Engagement with Iran, as with any power, is a
means to an end--not an end in itself. We have to be clear about what
we want to achieve before we engage our diplomacy and, for the moment,
our objectives have not been defined. I hope that the deliberations of
this committee will contribute to a definition of objectives. As a
contribution to your debate, let me advance the following thoughts.
Be prepared to address all issues. A diplomatic engagement
with Iran will fail if we attempt to ``cherry pick'' the
issues. The problems we and Iran face are numerous and they are
interconnected. The Iranian side attaches special importance to
national security and national honor. We and Iran cannot
address Iraq without considering the gulf; it is not possible
to deal with the nuclear question without coming to grips with
Iran's conception of its security environment: In addition, the
past quarter century is littered with cases of single issue
engagements with Iran. Each time we and Iran have tried to
close on one problem, we have found that its resolution led to
a dead-end and did not contribute to the resolution of other
issues. The reason is simple--we and Iran have not agreed on a
political context.
Top down; not bottom up. The only way to engage Iran is to
begin with a political understanding between our leaders. That
understanding must be based on a mutual recognition that the
United States has legitimate interests in the Middle East and
that Iran is a regional power with its own national interests.
``Live and let live'' is key to a political understanding with
Iran. We must set aside pretensions to regime change. We and
Iran can operate on the basis of different principals and still
respect one another. Debates over human rights and democracy,
for example, can take place without either side questioning the
other's legitimacy. If we need an example of ``top down''
diplomacy, we have only to look at President Nixon's and
Chairman Mao's decision to engage. Once the two leaders had
reached a basic understanding of the principals which would
guide relations between our two countries, our diplomats were
able to address the specific questions which divided us. That
example should be instructive in the case of Iran. To launch
successful diplomacy our President and Iran's Supreme Leader
must ``shake hands'' and, in doing so, create a political
context for our engagement.
Building confidence. Engaging Iran will require constant
attention to the issue of confidence. We do not trust each
other; we will only deal with facts. This said, words matter.
Removing regime change from our vocabulary and our legislation
is a good signal; the Iranians should drop offensive language
they use in our regard. We should return to the principle we
negotiated in Algiers in 1981 when we agreed that the United
States would not interfere in Iran's internal affairs. In the
Algiers Accord, we also agreed to address questions which
divided us. Financial claims are an example but one could add
to it direct air flights, restrictions on diplomatic travel,
counternarcotics cooperation and confidence-building contacts
between naval forces in the gulf. Reviving the Algiers Accord
would also provide for expanded cultural, educational, and
scientific exchanges. As we proceed in our engagement with
Iran, there will be reason to establish an interests section.
At the end of the day, diplomatic relations must be restored.
In the immediate future, we should drop restrictions on
contacts between American diplomats and representatives of the
Islamic Republic.
Avoid domestic politics. Some argue that the United States
should not seek to negotiate with Iran before it holds its
Presidential election. I disagree. Putting the question in
these terms implies that we have favorites in Iran's political
race. Our interests lie in dealing with the government and
nation of Iran; Iranians will pick their leaders. I recommend
that we begin without delay to design a policy of engagement
with Iran and explain it to our friends and allies; that we
send the appropriate signals and make the necessary contacts to
begin talking without regard to the timing of the Iranian
Presidential contest. In all likelihood, by the time needed to
prepare our diplomacy, Iran's election and the runoff will have
taken place.
Setting objectives. As a matter of priority, we need to
decide how to approach the nuclear issue, Iraq and.
Afghanistan. With regard to nuclear enrichment a fresh
examination of our objective is in order. It is not possible to
eliminate Iran's program: Since 2005 we have made no progress
in convincing Iran to give up its program. Unilateral and
multilateral sanctions have been painful to Iran but
insufficient to force a change of policy. Instead, Iran every
day moves closer to developing a nuclear weapons capability.
Trying to force Iran to forgo enrichment is, to my way of
thinking, a losing proposition and we are not likely to secure
strong international support. Neither Russia nor China have
their hearts in further sanctions.
Iran attaches great importance to its nuclear program for
reasons of national prestige, economics, and national security.
If it is nothing else, the program is highly popular. If we are
to stop Iran from crossing the weapons threshold, we have to
move quickly. I am persuaded by the arguments advanced recently
in the New York Review of Books by former Ambassadors Luers and
Pickering and Jim Walsh that we should attempt to convince Iran
to accept the international supervision and ownership of
nuclear enrichment facilities, even if they are located on
Iranian soil. The way to start would be an agreement to suspend
sanctions on our part and a suspension of enrichment on Iran's
part.
Similarly in Iraq and Afghanistan, we need to advance Iran's
interest in stability along its borders. Iran wants the al-
Maliki regime in Iraq to succeed but it recognizes the need for
reconciliation among Iraq's ethnic and religious groups. In
Afghanistan, a return of the Taliban to Kabul is inimical to
Iranian interests, a disposition we can harness to our
advantage. In fact, Tehran today is sending signals it wishes
to discuss Afghanistan. For openers, we must make it clear the
United States seeks no permanent base for its forces in either
country.
Involving other nations. A negotiation with the Islamic
Republic is not simply about the United States and Iran. The
interests of Israel, the Sunni Arabs, our European allies and
Russia and China are in play. It is essential that we explain
carefully to them what we intend to achieve with Iran and how
we intend to go about it before we engage the Iranians. If we
fail to make ourselves clear, we will lose the important
international support we require to conduct a sustainable
relationship with Iran as well as sustain confidence in
cooperation with the United States as we pursue other regional
and international goals. In a word, we must never allow Israel
nor the neighboring Arab States to believe we are prepared to
negotiate with Iran behind their backs.
Americans have put off decisions about Iran for too long. But the
stakes have gone up sharply in recent years and the risks of
miscalculation and therefore violence are too great. We have learned
that sanctions and threats will not move Iran nor will we be able to
carry the international community if our policies do not provide for
political engagement with Iran. Most of all, the past quarter century
should have taught us that we cannot impose our will on Iran. We can
only work to find common ground based on a mutuality of respect and
interests. I hope that these hearings will contribute to an early and
sustained engagement with Iran. Only then will we know if that common
ground exists.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Haass.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS, PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Haass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for inviting me before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
today. I realize, 35 years ago, it was here that I had my first
job beyond the corner drugstore and Baskin-Robbins. So, it's
good to be back.
The Chairman. Welcome back. We've still got a few openings.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Haass. What I thought I'd focus on in my oral
remarks is the prescriptive side of what we're talking about
today, in part because it would be so hard to do better than
what we've heard analytically.
I agree: The United States should offer to talk with the
Government of Iran, not as a reward, but simply as a
recognition that ignoring it has not weakened or isolated Iran.
To put it bluntly, regime change is a wish, not a strategy, and
we need to have a strategy.
In doing that, the United States should resist setting
preconditions on negotiations over Iran's nuclear program or
other troubling aspects of its foreign or domestic policy. What
matters most in a negotiation is not where you begin, but where
you come out, and we should not lose sight of that.
We should also--and I think here I'm seconding my good
friend Frank Wisner--resist Iranian calls for preconditions or
for apologies by the United States. The focus of any
negotiation should be the present and future. And if the
Iranians insist on apologies by the United States, I would
simply take it as a sign they are not serious.
It's true that we should have a comprehensive agenda, but
among the things we should be resisting, I would suggest, is
linkage. We should be open to making progress where we can. To
put it another way, we don't have to have progress everywhere
in order to have progress anywhere. It may well be that Iraq
and Afghanistan are two places the United States and Iran can
realize some accommodation, despite the fact that we may well
be unable to in the nuclear realm or vis-a-vis, say, Hamas. My
own experience,
by the way when President Bush put me in charge of coordinating
our policy toward Afghanistan after 9/11, was that the United
States and Iran could make some progress working together in
that country.
As others have said, and I echo it, United States policy
needs to be multilateral, with the IAEA, the other major
powers, and Iran's neighbors; there's no serious unilateral
option for the United States. And the goal should be to get
international agreement on what we want from Iran and what we
are prepared to do for Iran, but also on what we are prepared
to do to Iran if we can't get that agreement.
There's probably a division of labor between what happens
bilaterally between the United States and Iran if such talks
are undertaken, and what happens multilaterally. And I would
simply say that it then becomes important that the United
States makes sure the various tracks are coordinated. It's a
similar challenge that the United States faces with the North
Korean negotiations. It ought not to be insuperable.
Russia will be a particularly important element of any
talks. It ought to be a priority of the United States to gain
Russian cooperation on Iran. And, as has been reported, and I
support this, the United States should be willing to set aside
its plans for missile deployments in Central Europe and Eastern
Europe if we can gain Russian support for our Iran policy.
Foreign policy by the United States needs to be about
priorities. And to put it bluntly, the Iran issue is a priority
for us.
I would be wary of a containment policy of Iran in the
region. It could simply, I believe, reinforce tensions between
Shias and Sunnis within countries, which would not be in our
interest. I also believe that, to the extent the choice in the
region becomes one of supporting either Iran as opposed to
Sunnis, the sorts of people who will come to the fore in the
Sunni world will not be people we are going to applaud or
welcome. Sunni extremism, as we have learned the hard way, is
just as much a threat to United States interests in the region
as can be Shia extremism or Iranian-backed imperial policies.
Let me turn to the nuclear program for a few minutes. There
are three choices. There's the military choice, there's the
acquiescence choice, and there's the diplomatic choice.
The military choice is a classic preventive attack. And I
underscore the word ``preventive.'' We are not yet at a moment
where we would have to contemplate preemptive strikes. No
Iranian capability or use of that capability is imminent. So,
the military option that is before the United States is a
classic preventive strike to try to stop or interrupt what you
might describe as a gathering threat. The question is what such
a strike could accomplish. It is impossible to destroy what you
don't know about, and it's not always possible to destroy what
you do know about. So I believe we need to be sober about what
a military strike could accomplish.
But, second, and perhaps just as important, whatever it
could accomplish, we should not delude ourselves that the
scenario would stop there. Iran would surely retaliate, using
tools that are available to it in places where it can exercise
or deploy those tools--I would think in Iraq and Afghanistan--
and also possibly in ways that would dramatically increase the
price of energy. I would simply say that coming against the
backdrop of where we are economically, we need to think hard
about that.
I also believe, based on my own experience, that despite
the occasional whisperings of certain Arab governments that
they would welcome such a strike, I am not persuaded that, in
reality, they would. One should always be careful about what
governments are willing to tell us privately, but not say
publicly. We should not, therefore, assume that we would have
anything like the widespread support in the Arab world that
certain individuals in the Arab world suggest.
And last, after a preventive strike, the Iranians would
then go about reconstructing their nuclear option, with even
greater determination and greater domestic support to do so,
and they would probably then go about it in a way where a
second preventive strike would be that much more difficult. So
even under the most optimistic scenarios, a successful
preventive strike would not solve the problem, by any means,
either as regards Iran's nuclear program or its foreign policy
more broadly.
So, let me turn to the second option, that of tolerating or
acquiescing in some type of an Iranian large-scale enrichment
capability, what you might call a ``near-nuclear-weapons
option.'' Even if it didn't go any farther than that, it would
have consequences and costs. I believe it would increase
Iranian assertiveness around the region, which is already quite
great, as we've seen over the last half-dozen years. It would
prompt other countries to follow suit, as has already been
described. It would also leave Israel and Iran on something of
a hair-trigger. Imagine if you had the sort of crisis that you
had several years ago in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah.
In a context in which Iran had a near or actual nuclear weapons
capability, the potential for instability, and, conceivably,
the introduction of nuclear threats or nuclear use into the
Middle East could not be dismissed.
More broadly, if Iran developed some sort of a near nuclear
capability, we would obviously want to introduce greater
sanctions and threats to deter it from crossing redlines. For
example, the redline from going to low-enriched uranium to
high-enriched uranium. Weaponization would be yet another
redline, as would testing.
We also want to think about setting down certain
understandings about what would happen if Iran carried out a
transfer of materials or capabilities. And obviously there is
the question of use.
And on our side, on top of all of that, there are things
that we would do to enhance defense in the region. This would
involve such things as missile defense, selective security
guarantees to local states, declaratory policy toward Iran
about such issues as mobilization of nuclear forces, crossing
various redlines, transfer, or use. Essentially, we would be in
the business of nuclear management, with all the policy
elements that that would introduce into our foreign policy.
Given that, the best course is obviously a diplomatic one
that would lead Iran to suspend, or, better yet, give up, its
national enrichment program. We would offer political,
economic, energy, and strategic incentives for Iran to do so,
again along with threats about what would happen if it did not
do so. These would, again, be put forward multilaterally.
It is unlikely that we will succeed down this path, given
how popular the so-called ``right to enrich'' is within Iran,
and given how far along Iran is.
I believe a negotiation really will need to focus on
whether Iran is allowed to have some enrichment activity. Or,
to put it another way, on how the right to enrich is defined.
What is the scale and what is the degree of transparency? What
is the degree of IAEA access? I would simply say our response
ought to be calibrated to this so that sanctions relief, such
as it is, would be directly linked to what it was Iran agreed
to, in terms of scale of a program, state of a program, and
transparency of a program.
I would like to make two final points. The first relates to
the timing of all of this. I believe the United States now
ought to use the time to put together a preferred national
position, and then ought to use the next few months to sell it
internationally. If there is an effective road to Tehran, it
most certainly passes through such places as Moscow, London,
Paris, Berlin, and Beijing. And so, it may actually then render
moot this question of timing--when we would put something
forward vis-a-vis the Iranian election. My own sense is, it
will take several months for us to line up the sort of
necessary international support that we would need. This is
probably just as well. I am uneasy about introducing new
proposals in the context of the Iranian election cycle, though
I also totally agree with the dangers of thinking that we can
somehow play Iranian politics in ways that'll work in our
favor. So, again, my focus would be on lining up international
support.
My last point is that whatever it is we line up, we ought
to do it, ultimately, publicly. It's odd for me to say this,
because, as someone who's spent a lot of his career as a
diplomat, we like to do things in private, but this ought to be
done in public as much as possible. And the reason is twofold.
It is important to let the Iranian people see the
reasonableness and the attractiveness of what could be theirs
if they agreed to play the international game, so to speak, by
the rules. And it's important, also, that the Iranian
Government be pressured by the Iranian people to explain why it
has sacrificed Iran's future, why it has compromised what could
be Iran's standard of living, to pursue this nuclear dream. Let
the regime have to justify that against the backdrop of
inflation that is above 30 percent, against rising
unemployment, against the backdrop of low oil prices. It should
be made public to let them explain their choice.
Going public has another advantage: It helps here, and it
helps around the world. If we can demonstrate that what we are
offering Iran is reasonable, I would suggest it will make it
less difficult for us to rally the sort of international
support we want. If it comes to escalation, whether sanctions
or what have you, it's important that we, in a sense, take the
high road, that we show that we have passed the ``reasonable''
test, and that it is Iran that has essentially rejected a fair
and reasonable course offered to it.
Thanks you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Haass follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard N. Haass, President, Council on
Foreign Relations, New York, NY
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the subject of Iran and U.S.
policy toward Iran.
Iran constitutes one of the most serious and most difficult
national security challenges facing the United States. What I plan to
do in this statement is offer some judgments about Iran and then put
forward several suggestions for U.S. policy.
Thirty years after the Islamic revolution, Iran is one of the most
influential local states in the greater Middle East. Its strategic
position has benefited enormously from Saddam Hussein's fall from
power, the weakening of the Iraqi state, and the coming to power in
Baghdad of a Shia-led government. Iraq is no longer able nor is it
inclined to offset Iran. In addition, the ouster from power of the
Taliban in Afghanistan was a long-time Iranian objective. The rise of
political Islam and groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in
the Palestinian territories provides Iran with powerful instruments.
And Iran was also (at least until fairly recently) the beneficiary of
high energy prices. The net result is that Iran is now something of an
imperial power, one that defines its interests broadly and seeks to
influence a large number and wide range of regional matters.
Iran's political system is sui generis and difficult to categorize.
It combines elements of both theocratic authoritarianism and democracy.
Public opinion matters there, though, and debates take place both
within the government and between the government and society. These
differences should not be exaggerated. Iran is not about to descend
into revolutionary unrest. The United States should jettison the notion
of regime change as the centerpiece of its policy toward Iran. The
focus should be on modifying Iran's behavior; over time, there is the
possibility of meaningful and desirable societal and political
evolution, but this is more likely to happen from an Iran that is
integrated into the region and the world than from one that is cut off
and able to indulge in the most extreme forms of radicalism and
nationalism.
Fundamental differences exist between United States and Iranian
outlooks and foreign policies. Even a short list of such differences
includes attitudes toward Israel, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation
in addition to the specific grievances each holds vis-a-vis the past
behavior of the other. At the same time, there are areas in which the
United States and Iran agree more than they disagree. Afghanistan comes
to mind in this regard, as both governments oppose a Taliban return to
power and continued opium production. There is also at least some
common interest in Iraq, as both the United States and Iran want to
avoid Iraq's becoming a failed state.
The notion of talking with the Iranian Government at an official
level makes good sense. To do so is not to reward the Iranian
Government but rather to judge that ignoring Iran--a policy of
neglect--has not weakened the regime or its influence and will not in
the future.
In approaching Iran, the United States should resist setting
preconditions. In particular, it makes no sense to demand as a
precondition what is a potential objective of the interaction. What
matters in a negotiation is not where you begin but where you come out.
This applies principally but not only to Iran's nuclear activities.
In the same vein, the Obama administration should resist Iranian
demands that the United States meet certain preconditions. Exchanges
about the distant past and calls for apologies for alleged or real
actions are a distraction. The agenda should focus on the present and
future. An Iran that insists on such preconditions is not serious about
negotiating.
The United States should not engage in linkage, i.e., demanding
that progress materialize in one or more areas in order for there to be
progress in others. Rather, the goal should be to make progress where
it is possible. (There is, for example, no reason to rule out
cooperation in Afghanistan because we cannot agree about Hamas.) That
said, it is a fact of life that disagreements in some realms of the
relationship will affect what the United States does in reaction to
that concern and what it may choose to do overall.
U.S. policy must be thoroughly multilateral. This means working
with the IAEA on nuclear matters and coordinating nuclear-related
policy--what is sought from Iran, what will be offered to Iran if it
meets these requirements, what will be done to Iran if it does not--
with the EU, Russia, China, and others who are important trading
partners of Iran. It also means consulting with Israel, the Arab
States, and Turkey. There should be a multilateral negotiation (on the
nuclear issue) and a bilateral negotiation (on all issues, including
Afghanistan, Iraq, regional security, terrorism, support for Hamas and
Hezbollah, and miscellaneous bilateral concerns as well as the nuclear
issue). One requirement for the Obama administration will be to make
sure these two tracks are closely coordinated.
Russia is of particular importance. Foreign policy must determine
priorities, and gaining Russian cooperation on Iran should be high on
any such list. Supporting Russian accession to the WTO, slowing the
pace of NATO enlargement, exercising restraint on going ahead with
plans for missile defense in Europe, supporting calls for a Russian
nuclear fuel bank or Russian participation in any international
consortium that would provide fuel for nuclear powerplants--all ought
to be on the table.
The United States should avoid institutionalizing a containment
policy that would divide the region along Sunni-Shia or Arab-Persian
lines. This would likely increase tensions within those countries that
have significant Sunni and Shia populations. It would also reinforce
the most radical Sunni elements in the Arab world--the same elements
that are at the core of groups such as al-Qaeda. And it ignores the
potential to involve Iran in efforts where our goals overlap or at
least are not in total opposition.
Iran has advanced much farther in its nuclear program and has done
so in less time than most experts predicted. The latest reports are
that Iran possesses roughly a ton of low-enriched uranium. It would
require only several months to adapt Iran's centrifuges so that it
could produce highly enriched uranium. The United States and the world
would have warning of this action only if it were done at declared
facilities and if the IAEA enjoyed sufficient access.
There are three choices when it comes to Iran's nuclear program.
One involves military force. Consideration of military options
inevitably involves several judgments. The first is what a use of
force--a classic preventive attack--might accomplish. Presumably it
would destroy a large portion of Iran's nuclear facilities, although
just how much is unknown given the uncertainty associated with any
military action and the reality that we may not know where all the
components of the nuclear program are located.
There is also the question of what a preventive strike would
trigger. Iran would likely retaliate against American personnel and
interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, and possibly elsewhere. Iran might also
take steps to interfere with the production and flow of oil and gas,
thereby reducing supplies and driving up prices. Such a development
would add to the already severe global economic slowdown. Iran would
likely move to reconstitute its nuclear program, but in a manner that
made a second preventive attack far more difficult to carry out. An
attack would also likely further radicalize Iran; most Iranians would
conclude that such an attack would never have been undertaken had Iran
possessed a nuclear weapon and been in a position to deter it.
It is possible that the threats of sanctions and military force (as
well as the lure of economic and political integration) will persuade
Iran to renounce its nuclear program. This is unlikely, though, given
the popularity the program enjoys in the country. More likely is an
Iranian decision to continue to enrich uranium but not test or build
actual weapons. Such a near-nuclear option would put Iran in a position
to produce weapons-grade uranium that could be ``weaponized'' in a
matter of months. It is also possible that Iran will decide to cross
this line and test and build weapons as India, Pakistan, and North
Korea all have. But this is less likely given that it would be
inconsistent with Iran's public statements and would run the risk of
more significant sanctions, including an enforced denial of refined
gasoline exports to Iran, as well as a preventive armed strike on any
and all facilities known to be associated with Iran's nuclear program.
Still, even an Iran that ``limited'' itself to a near-nuclear
option would change the strategic landscape. Nevertheless, one
alternative to launching or supporting a preventive attack is a policy
of living with an Iranian nuclear weapon or with an Iranian program
that could produce one or more weapons in a matter of months. Although
there is a high probability that Iran could be deterred from using
nuclear weapons, this approach contains significant drawbacks. An Iran
with nuclear weapons or an option to build them in short order is
likely to be even more assertive throughout the region. A second risk
of this ``acceptance'' approach is that other states in the region
(including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) might be tempted to follow
in Iran's footsteps, a process that would be destabilizing every step
of the way. Even if they did not, this situation would place Israel and
Iran on something of a nuclear hair-trigger. Mutual assured destruction
is for understandable reasons not an attractive notion to a state such
as Israel given its small number of large cities, its relatively small
population, and the history of the Jewish people.
Managing an Iranian nuclear or near-nuclear capability will bring
to the fore a number of decisions, including whether the United States
should station or provide missile defense to local states, extend
security guarantees to selected states, and issue a clear declaratory
policy. Iran must know that any use or transfer of nuclear materials
will bring devastating consequences to the country and those who rule
it. Iran must also know that it would make itself vulnerable to a
preemptive attack if the United States received evidence that Iran was
altering the alert status of its nuclear forces. The United States
should also consider selected enhancement of Israel's own nuclear
capacities. The overall goal is to bolster deterrence and to increase
defense should deterrence ever break down.
Far preferable to either attacking Iran or accepting a nuclear Iran
would be persuading Iran to suspend or give up its enrichment effort
altogether or, failing either of those outcomes, to accept significant
limits on it. In return, some of the current sanctions in place would
be suspended. In addition, Iran should be offered assured access to
adequate supplies of nuclear fuel for the purpose of producing
electricity. Normalization of political ties could be part of the
equation. As part of such a negotiation, the United States should be
willing to discuss what Iran (as a signatory of the NPT) describes as
its ``right to enrich.'' It may well be necessary to acknowledge this
right, provided that Iran accepts both limits on its enrichment program
(no HEU) and enhanced safeguards. Such a right must be earned by Iran,
not conceded by the United States.
The optimal timing of a new U.S. diplomatic initiative can be
debated. The rationale for delay is to reduce the risks that the United
States and Iran's nuclear option will enjoy center stage in the
upcoming Iranian election campaign. Such a focus would be unfortunate
because it would distract attention away from Iran's economy (the
Achilles heel of the incumbents) and because public debate on the
nuclear issue at this time in Iran would likely push all candidates to
embrace more nationalist positions. Reaching out now could also allow
the incumbents to argue that their radicalism brought the United States
to the negotiating table. There is the possibility that the next
Iranian Government will be different than (and preferable to) the
current one. The problem with delay, however, is that it provides Iran
additional time to produce enriched uranium. What is more, ``gaming''
another country's politics, and in particular Iran's given its
conspiratorial bent, can be difficult at best and counterproductive at
worst. Still, I lean toward waiting until after Iran's June election
before launching a new initiative, but with the caveat that the time be
used to develop the substance of a new comprehensive offer that the
Europeans, Russians, and Chinese would support. The best road to Tehran
runs through Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing. Should this road prove
rocky, the dilemma over when to launch a new diplomatic initiative may
well become moot as the United States will need the months until June
to work to garner international support for a new approach to Tehran.
The basic elements of any policy proposal toward Iran need to be
made public. The Iranian Government should have to explain to its own
public why it pursues certain foreign policies that incur significant
direct and indirect costs to the country.
Public diplomacy will also help pave the way for escalatory steps
against Iran if they should be deemed necessary. It is important that
the American public, Congress, and the media here, as well as foreign
publics and governments, understand the reasonableness of what was
offered to Iran and the fact that it was rejected.
Two final points. The current economic crisis is having a mixed
effect. On one hand, the fall in world oil prices and Iran's economic
plight increase opportunities for using economic leverage effectively.
These conditions also create internal pressures on the Iranian regime.
At the same time, there is little or no cushion in the global economy,
and a major crisis involving Iran that led to substantially higher oil
prices would cause a sharp worsening of the global slowdown. This
latter set of concerns constrains U.S. options.
Finally, a successful policy toward Iran will require more than a
different policy toward Iran. It will also require a broader foreign
policy response, beginning with a serious move to reduce U.S. and
global consumption of oil. This is the only way to protect against
future price increases that would resume massive flows of dollars to
Iran. A successful Iran policy will also require movement on the Arab-
Israeli front. This argues for U.S. efforts to broker an Israel-Syria
peace treaty. It also calls for greater efforts to improve prospects
for progress between Israelis and Palestinians. This means providing
moderates with an argument that moderation pays, something that will
entail building up the economy on the West Bank and putting in place an
ambitious diplomatic process that holds out real hope of a two-state
outcome.
The Chairman. Well, thank you all very much. Very
complicated questions, obviously. Appreciate your testimony
enormously.
Let me just begin by asking, right up front: What is the
appropriate redline? Is there a redline that needs to be drawn?
Obviously, the Bush administration drew some, and we passed by
them in sequence. So, the message is one of ambiguity, if not
impotence. And the question now to be asked by a new
administration, and by us here, Is there a redline? If so, what
is it?
Ambassador Haass. Is that question to me?
The Chairman. Sure. Ambassador Haass, Ambassador Wisner,
and then I'd like----
Ambassador Haass. Let me just say one thing, Mr. Chairman,
that's implicit in your question. Redlines have consequences.
When the United States says something is a redline, when the
United States says a course of action is unacceptable, those
are not words that we ought to use lightly. If we do, we simply
devalue the currency, and that will have consequences, not
simply vis-a-vis Iran, but vis-a-vis every other thing we do in
the world diplomatically.
The Chairman. I couldn't agree with you more, but let me
say, as a preface to the rest of your answer, many countries,
ourselves included, have already made many public declarations
about the unacceptability of a nuclear weapon in Iran, and that
is the current policy that's also been adopted by the sanctions
regime and otherwise. So, the question is, Are we prepared to
enforce that? And if so, how does one?
Ambassador Haass. What I would do is avoid anything that
would undo that position. There's no reason to invite or give a
green light to Iran going down that path. What I would do,
though--coming back to something I said before--is have a
relationship between Iran's progression down a nuclear path and
what it would expect, were it to cross certain thresholds.
Right now, what we have is Iran at what you might call an
industrial-scale low-enriched threshold. It has crossed that
threshold, it reached that threshold.
The Chairman. Correct.
Ambassador Haass. And if they stay there and do not roll
that back, what I would try to do is negotiate an international
package of sanctions that would stay in place, so long as they
stayed at that level and did not roll it back. And I would also
make clear what would be the incentives for them to step back.
I would then have additional packages of sanctions and
other measures that would be introduced were they to go through
other potential steps. For example, an even greater scale of
enrichment, as Mark laid out, or----
The Chairman. There are a series of sanctions, which we've
talked about here----
Ambassador Haass. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. That can get much tougher.
Ambassador Haass. Right, including, for example, when we
would try to get a U.N. Security Council resolution that would
call for a ban on the export to Iran of refined petroleum, one
of the things that Iran's economy, as you know, needs. And a
followup to that, almost akin to some of the Iraq resolutions
from 1990-91, would be to provide the authority for all
necessary means to enforce such a ban on petroleum exports to
Iran. So I would be prepared to suggest----
The Chairman. You'd be prepared to do that, notwithstanding
whatever potential impact there might be on oil prices?
Ambassador Haass. I would think that's the sort of policy
review we should go through domestically and that we might want
to sell internationally. And, as I say in my written statement,
one of the things we've got to do if we're going to down this
path with Iran, is, we can't do it in isolation from a serious
strategy to try to reduce American use of, and consumption of,
oil. To leave ourselves as exposed as we are reduces our
ability to do the sort of escalatory measures we're just
discussing here.
The Chairman. Mr. Wisner.
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, I've followed, as you have, our
diplomacy now for a number of years, and we have talked
throughout about redlines, unacceptability, we've set
deadlines, we've--I think, frankly, as we look at the next
stage, we should start emphasizing the positive. Richard Haass
has outlined many steps that we could take. I've tried to
indicate the importance of addressing Iran's security
circumstances, of engaging it more generally. Begin to
emphasize the positive side of the agenda.
The Chairman. Well, I understand that.
Ambassador Wisner. That does not----
The Chairman. I understand that.
Ambassador Wisner. That does not mean removing from the
table the negative side. But, rather than emphasizing publicly
the negative side and then being unable to deliver on it,
either in our dealings with the Security Council, notably the
Russians and the Chinese, I would prefer to downplay the
negative, but be very serious about organizing it to get----
The Chairman. Well, here's the problem. Here's the problem
with that. And it's the problem with our overall policy, it's
the problem with the road we've traveled. You know, these folks
are smart. People know how to read the tea leaves. You either
have consequences or you don't, in foreign policy. And if
people believe that you don't, they're going to make a set of
judgments, accordingly. It would be my preference, and
everybody on this committee's preference, that Iran understand,
you know, we're not--you know, regime change isn't on the
table, we're not sitting here--you know, we're looking for a
way to engage and to find the positive. But, if they continue
to try to develop a bomb, which is the judgment most people are
making they are doing----
Ambassador Wisner. Well----
The Chairman [continuing]. There's a question whether
they're developing the capability or whether they'd then go to
the weaponization. And so, that's sort of part of my question,
Do we draw a line that we mean something about, and then go out
to the international community--because either the arms race of
the Middle East is unacceptable--I mean, Egypt, Saudi Arabia--
if they feel threatened and decide this, then the whole thing
begins to unravel. So, we have to decide, What is the line at
which we are serious, at which the world is prepared to take
steps? And the Iranians have to understand that, do they not?
Ambassador Wisner. Iran--I--Senator, you're absolutely
right. The redline that I'm suggesting is one we draw
internally, but using it to threaten the Iranians--we've seen
the consequences----
The Chairman. Doesn't do a lot, I agree.
Ambassador Wisner [continuing]. Of threat. Doesn't do a
lot. That we have our own redline. That we organize our
diplomacy to meet that redline, I'm fully in support of. I want
to try to change the approach to the problem so we're trying to
engage the Iranians, showing there's flexibility in our
diplomacy, while internally we are very tough about the
provisions----
The Chairman. What we might do. Fair enough.
So, Mr. Sadjadpour, how do we make certain that, as we
engage in that process, that the talking--the delay is not--the
process is not misinterpreted, that there is a clarity to what
we believe is real, and it's communicated in a way that it
isn't a threat, that it's a reality, but not a bullying, if you
will, not a sort of, you know, pressure point, it's just a
reality, and we reduce the tensions, but they don't
misinterpret the fact that we're engaging in the diplomacy as
an excuse to then put us in a position where alternatives have
been taken away from everybody.
Mr. Sadjadpour. Well, I think it's a delicate balance,
Senator Kerry, because, as I see it, the short-term tactics and
the long-term strategy are at loggerheads, in the sense that I
think, in the short term, it's imperative that we make it very
clear to the Iranians and to President Ahmadinejad that a
belligerent noncompromising approach is not going to reap
rewards. And what we've challenged them with is greater
sanctions, greater political and economic isolation.
The problem, as I see it, is that the hard-liners in Tehran
thrive in isolation. I describe them as weeds that only grow in
the dark. So isolation is not necessarily a stick to them; in
some ways, it's a carrot. And ultimately, our problem with Iran
is the character of the Iranian regime. And my concern is that
the measures we're taking to send the signal to them that their
belligerent approach is not going to reap rewards actually
strengthens the individuals we're trying to hurt.
So, I've been doing some research in Dubai, because Dubai
is the place--Dubai is the arena where Iran is most effectively
circumventing the sanctions regime and allaying its economic
isolation. And when I talk to businessmen in Dubai, Iranian
businessmen who are going back and forth, and European
businessmen, and foreign businessmen who are dealing with Iran,
the recommendations they always have are to have more targeted
sanctions, targeting senior officials within Tehran, as opposed
to broader sanctions which simply strengthen the regime's hold
over the economy and are not conducive to economic and
political reform.
The Chairman. Well, my time is up. I want to recognize
Senator Lugar. But, as I do, let me just say that I agree
completely--
I think it was Ambassador Haass who said--you know, I don't
think we should pretend that we have the ability to affect the
Iranian elections. We don't. But, I don't think we should give
any read of any kind of interpretation, in the next months,
that allows anybody to exploit it or play games with it. And I
completely believe that we must be organizing the international
community's clear understanding of what this line is or isn't,
of what we're prepared to do, or not, and then engage in the
diplomacy that makes it as attractive and as feasible and as
possible to be able to, all of us, move down a different road.
I was struck by the fact--I mean, there is--there really is
a positive side to what a relationship could produce, in terms
of Afghanistan, Iraq, energy, any number of other issues. And
those are much bigger than any of the other kinds of things
that have been allowed to define this. So, I hope we'll take
advantage of that.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just pick up
where you left off. One of the positive aspects, although it
may be superficial, is that there is a new administration here
in the United States. There is a congratulatory letter that has
arrived from the President of Iran to President Obama. Some
would say that it is not sincere, but, nevertheless, this might
be true of communications from leaders of many countries around
the world who look for a new policy.
Some of you have suggested that we formulate, in the next
few weeks, a new policy, and that we do so publicly. In other
words, that the American people have some idea what the
arguments are, as they will, listening to our conversation this
morning. As people try to pin down what it is we want to do we
must remember that are not only selling it to the international
community, but also to the American people.
We've been on a different course, at least some Americans
have been, starting with the ``axis of evil.'' This policy
identified three targets, and Iran was one of them. And the
regime-change idea has been out there, and it still may have
some supporters that believe we should provide foreign
assistance to help various groups within Iran who are
democratically inclined to infiltrate the system. This strategy
still has supporters and so we continue to have a debate within
our own congregation here.
But, let us say that we finally decide what this policy
is--and I think, as you said, Dr. Haass, this may not come
easily for us, quite apart from our explanation to our allies.
Nevertheless let's say we try to sell it to the allies, and we
reencounter some of the problems that we have had already seen
with Russia and China, but, likewise, with Europeans who have
commercial interests and others. It is not an easy sell to any
of the above, each of the governments have different agendas.
Meanwhile, we are busy working through the problems of
Afghanistan and Pakistan which intersect Iran. And, as some of
you have suggested, this will probably require, at minimum,
some Americans talking to some Iranians. As we formulate our
overall policy, we must determine the best way to communicate
with Iranians. How do we reach out to those elements of Iranian
society who we believe have some affinity for us. In other
words, how do we ensure that our efforts to communicate with
people in Iran produce results. As all of you have said, we
want the people of Iran to be watching and monitoring
international discussions and negotiations on these matters.
Not only do we want our allies and the American people watching
how we are attempting to build a comprehensive relationship. An
equally important message to the Iranian people is that we here
in the United States have differences of opinion but we're
trying to resolve those.
Finally, discussions of additional economic sanctions on
Iran continue. A wide variety of forms and degrees of sanctions
have been suggested. The global economic crisis is making this
process harder for all involved. It is difficult to set a
baseline for action when the condition of the United States
economy in 2009 is unknown as are the economies of Russia,
China, or Iran.
Six months ago we could not have imagined what changes the
economic crisis would have on foreign policy. The collapse of
banking institutions, currencies, and economies has
dramatically changed the international landscape. The economies
of countries who rely on incomes generated from natural
resources have changed markedly. Iran is such a case. As you've
pointed out, perhaps the Ayatollah is unaffected by the economy
but the rest of the country is feeling the effects.
Conceivably, the GDP of Iran may sink almost interminably, and
you would still have those preaching that you're on the right
trail. If we had communicated better and been more transparent
in what we are doing, the Iranian people would have a better
understanding of the rationale and implications of sanctions
and they would appreciate how and why we take each step. The
sanctions will have more consequence and greater affect on
Iranian society if we better understood the Iranian economy.
For the moment, we have a superficial idea of the affects
of sanctions on politics of the country, the rural people who
may or may not have been very well served, quite apart from
students and so forth. But, we've really not concentrated, in
an academic way, on the effects of sanctions in Iran. And we
probably ought to have that as a part of our argument with the
international community, because other economies are going to
be affected by either turning on or off various situations.
But, the overall effect of this could be positive, even if
there are not decisive steps taken. In other words, the fact
that we are engaging with the American people, the world
community, and hopefully Iranians themselves on how nuclear
strategy ought to proceed in Iran. The goal would be to help
Iranians to come to grips with the costs and tradeoffs of the
nuclear program and options that would permit their stated
objectives while reassuring the international community of
their stated peaceful intentions.
Before we adopt a new policy, we're going to have to
convince our constituents and the international community that
our proposal is the most appropriate and most likely to succeed
and your suggestions here today have helped this immeasurably.
Let me just ask if any of you have any reactions to this
overall summary that we've tried to give.
Yes, Richard.
Ambassador Haass. As I listened to both you and Senator
Kerry, and to my colleagues here, I increasingly think, for the
United States, diplomatically, the single biggest question in
the nuclear realm that will meet us in the next few months is
whether we are prepared to accept a limited Iranian right to
enrich. If we basically insist that they have zero enrichment,
I believe there is a negligible chance we can ever get them to
accept that, or that we could ever set in motion a debate in
that country where, no matter what was offered to them, it
would be a desirable deal. And I also believe a zero-enrichment
insistence would make it very difficult for us to build the
requisite degree of multilateral international support for the
kind of sanctions escalation we're thinking of.
So, my own position is that we ought to think very hard
about defining an acceptable, limited Iranian enrichment
capability. We would do that and say, ``If you limit enrichment
to this, and if you accept this degree of transparency and
inspection, we can then offer you the following incentives. We
may still keep in place some limited sanctions, because our
preference would be that you go down to zero. And if you don't
accept this''--going back to Senator Kerry's question, which is
also really in yours--``as you go down certain paths, the mix
of incentives and sanctions would change in a way that would
not be to your liking.'' But, I really do believe some
willingness to accept the so-called--or, quote/unquote ``right
to enrich'' is essential, both for winning the argument in
Iran, that what we're offering to them is worth their taking,
and for winning the argument in places like Moscow and Beijing.
And I'm sad to say I think we've reached that point. We can
argue whether, 7 or 8 years ago, we might have been able to
head off ever reaching that point. But, I believe that is where
foreign policy is now.
The Chairman. Mr. Sadjadpour.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I would second Dr. Haass's comments, and I
would say that--I would argue we need not concede that right
before the negotiations take place, but certainly, as part of
an end game, I think it would be something more palatable not
only to Iran but also to our allies.
I would make a couple of points. One is that when the
United States prosecuted the Iraq war, we pursued very strong
resolutions at the U.N., and therefore, we achieved a very weak
coalition. And I think our strategy with regards to Iran needs
to be the opposite, in the sense that we pursue, initially,
somewhat weaker resolutions in order to achieve a broader
airtight coalition. Because I think what the Iranian leadership
fears is not an amplification of existing United States
sanctions or European sanctions. What they fear is the day when
not even the Russians or the Chinese or the Indians are
returning their phone calls. This is what I think will
concentrate Iranian minds the most.
And the second point, as you mentioned, Senator Lugar, is
the contraction of oil prices. I once did a study charting the
price of oil from 1979 to the present, and charting major
Iranian foreign policy milestones. And I can tell you, it's not
coincidental that, in 1997, when then-President Khatami first
called for a dialog of civilizations, oil was at $12 a barrel,
and when President Ahmadinejad first denied the Holocaust, oil
was at $70 a barrel. So, I think we will--this will be our best
weapon in continuing forward with Iran, this contraction of oil
prices, coupled with a very airtight multilateral approach.
Senator Lugar. Well, my time is expired, but I appreciate
almost a description of metrics of trying to determine how much
enrichment is possible, or how we're progressing. On the other
hand, what--how the screws are turned, what they do with regard
to this, whether it be the oil prices, the international
community, and what have you. But, it's very helpful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I
appreciate this opportunity for us to examine, with these
experts, the national security challenge that we face with
regard to Iran, and also to explore the options. So, thank you
for making this opportunity possible. It's a critically
important issue.
I wanted to try to get to about three areas, if possible.
The first one, I wanted to direct Mr. Fitzpatrick's attention
to just a very brief background that I'll provide, and then
also your testimony on some of the technical aspects of this.
For those of us who are not scientists I want to try to achieve
some clarity.
One of the problems with the question of where Iran is with
its nuclear capability, both where they are and what the
timeframe is--it's almost like we get a continual stream of
pronouncements about where they are and what the timeframe is--
after a while, there's kind of a blizzard of facts and
seemingly inconsistent assertions about it. Even this weekend,
we saw Secretary Gates saying something, and Admiral Mullen
saying something, which seemed to be, if you read it
carefully--you can read them together and may not have an
inconsistency, but the way they're sometimes articulated can be
confusing.
I'm looking at two descriptions here. One is yours. I'll
start with a general summary, here, of something that isn't in
your testimony, but I think is consistent, the annual threat
assessment presented--or submitted, I should say--to the Senate
Committee on Intelligence, saying that the key components that
Iran had to successfully complete in order to obtain a nuclear
weapon are the following. One, production of fissile material;
we know that. Two, effective means for delivery, for weapon
delivery. And three, design, weaponization, and testing of the
warhead.
And I noticed in your testimony--first of all, it's helpful
when you make statements in your testimony like ``having a
stockpile of enriched uranium is not the same thing as having a
bomb.'' In the public press, sometimes they get confused. But,
I was interested, on the top of page three of your testimony,
where you say, ``For a weapon, the low-enriched uranium first
would have to be further enriched to 90 percent or more.'' And
then you go on from there.
Could you answer the question in two ways? No. 1, what are
the specific steps the Iranian regime would have to take to
reach the point where they could actually launch a nuclear
weapon? In other words, the ultimate threat. And No. 2, what is
the timeframe that you think--within which that could happen?
Because we hear all kinds of timeframes--2010 to 2015, some say
2013. Just like the question itself, the timeframe has become
kind of a blizzard of assertions.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Senator. I'll try to answer
the question directly.
The first step, Iran would have to enrich further to 90
percent. As I said, most of the work has already been done by
the time you get to low enriched, but it'll take several weeks
to get to highly enriched. They could do that either at Natanz,
in which case they would probably have to reconfigure the
cascades, or, if they had some hidden facility somewhere, which
we don't know whether they do or not, but maybe, in a worst-
case scenario, one might think that they might, so----
Senator Casey. So, that would be step one.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. That would be step one, further enriching
to HEU.
Step two would be to take this highly enriched gasified
uranium, reconvert it to metal form, and fashion the metal into
a pit for a weapon. And then, associated with that, build the
weapon itself, the various firing mechanisms and so forth. And
all of that kind of work is unclassified, and I said in my
testimony, an estimate--you know, an estimate might be at least
6 months or more.
A third step would be, then, to----
Senator Casey. Six months for that step.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. For that--at least 6 months for that step
of weaponization.
Then the third step would be to have some means of
delivering the weapon. The means that is usually talked about
is a missile, and Iran is--been working steadily on missiles,
and there is evidence that they were trying to design a nose
cone that could accommodate a weapon. And that's probably the
most likely, but one could also deliver a nuclear weapon in the
back of a truck, and, you know, it--so, the--but--so, the
delivery, it's a little bit hard to answer that question of how
long to build a missile and how far they are in being able to
mate the two.
I think the reason that the intelligence community has
given this wide range of 2010-15 is because the 2010 is the
worst case. If they were to take the uranium they have now,
further enrich it to HEU, takes several months, and then at
least 6 months to weaponize it, and then maybe they already
have a missile they could use. So, that's the 2010. But, each
of those--there's a lot of big ``if's'' there, and therefore,
it might take longer.
And one should stress, just having one weapon doesn't
really--you know, that's a huge risk for them to take; to try
to further enrich it, the inspectors would know. Just to get
one weapon? It doesn't seem logical that they would do that.
So, probably they would want to be able to--you know, if you're
going to take that risk, you'd have more.
Senator Casey. Thank you for that. And I wanted to pursue
this subject a little further, but I'll move on, because I know
we have limited time.
I wanted to move to the question of the relationship
between this threat--and I'm directing my question to
Ambassador Wisner and also Mr. Haass--the question of this
threat, that we're here to discuss, and the posture that Iran
has to Israel, which is obviously extremely adverse and
hostile. And I guess the first question I have is with regard
to what's happening right now. Is it your belief that Iran is
actively undermining the peace process in the Middle East right
now? And if that is your belief, what's the evidence of that?
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, the obvious facts are on the
table. The Iranians do not recognize the state of Israel. We
have, in the President of Iran, a Holocaust denier. Iran has
been a principal source of advice, finance arms to Hezbollah.
Iran is deeply involved with Hamas. Many aspects that you look
at with regard to Iranian behavior that are distinctly hostile
to the state of Israel.
But, I don't think--and I think your question goes--whether
that's the whole story. I believe the Iranians are ambivalent
about Israel. They are realists at heart. They do not believe
that Israel can be eliminated. But they are also determined to
make the point that Israel cannot be a launching pad, for us or
anyone else, in a threat to them.
I spent one evening, some years ago, with former Iranian
President, and said, ``Don't you realize, Mr. President, how
dangerous it is, the armaments you're giving to Hezbollah? The
militarization of southern Lebanon, the undertakings with
Hamas, it can blow Israel at war in Lebanon, it spreads to
Syria, we're involved, you're involved.'' And Katami looked
back at me, and he said, ``Got to remember, we plan our defense
along external lines. We're trying to keep you from putting
your hand around our throat.''
Now, I don't ask that you take such a statement at face
value, but to try to look at the world that Iran sees from
inside of Iran leads me back to the point that Senator Lugar
made, and that is that it is vitally important we address--we
sit down and begin, as part of our dialog, an exploration of
what is security to Iran and how to deal with the issue of
security.
I am enormously taken by what Richard Haass said, Senator
Lugar, in talking about finding a way to accept a degree of
Iranian enrichment, but I warn Richard, all of us, that if you
go too quickly to that conclusion, without rooting it in a
security understanding with the Iranians, you may have cast
aside a vitally useful way of settling the nuclear matter,
because you won't have dealt with confidence, you won't have
dealt with the core issues of Iranian security.
So, I like what Richard proposed to you, but I would say,
``Careful, don't play that card too quickly.''
Senator Casey. I think my time's----
Ambassador Wisner. Get your hands around the security
question. Forgive me for----
Senator Casey. That's OK. My time is up, but I wanted to,
maybe, take 1 minute, if it's possible, Mr. Haass, just to
respond, as well.
Ambassador Haass. I don't believe Iran can stop what's
probably the most promising possibility for a diplomatic
breakthrough between Israel and its neighbors, which is Israel
and Syria. The Syrian Government is in a position, if it
wants--and there's some reason to believe it might--to enter
into serious negotiations with Israel that could end the state
of war between those two countries. Iran wouldn't like it, but
I do not believe Iran is in a position to prevent it. Of all
the situations in the Middle East, it's the one that's most
ripe for diplomatic progress. Iran has many more cards to play,
obviously, vis-a-vis the Palestinians; but there, I'd simply
say Iran cannot prevent the United States or the European Union
or anybody else from building up Palestinian policing
capabilities or improving the economic situation on the West
Bank. Nor can Iran prevent President Obama from giving a major
speech in which he articulates what the United States believes
a fair and reasonable Middle East settlement might look like,
which, in turn, would give the moderates in the Palestinian
world a powerful argument for explaining to their own people
why moderation works and the guys with the guns will get them
nowhere.
So, yes, Iran has tried and will continue to try to
frustrate the Middle East peace process, but they do not have a
veto over what can happen.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Sadjadpour, I know you want to respond
quickly, so why don't you do that, if you'd just keep it
tight----
Mr. Sadjadpour. OK, I just wanted to briefly recount an
anecdote--a brief anecdote--that will give you an idea of
Iran's vision for the Middle East. I once relayed to a senior
Iranian diplomat a question which a Shiite Lebanese friend of
mine once asked me. He said, ``Think of all the money Iran has
spent over the years on Hezbollah since Hezbollah's inception
in 1982. We can say upward of $2 billion. And, likewise, Hamas.
And think of how many Shiite Lebanese Iran could have educated
to become doctors and lawyers and engineers instead of arming
Hezbollah. And likewise, the Palestinians. And how much better
off would those communities be, vis-a-vis Israel?'' And his
response to me was very telling. He said, ``What good would
that have done for Iran?'' I said, ``What do you mean?'' He
said, ``Do you think, had we educated them to become doctors
and lawyers and engineers, they're going to come back to South
Lebanon and Gaza and fight Israel? No. They will remain doctors
and lawyers and engineers.''
And my point is that Iran is to the Middle East, in a way,
what Rush Limbaugh is to the United States, in the sense that
they know they can be the champions of the alienated and the
dispossessed, but they know they can't be the champions of the
upwardly mobile. And I think the problem with our strategy and
Israel's strategy in the Middle East the last several years, if
you look at the last three wars which have been prosecuted in
the Middle East, the Iraq war, the 2006 Lebanon war, and the
recent war in Gaza, is that we've created--we've increased the
ranks of the alienated and the dispossessed, and we've created
more fertile ground for Iran's ideology throughout the region.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We're going to resist the temptation to talk about foreign
policy and Rush Limbaugh. [Laughter.]
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I am a member of the Intelligence Committee,
and I need to state, for the record, a disclaimer, and that is,
I want to make certain that--and state, in certain terms, that
no question I ask should be interpreted to suggest that I'm
referring to any facts other than those facts that are widely
known and are in the public domain. Any suggestion to the
contrary would be inaccurate.
Having said that, I'm struck this morning by how parochial
this discussion has been. And I've listened to the--each of you
describe the problem, and I'm--I can't--until I walked in to
this hearing this morning, I thought the only two people on the
face of this planet that believed that Israel would allow Iran
to completely develop a nuclear weapon were the President and
the Ayatollah in Iran. But, I'm struck that perhaps there's
other people that think otherwise.
If you look at the history of this, what Israel has done in
the past, particularly in Iraq, and second, most recently, in
Syria, and think that that points to anything other than the
fact that Israel is not going to allow this to happen,
regardless of what we do, we say, we hold negotiations, or we
impose sanctions, it seems to me to be incredibly naive.
Certainly, their intelligence, one would have to assume, is as
good as our intelligence. And although I agree that a military
strike will not completely take out all of the nuclear
capability, it will certainly destroy links in the chain that
will put them off for probably years. It just seems to me that
this discussion needs to be--needs to include, in a lot more
focused fashion, what's going to happen when Israel does what I
think it inevitably will do to keep the Iranians from
completing a nuclear weapon.
And, Mr. Wisner, I'd like your response to that.
Ambassador Wisner. Happy to give it.
I have followed, as you have, the signals the Israelis have
sent, from military exercises to political statements by
governments that have been, in the past, and will, in the
future be, in Israel. And any Iranian who doesn't take very
seriously the Israeli threat to an Iranian nuclear capability
is misjudging his nation's most vital interests. I have no
doubt about that.
But, where I depart, Senator, from the thrust of your
remarks, if I understand you correctly, is, I think an Israel
nuclear response--an Israeli military response to Iranian
nuclear development is going to put all of us in a really,
really very difficult situation.
First of all, it is not clear to me that we will know, and
Israel will know, when Iran has crossed this redline. There
will be a tremendous amount of ambiguity; ambiguity that Israel
might accept--it would take a--not take a chance, but it would
put us in terrific harm's way.
Second, I do not believe that you can knock out the Iranian
nuclear capability, as my colleagues have asserted. The nuclear
technologies have been indigenized in Iran. The ability to come
back very quickly would be on the table.
Third, I believe we will pay the price for an Israeli
strike, just as much as Israel will, and that our other
objectives will be compromised.
Therefore, I would like to think that the right approach
for the United States, looking at the anxieties of Israel, is
to look at Israel's defenses, to talk to Israel in terms of
security guarantees, to be able to dialogue with Israel on your
overall diplomacy, to open up other ways to consider a response
to the Iranian problem that is not purely military. Otherwise,
I suggest we will fail to stop the nuclear development in Iran,
and we will further endanger the peace of the region and
Israel's own most vital security interests.
Senator Risch. Well, Ambassador Wisner, I don't disagree
with you, and I'm certainly not--I hope you didn't think that I
was suggesting that that was a good thing. I think, however,
that, given what we know, it seems to me a reasonable
conclusion that that's where Israel will wind up on this. If
you look at the threat that they felt from, most recently,
Syria, and, before that, some years before that, Iraq, it
wasn't nearly the threat that they feel right now with Iran
breathing down their neck.
And, with all due respect regarding your anticipation that
Iran would come back very quickly, I would say that I don't
think, necessarily, the Israelis share that conclusion. And, as
a result of all that, I think that we need to, as we analyze
this--and I think all of you are thinking about this--we need
to factor in that whole scenario, because we're tremendously
parochial. We're sitting here talking, ``Well, we'll do this,
we'll do that. If we do this, the Iranians will do that.''
We've got to factor in--if you just put yourself, for a moment,
in the shoes of the leaders of Israel, they look at this
entirely differently than we look at it. And having said that,
I think that needs to be factored in.
Ambassador Haass, I know you've been wanting to get your
two cents' worth in.
Ambassador Haass. Yes, let me suggest why I don't share
your certainty about Israeli behavior. One reason is, if you
look at some historic Israeli comments about Iran's nuclear
program, Iran has already reached the point that some Israelis
said would be a redline and would be unacceptable, which is to
have an industrial-strength enrichment program. So, all I'm
saying is, the Israeli debate is somewhat fluid.
Second of all, Israel, in the past, has made calculations
that we never thought possible. I was involved in one of those
incidents, as you will recall, which was in 1991, when Iraqi
missiles struck Israel, and Israel, at the behest of the United
States, did not exercise its obvious right of self-defense. So,
again, all I'm saying is, I would not assume that Israel has
made up its mind on these things.
I also believe, as Ambassador Wisner said, that some of the
things the United States offers to Israel could affect Israeli
calculations, in the way of defense, possible contributions to
Israel's own capabilities, and so forth.
Last, though, I think it's a healthy thing that we don't
know the answer to the question you've raised, and nor do the
Iranians. And if I were an Iranian political leader or planner,
I would not assume or rule out in any way that Israel might
attack. There's a decent possibility they could, which is one
of the reasons I said in my statement that I believe the most
likely scenario is one where Iran stops short of a point that
would dramatically increase the possibility of the scenario you
suggest. If Iran goes to HEU, to highly enriched uranium, if
Iran tests, if it weaponizes, it increases, to an unknown
degree, the probability of the scenario you are suggesting. I
believe, as a result, it is far more likely that Iran will
decide, for the foreseeable future, to park, if you'll pardon
the untechnical word, its capability in this realm at the level
of large-scale low enrichment, in part because of the
uncertainty about how Israel and the United States might react.
Senator Risch. Well, I would just conclude with--I think
that anyone who thinks that Israel hasn't thought this through
and has an idea of where they're going to go with this, I think
would be very naive. And, again, I want to urge, in the
strongest terms, that everyone should factor this into our
ideas of where we are going with this, because, again, you
know, admittedly, Israel has not acted, to this point. But, you
remember, they took 4,000 rockets from Hamas before they acted,
recently, in Gaza. And so, they are a little bit like us, in
that they will--they'll wait and do what they have to do. But,
this--as we know--we've watched the Europeans negotiate with
Iran for, what, 5 years, 5\1/2\ years; and, through all those
negotiations, and through all of this, all they do is put one
foot in front of the other, getting toward where I think, and
even Ambassador Wisner has concluded, that they will eventually
wind up, regardless of what we do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. Very important line
of questioning. Appreciate it.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
hearing. I think it's incredibly worthwhile.
And I think--to direct my--comments by Senator Risch, I
think the panel's talked about missed opportunities, and I
think several of you mentioned that the time is now to operate.
And I think that Senator Risch's comments are one more
indication that we have to move quickly on this thing, and that
we have to--we have to move carefully, and we have to be
careful about what we do. But, we have used up all of our get-
out-of-jail-free cards.
Ambassador Haass, you said that you thought life's a matter
of priorities, something I definitely agree with. And you said
that, therefore, we should be thinking about missile defense in
our relations with the Russians, and how that may be something
we trade. Do you have any suggestions, does anyone on the panel
have suggestions, things that might work the same way with
China?
Ambassador Haass. Well, I'd say two things about China.
Well, maybe three. One is, China has a different relationship
with Iran, as you know, than does Russia, and has a different
set of calculations. Another, which is good for us, is that
China has no interest in the price of oil going up, as a large
importer, which gives China a stake in energy security and the
peaceful working-out of this issue. And going back to the
previous comments, if China is concerned that certain scenarios
could lead to uses of force, it will concentrate some minds in
Beijing.
Second, China does not want to be the odd man out on the
U.N. Security Council. We have reason to believe we can get the
British and French to line up with us on most approaches. It's
why I put such an emphasis, as do others, on Russia. I believe
that if we can get Russia to line up, Beijing will be extremely
reluctant to be the odd man out.
Third, the United States and China have a developed and,
shall we say, integrated relationship. And China, right now, is
suffering significantly as a result of the American economic
slowdown. Its unemployment rates are going up and they've had
to essentially stop the movement or resettlement of people from
rural areas into urban ones. They are obviously going to worry
about the political consequences of a lack of economic growth,
given that their last quarter had no economic growth. All of
those things argue against Iran scenarios that could place
greater stress on the world economy.
For all of those reasons, reinforcing the arguments you've
heard today, we ought to take a serious diplomatic effort at
bringing the Chinese on board. I'm not suggesting it's going to
be easy in any way. And as Frank Wisner said, we may have to
dilute what it is we want. But I believe it is well within the
realm of possibility, particularly if the Obama administration
makes clear to the Chinese that this is a priority for the
United States, and China's behavior on this issue will be at
the head of the list of how this administration will come to
judge China and its willingness to take our vital national
interests into account.
Senator Kaufman. Ambassador Wisner.
Ambassador Wisner. I like what Richard just said. I'd just
add a footnote, and that is, the Chinese, in coming to the
decision that he described, will arrive at it very painfully.
The Chinese have, deeply rooted in their view, a predisposition
against interference in other nations' activities. They are
very hard to move, and they are very hard to break loose from
the Russians. I'm thinking of many examples in recent years it
has proved to be the case.
Rationally, Richard's put his finger on why there is a
reason and an opening, but I come together with him in saying
that if there is a chance of moving Chinese diplomacy, it will
have to be a very high American priority and be clearly
understood by the Chinese to matter to the Obama
administration.
Senator Kaufman. And it's also interesting how often around
this town different people want different things to be our No.
1 priority with China. I mean, we've got so many things to talk
about China. But, I think you make a good point on this being
one of our very highest priorities.
Mr. Sadjadpour, on Meet the Press, Secretary Gates said
he's been searching, for 30 years, for the elusive Iranian
moderate. I know you know a lot about what's going on in Iran.
What are the forces of moderation in Iran? And do you think
they'll have any impact on the June elections?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I'm sorry?
Senator Kaufman. On the elections. What are the forces for
moderation in Iran? And do you think they'll have any impact on
the elections?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I would describe the internal debate in
Iran as somewhat akin to the debate we have in the United
States between textualist and constructionist scholars of the
Constitution, in the sense that you have many Iranians, hard-
liners, who believe that anti-Americanism is central to the
identity of the Islamic Republic, and one of the core pillars
of the revolution. And if you abandon this anti-Americanism,
then what's left of the revolution and what's left of the
Islamic Republic?
And I think you have plenty more moderates--and I would
say, the vast majority of the population--who understand that
it's time to move on, that policies that came into play in 1979
are not constructive in 2009. And--I would put, again, the vast
majority of the Iranian people in that category--and, based on
my time in Tehran, the vast majority of the political elite.
At the moment, I think the hard-liners very much benefit
from this antagonistic relationship with the United States. And
that's why they want to continue to propagate it.
Senator Kaufman. Yes.
Mr. Sadjadpour. And, you know, it allows them a pretext--
this threat perception from the United States--it allows them a
pretext to clamp down on the population, narrow the accepted
realm of political discourse, and rig elections.
But I do think, like Ambassador Wisner, having had private
conversations with former President Khatami, that he is in the
constructionist camp, in the sense that he knows very well that
Iran will never fulfill its enormous potential as long as its
relationship with the United States remains adversarial. And I
think we should make it clear to the Iranians that, when and if
they are ready to change their approach, there's a standing
offer from the United States that we will be ready to
reciprocate.
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Fitzpatrick, you talked about the
domino effect with Iran's nuclear program, and I noticed in
your testimony you said 15 countries in the Middle East. I
never realized that that many have announced new or revived
plans to explore civilian nuclear energy in 2006. What do you
think the regional governments think about Iran's nuclear
program?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I think most of them are very concerned
about it. In the gulf region, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia, they see it as a potential direct threat, because
they've had, some of them, territorial disputes, they have
sectorial disputes, Iran has, in the past, interfered in their
domestic politics. Other countries a little bit further afield
feel that if Iran had a nuclear weapons capability, their own
status would necessarily decline. Egypt used to be the center
of the Muslim world, and they see the financial center moving
to the gulf, they see the political center increasingly being
encroached upon by Iran, and they would worry about that
status. Turkey is in a kind of a similar position.
All of the--several of these countries, though, are willing
to forgo an enrichment and reprocessing capability. And I think
it's a very positive momentum that the United States and its
policies can try to promote this positive momentum. It'll be
very difficult to get Egypt to accept any constraints, as long
as Israel doesn't accept any constraints. And that's why a lot
of these issues are intertwined. But, there is some positive
momentum in the region.
Senator Kaufman. Great.
Ambassador Haass, you talked about how important public
opinion was. Is there anything the United States should be
doing, or could be doing, to influence public opinion in Iran,
about nuclear, especially?
Ambassador Haass. The best thing we can do, Senator, is to
come up with an offer that demonstrates to the Iranian man or
woman on the street how his or her standard of living would go
up significantly if Iran accepted the sort of limits the
international community wants to place on its nuclear program
and that this could be done consistent with Iran's pride, its
national honor. Or, to put it another way, that their
government is following a course, if they continue down the
nuclear path, that is sacrificing the quality of life for every
Iranian. Iran is not a democracy, but there is a degree of open
debate. There are democratic elements, if you will, in Iranian
society.
Future Iranian leaders will have to deal with this sort of
pressure from below. Our public diplomacy ought to be the exact
replica of our private diplomacy. So, we shouldn't think of
public diplomacy as something differently there. In this case,
it ought to be exactly the same as what we say, and I believe
that will help us with Iran. And, as I said before, it will
help us here at home, and it'll help us in Moscow, and, coming
back to your previous question, in Beijing.
Senator Kaufman. OK. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kaufman.
Let me just say to the panel, we have a vote that's gone
off. Senator Menendez will have his full time for questioning
and still be able to get over to make the vote. And I will
leave it to him to adjourn the hearing.
But, I just want to thank you, on behalf of the committee.
This has been enormously instructive, very, very helpful. There
are many other questions. We are going to leave the record
open, and we would like to impose on you to submit some
questions for the record, if we can.
The Chairman. And this is a conversation that will
continue. We have several days of hearings, some classified.
And subsequently, we'd like to engage as we sort of think about
the road forward.
But, this has been enormously helpful today. We thank you.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all for your testimony. I was grabbing at
some of it in my office, read some of it along the way. And I
have two sets of questions.
One is, there are news reports that came out today that
President Obama sent a letter to Russia's President last month
suggesting that he would back off deploying a new missile
defense system in Eastern Europe if Moscow would help stop Iran
from developing the long-range weapons that we are concerned
about. And that letter supposedly, further on, said the United
States would not need to proceed with such an interceptor
system, which, of course, the Russians have vigorously opposed,
if Iran halted any efforts to build nuclear warheads and
ballistic missiles.
Do you think that that is a sufficient enough incentive to
get the Russians to be engaged in a manner in which we would
like to see? And it's open to anyone who wants to----
Ambassador Haass. I would describe it as necessary, but
possibly not sufficient. There's a logic to it, in any event. I
think it was Secretary Gates who also noted the linkage, that
if the missile system is largely designed to counter an Iranian
missile that might be carrying a nuclear warhead, if we can get
Russian help to place a limit on the Iranian nuclear program,
the rationale for the missile program obviously fades
significantly. But, I don't think we could get what we want
from the Russians on this, in isolation from the rest of the
United States-Russian relationship.
And that, then, returns to something your former colleague,
Vice President Biden, said when he talked about resetting the
button on the United States-Russian relationship. The
administration will have to think about how hard we criticize
the Russians over what's going on domestically there, whether
we're willing to support WTO accession, the question of how we
handle, not just Georgia, but Georgian and Ukrainian desires to
become members of NATO, and so forth.
We are going to have to look at this against all those
factors. Also, there is the question of United States-Russian
nuclear negotiations. It's going to have to be done in the
fullness of the relationship. But, the short answer is, if we
were to make clear the linkage with the missile deployment
proposal, and if it were done in the context of an overall
improvement in United States-Russian relations, yes, then I
think this is manageable.
Senator Menendez. Anyone have a different view?
Ambassador Wisner. I don't have a different view, but I
would only add one more circle of complexity, and that is, it's
not just about the United States and Russia; we're going to
have to be extremely careful who we deal with the Czechs and
the Poles. And the way we presented the matter to NATO, there's
going to have to be an acceptance that the linkage we're
talking about, in fact, affects--is an effective linkage.
So, I think we've only seen a--my sense is that we've seen
just the tip of the iceberg of what is actually in play, and
we've got to learn a lot more before we can make a judgment.
Senator Menendez. Well, it sounds like a much broader
agenda in order to get them engaged in the way in which we
want. And the clock is ticking.
I've heard all of you basically testify, please let me know
if I'm wrong, that we should be more vigorously engaging Iran.
And the ``P5+1'' process committed themselves to a dual-track
process. But, I have not received a sense of what they view
that dual process--the elements of that dual process, moving
forward. Do you all have ideas about that? At the same time as
we're talking, the clock is also ticking, and so, what do you
think that dual process being, or should it be in the process,
both on the negotiation-engagement side, as well as on the
sanctions side?
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Senator.
I think everyone engaged in the P5 process is dedicated to
the proposition that Iran should be presented these clear
choices of either cooperating with the world and receiving
cooperation in exchange, or pursuing the path they are on, of
obtaining a nuclear weapons capability, and the isolation,
politically and economically, that goes with that.
And most of the other partners are willing to see some
strengthening of both sides of this choice, but there are
differences of opinion in the other nations.
Sometimes there is a view, in this country, that the
Europeans are united in thinking that we should only pursue
engagement, and not strengthen the disincentives part of it.
And the Europeans are quite different on that.
I work and live in London. The British and French are
probably to the right of the United States right now. They're a
little worried, frankly, about U.S. policy of unconditional
engagement. I think they will follow United States leadership,
but they have some concerns, because their policy had been that
if Iran broke the deal with them of suspending its enrichment
program, that there wouldn't be negotiations on the nuclear
front. So, we're going to have to work closely with the British
and French if the United States embarks on a different policy.
Senator Menendez. Any other views? Any views on what the
sanction side of this should be as we pursue the negotiation
side?
Ambassador Haass. Well, I think what's come out of the
conversation this morning, Senator, is a general view that
those sanctions and incentives ought to be linked fairly
directly to Iranian behavior in this area.
You could almost think of it as a sliding scale, that if
they continue down the path of, say, continued low enrichment,
there would be one mix of sanctions; and if they were to cross
certain other thresholds, they would then be met with an
escalation of sanctions. Conversely, if they dialed back their
capabilities, placed real limits on the scale of enrichment and
accepted intrusive inspections that gave the world confidence,
the mix of benefits and sanctions would turn more in the favor
of the benefits. So, it's almost useful to think of it as
multiple redlines, almost a spectrum, and then a rheostat of
approaches that blend desanctioning and sanctioning.
Such an approach has the advantage of having at least the
potential to garner some international support, which is
essential. It might also play well in Iran, because it makes
more stark the consequences of policy choices by the Iranian
Government, and we want them to have to think about those
consequences and put them on the defensive and force them to
think about, in advance, the difficulty of defending the
choices we don't want them to make.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you. I'm going to have to go
to this vote, but I appreciate your collective testimony and
your answers to my question.
And with that, seeing no other members, the committee is
adjourned. Thank you for your testimony.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kirsten Gillibrand,
U.S. Senator From New York
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this critical hearing. I want
to also recognize our distinguished panelists for joining us today to
share their expertise and recommendations and look forward to hearing
their testimony.
Iran's stated interest in nuclear technology is one of the most
serious national security challenges facing the United States and the
entire international community.
Over the past 8 years, we have seen the growth in Iran's power and
influence in the region, threatening our Nation's interests in the
Middle East.
Iran is a chief supporter of terrorist groups like Hezbollah and
Hamas, supplying them with both weapons and financial assistance to
carry out their attacks.
As we heard from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ADM Michael
Mullen, who I had the honor to meet with last week, Iran now has enough
uranium that if further purified, could be used to build an atomic
bomb--a process that could be completed in just months.
This alarming news is compounded by the fact that Iran's Government
is isolated and its economy vulnerable--making them even more dangerous
and unpredictable.
Iran's nuclear quest is an existential threat to our ally Israel,
the Middle East as a whole, and to world stability.
To address this growing concern, the United States has begun a
process of engagement with Iran. There is good reason to believe that
there are elements in Iran who recognize that it is in Iran's best
interest to engage.
Effective engagement now is essential.
Additionally, while offering positive incentives to Iran, the
United States must continue to strengthen international pressure to
make it clear to Iran that its failure to work with the international
community will have significant repercussions. We must continue to work
with Russia and China by using diplomatic solutions to influence Iran
favorably.
These additional measures should include targeted sanctions on the
Revolutionary Guard, which this body urged the Secretary of State to
include on the list of recognized terrorist groups; a measure I
supported.
We should also seek increased limitations on Iran's importation of
refined petroleum products. Despite being a major oil producer, Iran
imports close to half its gasoline. I support the efforts of our
colleagues in the House who recently sent a letter to Secretary of
Energy Chu requesting that he reevaluate a recent federal contract
awarded to the Swiss firm that is Iran's leading supplier of gasoline.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing
and I look forward to receiving the testimony of our distinguished
panelists.
______
Responses of Mark Fitzpatrick to Questions Submitted for the Record
from Senator John F. Kerry
Question #1. The February 2009 report by the IAEA Director General
found that Iran, at its Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, is reportedly
feeding uranium into nearly 4,000 centrifuges (of the ``IR-1'' design)
and has about 1,600 more installed in reserve. The latter figure is a
significant increase from the November report. The report also noted a
10-machine cascade of ``IR-2'' centrifuges and a single ``IR-3''
centrifuge.
Is there anything about the publicly available evidence,
such as the amount of uranium that has been fed into the
centrifuges, that provides information about whether Iran is
getting better at operating its centrifuges?
Answer. In 2008, Iran rapidly improved the operation of its
centrifuge cascades, moving from 20 percent to 85 percent of claimed
capacity (based on the UF6 feed rate). The most recent IAEA report
indicated a feed rate of 80 percent. It is not clear whether the feed
rate is based solely on technical capabilities or whether political
calculations are also a factor. However, the 80-85 percent feed rate
does suggest that Iran has overcome many of the technical difficulties
it previously was experiencing operating centrifuge cascades. Based on
the reported quantities of low-enriched uranium produced, Iran seems to
be maintaining a fairly steady rate of production with its operating
centrifuge machines. The ability to maintain steady production is an
important indicator of capability. At the current scale, however, this
consideration is only applicable to enrichment for weapons purposes. If
the main intent was the long-term production of low-enriched uranium
for power reactor fuel, Iran would not have rushed to install nearly
6,000 centrifuges before testing smaller cascades for longer sustained
periods.
What does Iran's development of two other designs of
centrifuges tell us about Iranian understanding of centrifuge
technology?
Answer. Iran's development of more advanced centrifuge designs
suggests a growing familiarization with this enrichment technology.
After having received a head start from the A.Q. Khan network, which
supplied it with both P-1 and P-2 centrifuge technology, Iran
apparently has been able to modify this technology further. Efforts to
produce advanced centrifuges appear to be still at the R&D stage. It is
not clear whether Iran has all the material and components it would
need to be able to produce large numbers of these newer centrifuges. If
there is such a bottleneck, strict export controls and sanctions
enforcement can help to keep Iran's program limited.
Question #2. The February 2009 report of the IAEA Director General
stated that the IAEA had not made any progress on the remaining issues
``which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of
Iran's nuclear programme.'' To make such progress, the report stated,
``Iran needs to provide substantive information, and access to relevant
documentation, locations and individuals, in connection with all of the
outstanding issues.''
Do you think the current Iranian regime will ever be able to
fully answer the questions about Iran's past efforts that the
IAEA has posed?
Answer. I see no reason why Iran would not be able to fully answer
questions about its past nuclear activities, but whether it will ever
summon the political will to do so is another matter, since it almost
surely would mean admission of nuclear weapons development work. Such a
full admission would probably require a strategic change on the part of
Iran to reject such work in the future. Obtaining a full admission of
past nuclear weapons work may also require a decision on the part of
the rest of the international community not to apply punitive sanctions
based on such an admission--a ``get out of jail free'' card, as it
were. This would be worth considering as long as it came with full
disclosure by Iran and verification measures that provided confidence
that its current nuclear activities were entirely for peaceful means.
What steps should the United States take or avoid to get
satisfactory answers to these questions?
Answer. The United States should continue to strongly support the
IAEA's investigation of Iran's past activities. Given the
administration's stated intent to engage in ``tough, direct'' diplomacy
with Iran, as reflected in President Obama's Nohruz message, the
context in which Iran must consider its stance at the IAEA may be
evolving. Of course, the United States and others should not lose sight
of the fact that the IAEA has a verification task in Iran regardless of
external political dynamics. That job is central not only to the Iran
issue, but to the continued viability of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.
Question #3. You stated in your testimony that publicly available
information suggests that, if Iran decided to build the core of a
nuclear weapon, it might take Iran at least 6 months to convert highly
enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to metal and fashion a weapon from
it, in addition to the several weeks it would take to enrich a
stockpile of low-enriched uranium to highly enriched levels. You also
say that Iran could not take the additional enrichment and conversion
steps you talked about to ready its low-enriched uranium stockpile for
a bomb without tipping off international inspectors. How quickly would
inspectors find out, and therefore, how much warning time might the
world have?
Answer. The IAEA conducts about 12 unannounced inspections a year
at Natanz, on a random basis. Although not all such random visits
include access to the cascade halls, the IAEA's surveillance cameras
can detect movements in and out of halls. In addition, the feed and
withdrawal areas are under containment and surveillance and checked
monthly. The safeguards measures at Natanz are not ideal; of particular
importance they do not include remote monitoring. At the current scale
of operations, however, the combination of unannounced inspections and
surveillance cameras means that if Iran were to try to divert nuclear
material or to produce HEU at Natanz, it would probably have no longer
than a month and probably less than that before the international
community was alerted through the IAEA.
Question. Do you believe that Iran has decided to develop a latent
deterrent by producing fissile material, even if it does not proceed
with weaponization or nuclear testing?
Answer. I have seen no evidence to suggest that Iran has made a
decision to produce weapons-usable fissile material. There is no need
for it to make such a decision for the time being, however, especially
since it could not produce any more than the bare minimum of highly
enriched uranium necessary for one implosion-type weapon. That said,
there is no plausible logic to the enrichment program at Natanz unless
it includes a desire to create at least the option to produce fissile
material for weapons.
Question #4. How relevant is any assessment of Iran's intentions,
given the relatively small amount of time it would take to convert a
program for ostensibly peaceful civilian uses into a bomb program?
Answer. In the case of Iran, capabilities are the most critical
factor in assessing worst-case possibilities, but intentions are not
irrelevant. If capabilities were all that mattered, nations might have
reason to be concerned by the small number of months it might take
countries such as Japan and the Netherlands to produce a nuclear
weapon. But these nations have not given any reason for concern about
their intentions. In the case of Iran, there are ample reasons to be
concerned.
Question #5. In your testimony, you mentioned ``strong evidence''
of past nuclear weapons development activities, including, for
instance, evidence of foreign assistance with experiments on a
detonator suitable for an implosion-type bomb. What unclassified
information is available regarding this foreign help you describe in
your testimony?
Answer. The IAEA's September 15, 2008, Iran report (GOV/2008/28)
said the Agency had obtained information indicating that
``experimentation in connection with symmetrical initiation of a
hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type
nuclear device . . . may have involved the assistance of foreign
expertise.'' An October 10, 2008, New York Times article by Elaine
Sciolino (``Nuclear Aid by Russian to Iranians Suspected'') reported
that the IAEA was investigating whether a Russian scientist, acting on
his own, helped Iran conduct complex experiments on how to detonate a
nuclear weapon. My own interviews have confirmed that the IAEA has
strong evidence that a former U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons expert was
working in Iran.
Question #6. The Iranians were caught red-handed in mid-2002
running a secret nuclear program in violation of their obligations to
the IAEA and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet they
managed to string out negotiations with the international community to
the point where today they are operating an enrichment facility buried
under about 75 feet of concrete to protect against possible air
strikes.
What impact does the Iranian case have on the NPT regime?
How will it affect the ability to restrain the ambitions of
other countries tempted to pursue a nuclear weapons capability
under the guise of a peaceful civilian nuclear program?
Answer. The NPT has withstood several challenges over the years and
remains a strong cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. If
the NPT system is unable to prevent Iran from producing nuclear
weapons, however, this failure may call into question the very purpose
and utility of the treaty, and it could trigger a proliferation turning
point. This is not to say that other nations would necessarily pursue a
nuclear weapons capability under the guise of a peaceful civilian
nuclear program. Even if the sanctions that are levied against Iran do
not ultimately persuade it to change its course, these sanctions, if
strong enough, can serve a secondary function as a disincentive to
others, if combined with other policy tools, including the
strengthening of defense commitments, that reduce proliferation
motivations.
How can we strengthen the NPT regime so that countries like
Iran are discouraged from following North Korea's example by
withdrawing from the NPT, barring IAEA inspectors, and
reconfiguring their technologies to produce weapons-grade
material?
Answer. The North Korean case underscores the need to strengthen
the NPT Article X withdrawal clause. I believe that, at a minimum, the
Security Council should adopt a resolution stating that an NPT party
that withdraws from the treaty remains responsible for safeguards
violations committed while it was a party to the treaty. The first
priority, however, should be on swift measures to stem proliferation
programs as soon as a problem is discovered. The U.N. Security Council
does not necessarily need to wait to take up a proliferation issue
until there is a formal IAEA finding of noncompliance.
Pierre Goldschmidt, a former Deputy Director General of the
IAEA, has proposed that the Security Council pass a resolution
establishing automatic actions that would take place if a
country were to withdraw from the NPT, and making clear that if
such a country is in violation of the NPT when it withdraws,
its obligations under the treaty would continue and all nuclear
materials previously provided to it would be withdrawn. How
useful would such a Security Council resolution be, and how
difficult would it be to pass it?
Answer. Dr. Goldschmidt's proposal has strong merit, in that it
would establish a new legal standard ensuring that states cannot easily
escape their NPT obligations and pay no legal penalty for violations.
Adopting such a resolution would be difficult, however. The members of
the Security Council have generally resisted resolutions that would
provide for automatic responses to future situations.
Question #7. In your testimony you portrayed the nuclear program
envisioned by the United Arab Emirates as a model for the region. The
United States and the United Arab Emirates have signed an agreement for
cooperation on civil nuclear energy, though it has not yet entered into
force. That agreement is built on the UAE carrying out a pledge to
forgo domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing
facilities.
Should the United States cooperate with the UAE civilian
program, even with the concerns about their ability to prevent
sensitive technologies from being diverted to other
destinations?
Answer. A nuclear cooperation agreement that locks in the UAE's
commitment not to pursue enrichment or reprocessing technologies would
be a useful precedent and would set a very clear contrast with the case
of Iran. I believe it would be inadvisable to hold up the proposed 123
agreement with the UAE on other grounds, such as the past history of
Dubai as a hub for the Khan nuclear black market network. The UAE is
implementing new export control laws put in place at Washington's
recommendation. In order to crack down on Iranian front companies, the
UAE in 2008 sharply reduced the number of business licenses and work
visas to Iranian citizens. Nevertheless, UAE export controls still need
to be tightened, particularly in the emirate of Dubai, in order to stem
the flow of illicit transshipments to Iran in contravention of U.N.
sanctions. One way to assist the UAE in this effort would be to give
the U.N.-Iran sanctions monitoring committee real responsibility and a
hands-on role by stationing customs experts in Dubai.
Should we offer a similar deal--cooperation on civil nuclear
matters in exchange for a civilian nuclear industry that did
not include enrichment and reprocessing facilities--to other
countries in the region?
Answer. If states agree not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing
and agree to full nuclear transparency through good-faith
implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, then there is no reason
on proliferation grounds not to enter into nuclear cooperation
agreements that codify such agreements. Indeed, it would be ideal if
such conditions became the ``gold standard'' and were encouraged by
other nuclear exporting states as well.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
