[Senate Hearing 111-39]
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[111 Senate Hearings]
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S. Hrg. 111-39
U.S. STRATEGY REGARDING IRAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
March 5, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew, CSIS counselor and trustee, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC............ 5
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts............. 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana................ 3
Scowcroft, Lieutenant General Brent, USAF [Ret.], president, the
Scowcroft Group, Washington, DC................................ 7
(iii)
U.S. STRATEGY REGARDING IRAN
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THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Feingold, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Lugar, and Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I apologize
to folks for starting a little bit late. It's my fault. I was
at the Finance Committee, where we're struggling with health
care in preparation for the White House meeting this afternoon.
So I apologize that we are delayed.
It is a really very, very special occasion. We're
privileged and excited about the opportunity to have these two
distinguished witnesses here today. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and
General Brent Scowcroft are two of the most insightful
strategic thinkers and distinguished public servants in our
country. We've been very, very lucky, and Presidents of both
parties have been very lucky to have their advice and counsel
through many, many years.
I can think of no better way to cap off this week's series
of hearings on Iran and its troubling nuclear program. If
America is going to successfully overcome this extraordinarily
difficult and pressing foreign policy challenge--I don't think
anybody missed the Supreme Ayatollah's comments yesterday about
Israel or about the Obama administration--we're clearly going
to need the kind of wisdom, the kind of insight which today's
witnesses have demonstrated throughout their careers.
On Tuesday we heard from four top experts on Iran's nuclear
program about the difficulties the United States and our
partners will face in dealing with this program. Ambassador
Frank Wisner, Ambassador Richard Haass, Mark Fitzpatrick, and
Karim Sadjadpour gave us some honest answers about the
seriousness of the challenge, the realities that we have to
confront when dealing with Iran, and the diplomatic efforts
that will be required to avoid some day being left with the
potential unacceptable choice between accepting a nuclear-armed
Iran or attacking its facilities.
Yesterday the committee received a classified update from
the Intelligence Community, and most members of the committee
were there to get the latest update on the status of Iran's
nuclear missile programs, as well as the internal political
dynamics, and the regional situation, to understand the playing
field.
Today we've asked Dr. Brzezinski and General Scowcroft to
help us look broadly at the security challenge that Iran poses,
so that we can lay out a vision for the way forward. Both of
these individuals know what it's like to walk into the Oval
Office or to the Situation Room and stare at an almost
overwhelming list of problems and have to figure out where the
real priorities are and where the real opportunities for
progress might be. They also understand as well as anyone in
the country all of the risks tied to those choices. They know
how to construct and implement a multifaceted approach to
achieve an ultimate strategic goal.
If there ever was an urgent challenge that will require a
multidimensional solution, surely it is this apparent race by
Iran to develop a nuclear weapon capacity. We know this is a
challenge that we're not going to deal with in isolation or
hope we don't have to deal with in isolation. It's not just an
American problem. It's not just an American perception that
suggests that it is a problem. And it is best not just, and
probably cannot be just, an American solution.
We know that, although Iran may have some distance to go
before it can test or deploy a nuclear weapon, it is daily
producing more reactor-grade uranium that can be further
enriched to provide the guts of a nuclear weapon.
I have long said that, following consultation with our
allies and partners, we have to engage directly with Iran, and
I'm glad that this idea's day appears to be coming. But as I
said on Tuesday, we've got to be honest with ourselves. We're
not going to solve this problem just by talking directly to
Iran. While Iran was just talking to the IAEA and the
Europeans, it deftly sidestepped every supposed redline laid
down by the international community. While Iran was just
talking to the world, it moved to the threshold of becoming a
nuclear-capable state.
Iran's leaders need to understand that the full weight of
the international community will bear down on them if Iran
continues to defy the United Nations Security Council and the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
I would remind people, Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty. Iran has obligations under that treaty.
Iran also has rights under that treaty, and those rights have
not always been appropriately put on the table. It is deemed by
virtue of the secrecy of their actions and their unwillingness
to answer questions that they are in violation of those rights,
and that is essentially the quandary, the place of
confrontation that we find ourselves in.
So we need to understand also and Iran needs to understand
that the talks that we envision will not be a substitute for
Iran's requirement to meet its international obligations.
At the same time as we engage, we have to understand that
it is by far better to get other countries on board with our
strategy. For diplomacy to succeed, we need the full backing of
our allies in Europe, as well as Russia, China, and other
countries that trade extensively with Iran. We must quickly
engage with those countries and construct a robust and
sustainable energy.
The President's recent announcement of a responsible
redeployment plan for Iraq, which comes with bipartisan support
and with the support and endorsement and input of our leading
generals--General Petraeus, General Odierno, and others--can be
an additional source of leverage in dealing with Iran because
it repositions us. But we will only be negotiating from a
position of renewed strength if we also reassure our allies in
the region that they will not be cut adrift for the sake of
making progress with Iran.
So in short, we need to act boldly, wisely, and quickly
with our allies and partners to win agreement on the way
forward and to engage Iran backed by real consequences for its
continued noncompliance.
I want to emphasize, as I'm confident that both of our
witnesses will and I'm sure that my colleague Senator Lugar
will, we are not seeking a confrontation, nor do I believe that
there's some overt effort that we're stuck on with respect to
regime change or anything else. I think it is better for the
world to see the possibilities of constructively moving on
issues of mutual interest. On Tuesday we heard many of those
issues of mutual interest, ranging from Afghanistan to Taliban
to counternarcotics efforts and many other things.
So I am hopeful that a solution to this problem will lie
within our reach through diplomatic processes, and I'm looking
forward to today's discussion on our witnesses' guidance and
recommendations on how we can achieve the best way forward.
Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
join you in welcoming our distinguished guests. They are both
very dear friends personally, as well as very good friends of
this committee through their faithful testimony throughout the
years. They've been generous with their time and counsel on
foreign policy issues in the past and we look forward to their
views today on Iran.
On Tuesday, as you pointed out, the committee heard
testimony from four distinguished foreign policy experts, and
they provided helpful analysis of the policy options available
to the United States in responding to threats posed by Iran.
The United States agenda with Iran involves numerous issues,
including the nuclear program, support for terrorist
organizations, its relevance to our efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, its threat to the security of Israel, its impact
on stability in the Persian Gulf region, its status as an
energy exporter, its relationship with Shiite communities in
the Middle East, and prospects for long-term improvements in
the United States-Iranian relationship.
Although all of these issues are interconnected, concerns
about Iran's nuclear program have understandably dominated
discourse, given the risks and the consequences of
proliferation and the uncertain status of Iran's nuclear
program. Potential leverage stemming from the economic stress
on Iran caused by the drop of world oil prices and the fresh
start provided by the Obama government also contribute to the
sense that the time is ripe for a concerted multilateral effort
to constrain Iran's nuclear program.
Our hearing on Tuesday provided an opportunity to examine
such questions as whether the Iranian Government can be induced
to limit its nuclear program, what set of multilateral
sanctions and incentives might achieve this goal, and whether
success would likely require recognition of a limited Iranian
right to enrich. There was broad agreement that restraining
Iran's nuclear ambitions would require greater cooperation with
allies and partners, most of whom have commercial interests
with Iran and independent views about the Teheran regime.
This leads to such questions as what compromises should we
be willing to make in our approach to Iran to ensure a tightly
unified coalition, and should the United States make explicit
to the Chinese and to the Russians that cooperation on Iran is
at the very top of our agenda with those nations.
Beyond Iran's nuclear program, the United States Government
should also be preparing a strategy for engaging Iran on other
issues, and such engagement should not undercut multilateral
efforts on the nuclear question. Rather, it should seek to
establish communications that can avoid miscalculation, open up
the possibility of cooperation on points of agreement, and
facilitate information flowing to the Iranian people.
Last year when Under Secretary of State Bill Burns joined
representatives of the other P5+1 governments in a meeting with
the Iranian nuclear negotiator, it signaled a shift in United
States policy. But we still have not established a clear course
of action on bilateral engagement, and some suggest the first
step should be a low-level meeting between United States and
Iranian officials that would set the parameters for future
discussions. Others argue that a public, top-down approach that
clarifies ambiguities and sets the context for subsequent
discussions is preferable.
Both Dr. Brzezinski and General Scowcroft have deep
experience in constructing these types of strategies. I am
hopeful they will offer thoughts about how a potential United
States-Iranian dialog could begin and how it should be
structured.
Last, I would ask our witnesses to comment on the
advisability and timing of opening a United States visa office
or interest section in Iran. I support establishing a modest
diplomatic presence in Iran. Such an outpost would facilitate
more exchange and outreach with the Iranian people and improve
our ability to interpret what is going on in that country.
I thank the Chairman again for this hearing and I look
forward to today's testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator Lugar. I
appreciate enormously again sort of the jointness of the
statements we made. I might add that I join you in that call
for the interest section, which I had hoped we would have
achieved last fall actually, before the change in
administration. But I think it would be beneficial to move
forward on that soon.
Gentlemen, thank you again for being here. Dr. Brzezinski,
if you would lead off. We'd ask you both if you'd sort of give
summaries of testimony so we can maximize the give and take
with the committee. Dr. Brzezinski, if you'd lead off. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, CSIS COUNSELOR AND
TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. Thank
you for having us here.
I had the opportunity to read the testimony given to you on
Tuesday by Richard Haass, and I agree with its generalized
approach. Therefore, I am going to focus much more narrowly in
my own comments on the negotiating process with Iran that the
President intends to undertake.
It seems to me that the negotiating process can be seen as
guided by essentially alternative strategic objectives. At one
extreme, the negotiating process can be designed deliberately
to fail, but to do so in a manner that places the onus for the
failure directly on the other party. That can be an objective
of negotiations. At the other extreme, the negotiating process
can be deliberately designed to seek a formula for an
acceptable compromise that satisfies the basic interests of
both parties.
To be specific, if the goal is to encourage, for example,
the Iranians to be intransigent and in effect deliberately to
strengthen the role of extremists, thereby justifying
alternative courses of action than negotiations because the
negotiations have failed, the United States should publicly,
first of all, insist that Iran meet certain basic preconditions
even prior to the negotiating process, in effect seeking Iran
to make fundamental concessions prior to the negotiations.
Second, we should publicly threaten Iran with more
sanctions if Iran is not compliant in the negotiating process.
Third, we should keep asserting publicly that force and the
use of force remains an option that may be exercised against
Iran.
We can also, fourth, keep saying publicly that it is one of
our political objectives to achieve regime change in Iran.
Last but not least, we should continue publicly to label
the Iranian Government as a terrorist entity, thereby inflaming
the public mood in Iran, and impose time limits on the duration
of the negotiations.
Such an approach would certainly achieve its obvious
objective: to make certain that the negotiations are not
productive and that Iran's intransigence is the cause of the
failure.
The alternative approach, of course, should be rather
different. It should seek to engage Iran in a process in which
there emerges the possibility of some consensual arrangement.
That of course means that we can and should consult privately
with our allies regarding the consequences of the lack of
progress, including the possibility subsequently of imposing
more stringent sanctions. We can evaluate, to the extent that
it is feasible, other options, perhaps of a more coercive
character. But we also have to be very careful not to set
restrictions on ourselves which dramatically limit our choice
of action and impose on us a pattern of conduct which could
lead us in the direction of an eventual collision.
Obviously, the achievement of a nuclear capability by Iran
would be a disaster, and I'm quoting President Sarkozy, who
said exactly that. But President Sarkozy also said that the
military collision with Iran, the bombing of Iran, would be a
disaster, and hence our strategy has to be guided by the
central strategic objective of avoiding both disasters.
That means that we have to approach the negotiating process
with some degree of patience, prudence, and with a deliberate
effort to shape the atmospherics of the engagement because
atmospherics of the engagement are not only important to the
negotiating process itself, but they affect Iranian public
opinion, and that there is a latent Iranian public opinion, and
we do know that a great many people in Iran are not in sympathy
with the attitudes so perversely expressed by Ahmadinejad, more
recently even by the Supreme Leader, either regarding us, the
Holocaust, or Israel.
In that context, I think we should be prepared to exploit
an opening which, probably unintentionally, the Iranians are
giving us. I have in mind a striking contrast between the North
Korean approach to the negotiations and the Iranian approach to
this issue. The North Koreans have said publicly: ``We want
nuclear weapons, we are seeking nuclear weapons.'' Indeed, at
one point or another: ``We have achieved nuclear weapons.'' The
Iranians are saying to us: ``We do not want nuclear weapons; we
do not seek nuclear weapons; our religion forbids us to have
nuclear weapons.''
I don't say that this is necessarily a credible statement,
but it is a statement which can be picked up in the sense that
our response to the Iranians can indicate: ``We are prepared to
explore the veracity of these assertions; we have grounds for
being suspicions; we need to be reassured. But if you're
serious about these statements, then by all means let us
examine means that will make us and the international community
certain that you are not seeking nuclear weapons, that in fact
you don't want them, and that, as you claim, your religion
forbids them.''
That seems to me to be a goal that the negotiations should
be designed to pursue; and therefore, we should be very careful
to avoid any approach which in advance impedes the process of
negotiations, inflames the context in which they'll be pursued,
and makes it easier for people like Ahmadinejad to goad the
United States and to undercut public support for the
negotiating process in the United States and in the
international community.
What I have now said does collide with some of the advice
or some of the considerations that are currently being
discussed in the United States. It seems to me that we run the
risk of wanting to have our cake and eating it too; of engaging
in polemics and diatribes with the Iranians while at the same
time engaging seemingly in a negotiating process. The first is
not conducive to the second.
I am not naive enough to think that the negotiating process
would be productive quickly. I am not certain that it will be
productive in the long run. But I know that if we prejudice its
chances in the short run, we will not have the opportunity to
push the process over the longer run. That means that we should
avoid time limits on the negotiations because they create a
sense of urgency and pressure which is inimical to serious
exploration of the issues. We should consult very quietly with
our allies about what alternative means of pressure we may
choose at some point to apply. But
we should start the negotiating process on the basis of a
serious determination to explore the degree to which there are
openings for accommodation.
There are ambiguities in the Iranian posture. There are
some indications, according to various reports, that the
Iranians are not moving at full speed to acquire nuclear
weapons. They may be seeking the capability to be a proto-
nuclear country, but not to cross the threshold of actual
weaponization or a level that would make weaponization possible
in the near future.
We should also be very careful also not to become
susceptible to advice from interested parties regarding how we
ought to proceed. There is a fascinating article in yesterday's
Haaretz on the advice that Secretary of State Clinton was given
in Jerusalem yesterday on how we ought to proceed with the
negotiating process. I would suggest that members of the
committee become acquainted with that advice. I have some
reservations regarding parts of it because it seems to me that
if we follow it closely we will be sucked into a process in
which escalation of tensions and mutual accusations will poison
the effort at negotiations even at the very start.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski, for a very, very
interesting and helpful approach and I look forward to
following up with questions.
General Scowcroft.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, USAF [RET.],
PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar,
members of the committee. It's a real privilege to come before
you today to talk about such an important issue.
Iran is an important state in the Middle East, with a proud
history stretching back for centuries. Unfortunately, both
Americans and Iranians tend to look at each other through the
prism of the last 30 years. Before that time, under the Shah,
Iran was our bastion of regional stability. When we replaced
the British as the outside power in the region, we counted on
the Shah to preserve stability in the region. After he was
forced into exile and with the seizure of our Embassy, we and
the Iranians developed an intense, visceral dislike of each
other.
It seems to me that now we need to get past our emotions in
order to deal effectively with the problem. Obviously, a first
step needs to be a willingness to talk to Iranian officials.
Given our mutual histories and antipathies, each side will want
to make sure it's found the right interlocutor. This is not a
straightforward task in the Iranian context.
Furthermore, I believe now is a time of opportunity and one
where we ought to try to encourage the tendencies in Iranian to
liberalize. Voting patterns of the Iranian people indicate they
want a more open regime. At the end of the day the Iranian
regime is not what is revolutionary in Iran. The revolution in
Iran is the people's desire for more openness. The
conservatives, the mullahs, want to hold things back.
Ahmadinejad is not the senior-most official we sometimes
make him out to be. But when our policies and actions encourage
an appeal to Iranian nationalism, at which Ahmadinejad is a
master, we play into his hands. We help him use anti-
Americanism to bring the country together. Put differently, the
conservatives in Iran have actually been helped by our
policies. We need to stop talking about regime change as the
objective of U.S. policy and instead to engage in discussions
with the right Iranian interlocutors to give flower to the more
liberal tendencies in Iran, which in turn may put pressure on
the extremists to evolve.
From a U.S. perspective, I think there are two issues at
the heart of a dialog and they are interrelated. The first is
Iran and its role in the region, and the second is Iran and
nuclear weapons. The fact is that Iran lives in a turbulent
region, where it perceives itself to be threatened. It's a Shia
state in a generally Sunni region. It's a Persian state in a
generally Arab region. We need to be willing to engage Iran in
strategic discussions and make clear we understand that Iran
has legitimate security interests and concerns that will
persuade Iran that it can be secure without the need to acquire
nuclear weapons and that its continued pursuit of its current
nuclear program will make it less rather than more secure.
America likewise needs to convince Iran that we understand
it's an important state in the region. For example, Iran is
bound to be involved in what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan
because Iraq borders it on the west and Afghanistan on the
east. If Washington and Teheran can work together to help these
countries achieve stability, it would be productive for the
entire region.
I've heard both Israeli and Arab officials express concern
that the U.S. might cut a deal with Iran at the expense of the
Arab community. I sincerely believe this is an unwarranted
concern. America's principal interest is lasting stability in
the Middle East and the gulf region. This can only result from
an understanding that deals satisfactorily with the concerns of
all the states in the region and one that's endorsed by all the
states in the region. Nevertheless, we need to recognize that
these concerns on the part of Iran's neighbors are real and
deeply felt and that any engagement with Iran needs to be both
preceded and accompanied by close consultations with all of the
neighbors.
On the nuclear issue, we need to reiterate that, while the
international community supports Iran having peaceful nuclear
power, civilian nuclear power program under proper safeguards,
a unilateral nuclear program that provides even a latent
nuclear weapons capability is destabilizing for the region.
I do not doubt that the Iranian desire to master the
enrichment process is partly motivated by dangers Teheran sees
in the region. But we need to convince Iran that it would in
fact be worse off were it to succeed in developing a nuclear
weapons capability. This is, I think, of utmost importance
because we stand on the cusp of a great flowering of
proliferation if Iran develops such a capability.
However, I would approach the Iranian nuclear issue through
a strategic approach, rather than as a precondition to a
broader dialog, which has been the case in the past. At the end
of the day, the dialog would convey two fundamental messages to
Teheran. First, we're aware that you live in a dangerous region
and we are prepared to discuss a regional security framework
that addresses your legitimate security concerns. As a
corollary, we recognize that Iran is an important and
influential power in the region, and we want to work with you
on issues of mutual interest. Second, in pursuing your
enrichment program you're proceeding on a course that
destabilizes the whole region and will make you, Iran, less
rather than more secure.
I believe we can and indeed should work through both
bilateral and multilateral channels in parallel. Our
willingness to engage directly with Iran is a form of leverage,
a way to both mobilize more from our partners and to disarm
Iran's arguments that we're only out to change the regime in
Teheran. That is, we can reach out to Iran on a bilateral basis
and also show that the U.S. is fully engaged in the
multilateral P5+1, that is the Permanent 5 of the Security
Council plus Germany, process.
It would be important to secure--to share responsibility
with the P5+1 and to engage fully with China and Russia. Just
as we need to have close and continuing consultations with
Iran's neighbors to assure them we will not make a deal at
their expense, we should engage with the P5+1 to ensure they
see our bilateral engagement with Teheran as reinforcing rather
than undermining the multilateral mechanism.
Thus far, that multilateral process has not worked, in part
I believe because there has not been solidarity among the P5+1.
I don't think any of them want Iran to continue with their
enrichment program, but they have not been willing thus far to
put their bilateral interests at risk. I believe we need to
create incentives for the other members of the P5+1 to share
more equitably the burdens and risks of increasing the pressure
on Iran if it continues on its present course. To this end, for
example, we should take our wider relations with the P5+1, and
particularly those of Russia, into account. For example, it
seems eminently sensible to me to adjust our missile defense
plans in Eastern Europe if Russia actively helps deal with the
threat that Iran acquires nuclear weapons technology. But we
should also persuade our P5+1 partners to increase pressure on
Iran in a meaningful manner should talks with Iran fail to
reach a satisfactory conclusion, and engaging and reaching out
for those talks will help encourage that result.
An essential goal of our strategy should be to present Iran
with a solid international front. While the NPT does not
prevent Iran from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel
as long as it abides by the IAEA rules, enriching and
reprocessing are not really acceptable things to do for Iran or
anyone else in the region, or even broader. I think that a U.N.
or other international mechanism that guarantees the provision
of enriched uranium fuel to powerplants is a vastly preferable
way to go.
This is not just a problem we have with Iran, although Iran
is the poster child for it. It's a nuclear problem. If Iran
continues to enrich uranium, I suspect that Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey at a minimum will feel compelled to have the
same capability as they move toward development of their
civilian nuclear power programs. And soon we will have a flood
of enrichment programs, putting many countries within a few
steps of producing weapons-grade uranium and with it a latent
weapons capability. That would not be a better world for
anyone.
So Iran could well be a tipping point on the proliferation
issue. Anything that allows Iran to enrich uranium is a deadly
peril to the goal of containing proliferation capabilities in
the world.
I think we should say to the Iranians: We, the nuclear
weapons states, encourage peaceful nuclear power. We want to
support nuclear power. To do that, we're prepared to support a
mechanism which would provide enriched uranium for nuclear
powerplants at a price below any cost which a particular nation
can produce it nationally, and take responsibility for removing
the spent fuel after it's burned. We will give an international
organization such as IAEA control of the process so that the
United States cannot if we don't like your policies cut off
supplies.
This would be applicable to all countries of the region,
not just Iran. And that's why I say we need to address the
Iranian nuclear program, not as an isolated problem, but in the
context of achieving an international regime that encourages
nuclear power, but without the threat of enrichment or
reprocessing.
In conclusion, I think the situation, as my colleague said,
requires sophisticated diplomacy, looking at all the elements
of a very complicated problem. We need to make clear not only
what we need from the Iranians, but also what we're prepared to
do to address their legitimate concerns. We have some
substantial cards to play in a bilateral dialogue with Iran:
recognition of Iran's important role in the region and support
for a peaceful nuclear program, which might include nuclear
fuel at costs otherwise not possible.
Direct talks with Iran will not be easy. They will not be
easy to organize. It's difficult to know who to talk to. But we
need to go the last mile with Iran, making clear we're not
trying to freeze them out of their rightful role in the region.
We must be realistic about prospects of success and we must
have some patience. If the talks succeed, we will have
fundamentally advanced the peace and security of the region. If
it turns out that Iran is simply too intransigent, then we will
at least have strengthened our hand in leading an international
effort to restrain Iran by having shown our willingness to go
the last mile.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, General. Thank you both again for
very, very important testimony.
We are going to proceed with a 7-minute round because of
the number of Senators here, and we want to make sure everybody
gets a chance to ask questions.
First of all, Dr. Brzezinski, you twice in your testimony
said: ``Don't set limits on ourselves''; and a second time you
said: ``Avoid time limits.'' Is there not, by virtue of Iran's
own activities and Israel's perception of those activities, as
well as our own intelligence community's interpretations of
those activities, isn't there an automatic timetable thrust on
us as a consequence, unless there is some indication by Iran of
a willingness to change that timetable?
Dr. Brzezinski. When I say that there should be no
timetable, I'm not suggesting that we should engage in
indefinite, endless negotiations. What I am saying is that
openly imposing time limits in advance creates a degree of
pressure which is not conducive to a serious negotiating
process.
Throughout the entire negotiating process, however long it
lasts, whether it's months or several years, we will be in a
position always to ask ourselves, are we being strung out? Is
the other side doing things outside of the negotiating table
that jeopardize the whole negotiating process and justifies its
abortion? We always retain that right. But I'm saying don't set
time limits in advance.
That is the advice, for example, that Secretary Clinton was
given yesterday: A time limit must be set for the talks. Well,
if there is a time limit set for the talks, can we keep it
secret? What is its impact if it's announced in advance? I
think it is damaging to the negotiating process.
We can also do things outside of the negotiating process
which help to create a greater degree of security and
confidence, not only on our own part or of our immediate allies
engaged in this venture, but also in the region. For example, I
am of the view that as we go into the negotiating process we
should at some point make it clear that we are prepared to
extend the nuclear umbrella to all of our friends in the Middle
East because for different reasons there are misgivings both in
Israel and in the Arab countries, whether it be the Emirates or
even Egypt and Saudi Arabia, about what the Iranians are doing.
A U.S. nuclear umbrella would reemphasize the importance of
deterrence.
I think we have to some extent lost sight of the relevance
of our very extensive experience with nuclear deterrence. It
has worked. It worked with the Stalinist regime which was
ominous, tyrannical, and murderous. It worked with the Chinese,
whose leader at one time talked about a nuclear war not being
so serious because it will kill only 300 million people. The
Indians and the Pakistanis have managed to deter each other,
knock on wood, so far.
In brief, the experience with deterrence gives us some
grounds for not being under tremendous time limits. And in any
case, we know that deterrence is predictable if it works.
Military action sets in motion unforeseeable circumstances,
which in the present context of the Middle East, the Persian
Gulf, Afghanistan and Pakistan would be absolutely devastating
to the American national interest.
The Chairman. Let me ask you both. Time sort of runs so
rapidly on these things, but I want to follow up, I want to
follow up on that because the equation of perception of
deterrence for Israel, given the nature of the region and the
challenges that are being thrown at them is somewhat different,
I think, than the nature of the deterrence that we went through
for those years of the cold war. And we could probably have a
good discussion about that, but before we do I put it on the
table.
I want to ask both of you. The Iranians are listening to
this. A lot of members of the Arab community are listening to
this. The world is listening to this. You are two very
experienced, thoughtful folks who people respect around the
world with respect to this kind of an issue. So as we begin
this hearing and lay this out, I do think it's really important
to put into context.
We have a bad record with the Iranians: 1953 and the CIA
involvement in the overthrow; their perceptions of what we did
in Iraq; the Congress's public embrace of a regime change
resolution and concept. If you're sitting in Iran and you see
the history of that, you're going to make some judgments. The
United States pulled out of the ABM Treaty. The United States
has refused to ratify the CTB Treaty. You can run--it's
important in these processes always to think about how the
other person sees you, and you know that better than anybody
else.
So would both of you please lay out why this--from their
perception as they think about our intentions and the
seriousness of our purpose here, why is this more, when we say
they shouldn't have a nuclear weapon, why is that more than
just us saying something vis-a-vis Israel? Why is that more
than the United States holding onto its Perm-5 status with the
other four members of it plus those who have already sort of
broken out?
What is it that is so critical here that brings the
Russians, the other countries in the region, the Europeans, and
the United States to say, with justification, it might bring us
to a point of confrontation, that Iran should not have a
nuclear weapon? Would you both sort of articulate that as
clearly as you can?
General Scowcroft. Yes, I will. I think it is because, as I
indicated in my remarks, we're on the cusp of an explosion of
proliferation, and Iran is now the poster child. If Iran is
allowed to go forward, in self-defense or for a variety of
reasons we could have half a dozen countries in the region and
20 or 30 more around the world doing the same thing just in
case.
That is not a better world, and it seems to me that is what
gives urgency to what we're trying to do here. So I think we
need to do what we can to reassure Iran that we recognize their
problems and we're prepared to help them deal with the
problems, that we do our best to solidify the P5+1 process, so
that Iran is facing a monolith saying ``Don't do this.'' And
then if that is not successful, then we're in a better position
to mobilize the P5 with the kind of sanctions that can really
punish Iran short of a conflict.
So I think all of these have to play together.
The Chairman. Building into that, as you answer, Dr.
Brzezinski, you very wisely left out sort of how people
perceive those threats. And what you say, if those threats
become too public and if there's too much concentration of
people, does it become a matter of nationalistic expression of
right, if you will, if not pride, that they say: The hell with
all of you; we're going to do this because you are ganging up
on us, in a sense. Is there a counterimpact? Dr. Brzezinski?
Dr. Brzezinski. I think there's a lot of evidence for that.
Even the Nobel Prize winner for literature----
The Chairman. Could you pull the mike a little closer.
Dr. Brzezinski. There's a lot of evidence for what you
said. Even a winner of the international Nobel Prize for
Literature, the Iranian lady, who is a critic of the
Government, has stated publicly: ``We all support the nuclear
program. This is a matter of principle, of pride, for many
Iranians of national well-being.'' So we have to be careful
about that, because if we are awkward in our approach, if we're
one-sided, if we seem to be seeking negotiations in order to
impose, we'll simply unify the Iranians and make it easier for
them to do what they're doing. So that's point No. 1.
Point No. 2: I do think that taking the position publicly
that the United States guarantees the security of every
potentially threatened country in the Middle East with its own
nuclear deterrent, would have a lot of credibility and it would
reduce this threat that concerns many Israelis, that they're
existentially threatened.
Actually, I don't think they are existentially threatened
because I don't see Iran the moment it gets its first nuclear
weapon using it in a suicidal act, because the retaliation
would be totally destructive. In fact, we were under a much
greater existential threat when Brent was sitting in the White
House, when I was sitting in the White House, and we were
involved in helping the President coordinate the nuclear
response in the event of an attack. We could have been
devastated in 6 hours and still faced the option of whether to
respond or to be finished up completely because of the size and
the followup potential of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. We lived
in that reality for years without claiming that we have to
disarm the Soviet Union somehow in order to continue. So I
think deterrence can help a lot.
We also, it seems to me, ought to be more active
internationally in promoting nuclear disarmament, because part
of the charge against us in many parts of the world is that
we're seeking to preserve a monopoly for ourselves, maybe for
two or three more countries.
So I think these are the kind of things we can do to
mitigate some of the problems that we face.
The Chairman. Could you just finish the part of the
question about the articulation of why it is so imperative that
Iran not have this weapon, and the justification for our
unified actions to achieve that?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, actually, on that point, curiously
enough, what the Iranians say publicly is consistent with our
position. They say they don't want nuclear weapons. We have
reason to suspect----
The Chairman. But they don't answer the questions put to
them by the IAEA----
Dr. Brzezinski. That's right. So we have reason to
suspect----
The Chairman [continuing]. About what they do in secret.
Dr. Brzezinski. We have reason to suspect that this is a
mendacious assertion. But as long as they claim that this is
truly their fundamental position, we are in a position to say
to them: ``In that case, let's negotiate an arrangement that
makes it absolutely credible to the world at large that in fact
you are not seeking nuclear weapons and you will not have
them.''
The Chairman. And you do agree with General Scowcroft on
the rationale for why they should not have it?
Dr. Brzezinski. Yes. The potential for nuclear
dissemination I think is the real threat, not that they will
use their first bomb to start a war in which they will perish.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Brzezinski, earlier in your testimony
you mentioned a point that one of our witnesses on Tuesday also
mentioned, and that is that the Supreme Ruler is the major
factor, major leader in Iran, as opposed to Ahmadinejad. I want
to pursue that for just a moment, to ask you and General
Scowcroft. In your judgment, does the Supreme Ruler really want
to have a relationship with us, that is the United States, or,
more broadly, with the West? Or does the Supreme Ruler believe
that his security, regime, and authority is based upon not
having such a relationship?
What is your judgment about his preference or his security
in this situation?
Dr. Brzezinski. I have somewhat mixed feelings. I think the
essence of the regime makes it inclined to be wary of a closer
relationship with us because to them we are the Great Satan,
and that in a sense justifies their own role in Iran.
But one also can note at times some shades of disagreement
between the Supreme Leader and Ahmadinejad. I think many
Iranians think that Ahmadinejad is a bit of a nut and that he's
damaging Iranian standing in the world, that his verbal
exercises suggest a high degree of dementia, and this does not
fill a country with genuine historical pride in itself with
much respect.
So there are these differences. I think our task is to
avoid becoming engaged directly in their political contests
while creating an external international context which favors
the evolution of the Iranian public in a more and more moderate
direction. We do have plenty of evidence that, particularly in
the large urban centers, among the younger people, among the
intellectuals, there is a sense that the extremist agenda is
counterproductive to Iran's wellbeing as well as to its
international standing.
Senator Lugar. But even if public opinion in Iran is in
favor of negotiating with the United States, does it make any
difference? In other words, if this is a theocratic regime of
the Supreme Leader, leaving aside whatever Ahmadinejad's
situation is, my basic question is, should our negotiating
posture be one of focusing on the Supreme Ruler? Is he inclined
to want to negotiate, or is his position one in which he sees
security by not doing so?
Dr. Brzezinski. We have no choice, because there is a
Supreme Leader and he is in charge. If we negotiate with the
Iranians, we are presumably negotiating ultimately with him.
But our objective ought to be in the process to create the
conditions in which it becomes evident to the top people in the
Iranian elite that it is in their own domestic political
interest to move in a somewhat more moderate direction.
Let's not forget, while we have, rightly so, a very
negative assessment of the Iranian theocracy, it is a theocracy
wedded to a political process that's considerably more
democratic than Russia's. The elections in Iran are much more
of a real contest and they're much more open, and there is a
much greater degree of competition between the key alternatives
in Iran than there is in Russia.
Senator Lugar. General Scowcroft, do you have a comment on
this subject?
General Scowcroft. Well, I agree in general with what
Zbigniew said. I don't think we know about the Supreme Leader,
but it seems to me, first, he has no reason to feel kindly
toward the United States. Second, he probably has as his
minimum achievement preserving the regime in Iran. Now, there
are others in Iran who are more revolutionary than the Supreme
Leader. The IRG, at least some elements, are prepared to
sacrifice Iran in the larger jihadist movement.
But we need to find out, and I think we need to pose those
issues to him in a way he will make the reasonable decision.
One of the interesting things that we're going to see, though,
is, I agree with Zbigniew we should not appear to interfere in
any way in the election process, but now we're going to have
Ahmadinejad running, we're going to have Khatemi running, and
apparently Larijani. That's a fascinating political lineup, and
one in which, if they're all allowed to run, the Iranian people
will really get to say whether they like the Ahmadinejad
nationalistic, xenophobic approach, or whether they like
Khatemi's more open, embracing posture.
So I think we have a lot to work with here, but we have to
be careful that we encourage the good side and don't push Iran
back into their fortress mentality.
Senator Lugar. The reason I ask is, just being the devil's
advocate for a moment, the election may be very interesting and
quite competitive and we are extremely interested in its
outcome. But I want to return to the point that despite all of
the debate and interest, if down deep the Supreme Ruler feels
that the regime needs to retain, if not hostility to us and to
the West, at least no particular accommodation, and that a
nuclear program is a part of that situation what are the real
prospects for an agreement. I am focusing on this because we've
had a lot of testimony that public opinion is important, that
we ought to have transparency as we formulate our policy,
transparency as we formulate relations with the Europeans, and
I think there's logic to that, so that the Iranian people see
all of this, or anybody who is in Iran. But when it finally
comes down to it, even if they do see all of it, what authority
do they have or what ability to change the mind of the Supreme
Ruler or those who are closest to him in a theocracy that has a
set pattern?
Dr. Brzezinski. The Supreme Leader, as well as the entire
Iranian leadership, has to also consider the overall condition
of the economy, the question of social stability, the wellbeing
of the people. There is, after all, some reciprocal
relationship between the rulers and the people, even in an
autocracy, in which there is a sense of kind of commonweal,
common destiny.
This is a country with genuine traditions of statecraft and
historical and cultural pride. It is also a country in which
the social indicators suggest that it is a country moving
toward an increasingly higher level of modernity, certainly
comparable in many respects to Turkey in the level of literacy,
access to universities, particularly of women, amount of women
in law, medicine, and so forth, there is even a woman who is a
vice president of the country. Most Americans probably don't
know that.
This is a country in which increasingly large numbers of
people go on vacations, particularly to Turkey, less so to
Europe, but towards the West. In other words, this is a country
in which some of the social dynamics, not very visible under
this super-overlay of theocratic fanaticism, are actually
evolving. And even the Supreme Leader, to the extent that he
wishes to remain a leader, has to take these considerations
into account.
If we can subtly encourage that process by avoiding a
posture which is easy for him and his associates to translate
to the public as being dedicated to unlimited hostility toward
Iran, I think we help the interests that we're anxious to
promote, and we help perhaps even in the long run to revive at
some point in the future the traditional amity, even at one
point alliance, between Israel and Iran.
Israel and Iran were in a close relationship under Golda
Meir, including the beginnings of the nuclear relationship.
Iran received help from Israel during the Iran-Iraq War under
Prime Minister Begin. Prime Minister Rabin once said that
Israel and Iran are natural allies, I assume because of the
principle that the neighbor of my neighbor is my friend, and
it's a perfectly sensible and well-tried principle.
So I am simply saying we should not lock ourselves into a
posture in which we view the current enmity with Iran as
something indefinitely enduring, and that we do have some
subtle means to try to alter that, with some receptivity in
Iran that we can nurture as well.
Senator Lugar. My time is up, but it would be interesting
to pursue how the Supreme Leader looks at the regional balance
of power, terrorism, economic picture, and Iran's history. In
other words, there might be some reasons why the Supreme Leader
could come under some circumstances to a different view toward
us.
Dr. Brzezinski. Right. And let's not be deceived by the
word ``Supreme.'' He is the leader, but supremacy in every
system has some limits. In their system it has more limits,
let's say, than in some others.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The chairman has asked me to recognize Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I thank the chair, and I want to thank
Chairman Kerry for his leadership in making sure we have a
particular emphasis on Iran this week. I think it has been very
useful.
I particularly want to thank these distinguished witnesses,
not only for their superb careers, but in particular for the
quality and the clarity of the testimony today. It's just so
helpful and interesting to listen to. Thank you very much.
As you both know, Iran poses a threat for a number of
reasons, including its nuclear ambitions, its missile
capabilities, and its support for terrorist groups. How would
you rank these in terms of how direct the threat is to the
United States and its interests and its allies and in terms of
the urgency and seriousness of the threat? And also, how should
we factor in the missile threat to Europe into our threat
analysis?
General Scowcroft. Well, I'm not sure I can rank them
because I think they're all serious problems. The nuclear
threat I think is probably the most serious in terms of the
world impact if they get away with it. But I think it is also
the one where we are likely to get the greatest amount of
support in dealing with it if we go about it the right way. For
example, a missile deployment, defensive missile deployment in
Eastern Europe. The previous President said at least a couple
of times, we cannot allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, and
yet we're building a missile deployment for when they do. Now,
if you're the Russians what do you take from that?
It seems to me that the way to go is go to the Russians and
say, look, neither of us want nuclear weapons to be developed;
let's work together. Then we don't need this, and we're
prepared to delay long enough so that we can see whether or not
it's necessary, and if it's necessary for us it's necessary for
you. It's a different approach.
With the Chinese it's a little different. The Chinese get a
lot of oil and Iran is a good customer. But what happens if
there's a turmoil in the Middle East, a conflict in the Middle
East? What happens to their oil supply?
So everybody has important interests, if we can draw them
together. I think Iran as a power in the region, it's very
important for us, but probably less apocalyptic in the sense
that they can help us or hurt us in our dealings with Iraq and
with Afghanistan. We had some incipient cooperation with them
in the early days of our operations in Afghanistan, which fell
apart.
So I think we have to deal on all fronts equally, and I
would not prioritize.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, do you want to comment on that?
Dr. Brzezinski. Let me just add this, and perhaps this may
be a little controversial. We're talking about a relationship
and you mentioned the issue of threat. There is an American-
Iranian relationship and if you look at the relationship you
have to ask yourself in what way, to what degree, they're
affecting us adversely, but you also have to ask yourself: How
does it look to the Iranians? Who threatens whom more? Are we
more threatened by the Iranians or are the Iranians more
threatened by us?
For example, who talks about the use of force a lot? And
who has infinitely more force? So it's a little more
complicated than, ``are they a big threat to us?'' Yes, some of
the things they do affect our interests adversely, but some of
the things we do probably are a source of very major concern to
them.
There's a further consideration involved here. We have
become extremely casual in the use of the word ``terrorism.''
We don't like somebody, well, of course he's a terrorist.
That's a slippery slope and it doesn't help to really deal with
the complexities of the issues. It also eventually reduces the
word ``terrorism'' to political convenience. Note, for example,
our negotiations with North Korea, a terrorist state; but if
they agree to what we say to them on plutonium, we'll take you
off the list as a terrorist state. What's one got to do with
the other?
Senator Feingold. I think your point is well taken on that.
I would add that Iran is a very disturbing country, but any
country that watches another country invade the country to its
west and the country to its east is going to get a little
nervous and edgy, which of course is exactly what we've done.
So that people have to understand the mutual perceptions
between our two countries, the history is a very disturbing one
ever since Mossadeq was taken out, and that this is something
that we have to look at from both points of view.
At a Foreign Relations Committee hearing earlier this week,
one of the witnesses, Karim Sadjadpour from the Carnegie
Endowment argued that building confidence with Iran is critical
to a productive dialog, a process that he said ``will be easier
if our efforts initially concentrate on areas of shared
interest, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, rather than those of
little or no common interest, such as the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the nuclear issue.''
Do you agree with this approach? If you start a dialog on
points of common concern, how do you then direct it toward
other national security concerns like the nuclear program or
support for terrorist organizations, or whatever term you want
to use, doctor?
Dr. Brzezinski. In my view, they need not be sequential.
They could be parallel. I recently commented publicly on
President Obama's timetable for withdrawal from Iraq. My point
was that for that to be effective and to minimize the
potentially destabilizing consequences of our departure we
ought to launch simultaneously with the withdrawal process an
effort to engage all of Iraq's neighbors in regional security
negotiations, because every one of Iraq's neighbors will be
affected adversely if Iraq becomes destabilized. That includes
Iran and Syria. So I favor security talks which include the
Iranians regarding Iraq. Similarly, I think we had a rather
constructive relationship briefly with the Iranians late in
2001 and in 2002 regarding the Taliban issue in Afghanistan. I
think that could be resumed as well. And at the same time I do
favor the initiation of talks directly with the Iranians
involving us particularly, not just through our European
friends, regarding the nuclear program. I think that should be
initiated before too long. I've already tried to articulate the
context and the manner in which this should be done.
But I'm also of the view--and I think this question was
raised either by Senator Kerry or Senator Lugar and we didn't
respond--that we not delay these talks, unless the Iranians
want to delay them, past the Iranian selections. I would rather
start them at a low level, a low key fashion, before the
elections, so that Ahmadinejad cannot claim in the course of
the elections that the Americans are waiting to negotiate with
Iran after he is defeated, which would then perhaps help him.
So let's start the process now, which woul d, of course, under
the mandate of the Supreme Leader in any case.
So I hope that's responsive to what you asked.
Senator Feingold. General, did you want to make a quick
comment on the strategy for negotiations that the doctor
responded to?
General Scowcroft. Well, I would just say that we ought to
start them in as comprehensive a fashion as we can. We don't
know. We're not used to talking to the Iranians and that will
take some time. Even finding out who to talk to usefully will
be a major challenge. So I would not say this is more
important, let's focus on this. I would start and push on all
fronts, and we'll see what's productive and what isn't
productive as we go along. This will take exquisite diplomacy.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. I
appreciate it.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and your testimony. I want
to ask you, is there doubt in either of your minds that Iran is
seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability?
Dr. Brzezinski. I would put it this way. If I had to make a
categorical judgment, I would say that they are probably at
this stage aiming at having a capability somewhat similar to
that of Japan, which is an NPT signatory, which is not in
violation of the treaty, but which has reached a threshold in
which it is what I call a proto-nuclear power, that is to say
one that could rapidly move towards effective nuclear weapons
capability if there is a political decision to that effect, but
will not cross that threshold in the near future.
Senator Menendez. General.
General Scowcroft. I would not dissent from what Zbigniew
just said. I think we make a mistake or have recently in
claiming that they seek a nuclear weapon, because it seems to
me the problem is there whether they want a nuclear weapon or
whether they simply want to control their civilian power and
have their own enrichment capability. I think that is almost as
big a threat because, as I say, I am more concerned about the
spread of nuclear capability in terms especially of uranium
enrichment than Iran itself having a weapon. I think that is a
much bigger threat, the general threat.
When we say--when we say, well, you want a nuclear weapon,
and they say, no, we don't, then a lot of the world who's
suspicious of us anyway says, well, what's our point? I think
we have to go after the broader question, not the narrow
question.
Senator Menendez. Well, I raise the question----
Dr. Brzezinski. Could I just add one sentence?
Senator Menendez. Surely.
Dr. Brzezinski. This is exactly what we should not be
saying, and I quote: ``They have declared they want to have a
nuclear weapon to destroy people.'' A statement by the
President of the United States in March 21 of last year. It's
absolutely false. They have never declared that.
General Scowcroft. That hurts us.
Dr. Brzezinski. That hurts us.
Senator Menendez. I asked the question because----
The Chairman. For people who don't keep track of the dates,
that's the other President. [Laughter.]
Dr. Brzezinski. March 21, 2008.
Senator Menendez. I asked the question because if Iran's
nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, then one must
ask themselves why they've refused to cooperate with the IAEA,
why do they continue to act in defiance of multiple U.N.
Security Council resolutions. It clearly raises the concern
that if you have peaceful purposes at the end of the day you'd
act differently in order to assure the world that you have
peaceful purposes at the end of the day.
General Scowcroft. Well, they have answers to those
questions. Their argument why they need their own enrichment
program is that they've tried to cooperate and the Germans were
going to build the first plant, they backed off. We were going
to supply enriched uranium to them; we backed off. Unless they
have control of it, they are subject to the whims of the great
powers. That's their argument.
They simply don't answer the question, why don't they let
the IAEA have free run. They simply don't answer it.
Senator Menendez. Well, let me ask you this. If the goal of
engagement is to dissuade Iran from continuing its enrichment
work and acquiring a weapon or a breakout capability, do you
believe that it can work in the necessarily short time frame
that we have, based upon some of the reports that we've seen
about where their capabilities are at this point?
General Scowcroft. Yes, I think it can. I don't know if it
will. I don't know if it'll work at all. But it seems to me
that it is worth a try, because in the process of trying, if
the United States is really sincere, we're likely to get on
board people who suspect now, who say we're sitting off in the
corner throwing rocks at them, asking for sanctions, but not
trying to solve the problem. If we can convince everybody else
that Iran is implacable and only the use of coercive force,
sanctions or whatever will work, then we're in a much better
position than we're in right now, because we're the bad cop and
so everybody else just goes about doing their own business.
Dr. Brzezinski. I agree with that.
Senator Menendez. But the time is ticking on us as well.
General Scowcroft. Yes.
Senator Menendez. We have an enormous challenge here. It's
not that we have an open-ended opportunity.
Let me ask you one last question. Just yesterday Iran's
president called Israel a ``cancerous tumor,'' and it called
upon Muslims to join in what he calls ``resistance'' against
Israel. Earlier this week, President Abbas said, ``We are
sending a message to the Iranians and others to stop
interfering in our affairs.''
I just wonder, how do you characterize Iran's behavior
within the region? And looking at that behavior, how would
acquiring nuclear capability embolden Iran as a power within
the region?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, obviously if Iran had a nuclear
weapons capability it would probably be emboldened, and this is
why we do not desire that outcome and we are prepared to work
against it. The question is how are we going to be effective in
working against it. In my view we should not rule out the
negotiating process, especially given the repeated commitments
by the Iranians to the effect that they don't want nuclear
weapons, but they do want a nuclear program.
I think we ought to try to see whether it is possible to
find a formula whereby these seemingly incompatible objectives
are somehow squared. We shouldn't overdramatize the immediate
international effects of having a bomb. I agree with Brent that
the most important effect will be the impetus towards
proliferation in the region, but it's not going to be some sort
of a suicidal nuclear war. That is really an extreme,
fundamentally irrational assumption for which there is no
proof, and simply anxiety and uncertainty cannot be the basis
for serious action.
This is, whether we like it or not, a serious country of 70
million people, with a tradition of responsible statecraft by
and large. It is a country that is profoundly aware of the fact
it's totally vulnerable to an attack by us, or even eventually
by the Israelis; if push came to shove and they had to use
their nuclear weapons against Iran they could greatly damage
that country. There's no evidence that Iran as a country, with
its traditions, its self-interest, its pride, is bent on
committing suicide.
We never felt that about the Chinese. We never felt that
about the Russians. The Pakistanis and the Indians have managed
to control their mutual anxieties. I don't see any evidence
that the Iranians, the moment they have a bomb, which I think
we can postpone or avoid, are going to plunge head-long into
suicidal adventurism.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez.
Let me just say that, through the wonders of Blackberries,
I can tell you that Secretary Clinton, who is now in Brussels,
has announced that the Obama administration is going to be
convening a meeting on Afghanistan on the 31st of this month.
And Robert Wood, the spokesperson for the State Department, has
publicly stated that that meeting will include Foreign Minister
and/or equivalent from Iran, because obviously that's important
to Afghanistan.
So I think a process is already under way and I think
that's a wise--first of all, it's wise to meet on Afghanistan.
Second, it's wise to be inclusive.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the sustained focus this week on Iran and the challenge that it
presents.
We want to welcome----
The Chairman. Let me just also announce--I apologize,
Senator--there's a vote that I think has been scheduled now for
12:10. So we'll try to push through here and I think we should
be able to wrap up by that time, because I know both of these
folks have another engagement.
Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. General, thank you. Doctor, thank you. As I
told you in the anteroom, I purchased your book, with my own
funds.
General Scowcroft. But you also said you haven't read it.
[Laughter.]
Senator Casey. And I haven't read it. I was about to admit
that. But I'll tell you, when you have that book in your office
on a coffee table and you get visitors, it impresses them. I
want you to know that. [Laughter.]
Senator Casey. So now I get----
General Scowcroft. We're happy to be of service.
Senator Casey. The next time you appear you'll have to quiz
me and see if I actually got to it. But I'll do my best.
But it's instructive for us on this committee to have a
book like that and have resources like that in your testimony
today, and I know this isn't the only testimony you're
providing today. But we're grateful for your service to the
country and for your continuing work on these difficult issues.
I wanted to try to get to maybe three issues rather
quickly, but the first one probably taking the majority of the
time. That's on sanctions. We read about as citizens and as
Senators stories and analyses about how sanctions are working
or not working in the context of Iran. I guess I'd ask you
generally, based upon your knowledge of this particular
challenge, but also more broadly your experience in foreign
affairs in similar circumstances, to evaluate the efficacy or
effectiveness of the sanctions to date, mostly of course in the
Bush Administration; and then also what your recommendations
would be or how would you construct sanctions going forward
with regard to Iran, in the context of obviously the Security
Council, but also what our government does and says in the
context of what sanctions can work.
We know that the financial sanctions and that isolation
becomes part of this, but also refining capacity. That's always
put on the table as probably a lot more serious step to take.
Please give us your evaluation of where we are on sanctions and
where we should be headed?
General Scowcroft. Well, Senator, I think we're not very
far on sanctions, but I think it's partly due to reluctance of
many of the major countries of the world to hurt what is a good
commerce, and also to the attitude of the United States
because, as we both said, we have not been participating in the
dialog with Iran. First of all, we said before we'll talk to
Iran they have to suspend enrichment, so they have to give away
their biggest card before they sit down at the table. And
that's been the general attitude. So there's been a great
reluctance to agree to sanctions that are anything more than
showing symbolic solidarity.
Sanctions generally are a very imperfect instrument. In
this case, sanctions would require--I think they could be very
effective, but they will require sincere acceptance by the
major powers. As you say, oil refining; Iran has to import a
lot of its refined product. That's a tremendous weapon for
sanctions, but it takes agreement and it takes--people get hurt
by it, and the reaction could be that Iran cuts off exports of
crude, which hurts everybody, including Iran.
So it's a complicated issue. But I think potentially, if
the P5+1 could get to the point there's nothing left, then I
think sanctions could be really effective.
Senator Casey. Doctor.
Dr. Brzezinski. I basically agree. I think they work at the
margins, but they don't work on fundamental issues. Look at
ILSA. It really hasn't achieved its objectives in a strategic
sense. In the present economic crisis, I think there could be
also complications with our friends if we are arbitrary about
them.
As Brent just said, just think what it would do to the
European quest for energy security diversification if we could
get Iranian oil and gas to be really exported at full capacity,
particularly to Europe. So in fact let's be careful not to
throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask you about the question of
how we talk and the strategy that's employed to make sure that
any kind of effort to have a new approach to talking, whether
it's bilateral or multilateral. If you were designing the next
6 months, so to speak, of our policy, how would you design it
and what would the structure be for how to construct a process
to make sure that talking and engagement leads to results that
you can identify, you can almost quantify? We know this
administration has a different point of view than the prior
administration about engaging Iran, how would you, if you were
designing it construct it?
Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I would certainly avoid the things I
talked about early on in my testimony. I think we have to
approach these talks as a serious, potentially a very important
undertaking. And we ought to do it in a fashion which respects
the interlocutor.
I would start with the Iranians simply by trying to first
of all draw up some sort of a mutually agreed agenda regarding
an analysis of the record in the nuclear area--in what respects
the Iranians have been compliant with NPT and with IAEA; what
are the accusations against noncompliance; what are the areas
in which suspicions and concerns can be narrowed--pointing then
to some perhaps mutual advantages in accommodation, beginning
to spell out the benefits to Iran of an accommodation in which
we have assurances that they're not doing what they say they're
not doing and in which their compliance with standards gives
them tangible benefits.
The joint memo of the ministers of the Five of last June I
think outlined a potential agenda, and I think this could be
then examined in much more detail. That process probably would
take us into the summer. By then there will have been elections
in Iran. We'll see what the political situation is and then we
can again reassess and see how we go from there.
We will not get much assistance from the Chinese or the
Russians unless we are prepared to be patient. The Chinese are
extraordinarily vulnerable to a crisis in the Persian Gulf,
extraordinarily vulnerable. This is where their position is
somewhat different from the Russians. The Russians, who may
have reservations about Iran going nuclear, would be
financially massive beneficiaries of an American-Iranian
crisis.
Senator Casey. I know I'm out of time by a minute, so we
can move on.
The Chairman. It's an important and it's an important
answer.
Senator Kaufman.
Senator Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for
holding these hearings and holding them together like this. It
really makes them very, very helpful to me. I think Dave
Ignatius got it right. He wrote a column earlier in February
saying that you two are the A Team for Iran. I totally,
absolutely, I agree with him.
Dr. Brzezinski. I'm sure he was doing us a favor.
Senator Kaufman. Well, I think he absolutely nailed it, to
tell you the truth.
General Scowcroft. He's trying to get rid of us.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kaufman. I think not.
You know, what he said in the article, and just listening
to you here today, that there's a real agreement between the
two of you that this new engagement policy's a good one. But
there was a little disagreement, he said--and I couldn't see
any clarification to that--whether we should do this in public
or in private. Could the two of you just talk about carrying
on--the excellent question that Senator Casey asked: Is it best
to do it in public or in private?
General Scowcroft. I think that depends heavily on the
Iranians. And we do differ somewhat, I believe, on that. I
would be inclined to start off in private, for this reason:
That negotiations with the Americans is a very controversial
issue inside Iran, and we don't know whether people in the end
are afraid to stick their necks out to be seen negotiating with
the Americans.
I had some experience with that in the first, the Bush
Senior administration, where we got very close to negotiations
and they backed out at the last minute. So I would let it
depend, but I would make the first overtures with the Iranians
quiet ones. First of all, we've got to figure out, get a
serious interlocutor on their side, and that's not easy. Who do
you talk to? The government? That's who foreigners should talk
to. But the government doesn't hold the power.
So there are all kinds of problems here, but I would be
inclined to start quietly.
Dr. Brzezinski. We may have narrowed our disagreement by
what you just said. First overtures, of course they have to be
done quietly. How else can we do it? We're not going to do it
on television or radio. So yes, preliminary discussions
quietly.
But once the negotiating process starts, I would favor
conducting it openly, not necessarily with open sessions, but
sessions that are publicly known, maybe even some press
briefings afterwards if there is agreement about press
briefings. My reason is this: If you do it secretly, first of
all there'll be a lot of suspicions by outsiders as to what's
going on. Second, you place yourself at the mercy of the party
that is prepared to leak and to distort. And given the
negotiating record of the Iranians, with whom, sadly, I have to
say, I had to negotiate, I don't have that much confidence that
the process would be protected and that the secrecy wouldn't be
exploited at some moment to create something awkward for us.
Senator Kaufman. General, you talked about how other
nations, once Iran developed a nuclear capability, other
nations in the region--I think you said Syria and the Saudis,
Syria and Turkey, would be interested in going ahead. I know
yesterday I've got a quote here where President Abbas said that
the Palestinians--he criticized Iran for their interference.
Clearly he wasn't happy with the Palestinians. The Saudi
Foreign Minister warned other Arab and foreign leaders in Cairo
on the Iranian challenge, the need for a joint position among
Arab States on Iran's nuclear program.
It seems to me there's a--and I know this is too
simplistic, but it seems to me there's a lot of people in the
region who are very much interested in Iran not getting a
nuclear capability. Can the two of us give us kind of ideas of,
is this something we can work on to try to help forestall
Iran's nuclear capability?
General Scowcroft. Well, I think there is, there's a lot of
fear. As a matter of fact, there's a lot of fear of Iran in the
region. It seems to me one of the ways we can take advantage of
that is to point out to Iran the consequences of their going
ahead will not be to improve their security, but will be to
make them less secure because of the reaction that will be
produced in the rest of the region.
Senator Kaufman. Dr. Brzezinski, you talked about keeping
the military option on the table----
Dr. Brzezinski. Off the table.
Senator Kaufman. Off the table. And said that we could use
it under some circumstances?
Dr. Brzezinski. These would have to be extreme
circumstances, because we know what it takes to maintain
deterrence and we can reinforce it, and I've tried to suggest
today how we could reinforce it by giving guarantees to Egypt,
Israel, Saudi Arabia, and so forth--the full American umbrella.
We cannot predict the consequences of a military action with
Iran, except that we can anticipate that they'll be very
difficult for us in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Persian Gulf,
more generally financially and economically, and perhaps in
terms of renewed global isolation.
So I think as a serious proposition the use of force ought
to be reserved in most cases either to anticipate and prevent
at the last moment someone else's use of force or in response
to an attack. But I think preventive warfare is not a good
bargain in the nuclear age, nor is it a good bargain for the
United States when we're already running the risk of being
bogged down for the next 10 years, maybe 20 years, in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Senator Kaufman. Could you just talk about--and you talked
about a number of things. What do you think the impact would be
in Pakistan if we used the military, or someone used the
military option against Iran?
Dr. Brzezinski. What would be the impact where?
Senator Kaufman. On Pakistan, their government.
Dr. Brzezinski. I think it would be very mixed, but
probably in an overall sense it would intensify anti-
Americanism, because it will be interpreted as another case of
the United States going to war against an Islamic country. And
there are a number of Shiites of some significance in Pakistan.
I think more generally it will be part of this feeling, which
is already pervasive, that we have locked ourselves into a kind
of anti-Islamic posture which is in their view very one-sided,
and which is I think becoming more pervasive, sad to say, in
Pakistan in general, and is thereby transforming the Afghan
problem for us into an Afghan-Pakistani problem, making it
increasingly difficult to resolve.
I just think that if we got into a military conflict with
Iran--and I have no hesitation in saying this publicly--it
would absolutely devastate the historical legacy of the Obama
presidency and damage the United States, which is even more
important.
Senator Kaufman. I'm out of time, but General.
General Scowcroft. I broadly agree with that. The use of
force sometimes looks like an easy option: cut through all the
nonsense, get to the core of it. But force brings its own
momentum. It changes the nature of the game, and I think in
this case it would change it strongly against the United States
and its interests in the region.
Dr. Brzezinski. And it's unpredictable.
General Scowcroft. Hmm?
Dr. Brzezinski. And it's unpredictable.
General Scowcroft. It's always--that's what I say. It
changes the whole nature of the game, as we found out in Iraq.
Senator Kaufman. Thank you, and thank you both for your
great service to this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you so much, Senator Kaufman, for a
terrific line from both you and Senator Casey. Good questions.
I think you covered the bases that we left open.
We for once have serendipitous timing with the United
States Senate here, because we're actually starting the vote
just as we're concluding the questions. So that's pretty good.
Yesterday I had the privilege of speaking at Brookings
Institute on the Middle East and laid out some thoughts about
Iran. I think--and not just Iran, but the entire peace process.
I really am grateful, as Senator Lugar is, for your testimony
here today, which dovetails into that. I am convinced we've got
to be smart, restrained, thoughtful, skilled in our diplomacy,
so that we have an opportunity to really pursue every avenue
with the greatest potential for success. It would be silly to
shut those down ourselves.
I thought Dr. Brzezinski's opening comments about how you
can certainly structure a negotiation to be unsuccessful, I
think it was a very polite way of looking backwards without
necessarily saying he was looking backward. But the reality is
that I am convinced, as I think our witnesses are today and
Senator Lugar, that there are much better prospects than the
current climate would seem to tell us.
There's a reason, obviously, for all the negative sides of
the choices we face, to hold out hope that we can take
advantage of those. So I hope the leaders of Iran are listening
carefully, that nobody has come here today seeking the down
side of this relationship, but rather hopefully diplomacy in
the next months can produce a productive transition that can be
effective not just for Iranian-American relations, but for the
entire region, and indeed set an example hopefully for some
transition that could take place on a global basis.
The interconnectedness of these issues is really critical
for all of us to see, and as we look at the increased tensions
and volatility of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan,
Somalia--and you can run the list--we have to understand how
these steps are really going to be related to how people
perceive us and what we can achieve in those other places.
So we thank you for contributing to this dialogue this
morning. I would not disagree with the notion that somehow the
two of you ought to be very much engaged in this effort with
respect to Iran, and I will do my part to--and hopefully it
won't be against your will--to see that we can get your
expertise to work.
Senator Lugar, do you want to say anything?
Senator Lugar. I just join you in thanking our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you so much.
We stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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