[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-88]
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 28, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
Eryn Robinson, Professional Staff Member
Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
Andrew Tabler, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, July 28, 2009, Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management...... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, July 28, 2009........................................... 27
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2009
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Miller, Hon. Jeff, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 1
WITNESSES
D'Agostino, Davi M., Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office.............. 21
Heyman, Hon. David, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 2
Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 6
Stockton, Hon. Paul N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
D'Agostino, Davi M........................................... 64
Heyman, Hon. David........................................... 34
Miller, Hon. Jeff............................................ 32
Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr.................................. 56
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 31
Stockton, Hon. Paul N........................................ 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 28, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Smith. Good morning. I will call the meeting to order.
Welcome.
I have an opening statement that I have submitted for the
record and will, with unanimous consent, just if we have that
read into the record, and make a couple of quick comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Smith. We mostly want to hear from the panel on a very
important issue that we are talking about this morning on
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear--preventing
those attacks on the United States. It is a very complicated
issue, mainly because so many different people are working on
it. Trying to make sure we keep that coordinated and have a
comprehensive strategy that maximizes our resources is a
challenge, and one that we will always have to work on, and
something that is very important for this committee.
And more than anything, we on this committee want to make
sure that this continues to be a priority within the Department
of Defense (DOD). I know there are a lot of competing
interests, a lot of competing challenges--certainly from
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, a number of different other
issues--that it is easy for this to sort of slip a little bit,
just because it is not happening immediately, not happening
right now.
It is a big threat that we want to make sure never happens.
And to do that, I think we need to constantly work as much as
possible to make sure that this stays a high priority for the
Department of Defense and for our entire government. And that
is the main purpose of our hearing is to get the update this
morning on where we are at from our witnesses, who I will
introduce in a moment.
But first, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Mr.
Miller, for any opening comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MILLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL
THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
you having this timely hearing. I thank the witnesses who are
going to testify before us today. I have a statement that I
would also like to have entered into the record.
But we know that ensuring that DOD can provide a much-
needed capability really is the reason that we are here today,
and to hear testimony from Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and DOD on the military's consequent management
capability.
I would like to ask that, as we delve into this critical
and important topic, that I would like to hear comments on the
national strategy and the national military strategy to combat
weapons of mass destruction, which I am sure we will hear more
about. And as we noted in this year's defense bill, there seems
to be a divergence in the application of the concepts contained
in those strategy documents.
So, I would like to hear your thoughts on what might be
lacking, what might be effective in our overall plan in
organizing to deal with this threat. And I look forward to
hearing your testimony today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.
With that, I will introduce the panel, and then I will take
you left to right.
We have the Honorable David Heyman, who is the assistant
secretary of homeland security for policy in the United States
Department of Homeland Security--welcome.
The Honorable Paul Stockton, who is the assistant secretary
of defense for homeland defense and America's security affairs,
the United States Department of Defense.
We are joined again also by General Victor ``Gene''
Renuart, the United States Air Force commander of U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense
Command.
They don't give out short titles over at the Pentagon to
anybody, I don't think.
So, welcome.
Mr. Heyman, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Heyman. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Miller, thank
you for inviting me here today and for the opportunity to
address you.
The topic of the hearing is consequence management of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-consequence
or high-yield explosive attacks--otherwise known as CBRNE. It
is a topic that sits at the intersection of what I believe are
three winding roads: the spread of transnational terrorism; the
proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the advancement and
diffusion of biotechnology.
Our top priority at the department is to secure the
American people from a range of terrorist threats. Preventing
CBRNE attacks is at the core of Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)'s mission and the reason the department was, in fact,
created. So, too, is ensuring we are prepared to respond for
any attack that may occur despite the nation's best efforts.
Consequence management is a critical element in our
nation's efforts to ensure that we are resilient in the face of
an attack. We can be a more resilient nation. The more robust
we are, the more agile we are responding to an attack, the more
rapidly we can recover.
But I want to stress that, alongside any discussion of our
ability to respond to and recover from an attack, we need to
also talk about prevention. Prevention and resiliency are two
sides of the same coin, or to mix metaphors, they are the yin
and yang of the nation's ability to manage risk.
My testimony, which I will submit for the record, focuses
primarily on biological and nuclear threats, because they are
particularly of high consequence. Our best CBRNE defense is to
put in place national and, in some cases, international systems
consisting of robust prevention, protection, response and
recovery capabilities.
This is not simply a DHS responsibility. It is a national
interest, requiring a comprehensive, integrated and layered
approach, which combines the capabilities and resources of many
entities across not only the federal government, but across
levels of society. I have detailed these layers in my written
statement.
As Secretary Napolitano has said, one of our principal
priorities within the department's all-hazard mission is to
ensure that the nation can respond and recover from any
incident, including terrorist attacks. The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 tasked DHS with coordinating the federal
government's civilian efforts to identify and develop
countermeasures to CBRNE and other emerging terrorist threats.
A number of national security and homeland security
presidential directives, including particularly HSPD-5, the
Management of Domestic Incidents, further defined the
department's roles and responsibilities for consequence
management. These authorities are also detailed in my written
statement.
When we consider nuclear threats, our emphasis must be
primarily on preventing an attack, because the consequences
would be catastrophic. As such, the nation's first line of
defense against a nuclear attack is to ensure the control of
nuclear materials and prevent the proliferation of nuclear
technologies.
If radiological materials and nuclear weapons cannot be
controlled at its source, the next layer is to detect and
interdict their movement. That is where DHS plays a critical
role.
Should these defenses fail, however, DHS and its partners
must be ready to respond. Like natural disasters, a terrorist
nuclear attack would be handled by the primary response arm of
the Department of Homeland Security, and that is the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA. FEMA rapidly deploys to
assist state and local officials in disaster-stricken areas.
Unlike radiological and nuclear threats, however, we face a
much different set of challenges with respect to bio. For
biological attacks, the emphasis must be on consequence
management and ensuring resiliency, because prevention is more
difficult, and there are ways we can save lives after an attack
to prevent it from becoming catastrophic.
The biggest building blocks of the nation's biodefense
strategy are to detect, to treat, to protect people from the
attack, to partner with the National Center for Medical
Intelligence and, finally, to strengthen the public health
community at the state and local levels.
Let me conclude by saying that the challenges of responding
to high-consequence terrorist attacks are real. Our top
priority will always be to mitigate the risk in the best
possible way. Prevention and consequence management are central
elements to our CBRNE defense, an approach that requires
continued collaboration with our federal, state and local and
international partners.
We look forward to continuing to strengthen these
partnerships and, thus, to improve our nation's resilience. And
we also thank the subcommittee for inviting me here today, for
its support, as DHS continues to carry out this important
mission.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Dr. Stockton.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICAS' SECURITY AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Stockton. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Miller,
distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to testify today.
My formal statement has been submitted to the record. I
would like to make some brief oral remarks now, to provide a
bit of context for the substance that I have put into my
prepared statement.
I want to have a key goal today with you, and that is,
begin a dialogue that I hope will continue for years to come.
Let me say a few words about why I hope that is going to be the
case.
It is my responsibility, obviously, to faithfully execute
the laws. But there is much more at stake here. That is not
nearly enough. Since well before 9/11, Congress has exercised a
leading role in the policy realms over which I now have
responsibility as assistant secretary of defense for homeland
defense and Americas' security affairs.
Today's hearing gives me the opportunity to listen to you
and learn from your perspectives as I carry out my policy
responsibilities in support of the undersecretary for policy,
the deputy secretary and Secretary Gates, and, most
importantly, as we all work together to help strengthen the
security of the United States.
Let me say a few words about the importance of the missions
that we are going to be discussing today.
The U.S. government's preeminent national security goal is
to prevent a CBRNE attack on the United States. But as David
Heyman just mentioned--and as you did, Mr. Chairman, in your
opening remarks--we also have to be prepared for the
eventuality that, despite our best prevention efforts, our
adversaries will succeed in conducting an attack.
So, today, as we examine how DOD can best support
preparedness for CBRNE response, a key word that I keep in mind
here is that of support. DOD is going to be in support of civil
authorities in responding to catastrophic natural or manmade
disasters when directed by the President or as authorized by
the secretary of defense.
At the federal level, this means being in support of DHS
and the other lead federal agencies. But it is also important
to remember that federal civil authorities aren't the only ones
who are vital in response and preparedness. Governors, mayors,
county executives, state and local contribution to preparedness
in response for disasters is absolutely vital. It is enshrined
in our Constitution. And we take that support role very, very
seriously at the Department of Defense.
It is something I thought a lot about as an academic, and
now that I have the honor of serving here, something I am going
to continue to take very, very seriously.
Let me close by offering a few words of thanks. First of
all, thanks to all of you for keeping the heat on, for creating
the position that I now have the privilege to occupy. Thank you
for the creation of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) civil support teams, and then many other initiatives on
which Congress took the lead that have helped strengthen the
nation.
Secondly, I want to take a moment to thank the brave women
and men in uniform today for serving both in far-off places,
like Afghanistan and Iraq, but also here at home, whether it is
defending our skies in Operation Nobel Eagle, or whether it is
assisting first responders in dealing with fires, earthquakes
or other natural hazards.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stockton can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
General Renuart.
I should point out for you, and I didn't mention this in
the opening, we do have a second panel, or a second person as
the second panel. It is a panel of one, I guess. Ms. D'Agostino
is going to be testifying from the Defense Capabilities and
Management from the GAO's office. So, we will go through this
round. That is for members' information as much as anybody's.
We will do questions with you and then move on to the next
panel.
Go ahead, General.
STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Renuart. Well, Mr. Chairman, good morning. It is
great to be back with you again. I appreciate the support that
we have had from this committee over the years of my tenure.
Members of the committee, I am particularly pleased to have
a chance to join my two colleagues here, Dr. Stockton and Dr.
Heyman, in participating in this important opportunity to
describe a national capability that is critical to our future.
It is also an opportunity to say thanks to our young men
and women each day who are wearing the cloth of our nation,
both defending the homeland here and deployed, as you mentioned
early on, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, in your comments
as we began the hearing.
As commander of NORTHCOM, I am assigned two principal
missions: that of providing for military defense of our
homeland against nation-state threats and non-nation-state
threats; and to support civil authorities, when directed, with
unique DOD capabilities in times of crisis.
Our role in responding to a crisis such an attack involving
CBRNE materials is to provide trained and ready consequence
management response forces, when requested from those civil
authorities, as Dr. Stockton mentioned, to save lives and help
mitigate pain and suffering. The specialized response force
teams augment the consequence management efforts of state and
local first responders, of the National Guard when called to
duty by their governors, and of other federal agencies.
We provide complementary and unique capabilities as a
follow-on line of defense, as it were, only when the effects of
the first responders are exceeded--I am sorry, the capabilities
of the first responders are exceeded.
Our efforts at NORTHCOM to prepare forces to assist in the
aftermath of a CBRNE event are part of a combined national
response framework. Our collaboration with federal and state
partners, with governors, with the National Guard, are all key
to this homeland response strategy and to our level of
preparedness, as well.
We also partner actively and aggressively with our
colleagues in the Department of Homeland Security, particularly
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to prepare for--
and I stress ``to prepare for''--these kinds of events, so that
we can respond rapidly to minimize loss of life and property.
At NORTHCOM we train hard to ensure our operational
readiness, and our mission effectiveness in executing this
mission are always at the best they could be. We cannot delay
our ability to defend our nation against any threat. We cannot
delay our planning efforts to mitigate the threat of an attack
on our nation.
We will keep up the momentum, remain alert, and partner
with all of our other mission partners to anticipate and
prepare for possible crisis. We don't have the luxury in the
homeland of long-term--of long lead time in many cases. Whether
it is Mother Nature or the potential for a terrorist attack,
the response must be of high quality, and it must be immediate.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be here
today. And we look forward to your questions as well.
[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in
the Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
We will follow the five-minute rule in questioning. We
should have plenty of time, so if members have more questions
than that, we will go around and do a second round. But I find
it best to keep it to the five-minute rule in terms of moving
the conversation forward.
Dr. Heyman, I want to start with you in terms of the
coordination efforts. Could you give us a picture of who all
you are coordinating basically within this effort up front at
preventing the attacks in the first place?
What other agencies are principally involved? How are those
responsibilities divided up? And then, following up on that, I
would be interested to get your perspectives on how well that
is working and how it could be better coordinated.
Mr. Heyman. Sure. Thank you for the question. At the
centerpiece of our coordination effort is Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), which describes the domestic
incident system. That management of the crisis is the principal
responsibility of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and the Department of Homeland Security.
The ability to do that starts with our national operations
center, which continually monitors potential major disasters.
Mr. Smith. And I am sorry--are you talking here--you are
talking here about responding to disasters, as opposed to
prevention.
Mr. Heyman. I am talking about responding.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Do that, and I am interested in
prevention, too, as well, but go ahead.
Mr. Heyman. Okay. Sure. On the response side, on the
consequence management side, the department continues to
monitor potential disasters and emergencies. And when advance
warning is received, DHS may deploy, in coordination with other
federal agencies, liaison officers and personnel to states that
may require assistance.
If there is a determination that there is a need for
additional resources, and the disaster is declared, the
department coordinates all of the federal family.
And the central centerpiece of this is something called the
emergency support functions. There are 15 of them, and they
have various capabilities that are required for responding to a
crisis to include communications, to include debris removal,
mass medical care and such.
The federal family all play roles in each of those support
functions, including the Department of Defense. There are also
sort of state and nongovernmental entities that are involved in
response as well. So the department has a broad reach in
coordinating the response.
Mr. Smith. And two quick follow ups to that. One, so that
is for whatever the disaster is, even beyond--and occasionally
I miss an initial here, but CBRNE--even beyond that, like if
there was, you know, a natural disaster, but also disease--you
know, we are very concerned about the swine flu and the way
that is going--if there was a big huge outbreak, DHS would be
at the theater that with FEMA's well, no matter the disaster,
and the different agencies that you plug in, depending on what
the specific threat is. Is that?
Mr. Heyman. That is correct. We have an all hazards
approach, whether it is a natural disaster or a deliberate
attack. The department has taken leadership role in domestic--
management of domestic incident.
Mr. Smith. Okay. And what about on the preventions side?
This may be more DOD that we are talking to, so Dr. Stockton,
feel free to jump in, or General Renuart.
But what is sort of the coordinating agencies that are most
looking out there, trying to figure out how to prevent that
specifically--obviously, you can't prevent a hurricane--CBRNE
attacks?
Mr. Heyman. Well, I will take the first answer on that,
that I think it is the--what you have to do is look at each of
these separately. And I focused on nuclear and biological.
On nuclear on the prevention side, we sort of have a
layered defense approach. The government looks at controlling
nuclear material as a first line of defense, so that they don't
fall into the hands of those who would seek to do harm.
There are a number of agencies that are leading that
effort. The Department of Energy has a role to play. The
Department of State has a role to play. The Department of
Defense has a role to play. Nunn-Lugar legislation is one of
the governing authorities on protecting from materials going--
--
Mr. Smith. Does any one of those groups have the lead? I
know when I have traveled internationally recently, there has
been--you know, DHS has shown up in different embassies,
depending on the issue, and there is, you know, consternation--
basically, people trying to figure out, okay, where does DHS
fit within the traditional State Department role and the
traditional DOD role?
Focusing on this aspect of it on nonproliferation,
actually, who is leading that effort? And then how is that
support group put together?
Mr. Heyman. So the proliferation security initiative, which
is led by the State Department, really tries to be an umbrella
for including most of these activities as coordinated not just
with the federal government, but on the international level.
And other nations contribute to what is a large international
effort to stem the spread of the nuclear material and nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I will follow up with this later on. I
will respect the five-minute time and recognize Mr. Miller for
five minutes.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Heyman, you know Florida prepares every year for a very
long hurricane season, and so we are accustomed to coordinating
working with the federal agencies on natural disasters. But
what I would like for you to talk about is how DHS manages
CBRNE incidents--a CBRNE incident compared with a natural
disaster.
Mr. Heyman. It is a good question. And let me just thank
the state of Florida for our new FEMA director, who is a----
Mr. Miller. Yes, you got a good one.
Mr. Heyman. We are very grateful to have them here. In
fact, I thank him this morning for giving me the opportunity to
testify instead of him.
Mr. Miller. Let the record reflect that Mr. Fugate did not
report to where he should have been.
Mr. Heyman. On the distinction between CBRNE attacks and
all other hazards is slight. We actually do have the design of
our nation's ability to respond to these type of attacks goes
through the national response framework and, as I said, our
domestic incident preparedness concept.
The distinction between the CBRNE attack and other hazards
is the notion is the notion that they are deliberate and
therefore require potentially additional interdiction or
attribution. As a consequence of that, in some--in those
instances, you would have additional work, perhaps by the FBI,
Justice Department, in leadership roles looking at those two
particular aspects.
Mr. Miller. And, Dr. Stockton, Research and Development
(R&D) investments are crucial, if you will, to the advancement
of the technologies for CBRNE consequences management. How does
DOD spread that across the, I guess, the system, if you will,
the investment of those R&D dollars?
Dr. Stockton. The under secretary of defense for
acquisition technology and logistics provides overall oversight
to make sure that the priority needs for response are going to
be addressed by the research and development community. So he
is in the lead on the civilian side.
Very important, the Joint Staff also has a joint
requirements office for chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear defense. These acronyms are going to kill me at some
point. And they ensure coordination to make sure that from the
armed services perspective, the R&D requirements are going to
be met.
We also coordinate very closely with our interagency
partners across the spectrum, including DHS, but also the
Department of Energy, our other federal partners. And let me
emphasize also that we exercise frequently for these response
requirements so we can discover unmet needs, we can figure out
how DOD's research and development capabilities can best be
harnessed to serve the CBRNE response.
Mr. Miller. Thanks.
And, General, how does NORTHCOM coordinate intelligence
sharing and operational planning activities with other DOD
organizations and with other agencies in response to a CBRNE
incident?
General Renuart. Well, Mr. Miller, I would even like to
jump back before the event to talk about that, because I think
it also gets to both of your questions about prevention.
This partnership in intelligence sharing is critical to
prevention for these kinds of events. We have an active role to
play each day as a member of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC).
We and the United States Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) have invested intelligence and operations analysts to
sit in these organizations each day, looking to reach into that
network of proliferators and potential users of a weapon of
mass effect for terrorist activities.
We have a partnership not only with NCTC, but with the
FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. We work very closely with the
Department of Energy with DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, on the technical capability of some parties to take
advantage of, to use, and then maybe to weaponize some of these
kinds of agents or nuclear materials.
So that partnership with both law enforcement and with the
intelligence communities has allowed us to become much more
proactive ahead of one of these events. Certainly, when an
event occurs, if it were to occur, again DOD has a supporting
role, but a very key supporting role.
For example, the FBI has the responsibility for the
recapture and recovery of nuclear material that may have been
stolen. We provide very significant support for the FBI--in
fact, have exercised that in our last spring Ardent Sentry
exercise.
We work very closely with the FBI on the attribution. An
event like this becomes a crime scene to a degree, and it is
important for the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to be
able to capture the evidence so that we can begin to attribute.
So this interagency partnership is one that is critical to
our success, and we play a very active role on a day-to-day
basis with them.
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
Mr. Marshall.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stockton, you began by addressing yourself to the
chairman and the ranking member and the distinguished members,
and I found myself wondering whether or not you were talking
with me as well. I kind of doubted that.
This is slightly off topic, but it would be helpful to me
to have your thoughts on the value in preparedness for these
kinds of problems of having a secure power on base--on military
bases scattered throughout the United States.
The House version of the bill at my request--this year's
authorization bill at my request has a provision requiring that
DOD study the possibility of installing nuclear power on
military installations.
The intent is to explore the possibility of public-private
partnerships that would both enhance the independence and
security function that military bases can provide, with secure
power available, despite what catastrophe might occur, and at
the same time try and address energy independence and
affordable energy, because the power plants presumably would
feed back into the grid from military bases.
And I would like your thoughts on--you know, we are
extremely familiar with this; at least in the Navy we have been
doing this for 50 years with no incident--thoughts on smaller
nuclear plants that are hardened against various attacks--
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) comes to mind--and what benefit
that provides us.
During Katrina, it seems to me that it would have been nice
to have some secure power plants in the region that was just--
where power was knocked out for days at a time.
Dr. Stockton. Thank you, Congressman Marshall.
It is an especially important question for me to address,
because in my responsibilities as assistant secretary of
defense, I am also responsible for defense critical
infrastructure protection and ensuring the ability of the
United States military to execute its core mission.
And if there is no power, it is very difficult to do so. In
fact, it would be catastrophic in terms of our ability to
execute our core mission.
So ensuring the reliability of power through the bulk power
system, through backup power systems that would deal with the
eventualities of either natural catastrophes are potentially
attacks on that power system--that is a priority.
And I want to thank you for calling everybody's attention
to it that--you and your colleagues both this year and in years
past.
In terms of the particular ways in which best providing for
the reliability of the flow power to the Department of Defense
facilities and also, as you point out, finding ways of
leveraging such investments so they benefit the civilian
economy as well, especially because so much of the Department
of Defense depends on our private sector for the execution of
our core mission, I think it is terrific to look for the dual
advantages of investment in terms of--in particular, how to
accomplish this goal of reliability and resilience in the flow
of power.
I don't yet have a lot of expertise on that issue, but I
sure do welcome the attention that you and your colleagues are
helping to focus on this issue, which is absolutely vital for
our ability to assure the execution of DOD missions.
Mr. Marshall. As the language now stands, I don't know that
it encourages DOD to think about this particular aspect. Well,
I think it does, but in any event I would hope that perhaps you
could add your voice within DOD, encouraging DOD to be thinking
about these kinds of benefits associated with independent
secure power on our military installations.
Dr. Stockton. I will do so, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your testimony
and addressing our questions. I am still sort of grappling, and
I think all of us are at one level or another, with the
fundamental question of who is in charge.
I know when I was out, General, visiting with your
predecessor, Admiral Keating, at NORTHCOM, I was very impressed
by the sort of interagency presence that was there and plans
that were either developed or being developed and being put on
the shelf. I am sure they are all completed and ready to go
now. But the question is still sort of troubling.
Dr. Heyman, you said at one time there are a number of
agencies leading that effort. And the chairman sort of followed
up and said, ``Well, who really is in the lead,'' because if
there are a number of agencies leading, I would argue that
nobody is really leading. There is nobody in charge.
And in the case of the DOD assets--gosh, we have a lot of
them, and that is a pretty good thing, I suppose--we have the
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams,
the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, the
DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force, the Joint Task
Force Civil Support Program.
And again, we always have these Title 10 sort of questions.
When are these forces federal and when are they state? When do
they work for the governor? When do they work for the general?
And looking in particularly at the CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Force, which is fundamentally a pretty
large force when you put it all together, I am looking at the
notes here, frankly prepared by the quite excellent staff, that
point out that originally these CBRNE Consequence Management
Response Forces were to be assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM, and now
they are being allocated to NORTHCOM.
And so again, it is a question of who is in charge when.
And I am wondering, General, if you could talk about why that
change and the impact it might have? Does it lessen your
ability to influence these forces to make sure they are trained
and prepared? Could you address that change for me, please?
General Renuart. Yes, sir. Happy to. And thank you for the
question.
Important to note that the forces you described, the civil
support teams (CST), the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package
(CERFP) and that acronym, and then the Consequence Management
Response Force are not designed to be stand-alone forces, but
really are designed to integrate with each other as the size of
the event grows.
Very small events, and we have--technically, CBRNE events
occur almost every day in our country, and those small Civil
Support Teams travel out on behalf of the governor to do the
assessment and identification of the agent and begin to
recommend initial mitigation actions.
And those are done, if you will, under the command of the
local first responder--that fire chief, that police chief, the
mayor. As the event is seen to be more significant, the
governor has the ability to pull in that large--next larger
team, the CERFP.
Those are guardsmen in state active duty status. They could
also be in Title 32 funding, but still under the command of the
governor, to provide sort of the next layer of muscle if the
event grows.
And then finally, if there is need for--and I must add if
all--at the same time these military forces are being employed,
that FEMA and DHS have similarly configured civilian first
responders. So this becomes additive as we see the significance
of the event occur.
Finally, if we approach a catastrophic type of event--we
talked about nuclear, but there could be other types--this
Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), which is fairly
robust, could come in then to provide sustainability over
longer periods of time for larger casualties for a broader
event.
The command, if you will, of those state forces rests with
the governor and continues to do that. Both the federal
military and the federal civilian responders come at the
request of the governor really to support the needs of that
state, but bring capability that the governor does not have in
his quiver, if you will.
Those military forces stay under the command of U.S.
Northern Command, and they are there in support of those lead
agencies--federal and state agencies. So command is not ever a
question. It is how you integrate the control and the execution
of those operations on the ground.
To your specific question of assigned versus allocated--
sorry I am long-winded sometimes, Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. It is all right. So my time has turned to red,
but as long as the chairman will let you answer, I am a happy
guy.
Mr. Smith. Go ahead. Please do. Yes. No, go ahead.
General Renuart. And I appreciate----
Mr. Smith. We have plenty of time. Go ahead.
General Renuart [continuing]. Mr. Chairman, the ability to
continue.
But in terms of assigned versus allocated, in a perfect
world every commander would like all of their forces assigned
to them. We are in a very busy time in our nation right now,
and we are using forces in many ways, and in some cases ways
they were not originally designed for.
And so we have--the secretary and the chairman have
adjusted this assignment process to something called allocated
with operational control. The bottom line is it allows me to
get access to those forces at--when I need them. It allows me
to have training and readiness oversight of them. It allows me
to make an input on funding for them, if funding is an issue.
But they can also be used--they are not technically
assigned to me for the administrative process. I have no
difficulty with that today. And given the circumstances that we
have with the demands on our forces, it is appropriate to
continue that. But that is--maybe it is a nuance difference in
the assignment versus the allocation.
Mr. Kline. Thank you. I would suggest it is perhaps a tad
more than nuance, but thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
A couple of other questions. I know we have the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) testifying afterwards, but I want
to get your comments, and perhaps both General Renuart, Dr.
Stockton, about DOD's plans on consequence management in this
area.
A GAO report basically finds those points are--they are
being worked on, but they are incomplete. They have not
actually finished, you know, integrating them fully into what
Homeland Security and others are doing. I just wonder if you
could comment on the progress of that and your thoughts on the
GAO report.
General Renuart. Just very quickly, sir, the GAO's--the GAO
has a--it is fair to say that the progress is mixed in certain
areas. We have done a great deal of work in partnership with
DHS on each of those planning scenarios.
The integrated planning system that we are now using as the
benchmark has been in existence formally for just about a year
and a half, and so we are still building some momentum in that
regard.
Having said that, Secretary Chertoff and now Secretary
Napolitano have invested in significant ways in creating the
planning capacity within DHS that can partner with the DOD in
these areas.
And I am actually very comfortable that we have made great
progress over the last year in particular to begin to complete
actually a number of those plans. And I think we are well on
the road to complete the remainder in a very short period of
time.
Dr. Stockton. Let me just support what General Renuart has
just said, but also emphasize that across the board, we are
looking for opportunities and acting on them to strengthening
the planning process to build integration. And that is true not
only within the federal family, but with our state and local
partners as well.
The Integrated Planning System (IPS) is a key vehicle for
this. Is IPS perfect now? No. We are just standing it up. We
are looking forward to making improvements, but we have
terrific partners at DHS and building on the foundation that we
currently have today and doing more to integrate and complete
the process that is now under way.
Mr. Smith. I have one other specific question about the
response side, and it has long been a frustration. You know,
certainly, it was present in 9/11. It was also present in
Katrina that when a large-scale disaster like this hits, the
communications, the ability through cell phones, walkie-
talkies, whatever communication system.
And there have been a number of technologies out there that
attempt to prioritize this. I am aware of a couple of them that
basically set it up so that in the emergency you can instantly
get, you know, your--you know, the people who need to be able
to communicate with each other will have priority, will be able
to do that, and that they will also be integrated just in
general, so the fire department can talk to the police
department can talk to the National Guard can talk to DOD.
There has long been a frustration that while this
technology exists, that it is seemingly very slow in the
appointment as of last report. And I am just wondering if
anyone of you would like to give an update on that.
Mr. Heyman. I actually am--I would have to get back to you
on that one. I am familiar with the prioritization. There is a
system in place to prioritize communications during a crisis,
which the department has led on.
And there are also additionally--in order to restore
communications, we have put in place pre-authorized contracts
to ensure that communications amongst first responders and
other officials are established rapidly in a priority way.
Mr. Smith. When you say there is a system in place on the
front end, I mean, are you confident right now? I mean, pick a
random city, you know, Denver. You know, if there is a big huge
incident there, are all the key players in that area, you know,
linked into a system that would enable them to communicate with
one another in an emergency?
Mr. Heyman. So the answer--the answer is yes, but the way
that that goes forward is both in terms of our public-private
partnership and our relationship with the private sector that
has communications, as well as federal communication systems as
well, including the Department of Defense, that support our
ability to put in place rapidly, within the first 48 to 72
hours, communications. And I can get you some more details on
that.
Mr. Smith. Yes, I would be very interested, because a lot--
as I understand it, a lot of this technology is stuff that, you
know, needs to be, you know, implemented now, obviously.
And some of it is, you know, in a crisis situation, you
know, systems are down. There is limited bandwidth. All of a
sudden, you know, everybody is on the phone for one thing. You
know, how do we make sure that the people who really need to be
on the phone can be? Is that in place?
And the other piece of it is more upfront. You know, there
are a lot of different hardware and software systems that are
spread out amongst the various different organizations, and
they may or may not be able to talk to one another. I know some
cities, some counties in my area have bought technology that
enables them mainly through software, so they don't have to
change the hardware. Software enables them to be able to do
that.
But I would be interested in if you could, you know, get
back to the committee on specific answers on how--what sort of
progress we have made on these two technologies. That would be
great.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. I think Mr. McIntyre would like to go into this
for his round of questions.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Go ahead.
Mr. McIntyre. I am fine. You go ahead.
Mr. Miller. Just one quick question to the general. What
protocols have to be met for NORTHCOM to become involved in a
CBRNE event?
General Renuart. Mr. Miller, I think the--as we have
mentioned earlier, we come at the request of the governor and
the lead federal agency.
And so there is a process that would be activated upon an
event occurring, where the state emergency manager and the
governor would make a determination that the size or
consequences of this particular event were large enough that
the state and their emergency management assistance partners,
those Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) partners,
may not have the capacity.
At the same time, the governor would go to the President
with a request for a disaster declaration, which, as you know,
frees resources to begin to support the state.
But in terms of NORTHCOM in particular, as soon as the
event occurs, we establish contact with the adjutant general in
the state. We establish contact with our FEMA region director.
We have a defense coordinating officer, who sits with that FEMA
region director so that we begin to get a sense if this event
is growing large enough for rapidly enough that there may be a
need for DOD support.
Mr. Miller. What happens--and I am going to ruffle some
feathers by asking this question--if the governor and the local
officials don't get it. They absolutely have become
overwhelmed, as they did with Katrina, and don't make the call
quick enough.
General Renuart. Well, Mr. Miller, I think the President
ultimately has a responsibility for the nation to make a
determination of the speed at which some event is unfolding.
That is not a NORTHCOM decision.
My role is to ensure that, if I am asked, I have all the
pieces in place to be supportive. So, I would defer to the
national leadership to make a policy decision on the ability of
an individual state. That is not really mine to call.
What we try to do is look at each of the states, and in
each of the regions, to understand where they have shortfalls
and limitations in equipment, in expertise, in planning
capacity, and then try to help them up front before an event
occurs to be as successful as they can.
How things unfold under pressure is really more a national
issue to deal with.
Mr. Miller. And I understand, but you led the answer to
your question by saying that the call would be made by the
governor and----
General Renuart. I understand.
Mr. Miller [continuing]. With individuals. And that is why
I wanted to drill down.
Mr. Chairman, that is all.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
Can you tell us, General, in specific, what kind of
exercises have occurred that have tested the consequence
management system?
I know occasionally, maybe one city might do some type of
exercise. But can you tell us specifically what exercises have
been done, and whether or not they have been done in such a way
that they could serve as an example for yet other cities, who
may not have done them, to follow?
General Renuart. Mr. McIntyre, absolutely. And this is an
area that I think is not well understood by many.
There is a very detailed and layered exercise program that
exercises each of these elements of the consequence management
system repeatedly. And I will just give you a couple of
examples.
On behalf of the National Guard, U.S. Northern Command
managed the Vigilant Guard exercise. And these are conducted in
states by the National Guards of each individual state. They
are supported by U.S. Northern Command with evaluators and
certifiers, and those kinds of folks, who specifically look at
our consequence management civil support teams and the CERFPs
in each state.
Those are done at the request of the states, so they are
not on a recurring basis. But each year we conduct about seven
or eight of those around the country.
Secondly, we have the training and readiness oversight for
the CSTs, as well. So, they actually have a periodic
certification exercise that we conduct through U.S. Army North
and their consequence management evaluation team.
The follow-on piece, the large-scale piece, is the exercise
of the so-called consequence management response forces. In the
last year, as you know, we brought the first one into
operational status.
Prior to that operational determination, we had a series of
small unit to large unit exercises and training programs that
allowed the leaders and allowed the individual soldiers and
airmen, sailors, to practice the skills that they would need.
We then conducted a consolidated command and control
exercise, so that we had an integrated opportunity to test and
evaluate decision-makers from the headquarters down to the
small unit commanders.
Finally, twice each year we have an exercise, one called
Vigilant Shield, one called Ardent Sentry, which are designed
to test some or all elements of the consequence management
response forces at a deployed location.
This past year, we conducted a no-notice--a number of no-
notice deployment exercises, so that we tested the ability of
each unit to pack up its stuff, in some cases to have it
prepositioned already, to move it to airlift heads, and then to
move to a location where the exercise would occur. We have done
that twice this year.
As we approach the new fiscal year, we have two large-scale
exercises for the new consequence management response forces
that will come on line. And we will physically deploy a full
CCMRF--that 4,500 size force--to a location well away from
their home stations, to exercise for an extended period of time
in a catastrophic event.
We have partnered these with the national exercise program
that DHS leads, so that we also get national level policymakers
involved in the decision process as we go through these
scenarios.
So, I think we have developed a layered and very well
thought-out exercise program--very different from what we had
just a few years ago.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I am heartened to hear about the exercise. It
addresses the issue that I was getting at earlier, that if
these forces are allocated, not assigned, do you still have the
ability to train and exercise the forces. It sounds like you
do, certainly with the exercise schedule.
I hope that the individual training that goes with that is
proceeding, as well, and that you are providing oversight for
that, for these forces that are not assigned to you and
presumably are stationed elsewhere, but are allocated to you.
But seriously, I am heartened by the response to Mr.
McIntyre's question.
I want to kind of follow up, because I am still grappling
with the ``who's in charge'' question. And Mr. Miller asked the
question, what if the governor or the local authorities simply
aren't responding, they are incapable, or sort of don't
understand the magnitude.
Another way to get at this problem is, what if you have an
event, CBRNE event, that I can think of at least one major city
where you might have four or five states involved, presumably
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, perhaps Delaware or Maryland.
Pretty easily you could get four or five states involved
instantly.
Who is in charge?
To anybody here, are the procedures in place to make that--
presumably, the President can be in charge at any time. But is
there an established series of steps to address that?
Mr. Heyman. There are a number of triggers by law that set
in motion when the federal government gets involved. If a--in
addition to a governor requesting aid, a Stafford Act
declaration can be made along a number of different paths: if
one federal agency requests it, if a multiple number of federal
agencies are involved in the response, if the President
determines that it is a natural--an emergency and an emergency
declaration is required.
States have an interest, obviously, in declaring a Stafford
Act emergency, because it means that federal resources can
start to flow to the state. And it is a mechanism I think that
has worked quite well.
In terms of how assignments go out as the department begins
crisis management and consequence response, there is a standard
mechanism called the ``mission assignment,'' which goes through
these emergency support functions I laid out earlier, 15
different support functions, that have basic functionality that
is required for managing the crisis and reestablishing elements
of society--things like firefighting, mass care, housing, human
services, medical surge capacity, et cetera.
The mission assignment is the vehicle that is used by FEMA
in a Stafford Act disaster or declaration. And it gets your
response going. It goes out to the different agencies that
would have the lead. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers
has the lead for emergency support in debris removal, and they
would take it from there.
The same thing for any kind of relationship with the
Defense Department. There are mission assignments that go out.
The secretary of defense reviews them to make sure those do not
conflict with readiness of the forces. And we have operated
under that for a number of years.
Mr. Kline. General.
General Renuart. Mr. Kline, I might follow up, just maybe
an example that is very close to home, the I-35 bridge collapse
in Minnesota.
Mr. Kline. Great example.
General Renuart. The process that we describe sounds
bureaucratic and cumbersome. In point of fact, within about two
hours of Governor Pawlenty's phone call to the Secretary of
Transportation, who then went to the President, who went to the
Secretary of Defense, who came to me, we had those Navy divers
moving within a matter of two hours after that was complete.
So, the process can work very quickly.
And the difference between Katrina and today, is we have
established the relationships among those participating
partners, those other agencies of government, such that we can
compress that response time down to hours and minutes, as
opposed to days.
We did a spectacular job after Katrina of moving 72,000
uniformed military to Louisiana. The challenge is, we had no
plans to integrate them. We had not done the spade work ahead
of time, so that we knew who would be coordinating these
activities.
Mr. Kline. If I can, I see that my time is about to--I
appreciate that. And it was a good example. It took really a
couple of days before the President talked to Mary Peters, the
Secretary of Transportation, who then talked to the Secretary
of the Navy, who came back to you.
But I guess, once you made that call, it was a matter of a
couple of hours. But it took some time to get there.
And just one more time on who is in charge, Dr. Heyman said
that the DOD or Guard had responsibility for--had the lead for
debris removal. But at some point, there is a competition for
resources. And somebody has to be in charge to say, ``No, no.
You can't have those cranes and that equipment for debris
removal. We need it for rescue operations over here.''
And as these things grow in size and you have multiple
states, somebody has to be in charge. Whether it is the
director of FEMA, or NORTHCOM, somebody has to make that
resource allocation.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
And one question, I know we were talking primarily about
consequence management after the fact, how you respond. But as
long as I have you here, the prevention piece is something that
I am also interested in, and I asked a little bit about
earlier.
And General Renuart, I would be interested in your comments
on the level of coordination on that, because this is a very,
very complicated thing. Obviously, a lot of the prevention of
these type of attacks happens overseas with some of the
nonproliferation work, tracking the terrorist groups that might
be inclined to launch such an attack.
And then, a lot of it happens within the U.S., as well. And
as NORTHCOM commander, preventing those sorts of attacks is, I
am sure, right up at the top of your list of priorities.
How do you plug in to that entire system of all of the
different pieces that are involved with prevention, including
FBI, other aspects of our intelligence community? And how
satisfied are you in terms of the level of coordination, in
terms of it is clear who is in charge of what, and how
coordinated it all is?
General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, again to sort of beat this
drum, we do most of these things in support of a federal agency
or to defend against a nation-state. And so, that requires a
partnership with other combatant commands around the world.
We share intelligence. We have a daily counterterrorist
intelligence video teleconference (VTC) that we use to share
information with Central Command (CENTCOM), for example, on
terrorist elements that may be resident in their area of
operations. And then, we work with our intelligence partners to
study the networks, the links, that might bring them back here
to the homeland.
The partners who sit in that are not just military. We also
have the FBI, as I mentioned. We have all of the intelligence
agencies of our government.
And that is an active discussion, sharing information, but
also arguing points back and forth, so that we try to make sure
we have asked the tough questions of how an event in Southwest
Asia may relate to proliferation, may relate to a terrorist
threat here in the homeland--with the intent being that we can
interdict that chain somewhere outside our borders, we prevent
an attack from occurring here in our country.
That is not just a DOD effort. How we participate in that
is through each of these collaborative analysis activities, and
by raising questions and concerns that I have about a
particular element of threat. We have talked about CBRNE events
here, so bioresearch, protection and security of nuclear
materials in other countries.
I drive my intel team to go out and find that information.
But that is resident in other agencies of government. And that
is the kind of integrated collaboration we try to participate
in.
Mr. Smith. I think--yes, and that would be a piece, you
know. Mr. Kline was talking about who is in charge. And there
are a lot of different pieces to tracking particular
individuals. But in this area in particular, it would be
tracking specific threats with the chem-bio-nuclear area.
And then, of all those different people, I mean, if a
threat comes up, we think, you know--I don't know. If some
chemical agent has been stolen in large quantities from some
place, and it links in with some terrorists who we think might
be in the United States, you know, at that point, I mean, you
are there. FBI is there. Homeland security is there.
But who is the person who would then say, ``I am managing
these resources, okay. You are doing this. You are doing that.
You are doing the other thing,'' to respond to this specific
threat?
General Renuart. Sir, just very quickly, this exercise we
just completed is a good example of your question. It simulated
a terrorist organization who had gained access to nuclear
material in our country.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has the lead
responsibility. But DHS partners with that. We partner with
that. DOD has some unique technical capabilities that are
exercised in support of that.
So we have worked out those relationships and procedures
ahead of the event. And in this particular exercise, we
actually live deployed the FBI team, the DOD teams from home
station to Wyoming to conduct this exercise in real time.
So, very positive experience, and the command and control
communications all worked very, very well.
So, I think we are forcing ourselves to practice those
scenarios and make them realistic.
Mr. Smith. And ultimately, I think that is what works best
is integration, is getting to know each other and working
together through various collaborative processes. And there are
a lot of different ways to do that. That is critical.
I have nothing further. Does anyone else have any further
questions for this panel? Okay.
Thank you very much for your testimony. I really appreciate
you coming here today.
And we will stay in touch.
Next up, we have Ms. Davi--and I am just not going to be
able to pronounce it. D'Agostino, I believe, is somewhere in
the neighborhood. And you can correct me once you--once we are
cleared out here and you can have your seat.
For the members' information, Ms. D'Agostino is going to be
the one testifying. Mr. Kirschbaum, Mr. Anderson are there in
support, in case we ask really tough questions----
So, but Ms. D'Agostino, please--well, we have some shifting
around here. Why don't we just----
Ms. D'Agostino. Sure.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Take a moment for folks to get in
and out.
And if you could introduce----
Ms. D'Agostino. Sure.
Mr. Smith. [continuing]. More formally the two gentlemen to
your left----
Ms. D'Agostino. Of course.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. That would be great.
Ms. D'Agostino. All right.
Mr. Smith. All right. Go ahead, please.
STATEMENT OF DAVI M. D'AGOSTINO, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. D'Agostino. Okay. I am Davi D'Agostino with the Defense
Capabilities and Management Team at the GAO. This is Joseph
Kirschbaum, assistant director, and Rodell Anderson, who is the
analyst in charge on the work that we have been done for the
committee on CBRNE consequence management capabilities at DOD.
I would like to submit our testimony statement for the
record, please. And I have a brief oral summary to present at
this time.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Miller, distinguished members
of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here before you today
to discuss the preliminary results of our work on DOD's efforts
to provide CBRNE or CBRNE consequence management support to
civilian authorities in the event of a catastrophic incident.
The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security
highlighted the continued threat posed to the United States by
potential terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction and the
need for comprehensive capability to deal with the consequences
of a CBRNE attack. A catastrophic CBRNE event within the United
States would require a unified whole-of-government, national
response and would be a tremendous challenge.
DOD plays a support role, including providing capabilities
needed to save lives, alleviate hardship and suffering and
minimize property damage caused by the event. NORTHCOM is to
lead the military operations in direct support of another
federal agency, most often FEMA. DOD has set its own goal of
having forces ready to respond to multiple mass-casualty CBRNE
incidents and has created significant capabilities that could
be used to support a federal CBRNE response.
Our work for this subcommittee has focused on DOD's CBRNE
Consequence Management Response Force, the CCMRF, a brigade-
sized force comprised of parts of various military services
units that are dispersed across the country. This testimony
provides our preliminary answers to the following questions.
One, to what extent are DOD's plans and capabilities to
respond to CBRNE incidents in the homeland integrated with
other federal government agencies' plans? Two, to what extent
has DOD planned for, and structured, its force to provide CBRNE
consequence management assistance. Three, how well-prepared are
DOD's CCMRF to perform their mission? And four, does DOD have
funding plans in place for the CCMRF that are linked to
requirements for specialized capabilities?
First, our work has shown DOD has its own consequence
management plans in place for more than a decade now, but
cannot fully integrate them, because the IPS, the Integrated
Planning System led by DHS, is not complete. Second, our work
today has shown that DOD's CCMRF's ability to respond
effectively may be compromised because of its land response
times, which are very long. And they may not meet the needs of
a catastrophic event.
Mr. Smith. Can I ask you--sorry, but the Integrated
Planning System that has been discussed a couple of time. DHS
is supposed to put this study together. It is not quite done.
Ms. D'Agostino. And they don't have timelines to complete
either, sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Ms. D'Agostino. It is reported on the----
Mr. Smith. Okay. What is done, what isn't done?
Ms. D'Agostino. We have laid out in our testimony a chart.
Let me--that talks about the various status. And I think it is
on page----
Is this it?
Yes, page nine.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I see. Okay. Sorry, please continue.
Ms. D'Agostino. Sure. Secondly, the CCMRF may lack
sufficient capacity in certain key areas, such as medical
personnel and equipment and decon, decontamination
capabilities. And third, it faces challenges enforcing the
CCMRFs, because of the competition for overseas missions and
the use of the Guard and the Reserves.
Compounding these challenges is the fact that, starting in
October 2009, DOD will allocate the units from all three CCMRFs
to NORTHCOM, rather than assign them outright. As a result even
though NORTHCOM's commander is responsible for commanding the
domestic military CBRNE response, he will have less direct
authority to control domestic deployment availability, to
manage day-to-day training and to monitor the readiness of the
units responsible for carrying out the mission.
Third, our work has shown that, in the last year, DOD has
taken many actions to improve the readiness of the units that
were assigned to the CCMRF. But the CCMRF could be limited in
its ability to successfully conduct operations, because first,
it does not conduct realistic full-force field training to
confirm the units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy
quickly. And, again, conflicting priorities between the CCMRF
mission and the overseas deployments impacts some units'
mission preparation and unit cohesion.
Basically, the training and force rotation problems we have
identified in our work have prevented DOD from providing the
kind of stability to the CCMRF that would allow the units to
build cohesiveness.
Fourth, and finally, our work thus far shows that DOD is
making progress in identifying and providing funding and
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements. However, its
efforts to identify total program requirements have not been
completed. And its approach to providing program funding has
been fragmented and is not subject to central oversight.
For example, the initial CCMRF that was established in
October 2008 does not have fully defined funding requirements
for the necessary dedicated resources to effectively carry out
the CCMRF mission in an integrated and consistent manner. While
DOD officials have told us they are in the process of
developing essential equipment requirements, they have not been
fully identified and funded.
We identified cases in which units have purchased their
mission equipment and have funded CCMRF-related training
activities from global war on terrorism monies and from
operations and maintenance accounts. These accounts are not
developed considering the CCMRF mission.
As a result, DOD lacks the visibility into the total
funding requirements for this mission. We do plan to provide
the subcommittee and our other congressional requester with our
final report in September 2009.
And Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared statement. And we would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. D'Agostino can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
I am just following for a little bit on that. So, is it a
matter of resources? They haven't dedicated enough money to
complete this? Or do you think it is just of the--they have the
resources, but it is complicated, and they haven't worked their
way through exactly how to set up the CCMRFs and assign
responsibilities? Which would that be?
Ms. D'Agostino. Well, it could be a combination, because
these are----
Mr. Smith. Sure.
Ms. D'Agostino [continuing]. From units that are spread all
throughout the country. And so, there is the administrative
issue of the funding that comes just from the structure--the
inherent structure of the CCMRF. But beyond that, there is no
single, you know, centralized point that, kind of, is
responsible for hovering over and watching the total amount of
funding that goes to the units that make up the CCMRF.
Mr. Smith. So, there is no, sort of, CCMRF budget, if you
will.
Ms. D'Agostino. No----
Mr. Smith. They have to sort of----
Ms. D'Agostino [continuing]. Program element, right----
Mr. Smith [continuing]. You know, getting a piece of
equipment there, a piece of equipment there.
Ms. D'Agostino. Exactly.
Mr. Smith. Within the DOD then, could you identify who is,
sort of, in charge or making sure the--got to love the acronym,
by the way, the CCMRFs.
Ms. D'Agostino. I know.
Mr. Smith. Strikes fear in the heart of our enemies, I am
sure. [Laughter.]
Got these little blue guys running around to make sure
nothing happens. Sorry about that.
In terms of is there someone in DOD--like if you wanted to
go say, okay, how come all this isn't happening--is there
someone who is, like, the deputy under secretary in charge of
CCMRFs? Or not that, but someone who is, sort of, supposed to
be monitoring this? Or is this spread out across DOD?
Ms. D'Agostino. It is spread out, no?
It is spread out.
Mr. Kirschbaum. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is rather spread out.
I mean, there are elements in the, for example, Dr. Stockton's
office responsible for homeland defense. There are offices in--
the policy office responsible for those kind of things, also
for consequence management, civil support. They all have
responsibilities, are directly involved in providing for those
forces. But there is no direct one person.
Mr. Smith. Okay. It would seem to me that when in NORTHCOM,
it would make sense to have such a person, you know, under
General Renuart. Is that something that has been suggested to
your knowledge? Or what is the----
Ms. D'Agostino. We are formulating our recommendations into
our report, which, you know, basically is--you have all the
findings that are going to be in our report laid out here
before you today. And we are formulating our recommendations.
And one of the recommendations is toward the funding with
centralized oversight.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Ms. D'Agostino. And again, I don't think that we are going
to be prescripted to DOD about who should be doing it. But----
Mr. Smith. Right.
Ms. D'Agostino [continuing]. I think we will have a
recommendation to the secretary that someone be duly appointed
to do so.
Mr. Smith. And how many CCMRFs are there?
Ms. D'Agostino. There are three----
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Ms. D'Agostino [continuing]. To be three.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Regionally dispersed, I assume.
Ms. D'Agostino. Well, even CCMRF 1 is very dispersed.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Ms. D'Agostino. And then the follow on that the other two
units are to be sourced from the National Guard. So----
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Ms. D'Agostino [continuing]. It makes it a little even more
difficult to----
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Mr. Miller, do you have anything?
Mr. Miller. No, other than don't forget the Teletubbies.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Smith. That would be a subgroup.
Ms. D'Agostino. That is right.
Mr. Miller. Yes. They will work on the push.
No, no questions.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I don't have anything further. We will
certainly take a look at the report. And I think those
recommendations are very helpful. And I think these are things
that we should work on developing to get better coordination of
who is in charge of what and where they are doing.
This hearing has been very helpful to me.
Do you have anything--any of you have anything to add?
Ms. D'Agostino. Did you want to add?
Mr. Anderson. Well, I would just add that, there is a lot
of training programs in place for a strategic-type training at
the tactical level where the CCMRF would operate. There--DOD
and NORTHCOM are just beginning to get a training program in
place. Because these units--it is not really a unit. It is a
number of individual units that span all services.
There are some civilian agencies that provide some of the
resources as well as National Guard and reserve. And to bring
this force together in an integrated manner to respond in a
quick manner, there needs to be more opportunities for them to
train together.
Generally, the training plan that DOD used is crawl, walk,
run. Because of frequent rotation in the units that have
provided capabilities to this force, this force has not been
able to get much past the crawl stage, because just as they are
gaining some momentum, a new unit comes in and they have to be
brought up to speed.
So, while there are a number of strategic-level training
programs, there have been a number of programs geared toward
the leaders who are in charge of the various units. The actual
tactical training for the units who would actually be on the
ground providing support, that hasn't quite caught up yet. And
hopefully in the future, they can get the participation that
General Renuart spoke about, get the whole force actually in
the field doing their mission real time.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Anybody else?
Well, thank you. I appreciate just knowing. I know when
your full report comes out, we will do this again.
So, I appreciate your work. And we will certainly stay in
touch.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 28, 2009
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 28, 2009
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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