[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-79]
ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION
OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION
PROGRAMS AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE
THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 15, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas California
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, July 15, 2009, Addressing a New Generation of Threats
from Weapons of Mass Destruction: Department of Energy
Nonproliferation Programs and the Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program........................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, July 15, 2009......................................... 31
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009
ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........ 3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,
Department of Energy, and Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 5
Nacht, Dr. Michael L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
Strategic Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P.................................... 35
Nacht, Dr. Michael L......................................... 45
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Massa.................................................... 53
ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 15, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Good morning. Let me start by officially
welcoming our colleague, Representative Buck McKeon, from
California for his honest-to-goodness first hearing as a
ranking member of this committee. He got off to a great start
during our markup. And here we are at our first hearing, so we
would like to officially welcome him in the first of many
hearings that we will work together.
We welcome our witnesses, Honorable Thomas D'Agostino,
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security with the Department of
Energy and the Department's Administrator for National Nuclear
Security Administration; Dr. Michael Nacht, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs with the Department of
Defense.
And we welcome both of you for being with us. This is a
highly important hearing, and we look forward to your
testimony.
The risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, particularly the risk that such weapons can
fall into terrorists' hands, are some of the gravest threats
facing our country. Since the end of the Cold War, the world
has experienced a new era of proliferation. In the last eight
years alone, North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, expanded
its nuclear arsenal and proliferated weapons of mass
destruction, technology, and expertise to Iran and to Syria.
Iran has rapidly developed capabilities that may enable it
to build nuclear weapons.
A far-reaching nuclear proliferation network run by Dr.
A.Q. Khan of Pakistan was uncovered and dismantled.
Nuclear arms rivalries have intensified in Asia and the
Middle East.
Changes in civil nuclear power programs have challenged the
nonproliferation regime. The spread of biotechnology has
increased the availability of technologies for sinister
purposes. Dangerous chemical, nuclear, radiological and
biological materials have remained poorly secured. At the same
time, terrorist networks around the globe have taken a deep
interest in obtaining and using these materials.
The Department of Energy nonproliferation programs and the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
undertake critical work to address the serious weapons of mass
destruction threats facing our country today and must be a top
national security priority. Unfortunately during the past eight
years these programs have suffered from a lack of effective
policy guidance and leadership as well as programmatic and
funding constraints. The 9/11 Commission gave the U.S. a grade
D on average to prevent weapons of mass destruction
proliferation and terrorism, and emphasized that Congress
should provide the resources needed for these efforts as
quickly as possible.
This committee has taken a number of important steps to
address the 9/11 Commission's concern and move weapons of mass
destruction nonproliferation and threat programs in the right
direction over the last two years. The committee has also urged
a strong national commitment to reinvigorate these programs and
ensure that they are a top national security priority going
forward. I am pleased that the President has now made that
commitment and has already undertaken an ambitious effort to
ensure that the U.S. does whatever we can do to reduce the risk
that weapons of mass destruction and related material could
ever fall into terrorist hands. This includes an international
effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the
world within four years, and an effort to expand U.S.
cooperation with Russia and pursue new partnerships to lock
down sensitive material.
When the House passed the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 this committee provided the President
with additional funding, new authorities and other tools to
further the President's goals and objectives in this area. This
includes a $403 million funding increase for Department of
Energy nonproliferation programs and a $30 million funding
increase for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program.
Gentlemen, we look forward to hearing about the good work
that your departments are doing. And under the new
administration, we hope you will address the new generation of
weapons of mass destruction threats facing our country. We are
especially eager to hear about opportunities that exist to get
a jump start on the President's initiatives.
I would like to remind our members and remind our witnesses
that, directly following the end of this hearing, we will move
to Rayburn 2337 for a follow-on classified briefing for members
only.
Before I begin, we turn to my good friend, the ranking
member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Buck McKeon, for any
comments that he may wish to make.
Mr. McKeon.
STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing on addressing a new generation of threats from weapons
of mass destruction, with a particular focus on efforts under
way in the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs and
the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program. I would also like to welcome our witnesses, Thomas
D'Agostino, the Undersecretary for Nuclear Security at the
Department of Energy, and Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration; and Dr. Michael Nacht, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. We look
forward to your testimony. As the Chairman said, since this is
my first full committee hearing as ranking member, I wanted to
take a brief moment and express my sincere enthusiasm and
commitment to work with Chairman Skelton and our members on
both sides of the aisle to ensure that America's men and women
in uniform have the direction, tools and resources they need to
succeed and that our defense policies meet the evolving
security demands facing our nation.
Today we are focused on the next generation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) threats. I think it is fair to say that
many would agree that we live in a complex security environment
that includes nuclear-capable states, nations determined to be
nuclear powers, and terrorists who seek nuclear materials and
know-how. If we look to the latest headlines in the news, we
will find a defiant North Korea which ignores the international
community with its nuclear tests, multiple ballistic missile
launches and proliferation of WMD technology and expertise; a
calculating Iranian regime that is determined to develop its
capabilities to build nuclear weapons; and Al Qaeda and their
affiliates who seek to undermine the Pakistani government, a
nation with a nuclear weapons program.
It is how we approach this WMD threat where we may have
some disagreements. From my perspective, we need a balanced and
effective toolkit filled with unilateral and multilateral tools
of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and military
preparedness, including missile defense and emergency response.
Today we are focused on one set of tools at our disposal--
defense nonproliferation programs managed by the Department of
Energy and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program managed by
the Department of Defense.
Gentlemen, I look forward to hearing your individual
assessments of the major proliferation challenges facing the
United States and the international community and how your
respective organizations prioritize to meet these challenges.
I am also interested in learning your thoughts on U.S.-
Russia nonproliferation cooperation. As you know, earlier this
month President Obama met with Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev, and in a joint statement, both nations confirmed
their commitment to strengthen cooperation to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of terrorism.
Based on this renewed commitment, what will be the impact, if
anything, on your existing programs with Russia and in terms of
cost-sharing?
At this time, I would also like to raise two concerns.
First, while I recognize that addressing the WMD proliferation
threat is in U.S. national security interests, our success
depends on our partnerships with Russia and other nations. I am
concerned that the United States often gets stuck paying the
bills, especially for those nations who have the financial
means to contribute. Let me emphasize that a partnership is not
a one-way street; it is not an assistance program, and it is
not effortless.
Please describe how you are working with other nations to
ensure they take the proliferation threat seriously and how
they are contributing, both in terms of capital and financial--
political and financial capital, to address our shared
proliferation interests.
Second, in the recently passed National Defense
Authorization Act, both the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)
received funding above the President's budget request for their
nonproliferation programs. While I support the bill that we
passed, I am concerned that the additional $402.6 million
provided to the NNSA came without a formal request from the
Administrator or Secretary of Energy and was based on a vague
commitment made during President Obama's April 5th speech in
Prague where he outlined his vision, ``to secure all vulnerable
nuclear material around the world within the next four years.''
My concern is that we are funding programs before the
President's rhetoric has translated into an integrated
interagency strategy or plan that has been shared with
Congress.
As further evidence of my concerns, neither our colleagues
on the Senate Armed Services Committee nor the House
appropriators provided additional funding for NNSA's defense
nonproliferation programs. In addition, both of these
committees also reduced funding for an NNSA program to disable
and dismantle North Korea's nuclear program next year. North
Korea's rejection of the Six-Party talks and recent provocative
actions are strong indicators that the international community
will be in a stalemate with North Korea for the foreseeable
future.
Considering these circumstances, Republicans would rather
see this funding and additional increases designated by the
committee for these programs be shifted to other priorities,
such as missile defense, given the current threat.
Before closing, I want to reiterate that our
nonproliferation programs are essential to U.S. national
security interests, especially our efforts to keep nuclear
materials out of the hands of terrorists.
Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony and a candid
discussion that follows and thank you for being here.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Our old friend, the Honorable Tom D'Agostino, we will call
on you first, sir.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, members of the
committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss NNSA's vital role in supporting the
administration's efforts to address weapons of mass destruction
threats.
Mr. Chairman, under your leadership the committee has been
a strong supporter of NNSA's nonproliferation activities.
The Chairman. Excuse me, would you move the microphone just
a little closer? We are going to have this room renovated, and
it is going to be a lot easier for witnesses as well as the
committee to hear witnesses some six months from now.
But, right now, we will have to do with what we have. So
please proceed. Thank you.
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The committee's assistance will become even more critical
as the NNSA seeks to expand and accelerate efforts, consistent
with the President's nuclear security strategy. The
nonproliferation activities that I will address today are a
subset Department of Energy's overall capabilities to address
the weapons of mass destruction threat. These activities
complement the Department's other recognized nonproliferation,
arms control and counterterrorism capabilities. However, my
remarks today focus on our first and second line of defense
activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, of materials and of technology.
The President made clear in his April speech in Prague in
joint statements with our Russian partners and elsewhere that
nuclear weapons remain a fundamental issue facing the
international community in the 21st century. He has stated that
the most immediate and extreme threat to global security is the
potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists. To
address this threat, the President has outlined an ambitious
strategy: deal with the nuclear arsenals, halt the
proliferation of weapons to additional states, and prevent
terrorists from acquiring weapons or the materials to build
them.
I have had the opportunity to speak to members of this
committee on the important work that the NNSA has done and the
enterprise carries out to ensure that the United States'
nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable to
deter any adversary and to provide the appropriate defensive
umbrella to our allies.
While I am speaking today about a major separate component
of the NNSA, the nonproliferation component of our national
security mission relies upon similar scientific and technical
expertise. It is that scientific and technical nuclear
expertise, combined with our proven track record on
implementing programs both domestically and abroad, that makes
the NNSA defense nonproliferation program a leader in
nonproliferation activities around the world.
The NNSA nuclear security programs provide an important
means to achieve a number of President Obama's objectives. His
April Prague speech provides a priority list of areas in which
NNSA will focus future nuclear security activities. Chief among
those is the President's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear
materials around the world in four years, expand our
cooperation with Russia, and pursue new partnerships to lock
down these sensitive materials.
This is an urgent and ambitious goal. However, it is one
that we stand prepared to support. Our work scope includes a
priority-based assessment of activities required to address
security concerns at specific sites worldwide. NNSA will
undertake the following actions to expand nuclear security
cooperation with Russia and other key partners; secure nuclear
material at the most vulnerable sites worldwide; remove and
eliminate weapons-useable nuclear materials where possible;
strengthen international security standards, practices and
international safeguards; improve international capabilities to
detect and intercept smuggling of nuclear materials; and to
prevent terrorists and proliferators from poaching on the
international market in the dual use of nuclear-weapons-related
equipment and technologies.
To start addressing the four-year time line to secure
vulnerable material, some existing NNSA activities will be
accelerated, including our Material Protection Control and
Accounting Program, our Global Threat Reduction Initiative and
our Nonproliferation and International Security programs. Other
aspects of the present agenda will require new or expanded
efforts, but in short, we have our to-do lists.
This NNSA plan of work alone will not accomplish all of the
President's nuclear security objectives. Under the leadership
of the White House, we will work closely with the Department of
State, Department of Defense, Homeland Security and others in
achieving these goals. The joint statement on nuclear
cooperation issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Russia
just last week, as well as the March 2010 Global Nuclear
Security Summit, announced at the G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy,
likewise will provide a solid foundation for work with our
international partners.
In closing, as the Administrator of the NNSA I am very
proud of the work and accomplishments of the nonproliferation
program that we have. For the sake of not taking up too much of
the committee's time today, I have not covered our other
numerous activities and accomplishments in my oral statement.
However, I have included the details of our nonproliferation
programs and the achievements in the written testimony. You
have my assurance that, as we continue on our important work to
achieve the President's nonproliferation goals, while closely
working with our interagency partners, NNSA will do its best to
make the world a safer place. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee thank you very much, and that concludes my remarks.
[The prepared statement of Secretary D'Agostino can be
found in the Appendix on page 35.]
The Chairman. Without objection, the written testimony of
the witnesses will be included in the record.
Dr. Nacht, please. We welcome you.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL L. NACHT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Nacht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, have
submitted written testimony for the record.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Armed Services Committee, I
am very pleased to appear before you today to discuss these
terrible threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and
explain how the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program plays an important role in the overall U.S.
strategy to mitigate these threats.
We all know that weapons of mass destruction pose a
tremendous threat to our nation, our interests and even our way
of life, and the Department of Defense is seized with this
challenge, and we are determined to ensure that we develop and
maintain the plans, strategies, capabilities and programs
necessary to prevent WMD proliferation wherever possible.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has identified
four strategic priorities that provide our Department with the
mechanism for examining WMD challenges. These four priorities
are: Increasing barriers to WMD proliferation and use;
identifying and mitigating emerging WMD threats; developing an
integrated, layered WMD defense; and managing WMD threats
emanating from failing or fragile states or from ungoverned
spaces.
These priorities provide a valuable framework to support
the President's ambitious nuclear security agenda from his
Prague speech. Within DOD, these priorities are shaping our
efforts to address WMD related issues in the Quadrennial
Defense Review, the QDR, which is currently under way. The QDR
provides an unparalleled opportunity to communicate the
importance of WMD issues to the broader defense community.
Let me briefly offer the committee a report on our current
and future Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities. And
before I begin, I do want to thank the committee for its
continued strong support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, and we take this as a vote of confidence in the
Department's efforts thus far to implement the CTR Program.
Mr. Chairman I know you and your colleagues are well
acquainted with the history and activities of the Program. I
just want to bring you up to date briefly on the status of some
current projects, some recent achievements, and then some new
initiatives.
CTR today is in a period of transition from a nuclear-
centric effort focused on the former Soviet Union to a more
expansive effort to respond to WMD threats throughout the
world. CTR continues to oversee the destruction of strategic
weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in
accordance with all relevant stock provisions and agreements.
Security systems at 24 nuclear weapon storage sites in Russia
have been upgraded in partnership with the Department of
Energy, with the final upgrades completed in late 2008 last
year. DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) are now
coordinating closely to give the Russian military the means to
sustain operational readiness into the future.
On March 5th of this year, the first chemical munitions
were destroyed in the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction
facility. By 2012, the facility will destroy the chemical
weapon stockpile at the nearby Planovy military base, which
contains approximately one-seventh of Russia's chemical
arsenal. In Azerbaijan, CTR is helping the Coast Guard
interdict WMD smuggling in the Caspian Sea, and we are
installing a comprehensive surveillance system that will cover
the major shipping lanes in the Caspian.
And by the way, Congressman McKeon, I can cite some
specific cost-sharing examples here perhaps after I finish my
testimony. The Biological Threat Reduction Program, the BTRP,
continues its work to consolidate and secure pathogen
collections, develop a capability for disease detection,
diagnostics and reporting and enhancing strategic research
partnerships.
We have negotiated an implementing agreement with Armenia
which is pending signature. There is construction of the
Central Reference Laboratory in Tbilisi, Georgia, which is on
track to be completed this year. And at the request of the
Georgian government, CTR was working to make the lab a joint
disease surveillance and research center. These are ongoing
activities today.
What about the future? First, we must continue to have a
strong CTR presence in Russia, as the President attempts to
reset our relationship with Russia, where the CTR Program
should be a central part of that resetting process. CTR is
working with an interagency forum to meet the President's goal
of nuclear lockdown within four years, as Administrator
D'Agostino has already discussed.
This group is currently assessing known locations of
nuclear material to determine the best way forward. This
initiative is a high priority for the President, and CTR looks
forward to assisting in this effort. In addition, the CTR
Program is bracing for a wide range of emerging WMD threats
beyond the former Soviet Union.
A recent National Academy of Sciences study recommended
that CTR expand geographically and evolve in form and function
to confront emerging WMD threats. In conjunction with an
interagency committee on bioengagement, CTR has identified four
countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya and Uganda, as
potential partners in future bioengagement efforts.
A National Research Council report on the Biological Threat
Reduction Program noted that countries that lack the
infrastructure necessary to detect, diagnose, and protect
disease outbreaks are at a greater risk of succumbing to a
bioterror attack. Dual-use technologies, materials and
expertise flow freely across international borders. Dangerous
pathogens exist in nature and can be weaponized without special
equipment or advanced technical skills.
So the increasing threat of animal-to-human transfer of
pathogens underscores the importance of reporting on animal
disease outbreaks as well as human. To meet this threat, the
Biological Threat Reduction Program has built facilities, such
as the Joint U.S.-Georgia Disease Surveillance and Research
Center, that will have the unique capability of conducting
research in both human and animal especially dangerous
pathogens.
BTRP will continue to grow and evolve as CTR shifts from a
nuclear focus to a more expansive vision for threat-reduction
efforts.
Let me conclude my remarks by endorsing the new legal
authorities this committee has included in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA). I wish to emphasize to the committee
that DOD understands the sensitivities associated with the use
of these authorities, and we will only utilize them within the
guidelines set forth in the legislation.
So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say CTR is one
piece of an overarching national strategy to counter WMD. We
have made significant progress over the history of the Program,
but we have more to do across the growing spectrum of WMD
threats. The Department of Defense looks forward to continued
close coordination with Congress and its interagency partners
as we seek to address the threats posed by WMD. And I welcome
your questions and look forward to a productive discussion.
Again, thank you for giving me this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Nacht can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
The Chairman. Doctor, thank you very much.
Let me ask each of you, in your considered opinion, what is
the greatest existing or emerging threat posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
Go ahead, please.
Secretary D'Agostino. Why don't I start, Mr. Chairman?
In my view, obviously, it is a complicated question. I
don't want to point to a particular region in the world, but I
would like to answer it in the following way. This is all about
the material. Preventing terrorists, nonstate actors, rogue
states from having the kind of material that can prove to be
dangerous; fissile material and, in some cases, certain types
of radiological material, can cause also panic, if you will,
but may not have that destructive power that fissile material
may have.
Our priorities are to look at both areas, but it is all
about the material. So we have a program working with the
Defense Department that integrates the whole material spectrum
problem. Looking to secure material where it exists around the
world is a key part of it, and reducing the number of locations
of the material, eliminating material, trying to get rid of
that fissile material that has no energy value, if you will,
and converting material from highly-enriched uranium to low-
enriched uranium; detecting material as it moves around the
world, having a specific program to focus on material
detection; and then ultimately stop adding to the material
problem with programs and ideas, such as the Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty and reopening it to discussion internationally to
get those pieces together.
So the threats come down to the material. It is kind of
like that old real estate add, which is location, location,
location. I think it is material, material, material. Obviously
technology and policies are a big part of that. But that is how
I like to think about this problem sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Nacht.
Dr. Nacht. Of course, President Obama to some degree
answered that question in Prague when he said the most
immediate and extreme threat to global security is a nuclear
weapon in the hands of terrorists. Within the Department of
Defense, we are very much emphasizing that it is most
expeditious to stop the proliferation of WMD at its source,
because once it gets out into a transportation network, it is
much harder to interdict.
Let me give you several examples of how we are trying to do
this. In cooperation with the Department of Energy, we, last
year, finished physical protection upgrades at every Russian
nuclear weapon storage site for which U.S. assistance has been
requested to enhance the security of those sites and make it
less feasible for material to be stolen.
Currently, the two departments continue to work closely
with the Russian ministry of defense to develop a cadre of
military personnel capable of operating, maintaining and
repairing those security systems far into the future. In an
effort to address the insider threat, which is really central
to stopping the flow of material from the source, we work
closely with the Russian--the three agencies. The Ministry of
Defense (MOD) in Russia and DOD and DOE are involved in further
developing MOD personnel reliability programs intended to
ensure that personnel with access to nuclear weapons are fit
for duty.
The DOD and MOD together have developed and installed an
automated system to inventory and to track the location and
condition of Russia's nuclear weapons. We also continue to
support the transport of nuclear warheads from operational
locations to dismantlement facilities and to consolidate its
secure storage. So we remain engaged with the Russian
Federation on multiple fronts, including eliminating strategic
nuclear arms and their delivery vehicles.
Of course, nuclear weapons are not the only form of WMD
that pose such a threat, even in the hands of terrorists. So as
I mentioned in the past already, the first processing building
at Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility began to
destroy agents in March of this year. A second processing
building will be completed by the end of this year. So
interdicting and stopping the proliferation of the weapons at
its source is our primary approach to this problem.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, in following up on my opening remarks, there has
been a great deal of attention focused on the President's goal
of securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide in four
years. Again, it is my understanding that, at this time,
neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of Defense
nor this Congress has seen a formal strategy, plan or timeline
to meet this goal. Would you please tell us when should the
Congress expect to receive such a formal strategy or plan?
Secretary D'Agostino. I will start, sir, and then shift
over. What we have done at the Department of Energy, and we are
very familiar with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and
work closely with Dr. Nacht and his team, is we looked at our
program, which is structured as I mentioned earlier around
securing material, addressing that and being able to detect
movement of items across the world, frankly; and looked at
accelerating those elements of our program, trying to push the
end dates, some of which are out in the 2016 to 2018 time
frame, and moving them closer within the next four-year period.
So the scope of work that we have laid out we don't have an
approved plan. My team, headed by Mr. Baker, has put together a
draft plan. I have asked him to put together a draft plan, but
that draft plan is not approved yet by me. It is, frankly, we
are negotiating both internally within the Department and in
the interagency process.
However, in the meantime, I don't need to have a final
approved plan to know what work I have in front of me because I
have a good sense of it. And so we are looking at recalibrating
the internals of our program to address what we think are the
most vulnerable and most important areas to address first.
And then the interagency process, as you have described in
your opening remarks, are exactly where ultimately I would like
to see this go. This is not just about the NNSA or this is not
just about the Department of Defense and the NNSA solving,
addressing this problem. This is about the whole federal
government and, quite frankly, all of our international
partners who are part of this solution. It will take a little
bit of time to get to the point, and unfortunately, I can't
give you a date, but it will take a bit of time to sort out all
those pieces. But in the meantime, I think Dr. Nacht and I know
about our work that we have cut out in front of us, and we want
to accelerate those pieces that we can, particularly with our
Global Threat Reduction Initiative in the National Nuclear
Security Administration, as well as with our Material
Protection and Accounting Program that we have. Those two
pieces coupled with the right policy and safeguards framework
will ultimately get us a lot closer to where we need to be four
years from now.
Dr. Nacht. Let me follow on with some remarks from the
Defense Department's perspective. As Dr. D'Agostino has said,
the staffs of several of the agencies involved in this work are
collaborating and developing an overall strategy, which is in
progress. There are several parts to this process that I can
cite. First, we are defining and scoping the problem in terms
of the definitions and thresholds for vulnerable materials.
What is it we really are looking for? What is included in our
effort to lockdown? And what is excluded? We are refining and
prioritizing the list of key facilities and sources of
vulnerable materials worldwide.
We are defining where the problem is best addressed, to
expanding and accelerating existing programs, and where new
activities and programs will be required, to include an
evaluation of roles and missions of the major departments in
the federal government. And I believe that we could be able to
return to you in September and provide a more detailed report
on the proposed way forward.
Mr. McKeon. So you are expecting by September to give us
the plan?
Dr. Nacht. I am optimistic that we will have something to
report to you in September. The NNSA, of course, is overseeing
this. They are taking the lead on it in terms of coordination,
and we are all on the job on this. We know how critically
important it is. It is not only something that has been
restated by President Obama; it was now endorsed at the G8
summit in L'Aquila, so it is becoming a global initiative. So
we know it is a very high priority.
Mr. McKeon. Will the four years start when the President
gave his speech or in September when you give us an update or a
draft of a plan?
And Mr. D'Agostino, you said it would take some time. Would
you be able to report back in September?
Secretary D'Agostino. I think what we would be able to--we
have an element of our plan, we have our work scope identified,
and the key will be making sure that our priorities are not
just within the Department of Energy, but are consistent with
the rest of the federal government, quite frankly, and having
those things line up and mesh up nicely.
I believe we will have a plan that I am comfortable with.
As you obviously know, sir, we are in the process of defining
our fiscal year 2011 and outyear program in details. I have a
personal desire, and I know Dr. Nacht does as well, to make
sure that things get settled as quickly as possible on this
plan because it helps inform the kind of program I will
ultimately submit to the White House and negotiate to get into
the President's budget next January.
So I think I will have enough information from a draft
standpoint. I don't know if it will be ready for Congress yet,
but quite frankly, I am pushing very hard, and I know Dr. Nacht
is pushing very hard, to get this thing done. We understand
that this is a focal point, and we understand that this is the
thing that is going to help us shape the details of our
program. And whether more money needs to be put in category A
versus category B and where the priorities are, we are right on
top of that because it is important to get this done.
Mr. McKeon. Is the President asking both of you to--is this
just something that sounded like a good thing to do, or is he
really serious and he wants this done in four years from the
time he gave the speech, and you are working on it and you will
have the plan back September or January? I think the Congress
is very interested in seeing that and then monitoring it
because I think we all agree that that is something that should
be done, and four years is a good time to have it done. So is
this something that he is pushing you on, that he wants this
plan and the date started from when he gave the speech?
Secretary D'Agostino. The President is quite serious about
this plan, sir. I haven't talked to him personally about it,
but I have talked--my contacts at the National Security Council
are very clear that we are going to put together a plan, we are
going to work the details of it. I don't know when, quote-
unquote, the official start date might be. My view is the
President said he wants the plan done within four years. I know
the date he said. I think it is April 4th. And I am working to
that end.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I think we are running out of time. We will
run and vote in just a minute. But I have one request following
up on Mr. McKeon. You will, the minute the plan is fully ready,
communicate it to this committee, am I correct?
Dr. Nacht. Yes, of course. As soon as the plan is fully
ready, we will communicate this to the committee. And there may
be ways we can brief you off line or in closed session on the
progress.
The Chairman. Of course, the sooner the better. A briefing
would be excellent. But we would like to have the full plan. I
am sure we would consider a full hearing on that issue the
minute that it is given to us. We will return after the vote,
and Ms. Sanchez will be the lead questioner. We will be
adjourned until we come back.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will resume. The gentlelady from
California, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today.
I have sat on this subcommittee that deals with these
issues now for I think 11 of the 13 years that I have been in
the Congress. And there are really two issues that worry me
today, and I continue to try to understand and get my hands
around it. So I will start with the first.
The START treaty will expire December 5th of this year. And
I know that your agency is the one that deals with giving the
technical information about numbers and capabilities and
delivery systems, et cetera. So my question is--it is my
personal opinion that it is very difficult to reach a
renegotiation and then extension treaty by December 5th. So my
question to you would be, what is it that we as Congress can do
to ensure that we meet this December 5th, that we get something
that we meet this December 5th deadline, because I think it is
very, very critical? It exposes us to a new arms race, if you
will, if we don't do something about this.
Dr. Nacht. Well, Congresswoman, obviously, you are aware
that there have been very intensive negotiations.
Ms. Sanchez. I have been to Russia several times.
Dr. Nacht. Right. And Rose Gottemoeller from the State
Department chairs our negotiating team. They are actually
leaving again next week for the first round of negotiations
post-summit. I think the calendar is daunting, as you suggest.
We are making every effort, and the Russians have been told
this, and they are fully aware of this, that we don't want to
go through a process of extending the treaty.
We want a new treaty that will be completed by the time the
START treaty expires. Now, then, we think probably it is
unlikely that the treaty will be completed and the ratification
process will be completed by the time the treaty expires, the
START treaty. So we would seek an extension from the Congress
to continue the treaty while the ratification process goes
forward. But we are hopeful, very hopeful, that a treaty will
be reached, an agreement will be reached on a new treaty before
December 5th. We will submit it to the Senate and to relevant
House committees as well, but for consent for ratification,
which will then take place. Senator Lugar has stated publicly
it might take four months. So sometime before the spring of
2010, we would hope to have a new agreement.
Now, the summit, as you know from the joint understanding,
did reflect a lot of hard bargaining that has already taken
place. We have an agreed range of operationally deployed
strategic nuclear weapons of 1,500 to 1,675. We have an agreed
range of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 500 to 1,100. Each
side has argued for one side or the other. At least we have now
bounded the problem, and I think we can see our way through to
an agreement on both those characteristics of the forces which
are critically important.
There are other elements of the treaty as well and
definitional issues that have to be resolved, so there is a lot
of hard negotiating ahead. But I think our readout of the
summit was that the Russians, although they are challenging to
work with, want an agreement. Actually, their nuclear delivery
vehicle programs are lagging ours by quite a lot numerically.
Just the atrophying of their systems; they are putting more
weapons on fuel delivery vehicles, which actually is quite
destabilizing. We would prefer to have single-warhead weapons
on delivery vehicles so it is not seen as a first-strike
weapon. So this suggests to me--I mean, there are other issues.
There is a missile defense issue in Europe.
Ms. Sanchez. Yes, I know about that also.
Dr. Nacht. So I don't want to in any way sugarcoat it. It
is not going to be simple. But I think this is an important
next step.
We had the London meeting between President Medvedev and
the President in April. We had the Moscow summit last week. I
think it is promising--I spent a lot of time negotiating it
with the Russians in the past, in the 1990s--that we will have
a treaty before the START treaty expires.
Ms. Sanchez. Let me stop you right there because I have a
second question. I am very concerned--my number one priority
has always been the concern over Iran getting nuclear weapons.
What do you think the Congress can do? I think it is not just
an ability for them to get the ability to send missiles off,
but their ability to put it in the hands of somebody who might
walk it into our country or into another ally's country. What
should the Congress be doing?
The Chairman. Doctor, answer the question, please, and then
we will go to the next witness.
Dr. Nacht. Well, this is a large subject. Obviously
stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or transmitting
them to others is obviously a top national security priority
for the President. We have had this recent--now where Iran is
going through sort of our people domestically.
One of our issues is, we are seeking to impose an effective
sanctions regime on Iran, so that they will find it in their
interest to come to the table. But it is not easy to do.
Germany alone exports $6 billion worth of goods and equipment
to Iran. A lot of our European allies are deep negotiating
commercial partners with Iran.
Ms. Sanchez. We have been working with them through the
dialogues that we have in the Congress.
Dr. Nacht. The Chinese buy a lot of oil from Iran. So
whether you are looking for a U.N. Security Council resolution,
if you are looking for a multi-party sanctions regime, we are
talking to the people who are selling the Iranians a lot of
high-priced systems. So anything the Congress can do, frankly,
to shore up our ability to enforce a sanctions regime we think
would be very valuable.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Bartlett--but before I call Mr. Bartlett, let me again
reiterate, gentlemen, we would appreciate continued briefings
on the progress on the four-year plan. And when it is
finalized, at the earliest moment, please, communicate it to
this committee because we wish to follow through at that time.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Several years ago, I spent three days in North Korea. They
may be evil; they are not stupid. They know, and I suspect the
same is true of Iran, they know that if they launched a missile
from their soil, nuclear tipped, that the consequences of that
would be that we would vaporize their country.
Gentlemen, they are just not going to do that. I have no
idea why we are watching to see when they get a missile which
could reach us from their soil. They are not going to launch a
missile from their soil toward us. If they launch a missile
toward us, it will be from the sea. And if it is nuclear-
tipped, the most probable use of that weapon is going to be to
produce an extra atmospheric electromagnetic pulse (EMP) lay
down. Their weapon and their missile is unlikely to have much
precision. If they miss their target by 100 miles for extra
atmospheric detonation, it really won't matter, will it? The
most probable place the weapon is going to be launched from is
the sea. And the most probable use of the weapon is going to be
an EMP attack. Why am I not seeing any meaningful preparation
to protect us against either one of these?
Dr. Nacht. Well, let me just take a piece of what you have
said. When the North Koreans started testing these missiles,
most recently after they tested a nuclear device, Secretary
Gates ordered redeployment of missile defense systems, the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and an Aegis
system, to protect the Hawaiian islands. We are working on----
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, if I might interrupt. That is because we
thought they were going to launch from their soil, and the
current missile would only reach Hawaii; it wouldn't reach our
mainland. I am saying, sir, that they are not going to launch
from their soil. They may be evil; they are not stupid. They
are not going to launch from their soil. They are going to
launch from the sea, which means that all up and down both of
our coasts, we are vulnerable. Why am I not seeing any
meaningful preparation to protect us against that? And if they
do launch there, sir, the most probable use of that weapon--it
is in all of their open literature and all of their war games--
and if a nonstate actor had it, that it is absolutely what they
are going to do, it is going to be an extra atmospheric
detonation-producing EMP. I am not seeing any meaningful
preparation to prepare for that attack either. Why am I not
seeing any preparation for either of these two, which is the
most probable way the missile is going to be used and the most
probable way the nuclear weapon is going to be detonated?
Dr. Nacht. With respect to possible EMP attacks on the
United States, there is work being done which we could discuss
in another venue. With respect to a sea-based system, there are
no current platforms or delivery vehicles available to the
North Koreans to launch an attack on the U.S. homeland from
sea.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, that just isn't true because any tramp
steamer and a Scud launcher, which they can buy for $100,000,
can launch a missile to an apogee of 180 miles. That is
perfectly adequate, sir, for an EMP attack which would
devastate all of New England. They do have platforms. Any tramp
steamer and a Scud launcher is an adequate platform.
Dr. Nacht. Congressman, of course, you are aware, take the
recent following of the Korean ship from the North Korean port
toward Burma that turned around just recently; we have
excellent surveillance of all North Korean naval vessels.
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, there are thousands of commercial ships
out there. And if a canvas is over it, you cannot tell whether
it is a stack of bananas or a missile launcher on the deck. We
can't see through the thinnest covering on the deck. There is
no way, in today's world, that we could detect whether that
cargo on the deck is a launcher or Caterpillar tractors.
Dr. Nacht. I think, Congressman, you raise some good
points, and I think we can continue this perhaps with members
from the Defense Intelligence Agency and others in a closed
session and I'd be happy to go into more detail on exactly your
concerns.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Marshall, please.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I second, third and fourth what my colleague Mr. Bartlett
had to say. This is so obvious. One of the reasons why I agreed
to co-chair the Missile Defense Caucus; we are not adequately
prepared to deal with rogue missiles. And a rogue missile
launched the way Mr. Bartlett described would just be
absolutely devastating to the United States, would
significantly weaken the United States. It would, obviously, be
in the interest of all of our adversaries to do that. And the
possible consequences, the human consequences, within the
United States are just too horrible to even contemplate. And so
I look forward to closed session discussions of this problem
and what we are doing about this problem.
CTR and the evolution of CTR, Mr. Nacht, if you had
additional funds available to you, what would you be doing with
those funds? How would you modify the Program, improve the
Program, expand the Program, those sorts of things? I
understand we have moved significantly away--well, not away
from--but we have broadened the scope of our inquiry beyond
nuclear to bioterrorism, chemical, et cetera. And if you could
describe what you would do with additional resources, that
would be helpful.
Dr. Nacht. Well, you raised one point immediately. We are
moving substantially into the bioterrorism threat space, and we
are still at the early stages. It is not easy to collaborate
with other countries on this, although we have made some
progress. A lot of the systems we are talking about are dual-
use systems. They can be used for perfectly legitimate
commercial research activities. We could really scope out a
broader effort to try to develop something that might begin to
move down the road toward a lockdown of pathogens even though
it would be even more ambitious than the nuclear lockdown.
Mr. Marshall. When you say it is not easy to coordinate
with other countries on this particular subject, is it because
of lack of resources or there is just lack of interest on their
part to cooperate with us?
Dr. Nacht. I would say it is a mix. You know, if we speak
to some governments, they find that we are being excessively
intrusive on what they are doing in certain areas, or they deny
that there is any malevolent intent or any military
application. Sometimes we can't prove that. We don't have the
intelligence to know definitively.
So we need collaboration that sometimes comes actually from
a broader framework. Take for example the case of Georgia.
Georgia was invaded by Russia last summer. Georgia has all
kinds of security concerns. We have signed an agreement that
basically pledges to maintain their security. They are very
keen on collaborating with us, even though it is a very
sensitive matter dealing with their Russian neighbors on all of
this. So there we have a substantial new program for a
biological laboratory in Georgia.
But other countries don't have that sense of security needs
or concerns. They don't think they are a transit point for
bioterrorism, and they are just more reticent. Now, sometimes
funds can help. If we say, we will put a downpayment down on
this activity or we will pay the majority share in the first
tranche, they might be more interested. So I think additional
funds could help. But we have been very careful not to go to
the committee or the Congress for request of funds that we know
we can't use effectively.
And, you know, you have been generous enough to support
beyond our request. So, you know, we have not submitted--we
don't have a list, really, of unfunded priorities that we have
in our pocket that we could go to. It is unusual, unlike a lot
of other areas. But if you are urging us to do it, we could
develop it.
Mr. Marshall. That would be great, if you would develop it.
We may not fund it, but it would be nice to know what
additional steps--where would you go from where you are right
now.
Dr. Nacht. Sir, we will follow up on that with NNSA.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry, please.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. D'Agostino, I appreciate what you and your colleagues
at NNSA have done over the years on nonproliferation. I have
thought that if the federal government were going to waste
money in one area that that would probably be the area to waste
it in, because any chance of reducing slightly the odds of a
terrorist getting a weapon of mass destruction would be worth a
lot. But, at the same time, we want to make sure our money is
spent smartly and effectively.
Secretary D'Agostino. Right. Right.
Mr. Thornberry. And I have some concerns that a lot of this
is moving so quickly that we have the risk of throwing money at
problems and not spending it as smartly and as effectively as
we might--could.
For example, it seems to me that the clearest, easiest
program to defend is Material Protection, Control, and
Accounting (MPC&A), where we put greater security around
nuclear fissile materials. But the question is, how much is
enough? How much do we keep upgrading, for example, Russian
facilities when they are spending a tremendous amount of money
to upgrade their own military and it is becoming much more
effective over time?
And what I really want to get to is, do you have an
objective standard of metrics that can help evaluate where
different facilities are, partly as a way to know where to put
the money, but partly as a way to know whether we are making
progress or not?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Thornberry, thanks very much for
the question.
The answer to that is, yes, we do have an objective set of
metrics. The nonproliferation program is driven, in fact, by
metrics.
With respect to MPC&A or even our Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, we have a very clearly laid out scope of work that
goes out into the future. Much of this work, as you know, takes
some time to do. I mean, you have to start with usually
country-to-country negotiations, and in each country it is
unique and different.
But in the end, we know how many facilities we have said we
were going to work on in Russia. We have laid out that scope.
We know how many buildings we said we want to secure in Russia.
We know how many ports and land transfer crossings we have in
Russia and around the world that we plan on doing. And we are
literally working our way through that menu. And so, at any
given point in time, we know how well we are doing, are we
getting a B-plus or an A-minus or a C or what have you.
Mr. Thornberry. And can you say that this facility in
Russia and this other facility in wherever, Bulgaria, meet
category III security standards, for example? I mean, is there
a standard set by which you can measure across the different
countries where security is relative to perfect security, which
doesn't exist?
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, sir. We use the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Circular 225, Rev. 4, which is an
international security guidelines that go off and help guide
our program. We make sure that those facilities meet that bare
minimum set of security standards. And we work our way through
that list.
So it is very much metric-based. At any given point in
time, for example, we have 73 out of 123 sites that we said we
are going to finish off in Russia are actually done; 73 are
completed----
Mr. Thornberry. And you have walked away from them?
Secretary D'Agostino. We have sustainability agreements.
This is the key point, though, and I think you are absolutely
right, is making sure we have a transition plan with Rosatom,
for example, which is one of our major partners in Russia. We
have a transition plan in place to work that off. Right now
they pick up 40 percent of the load on maintainability, and the
plan is to get them off of the U.S. approach out into the next
few years. The Ministry of Defense, which we work closely with
the Defense Department, has already agreed that they are taking
care of 100 percent of the security upgrades that we have
jointly worked on.
So I am very much in the mind of making sure that this is
not the gift that keeps on giving, if you will. This is
something where we expect a partnership relationship. And,
frankly, I am quite pleased with the partnership relationship.
I will give you one more example, the Federal Customs
Service in Russia, for example. Right now, with them we are
working on putting security upgrades at 370 land border
crossings, with the agreement right off the bat that they do 50
percent of the work, we do 50 percent of the work. And on the
50 percent of the work that we do, they are picking up the
maintenance costs on those facilities bit by bit, so that over
the next three years they will have 100 percent of the
maintainability on that covered.
Now, of course, we are going to watch them to make sure
they follow through on that--that is my own parochial
interest--but I think it is happening.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was late because of
the Veterans Committee. If Mr. Thornberry would like another
five minutes, I will yield my time to him. He is one of the
experts and zealous advocates. If he only has five minutes of
information, then he is done--I will let you have my time.
Okay. Well, I am just going to pass.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, all right.
Dr. Snyder. There he goes.
Mack has been a leader in this program. There were
political threats to this program 10, 12, 13 years ago, and
Mack lead action both in this committee and on the floor of the
House because of the importance of these programs. And I want
to recognize him.
The Chairman. The gentleman is recognized for another five
minutes.
Mr. Thornberry. I appreciate the gentleman from Arkansas.
He and I have traveled together with some of your folks and
seen some of this, particularly in the early days, which,
again, seems to me to be eminently defensible. I am worried,
though, again, that, as we move ahead, that it continues to be
eminently defensible.
And let me just pursue a little bit--you were talking about
Russia, and you talk about Russia a lot in your statement, and
the partnership we have with Russia. You talk in your statement
that Russia is bringing back some civilian fuel that it has
produced from neighboring countries. Other than that example,
is Russia doing anything for anybody else other than itself?
Secretary D'Agostino. Well, we work with Russia on the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which talks
about the training and export control and making sure--since we
obviously have the majority of the material and the warheads,
we have a certain obligation, we feel a significant obligation
in that manner, to essentially get the whole world up to a
certain level of standards with respect to nuclear
counterterrorism.
Essentially, we work obviously very closely with
repatriating material, as you have described. Russia is very
keen and has been very helpful with us, kind of with some other
states that I would rather talk about in closed session. I
would be happy to do that in closed session because of the
sensitivity of the discussion.
But also they have--because of our partnership with Russia,
other nations have watched this, and we have agreement with our
second line of defense activities where this isn't just a
matter of the United States going over to some foreign port and
saying, ``We will take care of everything; we are going to
install this equipment.'' We typically provide the equipment
and the know-how on the operations, but those other countries
pick up the rest of the work, which is significant. It is not
only the installation, but the operations and the maintenance
of that stuff.
So we are--I am very confident overall with our
partnerships.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I appreciate it.
And I appreciate, again, Dr. Snyder yielding.
I would just say, to keep bipartisan support, it will be
very important for the administration to make sure we are not
just funding Russian military modernization and that they do
not only what they say they are with their own materials and
facilities, but they are genuinely helpful, whether it is
public or not, are genuinely helpful in getting better control
of materials in other places.
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. So, with that feedback, I appreciate the
gentlemen. Yield back to the gentleman from Arkansas.
The Chairman. Mr. Heinrich, please.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, what do you see as the role of the Congress in
motivating our allies and partners, countries like Germany, to
pursue a more effective sanctions regime with Iran?
Dr. Nacht. This is a tough nut. And it has been an issue
that has been addressed at least going back to the early
Clinton years, so we are talking about at least a 15-year-old
problem here.
The fact of the matter is that there are many lucrative
commercial arrangements between private entities in a number of
ally countries with Iran whose behavior has not been altered by
any government persuasion by their host government, by their
own government.
What the U.S. can do in that regard, you know, we have
tried various forms of consultation and negotiation and
dissuasion, but so far I would say we have, you know, mixed
results, very mixed results.
I don't know if some more draconian legislation coming out
of the Congress would actually be helpful, because there are so
many dimensions to our relationships with the European
partners, with the Chinese, that, you know, we can go--it is a
very important matter, but if we go overboard in this area, we
may pay a price in another area.
So I think this is an area under review. We are struggling
with it, and we are looking for--it is a very tailored
approach. You can't have an overall sanctions policy, I think,
because the situations are so different. I mean, to alter
Chinese behavior about acquisition of oil resources from Iran
is one whole problem. Dealing with heavy machinery from Siemens
in Germany to Iran is a different problem. Dealing with the
Russians on their nuclear technology is still a third problem.
So we have not derived an umbrella approach to this problem,
but we are open to ideas. It is critically important.
Obviously, as long as Iran believes and knows that they are
not really being hurt very much economically--and their economy
is not in good shape, as we all know--then it gives them less
of an incentive to alter their behavior or to sit down and talk
with us in a meaningful way about their nuclear program.
Mr. Heinrich. To shift gears a little bit, we saw with the
outbreak of H1N1 in Mexico that we have places right in our own
backyard where there is no effective surveillance and reporting
detection when it comes to both animal and then animal-to-human
pathogens.
Where do you see the most acute needs for more effective
detection and reporting as sort of a first line to prevent both
bioterror outbreaks and also to manage natural animal-to-human
pathogens that can have huge public health ramifications as
well?
Dr. Nacht. That is a very important subject and could be
very, very important this fall. It is a little outside of my
particular lane. There is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Security, Paul Stockton, who works these issues in
close consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and
with Health and Human Services (HHS). And that is really----
Mr. Heinrich. I guess, what do you see as the relationship
between early detection and reporting and how that can maybe
help both with natural outbreaks but also having a surveillance
system in place that potentially can be helpful in bioterror
attacks as well?
Dr. Nacht. I mean, obviously, the earlier we can detect the
outbreak and the better surveillance systems we have in place,
the more likely we will be prepared to deal with these matters.
I think that we are looking very carefully at division of
labor on exactly what kind of systems and what should we
request from the Congress, what should be deployed, who is in
the information loop. Because, as you know, I mean, take the
catastrophe of 9/11, how many different governmental and other
players are involved? If this became a major outbreak in the
fall, I mean, it would be a national emergency.
So it is a large subject. It is a subject that is under
interagency review currently.
Mr. Heinrich. Okay.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Before I call on Mr. Turner, Dr. Nacht, let me follow
through on the discussion you had with Mr. Thornberry a few
moments ago.
He asked about the Department of Energy cost-saving with
Russia on nonproliferation activities, and we received several
examples of such cost-sharing. But are you able to give us
examples of such cost-sharing for the Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs?
Dr. Nacht. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I can cite a few examples.
In Azerbaijan, the government there is paying the cost of
the Cooperative Threat Reduction bio facility that has been
established there.
Of course, all of our Cooperative Threat Reduction partners
provide land for facilities. They provide in-kind services,
such as security forces to protect the facilities. Russia is
actually paying a portion of the cost for the dismantlement of
their ballistic missile submarines, which is a CTR program.
And our friends in Canada and Britain have contributed
financially to the nerve agent elimination plant in Russia. So
they are helping to pay for the elimination of a plant in
Russia that we are helping with the Russians to eliminate, but
it is British and Canadian funding that is supporting that.
So there is a mix of different cost-sharing arrangements
across the many different programs under CTR in the defense
area.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate both of you gentlemen being here. I have a
great deal of respect for Mr. D'Agostino. And, Mr. Nacht, you
have an incredible record of service to your country and
substantively on these issues. And I have a topic that perhaps
the two of you might be able to help me with.
I am very concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons
programs. I certainly respect Mr. Bartlett's issue that he had
raised of alternative ways that they might attack us, but at
the same time we have the evidence of their full pursuit of a
nuclear weapons program and a very aggressive missile program
that appears to be, I believe and I think others and perhaps
you believe, is a direct threat to the national security of our
country.
In the budget that was put forth by the President, he
requested funding for the disablement and dismantlement of
North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Now, during our
committee's markup, I noted that the request for the
disablement and dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program totaled $80 million. That was the President's budget
request, $80 million.
At the same time, the President requested a cut of $120
million in missile defense funding that would have completed
part of the missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. So we are
setting aside $80 million for the disablement and dismantlement
of North Korea's nuclear weapon program, and we are eliminating
$120 million to finish a missile defense field that was two-
thirds of the way complete in Fort Greely, Alaska.
I offered an amendment that was defeated to offset that, to
take the $80 million for North Korea and offset it on the $120
million that we were losing to actually defend ourselves.
Now, while I support nonproliferation programs and I
certainly support the dismantlement and the disablement of
North Korea's nuclear program, I am highly skeptical that Kim
Jong-il will return to the negotiation table and allow either
the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency to
disable and dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.
It is my understanding that Secretary of State Clinton
expressed similar pessimism in April, when she told a Senate
committee that North Korea's return to the six-party talks was
``implausible, if not impossible.''
So I believe that those funds could be better spent. I fear
that we are going to get to the end of the year and that $80
million is still going to be sitting there.
You only have to look at North Korea's recent actions. The
Six-Party talks have come to a complete halt. North Korea
conducted another nuclear test. North Korea ejected U.S.
International inspectors. North Korea reversed most of the
initial disablement work that was under way. North Korea has
repeatedly tested cruise and ballistic missiles, to include an
intercontinental ballistic missile which threatens our
homeland.
It appears that many senior officials within the Obama
administration are coming to the realization that the Six-Party
and diplomatic engagement with Kim Jong-il are ineffective.
According to the Los Angeles (LA) Times, they have all but lost
hope that North Korea will cooperate, and some are arguing that
it is time for a new approach. Others agree with my assessment.
And so, gentlemen, you have a great deal of expertise in
this, and I was wondering what your thoughts were, if you
thought that this year, that the $80 million designated in
NNSA's budget to verify, disable, and dismantle North Korea's
nuclear program, has any likelihood of being used.
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, sir, for the question.
The direct answer to your question, whether it has any
likelihood of being useful, I think is dealt with--and I will
also offer some comments on North Korea, if I could.
And I think, yes, there is an element of the work that we
were planning on doing--North Korea kind of being the lead
horse in the race, if you will--for working on equipment,
tools, and technologies that we think are important for the
United States to have at the ready to deploy, kind of,
anywhere, frankly, to work on disabling and dismantling nuclear
weapons programs or nuclear material programs around the world.
As Dr. Nacht stated earlier, and I completely agree, that
we have looked at--the best place to solve security problems is
where the material is or as close as possible to the source.
The further away you get from the problem makes it a much
harder. The security problem becomes much more difficult; it is
harder to detect the material.
And so, we feel--and particularly as the budget was
developed in February, we were, of course, in the middle of
engaging directly. But a significant portion of that $80
million was not North Korea-specific but was nuclear security-
specific. It is the equipment, the tools, the technology for us
to be able to determine how far a nation-state has gone; buying
the containers, if you will, some of the long-lead material
that we would ultimately use to repatriate, whether it is North
Korean material or whether it is material from another country,
and bring it back to a secure location.
So there is a tremendous amount of what I would call dual
country capability--in fact, more than dual. These are the
things that we would have done around the world. But that is my
sense of the situation. I will defer my thoughts on missile
defense.
Dr. Nacht. Yes. Let me first say a word about the missile
defense budget situation. Obviously, it is controversial in
some elements of the Congress.
Secretary Gates went through a very thorough review and
analysis of missile defense needs, including detailed studies
done by the Missile Defense Agency that went right through
review with the combatant commanders and the joint staff and
the chairman and the vice chairman. And the leadership agreed
unanimously that 30 ground base interceptors, 26 based in Fort
Greely and four in Vandenberg Air Force Base, was sufficient
for the next period to deal with projected North Korean threats
based upon our best intelligence of the evolving North Korean
threat. And it is actually not just against the North Korean
threat, but against some other potential threats too.
So, at the moment, the Defense Department is not seeking
additional funds beyond what we have requested there.
On the money for the North Koreans, I think Administrator
D'Agostino has answered fully. I would just say, of course
North Korea is going through some sort of succession process
currently. We don't know if it is going to take three months or
three years. By all accounts, the leader is very ill. The son
who he has anointed is of uncertain stature, 26 years old. And
it may well be that a number of activities of the North in
escalating, kind of, aggressive behavior in recent months, is
as much for domestic consumption as it is for international
activities.
They are an opaque society, as you know. The quality of our
information about them is not zero, but it is limited. And we
are actually developing scenarios--we have developed scenarios
for future North Korean situations in which these funds could
be used more effectively should those scenarios materialize.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here
today and for the work that you do to keep our nation safe.
Particularly, Mr. D'Agostino, I want to thank you for your
time yesterday. I enjoyed our conversation when we met
yesterday. And I want to thank you again, of course, for your
testimony today.
Let me begin with the new loose nuke threat, nuke material
threat. Obviously, the threat of a loose nuke falling into the
hands of terrorists is a threat not just to the U.S. but,
clearly, to every nation.
What I would like to ask is, how much more does the NNSA
need to secure--and this is from a program perspective--need to
secure and reduce all known nuclear weapons, as well as
unsecured weapons-grade nuclear material, around the world? And
what are the remaining costs of this effort? And what is also
being done to expand cooperation with partner nations to
address this shared risk?
You know, in the context of your answer, if you can talk
about the successes that we have had, but most especially what
is left undone. I am particularly concerned if you can give
some insight into what you are doing to protect us from the
insider threat.
Secretary D'Agostino. Certainly, sir. The insider threat
piece may be best dealt with in closed session. And if we don't
have time, I could come up to your office, sir, and talk to you
about it there, as well.
Mr. Langevin. That is fine.
Secretary D'Agostino. There is a lot more work to be done,
actually, on the materials and weapons side. We have,
obviously, this Global Threat Reduction Initiative program you
have heard about and you have analyzed, which is to convert or
shut down 200 reactors around the world that use highly
enriched uranium, remove essentially 4,600 kilograms of
material by 2016, and protect close to 4,000 buildings.
We are down the track on each one of those lines of work,
but we are not completed and we are not finished down the
track. We are only 32 percent of the way there on our reactor
conversion work. We are looking at accelerating up as much as
possible what we think are the most vulnerable ones. We are
about 50 percent of the way there on removing and getting into
secure sites the highly enriched uranium and plutonium that
exists around the world to get to that 4,600 total. And we are
only about 15 percent of the way down on securing the number of
buildings that we have around the world.
Now, let me be fair here and clear. Not all of these sites
have fissile material, particularly in the buildings area. Most
of the buildings have radiologic material, sources and things
like that that could be used for a radioactive dirty device--
still not good, but not as bad of a problem, obviously, with
fissile material.
In our Material Protection, Control, and Accountability
Program, we have slightly better numbers with respect to
completion of the work that we have to do. About 60 percent of
our sites that we think are in the work scope are done; 87
percent of the buildings. And only about 40 percent of the
Megaports work that we have to detect material is done.
So it is pretty significant. We think it is going to take a
concerted effort--we know it will take a concerted effort,
obviously, to complete all of the work. But what we are working
on right now is the costing plan and the program plan, to pull
all of this together.
I think your other question dealt with partner nations,
what are other nations doing, kind of, with respect to these
programs. And it really depends on the particular program. We
have agreements in place, ready to execute, for example,
additional work in Mexico, in the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan. Many
of those states have agreed to pay up front for a significant
portion of that work. And, obviously, our approach in all of
these cases for Megaports, for example, is to have the nation-
states operate and maintain those facilities. We check on them,
but we have them do that.
Mr. Langevin. How many other countries are actually
cooperating with us in this effort and actually contributing
dollars to the effort?
Secretary D'Agostino. I will have to get you specifics as
a--I would like to take the specifics as a lookup.
But if I can offer you some perspective and offer the
committee some perspective, we operate with over 100 countries
around the world. In most cases, to do the significant work
that we have to do, we sign memorandums of agreement with those
nations where we define the type of a cost-share agreement.
Overall, we look along the process--the general principle
is we come up and kick-start, get the work started, and provide
the equipment and technology and know-how. We have them pick up
the work from there and carry it forward. And then we check and
offer assistance.
So I will get you the details off the record, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I see my time has expired, but I
would like to talk about the insider threat issue when we get
into closed session.
Secretary D'Agostino. Certainly. I would be glad to.
The Chairman. Who is next? Mr. Franks, please.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
You know, I guess I first want to commend the points of Dr.
Bartlett and Mr. Marshall even though they are no longer here.
I do think that their points are salient. And I am looking
forward to hearing more of your response in a different venue,
as you say.
Let me just say that I believe EMP potentially to be the
most effective asymmetric weapon in the hands of almost anyone
that could have them. I also agree that the departments that
you represent are wise in focusing on the source to try to do
those things to prevent the material from ever becoming
available to anyone. And I was especially appreciative of Dr.
Nacht's comments related to Iran being such a priority in that
regard.
Let me just say something that is very obvious to both of
you. I say it primarily for the record, and sometimes restating
the obvious is important. I believe missile defense, an
effective missile defense, especially in the area related to
Iran, even the European site, to be something that is capable
of devaluing the entire nuclear program in Iran's plan. And I
believe that--you know, it is going to be hard to deter them in
any circumstance, but if we have whatever efforts we are making
that are coupled with at least the notion that any leverage
they might gain is ameliorated by our missile defense
capabilities, I think that is vitally important. And I hope it
is something that we don't overlook. It is not just about
stopping a missile; it is about stopping the proliferation.
Missile defense is probably one of our most important
components in preventing proliferation.
With that said, let me shift gears here and ask you, Mr.
D'Agostino, in your testimony, page 2, you say that North
Korea's continued defiance of the international community
through its WMD-related missile and nuclear activities makes
clear the urgency of today's global nuclear threats.
So I guess I am hoping you can explain to the committee how
you surmise that North Korea's defiance--and, incidentally, I
agree with you--but explain it to us how North Korea's defiance
drives a global nuclear threat.
Secretary D'Agostino. I look at this as an example, real-
time, that is dynamic. And I think this is the piece that we
just have a very clear example of--when the President's budget
for 2010 was coming to its final days of closure and we were
doing the negotiation in writing and making sure the numbers
were right and the words were right and, more importantly, the
strategy is right, we were in a different situation, and it
changes quite quickly.
So my sense is this is a dynamic problem. It is a problem
that is a lot faster than the budget process that we have on
the executive branch. Obviously, it outpaces everything. So, to
me, that drives a sense of urgency to get on top of the problem
as quickly as possible, to put the resources on the problems as
quickly as possible. It is very significant, but it is
something that we can't shy away from. And, obviously, we are
not. With the committee's support, excellent support, we have
been in a position to do that.
The one thing I might add is that, with the committee's
support as well, it has made it possible for us to receive
resources from other countries. Other countries see it the same
way as we do. Canada and United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan,
other nations have actually contributed their resources toward
our problems in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. I think
that is an excellent testimony to the programs that you
support, as well as to this urgency piece that comes forth.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Given the parameters, the sensitivities that you have to
deal with here, I do think that, as Mr. Langevin mentioned,
again, the greatest challenge that we face, at least short
term, is some type of nuke device in the hands of terrorists.
Because it is not so much that they are so much better at
delivering it, but I am convinced that their mindset of
actually using it is really unquestionable. And I think that is
what makes it so dangerous.
It is likely that if they do gain some type of nuclear
yield weapon, it probably won't be a large weapon. It will
probably be a smaller weapon which may not be as effective for
EMP, and they may just want to try to bring it into the United
States.
So my question to you, Dr. D'Agostino, and certainly, Dr.
Nacht, if you are inclined to respond as well, is: Help the
committee understand, within the parameters that you can in
this venue, what mechanisms do we have, either at the ports--
and you mentioned in your Second Line of Defense a lot about
the ports--within the ports and the border crossings, what do
we have here, whose responsibility is it to be making sure that
we screen for nuclear devices coming into this country.
Secretary D'Agostino. Department of Homeland Security has
primary responsibility. We provide technical support and backup
with our radiation detectors, as well as we have--we also take
care, with the Department of Homeland Security, we have our
Megaports program to make sure that we have detectors up and
operating in 100 of the largest seaports around the world,
which send the materials, send goods here in the United States.
So that is a short answer. I am not sure how much time I
can keep talking. But from that standpoint, our job is to make
sure to finish the work on Megaports initiative, which is
significant, as well as to support the Department of Homeland
Security in its Secure Freight Initiative, which has a
responsibility for looking at all the material that comes in
here domestically.
Dr. Nacht. And the Department of Defense's role is to work
with NORTHCOM also in consultation with DHS so that, as
horrible as it sounds, if a weapon is detonated, that a second
weapon is not detonated, so that one weapon would be horrific,
but more than one would be much worse. So not to have some sort
of ad hoc approach to dealing with the perpetrators but having
as comprehensive a plan as possible to stop them from doing any
more damage than they have done.
Mr. Franks. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me say that we are supposed to have votes
shortly which will take about 45 minutes. Let's get as many
questioners as we possibly can and observe the 5-minute rule.
After the votes on the floor, we will adjourn here to 2327 for
the classified hearings, and those that have not had the
opportunity to ask questions in the order they would have asked
here will be recognized at that moment in 2337 to continue on
the classified basis. With that understanding, Mr. Kissell, we
will squeeze in as many as we can before the votes come.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of quick questions, thank you, gentlemen, for
coming today. We had a hearing--I think it might have been
January the 22nd, earlier this year, when former Senator Graham
and his Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction testified
before us. And one of the conclusions they drew and presented
to us was that they predicted there would be a weapons of mass
destruction attack upon the United States I think in the next
three, four, years. And the opportunity to stop it was there,
but actually, we were losing ground in terms of being able to
stop it. In other words, we weren't making up that deficit
towards being able to keep this from happening.
In your opinions, what is that opportunity now, is that a
growing situation or a lessening situation that we would have
that attack?
Secretary D'Agostino. I will start and turn it over to my
colleague. I typically am not a big fan of putting time frames,
because I don't want to promote anybody from trying to beat the
odds or not. What I think my focus frankly is--I think we are
getting better, but only because what we are seeing is an
increased sense of urgency. I think the increased sense of
urgency is properly placed by the administration.
I think it is well understood in my organization, which is
more of a technical organization than necessarily establishing
the policy, if you will, but the key is that we recognize, we
understand the devastating impacts of material getting out. I
am speaking mostly on the nuclear side, which is my expertise,
and what we are trying to focus on is, do more. And I am
looking internally at the program to see, am I properly
prioritized?
But I am also communicating externally with my colleagues
at the National Security Council to make sure they recognize
that. I think what we have got from the administration which I
represent is this renewed sense of urgency, this idea of
securing material within a certain period of time; the idea of
working internationally and establishing the right type of
international frameworks; the idea of making sure that the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is properly supported
and we have the next generation of scientists and technicians
ready to work. Because as energy increases, as the nuclear
power becomes more ubiquitous, we want to make sure we design
in the safeguards into those systems so that we don't cause
ourselves problems out in the out years 5 or 10 years from now.
So, from a technology standpoint, I think the urgency is there,
and the light is on the problem; it is up to us to go out and
go execute, frankly.
Dr. Nacht. Congressman, I note that the language of the
Commission was that a weapon of mass destruction will be used
in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
2013. So that is what, three and a half years now. I don't
know, I am a little--point predictions are sometimes a little
hard to justify. Clearly, we have a major problem here. I think
the combination of the activities Administrator D'Agostino and
myself talk about and the President's commitment suggests that
we are looking at this problem globally, nuclear, as well as
biological. We have renewed resources in the intelligence
community to track, as best we can, terrorist activities. And I
would say we are trying to get that curve to turn around,
plateau and then drop off, but we are in a full court press now
in this administration on this problem.
Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman, let's see if we can squeeze two
questioners in between now and the time we have to go vote.
There will be five votes, and it will take approximately 45
minutes. We will reconvene and the questioners will be in the
same order as if you were here in 2337. So let's get there as
soon as the five votes are over.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It was mentioned, concern about Iran and their development
of nuclear weapons, and it was also mentioned about sanctions,
effectiveness of sanctions against Iran by the United States in
the international community. I believe there was legislation in
the House and Senate that has been introduced that would in
fact impose further sanctions on Iran. I wonder if one of you
could speak or both of you could speak to the effectiveness of
that legislation or sanctions that you would envision
specifically that would be effective in terms of getting Iran
to back off of its development of nuclear weapons.
Dr. Nacht. There is little I can say about that at this
time. We could provide you with more detailed information and
perhaps in another setting with additional colleagues who work
this problem more specifically.
Mr. Coffman. Well, thank you very much.
I would really appreciate any information you could provide
on that issue. If, in fact, sanctions would help in deterring
Iran from attaining nuclear weapons, then we need to do
everything we can to promote those sanctions at the earliest
possible time in order, again, to deter them from moving
forward. Now, I wonder if you at all would speak to--if you
were to say what is the number one threat facing the United
States, is it bioterrorism, is it a dirty bomb or is it an
ICBM, a nuclear weapon launched from a rogue nation?
Dr. Nacht. Again, the President answered that question by
saying it would be a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. I
think the core difference between the terrorist or even the
suicide bomber, obviously, and the nation state is that they
are very difficult, if not impossible, to deter. You can't
dissuade them. You can try to prevent them, but they don't have
anything to lose because they know they are on an exalted
mission, and they are going to a better reward after the
detonation. So whether it is biological attack or a nuclear
attack by terrorists, I think it is now an absolutely top
priority for us to try to deal with.
We have varying degrees of judgment about our ability to
deter other states, but I think many of us believe that even
Iran and North Korea are deterrable from using these weapons
because they have a tremendous amount to lose once they use
them. In fact, their entire societies are at risk, whereas the
terrorist does not have that incentive.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas, please.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
I would like to ask a question about Pakistan and reference
the same report that Congressman Kissell referred to on the
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation. That report--their report describes Pakistan as
the focus point of WMD and terrorism. I just wondered if you
could reflect on that your own thoughts and how we as a
country, particularly given the destabilized situation in
Pakistan today, how we can exercise influence over Pakistan to
secure their weapons and deal with the threat among--in their
midst.
Secretary D'Agostino. I would be glad to start off on the
answer. We absolutely agree; working with Pakistan, probably
working with Pakistan makes a lot of sense. In fact, Pakistan
has--we do work with Pakistan, with the Department of Homeland
Security on Secure Freight Initiative in putting radiation
detectors in their ports. One port is done, Karachi is the
second port. We are negotiating that type of work. We have
export controls experts who are in the process of working with
Pakistan on training them on what to look for with respect to
what comes into the country and goes out of the country.
Pakistan has legislation in place as a nation to establish
this type of capability and maintain it. They have developed
their own list of materials and advanced their list of
materials on things that they are looking for. We also, from
the standpoint of their programs, we know that Pakistan,
obviously, some of the details I would rather go into in a
closed session. But what I can say about the military is they
are a very highly professional group. They are well trained.
They understand the problem and the work they have cut out
before them and in fact the work the rest of the world has cut
out for them, and they take these issues very seriously.
We do work closely in many areas, as I said, with their
port security, export control work, and we have actually seen
things taking place in country which signifies they have taken
that seriously. Other details I will address later in closed
session.
Dr. Nacht. I would just add that collaboration of the
Pakistani government with the United States is a sensitive
matter in Pakistan. So what we do with them is best discussed
elsewhere.
Ms. Tsongas. I yield back, given the time constraints.
Thank you.
The Chairman. We will adjourn to 2337. Mr. Spratt will be
the next questioner. We will see you in half an hour, 45
minutes.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned to
reconvene in closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 15, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 15, 2009
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 15, 2009
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MASSA
Mr. Massa. Based on the success of the dismantling of the Libyan
nuclear weapons program of the 1990s, are there any lessons learned
from that effort that can be applied in respect to Iran and North
Korea?
Dr. Nacht. The important lesson learned was that the USG was able
to move quickly in response to the Libyan decision to dismantle their
WMD program. The proposed ``not-withstanding authority'' legislation,
Section 1305 of the House 2010 National Defense Authorization Bill,
will permit additional flexibility should Iran or North Korea agree to
dismantle their WMD programs.
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