[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-53]
REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 6, 2009
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii California
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
ADAM SMITH, Washington W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
GLENN NYE, Virginia
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
Rudy Barnes, Professional Staff Member
Bob DeGrasse, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, May 6, 2009, Report of The Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States..................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, May 6, 2009........................................... 31
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 2009
REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE
UNITED STATES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 3
Spratt, Hon. John, a Representative from South Carolina,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, The Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States..................... 5
Schlesinger, Dr. James R., Vice Chairman, The Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States....... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Perry, Dr. William J......................................... 35
Schlesinger, Dr. James R..................................... 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF
THE UNITED STATES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 6, 2009.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Spratt
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SPRATT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Spratt. I call the committee meeting to order. I
welcome everyone here. Chairman Skelton, unfortunately, is not
able to be here, but I am pleased to have the opportunity to
chair this important hearing in his place instead.
Led by the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which is ably
chaired by Ellen Tauscher, this committee has a long tradition
of attention to the United States' strategic posture and to
nuclear weapons policy in particular. The National Defense
Authorization Act of fiscal year 2008 calls for the
establishment of a commission, a congressionally appointed,
bipartisan commission, to analyze and make recommendations on
our strategic posture.
I am pleased to welcome the Commission chairman and vice
chair and other members of the Commission, but in particular
Bill Perry and Jim Schlesinger, to the hearing today.
All of you deserve enormous credit for bringing this
hearing, this investigative process, to the conclusion you have
in the reports you filed today.
In the interim reports you released last December, I agree
with your broad definition of strategic posture and the
priority you placed on dealing with the most urgent post-Cold
War threat, which you termed in that report ``catastrophic
terrorism.'' You went on to write or say, ``A terror group
cannot make a nuclear bomb from scratch, so the best defense
against this threat is to prevent terror groups from acquiring
a nuclear bomb or the fissile material from which they could
perhaps make a bomb.'' I have been making this argument since
the demise of the Soviet Union, and I commend you for
emphasizing it in your interim report.
I have not yet had a chance to read your report in its
entirety, but I can see that it places our most pressing
strategic challenges in the right context.
My friend and colleague, Ellen Tauscher, was the driving
force behind the legislation that set up this commission, and I
want to yield to her now for any opening remarks you may care
to make.
Ms. Tauscher.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon
to everyone.
This hearing will cover very important ground. Led by the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, which I have the privilege of
chairing, the House Armed Services Committee has long called
for a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the
United States' strategic posture and a fresh examination of our
nuclear weapons policy.
In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2008, which the House approved almost exactly two years ago, we
created a congressionally appointed bipartisan commission to
analyze and make recommendations on the United States'
strategic posture. The Commission was designed to foster and
frame a debate on these critical issues. It was also designed
to help forge a consensus on the United States' nuclear weapons
policy that has been lacking for too long.
It is with great pride and anticipation that just 14 months
ago, this committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee
announced the names of the 12 individuals who agreed to serve
on the Commission. I see several of the commissioners here, and
I want to thank each and every one of you for your service.
I am most delighted to welcome the Commission Chairman and
Vice Chairman, Dr. William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger, to
this hearing. I also want to praise the United States Institute
of Peace, its President, Richard Solomon, and Paul Hughes, the
Commission's Executive Director, for their vision, hard work,
and shepherding of the Commission's final product and the
publishing of the final report.
I would also like to thank Secretary Gates and the
Strategic Systems Programs of the Navy, where we were able to
get the funding for this very, very important commission. As
you know, forming commissions is a part-time job of the
Congress. Finding the money is the very, very difficult job of
the Congress. And without Secretary Gates and the Navy coming
forward, we would not have the final product that we have
today.
Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, both of you have brought a
great wealth of experience and expertise in your service to the
country of many decades; and it could not be more timely or
more important for this work to be done now.
As the Commission noted in both its interim and final
reports, what the United States does with its nuclear weapons,
and how it does it, is linked to our ability to dissuade other
nations from pursuing nuclear weapons and to our efforts to
stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
nuclear weapons. Of course, other nations will continue to make
their own decisions about whether to pursue nuclear weapons for
many reasons. As the Commission has noted, as long as there are
nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain a strong,
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.
But, as you have also said, how we maintain and manage our
nuclear arsenal directly impacts how credible we can be when
pressing for nonproliferation. We have committed under Article
VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith toward
nuclear disarmament. Both President Obama and Russian President
Medvedev have recently reaffirmed this pledge.
So the question we basically put before the Strategic
Posture Commission was: How do we craft a nuclear weapons
strategy that balances these fundamental challenges? How do we
maintain an effective and credible deterrent, while trying to
reduce our nuclear arsenal, and persuade other nations not to
pursue nuclear weapons? Each of you has spoken eloquently about
this need for balance in your testimony, and the Commission's
final report reflects that challenge as well.
Dr. Schlesinger, I appreciate your emphasis on the
stabilizing effect and nonproliferation benefits that accrue
from the extended deterrence we provide our allies.
And Dr. Perry, I am grateful for your forceful observations
about the urgency of our efforts to stem the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Let me recite a part of your testimony, Dr.
Perry. And I quote: ``All commissioners accept the view that
the United States must support programs that both lead and
hedge; that is, programs that move in two parallel paths--one
path that protects our security by maintaining deterrence, and
the other which protects our security by reducing the danger of
nuclear weapons.''
That is at the heart of the matter. I want to commend you
all for your leadership in steering the Commission to
consensus. Thank you, again, for your work and for being here
today.
I agree with you, Dr. Perry, that we are at a moment of
both opportunity and urgency, and I look forward to a good
discussion.
Congratulations to you all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
the time. And I yield back.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, Ms. Tauscher.
Let me turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr.
McHugh, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. McHugh. I thank the chairman.
I certainly want to begin by adding my words of welcome to
two most venerable witnesses; and we are deeply blessed to have
both Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, sage national security and
foreign policy experts, with us here today with such long and
distinguished histories of public service. Joining these two
gentlemen, as has been noted, on the Commission are ten other
extremely accomplished individuals, and we are fortunate, as
both a committee and as a Nation, to have the service of these
great people on what has certainly been a long-standing and
repeatedly difficult and complex task.
It goes without saying that the report before us is
thoughtful and it is thorough. And I want to add my words, Mr.
Chairman, to yours of appreciation to our Strategic Force
chair, Ms. Tauscher, and Ranking Member, the gentleman from
Ohio, Mr. Turner, for their great work. They asked for
recommendations as to the most appropriate strategic posture
and the most effective nuclear weapon strategy for the United
States, and I think this great commission has really set the
stage for delving into those answers.
I expected, when this all began, widely divergent views on
such matters as nuclear weapons and the policies associated
therewith; however, it is, to say the least, unusual--and I
would note, highly refreshing--to learn that this commission,
embodied as it is with 12 thoughtful individuals, could achieve
bipartisan consensus on these issues. I said to Dr. Perry
before the hearing, perhaps they could give us here in this
Congress some lessons on how to come and to work together.
I am, most of all, hopeful that the Administration, working
with Congress on both sides of the aisle, can now build upon
this bipartisan momentum as it works to define its nuclear
policies and posture in the future.
The report highlights some basic truths and realities.
First and foremost, it reaffirms the need for the United States
to maintain a nuclear deterrent capability to deter potential
adversaries and, equally important, to reassure our allies who
depend upon our nuclear umbrella and, as a result, forsake
developing their own nuclear arsenals.
One month ago, the President delivered a speech in Prague
calling for a ``world without nuclear weapons.'' But, as the
Commission rightfully noted in its interim report, no less than
a fundamental transformation of world political order will be
required to obtain a goal of zero.
While no President has wanted nuclear weapons, all came to
the stark realization that possessing them was necessary as
long as others had sought or had them in their possession. In a
speech last fall, Secretary Gates observed, ``Try as we might
and hope as we will, the power of nuclear weapons and their
strategic impact is a genie that cannot be put back in the
bottle--at least for a very long time.''
While the President's long-term vision is laudable, I fear
its allure may be a distraction from the near-term nuclear
security and proliferation challenges faced by our Nation and
the international community. These challenges are multifaceted
and start with how we bring an end to the Iranian and North
Korean nuclear programs--two efforts that, at least in my view,
pose a real and immediate threat.
A month ago--and perhaps coincidentally on the same day as
President Obama's speech--North Korea launched a satellite atop
a long-range Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, ignoring all
international warnings. According to recent reports, some in
the Administration expect that nation to conduct yet another
nuclear test. In the meantime, Iran continues to perfect its
assortment of long-range missiles and pursue key elements of a
potential nuclear weapons capability, despite United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council efforts.
As the report before us observes, unless these programs are
halted, ``There is likely to be a proliferation cascade that
would greatly increase the risks of nuclear use and
terrorism.''
We are also faced with the challenge of securing nuclear
materials and facilities worldwide, implementing safeguards
into civilian nuclear programs to prevent breakout weapons
capabilities, and preventing terrorist groups from acquiring
nuclear bombs, weapons design, or fissile material. Both Russia
and China are modernizing their strategic forces program and--
as this report points out--ironically, our edge in conventional
capabilities has induced the Russians to increase their
reliance on both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
A credible and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent will be
required for the foreseeable future. However, senior government
officials and many outside experts have expressed concern about
our stockpile's long-term condition and the confidence that
many have in that stockpile and its supporting infrastructure.
The commander of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
testified this spring, ``The most urgent concerns for today's
nuclear enterprise lie with our aging stockpile,
infrastructure, and human capital.'' To that end, I believe we
need a program to modernize our stockpile and infrastructure.
I want to be clear; I am not calling for new weapons
capabilities. However, I believe there are prudent steps we can
and must take to introduce greater reliability, safety, and
security features into our arsenal and, thus, create conditions
for maintaining a highly reliable deterrent with fewer
warheads. Furthermore, we should insist on conscious efforts to
strengthen the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, support investments
and stockpile stewardship, and sustain our exceptional
scientific, engineering, and production workforce.
What I find worrisome in this evolving nuclear policy is
that they rest almost entirely on treaties and arms control
measures. The previous Administration--wrongly in my view--
appeared to have an aversion to arms control. I believe it is a
valuable tool, but it must be practical, verifiable, and
enforceable. Furthermore, actions taken to decrease our nuclear
forces should be counterbalanced by other means to strengthen
our security and that of our allies--missile defenses, advanced
conventional capabilities, unconventional capabilities,
intelligence, nonproliferation, and other aspects of a
comprehensive strategic posture strategy.
Lastly, Secretary Gates warned we cannot predict the
future. That uncertainty cannot be underestimated as we weigh
the nuclear policy and posture decisions ahead of us.
The Commission has given us much to consider. I want to
thank them again, and I look forward to their testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. Spratt. Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, the floor is now
yours. Once again, thank you for the effort all of you put into
this report. Your written testimony has been received; we will
make it part of the record so you can summarize as you see fit.
We welcome you to make a full statement of the positions that
are taken in the report.
By arrangement, Dr. Perry, I believe we will begin with
you. The floor is yours. Thank you again for coming.
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr. Perry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
When the Congress formed this Commission, they formed it
deliberately and consciously as a bipartisan panel, and we have
functioned as such. At our very first meeting, Congresswoman
Ellen Tauscher came out to join us and urged us to come
forward--in spite of the fact that we are a bipartisan group--
to come forward with a consensus report. Easy for her to say,
but very difficult to execute. Nevertheless, we have come
surprisingly close to that, as you will see in reading the
report.
I am going to use my time, Mr. Chairman, by trying to
relate some of the major findings in our report to what I
perceive to be the Administration's emerging strategic policy.
I base this judgment primarily on statements and speeches made
by President Obama.
First of all, he has said the country--indeed, the world--
faces a new threat: nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. But, at the same time, we need to hedge against the
possible resurgence of the old threat. The Commission firmly
agrees with that judgment.
Secondly, he said that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the NPT, is critical in dealing with this new threat.
The United States should work to strengthen the NPT and it
should agree to put more resources into the arms of the NPT,
dealing with inspection and enforcements of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Commission agrees with that
judgment as well.
Third, he has said that we--in order to get success in
preventing proliferation, we need the effort of all nations;
and to get their full cooperation entails that the United
States and other nuclear powers make progress in disarmament. I
agree fully with that judgment. The Commission members have
different views on the extent to which our progress in
disarmament and getting that full cooperation is really coupled
together. Some of us think it is coupled quite closely--I am of
that view--and others think the coupling is quite loose.
Fourth, the President made a very clear statement in his
speech in Prague that the United States seeks a world without
nuclear weapons and, therefore, we should be reducing the
number and the salience of our nuclear weapons. But, he went on
to say, as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will be important
for the United States to maintain safe, secure, reliable, and
credible deterrent forces. I strongly agree with that full
statement.
Some of our members do not agree that we should be seeking
a world without nuclear weapons or that it is even feasible to
do that. But, even those members fully support the part of the
statement of maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable
deterrent, and they also support reduction in the numbers,
provided that reduction is done bilaterally.
Fifth, the President is seeking new treaties: the Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty, and seeking to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Our commissioners agree with the goal of moving for a
new follow-on START Treaty, and we offer some comments in the
report about how that might be done. We also agree that seeking
a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is desirable.
On the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification, I
strongly agree with that move. Indeed, I believe that the U.S.
will not be able to assume leadership in the world if we do not
actually make that ratification, but I must say that the
Commission is split on that issue. About half of our members
disagree with the goal of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and, indeed, if the Senate proceeds to hold hearings on
that, I suspect some of our members may be testifying on one
side of the issue and others testifying on the other side.
All of us, however, agree that there are certain steps that
the Administration should take before they submit the treaty
for ratification, most importantly, to get a clarification
among the Permanent Five (P-5) as to exactly what is banned by
the test ban treaty. There seems to be some ambiguity on that
today.
The sixth issue is missile defense. The President says he
wants to move forward on the European missile defense system as
long as the Iranian threat persists and he wants to seek a way
to find cooperation on that with the Russians. The
commissioners agree on both of those goals. I must say that our
commissioners have a wide variety of views on the value and
importance of missile defense. But on those two issues--at
least on missile defense--we were able to reach an agreement.
Seven, on civilian nuclear programs, the President has
argued we should get and propose programs to get the loose
fissile material under control, and stated we need a new
international framework to discourage the spread of enrichment
and processing in the civilian nuclear field. We strongly agree
with both of those conclusions.
And finally, the President has said we should roll back the
North Korean nuclear program and prevent Iran from getting
nuclear. The Six-Party Talks have failed to stop the North
Koreans from building and testing the nuclear bomb, and the
compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is in
tatters. The President has argued there must be consequences
under the NPT. We firmly agree with that. We do not offer him
or you advice on how to achieve those goals but, quite clearly,
those are very important goals.
Now, beyond commenting to you on these policy issues, I
wanted to highlight some specific recommendations we made on
how to sustain the nuclear force; particularly, how to sustain
this force in the face of American policies of no testing, no
design of weapons of new capabilities, and with the budget
limitations that have been existing.
Under those three limitations, it is a challenge to sustain
this nuclear deterrence. The key to that, I believe--indeed,
all of our members believe--is the strength of the nuclear
weapons laboratories. We are blessed in that they have
outstanding technical staffs at these laboratories, and they
have had remarkable success in what is called the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP) and the Life Extension Program (LEP).
But as our weapons age, it is going to be harder and harder to
sustain that success.
Inexplicably, I believe our government has responded to
that growing problem by cutting the staff at the weapons
laboratories. We believe that that trend should be reversed and
indeed, beyond that, we should add responsibilities for
laboratories for other national security programs--for example,
programs in energy technologies; programs in supporting our
nuclear intelligence assessments; and, even more broadly,
programs in research that have the effect of making a research
lab--national research laboratory--out of the three weapons
laboratories.
If this is done, we believe it would be important to change
the name of the laboratories. They are not just weapons
laboratories, but they are national security laboratories. And
they should be renamed, and they should be funded accordingly.
We have a unique national asset in these weapons laboratories,
and we should be treating it accordingly.
Now, if that is done, they need to be given more freedom of
action appropriate with that new mission. And we need, also, to
look at their direction, which is at the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), to whom the laboratories
report. NNSA was created by Congress some years ago on the view
that they would be able to provide that direction, but they
have not had full success in doing that. We believe that the
NNSA should have more autonomy of action than it has today, and
it should be restructured so that it reports to the President
through the Secretary of Energy instead of the present
reporting arrangements.
I would like to conclude my comments by looking briefly
ahead.
The future world out there is heading in the direction
today in a very dangerous direction. There is a danger that we
are going to have a collapse of the nonproliferation regime,
the danger that there will be a cascade of proliferation in the
world, particularly if Iran succeeds in going nuclear; and both
of those will increase substantially the risk of nuclear
terrorism. And there is a danger that the nuclear powers in the
world will renew their nuclear competition.
All three of those dangers are facing us right now quite
seriously. But there is also a more hopeful future out there:
that we will be able to contain the proliferation, that we will
be able to stymie nuclear terrorism, and the nuclear powers,
instead of competing in the nuclear field, will learn how to
cooperate in that field.
Our report tries to describe for you a strategy which leads
to that more hopeful future rather than the more dangerous
world that I have described.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Spratt. Dr. Schlesinger, the floor is yours. We welcome
your statement.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, VICE CHAIRMAN, THE
CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED
STATES
Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McHugh, and
Ms. Tauscher, our godmother.
The Congress established the Commission on Strategic
Posture in order to provide recommendations regarding the
appropriate posture for the United States under the changed
conditions of the early 21st century. The appointed
commissioners represented a wide range of the political
spectrum and have had quite diverse judgments on these matters.
Nonetheless, urged by Members of Congress--not the least of
whom was Ms. Tauscher--the Commission has sought to develop a
consensus view. To a large and, to some, an astonishing degree,
we have succeeded.
Secretary Perry and I are here to present our consensus to
this committee. We are, of course, indebted to the committee
for this opportunity to present these recommendations.
For over half a century, the U.S. strategic policy has been
driven by two critical elements: to maintain a deterrent that
prevents attacks on the United States, its interests and,
notably, its allies; and to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War and, particularly, the
collapse of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, along with the
substantial edge that the United States has now developed in
conventional military capabilities, have permitted this country
sharply to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, radically to
reduce our nuclear forces, and to move away from a doctrine of
nuclear initiation to a new stance of nuclear response only
under extreme circumstances of major attack on the United
States or its allies.
On the other hand, the growing availability of nuclear
technology, along with a relaxation of the constraints of the
Cold War, have obliged us to turn increasing attention to the
problem of nonproliferation and, in particular, to the
possibility of a terrorist attack on the United States.
Secretary Perry has just spoken on the diplomatic issues
and the problems of arms control, of preventing proliferation,
and the risks of nuclear terrorism. I, for my part, will focus
on the need--despite its substantially shrunken role in the
post-Cold War world--to maintain a deterrent reduced in size,
yet nonetheless reliable and secure, and sufficiently
impressive and visible to provide assurance to the 30-odd
nations that are protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Since the early days of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the United States has provided extended
deterrence for its allies. That has proved a far more demanding
task than the protection of the United States itself. In the
past, that has required a deterrent sufficiently large and
sophisticated to deter a conventional attack by the Soviet
Union/Warsaw Pact. It also meant that the United States
discouraged the development of national nuclear capabilities,
particularly during the Kennedy Administration, both to prevent
proliferation and to avoid the diversion of resources away from
the development of conventional allied capabilities.
With the end of the Cold War and the achievement of the
U.S. preponderance in conventional capabilities, the need for
so substantial a deterrent largely disappeared. Nonetheless,
the requirements for extended deterrence will remain at the
heart of the design of the U.S. nuclear posture. Extended
deterrence will remain a major barrier to proliferation; both
the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven
more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the
nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone.
Even though the overall requirements of our nuclear forces
have shrunk some 80 percent since the height of the Cold War,
nonetheless, the expansion of NATO and the rise of Chinese
nuclear forces--significant, if modest--have altered somewhat
the requirements for our own nuclear forces.
Two: Even though the most probable source of a weapon
landing on American soil increasingly is that of a nuclear
terrorist attack, nonetheless, the sizing of our own nuclear
forces, in addition to other elements of our deterrent posture,
remains driven in large degree by Russia. Our NATO allies and,
most notably, the new members of NATO, remain wary of Russia
and would eye nervously any sharp reduction of our nuclear
forces relative to those of Russia, especially in light of the
now greater emphasis by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons.
Consequently, the Commission did conclude that we should
not engage in unilateral reductions in our nuclear forces, and
that such reduction should occur only as a result of bilateral
negotiations with Russia under a follow-on START Agreement. Any
such reductions must, of course, be thoroughly discussed with
our allies.
Three: Our East Asian allies also view with great interest
our capabilities relative to the slowly burgeoning Chinese
force. Clearly, that adds complexity; for example, to the
protection of Japan--though that remains a lesser driver with
respect to overall numbers. Still, the time has come to engage
Japan in more comprehensive discussions akin to those with our
NATO partners in the Nuclear Planning Group. It would also
augment the credibility of the Pacific Extended Deterrent.
Four: The Commission has been urged to specify the number
of the nuclear weapons the United States should have. That is
an understandable question, particularly in light of the
demands of the appropriations process in the Congress.
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to focus unduly on numbers alone
without reference to the overall strategic context. Clearly, it
would be illogical to provide a number outside the process of
negotiation with Russia, given the need to avoid giving away
bargaining leverage.
In preparation for the Treaty of Moscow, as with all of its
predecessors, the composition for our prospective forces was
subject to the most rigorous analysis. Thus, it would seem to
be unacceptable to go below the numbers specified in that
treaty without a similarly rigorous analysis of the strategic
context, which has not yet taken place. Moreover, as our
Russian friends have repeatedly told us, strategic balance is
more important than the numbers.
Five: Given the existence of other nations' nuclear
capabilities and the international role that the United States
necessarily plays, the Commission quickly reached the judgment
that the United States must maintain a nuclear deterrent for
``the indefinite future.'' It must convey not only the
capacity, but the will to respond in necessity.
Some members of the Commission have expressed a hope that
at some future date we might see the worldwide abolition of
nuclear weapons. The judgment of the Commission, however, has
been that the attainment of such a goal would require a
transformation of world politics.
President Obama also has expressed that goal, but has added
that as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United
States must maintain ``a strong deterrent.'' We should all bear
in mind that abolition of nuclear weapons will not occur
outside that ``transformation of world politics.''
Six: We sometimes hear or read the query: Why are we
investing in these capabilities which will never be used? This
is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it is effective, is in use every
day. The purpose in sustaining these capabilities is to be
sufficiently impressive to avoid their ``use'' in the sense of
the actual need to deliver weapons to targets. That is the
nature of any deterrent but, particularly so, a nuclear
deterrent. It exists to deter major attacks against the United
States, its allies, and its interests.
Years ago, the role and the details of our nuclear
deterrent commanded sustained and high-level national
attention. Regrettably, today, they do so far less than is
necessary. Nonetheless, the role of the deterrent remains
crucial. Therefore, I thank this committee for its continued
attention to these critical matters.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger can be found in
the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Spratt. I will start the questions.
Unless there is another member of this panel that would
like to have the opportunity to make a statement? Dr. Foster?
Let me turn everyone's attention to something that receives
too little attention, I think, and that is tactical nuclear
weapons. We tend to think and talk about Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs) and heavy-lifting systems, but these systems, if our
principal concern is nonproliferation, may be a bigger danger
to us than the larger systems which are subject to deterrence.
In your report, you say ``The imbalance of non-strategic
nuclear weapons will become more prominent and worrisome as
strategic reductions continue and will require new arms control
approaches'' that are assuring to our allies.
Would you explain to us what your worries are about
tactical nuclear weapons? Do we have a good count as to these
weapons? Are we assured that they are securely held somewhere?
Are we satisfied we know what we should know about the universe
of nuclear tactical weapons abroad and in the world?
Dr. Schlesinger. I believe that the Russians have removed,
as they said they would, their tactical nuclear weapons to the
Ural Mountains. Nonetheless, as the Soviet conventional forces
have deteriorated--as the Russian conventional forces have
deteriorated, the Russians have expressed increasing interest,
doctrinally, on reliance of tactical nuclear weapons to protect
the vast territories of Russia, which they fear are under
potential attack from NATO and, notably in Siberia,
underpopulated Siberia, China. As a consequence, they have
maintained not only a doctrine but a sizable number of tactical
weapons.
We, in the United States, have tended to stress strategic
weapons because we are reaching overseas, but we have a
significant number of nuclear weapons that are tactical here in
the United States. Nonetheless, as a result, our weapons are
here in North America and the Russians are close to some of our
allies in Europe, which causes them to be rather nervous.
So I hope that our negotiators, as they deal with the
strategic level, will also look at the total number of nuclear
weapons, including tactical, so that there is some kind of
balance that is maintained and, in consequence, reassure some
of our allies.
Mr. Spratt. Do you think then, this requires a special
approach different from that of larger systems? For arms
control purposes, do we require----
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that we need to have an inspection
system that we can rely on, and that we need to have a clear
declaration by the Russians where their tactical nuclear
weapons are, and an inspection of those tactical nuclear
weapons.
The strategic weapons are easier to deal with because we
can count them by overhead reconnaissance.
Mr. Spratt. Dr. Perry.
Dr. Perry. I would emphasize one of the points that Dr.
Schlesinger made, but I mostly want to emphasize the asymmetry
between the U.S. position and the Russian position.
The Russians perceive that they need their tactical nuclear
weapons to buttress their conventional--decline in the
conventional forces--and that leads them to put a major
emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons.
We, on the other hand, could meet our military requirements
without any tactical weapons. The reason we keep tactical
nuclear weapons is more a political reason, which is because
our allies in Europe feel more comfortable when we have weapons
deployed in Europe. So we do it to assure the credibility of
our extended deterrence to our allies, not because we have a
military necessity. We could meet the real needs of our
allies--the military needs--with our strategic forces, but they
feel much more comfortable if we have forces deployed in
Europe.
So it is a very different situation. There is great
asymmetry between the two. Therefore, as we go into arms
control and start to consider tactical weapons, we have to
recognize it is going to be a difficult problem because of the
asymmetry and the perceived need for tactical weapons between
the United States and Russia.
Mr. Spratt. One further question from me, and that is, the
Commission also found that ``Missile defenses are effective
against regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited
long-range threats are a valuable component'' of our strategic
posture. Would you explain what you meant there?
And you went on to say that you would be concerned about
actions taken on our part that increase--that lead to
counteractions by Russia and China. Would you elaborate on what
you mean there?
Dr. Perry. We were focusing on the role of missile defenses
to deter or, if necessary, defend against nuclear weapons in
the hands of regional powers; for example, North Korea and
Iran. But to the extent we build and deploy such systems, those
systems also have some capability against Russia and China.
So our concern here was that we do not want to have a
missile defense so extensive and so capable that it threatens
the Russians and the Chinese deterrent to the extent that they
believe they are going to have to increase the number of
missiles deployed. We do not want our missile defense systems
to stimulate an increase in offensive missiles to be used
against us. That was the point we were trying to make.
Jim, would you like to comment on that?
Dr. Schlesinger. I would like to add one point: there is a
distinction between Europe, in which some of the nations are
relatively indifferent to missile defense, and Japan, which has
gotten deeply into missile defense.
Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you again for being here.
I would like to pursue a little bit further, for my own
edification, this issue of deterrence, particularly with
respect to our allies. I appreciate Dr. Schlesinger's comments.
Too often, perhaps understandably, when we think about our
allies and the deterrence that our nuclear umbrella has
provided, we think Europe. But there is another theater where
Japan certainly has its limits as to how many questions they
feel they can ask about the nuclear effectiveness or commitment
of this Nation to continue to provide that umbrella before they
strike out on their own. And the whole objective, it seems to
me, of arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, is to try to
keep those who don't yet have them from wanting to get them.
I understand the comments about a number. Clearly, we can
reduce warheads. But how do we go about partnering with our
allies to make sure that they still feel we have the structure
and the forces necessary to continue to provide that umbrella
and deterrence?
Is it through consultation? Is it at some point a
mathematical formula? Actual deployments? How do you pursue
that? Because if you are not successful, then other nations
will make themselves a part of the nuclear family, will they
not?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, no nation that I know of is
reassured by mathematical formulas. It will require direct
consultation. In the past, as I indicated in my earlier
comments, we have not had those kinds of direct consultations
with Japan, which is the country that has, perhaps, the
greatest leaning amongst the 30-odd nations that we have under
the umbrella, to create its own nuclear force; and, therefore,
intimate discussions with the Japanese, I think, are mandatory
at this stage.
In the past, the Japanese have not really worried about the
Soviet nuclear threat. But as the Chinese have increased their
capability, they have become increasingly concerned about China
and, thus, they want to have direct consultation with us and
reassurance from us.
In the case of Europe, some nations are relatively relaxed
and others are nervous. For the most part, given the attitude
of the European public, they would prefer that this whole
question of nuclear weapons be left out of the headlines.
Mr. McHugh. Dr. Perry, any thoughts?
Dr. Perry. My comment is that this issue goes back many,
many decades. There is nothing new about it.
Back in the late 1970s, when I was Under Secretary of
Defense, the Soviet Union was deploying their intermediate-
range missiles in Europe, threatening Western Europe; and we
were planning an offset to that, a deterrent force to that,
which we were doing in consultation of our NATO allies. And our
judgment at the time was that we could provide that offset with
what we call ``strategic weapons''--in this case, would be
submarine-launched missiles.
But it was very, very clear in consultation with allies
that, although they saw the logic of the argument, they felt
that it was necessary to have our forces deployed in Europe in
order to give them the confidence that our deterrence would be
upheld. And to a certain extent, that issue is still with us
today even though conditions have changed quite a bit.
So we still see great concern in both Europe and in Asia
about the credibility of our extended deterrence. It is
important for us to pay attention to their concern and not to
judge whether deterrence is effective by our standards, but we
have to take their standards into account as well. And the
failure to do this, as suggested by Dr. Schlesinger, the
failure to do this will be that those nations will feel that
they have to provide their own deterrence--in other words, they
will have to provide their own nuclear weapons. So that will
lead to a failure of proliferation.
Mr. McHugh. We discussed very briefly the CTBT. I would
just be curious, Dr. Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, if you would
care to comment, your view of the future for that treaty,
should the United States sign on. Obviously--it seems to me, at
least--there will be a number of nations that will never sign,
or certainly at this point in time have very few incentives to
sign. And although the treaty calls for a certain number of
nations having to sign before it is binding, there is probably
a policy imperative the United States would almost
unilaterally, once signing it, adhere to it.
What is your opinion on the CTBT?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, a number of nations in Western
Europe, in particular, and the President have both said that
they would like to see the United States ratify and the treaty
come into force. The likelihood of the latter is very low,
because all of the nations on Annex 2 must ratify before the
treaty comes into force. That includes China, India, Pakistan,
Egypt, Israel, Iran and, most notably perhaps, North Korea in
this connection.
If we were--some suggest that American diplomacy can bring
them around. I would point out that we have had extended
diplomacy with respect to North Korea over nuclear weapons for
approaching 20 years, which has not been a signal success; and
that if we put pressure on them, we are likely to be asked for
a bribe, to put it bluntly.
I think that Dr. Perry will point out that there is value,
even if the treaty doesn't come into force, for diplomatic
reasons. But my own judgment is that the substantive benefits
of the treaty are modest and, therefore, I think that roughly
half of the members of the Commission did not endorse
ratification.
Dr. Perry. I will repeat again that I believe that the
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enhances
America's national security whether or not the treaty enters
into force.
I have had considerable discussion with leaders all over
the world on this question, and I am persuaded that our signing
will put substantial pressure on India, Pakistan, and China to
ratify. I would be willing to bet that their ratification will
follow ours if we do it in reasonable time. And that, itself,
will be a substantial benefit to national security.
I cannot conceive of the circumstances under which North
Korea would willingly ratify the treaty, and I do not believe
it makes any sense for the United States or other nations to be
in a position of trying to bribe them to do so. But with or
without their signature, I still think this is an enhancement
of U.S. security.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back. Thank you for the
side-bar consultation. I would just note that when our side's
turn comes again, I will be yielding to Mr. Turner, who is the
ranking member on Strategic Forces, to lead off the questioning
after ours.
And again I thank the two gentlemen. I think we have a lot
of ground to cover on this issue of tactical nuclear weapons
and how we approach discussion with our friends, the Russians,
et cetera. But I am sure the other members want to talk about
that as well. So I will yield back at this time.
Dr. Perry. Can I make one other comment relative to the
points Mr. McHugh was making?
Mr. McHugh. He will say ``yes.'' He is a nice man.
Mr. Spratt. Certainly, Dr. Perry. I beg your pardon. We are
trying to resolve the problem of who speaks next up here, but
you have the floor.
Dr. Perry. Assuming this treaty comes to the Senate for
ratification, there will be safeguards on the treaty. We
certainly advocate safeguards. Some of those safeguards will
require legislation and funding, and the House will be as much
involved in that as the Senate will be. So I think this is a
very important issue for the House.
Certainly, one of the most important safeguards is
maintaining the vitality and the strength of our weapons
laboratories; and that requires funding, which the House will
have to play a major role in.
Mr. McHugh. Thank you, Doctor.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spratt. Ms. Tauscher.
Ms. Tauscher. Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger, I would like
you to elaborate--each of you, if you don't mind--on your
recommendations for the National Nuclear Security
Administration.
About 10 years ago, Mr. Thornberry was the chairman of the
panel--and I was the ranking member--that helped create the
National Nuclear Security Administration. It was a little bit
of a compromise, to say the least. But we believed that it was
very important to get the NNSA out from under what we
considered to be a ``kudzulating'' bureaucracy.
As you know, the Department of Energy (DOE) regulates
refrigerator coolant and also has the nuclear weapons. It takes
quite a wide brain pan to manage all of that, and we believe
that for national security reasons, intelligence reasons, and
many other reasons that the weapons labs and the complex in
general and its budget policies needed to be elevated in a way
that could give it much more standing and much more of a
national importance, not just also something that the
Department of Energy did.
So I would really be interested in your talking about--in
your report, you basically talk about that the NNSA should now
report to the Department of Energy but, effectively, to the
President. If you could expand a little bit on that, I would
appreciate it.
Dr. Schlesinger. As you will recall, in 1985, the Blue
Ribbon Task Force recommended greater autonomy for the nuclear
enterprise within the Department of Energy. Congress passed
legislation in 1999 after a lag, establishing the NNSA.
The problem is that the NNSA has not escaped the large
bureaucracy of the Department of Energy. Instead of really
dealing with the NNSA, it is affected by general counsel's
office of the Department of Energy, environmental safety and
health, and other elements within the DOE bureaucracy. And this
bureaucratic tendency has trickled down to the NNSA itself, so
that everything that is done out there in the labs or in the
plants kind of gets examined not only by the site office, the
successors to the operations office of the past, the NNSA, and
by the Department of Energy, so that the costs keep rising.
And one of our concerns in establishing national security
laboratories is that who, elsewhere in the government, wants to
pay those operating additional overhead costs, which can be
quite excessive. We need to reduce the costs, the non-
operational costs, of the laboratories and the plants in such a
way as to provide some leeway with regard to the total budget.
And the Congress, of course, can help in that regard.
With respect to reporting to the President through the
Secretary of Energy, our intent was to get the DOE bureaucracy
out of the way. And we need to have clear-cut lines of
authority. Whoever is the head of NNSA must take it on as a
task to reduce the kind of bureaucratic interference that has
marked these recent years.
Ms. Tauscher. Dr. Perry, can you also talk about the role
that you imagine for the Cabinet officials that you recommend
take on formal roles regarding the NNSA programming budget
matters, like the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI)?
Dr. Perry. When we talk about this expanded national
security role for the laboratories, it is today performing some
of those functions already, but it is doing it on a hit-or-miss
basis from the point of view of funding, and there is no
overall guidance or overall organization of how this is done.
And as Dr. Schlesinger has already indicated, the different
agencies who fund this are paying for the direct work, but they
are not paying for the overhead costs of that work.
So there needs to be a better way of doing that. And our
view was that that would entail creating a broader
responsibility for the laboratories. That was part of this
stated mission. It also requires some oversight, then, on the
part of the Defense Department, for example, and the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI), which have the responsibilities
for those programs. So we imagine there needs to be some form
of a steering group of those various--formed of the secretaries
of those various agencies which provide the oversight and the
funding necessary to the providers of the programs.
But the hit-or-miss program-specific funding that is done
today is not an appropriate way to effectively and
appropriately use the great skills where you have those
laboratories. This is just one way of doing it. We are open to
other ways of doing it, but it needs to be approached--we need
a fresh approach to it--tailored to that particular set of
problems.
Ms. Tauscher. Dr. Schlesinger, I just want to state the
obvious, and I am speaking as Congresswoman Tauscher, not
somebody who is potentially nominated for another job in the
State Department. I would like to chat with you a little bit
about the CTBT. Since 1993, we have had an executive order,
presidential executive order that has put the United States in
a place of suspending testing. In 1999, when the CTBT was
failed to be ratified, I think there was tremendous concern
about science-based stockpile stewardship. The difference
between 1993, 1999 and 2009 is not only a lot of time, but an
overwhelming grade of ``A'' on the success of science-based
stockpile stewardship.
And effectively ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, there is an out that says if you have a national
imperative you can test. So since we have been living since
1993 without testing, since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ratification allows for the out, could you talk to me and
explain to us what the hesitancy is, considering that I think
we have universal agreement that the stockpile stewardship
program, the science-based program, is enormously successful
and that in time since 1993, 1999 and now 2009, I think we have
a lot more evidence that the safety, security and reliability
of stockpile has been more than secured without testing.
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, we don't know the last. We have the
Stockpile Stewardship Program which has given us some basis for
encouragement. But as you know, the directors of the
laboratories have pointed out that the stockpile continues to
age and that there are greater uncertainties. The question
before us is whether or not the United States should surrender
the option to test, given the uncertainties. I might point out
that there are other members of this commission who feel more
passionately on this subject than do I. But it was--this issue
has been around as a dialectical tilting ground at least since
the signing of the underground test moratorium, test treaty. A
question is whether we are completing something that is in the
minds of the proponents of the last 60 years when it is not of
any substantive benefit to the United States.
It is, as Bill Perry points out, potential diplomatic
advantage, as you will no doubt hear when you arrive in the
Department of State. But symbolism has a role to play in
diplomacy. It is not necessarily the ideal element in judging
force posture. Years ago, somebody observed that the CTBT was a
bad idea whose time has come. And the question that was posed
to me the other day by somebody from the laboratory said, each
element of that should be examined carefully, why is it a bad
idea and why has its time come?
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. Dr. Perry.
Dr. Perry. I was the Secretary of Defense at the time we
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. All of these issues
were considered at that time. No one in the Department of
Defense, and certainly not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
willing to say me signing this treaty means we never again can
conduct tests. It means we agree not to conduct tests. But the
treaty has, as you all know, a provision by which we are going
to withdraw if we see our supreme national interest at stake.
We felt that wasn't quite strong enough at the time, so we
added to it, as one of the safeguards, that the director of the
weapons laboratory had to certify on a yearly basis the
adequacy of the stockpile to perform the deterrence missions.
And that the President, on receiving this then, if he got a
statement that said they were unable to certify it, that was a
clear signal where we would withdraw from the treaty and begin
testing. So I don't think it is an issue that we have forever
given up our right to test. We are simply formalizing in a
treaty the agreement we have already made--the policy we have
already established--not to test. And we still have the--we
will still have, even after signing the treaty, the provision
that we can withdraw from it if we see the--national interest.
Now, if I thought we were going to have to exercise that
withdrawal provision any time in the foreseeable future, I
would not be in favor of the treaty. As I look at what we are
doing in the laboratories and on the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and the Life Extension Program, the considerable
technical capabilities we have there, I am confident that that
is not going to happen. That is contingent though on the
Congress and including the House, not just the Senate, funding
adequately the work that goes on at the laboratories.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Spratt. By unanimous consent, we turn now to Mr.
Turner. And after his questions we will recess momentarily to
go to the floor. We have three votes. We beg your indulgence.
We will be back as quickly as possible. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
Ranking Member McHugh for recognizing me. Dr. Perry, Dr.
Schlesinger, thank you so much for taking your long legacy of
great accomplishment in this field to give us some present
guidance to Congress. I am the ranking member of the Strategic
Forces Committee and I want to recognize our Chair's work, our
Chairman, Ellen Tauscher on this, and her leadership so that we
could have this document for Congress to take a look at. In
looking at both your testimony and the report, there is one
area that I wanted to highlight.
Dr. Schlesinger, you said in your written testimony, ``why
are we investing in these capabilities which will never be
used?'' And you said, ``This is a fallacy. A deterrent, if it
is effective, is in `use' every day.'' And then I look at the
report and its writings in the executive summary. And the
report says, ``so long as it continues to rely on nuclear
deterrents, the United States requires a stockpile of nuclear
weapons that are safe, secure, reliable, and whose threatened
use in military conflict would be credible.''
You go on to cite, the controversy that occurred over the
Reliable Replacement Warhead discussion, and indicate there
appears to be some confusion as to what we need to do and how
we go forward. And then you conclude with something to the
effect of, ``so long as modernization proceeds within the
framework of existing U.S. policy, it should encounter minimum
political difficulty.'' Well, I thank you for those words
because you contribute a great deal of insight with your report
as how to get over the issue of political difficulty, because
this is an area that requires congressional attention and
congressional investment.
Even if we all have the goal of the future elimination of
nuclear weapons, that investment of that strategic and
important deterrent is echoed throughout your report.
Another theme in your report on this posture review is the
issue of strategic balance. And I have here some of the quotes
that you have given in the report about Russia's strategic
forces modernization. For example, you say, ``current strategic
modernization programming includes various elements. Russia is
at work on a new intercontinental ballistic missile . . . a new
ballistic missile submarine and the associated new missile and
warhead, a new short-range ballistic missile, and low-yield
tactical nuclear weapons.'' It was on page 12.
And you say, ``Russia's military leaders are putting more
emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces'' on tactical use in
the battlefield, also on page 12. And you indicate, ``senior
Russian experts have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational
tactical nuclear warheads,'' and you expound by saying, ``the
United States does not know definitively the numbers of nuclear
weapons in the Russian arsenal.'' I would like if you would,
both of you, to speak for just a moment on the need for
strategic balance as we look to Russia's efforts of
modernization.
I know we are all currently focused on Iran and North
Korea, but what should we look to with what the Russians are
doing and how that might be some impetus for us to look for
investment in our own nuclear complex. Dr. Perry.
Dr. Perry. I would say, first of all, Mr. Turner, that
Russia's needs--security needs--are very different from the
United States' security needs. The most important element of
the difference is the asymmetry in our conventional forces. We
have, probably, the most powerful conventional forces in the
world. Russia perceives, and I think correctly, that their
conventional forces are quite weak, particularly relative to
the neighborhood in which they live. So they have a totally
different need for tactical weapons than have we. Having said
that, when we consider any arms agreements with them, all of
our commission believes at some level of reduction we should
not go lower until or unless their tactical weapons are
considered in the equation. Because there is, in terms of
maintaining our extended deterrence, the perception in the
minds of our allies is going to be very important on whether
they believe we can continue to maintain that extended
deterrence. And if they see an overwhelming superiority of
tactical nuclear weapons in Russia relative to the United
States, then we will lose some of the credibility of our
deterrence.
So indeed, the need is very different between Russia and
the United States. But at some level, we have to consider their
tactical weapons very seriously in any balance.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Schlesinger, on the issue of modernization
and our deterrent?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that Dr. Perry has covered it to a
substantial degree. We don't need the same number of tactical
nuclear weapons that the Russians have. We do not need to match
them. In the strategic area, we do need to match them because
the Russians fear that they cannot defend their vast
territories against a hypothetical NATO attack which they talk
about publicly and an engagement with China which they talk
about privately, given the underpopulation of Siberia. So they
feel a need, and we do not have to match them. But we have to
be responsive to the requirements of our allies. That involves
the dual capable aircraft, which are in Europe at the present
time, which some of our military folks have thought are cost-
ineffective and should be removed.
We must not remove those capabilities in Europe without
careful consultation with our allies. The Japanese have
different requirements that they have expressed to us with
regard to the specific components of local nuclear forces, and
they have to be taken into account in a different context. But
overall, we do not need to match the Russians in terms of the
aggregate number of tactical nuclear weapons.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, thank you.
Mr. Spratt. We have got about three minutes to make it to
the floor. We will be back as soon as we possibly can. We
appreciate your indulgence. And when we come back, Ellen
Tauscher will take the gavel because I have a meeting with the
Speaker. Thank you again for your participation and for your
report.
[Recess.]
Ms. Tauscher [presiding]. The committee will be in order.
At this time I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman
from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.
Dr. Snyder. Thank you. If the timing was just right, Madam
Chair, you could call the committee to order, then run down
there and testify if they just timed this confirmation stuff
just right. But I guess it is not to be. Thank you all, Dr.
Schlesinger and Dr. Perry, for being here. I appreciate your
patience with us as we went to vote. I think it is apparent to
those that have studied your report and to those of us that
have been more peripheral in our study of your report that it
is a very serious compilation of these very important issues.
I want to ask more, I guess, of a diplomatic question. It
seems to me that the timing of your report is a good one in
terms of the relationships between the United States and Russia
that, I don't know, in my amateurism, I have sensed, in the
last six or eight months or so, that there seems to be renewed
interest in the relationship, which, I think, over the last
couple of decades, we Americans probably haven't done enough to
cultivate. But it seems like these issues that you have brought
up, in all their complexity and detail, are an excellent
starting point for a relationship between a new administration
and leadership in Russia. And I would like to hear you both
comment on that question in terms of a broader relationship
between the United States and Russia.
Dr. Perry. I think that is a very important point, Dr.
Snyder. I see that we have a major opportunity now in forming a
new relationship with Russia. And what I think Vice President
Biden referred to as ``pressing the reset button,'' which I
would call it to be in computer terminology ``rebooting.'' I
have talked with nearly every major leader in Russia about this
in the last two months. The President, the foreign minister,
the National Security Advisor, they are all very anxious to do
that.
So this is a great opportunity. I must say, though, it is
not an opportunity we foresaw when we were working on the
report. This has only developed in the last few months. And by
the time it developed, our report was already pretty much put
together. In the report, we urged working to establish such a
relationship. And by the time we put the final words down in
the report, we were talking as if that was a great opportunity
to do that. But we did not know that that opportunity was going
to exist six months ago, eight months ago. So it is a big
opportunity, though.
Dr. Schlesinger. We are going to have our ups and downs
with Russia, but the important thing is to focus on the
priorities. With Russia, our priorities are dealing with
terrorism, dealing with proliferation, and dealing with arms
control. And that other issues that come up, for example, the
controversy over Georgia should not mislead us about what is
central--or should be central--in our relationship. If one can
object to a tenor of American foreign policy, it is a tendency
to start chasing rabbits off the main trail rather than focus
on what is central to our relationship. That applies to Russia,
it applies to China and to others.
Dr. Snyder. And I am sorry, I left for a while so you may
have discussed this but, in the report, you talk about the
Nunn-Lugar funds and that additional funding for Nunn-Lugar
would be money well spent. And I probably should ask the Chair
because she would probably be able to answer my question, but I
will ask you. I have sometimes heard the argument over the last
several years as somebody who has been very supportive of this
program that it has not just been a funding issue; that, in
fact, it has been, you know, are projects ready to use the
funding? But you all concluded that the primary obstacle was
funding the further progress, is that accurate? Or would you
amplify on your statements about Nunn-Lugar, please?
Dr. Perry. I think two things are necessary to make further
progress in Nunn-Lugar. The first is the funding. That is a
necessary condition. It also requires a Russia that is
motivated to fully cooperate. And so it gets back to your first
point, that we seem to be developing a new relationship with
Russia, and that new relationship should enable us to
cooperate, and cooperate effectively, on things that can be
done to reduce the risk of proliferation. I don't believe that
proliferation is at the top list of their priority of things
that need to be done now--dealing with proliferation--but it is
on their list, and therefore we ought to be able to find some
way of cooperating in that field if we can get other things off
the table.
I believe, myself, that the main factor in souring a
relationship between the United States and Russia in the last
couple of years has had nothing, really, to do with this
nuclear field as such; it has had to do with the NATO
expansion, it has had to do with the dispute over Georgia. But
if we can get those issues resolved, or at least set aside,
then we ought to be able to deal effectively and cooperatively
with them in the nuclear field.
Dr. Snyder. I think missile defense has probably been one
of the issues that made the relationship difficult too. Thank
you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Schlesinger. Dr. Snyder, new relationship or old
relationship, Nunn-Lugar overall has been a substantial
success. Nothing works perfectly. Of course, funding is not the
only issue. It is difficult dealing with the Russians because
of security problems. But if you look over the years, their
nuclear weapons are now reasonably well protected. They haven't
done as well on fissile material. We would hope that they will
do better. But the fact that their nuclear weapons are under
good security is an accomplishment that would not have occurred
without Nunn-Lugar.
Ms. Tauscher. I am happy to yield five minutes to gentleman
from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Dr. Schlesinger, when you said in
your testimony that a deterrent, if it is effective, is in use
every day. I remembered the emotional response I had when I was
privileged to spend an overnight on one of the big boomer subs.
And standing there beside that missile tube, the captain said,
you know, if we ever have to use one of these, we will have
failed. Thank you for reminding us how important they are. I
think in practice, everybody knows the rules of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. If you don't have nuclear weapons,
you absolutely certainly cannot have nuclear weapons until you
have them, and then it is okay and you are a member of the
club. Witness India and Pakistan, North Korea, Iran tomorrow;
certainly the threat is proliferating.
I think that there is a very high probability that our
antiballistic missile shield in Alaska will never be used. The
only country, I think, that would use it to come over the pole
today is Russia, and they would very quickly overwhelm our
system there. There is no other country--I believe China may be
tomorrow--but no other country that is going to come over the
pole, no other country that is going to launch from their soil.
We would certainly detect that, and we would vaporize them and
they know that.
I think that if a nuclear weapon is delivered by missile on
us, it will certainly come from the sea. They will then sink
the ship and they will believe there are no fingerprints. You
may argue that there is a signature in the weapon or a
signature in the missile that you could detect. I am not sure
they believe that. And I am not sure we would be certain that
it wasn't a nonstate actor who was doing that, so our response
would be very difficult to predict. Since this is true, and we
have large coasts, how are we going to deter that kind of an
attack, and how could we protect ourselves from it?
Dr. Perry. Mr. Bartlett, let me take one component of your
question which has to do with North Korea. It is not the whole
story you are talking about, but it is an important part of
that story. I do not believe the United States should accept
North Korea as a nuclear power. And I believe that the U.S.
Government should make every effort to roll back nuclear
weapons they have, and I think there is some possibility we can
be successful in that. The possibility of success depends on
being able to apply what, I think, could reasonably be called
coercive diplomacy. Of course, for diplomacy to have a chance
of success, it is going to require the cooperation of several
other key nations, most importantly China. So the key that I
see to having any success in rolling back the North Korea
nuclear program is finding a way of getting a common strategy
with China on how to do that. Because while we supply some of
the--have some of the positive incentives for North Korea, or
more importantly South Korea and Japan have some of the
positive incentives for North Korea, all of the negative
incentives short of military action are in the hands of China.
And so we have to have some cooperation from China to make that
happen. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett. Jim.
Dr. Schlesinger. Bill has outlined a world of hope about
nonproliferation, and I hope that he is correct. But our--I am
sorry. Bill has outlined some hope with regard to
nonproliferation, and I hope he is correct. But as you have
indicated----
Ms. Tauscher. Dr. Schlesinger, your mike is not on.
Dr. Schlesinger. Oh, I see. Bill has, the third time,
outlined hope with regard to nonproliferation. I hope he is
correct. Needless to say, I worry about the North Koreas and
Irans of this world. But our record that you mentioned at the
outset of your comments--about India and Pakistan are now part
of the club--our overall record over the last 60 years has not
been awe-inspiring. We attempted to deflect Israel. We were not
particularly hardworking at that, but we were not successful.
We attempted to deflect France and of course, as you mentioned,
India and Pakistan. So we must work hard on seeing whether, in
this new environment, nonproliferation becomes a higher
priority for many of the countries of the world. But we must
also recognize that it is not a certainty that we will be
successful. And the--I think that is sufficient.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I remain concerned about
the challenge of deterring nations that would attack us from
the sea without any notions to where it came from. We have huge
coasts on both sides. I am not sure how we protect ourselves
there. I think this is a vulnerability that warrants
considerable attention. Thank you all very much for your
service and your testimony.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. I am happy to yield
five minutes to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chair, and this is really a
great day for us to arrive at this point after several years of
working on this issue, and it is due largely in part, I
believe, to your leadership. So it is pretty exciting to be
here together doing this. Gentlemen, thank you, both of you
doctors for being before us and for all of your service to our
Nation. I think that one of the biggest threats the world faces
today is the terrorist groups like al Qaeda, seeking and
working to obtain nuclear weapons. And the IAEA has proposed
strengthening the NPT safeguards to enhance protection of
fissile material, but it is not getting the support that it
needs for their proposals.
So my question to you would be, considering--what should we
do to try to prevent terrorists from obtaining these nuclear
weapons? In particular, what are the reasons that the IAEA is
not getting support for the proposals they put forward on this?
Dr. Perry. I believe that the proposals of the IAEA for
strengthening the--for the so-called additional protocols and
strengthening their ability to inspect, for example, are well
founded and would have been very--would have enhanced the whole
world's security had they been accepted. Secondly, I have not
yet given up on those proposals, or something like those
proposals being accepted. To try to get to your question, what
is the reason the nations have turned that down: it is not a
very happy reason, but nations--Iran and other nations--have
been able to make the case that they have a right to enrich
uranium, they have a right to reprocess plutonium, and that
nuclear powers like the United States, Russia, and so on should
not be trying to abridge that right. They have put it as an
issue of unfairness.
Ms. Sanchez. So sort of a sovereign right and, who are we
to have it and not they?
Dr. Perry. And that in my mind is a fallacious issue, but
it is an issue which has gained quite a lot of resonance among
60 or 70 countries--nonnuclear countries--who have been swayed
by that argument. I think we need to be much more effective in
addressing that argument. It is not--when they join the NPT,
their rights come along with obligations, and those
obligations, of course, have to do with not taking any actions
that would use the facilities and equipment and technologies
that have been given them to move towards nuclear weapons.
So this battle--this debate is not yet over. And I think we
should be much more effective in pursuing the move to get
support for the additional protocols of the IAEA. Otherwise,
the move to contain the uranium enrichment and protocol will be
lost and the probability of a nuclear weapon falling in the
hands of terrorists is greatly increased.
Ms. Sanchez. Doctor, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Schlesinger. Well, we have had somewhat--we, the United
States have had a somewhat checkered career with the IAEA.
Unfortunately, we have allowed, in recent years, for our
relations to deteriorate, which is a mistake. The IAEA is an
independent body; it has been influenced by the United States
effectively in the past, less so today. I hope with a change of
certain personalities--both in the Administration and at the
IAEA--that those relationships can be restored and that the
United States can have an improved relationship.
Unfortunately, in the eyes of many people, the IAEA is just
another part of the United Nations, which many don't like. The
fact of the matter is that the IAEA is, has been and,
potentially, will be a very effective part of nonproliferation
and American foreign policy, and that we ought not to allow
personal estrangements to affect our overall support. On a
broader issue, going back to the Atoms for Peace Program 1956,
it is my personal judgment that that was based upon the
premise--and I think Bill may have covered this--that was based
upon the premise that those who received technical information
under Atoms for Peace had also accepted and embraced
nonproliferation. If they failed to do that, they are not
entitled to technical information, as in the case of Iran.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. My last question. Secretary Gates
has stated that, currently, the U.S. is the only declared
nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal
nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead, and
has called on the modernization of nuclear security complex and
the stockpile itself. I agree with President Obama and
Secretary Gates that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States needs to maintain a safe, secure and effective
arsenal. However, I am concerned by what exactly maintaining an
effective and modernized arsenal entails and how it would be
perceived by the international community.
So my question to the two of you is: What is the
Commission's recommendation for the most efficient way to
maintain a credible, safe, secure and reliable deterrent and,
with the comments of Secretary Gates, what has been your
knowledge of what the rest of the international community has
said to the fact that we might want to start back up?
Dr. Perry. A major section of the report goes into that in
quite a lot of detail. I will try to summarize the main points
from it. That an important key is maintaining robust, healthy,
vigorous weapons laboratories. And related to that is a strong
Stockpile Stewardship Program and effective Life Extension
Program. As we proceed--but as our weapons continue to age, we
may find that the things that they have done in the past to
keep the credibility of our deterrence may not be adequate.
And so I believe we should be open to, as we take each new
weapon into its Life Extension Program, we should be open to a
variety of approaches on how that should be done. If it can be
done through the Life Extension Program techniques in the past,
it should be done that way. If it requires mining other weapons
for the components to get that reliability we could do it that
way. But if it involves a new design, I think we should be open
to doing that also. And the decision should be based on the
technical necessity, not on a political judgment.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor. Doctor, do you have a
comment to add?
Dr. Schlesinger. I think that we ought to drop phrases like
``modernization'' and ``new weapons'' from our vocabulary, and
that we just talk about refurbishment, maintenance of the
stockpile. Some of these weapons are aging. As Bill mentioned,
we need to have life extension systems. We ought not to be
arguing about modernization, which has created more clouds than
light. And, if we can get over what have been some unnecessary
quarrels from the past, we would be far better off.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Madam Chair, for
your indulgence.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. I am happy to yield
five minutes to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. One question from
both of you, and that is: to what extent are we still relying
on the mutually assured destruction doctrine, and do you think
that missile defense systems have to--or to what extent missile
defense systems have a stabilizing or destabilizing impact on
security?
Dr. Schlesinger. You are going to buck that one to me,
Bill. With regard to mutual assured destruction: that has
declined, and declined substantially, in importance. I do not
expect that the Russians are prepared to attack us, and I do
not expect that we would need to respond with a full strike. I
think that both sides have learned from the past that a lot of
our rhetoric got out of hand. So we are going to maintain an
assured destruction capability as a hedge, as Bill might say,
against the possibility--however remote it may be--that the
Russians would engage in a strike against the United States, so
as to deter them.
But I think that that possibility is vastly remote. With
respect to the problems of missile defense, I think that we
have to recognize that neither Russia or China are going to be
put off by an American missile defense. They have already
demonstrated the capacity of maneuverable warheads, penetration
aids, against such a defense and they can penetrate it.
Years ago, going back to the 1960s, when the Soviet Union
deployed the missile defense around Moscow, Secretary McNamara
said, no, we are not going to try and create a damage-limiting
capability, we are not going to have a missile defense of our
own; we are going to use offensive weapons to penetrate that
defense. That was our strategy then, and that would be the
strategy of Russia or China if they thought that we had a thick
missile defense. And as a consequence, there is always this
interaction with sophisticated nuclear powers that a missile
defense that worries them will simply lead to an expansion of
their offensive forces, which is something that we do not want
to see.
Dr. Perry. I associate myself with the answer that Dr.
Schlesinger just gave; the same answer.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, gentlemen. Does the success of
mutually assured destruction assume that we are dealing with
rational nation-states?
Dr. Perry. Yes.
Mr. Coffman. Would you classify Iran as a rational nation-
state?
Dr. Perry. Yes, I would. I can see many other instances
where it does not apply; in particular, with a terrorist
attack. But everybody can come to their own judgment about how
rational Iran is. My own belief is that they understand that if
they attack the United States, their country would be destroyed
and that they are not seeking suicide.
Mr. Coffman. Is North Korea a rational nation-state?
Dr. Perry. I think yes to that, also. And for the same
reason, I do not think the regime in North Korea is seeking
suicide.
Dr. Schlesinger. In my view, you hear irrational statements
from the President of Iran. Whether or not he completely
believes them or whether he is engaged in stirring up support--
domestic support--for his position in the run-up to the
election or whatever, the supreme leader in Iran maintains
control. And it is not the President of Iran, who has, from
time to time, been pulled back from some of his bolder
statements by other Iranians. I worry about the degree of
control that the Iranian government has over the Iranian guards
who express flamboyant statements that exceed those of the
President of Iran.
And I think that one of the things that we ought to be
doing in our own deterrent policy is to make sure that we know
where the guards' core bases are and, in the event of trouble,
that they get wiped out.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you
gentlemen.
Ms. Tauscher. I am going to yield to Mr. Langevin for five
minutes, the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair. Dr. Schlesinger, Dr.
Perry, thank you for your testimony here today and the fine
work you have done on this report. If I could go back to the
discussion just a minute ago about the role of missile defense
and, in particular, the relations with China and Russia. Again,
the Commission found that missile defense is effective against
regional nuclear aggressors, including against limited long-
range threats, are a valuable component of U.S. strategic
posture. And you recommend the United States should ensure that
its actions do not lead Russia or China to take actions that
increase the threat to the United States and its allies and
friends. Can you expand on that discussion a little more about
the balance of missile defense before it provokes Russia and
China to take action because we went too far with a strong
missile defense program?
Could you talk about the role that missile defenses play in
achieving that objective, the strategic stability that the
Commission emphasized throughout the report? And is there a
way, by the way, to enlist Russia and China's support for a
missile defense system so that it would protect us against
either accidental missile launches or an irrational actor who
would launch a missile.
Dr. Perry. Well, a system to provide defense against a very
limited Iranian capability should look very different from a
system designed to defend against a Russian larger-scale
missile attack. And, therefore, we ought to be able to have one
without threatening the other. Moreover, to the extent we are
focused on defense against Iran, a nuclear missile in Iran is
actually a greater threat to Russia than a nuclear missile is
against the United States. And, therefore, there ought to be
some way of not only communicating with Russia on this problem,
but maybe even cooperating in providing that defense. And to
the extent you have that communication and even the possibility
of cooperation, then there should be no basis for the Russians
increasing or expanding their missile program to try to offset
this missile defense which, in any event, is not directed
against them. But it does require good communication with the
Russians.
Mr. Langevin. If I could just interject there, what I find
troubling, of course, is that when the previous Administration
took steps to begin the process of putting the missile defense
system somewhere in Europe, the Russians found that very
provocative, and it clearly increased tensions between the
United States and Russia. Is there no way to bring them to the
table to support a limited defense, missile defense system?
Dr. Perry. Well, we have--I think the first step in getting
that issue resolved is very close communications with the
Russians which would start off with a joint threat assessment.
We and the Russians, both looking at what Iran is doing,
together assessing what the threat is and what should be done
about that. Because I say, again, they are at least as much a
threat to Russia as they are to the United States. And if we
are working together on this issue, then it should not become--
it should not morph into an issue in which the system is seen
as posing a threat to Russia. I believe this is a solvable
problem. And based on my own discussion with Russians over the
last two or three months, I think we are probably already on
the way to getting that problem solved.
Dr. Schlesinger. There has been discussion over the course
of the last 30 or 40 years about unauthorized launches;
alternatively, accidental launches. I think that a missile
defense for either China or Russia clearly directed against
that remote possibility would be acceptable to them. What would
not be acceptable is a degree of deployment of missile defenses
that clearly undermines their own deterrence. Now, there has
been a good deal of unnecessary talk about our deployment in
Poland and in Czech Republic. It seems to me that we decided to
deploy before the Iranian threat really had developed. But the
most important thing is: in the eyes of the Russians, they
profess that this is a threat to their own deterrent and they
go on and make speeches on that subject.
The fact of the matter is they know full well that it is
not a threat to their deterrent and they say privately, why in
God's name did you deploy in Poland and the Czech Republic? If
you had deployed in France or Britain or Germany, we would not
have this problem, but you are provoking us by deploying in
former satellites of the Soviet Union, and we regard that as
provocative. I think that that might have been avoided by the
conversations with the Russians early on.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you both for your answers and your
testimony today, and your invaluable service to our country.
Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. I am happy to yield
five minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Dr. Perry, Dr. Schlesinger, I want to thank
you for being here today and for all the work the Commission
did. Gentlemen, the Commission concluded on page 62 that ``the
intellectual infrastructure is also in serious trouble. A major
cause is the recent (and projected) decline in resources.'' The
report went on to say that, if funding for the NNSA does not
increase, that the Agency will be unable to transform the
weapons complex, perform the necessary life extension work, and
sustain the scientific base of the weapons program. Indeed, the
report points out that the NNSA is already planning to reduce
lab budgets by 20 to 30 percent regardless of the impact on
scientific capabilities, and without having even studied that
impact.
Recognizing that you believe that a funding study should be
performed, I would like to ask: Did the Commission reach any
consensus on the level of resources that should be allocated in
the short-run to NNSA to ensure that these three key objectives
can be achieved?
Dr. Perry. The short answer to your question is no, we have
not done a detailed cost analysis. We have reached a clear
judgment that it is a mistake to proceed with this decrease in
the intellectual capital with the laboratories. Without any
question, I have to add my own personal judgment that we should
restore it to the previous levels. That can be done either by
increasing the overall budget for NNSA, or by time-phasing out
some of the physical infrastructure changes that are being
made, and we gave a set of priorities on how that might be
done. But, without question we ought to put first priority to
maintaining the intellectual capital at the three laboratories.
Dr. Schlesinger. The first point, of course, is: do no
harm. And given the prospective budget levels, the labs are in
for a 20 or 30 percent cut, which would do damage. So we need
to sustain at least the present level. The problem that we have
had is that the plant infrastructure for many years has been
starved in order to preserve the laboratories. And now that
infrastructure needs to be replaced. And against a level
budget, all that we can do in the eyes of NNSA is to reduce the
funding of the laboratories, and we think that that is a
mistake. I think that you have to break out the restoration of
the metallurgical lab at Los Alamos separate from the funding
for the labs.
Now, I would hope that there would be a careful analysis of
how much money is required to sustain that intellectual
capability, not this year, not next year, but over the decades
ahead. And we have not done that. I don't know whether we have
the resources to do that in the Commission, but it needs to be
done in a serious way. Otherwise, one faces these kinds of
arbitrary cuts that, in this case, will damage the intellectual
capital at a time that it is deteriorating simply because of
the aging of those who have worked on this work in the
laboratories for many years and who are now retiring.
One other comment I would make is that the intellectual and
the human capital, if we continue on the process of reducing
the funding for the laboratories and the personnel at the
laboratories, and we lose more laboratories, that is an
irreversible move. It took us decades to build up that human
capital, and it will take us many more decades to try to
restore it. So it is a very serious concern.
Mr. Heinrich. Would you have any comments on the
consequences of not funding the national security labs on the
potential for future arms reduction attempts and negotiations?
Dr. Perry. Just one point I would make.
I testified to this committee that I strongly support the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. That support is contingent, in
my mind, on maintaining a strong intellectual capacity at the
laboratories.
Dr. Schlesinger. We have repeatedly made the point that one
of the purposes of our posture is to provide reassurance to the
allies who depend upon us. And to the extent that they watch
the deterioration of our intellectual capital at the
laboratories, their confidence in us diminishes and the
willingness of some to develop their own nuclear capabilities
may increase.
So the overall impressiveness of the U.S. nuclear
establishment is part of what maintains stability in the
international environment.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you both. I yield back.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich. Dr. Perry, Dr.
Schlesinger, members of the Commission, the United Institute of
Peace, and staff that have worked so hard on this: let me tell
you that this document that you have worked on is one of the
finest I think I have ever seen, and far beyond meets my
expectations when we created this commission two years ago.
Let me thank you for your significant and extraordinary
pedigrees that you have brought forward. You have done
extraordinary service for this committee, for the Congress, and
for the American people. Let me thank you for your patriotism.
Some of you have been in service of this country all of your
adult lives, and I will tell you that for all of the work that
you have done, this, I think, is a fantastic culmination.
I will tell the American people and my constituents the
most impressive thing about this is that, not only is it so
important and timely, but it is readable. And I really commend
this to average Americans who are interested in understanding
where we are on this issue.
When I met with you the first time, one of the things I
asked you for was a narrative for the American people, for us
to be able to lift this above partisan politics and ideology to
a place where average Americans could understand exactly where
we are, exactly what the threats are, exactly what our
opportunities are, and to really lever the time of a new
Administration--a time when we have a nuclear treaty review,
when we have a new nuclear posture review coming out,
nonproliferation treaty review, a potential for a CTBT, all of
these coming together in this extraordinary time.
And I think that you have given a road map by an all-star
team, and I hope we can keep this team together. Perhaps we
will find more work for you to do in the not-too-distant
future.
Thank you very much for your service, and the hearing is
adjourned.
Dr. Schlesinger. Madam Chairman, you are far too modest.
Think of this as your baby.
Ms. Tauscher. My baby, by the way, is graduating from high
school and is going to Bucknell University to play Division I
volleyball. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 6, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 6, 2009
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