[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 111-57]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY
DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 13, 2009
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SCOTT MURPHY, New York
Rudy Barnes, Professional Staff Member
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Zach Steacy, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2009
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, May 13, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act--Budget Request for Department of Energy
Atomic Energy Defense Activities............................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, May 13, 2009.......................................... 29
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California,
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee........................ 1
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee.................................. 3
WITNESSES
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas, Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy...................... 5
Podonsky, Glenn, Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer, U.S.
Department of Energy........................................... 10
Triay, Dr. Ines R., Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, U.S. Department of Energy.......................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas...................................... 33
Podonsky, Glenn.............................................. 94
Triay, Dr. Ines R............................................ 86
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 113
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin................................ 117
FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST FOR
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 13, 2009.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Ms. Tauscher. Good afternoon. This hearing of the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. Today we
will consider the Department of Energy's (DOE) fiscal year (FY)
2010 budget request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities.
Let me begin by welcoming our distinguished witnesses: The
Honorable Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA); Dr. Ines Triay, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM),
Department of Energy; and Mr. Glenn Podonsky, Chief Health,
Safety, and Security (HSS) Officer for the Department of
Energy.
I want to thank each of you for being here today. I also
want to welcome to the hearing the newest member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Murphy, of New York, who is not here, but we
welcome him anyhow, and we are delighted that he is going to be
on this subcommittee.
The fiscal year 2010 budget request for the Department of
Energy is slightly more than $26 billion. The Armed Services
Committee annually authorizes about two-thirds of this total
for Atomic Energy Defense Activities. For fiscal year 2010, the
request of $16.4 billion for these programs is an increase of
about $147.9 million over the fiscal year 2009 appropriation.
This committee is a strong supporter of the critical
missions embodied in your respective program area: maintaining
and ensuring the reliability, safety, and security of our
nuclear deterrent; conducting the scientific research,
engineering, and production activities necessary to support
that deterrent; keeping our nuclear weapons and the weapons
complex safe from physical, cyber, and other threats; see to
the government's international nuclear nonproliferation
efforts; and cleaning up the environmental legacy work of
decades of nuclear stockpile work.
We are eager to hear testimony for the fiscal year 2010
budget request. I am especially interested in your thoughts
about the following issues: first, does the budget adequately
fund the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)? As the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States just wrote in its final report, the Stockpile
Stewardship Program has been ``remarkably successful.''
Remarkably successful.
But its continued success is not something we can take for
granted. With world-class experimental tools like the National
Ignition Facility (NIF), the Dual-Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility, and the Z machine now
available to the NNSA, the stewardship program is poised for
even greater achievement. But for that to happen, we must
continue to sustain and strengthen the stewardship program.
That means supporting both the scientific tools and
advanced computing capabilities that are coming on line, as
well as the world-class scientists and engineers that use these
tools to run the stewardship program. In this context, the
committee needs to know whether the budget adequately funds the
exercise of these physical and intellectual capabilities.
Second--and this is a question I ask year after year--does
the budget properly balance various safety and security
priorities? What impact will the new Graded Security Protection
strategy have on your security investment strategy?
And third, does the budget for Environmental Management
support the numerous commitments the Federal Government has
made? With the approval of more than $5 billion in Defense
Environmental Cleanup funds in the 2009 stimulus package, can
the Department successfully manage three years' worth of
funding in two years?
Finally, this committee continues to be concerned about the
relationship between plans for consolidation of special nuclear
materials (SNM) and other national security activities,
including the stockpile stewardship, complex modernization,
nonproliferation, and environmental cleanup. I hope that you
can shed new light on the efforts to coordinate materials
consolidation and disposition among the stakeholder offices
within the Department. These are the concerns we hope you will
address in your statements and during your discussion that will
follow your testimony.
Before I turn to my ranking member, the distinguished
gentleman from Ohio, let me welcome our newest member. We are
happy to have Congressman Murphy with us.
You bring a special kind of background, as a former
investment banker, to a former investment banker--a business
that is now no longer in existence, by and large--I welcome you
to the committee. It is a very, very interesting committee, and
we are happy to have you along, Mr. Murphy. Thank you for being
here.
And now I would like to turn to my Ranking Member, the
distinguished gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for any comments
he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO,
RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to
acknowledge that we have our chairman with us pending her
confirmation by the Senate to an appointment to the State
Department. We are very glad to have her continued leadership
while we are awaiting that confirmation.
I am told that our opening statements are--somewhat echo
common themes. I think that shows the bipartisan concern that
you have on this committee for this issue, and I would also
like to welcome Scott Murphy to the committee. We look forward
to your added thoughts on what really is an important issue for
national security.
I would like to welcome back Mr. D'Agostino and Mr.
Podonsky, and extend a warm welcome to Dr. Triay, who this is
her first appearance before the subcommittee.
As I look at this year's Atomic Energy Defense Activities
budget request, I can't help but think that we are in a state
of treading water. The science and engineering campaigns are
stagnated. Key decisions on warhead refurbishment are avoided.
A significant number of construction projects are halted. We
understand that many NNSA program decisions are on hold pending
the completion of the Nuclear Posture Review, the NPR. This
review, and the stockpile and infrastructure decisions that
follow, can not happen soon enough.
Earlier this year, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command testified, ``The most urgent concerns for today's
nuclear enterprise lie with our aging stockpile,
infrastructure, and human capital.'' The Chairman of the
bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, Dr. William Perry, who
appeared before this committee last week, stated, the key to
maintain a credible, safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
deterrent rests with ``robust, healthy, vigorous weapons
laboratories, a strong stewardship program, and an effective
Life Extension Program.'' However, the commission observed two
worrisome trends: The intellectual infrastructure is in serious
trouble, and lab funding is likely to be reduced by 20 to 30
percent in the out-years.
The fiscal year 2010 budget request substantiates these
concerns. There is a net decrease in NNSA's Science and
Engineering Campaigns. Four of the five campaigns experience
zero growth. The fifth campaign, Readiness, decreases by 38
percent. In the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP),
these campaigns show decreases from 1 to 20 percent in a given
year. Has the NNSA thought about these trends and their
implications? How does NNSA continue to meet the demands of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program with fewer people and decreasing
scientific resources?
Furthermore, there is a serious need to transform the
physical infrastructure. The commission recognized this and
recommends that Congress fund NNSA's complex transformation
plan. However, this year's budget request halts a significant
amount of construction activities, accounting for a $111
million decrease in Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
(RTBF). And, top commission priorities--the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement, CMMR, facility at Los Alamos,
and Uranium Processing Facility, UPF, at Y-12--are only
modestly funded.
On the part of some, there appears to be a perception that
if the stockpile goes down, we don't need these facilities, and
perhaps, the NNSA budget can go down as well. Mr. D'Agostino, I
would like to have your thoughts on this.
In addition, though the fiscal year 2010 budget request
terminates the Reliable Replacement Warhead, RRW, and avoids
making substantial decisions on the stockpile, I would like to
solicit your thoughts on how NNSA is approaching its
modernization, or as Dr. Schlesinger prefers to call it,
``refurbishment.'' The commission concluded that the current
warhead Life Extension Programs (LEPs) could not be counted on
indefinitely. They recommend that decisions about weapon
modernization, or refurbishment, be made on a case-by-case
basis that included consideration of a spectrum of options from
component replacement to new design.
Lastly, it strikes me that balance is the major challenge
for NNSA in the years ahead--balancing recapitalization and
modernization of the infrastructure, human capital, and weapons
systems, all within an assumed flat or declining budget
scenario.
Shifting to other areas of the Department of Energy, Dr.
Triay, I am concerned about the Department's nuclear material
consolidation and storage plans. Can you update us on these
plans and also discuss the implications of the President's
decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain repository?
Finally, Mr. Podonsky, physical security and the safe
transport of our nuclear weapons and materials are top
priorities for me. There is no margin for error. In the past
year, the Department has replaced its Design Based Threat (DBT)
security policy with the Graded Security Protection policy.
What drove this change in policy, and what is the status of its
implementation?
The budget, and budget strategy, presented before us today
may work for a single year, but it is not sustainable. Unless
the placeholders we see in out-year funding are significantly
changed based on the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review, we
risk losing our world-class intellectual talent and endangering
our ability to successfully maintain and certify the stockpile.
I would like to thank the chairman for calling this
important hearing, and thank you for your leadership and
service. I look forward to the testimony today.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
We will begin with Mr. D'Agostino. Since we have received
your prepared statement, and it has been entered into the
record, I would like to simply have you summarize, if you can.
We would welcome that.
And let me also say that while the Armed Services Committee
handles NNSA nonproliferation programs at the full committee,
Chairman Skelton has agreed again this year to allow us to
address the budget request for these programs as part of the
hearing. So if you want to make some remarks about the fiscal
year 2010 request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN), we
would welcome that, too.
I just want to let the members know that we are expecting a
series of three votes in a few minutes. At that time we will
try to continue as best we can with our summarization of your
testimony, and then we will take about a half an hour break and
go back to the agenda as we have it.
Mr. D'Agostino, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Madam Chair, and members of the
subcommittee.
Hi, I am Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator for the NNSA,
and I am accompanied here by Brigadier General Harencak, who is
the--potential running defense programs for me, and Ken Baker,
as well. They are seated behind me, over my left shoulder, and
I am honored to have them here helping me out--not just here
today, but running the programs with me. It was a very exciting
year for us.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee, and sincerely thank the subcommittee's support
for our programs. We think they are quite important.
The NNSA is critical to ensuring the security of the United
States and its allies. The President's fiscal year 2010 budget
request for the NNSA is $9.9 billion. It is an increase of 8.9
percent over the fiscal year 2009 appropriated level. The
budget request provides funding to enable the NNSA to leverage
science to promote U.S. national security objectives. NNSA
programs are on the front of lines for the following national
security endeavors: Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable
stockpile and the capabilities that support the stockpile;
accelerating and expanding our efforts here and around the
world to reduce the global threat posed by nuclear terrorism,
nonproliferation, and unsecured nuclear materials; providing
the United States Navy with safe, military effective nuclear
propulsion; and supporting U.S. leadership in science and
technology (S&T).
The President has initiated both steps to put an end to
Cold War thinking, to lead to a new international effort to
enhance global security. The fiscal year 2010 President's
budget request is the first step toward implementation of this
strategy.
For our nonproliferation programs, funding increases are
requested to expand and respond quickly to opportunities to
reduce global nuclear threats. Increases are also requested in
the Naval Reactors Propulsion Program to begin development of
reactor and propulsion systems for the next-generation
submarine along with other activities.
The programs and the Weapons Activities appropriation
budget strategy is to maintain capabilities and activities at
the current level until the strategic direction is established
in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. In President Obama's
speech in Prague, he indicated his commitment to maintaining a
safe, secure, and reliable stockpile while pursuing a vision of
a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons. The NNSA
maintains the unique knowledge, capabilities, and skills that
are critical to achieving both of these objectives which, in
many cases, some people think are opposing. Quite the
contrary--they are complementary to each other.
Our nonproliferation programs are focused on securing the
key ingredients of nuclear weapons, and that is weapons-usable
materials and the related equipment and technologies.
Supporting NNSA's efforts include the Elimination of Weapons
Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP), which has been working with
Russia to shut down Russia's plutonium production reactors, and
the Fissile Material Disposition program (FMD), which will
provide a disposition pathway to eliminate at least 34 metric
tons (MT) each for the United States and Russia of weapons-
grade plutonium.
The NNSA is a recognized leader on these and other
nonproliferation initiatives to prevent proliferators or
terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. This includes our
activities to secure and reduce weapons-grade nuclear materials
at sites worldwide, but also, NNSA's efforts to detect and
intercept Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or related
materials that are in transit.
In addition, we also worked in fiscal year 2010 to support
the President's call to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty,
support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and
strengthen international safeguards and technologies that
support inspections that are so important to a future--safer
future. To implement this comprehensive nonproliferation
strategy, we will expand our cooperation with Russia, pursue
new partnerships, and work to secure vulnerable nuclear
material around the world within four years. NNSA's Global
Threat Reduction program and the International Material
Protection and Cooperation (IMPC) program will have a major
role in this four-year plan.
The NNSA is actively participating in our national debate
over our Nation's nuclear security and nonproliferation
strategic framework. This debate is not just about warheads and
the size of our stockpile. It includes the inescapable
obligation to transform our Cold War weapons--nuclear weapons
complex into a 21st century nuclear security enterprise that
retains the capabilities necessary to meet emerging national
security threats.
In a future with fewer warheads, no nuclear tests, tighter
controls on weapons systems and our weapons materials
worldwide, and effective counteraction of nuclear terrorist
threats, the NNSA's science and technology capabilities will
play an ever-increasing role to address these challenges. We
must ensure that our evolving strategic posture and our nuclear
stockpile, nonproliferation, arms control, and counterterrorism
programs are melded together into a comprehensive strategy that
protects America and its allies.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has initiated the Nuclear
Posture Review, which is scheduled to culminate to report to
Congress in early fiscal year 2010. We are actively
participating in this review and all of the aspects related to
nuclear security.
As you are well aware, the Commission on the Strategic
Posture was established by this committee and, in fact, by
Congress, to identify the basic principles for reestablishing
the national consensus on the strategic policy. The commission
has examined the role of deterrence in the 21st century and
assessed the role of weapons in our national security strategy.
Its final report was issued--I have a copy here--and it
includes a variety of recommendations. I am familiar with the
report and, given the breadth and scope of the report, the
Secretary and I are actively taking a look at the--finding the
recommendations and are coming to some conclusions. We haven't
quite finished yet, and I expect we have an opportunity, maybe,
to discuss some of those things today.
As you know, we have made tremendous progress in reducing
the size of the stockpile. The stockpile will be less than one
quarter of what it was at the end of the Cold War--the smallest
stockpile in 50 years. These reductions send the right message
to the rest of the world that the U.S. is committed to Article
VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which will help create
positive momentum into the 2010 Review Conference--will be
happening next year.
Each year since this stewardship program was developed, we
have been able to certify the safety, the security, and the
reliability of the stockpile with no need to conduct an
underground test. Since 1993, we have acquired a whole suite of
capabilities--tools, or facilities, if you will--that are
necessary to maintain this effective stockpile, and most
recently, the National Ignition Facility has come on line. We
are applying these tools to help solve current stockpile
reliability issues.
There are challenges, though, and the main challenge for
our program for the future will really be to make effective use
of these tools and capabilities. Following completion of the
Nuclear Posture Review, we will prepare a 5-year plan that
recapitalizes our infrastructure, retains our scientific
technology and engineering capability and expertise, and really
makes full use of the experimental and super-computing
capabilities that we have invested in so far over the last 10
years.
Madam Chairman, numerous external reviews have identified
the fragile state of our expertise and capabilities that reside
in our people. It is very clear to me, people are our most
important resource. We need to retain those skills and
capabilities and develop the next generation of scientists and
engineers and technicians needed to perform work in
nonproliferation; needed to perform work in nuclear
counterterrorism and forensics; and needed to perform work to
maintain our deterrent. We also need these skilled people for
the foreseeable future, especially when we consider a world
potentially without underground testing.
Madam Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be
pleased to take your questions.
I do have your comments, Mr. Turner, Madam Chair, and I
will be glad to address them in the question and answer (Q&A)
part of the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Tom.
Dr. Triay, welcome. I believe this is your first appearance
before the subcommittee, and we welcome you. And the floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. INES R. TRIAY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Dr. Triay. Thank you.
Chairman Tauscher, Congressman Turner, and members of this
subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today and to address your
questions regarding the Office of Environmental Management
fiscal year 2010 budget request.
The Office of Environmental Management's mission is to
complete the environmental cleanup of the legacy left by the
Cold War in a safe, secure, and compliant manner. Our goal is
to complete this mission by keeping our projects on schedule
and within budget. We will continue to proactively pursue our
cleanup objectives and our regulatory compliance commitments.
At the same time, we will continue to seek out sound business
practices in order to maximize cleanup progress. We have put
forth this effort to achieve the greatest environmental benefit
by maximizing risk reduction while being good stewards of the
taxpayers' money.
To best achieve the Office of Environmental Management's
cleanup mission, we have prioritized the cleanup activities
that are conducted at the sites. High-priority cleanup
activities include requirements necessary to maintain a safe
and secure posture at each site: radioactive tank waste
stabilization, treatment, and disposal; spent nuclear fuel
(SNF) storage, receipt, and disposition; and special nuclear
material consolidation, processing, and disposition. These
activities represent the highest risks that the Environmental
Management Office faces and make up a large portion of our
fiscal year 2010 budget request.
In more specific terms, we have made substantial progress
in the areas of consolidating surplus special nuclear materials
and stabilizing plant waste. To date, the Office of
Environmental Management has eliminated 11 of the 13 highly
secure nuclear material locations.
At the Hanford site, the Office of Environmental Management
has transferred pumpable radioactive liquid waste from leaking
underground single shell tanks to more durable double shell
tanks. Parallel to that effort, we are also pursuing tank
cleanout at Idaho, Hanford, and the Savannah River Site (SRS).
In addition, the Office of Environmental Management has
nearly completed the transfer of spent nuclear fuel from wet to
dry storage. Many of these storage areas were aging basins
filled with radioactive water. At the Idaho National
Laboratory, these basins were located over a groundwater
aquifer, and at Hanford, these basins were located within a
quarter-mile of the Columbia River.
We continue to move forward with the design, construction,
and eventual operation of three large tank waste processing
plants. These processing plants will treat approximately 88
million gallons of radioactive tank waste. The estimated total
cost for construction of these three plants is $14.3 billion.
The Office of Environmental Management remains devoted to
building the capability for tank waste treatment and
disposition. The Office of Environmental Management's fiscal
year 2010 budget request fully funds these high-priority
activities.
We are also focusing on technology development in our
fiscal year 2010 budget request. Technology development is
instrumental in reducing the technical uncertainties that come
with the construction and operating of these unique cleanup
facilities. Because of these challenges, we have increased
technology development and deployment funding to $105 million
in fiscal year 2010. The Office of Environmental Management
(EM) will target its science and technology investments on
solving challenges associated with tank waste management and
high-risk groundwater remediation. We are confident that with
an increase in funding, the Environmental Management program
will be better positioned to address science and technology
uncertainties associated with these activities.
The Office of Environmental Management will also continue
to seek ways to maximize footprint reduction efforts. Footprint
reduction activities include the decontamination and
decommissioning of excess facilities, source and groundwater
remediation, and solid waste disposition. Each of these
activities has proven technologies and established regulatory
framework. Footprint reduction makes laboratory facilities in
the Department of Energy and other site infrastructure
available for beneficial reuse. In fiscal year 2010, many of
the footprint-reduction activities would have been deferred to
fund higher-risk activities. However, because of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding provided by Congress, the
Office of Environmental Management was able to fund many of
these footprint-reduction activities.
Now that we have outlined our program priorities, I would
like to discuss some key cleanup strategies. The Office of
Environmental Management continues to have a strong commitment
to safety first--the safety of our workers, the public, and the
environment. Safe operations and cleanup is our overarching
goal with every activity that is commenced.
As the committee is aware, the Office of Environmental
Management has come under considerable criticism for its
execution of these projects. Aggressive efforts are underway to
transform the Environmental Management program into a best-in-
class project management organization. It will strengthen our
project management capability and improve the skill set of our
project management teams. This budget request supports 1,674
full-time equivalent employees to assist in this effort. We
have added over 300 mission-critical hires since 2007 to
support both the best-in-class project management initiative
and align the program with the human capital recommendations
made by the National Academy of Public Administration.
With these planned improvements in project management and
acquisition, the Environmental Management program will move
forward, will identify and manage the programmatic risks
associated with start of construction during the early stages
of the design phase. We will also integrate safety early in the
design phases of all projects. We currently are instituting
construction project reviews that are modeled after the reviews
performed by the Department's Office of Science that have had
great success in delivering projects on cost and schedule.
These independent reviews will examine all detail aspects of
our construction project. This process will include expert
knowledge and experience of world-class engineers, scientists,
and managers.
With all of these improvements, we are confident that the
Environmental Management program can succeed in its mission.
Chairman Tauscher, Congressman Turner, and members of the
subcommittee, I look forward to addressing your questions.
And on a very personal note, within the Department of
Energy, we really thank Chairman Tauscher. Your leadership has
made all the difference for our program.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Triay can be found in the
Appendix on page 86.]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much. Well, I am aided by my
fabulous colleagues and great staff, so no one ever does
anything alone, as she so well framed.
Dr. Triay, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Podonsky, you are a veteran of appearing before the
subcommittee, and we want to welcome you back. The floor is
yours. We have been called for a vote, so if you could limit
your time to about five minutes, then we will go take a vote.
Thank you. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GLENN PODONSKY, CHIEF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Chairwoman Tauscher, Ranking
Member Turner, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me
to testify today on the fiscal year 2010 budget for the Office
of Health, Safety, and Security. As you know, we are the
Department's central organization responsible for the health,
safety, security, and environment, designing policy, taking
closed systems, training, and Department-wide enforcement and
independent oversight.
The brevity of my oral statement is not a reflection of our
responsibilities, but a reflection of your limited time. So I
will simply conclude and say that I look forward to answering
your questions that you posed in your opening statements, and
we look forward to continued support from the Congress, the
Department, and our stakeholders, so that we can continue to
strengthen the Department's health, safety, and security
posture.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky can be found in the
Appendix on page 94.]
Ms. Tauscher. That is a true veteran. Thank you.
Colleagues, we have three votes that will take about a half
an hour on the clock, but about 40 minutes in real time. So we
will adjourn for about 40 minutes. We will be back as soon as
we can. We thank the witnesses for their forbearance, and the
subcommittee is temporarily adjourned.
[Recess.]
Ms. Tauscher. The hearing will resume. I am going to begin
our questions and our discussion by going back to the science-
based Stockpile Stewardship Program. The Strategic Posture
Commission discussed at some length the future of the nuclear
security complex and the laboratories in particular.
The commission noted that many of the best veteran
scientists at the labs are taking early retirement, and many
younger scientists are seeking employment elsewhere. The
commission noted that the problem of maintaining the
intellectual expertise necessary to execute the Stockpile
Stewardship Program is ``aggravated'' by budget pressures;
pressures that are made worse by the need to reduce spending on
science and engineering in order to fund improvements in the
physical infrastructure of the complex.
But of the greatest concern to me, the commission also
found that, ``The NNSA expects to reduce the number of
laboratory personnel funded by the weapons program by 20 to 30
percent. It is doing so without any understanding of what types
of expertise to seek to retain or reduce. It does not know
whether the results will be a weapons program too large or too
small to meet its required purposes.'' Then, with a remarkable
flair for the understatement, the commission said, ``This poses
several risks.''
Administrator D'Agostino, I want to know whether the NNSA
has conducted any analysis of the staff reductions that have
taken place at the nuclear security laboratories over the last
two years, which total more than 4,000 at Livermore and Los
Alamos alone? And secondly, do you plan, and does the fiscal
year 2010 budget request entail, any additional staff
reductions? And thirdly, what steps does the NNSA plan to take
to ensure that we retain the intellectual capability needed to
continue the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. I will answer your questions in
order, but I will maybe have to start off with a comment.
Though I agreed in large part with most of the commission's
report, I would argue with the details. The statement of a 20
percent--20 to 25 percent reduction in the Weapons Activities
account is a true statement, we think.
One of our strategies--we have, actually, four main
strategies: Change the stockpile, change the infrastructure,
change the way we do business, and support the science and
technology base. So those two middle strategies--change the
infrastructure and change the way we do business--mean,
basically, do things more efficiently. And we think we can
drive out what I would call kind of inefficiencies that have
built up over 30 or 40 years of the program, and in fact, as
the laboratories have--rightfully, they have come down 4,000
over the last couple years, and that is a very significant
number. The majority of those changes happened in areas of what
I would call administrative, technical support, operations
support. In a new infrastructure, you don't need as many
maintainers. Right now, we have a lot of people taking care of
Cold War facilities, and that is very expensive, and we want to
get out of that business.
So in effect, this 4,000 reduction was an opportunity--and
Director Miller and Anastasio took advantage of it--to shape
the workforce for the future. So the short answer to your
question, yes, we are very aware of--we did do a study; we took
a look at the skills that we lost. It is never good to lose any
skill, but where our focus was was to try to retain the skills
that mattered the most to the core program.
Second point is, that hasn't--unfortunately, 4,000 people
is a significant part of the workforce, and that sends a signal
and it really hurts morale. And that is an unfortunate part of
reshaping the workforce--is there is kind of a spinoff effect,
and we have lost a few folks. The 2010 budget plan is
specifically crafted to avoid major changes in workforce. As
Mr. Turner correctly pointed out, there are a lot of flat-line
numbers when you look at our program, particularly into the
out-years.
I don't like the idea of having flat-line numbers in the
out-years, because it sends a signal to your workforce that the
country thinks this is just to keep on--it is just a flat
program and it has got no future. But in reality, we made some
changes in the last few months to actually add money to science
and technologies to ensure that we didn't take any major
reductions in that area. So our focus, ultimately, with the
Weapons Activities account, which includes support for not just
warheads but, quite frankly, nuclear counterterrorism, and
incident response, and things that we think are very important
for the future--specifically crafted to avoid layoffs.
Your last question was, how would we put together a program
to retain people----
Ms. Tauscher. Correct.
Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. And I think it is done
probably in a couple of fashions. One is, obviously, we need--
we have elements of our program to fill the pipeline of young
folks that are going to come in behind and get trained. And
there is a program right now that we have to get folks from
Historically Black Colleges and Universities and other minority
institutions, as well as big schools--one from Washington--but
the focus is to get those folks out into the labs. Each
laboratory has their own undergraduate, graduate degree
programs to bring people in.
I think the best signal to send, quite frankly, will come
in the form of, you know, a report like this Strategic Posture
Commission report, whose ultimate aim is to drive this national
consensus on where our programs are going out into the future;
because our scientists and engineers look at these programs,
they listen to these testimonies, they read the transcripts,
they read the conference report language, and they want to get
a sense that the country cares about this program.
I care passionately about it. They need to see it in
financial terms; they need to see it in the words from the
Administration; and, they need to see it in the words from the
Congress. I think we are on the way to turning the corner and
getting that national consensus. In my view, that will send one
of the best signals to getting the workforce confident that
they are on the right track.
Ms. Tauscher. I agree with you. I think that the--one of my
first meetings with the Strategic Posture Commission, I asked
them to have--provide us with a narrative, not only with
results of their hard work, but to provide us with a narrative.
And I asked them to make it readable and have it produced like
the 9/11 book was.
And I think that what that book does is provide every
American with an opportunity to understand where their
investment capital is going. And I think it also creates a
raison d'etre for the scientific community, the innovative
community, the technology community----
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Ms. Tauscher [continuing]. The academic community, to see
that there is a big future for folks that want to go into this
line of work. And that not only are they going to get rewarded,
as everyone does, commensurate with their hard work, but this
is a very patriotic way to serve your country.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Ms. Tauscher. I have one more question.
Dr. Triay, I would like to ask about the office's handling
of the funding provided for the Defense Environmental Cleanup
through the stimulus, basically, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. In addition to the $5.7 billion appropriated
for the Defense Environmental Cleanup for fiscal 2009, the
stimulus package provided $5.1 billion. The request for these
activities for fiscal 2010 is $5.5 billion. This is essentially
three years' worth of funding in two years.
First of all, do you anticipate any challenges associated
with finding the contractor workforce to carry the Recovery Act
work without detracting from EM's program baseline activities?
And second, will you be able to obligate the Recovery Act
funding within two years and expend it within five years, as
required by law?
Dr. Triay. Thank you for the opportunity to talk about the
Recovery Act funding for the Environmental Management program.
We selected the portfolio of the Recovery Act in a very careful
manner. Our portfolio is geared toward reducing the footprint
of the environmental management legacy cleanup complex and, in
particular, disposition of solid waste, decontamination, and
decommissioning, and demolition of excess facilities, and in
addition to that, dealing with soil and groundwater
remediation.
The reason we did that is because we wanted to actually
maximize the jobs, while at the same time maximizing the
cleanup progress that we can make. This area has proven
technologies, has an established regulatory framework, the
contract vehicles are in place. And the Environmental
Management program, even though we have had issues associated
mainly with our construction project performance management, in
these areas associated with footprint reduction, we have had a
proven track record of good performance. In addition to that,
we have demonstrated that we can get great economies of scale
and a substantial return on investments.
In 2005, the Environmental Management program had an annual
budget of $7.3 billion. Since 2008, our budget--annual budget--
has not exceeded, essentially, $6 billion. So the Recovery Act
funding actually addresses some deferred activities in these
areas associated with footprint reduction, fully funds
underfunded contracts that we already had for these three
areas, and improves the compliance posture of the Environmental
Management complex.
In addition to that, it deals with some of the high-risk
activities associated with the excess facilities not only in
the Environmental Management program, but in NNSA, in Science,
and in Nuclear Energy. In January of 2009, the Environmental
Management program was required by Congress to send a progress
report of the cleanup progress, and in that report and in a
previous report, we delineated that there are 340 excess
facilities and materials in NNSA, Science, and Nuclear Energy
that were not part of the Environmental Management portfolio,
that would increase the lifecycle cost of the Environmental
Management program by $3 billion to $9 billion.
So the Recovery Act fund has not only assisted us in
dealing with those deferred activities already in the EM
portfolio, but also deal with some of the high-risk excess
facilities in other programs. In particular, for instance, in
Y-12, as you know, there has been a significant issue with
respect to the deterioration of some of those facilities, and
this--substantial amount of this funding is utilized for
programs in addition to EM.
With respect to your question about whether we were going
to utilize the entire five years that the Recovery Act
delineates for execution of this program, our target--our
goal--is to obligate the funds by the end of 2009 and finish
our portion of the Recovery Act activities by the end of 2011.
That is our goal, and the reason for that is, again, because we
wanted to maximize the jobs that would be created.
Chairman Tauscher, I have to tell you that at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, Washington State, South Carolina, when we have job
fairs, we have on the order of 5 to 10 times the number of
individuals showing up for jobs as the jobs that we have to
give out. The Environmental Management program has very
rigorous training processes to train workers that were
previously construction workers to do work in decontamination
and decommissioning; using very rigorous processes for handling
radioactivity. So, we are confident that we can find the
workforce and that we can train it appropriately and we can do
this work safely.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Dr. Triay.
I have some questions for Glenn Podonsky, but I am going to
wait until the second round. And I am going to yield time, now,
to the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Turner, of Ohio.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. D'Agostino, you, in your comments, acknowledged the
President's statement of desiring to have a world free of
nuclear weapons, and that is a very laudable goal. The
Strategic Posture Commission, in their report, indicated that
it would take political transformation unlike what is expected
or foreseen in order for that to be accomplished. And then they
go on to indicate that a significant investment needs to be
maintained in order to ensure that we have our strategic
deterrent.
One of the interim steps, obviously, to the laudable goal,
is stockpile reduction, and a recognition that, perhaps, the
strategic deterrent can be satisfied with a lower number of
weapons overall. As we do that--there are many who would like
to see the goal of no nuclear weapons--I think even those who
would support or desire the United States to have no nuclear
weapons would want, and understand that the United States needs
to have, nuclear capability, we need to have the conditions of
an infrastructure that is capable, and that we need to engage
in activities, research and development that can encourage the
type of ingenuity that could perhaps lead us to even other
greater discoveries.
I know that you have a concern that as we look to reducing
our stockpile, that there might be a misunderstanding that that
would reduce, correspondingly, our overall costs in having
nuclear capability--our labs, our infrastructure that supports
the know-how and the weapons that we maintain. So, if you could
speak for a moment about the size of the stockpile and the
level of capability needed, size of facilities needed, and also
discuss the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
facility at Los Alamos, the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-
12--your thoughts about how stockpile reduction relates to
savings, and also the issue of how do we ensure that we
maintain our investment?
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, sir.
Absolutely, in my view there is a false view out--kind of
out there--that says if you reduce your stockpile by half, you
can reduce your budget by half, or your program by half, and
consequently, your facilities by half, and just keep reducing
everything by half or even smaller, quite frankly.
But I think most people that spend time and ultimately have
the responsibility for--and we are in positions of
responsibility here on the committee, as well as in the
Executive Branch--to making sure that the country's national
security is maintained not only today, but more importantly,
out into the future, because the future is uncertain. We don't
know what that future holds.
But one thing we do know is that we have been quite
fortunate to have invested the amount of effort we have in the
people and in the facilities that we currently have right now,
because they are dealing with problems that 10 years ago, we
would never have imagined we can deal with. So it is this
question of capability versus capacity. And when we took a look
at what we had called ``transformation from a nuclear weapons
complex to a 21st century national security enterprise,'' we
took a look at it with exactly that in mind: What capabilities
do we need to maintain out in the future? When we look at
reducing the size of the stockpile, what impacts does it have
on our facilities?
And what we found out is, we are at that point where we are
at that bottom plateau. As you start reducing your--how much
work you have to do, we are down at reducing--we think we are
going to take our infrastructure to a point where it will
either produce one of or up to a small number of what we think
the country might need out in the future. For pits, for
example, we are shooting at this 50 to 80 number, so a fifth
per year. Not because we were going to plan on building 50 to
80 weapons per year, but because the Nation needs the
capability to do that in this uncertain future.
I liken it to a garage that exists in the neighborhood. You
know, the garage has a lift--most of them have two lifts--it
has a mechanic, and it has a set of tools. And that garage can
take care of 1 automobile for the whole year, or it can take
care of X number, maybe 100 or something like that, for the
whole year. But it provides you a range of capability. And that
is where we are. That is where our plan is right now, is to do
that. And to take care of that capability requires resources.
With respect to CMRR, the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Replacement facility, that facility is designed--again, as I
mentioned to the chairman earlier, we are trying to change the
way we do business and have a much less expensive
infrastructure and much smaller infrastructure, one that is
sized for the future. That capability that we would like to
bring there will allow us to reduce the number of plutonium
facilities in our infrastructure from nine down to two.
Now, that is cheaper. That allows me to take that money I
save there and invest it in scientists and engineers, and
actually have them work in a facility that is designed with the
future in mind, unlike the facilities we had built during the
Cold War. So there is a lot of money to be drawn out of the
program by consolidating. The Uranium Processing Facility at Y-
12--building that structure will allow me to shift from 150
acres of security footprint in very old Cold War facilities, to
15 acres of security footprint in modern 21st century
capabilities that allow me to drive my security costs way down.
In fact, we think we can save over $200 million a year at Y-12
alone. This is in a separate audit we did just on the basis of
building that facility. That is almost a facility that builds
itself--that pays for itself over a 15-year or less time
period.
So, my goal is, ultimately, when the--as we work the
Nuclear Posture Review, which is actually happening today, and
it has happened yesterday, and it is going to be happening very
intently over the next three months or so--getting that output
and having that shape this program in a cohesive manner for
five years get a--and then send that right signal to our
workforce that there is a future in doing nuclear security
work. And when I say nuclear security, certainly the deterrent
is in that, but also nuclear counterterrorism,
nonproliferation, forensics, intelligence analysis, incident
response, and that whole suite of things that I believe the
country needs.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
The Strategic Posture Commission also spoke a lot about our
aging stockpile using the words--it concerns issues of
modernization, or as Dr. Schlesinger says, refurbishment of our
stockpile. Could you please tell us--give us a picture of
trends that we are facing with our nuclear stockpile and what
types of issues we are going to be facing with weapons
capabilities and performance? What are we going to need to do?
Even if we reduce our stockpile, with those that are left, what
is ahead of us?
Mr. D'Agostino. By reducing the stockpile, which is
something that is clearly--that we are trying to do in this
Administration, and not only reducing, but taking the warheads
apart, ultimately, and dealing with the material that we have
left, we have to--because we will have smaller numbers of
warheads and because we still have an extended deterrent that
we extend out to 30 of our allies in other nations, it places a
real premium on the warheads that you have and on our desire to
make absolutely sure we know exactly what is going on with
those warheads.
General Chilton has once called these warheads chemistry
experiments kind of in action. That is a great way to describe
that. You have got radioactive material radiating various
organic materials and causing them to change over time. Many of
these warheads have been out there for 20, 30 years or so. So
what we are seeing is, from a trend standpoint, is that the
aging--we are seeing problems that we did not expect to see.
When we started the Stockpile Stewardship Program 10 years ago,
we expected to see certain problems, and what we found out is
that we aren't always that great at predicting the future. We
have been able to address all the problems we have found, and
there are problems that came up we didn't expect to see.
But what is clear is that things are changing. I am very
confident in the Significant Finding Investigation process and
the accountability we have in there, and my briefs to the
Secretary and tracking on the specifics. But if we don't change
into a--what has been termed ``the spectrum of activities,''
which I think is right--we don't look at changing the way we
modernize, we are going to continue to run into more and more
problems. And ultimately, my job is to make sure that we have a
stockpile that will never need an underground test for the
Nation.
And so that is why I completely agree with the commission
saying that these have to be done on a case-by-case basis,
because every warhead is different. And I am very pleased to
see that despite a--I mean, they have spent a lot of time
looking at this topic. They came to the same conclusion that we
in the--to a similar conclusion that we in the program have
looked at over the last number of years.
Mr. Turner. Very good.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I thank the panel for testifying today, and if we could
maybe continue on that line of questioning, looking at the
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Can you talk about your highest priorities and areas of
emphasis for NNSA science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program,
and do you have the tools and the capabilities in place that
you need, and what are the gaps, if any? And if you could
also--mindful that we are in open session--could you also give
examples of the challenges the stewardship program will
confront in the coming years? And could you indicate the time
outlines involved with those challenges? For example, when the
challenges--when will the challenges manifest themselves?
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, sir. My highest priority, quite
frankly--well, probably kind of look at it in two ways. There
is a tactical priority that I have right now, which are the
people--sending the signal to the people in this infrastructure
and program that the work they do is important, and making sure
that message gets out. I think we have gone through, over the
last few years, a pretty rough period, quite frankly, of lots
of pressures from an infrastructure standpoint, uncertainty on
where the program is going, and not so discreet trends with
respect to investments in science and technology.
I see that tactical problem landscape changing a little
bit, from a challenge standpoint, because we are getting a bit
closer, with the Nuclear Posture Review and with this report
that we have, toward getting that consensus. So that will take
care of that part of the tactical problem.
I see us taking well over $100 million--about $130 million
a show out of our infrastructure investments, so that creates
another problem. But bringing it back in to support programs in
computing and in high-energy density physics that are important
for the future. So, we are dealing with that near-term tactical
problem.
The more strategic challenge I think we face after we get
this national consensus is putting together an integrated
program that deals with fully utilizing these tools that we are
bringing onboard, that we have brought onboard. I am talking
about the National Ignition Facility, the Dual-Axis
Radiographic Hydro Test facility at Los Alamos, the Z machine
at Sandia, the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental
Research (JASPER) facility, which is a Livermore facility but
it is at the Nevada Test Site. In other words, now that we have
invested a lot of the money here, well, let us get the
experimental data out of that, and then let us make sure we
have the scientists and engineers that can analyze that
information to send us in the right direction out in the
future.
And we will have to reinvest in our infrastructure, and
ultimately all those things are going to require additional
resources. And it comes down to money, but I can't ask for the
money unless I have the strategic context to put those
resources in. And that is why I am anxious, quite frankly, to
get past--I mean, the consensus and the strategy phase is the
right thing. I am anxious to get past that and to get into
developing that program, and that is what, in essence, we will
be doing this summer.
Timelines involved, I think, was the last part of that
question. As we go through this next upcoming decade, there
will be a few--if we can get the infrastructure facilities that
we--Mr. Turner talked about, the UPF, or Uranium Processing
Facility, and our plutonium capability back up to speed, I
think we are going to start seeing some significant--it will
allow me to shift some significant resources into the S&T
program without changing the bottom line of the program. And
that will happen mid to end of next decade. These are very
complicated facilities to build.
We have gotten a lot of use out of these Cold War
facilities. We need to get our people out of them. That is one
way we show respect, quite frankly, to the workforces: Put them
in facilities so I don't have my good friend, Glenn Podonsky,
you know, rightfully saying, ``Hey, we might have some safety
problems here, Tom,'' or, ``We might have some security
problems here.''
So I am anxious. I think there is a great opportunity that
we have over the next few years to shape this program the right
way. I see it. My job ultimately is to put together that
program for you, for the President, and ultimately to bring it
here to you and explain it to you in more detail. And in
effect, we are in a kind of a one-year budget scenario. We have
put together a program to stop things from getting worse while
we define what that better future is going to be. It is a
little different than normal, unfortunately.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from New
Mexico, Mr. Heinrich.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you all for being here today. I am going to jump
right into a number of sort of specifics, and they deal with
this issue that you have already alluded to of the general
strategic context. And some of that I will infer from comments
and speeches that the President has made regarding the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the potential for
additional negotiations in strategic arms reduction, and the
need that you articulated to be able to have the adequate
science and the adequate capacity to make sure we support the
capabilities doing those things.
I am very concerned with the proposed budget for Sandia's
science and inertial confinement fusion campaigns. The NNSA's
fiscal 2010 budget request represents a $19 million cut from
fiscal year 2009--I think that is about 35 percent. And at the
newly refurbished Z machine, your budget will cut the annual
shot rate from 200 in 2009 to around 130 in 2010, even though
the weapons in high-energy density physics user community have
an operational requirement of over 400 shots, I believe. At a
time when we are reducing the stockpile and must increase our
investment in science-based Stockpile Stewardship Programs,
aren't you concerned with such a dramatic cut to the operations
of science facilities, for example, the Z machine and Sandia?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The answer to your question is, I am
very concerned. The 400 shots that we had previously were kind
of a two-shift operation, in effect, for the Z machine. We are
down to about 80 percent of a one-shift--fully loaded one-shift
operation. What we focused on doing were making sure that we
had a minimal--I would say, is a minimal set of shots we needed
to support the primary mission of the Z machine, which is the
stockpile itself, and we are confident we have a program that
does that.
There is absolutely a lot more work we could do with the Z
machine. You know, in the aggregate the Sandia budget is, in
effect, flat, and there are decisions that we had to make--that
my staff had to make--with respect to how much should go in
this versus how much should go in that one. And we felt when we
balanced across all of this, that keeping the lab--not hurting
the lab population, doing some reprioritizations with respect
to what we need to do in the future, was the right thing to do.
It ended up having an impact on the Z machine. It is
ultimately my responsibility. It is a decision that I made.
With more money, we would have definitely put it there, but we
definitely are in a situation where we are potentially--the
term Mr. Turner used was ``treading water,'' I think was the
term you used, sir, which is kind of where we are at.
Mr. Heinrich. So do I understand you to say, sort of, that
this is sort of the wait and see year? We develop a grander
vision of what the strategic context is and maybe adjust in the
following budget year? Is that what you are----
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. I mean, I do think, you know,
whether we call it a ``wait and see year'' or a ``treading
water year,'' I mean, the focus was, you know--priority number
one for me, because many of you are aware that this budget was
developed kind of fairly quickly in the last days of January
and into the month of February. So what we ended up doing is
saying, the priority is, we are going to focus on not having
any reductions in staff across the complex in the aggregate.
Try to preserve as much as possible the people and the program
while the Administration gets its hands around what it wants
its nuclear security posture to be.
And, you know, because it is--in fact, it still isn't done
yet. We are developing that posture. And so my expectations--I
mean, I have spent a lot of time in this program; I know a lot
of the people, I know Keith Matheson quite--very well, out at
Sandia, running the Z machine. My expectation is that in order
to drive this program into the future that supports the visions
on CTBT and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that we
absolutely have to have a fairly significant increase in the
science and technology in this program in the out-years. It
just can't happen any other way. We have to have support for
facilities upgrades out into the future. It just can't happen
any other way. We have to send the signal that this is a
nuclear security program, not a nuclear weapons program,
because in fact, that is exactly what it is. It is a nuclear
security program, not a nuclear weapons program--not completely
a nuclear weapons program.
And those messages have to get sent out by the
Administration in an integrated five-year program that will
look different than--I didn't bring a budget book with me, but
it will look different than what we have in front of us today.
So it is a one-year program right now.
Mr. Heinrich. Jumping on to sort of the next thing in
response to that is the Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities accounts. And sort of given the 16 percent decrease
in Operations of Facilities, 28.6 percent in Program Readiness
from fiscal year 2009 levels, how are some of those things
going to play into this broader picture that you are talking
about? I mean, those seem to be--those are kind of bread and
butter sustainment----
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Heinrich [continuing]. Accounts.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities and Program Readiness accounts are accounts that
fund what we call our fixed costs--in effect, you know, lights
burning, you know, roads working, roofs maintained, and that
kind of thing. In parallel with what we have right now, which
is a fairly--like it was said earlier--flat-budget scenario for
the Weapons Activities account, we are driving changes in the
way we do business.
Probably the best example--and I have got numerous
examples--but the best example is what we called ``supply chain
management center.'' Something we started about a year and a
half ago, it is to centralize procurement of commodities-type
products. Every laboratory, every production site needs paper,
paper clips, it needs a variety of commodity-type products, and
they were all being purchased separately, and we felt that
there was an opportunity to leverage our purchasing--you know,
operate as an integrated organization instead of eight--seven
separate sites, and in fact, there is opportunity, and we took
advantage of it, and we have demonstrated $32 million worth of
savings. That is one example.
Another example is doing the same type of concepts with
replacing roofs across the concept, and we saved money there.
So a lot of the pressure--the negative budget pressure--you see
in those fixed-cost accounts are due to our driving our lab
directors individually, and the enterprise as a whole, toward
being more efficient.
Just one last point and I will stop, and that is, we have--
about two years ago I chartered a group, and it is only
contractor employees--lab--senior from each lab or production
site--when we develop a Nuclear Security Enterprise Integration
Council, and this integration council was set up so that I
would put, potentially, operational efficiency pressure, and I
say, ``You guys run this place. You are Management and
Operations (M&O) contractors. You tell us what is a more
efficient way to operate, and I would like to see specific
results.''
And that group meets, in fact, they met yesterday here in
Washington, and they have a very well prioritized list of
activities. In the essence of saving time, I would be happy to
provide, if I could, to the committee examples of those types
of projects and where they produce savings.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Heinrich. That would be helpful, I think. I wasn't
surprised so much with the cuts as with the scale. You know
28.6 percent is a lot of paper cuts and bruises.
I am sure there is capacity there. I just thought--I mean,
that is substantial. So I would be curious to look at some of
those programs and see how they match up with the scale of the
reductions that we are seeing.
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Be glad to show you that, sir.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Podonsky, I wanted to go back to the one question I
have. It is an issue that we discussed about a year ago. When
HSS was established it was structured so that you were not
responsible for any operational elements, with one exception:
the DOE headquarters security. This exception, which gives your
organization responsibilities for an operational unit, appears
to represent what we considered, at the time, a conflict of
interest.
Last year, you agreed, and said that you were working with
the past Administration to address the issue. But since then, I
understand your office has conducted an oversight inspection of
the security operations at the headquarters facilities, and we
still think that is a conflict.
Why don't you tell us where you think you are with this
right now, and can you provide the subcommittee with an update
on what you have done over the past year to address the concern
we have?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question. And
it is true, at the hearing that I testified last year that we
talked about the inherent conflict for my office to be
responsible for environment, safety, and health safeguards to
security, cyber, emergency management, policy oversight
enforcement, and then to have an operational arm; it has proven
to be quite a challenge.
We just had a vigorous inspection, as I mentioned, last
year that we would conduct, and my operation did very poorly.
And so I put myself on report and went to then-Secretary Bodman
and talked about the corrective actions in the same way I would
expect when I go to inspect any of my colleagues' to my right,
here, operations.
We did the corrective actions at the headquarters to make
the improvements, but the Administration--the previous
Administration at the time--did not want to make any wholesale
changes because we were so close to the changeover with the
upcoming election. Now, where we are, that we have all the
corrective actions fixed, in place, we await the current
Administration for what they are referring to as a resetting of
the DOE organizational structure.
So my recommendation will be to Secretary Chu and the
Deputy Secretary designate that when they look at the
restructuring of the Department, as they intend to do, my
recommendation will be that even though we have taken every
precaution to avoid any conflicts, the fact of the matter is
that they exist. And quite honestly, I don't want to have to
put myself on report again for poor performance.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, we don't want you to either, so we are
going to--I think that the subcommittee will write to Secretary
Chu and we will ask exactly what the plan is to reset the
organization and to take you out of that situation.
Mr. Turner, do you have any further questions? I want to go
to Mr. Thornberry.
I am happy to go to Mr. Thornberry for five minutes.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. And I apologize for being in and
out during the testimony.
Mr. D'Agostino, I know you said that you all are still
digesting the commission report that came out last week, but as
I have read that report and now I look at the future year
budgets for Weapons Activities, seems to me the two things
don't fit together. I mean, the Weapons Activities budgets go
down, not even counting inflation under this budget, and it
just seems to me, when you look at the challenges with people,
facilities, the other things that were talked about in that
report, this isn't all fitting together. Am I missing something
here?
Mr. D'Agostino. No, sir, you are not. They don't match up.
Our focus, recognizing the report just recently came out--of
course, I have been working this program for a number of
years--and that what we have got, in essence, is inconsistency.
In fact, you know, the report will inform--in fact, is
informing--the Nuclear Posture Review groups that are meeting.
I am one of those people that are on that group. The report
helps me out, quite frankly, quite a bit in defining what I
believe is the right path for the program.
The out-year numbers for this program do not reflect what I
think are important to do to maintain a stockpile, to do a
CTBT, to take care of a variety of challenges we have coming
forward. And, you know, granted--I mean, somewhere buried in
the narrative of the actual President's budget submission, I do
make it clear that what we are trying to do is first, do no
harm and not reduce significantly the program between 2009 and
2010; and second, set us up--you know, it is kind of like a--
getting yourself ready for that next pitch that has to happen,
getting the program set up so that it can move out smartly,
given a strategic direction.
The report actually sets the right tone, in my view, of
where programs need to go. It endorses things that the
committee has looked at for a number of years now with respect
to stockpile, so----
Mr. Thornberry. Well, my concern, among others, is that if
we have this idea we are going to negotiate further reduction
with the Russians, that means we can spend less money, and--
when, in fact, that even puts greater necessity on making sure
what the other things we do are done well, or else--and
articulating that risk of not funding those other things well
is something that does concern----
Let me ask, on another topic: I know that you and Mr.
Podonsky have, I believe, written a memo on the issue about
whether the guard force should become federal employees or not.
And my impression is that you are both in agreement that that
is not a good idea. Could you briefly, each of you, tell me
why?
Mr. D'Agostino. I can start, and I would ask Glenn, maybe,
to--because in essence there is a policy piece, and Glenn has
that responsibility. My sense is, just as a program lead, that
we can spend a lot of time and effort, I call it reorganizing,
or making fairly significant strategic shifts. It has been my
observation in the past in running programs that there is--the
devil is in the details on many of these things--that the guard
force may have a certain view that, ``hey, being a federal
employee is a great thing because you get this, that, and the
other,'' and actually there are some unintended consequences.
So in my view, unless there is a hugely obvious benefit
that seems to override a variety of things, reorganizing or
restructuring are things that should only be done with very
careful deliberation. I know Glenn has done the spade work on
this, and I will ask you to follow up.
Mr. Podonsky. If you will indulge me, Congressman, this
actually stems with a conversation that started with former
Secretary Spence Abraham, former Deputy Secretary Frank Blake,
General John Gordon, myself, and Clay Sell was in on the
conversation at one point, and what it was is, Secretary
Abraham, at the time, said he wanted to take a look at how to
improve security posture of the Department of Energy in a post-
9/11 environment. This was 2003.
And I had put on the table the option of looking at
federalization of the guard force. And I put it on the table
for the Department to take a serious look to see whether or not
security posture of the Department would be improved by
federalizing the force. And there were a number of joint
studies done by both contractors in the field, managers, staff,
and our staff at headquarters, and the conclusion was that
security posture would not be improved.
And the guard force unions, who I work with closely, saw
this as an opportunity, and rightfully so, to create a career
path for themselves, so as they got older they had a place to
go, because maybe they were not any longer in physical
condition to meet the standards of a security officer. So the
conclusion that Under Secretary D'Agostino and I came with is
that the federalization was not the answer.
Well, what we have done is I have started another group to
evolve the guard unions across the complex to involve my policy
people, my overseers, to find the alternatives that would meet
the challenge of improving the Guard security for their own job
security, and also meet the challenge that we originally had in
2003 to improve the security posture.
One of the things we did was come up with what we called a
``security elite force,'' so that would help improve the
security posture. But the federalization as a whole, our
conclusion was that it would not improve the posture for the
amount of money that would be spent to change the entire
construct of the Department.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Podonsky, I don't think there has been a hearing where
you have been present where I have been here where I haven't
said something about my concern for security, but for our
facilities and our weapons, so I just wanted to turn to that. I
appreciate your diligence and your commitment, but I remain
concerned and I would appreciate your continued efforts to keep
us informed of ways that we can close any gaps that may exist.
I know you are transitioning from a Design Based Threat
security policy to a Graded Security Protection policy, and
should in the future learn more of that, and also ways in which
we can make a difference, because, as I said in my opening
statement, we do not have a margin of error in the issue of
security. And Mr. D'Agostino and I have also had that
conversation, so thank you for your efforts there.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
We are going to go ahead and finish at 4:30, and I just
wanted to see if Mr. Langevin or Mr. Heinrich had another round
of questions.
Mr. Langevin for five minutes?
Mr. Langevin. Sure.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Langevin for five minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Going back on the stewardship program, if I could, one of
the questions I wanted to get to was, would our ratification of
a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty change any of the current plans
for the program? If so, could you describe how?
Mr. D'Agostino. Sure. Certainly. Yes, it would change our
plans. It would, in fact, reinforce the fact that we need to
bring our science and technology infrastructure, if you will,
which--people facilities, experimental tools--actually start
using our tools in the way they were meant to be used. Mr.
Heinrich talked about the--we are doing about 80 percent of
what we could do on one shift on the Z machine; we would want
to do, quite frankly, two shifts' worth of shots on Z to get
that experimental data out.
If ratification of CTBT comes forward as we expect, we will
be putting forward a program that will fully utilize these
machines. So it will be increased effort. That will present
some technical challenges because, you know, we are now going
to be shifting from a ``build the capability'' to actually
``use the capability.'' and then the next step is analyze the
results of that data and get ourselves down into this ability
to do what has been termed ``predictive science,'' which is an
art right now, and not quite yet at the science level. So----
Mr. Langevin. I guess you kind of lost me. But why wouldn't
you do that absent ratification of the treaty?
Mr. D'Agostino. Well, what we are doing right now is, we
would need to do that absent because right now we have to
maintain that policy of no underground testing, but we are not
getting--in other words, without the--the problem that we have
had in the past, quite frankly, is this national consensus, you
know, an agreement, in effect, between the Administration, the
Executive Branch, the international community, and, you know,
what I call nongovernmental organizations--that national
consensus. And frankly, it goes to a global consensus in some
respects, and the national consensus on our strategic posture.
And not having that has made running this program very
difficult. We have had greater than $600 million shifts, you
know, as that program of record to submit up and gets debated
in Congress, and whenever you have that kind of shift and you
have those kind of deltas, it makes it very hard for the
program to be successful. I think we have a real opportunity,
frankly, to get to this national consensus. We are not quite
there yet. I think we are on the cusp of it.
I mean, there will be debates whether or not we took the
stockpile size down too much or not enough, or whether our
reserve capability on warheads is too big or too small, or
whether we have too many scientists or engineers or not, and
some people will debate that. But I go back to kind of the
legwork that has happened here on this document, as it informs
the Nuclear Posture Review, that will clearly demonstrate the
need for reinvestment in our facilities and in our people and
to fully utilize that.
And I guess maybe I have been--I am going to call it
stymied--in the past on getting these increases, but I see this
as kind of like a running back. You know, a fullback--block
fullback--in front, making sure that all issues are out on the
table for us to debate, and then once the debaters are done
then we move out, because frankly, the people, as we talked
about earlier, are getting older; they are getting mixed
signals. They are getting mixed signals. And they end up
wondering, you know, ``What are we doing here?'' It strains
budget, from that standpoint.
Mr. Langevin. Before my time runs out, can you tell me--
look into Russia, what is NNSA doing to ensure that as it
expands the scope of its nonproliferation programs, existing
programs with Russia remain a cooperative endeavor, and the
U.S.-Russia nonproliferation partnership continues to address
our remaining work in Russia and other possible opportunities
for nonproliferation cooperation?
Mr. D'Agostino. We are doing a lot in that area, sir. Mr.
Baker, who is here behind me, just came back recently from a
trip to reinforce, talk to his counterparts. We have a whole
series of deputy directors. And we are also--Tom, in the
Russian and customs service and in the military, where we have
ongoing problems, to do security upgrades, do vulnerability
assessments, to do sustainability projects. We are identifying
not only those--making sure that those partnerships are--
continue on, but we are looking at opportunities to develop new
areas for work with Russia.
I will give you some examples here on the research reactor
conversion. Russia has a number of research reactors in country
that have highly enriched uranium (HEU), so we are looking at a
joint partnership where both U.S. and Russia have a domestic
reactor conversion effort to take advantage of the fact that if
we are going to have the rest of the world convert to research
reactors from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU), we ought to be
doing the same thing.
So in fact, I see expanded work with Russia out into the
future, and I see our programs shifting a little bit toward not
just the U.S. paying, but a cost-share approach. And we have
examples of where Russia, in certain parts of our program, has
picked up the load, quite frankly, on sustainability. Once we
have done the upgrade, they have picked up the responsibility
for doing the sustainability, or carrying it out for the
future, and we get to check and see how they are doing. So I
see a lot more work, sir, in that area.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Thornberry, do you have a second round?
Mr. Thornberry. Madam Chair, may I follow up?
I was a little confused in your testimony. At one point it
says that the U.S. and Russia have reached agreement on
disposition of excess plutonium; in another point, it kind of
sounds to me like it is still in negotiations and expect to
complete negotiations this summer.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. We may have made it confusing,
unfortunately. There is a joint technical statement where we
have agreed in principle--I think it was in end of 2007 that--
where we basically said, we agree on the--this is the 34 metric
tons question----
Mr. Thornberry. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino [continuing]. And we agreed in principle on
how each country was going to do it, but what we needed to do
was upgrade what is known as the Plutonium Disposition
Management Agreement, or, Plutonium Management Disposition
Agreement. That agreement is one of the elements of what Mr.
Baker's trip was to work out the exact words that the two
presidents can sign in July.
And so there is the technical piece of the program, where
everybody that actually does the work says, ``It is a done
deal. We are ready to go.'' We want the two presidents to sign
the agreement in July, and then that actually commits both
countries, frankly, to now let us follow up and do it.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. And are we paying for their plutonium
disposition?
Mr. D'Agostino. The commitment on behalf of the United
States is, if appropriated, $400 million. This is money that
was appropriated in the past. I think about $200 million or so
that was appropriated in the past, most of that was retracted
last year. But we are only paying for a portion of it, quite
frankly, because the plutonium--they are going to have to do a
lot--put out a lot more of their own capital to do it, and they
are planning on doing it via their fast reactor disposition
programs.
So the $400 million the U.S. would be committed to would
help but would not take it all the way. And frankly, I am okay
with that because, you know, Russia is a different country now
than it was 10 years ago when the agreement was----
Mr. Thornberry. We have been dealing with this for 10
years, so that is why I have--so the $400 million is a cap----
Mr. D'Agostino. The $400 million----
Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. On how much we would pay?
Mr. D'Agostino. The $400 million is the amount we would
pay, yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Mr. Heinrich for five minutes.
Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to go to the B61, which I think was touched on a
little bit in the report. But even given the uncertainties in
our overall strategic posture, it seems like some sort of Life
Extension Program or refurbishment program for that should be a
priority. How does that fit into the next year's budget?
Mr. D'Agostino. The way it fits in is to finish--it does
fit in the next year's budget, for one. Two is, our focus in
next year's budget is to do--I will use this term--it is called
a ``phase 2-A study,'' which is a cost, scope, and schedule
study on exactly what we are going to do by when and how much
is it going to cost.
It is actually the completion of an effort we started in
2009, and on the--you know, again, when the strategic posture
review comes out--the Nuclear Posture Review comes out, I am
sorry--I am hoping that it has enough definition with respect
to the B61, because General Chilton and I believe that this
warhead--you know, whether ultimately, 15 years from now, it
goes away, it is not on the good path between zero and 15
years. I mean, I don't--you know, we have to do work on that
warhead.
Mr. Heinrich. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. And so the question will be, okay, let us
say it goes away in 15 or 20 years, then that helps inform the
study to say, ``Well, let us just do enough work to get us
through that time phase, period.'' That is why we need to do
the study in 2010.
Once the study is completed----
Mr. Heinrich. That will be done this fiscal year?
Mr. D'Agostino. It will be done into the next fiscal year,
because what we are going to be looking at is, you know,
whether we just do a nonnuclear replenishment--just change out
those nonnuclear parts--or whether we actually have to get into
the nuclear package itself because of aging of components and
other things. And there is also the desire, I think, on the
part--certainly on my part, and I believe on the part of the
subcommittee and others--that where we can insert improved
safety and security without substantially changing, that we
ought to take advantage of that opportunity. And in fact, that
is where Sandia comes in, is it provides the details there.
Mr. Heinrich. Right. Thank you.
Dr. Triay, I want to ask you a quick question. I don't know
if you remember us meeting in Santa Fe a few years ago----
Dr. Triay. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Heinrich [continuing]. But I wanted to ask what you are
doing to address the natural resource damage issues at DOE and
NNSA facilities like Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)?
Dr. Triay. I have been working closely with NNSA on this
particular issue, and the reason is that--matter, I feel that
while the cleanup is going on, to the extent that we can
address some of the issues, that ultimately we will come out of
assessing the damages after the cleanup is done, we actually
can do a lot better. So I firmly believe that we have to work--
NNSA and the Environmental Management program--need to work
together to ensure that anything that can be identified while
we are in the cleanup phase, that we work in partnership with
the Tribal Nations, the state, so that we can get ahead of,
ultimately, having to assess the damages at the end.
So you have my commitment that, in my case, if confirmed, I
will continue to work in a very close manner with NNSA on the
Los Alamos issue.
Mr. Heinrich. So you are saying you understand the
advantage of a parallel track as opposed to a Rocky Flats
situation where you do one and then try to figure out how you
figure out the other one when you have changed the data and----
Dr. Triay. Absolutely, sir. I definitely do understand
that, and I am very committed to that approach.
Mr. Heinrich. Great. Thank you.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much. We are about to be
called for three votes--the last votes of the day.
I want to thank our witnesses, Dr. Triay, Administrator
D'Agostino, Mr. Podonsky, thank you very much, and the people
behind you who do such great work for this country, and the
people behind them, and the people behind them. [Laughter.]
Thank you for your service. Thank you for informing the
committee as well as you have, and we will look forward to
talking to you again soon.
Hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
May 13, 2009
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 13, 2009
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 13, 2009
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. D'Agostino. The Nuclear Security Enterprise--Integration
Council (NSE-IC) is a team of senior weapons contractor managers from
the eight NNSA sites established to work on difficult projects/
assignments that require more than one site to accomplish. The Council
was chartered in August of 2006. The following are some of the
accomplishments achieved during the last three years of operation:
Successfully completed 90% of the Multi-site Targets
identified by NNSA as critical mission essential milestones for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program in fiscal year (FY) 2007, 100% in FY 2008
and expect to complete 90% in FY 2009;
Each year the council has identified initiatives that are
not incentivized that enable additional collaboration and resultant
improvements between sites. Some examples are:
Establishing a ``Code Blue'' process across all sites to
enable forming teams to address/solve difficult problems
quickly;
Performing a ``Macro-Baseline Benchmarking'' of each of
NNSA's site management and operations contractors to enable
identification of improvement opportunities at sites;
During FY 2009, completed additional scope projects
beyond those planned through increased efficiency of nearly $100M
across the Nuclear Security Enterprise; and
Chartered in FY 2009, the Nuclear Security Enterprise's
Field Council, was built upon lessons learned from the NSE-IC to
further enable changes/improvements. This Field Council has a chairman
and the members are the eight NNSA Site Office Managers. These two
councils have met several times to date and are jointly working to
increase the overall operational efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA.
[See page 21.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 13, 2009
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER AND MR. LANGEVIN
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. How would you characterize your
confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United
States' nuclear stockpile? Please describe any issues that might erode
that confidence over time.
Mr. D'Agostino. Overall NNSA's confidence in the safety, security,
and reliability of the stockpile is adequate, but faces challenges as
mentioned in the Annual Assessments to the President from the National
Laboratory Directors and Commander, USSTRATCOM. Most of the stockpile
weapons have greatly exceeded their originally expected in-stockpile
lifetimes of 20 years. NNSA applies knowledge gained through
surveillance and weapon assessments to identify issues and judge the
stockpile's ability to meet the mission without nuclear testing.
Safety and security features of the weapons continue to meet their
original designed requirements. However, technological advances and
less stringent military requirements since the end of the cold war have
created opportunities to introduce safety enhancements into the weapons
such as those recommended by the Drell Commission. The DoD and NNSA
continue to maintain our highest standards of procedural safeguard to
supplement each weapon's particular safety features. Security of
nuclear weapons is confronted with an ever-evolving threat and
capabilities that ever-improving technologies offer potential
adversaries. The DoD and NNSA continuously respond by upgrading our
site, facility, and transportation safeguards to counter the potential
threat capabilities. However, upgrading the internal weapon safety and
security features requires redesign and production of certain weapon
components. The most effective safety and security implementation can
be achieved through a comprehensive redesign.
Many of our nuclear weapons have small performance margins as a
legacy of the Cold War drive to maximize yield and minimize weight.
This weapon design margin degrades with time. Furthermore, uncertainty
in the reliability of components grows with time. This combination
reduces our confidence in stockpile performance over time and can
impose performance limitations. The DoD and NNSA work together to
procedurally alleviate, to the extent possible, any resulting
performance limitations until a warhead condition can be corrected by a
weapon repair, alteration, or refurbishment. NNSA has put greater
emphasis on the evaluation of aging-related degradation to performance
margins; however, there remain many investment opportunities for new
diagnostic capabilities to identify, characterize, and monitor the
aging trends. Surveillance is essential to prevent uncertainty from
eroding our ability to remain confident in the assessed health of the
stockpile today and our ability to predict issues that would prevent a
positive assessment in the future.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What steps does NNSA plan to pursue
to maintain the safety, security and reliability of current stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. The change in the global security environment and
the manner in which nuclear weapons fulfill their deterrence role
promotes introducing enhanced weapons safety, security, and reliability
not possible during the Cold-War era. Rather than simply duplicate the
manufacturing of the weapon as it was originally designed in the 1970s
and 1980s, NNSA will seek to build a consensus with national leadership
that investments in nuclear weapon safety and surety enhancements are
in the best interests of national policy and the public. The 2009
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will provide the most immediate
opportunity to reflect this consensus. The weapons program budgets for
that portion of the stockpile recommended for retention, which should
also reflect this consensus. In addition, NNSA will continuously assess
the health of the stockpile and identify critical performance
parameters and knowledge gaps that require resolution. NNSA must make
commensurate investments in science, engineering, and manufacturing to
better understand these parameters and gaps and to implement design
solutions when aging issues arise--ultimately producing the tools and
capabilities to maintain the stockpile as it ages.
As long as the United States requires a nuclear deterrent, we must
maintain the capabilities required to sustain our deterrent. We need to
recruit and sustain the skilled scientists, engineers, and technicians
required to solve the key challenges in science-based stewardship, and
we need to maintain the stockpile in a manner that ensures our ability
to support the deterrent without testing. Life extension programs
(LEPs) ensure confidence in long-term stockpile effectiveness
(reliability and performance) and provide opportunities to increase
weapon margin and incorporate enhanced safety and security features
into warheads. Life extension activities will not create new military
capabilities, do not require nuclear testing, do not require new
production of fissile materials, and do not add impetus to others'
proliferation. Our ability to enhance the margin, safety, and security
of the stockpile, however, is limited by restricting LEP work to only
warhead refurbishment. LEPs should be considered on a case-by-case
basis as recommended by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic
Posture of the United States. Effective stockpile management could
allow policy makers to further reduce the size of the stockpile,
particularly those warheads maintained in reserve as a hedge against
risk. We must base each LEP on technical considerations regarding the
best approach to meet stated objectives including assured long-term
reliability and enhancing America's nuclear security. Furthermore, to
meet these objectives, NNSA must recapitalize the infrastructure to
provide modern, safe, secure, and efficient facilities.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Are there limits on Stockpile Life
Extension Programs in terms of their scope, and ability to meet
military requirements? Are these technical, operational, regulatory,
statutory, or a combination? Please give examples.
Mr. D'Agostino. Life extension programs (LEPs) ensure confidence in
long-term stockpile effectiveness (reliability and performance) and
provide opportunities to increase weapon margin and incorporate
enhanced safety and security features into warheads. Life extension
activities will not create new military capabilities, do not require
nuclear testing, do not require new production of fissile materials,
and do not add impetus to others' proliferation. Our ability to enhance
the margin, safety, and security of the stockpile is limited by
restricting LEP work to only warhead refurbishment.
The current approach to legacy stockpile sustainment through
refurbishment is focused on minimum excursions from the original design
which imposes technical limits on what can be done to the weapons
during refurbishment. A fundamental objective of the refurbishment
approach is to meet the original military requirements that were
established with the DoD. Most of the legacy warheads were highly
optimized systems, trading margin for more yield and reduced weight,
and all were validated by nuclear testing.
Refurbishments are becoming increasingly more difficult and costly
in order to replicate materials and outdated or non-operational
processes and technologies that were used to meet original warhead
specifications. In some instances, regulatory limits affect the LEP
approach. Some materials or processes have been eliminated because they
were hazardous and are not available in industry due to increased
regulatory constraints and costs. Each refurbishment introduces changes
that take the designs further from the tested configurations, with
increases in uncertainty. As these designs continue to evolve, NNSA's
ability to ensure confidence in the legacy stockpile's safety and
reliability over the long-term will depend even more on a robust and
successful stockpile stewardship program and a viable peer-review
process.
Some specific challenges include eliminating the use of beryllium
due to health and environmental concerns and moving toward the use of
insensitive high explosives or other safety enhancements. These provide
significant technical challenges that will require considerable weapon
redesign. Furthermore, replacing archaic electronics and other sunset
technologies will inherently improve performance for certain
components. Opponents of the nuclear weapons program have characterized
these changes, which are essential to sustaining nuclear security, as
new military capability even though the weapon continues to fulfill the
same mission need. This further highlights the need for a national
consensus on maintaining credible deterrent and improving nuclear
security as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The NNSA has said it will rely on
initiatives such as facility and staffing reduction and new business
practices to pay for transformation of the existing nuclear security
complex. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States expressed doubt that complex
transformation could be funded without budget increases. The commission
further argued that additional staffing reductions in the laboratories
could erode the core competencies of the labs and the complex overall.
To what extent do you believe that cost savings from facility and
staffing reduction, business process improvements, and materials
consolidation can help pay for complex modernization? If such
reductions will pay only for part of modernization, from where will
NNSA draw the remainder of the required funds?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA originally planned to implement
transformation within our budget projections, assuming that savings
from early transformation actions (e.g., supply chain management
improvements, special nuclear material (SNM) consolidation, non-nuclear
production transformation at our Kansas City Plant, and test facility
consolidation) were available to be reinvested. This approach included
paying for transformation through a combination of the following:
Infrastructure savings through major footprint
reductions, replacement of buildings that are long past their economic
lifetimes, and updated cost-sharing models for work-for-others
customers;
Reduced overhead costs through contract reforms, improved
risk management strategies, greater business practice uniformity,
improvements in product assurance processes, and commodity purchase
savings through a supply chain management center; and,
Reductions in staff supporting weapons activities through
attrition and possibly through reassignment to other national security
missions.
The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture articulates
the current complex transformation funding condition in their report.
The report states, ``The physical infrastructure is in serious need of
transformation and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
has a reasonable plan to do so but lacks the needed funding.'' Due to
continued flat budgets (20% loss of buying power since 2005).
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The NNSA has said it will rely on
initiatives such as facility and staffing reductions and new business
practices to pay for transformation of the existing nuclear security
complex. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States expressed doubt that complex
transformation could be funded without budget increases. The commission
further argued that additional staffing reductions in the laboratories
could erode the core competencies of the labs and the complex overall.
To what extent are the design specifications for the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility and the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) facility dependent on the size of the nuclear
weapons stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. The CMRR and UPF facilities are designed to house
the minimum equipment necessary to perform plutonium and uranium
processes. Both facilities are ``capability based designs''. The size
of the facilities and the amount of equipment is driven by the number
of unique processing steps, operations and missions required, not by
the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The same tools and equipment
needed to make a single CSA in UPF, for example, could be used to make
up to the planned number of CSAs per year and meet the non-production
missions assigned to UPF. For CMRR, the same process equipment provides
the scientific support functions for fabricating pits at the rate
specified in the requirements for the facility. For both facilities,
any reduction in this equipment would disable the ability to conduct
some or all of the missions. CMRR and UPF also support other defense
missions, such as weapons surveillance, certification, and quality
assurance as well as non-weapons programs such as providing feedstock
for making naval fuel and for supporting disassembly and disposition of
highly enriched uranium for non-proliferation missions.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine
alternatives for managing protective forces at all NNSA and Department
sites with special nuclear material. The committee understands that the
NNSA has concluded that federalizing protective forces is not
desirable.
What steps does the NNSA plan to take to improve and make more
consistent the management of protective forces throughout the nuclear
security complex?
Mr. D'Agostino. On March 31, 2009, the Office of Health, Safety and
Security (HSS) commissioned a study to examine realistic and reasonable
options for improving the career opportunities and retirement prospects
of protective force members while maintaining, within current and
anticipated budgetary constraints, a robust and effective security
posture. The Protective Force Career Options Initiative Study Group
consisted of senior representatives from HSS, the Office of Defense
Nuclear Security (DNS), and other Departmental organizations. The goal
of this group was to find ways to overcome problems that prevent
protective force members from working to a normal retirement age, and
accruing reasonable retirement benefits. The study identified 29
recommendations for consideration that the Department is currently
evaluating. These recommendations addressed issues ranging from the
classification of Security Police Officers (as ``offensive'' or
``defensive'' combatants), through the implementation of current
physical and medical requirements, to proposals for a large-scale
revamping of the retirement structure for both disability and age-
related retirements. The recommendations included a number of measures
aimed at increasing the employment options available for protective
force members, who through age or injury, are confronted by a premature
end to their protective force careers. The study also addressed a
variety of ``quality of life'' issues for protective force members,
including arrest authority, uniforms, and equipment. The first 14
recommendations were viewed by the Study Group as being appropriate to
existing budgets and structures, and the last 15 will require
additional resources, change in governance, or both. A central theme
emerged from the study: the expectations placed upon protective force
personnel should be clearly related to job requirements, and wherever
demands are placed upon an individual's tactical skills and physical
capabilities, those demands should be matched by training opportunities
sufficient to support the maintenance of those capabilities. The
anticipated contribution of these recommendations will improve the
longevity and career potential of individual protective force members
and enhance the potential contribution to the Department and its
programs. Every positive step toward improving the career environment
of protective force members improves morale; and contributes to making
our forces more efficient and effective. By creating incentives for
individuals to enter a protective force career and then remain in the
Department's security community for a lifetime of service, the
Department minimizes the significant costs associated with hiring,
vetting, and training protective force members.
Additionally, DNS initiated a Zero-Based Security Review (ZBSR) of
the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) physical security
and management oversight programs, in partnership with HSS. The pilot
effort of this review was conducted from July 7 through July 24, 2009,
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The purpose of the ZBSR is to
determine how NNSA meets its security obligations, with an emphasis on
improving cost-efficiency while simultaneously maintaining an effective
security posture that incorporates sound principles of risk management.
The protective force portion of the ZBSR focuses on improving the
implementation of Federal management and contractor oversight
requirements. It also focuses on developing a solid methodology for
driving cost and activity transparency, cross-site consistency, and
comparability among the diverse sites throughout the Nuclear Security
Enterprise (NSE) that have similar protection missions. This will lead
to increased consistency and more effective management of protective
force operations, as well as more effective allocation of the limited
budgetary resources available to the safeguards and security (S&S)
program. By balancing funding with performance expectations, DNS will
improve the consistency, effectiveness, and efficiency of its security
program in general, and within the protective force program in
particular. The result will be a set of recommendations to improve the
quality of oversight management functions and/or to realign oversight
activities to achieve better balance of Federal responsibilities and
contractor authority for execution of the NNSA site security program.
Additionally, DNS will develop supplemental guidance to assist NNSA
sites in implementing S&S directives in a cost-efficient and effective
manner.
DNS is also pursuing alternative ways to enhance and improve
protective force operational efficiency and effectiveness, including:
Enterprise-wide standardization of select S&S equipment
Establishing a common sourcing and procurement mechanism
to acquire protective force items
NNSA is utilizing the Kansas City Plant's Supply Chain Management
Center (SCMC), operated by Honeywell FM&T, which is a strategic
sourcing organization that leverages NNSA's purchasing power across its
contractor sites to obtain reduced pricing, better delivery, increased
quality, and improved service. The objective of the SCMC is to
transform the Management and Operating contractors' acquisition process
to a strategically integrated function that ensures maximum value for
every acquisition and will assist in protective force equipment
standardization throughout the NSE.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 NDAA also directed NNSA
to conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed
to the nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed
against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in
which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the
weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future
Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).
Is the NNSA working on this assessment and report?
Mr. D'Agostino. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has
completed a Physical Security Technology Management Plan that is in
final coordination with DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security
(HSS). This plan was developed to address the physical security portion
of the NDAA amendment. It describes the defined processes currently
used by NNSA to identify, deploy, and sustain physical security
technologies, along with supporting rationale for the physical security
technology-related budget requests in the FYNSP submittal to Congress.
The plan identifies existing physical security technologies currently
deployed at NNSA sites; describes the prioritization process used by
NNSA sites to request new or replacement technologies; and specifies
the funding strategy to address the requests.
The Cyber Security Technology Management Plan has been completed
and is currently under review by NNSA leadership, HSS, and the DOE
Chief, Information Officer. The plan was developed to address the cyber
security section of the FY 2009 NDAA amendment. The content of the plan
provides an overview of the current processes for the deployment and
sustainment of cyber security technologies. The plan also provides
information on future program technology enhancements which are
requested as part of the FYNSP submittal to Congress. The plan covers
existing and future cyber technologies, the prioritization of processes
and procedures used by NNSA sites for the development, and enhancement
of technologies and the funding strategy to address the requests.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What are NNSA's highest
nonproliferation priorities? What are the primary areas of progress and
the main challenges facing NNSA nonproliferation efforts?
Mr. D'Agostino. What are our highest priorities? The overarching
mission of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is to
prevent the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
including the necessary materials, technology and expertise. NNSA's
comprehensive nonproliferation programs help to deny unauthorized
access to fissile materials and nuclear weapons technology. Specific
efforts include ensuring adequate nuclear material control and
accounting, and physical protection, at nuclear sites worldwide,
strengthening international safeguards and tightening controls on
international transfers, and programs for removing, dispositioning, and
monitoring excess nuclear materials.
We have made much progress meeting these priorities through the
cooperative partnerships that NNSA has developed with over 130 country
partners across the globe that work in 19 specialized nuclear security
activities. We have completed material protection, control and
accounting upgrades at 93% of Russian nuclear material and warhead
sites of concern; converted or shutdown 64 reactors in 32 countries
from the use of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium; and
returned over 910 kgs of Russian-origin nuclear material and over 1,215
kgs of U.S.-origin nuclear materials; and secured vulnerable nuclear
and radiological materials at over 570 buildings worldwide.
A primary challenge now will be ensuring the necessary resources,
staff, and international partnerships required to help implement the
President's nonproliferation strategy, including securing all
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years, as outlined
in the President's April 5, 2009 speech in Prague.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. NNSA plans for fissile materials
disposition have slowed in recent years, first as a liability dispute
between the U.S. and Russia delayed work, and later as Congress
expressed reservations about proceeding with construction of the U.S.
MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. Most
recently, the FY 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding
for the MOX facility and transferred funding for the facility from
NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program to the Office of
Nuclear Energy. However, the FY 2010 budget request restores funding
for the MOX facility and reflects a transfer of all funding for the
facility back to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. What is the current
status of construction of the MOX facility and what is the timeline for
completion?
Mr. D'Agostino. Overall the project is 35% complete and
construction is 18% complete. Design, procurement and construction
activities are proceeding on schedule and within budget. Eight of the
seventeen auxiliary buildings needed to support construction and
operation of the MOX facility have been finished, including the
recently completed MOX Administration Building. At the MOX Process
Building, more than 53,000 cubic yards of reinforced concrete, 50,000
cubic yards of unreinforced concrete, and 11,000 tons of rebar have
been installed. Operations are scheduled to begin at the MOX facility
in 2016.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is the status of outstanding
issues with Russia relating to the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials
Disposition program, and what are the plans to move the program forward
in a manner that is consistent with the program's nonproliferation
objectives?
Mr. D'Agostino. The United States and Russia reached agreement in
principle on the text of a Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). While this would update
the PMDA for both sides' programs, the major change is that Russia's
program will now be entirely (instead of partially) based on the use of
``fast'' reactors. This is the only program consistent with Russia's
nuclear energy strategy, and the amendment accordingly adds appropriate
nonproliferation conditions (e.g., that the BN-800 is operated as a
plutonium burner and the plutonium breeding blanket is removed from the
BN-600). The text of the Protocol is currently being confirmed and
reviewed by both governments. No significant substantive issues have
been raised to date, and both sides are seeking to complete approval
for signature early this fall.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. In recent years, the committee has
emphasized its strong concern with the use of fast reactors under the
Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program and has conveyed
its expectation that NNSA pursue a disposition path for Russia's
surplus weapons-grade plutonium which ensures that any reactors used
under the program do not produce plutonium and include necessary
monitoring and inspection controls. What is the status of NNSA's
efforts in this regard?
Mr. D'Agostino. As part of the agreement in principle on the text
of a Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition
Agreement (PMDA), Russia will dispose of all of its surplus weapon-
grade plutonium in fast reactors with certain nonproliferation
conditions. These conditions include: the removal of the plutonium
breeding blanket in the BN-600 fast reactor; the operation of the BN-
800 fast reactor with a breeding ratio of less than one and;
restrictions on reprocessing disposed plutonium and prohibition on
creation of new stockpiles of separated weapons-grade plutonium from
any other materials that will be irradiated in the reactors that will
be used for disposition. With regard to monitoring and inspections
(M&I), the United States and Russia have agreed in principle on the key
elements of a PMDA M&I regime. Among other things, the M&I regime will
confirm that each country is disposing of 34 metric tons (MT) of
weapon-grade plutonium and that none of the 34 MT is being reprocessed
during the disposition period or thereafter unless under agreed
international monitoring. Once the M&I key elements have been approved
by the governments, U.S. and Russian experts will begin consultations
with the International Atomic Energy Agency about its willingness to
participate in such a regime.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. In recent years, the committee has
conducted vigorous oversight of the Global Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. The GIPP program's engagement
activities with former WMD scientists clearly serve important U.S.
nonproliferation interests by helping to impede the transfer of WMD
expertise and know-how to states of concern or terrorist entities. But
the program has also been criticized in past years for contributing to
national security risks involving Iran. In response, NNSA reports that
it has taken various actions to strengthen the management,
implementation and oversight of the program. Please elaborate on these
recent actions.
Mr. D'Agostino. As set forth in former Secretary Samuel Bodman's
letter of October 2, 2008, DOE/NNSA conducted a thorough review of all
project payments since GIPP's inception in 1994 and determined that the
program has operated in conformance with U.S. law and policy and that
there is no basis for the assertion that it has contributed to national
security risks involving Iran. Furthermore, new management controls and
new and strengthened interagency review procedures are now in place.
In direct response to concerns raised by Congress, the U.S.
interagency established a committee to review nuclear and missile
technology-related scientist engagement proposals and projects under
the guidance of the National Security Council. Chaired by the
Department of State, the committee includes representatives of the
Departments of Energy and Defense as well as the intelligence
community. The committee establishes a unified policy for U.S.
scientist engagement activities and is intended to prevent any work
from being funded that is inconsistent with U.S. policy.
With headquarters and national laboratory oversight, GIPP assesses
each project for proliferation potential and monitors projects
throughout their lifecycle in order to maintain project and program
integrity. Moreover, the program has hired an additional national
laboratory specialist specifically to enhance the review process for
participating scientists and to improve documentation of the reviews.
As the GIPP Report to Congress required by Section 3116 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 details, GIPP
has refined its overall programmatic approach to: (1) focus on
scientists at facilities rated as high priority, based on an
interagency assessment of proliferation risk; (2) develop multiple
avenues for scientist engagement, such as industry partnerships that
foster sustainability and leverage private sector resources as well as
cooperative research and development programs and training efforts, and
(3) pursue cost-sharing activities for new projects in Russia. GIPP is
also pursuing potential cost-sharing opportunities with Ukraine,
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan for projects on nonproliferation nuclear
forensics.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. This committee has expressed its
concerns regarding the proliferation risks associated with the NNSA's
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP. What is the current status
of this program?
Mr. D'Agostino. DOE is no longer pursuing a domestic GNEP program
that includes consideration of near-term demonstrations and GNEP
facility construction. We have restructured GNEP-related research and
development (R&D) work into a long-term, science-based R&D program
within the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. And, for FY 2010 we are
proposing to incorporate this R&D under the Fuel Cycle R&D program.
The United States continues to support the objectives of the
international component of GNEP, which is comprised of 25 member
countries and is dedicated to the use of civil nuclear energy in ways
that advance safety, security and nonproliferation. The Department
continues to participate in the GNEP international meetings while the
subject of how best to achieve GNEP-international objectives undergoes
interagency review. We believe that proliferation issues should be a
priority in any discussions about the expanded use of civil nuclear
energy and, in particular, in discussions that relate to development,
deployment and operation of advanced fuel cycle technologies. Thus, the
Department remains engaged in international meetings and activities
that focus on developing strategies to ensure reliable nuclear fuel
services and to provide management options for spent fuel in a manner
that minimizes proliferation concerns.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. How much more does NNSA need to do
to secure and reduce all known and unsecured weapons-grade nuclear and
radiological material around the world, and what is the cost of the
remaining effort in this area? Please also submit something for the
record on this in classified form if necessary.
Mr. D'Agostino. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has made
great strides in its threat reduction activities and continues to focus
attention on locking down or removing vulnerable nuclear and
radiological materials as quickly as possible. To this end, GTRI is
working to:
convert or shut down 200 research reactors by 2020 (32%
completed to date--57 converted and 7 shut down)
remove 4610 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by
2016 (50% completed to date--2,300 kilograms of HEU removed to date);
and
complete security upgrades for 3,950 buildings with
vulnerable nuclear and radiological material by 2019 (14% completed to
date--573 high-priority nuclear and radiological buildings)
An additional $126.5 million above the current Future-Years Nuclear
Security Program (FYNSP) would allow acceleration of removal efforts
and support the President's goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear
materials around the world within four years.
The MPC&A Program has completed upgrades at all 73 Russian nuclear
warhead sites, and has completed upgrades at 87% of buildings
containing nuclear material in Russia and in several former Soviet
states. We expect to complete upgrades to the remaining buildings by
the end of 2012. The costs for the planned work are reflected in our
out-year budget profile. Additional upgrade needs may arise should gaps
in the protection strategies be identified or if new areas of
cooperation are proposed by the Russian side. Cost estimates would be
formulated subsequent to these circumstances.
The MPC&A Program has limited cooperation with countries outside of
the former Soviet Union. Since 2004, we have had a series of exchanges
with China on best practices for securing nuclear material. The MPC&A
Program is pursuing cooperation with India, but efforts to engage the
Government of India on this subject have generated little interest to
date. Given the uncertainty over whether cooperation will occur and its
scope, it is very difficult to estimate the costs at this time.
Canada is contributing to this effort by providing resources for
secure transportation of nuclear materials in Russia. Germany and Great
Britain are also working with Russia on physical protection of nuclear
material at select sites. Finally, Russia is contributing directly to
this effort by sharing the cost of securing their nuclear sites and
committing to sustain those upgrades for the long term.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is NNSA doing to expand and
strengthen the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the
International Nuclear Materials Protection & Cooperation (MPC&A)
programs?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA is accelerating work where possible and
reaching out to new and existing international partners.
GTRI is accelerating the removal and disposition of spent HEU fuel
in cases where there is no other reasonable disposition pathway.
Approval of a Revised Record of Decision will allow GTRI to return up
to 1,000 kilograms of HEU spent fuel not currently covered by other
GTRI removal programs.
In addition, GTRI has enhanced its ability to accelerate nuclear
material removal by expanding its methods of transporting Russian-
origin HEU spent nuclear fuel by air. Removal can now be accomplished
by using a combination of air, land, and sea transport.
The MPC&A Program has completed upgrades at approximately 80% of
sites in Russia containing vulnerable weapons-grade nuclear material
and at 12 sites in seven other former Soviet states. Additional
upgrades are underway or planned at a number of sites that improve
security further and address the evolving threat environment.
Additionally, the program continues to focus on ensuring that these
security upgrades will be sustained in the long-term through increased
cooperation on nuclear security training, encouraging effective nuclear
security culture, continuing education and regulatory development.
To address concerns about the security of weapons-grade nuclear
material in other parts of the world, the MPC&A Program has expanded
its engagement to include other declared and undeclared nuclear weapons
states on nuclear security best practices. Since 2004, the MPC&A
Program has cooperated with China to discuss nuclear security best
practices at civilian nuclear facilities to provide a first line of
defense against nuclear material theft and diversion. The MPC&A Program
is also pursuing MPC&A cooperation with India, but attempts to engage
on this subject have thus far generated little interest from the
Government of India.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The Nonproliferation and
International Security (NIS) program offers opportunities for robust
activity on major current WMD proliferation concerns, including:
activities to address proliferation concerns in Iran; engagement on
nonproliferation with Russia, China, India and other states; inter-
agency participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);
assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
cooperation on international safeguards and export controls in South
Asia and the Middle East; efforts to strengthen U.S. commitments to
international agreements and regimes; and the establishment of a
contingency fund for opportunities to prevent WMD proliferation and
terrorism that may arise. What is NNSA doing to expand and strengthen
this critical program?
Mr. D'Agostino. The President's Prague speech outlined three key
arms control and nonproliferation objectives: (1) a world free of
nuclear weapons; (2) strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty;
and (3) ensuring that terrorists are denied the materials, technology,
and expertise required to build a nuclear device. The NIS program is
making critical contributions to each of these areas:
NIS is directly involved in the negotiation of the START follow-on
treaty as it will be in talks on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty. We also are supporting Administration efforts to achieve U.S.
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by
ensuring a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile in the
absence of testing and supporting the elements necessary to monitor
compliance with the treaty.
NIS is working to develop mechanisms to provide reliable
access to nuclear fuel as a way to allow countries to benefit from the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of nuclear
proliferation associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies.
NIS is responsible for implementing a variety of programs
that work in concert to reduce the threat of terrorists obtaining the
materials, technologies or know-how necessary to develop nuclear
weapons:
NIS provides technical assessments of Iran's nuclear
capabilities, supports interdiction efforts by reviewing
foreign procurements and maintaining ``watch lists'' of
sensitive items, supports public diplomacy efforts through
targeted briefings, and develops tools and methods to
strengthen international safeguards.
NIS launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative
(NGSI) in 2008 to develop the policies, concepts, technologies,
expertise, and international infrastructure necessary to
sustain the international safeguards system as it evolves to
meet new challenges over the next 25 years.
NIS is working within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
to strengthen its guidelines for transfers of enrichment and
reprocessing (ENR) technologies based on a strong, criteria-
based approach that would only allow transfers to states with
impeccable nonproliferation credentials.
NIS contributes technical expertise and reach back
capabilities both to Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
exercises and to possible interdiction cases.
NIS supports the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security by
providing physical protection training and guidance development
for the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities
worldwide. NIS is leading the USG efforts supporting revision
of IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4.
The NIS International Nonproliferation Export Control
Program recently initiated new engagements with 10 countries
and 4 international organizations to promote improved export
control implementation, including the first-ever region-wide
effort to support implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1540 priorities on a regional basis.
The International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program
(INSEP) partners with approximately 20 countries globally, as
well as with regional organizations such as the Brazilian-
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material
(ABACC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) on
(1) civilian nuclear infrastructure arrangements that emphasize
safeguards and other nuclear security and nonproliferation
obligations of a nuclear aspirant and (2) cooperative
activities intended to strengthen the international safeguards
system. In 2010, the program plans to initiate safeguards
cooperation discussions with the Russian Federation,
Kazakhstan, and South Africa, among others.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is the status of NNSA's
contributions to dismantlement efforts in North Korea given the pause
in Six-Party Talks? What specifically is NNSA doing to prepare for
dismantlement and verification activities?
Mr. D'Agostino. Despite the current pause in the Six-Party Talks,
DOE/NNSA continues to contribute to the USG process to evaluate future
dismantlement and verification activities in North Korea. DOE/NNSA
provides technically informed policy advice to USG decision makers in
terms of the feasibility and appropriateness of various
denuclearization options under consideration.
DOE/NNSA also is continuing to develop tools and technologies and
plans and assessments for the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula not only for the verification of past DPRK nuclear activities
but also for any future dismantlement of nuclear facilities.
In order to be able to respond quickly to future denuclearization
opportunities in North Korea, DOE/NNSA is continuing to work during
this pause in the Six-Party process to further develop and refine our
response capabilities to undertake this important national security
objective.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The Nonproliferation and
Verification Research and Development (R&D) program is the sole
remaining U.S. government capability for long-term nuclear
nonproliferation research and development and other critical work that
helps keep the U.S. on the cutting edge of technology. The program has
also been thinly staffed in recent years and supports many U.S.
government entities outside of NNSA. What is NNSA doing to expand and
strengthen this program, with a particular focus on increasing the
qualified scientific workforce in this area and developing the capacity
to direct nuclear material origin and uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing?
Mr. D'Agostino. In the last year, we strengthened this program by
making the following staffing additions: we created new programs for
addressing emerging requirements for global nuclear safeguards and
radiological source replacement, and designated a full-time federal
program manager for these tasks; we created a new forensics program and
hired a full-time federal program manager and a full-time federal
supervisor for integrating proliferation detection programs; we took
advantage of using fellows from the Nonproliferation Graduate Program;
and we created a Chief Scientist position for better integration of
efforts across the program. Our cutting-edge, fundamental research at
the national laboratories attracts both experienced and new
researchers, thus enhancing the qualified scientific workforce in this
area.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The risk of terrorism involving WMD
is certainly not limited to the United States, and the success of U.S.
efforts is dependent in large part on whether our international
partners share a common recognition of the threat and willingness to
combat it. How is NNSA working with international partners to address
these risks? How are our international partners contributing to our
shared nonproliferation goals?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA works to build self-sustaining indigenous
capabilities. For example, the International Nonproliferation Export
Control Program (INECP) works with over 50 countries to combat illicit
trafficking through strengthened export controls and has successfully
transferred indigenous Commodity Identification Training capabilities
and responsibility to approximately 20 countries, which are now
conducting a state of the art training program on a self-sustaining
basis.
Additionally, we continue to support multilateral efforts, e.g.,
working with international partners to build capacities to support
their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
and other international agreements and arrangements; exchanging nuclear
security best practices with Russia, the United Kingdom and China; and
working with the IAEA to develop robust standards for ``appropriate and
effective'' material control and physical protection of nuclear
materials. NNSA's Office of Material Protection and Cooperation
contributed $1.2M as a voluntary contribution in fiscal year 2009 to
the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund
(NSF). The funding supports the continued development and
implementation of the IAEA's efforts to mitigate insider related
threats and address sustainability of nuclear materials security
programs.
The purpose of NNSA's cooperative engagement with the IAEA's NSF is
to give impetus to the role that material control and accounting plays
in protecting nuclear material from insider diversion. The funding will
support activities such as establishment of a joint working group on
material control and accounting (MC&A), establishment of an informal
exchange on sustainability best practices, an `Insider Mitigation'
course, and other technical projects.
Another venue for exchanging best practices will be through the
World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS). The goal of this effort,
initiated by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), in partnership with
the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), is to improve
the security of nuclear materials through the establishment of a new
organization for the exchange of information on and promulgation of
``best practices'' for the security of nuclear materials in nuclear
facilities and for nuclear materials during transportation.
The MPC&A Program is also promoting nuclear security through the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. By committing to the
Global Initiative, the United States and sixty-six other countries are
urged to ``develop, if necessary, and improve accounting, control and
physical protection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials
and substances.''
The success of the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program depends
upon a common recognition of the threat of nuclear terrorism and a
mutual commitment to long term successful operation of the systems
provided. Under the SLD Core program, DOE/NNSA provides radiation
detection equipment and training at border crossings, airports and
feeder seaports in countries of the FSU, East Europe and Central Asia.
Many countries with which the Core Program works do not have sufficient
funds to purchase or install equipment. However, in Russia, the Federal
Customs Service is funding the installation of radiation systems at
approximately half of all crossing points, and SLD is funding
installation at the other half. In Slovakia, SLD has provided
equipment, and the Slovakians have paid for most installation costs.
All countries bear the cost of manning and operating the equipment SLD
has installed.
Under the SLD Megaports Initiative, DOE/NNSA provides radiation
detection equipment and training at major seaports throughout the world
and employs cost sharing in the implementation process wherever
feasible and appropriate. An important result from cost-sharing is
often increased buy-in from the host government and terminal operator,
which offsets potential cost sharing risks related to schedule and
quality. Although no set formula for cost sharing is available, the
terminal operator or port authority often pays for design,
construction, engineering, installation, or a combination of those
costs. Cost sharing arrangements are site specific and negotiated
differently for each port.
The best example of Megaports cost sharing to date is demonstrated
by Dutch Customs in the Netherlands. In 2004, the Megaports Initiative
installed four RPMs at the European Container Terminal (ECT) Delta
Terminal at the Port of Rotterdam as part of a pilot demonstration for
Dutch Customs to demonstrate the feasibility of monitoring container
cargo. In 2007, Dutch Customs replaced the U.S. RPMs and installed 40
sets of RPMs to monitor all import and export containers at the Port of
Rotterdam. This $40M Dutch investment demonstrates the proof of concept
for successful cost-sharing and is the model for which the program is
striving. This cost sharing model has also proven successful in
Belgium, Colombia, Panama, Mexico and Israel, and is now underway at
two ports in Spain.
In addition, several international partners have made monetary
contributions to DOE/NNSA to support ongoing SLD projects in several
countries. Through FY 09, DOE/NNSA has received over $10M (US) from
international partners to support projects to deploy radiation
detection systems in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Canada, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea have all contributed to
SLD activities.
NNSA programs continue to enjoy financial support of international
partners (see chart of international donations below). International
partners have contributed $59 million to date. NNSA increasingly relies
on cost-sharing. For example, the Second of Line of Defense Program has
cost-shared with Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Belgium, Spain and Israel to
install radiation detection equipment. Cost-sharing can increase a
partner country's buy-in and strengthen their commitment as well as the
longer term sustainability of nonproliferation efforts.
The Chart below lists all international contributions to these
programs.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. With Russia's economic growth, has
it taken on more responsibility in funding nonproliferation programs
within its borders? How is NNSA working with our Russian partners to
move them toward ``cost sharing'' models?
Mr. D'Agostino. At every opportunity we encourage cost sharing of
new projects with our Russian counterparts, and have a long list of
successful examples. Furthermore, we recently developed a Joint
Transition Plan with Rosatom that identifies specific timelines for
each site to take over financial responsibility for sustainability-
related activities such as human resources development, regulations
development, performance testing and training.
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) informed us that it will take over
full financial responsibility for sustaining permanent warhead sites
(11 sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 18 sites with DOD-funded upgrades),
and that the Kremlin has promised necessary funds will be made
available.
Despite these positive developments, we can't be certain that
Russia's nuclear security budget is increasing as a result of declining
U.S. support because this budget is classified. Facilities may be asked
to allocate additional funds to compensate for reduced U.S. support.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. What is NNSA doing to address issues
of limited staff capacity, capabilities and resources, which have
created challenges for implementation of critical nonproliferation
programs in past years?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
(DNN) has generally been able to maintain staffing at roughly 90
percent of its authorized manpower ceiling. DNN has also economized a
bit on travel expenditures toward the end of the fiscal year. However,
NNSA has also given priority to personnel hiring in the
nonproliferation area, and has also provided additional funding for
international travel when required. The Nonproliferation Graduate
Program internships have provided an important pipeline of new Federal
employees that are well-versed in international relations and national
security studies, foreign languages and cross-cultural communications,
international negotiations, program management and interagency
coordination.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Some NNSA nonproliferation programs
have carried relatively large uncosted and/or unobligated balances in
past years. Do you expect any NNSA nonproliferation programs to have
significant uncosted unobligated balances in FY 2009? If so, please
describe the factors contributing to such balances. Please also
describe any progress by NNSA to limit uncosted unobligated balances
for nonproliferation programs and the rationale, if any, for
maintaining a certain level of such balances for these programs.
Mr. D'Agostino. Due to the fact that DNN works in 120 countries
around the world, there are some unique budgeting requirements. DNN
signs international contracts that typically take 18 to 24 months to
complete. In order to ensure proper oversight, DNN does not settle
invoices on international work until it has verified that the work has
been satisfactorily completed. Even with this rigorous evaluation of
completed work scope, at the end of FY 2008, the uncommitted balance
for DNN Programs was 13%, which is consistent with the Department's
threshold for uncosted balances. This positive trend is expected to
continue for FY 2009.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. In a January 2007 report to this
committee, GAO found that among other security challenges at LANL, the
Los Alamos Site Office lacked the security staff required to conduct
oversight of the LANL contractor, and that in many cases site officials
lacked proper training. From your perspective as Chief Health, Safety
and Security Officer for all of DOE, does the Los Alamos Site Office
have an adequate number of properly trained security officers?
Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS)
conducts periodic inspections to determine the status of safeguards and
security programs at DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) sites. During the conduct of these inspections, the HSS Office
of Independent Oversight does not generally focus on the specific
number of authorized staff but rather on the performance resulting from
the utilization of available staff at the sites. This is especially
true in regard to the assessment of Federal oversight of contractor
performance in specific sub-topical areas.
HSS Office of Independent Oversight reports in 2003 and 2007 did,
however, point out shortfalls in the Los Alamos Site Office's (LASO)
ability to effectively carry out its line management oversight
responsibilities due to unfilled LASO vacancies. For example, staffing
constraints played a large part in LASO's inability to conduct a
required annual safeguards and security site survey, which is a key
line management oversight mechanism for monitoring and driving
improvements in contractor performance. These inspection results,
coupled with the information provided to your committee by the 2007 GAO
report, suggest the LASO security function has been chronically
understaffed.
A special follow-up review conducted by the HSS Office of
Independent Oversight in February 2008 found that LASO had taken action
to improve its line management oversight function, which included
hiring a senior federal employee to serve as the manager of the
security oversight function, reporting directly to the LASO Manager.
LASO was also acting to expand its cyber security staff by hiring two
Cyber Security Operations Mangers and by adding three cyber security
support contractors.
NNSA is conducting an exhaustive Federal Oversight Zero-Based
Security Review to indentify where the consistency and quality of
Federal oversight functions can be improved. The review was held at
LANL and benchmarked LASO during its evaluation of Federal oversight. A
team of subject matter experts from the NNSA Service Center, HSS, and
several NNSA sites was formed to conduct the review. The team evaluated
four topical areas: Oversight, Staffing, Communications, and Program
Management. An evaluation of staffing resulted in an important
recommendation that NNSA ``Determine and right size the Safeguards and
Security staffing with appropriate number and capability/skill mix.''
In addition, NNSA has recognized the need to augment site office staff
with additional technical resources and has responded by forming a
Field Augmentation Cadre (FAC). The FAC provides the site offices with
access to security experts to assist in conducting surveys of
contractor operations and other assessment and benchmarking services.
HSS believes that NNSA is currently directing sufficient attention
toward resolving this longstanding deficiency at LASO and across the
NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act requires the GAO and then the NNSA to examine
alternatives for managing protective forces at all Department sites
with special nuclear material. Has the GAO contacted the Department
about this review? Will the Department conduct a concurrent review, or
wait for the GAO review, as the NDAA allows?
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Jonathan Gill, Assistant Director, GAO, conducted
an entrance briefing concerning the FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act (GAO Engagement 360953) on June 10, 2008. Mr. Gill
and his team have been in frequent contact with the Department since
then, and have conducted several field visits and conferences with the
NNSA program offices and other key stakeholders. The Department is
awaiting completion of the GAO review in accordance with the FY 2008
NDAA and will not conduct a concurrent review.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The committee understands NNSA has
established a new security policy--the Graded Security Protection
policy--to replace the Design Basis Threat (DBT). What prompted this
change in policy and how is it being implemented?
Mr. Podonsky. The Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), in
coordination with the Department of Energy (DOE) Program Office and the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), established the Graded
Security Protection (GSP) policy to replace the Design Basis Threat
(DBT) policy. Two critical factors influenced the revision: the
intelligence community's reassessment of the threat, and the need to
analyze and base protection postures on a broad array of possible
adversary attack scenarios as opposed to a focus on a single worst-case
scenario. The collaborative annual DBT policy review highlighted the
need to update the policy in terms of the risk management
considerations, which include factors such as the consequence posed by
the loss, theft, and/or unauthorized use of an asset; intelligence
pertaining to the current and future objectives and characteristics of
adversaries; and the effectiveness of the Department's and,
collectively, the Government's security and intelligence programs
relative to thwarting, providing early warning, and/or mitigating an
attack.
DOE/NNSA sites are currently analyzing their robust protection
postures against the GSP policy to evaluate the security measures
instituted at each site and identify any additional enhancements or
changes in protection postures necessary to appropriately implement the
2008 GSP. These detailed analyses will provide the basis for developing
site-specific implementations plans. These GSP implementation plans
will require the review and approval of the respective Program Office
to ensure that each plan reflects the Department's commitment to
developing protection postures that minimize the ``footprint'' of
nuclear material holdings, minimize recurring costs; maximize security
technologies; and provide for a highly survivable and dynamic tactical
response force.
BACKGROUND
The DBT adversary planning numbers were strongly
influenced by a single data point and did not reflect improvements in
the Intelligence Community's analysis, detection, and reporting.
Intelligence products supporting the DBT were no longer current based
on observed terrorist activity. Therefore, the GSP restructures the
adversary numbers based on intelligence and maintains a ``graded''
security program on the basis of material attractiveness/consequence
considerations.
Interpretation of the Adversary Capability's List (ACL)
led sites to include ``all'' capabilities from the ACL into a single
attack scenario. These scenarios exceeded any known or anticipated
terrorist threat. The binning (``representative'' and ``sensitive'') of
adversary capabilities to reflect reasonable aggregate threats proved a
viable solution.
The lack of a specific policy or guidance requiring
performance against intelligence reporting did not ensure that sites
consider intelligence reporting (i.e., adversary Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures [TTPs]). The GSP counters this by incorporating TTPs as
intelligence-related ``tasks,'' with each site continuing to develop
its own site-specific scenarios which demonstrate performance against
adversary TTPs.
The DBT allowed for compilation of capabilities and
focused on a single ``worst-case'' scenario, which resulted in
significantly over-designed protection postures. This was demonstrated
by force-on-force exercises that indicated a potential significant
weakness in the protective force response (i.e. ``looking/leaning in
one direction''). To redress this weakness, the GSP requires sites to
develop and analyze against a range of scenarios, evaluate the various
elements of the protection posture (with appropriate credit for
security technology), facilitate a dynamic tactical response force, and
vary scenarios in terms of adversary TTPs, knowledge, role of the
insider, pathway and threat objectives.
The DBT did not incorporate the results of recent nuclear
material technical studies and therefore required a denial strategy for
all Category I special nuclear material quantities. With the
integration of specific technical studies, a ``graded'' protection
strategies approach is utilized.
Inconsistent interpretation and application of the DBT
led to sites with like assets protecting to different standards. The
GSP includes the Scenario Development Review Team (SDRT) process, which
provides consistent application of the GSP, ACL, and Threat Guidance;
site-specific scoping agreements based on defensible standards;
utilization of credible representative scenarios to evaluate system
effectiveness; and increased confidence in vulnerability assessment
(VA) results. The cognizant program office provides oversight of the
SDRT reviews, which are conducted by diverse teams comprised of
complex-wide VA analysts, subject matter experts, HSS and site office
security representatives. VA analyst(s) from other sites being reviewed
also observe and participate in the SDRT.
The title DBT conveys threat assessment, rather than a
security planning policy document. Therefore, the document was re-
titled, ``Graded Security Protection'' policy to better delineate the
scope and purpose of the policy.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act directed NNSA--in consultation with your office--to
conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed to
the nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed
against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in
which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the
weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future
Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP). Is the NNSA working with your
office in conducting this assessment and report?
Mr. Podonsky. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
has indeed been working with the Office of Health, Safety and Security
(HSS) on initiatives that respond to the Fiscal Year 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) direction. In the case of physical
security, the HSS Office of Security Technology and Assistance has
reviewed and provided comments on an NNSA Physical Security Technology
Management Plan. This plan addresses the items in the NDAA direction.
NNSA has also sent a representative, tasked with writing the report, to
interview the Office of Security Technology and Assistance staff and
obtain additional input and clarification of the comments HSS provided.
NNSA is preparing a similar plan that addresses issues related to cyber
security, and we expect that similar coordination will take place not
only with HSS, but also with the Office of the Chief Information
Officer.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. The FY 2008 National Defense
Authorization Act directed NNSA--in consultation with your office--to
conduct an assessment of the physical and cyber security risks posed to
the nuclear weapons complex and the security technologies employed
against those threats, and prepare a report identifying the manner in
which it prioritizes investments in physical and cyber security of the
weapons complex. The report would be included in the annual Future
Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP).
How does the Department prioritize investments among physical and
cyber security?
Mr. Podonsky. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA)
physical and cyber security are two separate subprograms within the
Safeguards and Security Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)
Unit and managed separately by NNSA's Associate Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA's Chief Information Officer.
Prioritization of investments for program and budget formulation is
accomplished first by the individual program managers with respect to
DOE, including NNSA, program guidance and multi-year program plans.
Integrated corporate priorities are established in the annual
programming phase of NNSA's Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Evaluation process in which all NNSA program priorities are evaluated
and balanced within our five year funding targets. Using a risk
management approach, NNSA makes its investment decisions on the basis
of the potential adverse consequences associated with threats to the
assets being protected. This ``graded'' approach works to ensure those
assets with the highest adverse consequences, such as the loss of
control of a nuclear weapon, receive the highest priority for resource
allocation. While mitigation of adverse consequences has been the
backbone of our prioritization approach, NNSA continues to balance the
risks to information and cyber security against the heavy demands of
physically protecting nuclear assets. This balanced approach provides
the necessary funding, even at the expense of other missions, to ensure
NNSA security programs provide an acceptable level of security in
accordance with risk management principles.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Your office is the central DOE
organization responsible for health, safety and security policy
development, assistance, oversight and enforcement. What is the extent
of your office's authority in establishing DOE security policies?
Mr. Podonsky. The basis for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
authority to establish security policies arises from the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) of 1954, which established the Atomic Energy Commission,
DOE's predecessor agency. Section 161.b of the AEA states:
``establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and
instructions to govern the possession and use of special
nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material as
the omission may deem necessary or desirable to promote the
common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize
danger to life or property; in addition, the Commission shall
prescribe such regulations or orders as may be necessary or
desirable to promote the Nation's common defense and security .
. .''
Today, the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) has the
responsibility to develop health, safety, and security policies for DOE
and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Safeguards and
security policies promulgated by HSS include regulations and directives
in the topical areas of: Program Planning and Management, Physical
Protection, Protective Forces, Information Security, Personnel
Security, and Material Control and Accountability. It should be noted
that the responsibility for cyber security policy resides in the Office
of the Chief Information Officer. The development of all safeguards and
security policy is achieved through collaboration and coordination with
Program Offices, the National Laboratories, and field sites. The DOE's
directive development and review process, as prescribed in DOE Order
251.1C, Departmental Directives Program, ensures that proposed
directives are reviewed and receive concurrence by the Headquarters
Program Offices having responsibility for the Laboratories and field
sites. A similar process is followed for regulations prior to the
public comment period.
Ms. Tauscher and Mr. Langevin. Your office is the central DOE
organization responsible for health, safety and security policy
development, assistance, oversight and enforcement. Does your office
have the necessary authorities to execute its oversight mission?
Mr. Podonsky. The DOE Office of Independent Oversight, within the
Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), derives its oversight
authorities from DOE Order 470.2B, entitled Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance. This DOE Order, which applies to all DOE
elements, including the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), identifies the Office of Independent Oversight as the focal
point for independent evaluation of DOE sites, facilities,
organizations, and operations in the areas of safeguards and security;
cyber security; emergency management; and environment, safety, and
health. The DOE Order also delineates the requirements for inspected
entities to provide comprehensive corrective action plans for all
findings issued by the Office of Independent Oversight.
The authorities granted to the HSS Office of Independent Oversight
through this DOE Order are not founded in legislation and are advisory
in nature. Independent Oversight's role is to provide information to
DOE senior managers and contractor line managers. Decisions about
accepting findings, correcting deficiencies, and managing risk are
ultimately up to the responsible DOE line managers. As such, the
Independent Oversight program complements the HSS Office of
Enforcement, which derives its authorities for enforcement activities
associated with worker safety and health, nuclear safety, and
classified information security through 10 CFR Parts 851, 820, and 824,
respectively. Historically, Independent Oversight has received a high
level of support from DOE senior management; its findings have been
widely accepted by DOE line management, and its oversight programs have
contributed significantly to improvements in DOE security, cyber
security, emergency management, and environment, safety, and health
programs for more than 25 years.
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