Subcommittee Chair Ellen Tauscher
Strategic Forces Subcommittee
Hearing on United States Nuclear Weapons Policy
July 18, 2007
"Good morning. This hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will come to order. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine U.S. nuclear weapons policy, and discuss our options regarding the future size and composition of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
"Led by this subcommittee, the House Armed Services Committee has called for a vigorous and open debate on the future direction of the U.S. strategic posture, and a fresh examination of our nuclear weapons policy in particular.
"In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which was approved by the House on May 17th, we call for establishment of a congressionally-appointed bipartisan commission to analyze and make recommendations on U.S. strategic posture. This commission is designed to both foster and frame the debate we believe is needed.
"We fully intend that Congress participate in this debate, and this hearing is part of that process. So I am delighted to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses to the subcommittee today: Dr. William Perry, former Secretary of Defense and current Co-Director of the Preventive Defense Project at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; Dr. Sidney Drell, Professor and Deputy Director, Emeritus at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; and Dr. Keith Payne, a principal architect of the most recent Nuclear Posture Review and current Chair of the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University.
"I want to sincerely thank each of our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee. Each of you brings a wealth of experience and expertise to this subject, which could not be more important or more timely.
"What the United States does with its nuclear weapons, and how we do it, is closely linked to our ability to dissuade other nations around the world from pursuing these deadliest of all weapons, and on our efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. We have no higher security imperative than that. To be sure, other nations will continue to make their own decisions about whether to pursue nuclear weapons for many reasons.
"But how we manage and maintain our nuclear arsenal directly impacts how credible we can be when pressing for global non-proliferation. And we have committed under Article Six of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.
"So how do we craft a nuclear weapons strategy that meets this challenge? The most recent Nuclear Posture Review is almost six years old. Its call for a "New Triad" promised to deemphasize nuclear weapons, but that promise was undermined by its call for new types of nuclear weapons. And its endorsement of preemption raised more questions than it answered.
"The Bush Administration has opposed arms control treaties, rejecting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiating the open-ended Moscow Treaty which allows for reductions in deployed nuclear weapons, not real reductions.
"In this context, we find ourselves at a critical juncture regarding our strategic posture. The human capital and the physical infrastructure we rely on to keep our nuclear weapons safe, secure and reliable is aging. And the Administration's nuclear weapons experts tell us that in coming years the Life Extension Programs currently used to maintain our legacy weapons will no longer be cost-effective.
"The Bush Administration has offered two major proposals to address these emerging challenges:
- The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, designed to modernize our weapons stockpile; and
- The "Complex 2030" modernization program, designed to transform the nuclear weapons complex that supports that stockpile.
These far-reaching proposals represent NNSA's preferred future investment and policy strategy, but they also raise fundamental questions: How many nuclear weapons does the U.S. need to meet the President's test of "the smallest number consistent with U.S. national security interests"? What sort of weapons complex do we need to ensure the safety and reliability of these weapons? How large should our stock of reserve weapons be, and how much would development of the RRW affect the answer? Is it possible to develop RRW without sending a signal to the rest of the world that we are investing in new nuclear weapons?
"I have called for extending the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty and for negotiating a new, legally binding agreement that achieves greater, verifiable reductions in the U.S. and Russia's nuclear forces, measures that the Bush Administration has not endorsed.
"In this spirit, as the Nonproliferation Treaty is under assault, and as this administration rejects the CTBT and does not negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, what is the role of arms control treaties in today's world and how can they be made to be more effective?
"This is not a rhetorical question. Iran is on course to develop a military nuclear capability. I believe that its next step will be to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Instead of waiting for it to do so on its own terms I believe we need to rally all of our allies around and strengthen the NPT and make it clear that there are explicit penalties for leaving the treaty. I would like your thoughts on this matter.
"Answering these questions is as critical to our national security as any issue before this committee or the Congress, and I look forward to a good discussion today.
"With that, let me turn to my good friend, our Ranking Member Mr. Everett, for any comments he may have."
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