STATEMENT OF REP. GARY L. ACKERMAN
CHAIRMAN SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
A.Q. KHAN'S NUCLEAR WALMART: OUT OF BUSINESS OR UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT?
JUNE 27, 2007
The subcommittee will come to order. Ever since the ship "BBC China" was intercepted in 2003 with centrifuge equipment bound for Libya, there have been questions about the nature and extent of A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation activities. Indeed, one year ago, our committee held a hearing to examine precisely those issues and was left with more questions than answers.
One year ago we didn't know the full extent of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network. A year later, as the report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies issued in May points out, we still don't. One year ago we didn't know the exact number of countries, entities or individuals involved. A year later we still don't know if we have a complete list. One year ago, we didn't know whether Dr. Khan or any of his associates had contact with al Qaeda as has been reported, or whether his associates transferred any nuclear equipment or technology to al Qaeda or any other terrorist group. A year later we still don't know. One year ago, we didn't know the extent of the involvement of figures who may still be in the Pakistani government and military. A year later we still don't know. And while what we don't know should certainly scare us, we should be equally concerned by what we do know.
What we do know is that A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, ran an illegal international nuclear proliferation network the likes of which the world has never seen. He sold nuclear equipment and related technologies to North Korea and Iran, two thirds of the axis of evil and tried to sell it to the other third. He sold the same equipment and technologies along with weapons designs to Libya. And for those who think it wasn't quite a nuclear Walmart, because Khan didn't sell completed nuclear weapons off the shelf, perhaps a nuclear Home Depot is a better analogy. He certainly adhered to Home Depot's motto: "You can do it and we can help."
To Iran, the world's leading terror state and chief threat to peace and security in the Middle East, Khan provided centrifuges, technical designs, components, and an address book of suppliers for other material. Yet we don't know whether he provided Iran with the same plans for a nuclear weapon that he provided to Libya. Without question Iran's nuclear program is years ahead of where it would have been without his assistance.
To North Korea, Khan supplied centrifuge machines along with drawings, sketches, technical data, depleted uranium hexafluoride gas, and a shopping list so that North Korea could procure additional equipment directly from foreign suppliers. In return, Pakistan got missiles.
To Libya, Khan committed to supplying the entire enrichment process, soup to nuts and for good measure threw in the designs for a nuclear weapon. In return, Khan got wealthy.
What we have uncovered since 2003 is the single worst case of nuclear proliferation in the last 50 years. But what is most startling is not the scope of Khan's network that stretched, as far as we know, across ten countries and involved at least 30 companies and middlemen -- but that so few countries, companies or individuals have been held accountable.
Apparently, the stiffest penalty the Pakistani government can impose on those who sell the nuclear crown jewels, is house arrest. Elsewhere around the world, only a handful of Kahn's co-conspirators face criminal charges. Most continue unfettered by law enforcement scrutiny and probably continue their trade in nuclear-related materials. On a government to government level, the Bush Administration has refused again and again to press the Pakistani government for direct access to A.Q. Khan, the one man who could answer all these outstanding questions. Even though the threat of terrorists getting access to nuclear weapons is cited as the greatest threat to American national security, the President has responded by giving Pakistan a squadron of F-16's, a giant "get out of jail free card" and has declared that the network has been "shut down."
But the President's facile conclusion and willingness to believe the few answers about the Khan network that the Pakistanis grudgingly provide, ignores the fact that all the incentives and missing safeguards that led the government of Pakistan to encourage A.Q. Khan in the first place, still exist.
Pakistan still has a nuclear program that operates largely without either international scrutiny or voluntary transparency, and because Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT, it will still have to procure nuclear-related materials and technology clandestinely in order to sustain that program. The Administration can believe whatever convenient fiction it likes, but all these facts lead me to believe that the Khan network is more likely to be open under new management rather than truly out of business.
And now I'd like to turn to my friend the Ranking Member, Mr. Pence.
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