Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

U.S. Efforts to Halt WMD Proliferation:
Past Experience, Current Programs, and Future Priorities

Testimony
of
Dr. James Clay Moltz
Director, Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Before
the
Subcommittees on Europe and on
International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights
of the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives

May 14, 2002

I thank the subcommittee chairmen, other members of this committee, and the professional staff for the opportunity to present my views on this important subject. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has worked on questions related to U.S. nonproliferation assistance programs in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union since the inception of these efforts in 1991. CNS has conducted two in-depth assessments of these programs (in 1994-95 and 1999-2000), which are available in published form. We continue to maintain a high interest in ensuring the effectiveness of U.S. programs and thereby halting potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation problems at their source.

U.S. Threat Reduction Programs in Historical Context

The once revolutionary concept of working with governments in the former Soviet Union to reduce the spread of WMD from facilities located within their territories has-over the past 12 years-become widely accepted as a substantively effective and cost-efficient means of reducing threats to the United States. We owe a debt of thanks to late Representative Les Aspin, former Senator Sam Nunn, Senator Richard Lugar, and Senator Pete Domenici for their forward-thinking efforts in developing these programs and to the U.S. Congress more generally for the bipartisan support that has sustained them.

Over time, these activities have expanded-appropriately-from a narrow focus on weapons dismantlement to a broader focus on nonproliferation aims, as the extent of safety and security problems in the former Soviet WMD sector have been revealed. Since 9/11, these programs have been adapted to the challenge of preventing terrorist access to WMD materials, technology, and know-how. Yet, despite significant accomplishments and a marked reduction in the threats faced by the United States in regards to NIS-origin problems, there is still much work to be done.

In the nuclear sector, civilian and weapons-grade plutonium continue to be produced in Russia. Tactical nuclear weapons remain in at-risk forward-storage areas. No comprehensive inventories exist of fissile material stockpiles within the Russian nuclear complex. In the chemical and biological weapons areas, considerable amounts of material need to be destroyed and large pathogen cultures need to be placed under heightened controls or eliminated.

Since 9/11, there have been calls to expand participation on the donor side to countries beyond the few currently supporting NIS nonproliferation projects. The major announcements last summer of the G-8 "10 plus 10 over 10" and of the associated Global Partnership offer promising avenues for greater international commitment to what has largely been a U.S.-led proliferation prevention effort to date.

There has also been increasing discussion about applying Nunn-Lugar programs to proliferation problems outside the NIS. It is undeniable that other regions of the world harbor similar (if less extensive) security problems to those in the NIS, providing tempting targets for terrorists or states of concern seeking to acquire sensitive materials for the production of WMD or dirty bombs. Thus, it makes sense to expand proliferation prevention to encompass these non-NIS facilities. Of special note are the more than 100 research reactors still operating on highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and thousands of sites with poorly secured commercial radioactive source material. These threats require international attention, and it would be foolhardy if we were to ignore them simply because they lie outside the NIS or the existing mandates of Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and State Department programs.

Indeed, certain U.S. training programs in the export control/customs field and in border security have already been applied successfully outside the NIS and could be extended to still other states. Material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) upgrades and other cooperative efforts could also prove fruitful and bring near-term safety and security improvements at modest cost, while building ties among governments sharing a common interest in preventing proliferation threats.

Overall, the rationale for existing proliferation efforts and new cooperation with the Global Partnership is convincing in terms of U.S. national security interests: dealing with proliferation threats at their sources in a pro-active manner. The alternative is being forced to react later on after they have already created actual military threats-requiring responses through more complicated, less reliable, and ultimately more expensive U.S. or coalition military means.

In the rest of my remarks, I would like first to outline some of the parameters for successful programs drawn from our experience in the NIS countries, while also examining reasons for the failure of certain efforts there. Next, I will highlight areas where improvements can be made in the implementation of existing programs to make them more effective. Finally, I will focus attention on neglected areas of proliferation concern where new programs or attention is required (both in the NIS and globally) in order to plug troubling gaps in current proliferation prevention efforts. My testimony concludes with a list of specific policy initiatives for your consideration.

Assessing U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance Programs in the NIS

Although Nunn-Lugar programs faced considerable criticism in their early years, with the benefit of 12 years of hindsight, it is clear that they have reaped tangible benefits in improving U.S. security. Thousands of strategic nuclear weapons have been disassembled, hundreds of missiles eliminated, dozens of nuclear submarines cut up, and tons of fissile material put into safe storage. All of this has been accomplished with an expenditure that has totaled, over all these years, less than 2 percent of the 2003 defense budget alone. This is a remarkable bargain, as well as a tribute to the hard work of many devoted personnel in DOD, DOE, the State Department, and other agencies of the U.S. government. In addition, we should not discount the major efforts made by officials on the Russian and NIS side to facilitate these programs in truly "cooperative" threat reduction, overcoming at times considerable bureaucratic, military, and even public opposition. The fact that these programs have lasted well over a decade now is attributable to the many important personal relationships, expanding mutual trust, and underlying security interests that have enabled these efforts to succeed.

In identifying the keys to success of specific initiatives, there have been several shared characteristics: 1) high-level "buy in" on both sides, which has been required to overcome bureaucratic hurdles; 2) attentiveness to experts and officials on the ground to ensure that local or regional obstacles are not thrown up to block federal programs that are sometimes poorly understood in the regions; 3) devoted project teams on both sides willing to stay with the projects through their completion, rather than leaving for more lucrative or career-enhancing opportunities in mid-stream; 4) reliable support from the funding organization-the U.S. Congress-and an ability of program managers to exercise flexibility in dealing with the inevitable problems that arise in any complex defense- and security-related operation of this sort being conducted in a foreign country; and 5) a clear coincidence of security interests on both the U.S. and NIS sides, thus providing a higher joint goal to guide the project through difficult times. Some of the programs where-through my own observations and research-I have personally witnessed these factors in abundance include DOD’s submarine dismantlement effort in Russia, DOE’s naval MPC&A program, and the State Department’s work on the international science centers. But there are many other examples.

By contrast, the smaller number of programs in which we have seen serious difficulties have tended to share a number of common problems: 1) a disconnect between U.S. and NIS goals for the project due to inadequate mutual understanding or acceptance of goals; 2) a failure to consult important local or regional authorities in a position to block or impede project implementation on environmental or safety grounds; 3) a failure to ensure incentives (such as reliable payment of salaries) for NIS personnel actually conducting the work; and 4) a failure to synchronize adequately in joint projects respective U.S. and Russian components. Critics of Nunn-Lugar programs have rightly pointed out individual cases where projects have not achieved their objectives (such as the Krasnoyarsk heptyl neutralization plant and the planned Votkinsk solid-rocket engine elimination facility) or have not achieved them in a timely manner (the shutdown of Russia’s remaining plutonium-producing reactors). However, it is important that we learn from these mistakes and not throw the baby out with the bath water. Why?

Nunn-Lugar efforts are being pursued out of U.S. security interests, not as aid programs. Just as we sometimes see a U.S. weapons system canceled because it fails to meet exacting technical requirements after a series of tests, so too are there going to be occasional Nunn-Lugar programs that fail due to human or technical factors. While these cases must be minimized, their existence does not mean that the whole effort is tainted. To the contrary, the fact that most have succeeded shows that U.S. program managers developed important skills that allowed them to meet their objectives despite the highly challenging legal, political, and economic environment presented in the NIS.

Measures to Improve Implementation of Existing Nunn-Lugar Programs

Improvements Requiring U.S. Action

Since one of the purposes of this hearing is to improve existing programs, it is worth addressing a few issues where overcoming obstacles could be accomplished by U.S. action alone. For various reasons, it has become apparent that certain regulations, norms, or guidelines for existing programs are now outmoded or inappropriate and need to be changed. The reason is that, despite good intentions, times and conditions change and we need to refresh these principles in order to adapt current programs to current conditions, rather than clinging to past procedures simply because they were appropriate earlier in the 12-year history of our NIS proliferation prevention efforts.

One problem is the guidelines that currently limit the DOE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI)-which seeks to downsize the Russian nuclear complex-to activities in only three of Russia’s "closed" nuclear cities (Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk). In an attempt to focus the program and enhance its effectiveness, Congress instructed DOE to emphasize the major warhead design and production facilities and to rule out a number of other closed nuclear cities dealing with other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Unfortunately, while helping to address what some believed was an overly diffuse program in its early years, an unexpected result has been the deterioration of conditions in other critical cities whose nuclear assets could create severe difficulties for U.S. security. While the three NCI cities and their laboratories have received a relative abundance of attention, other closed nuclear cities (including Ozersk, Novouralsk, and Seversk, all with at-risk nuclear enterprises) have been neglected. Without incoming external assistance, the economic situation in these cities has become dire, contributing to the rise of criminal activities, large-scale unemployment, and growing nuclear risks. Yet, DOE NCI funds cannot be expended there due to existing Congressional restrictions. These limitations need to be lifted and DOE given the flexibility it needs to determine where threats are most urgent today and where U.S. programs can be leveraged to make the most difference.

Another problem area relates to neglect of educational initiatives as a nonproliferation tool. U.S. programs (particularly in DOE) have made significant progress in providing technical training to scientists responsible for nuclear materials in Russia and the other NIS, including the provision of relevant MPC&A technologies. But, in order for the equipment and training to be effective in halting proliferation, managers must understand why the equipment needs to be turned on, operated effectively, and maintained. This is a critical hurdle in the pursuit of MPC&A sustainability, once U.S. programs end. By training current and future nuclear facility managers to recognize the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear materials, comprehend the efforts being made by states of concern and terrorist to divert material, and appreciate Russia’s obligations to nonproliferation treaties and regimes, the United States could begin to instill strong nonproliferation norms and practices within the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) complex. Moreover, training of this kind would build an additional barrier against the danger posed by the "insider" threat and reinforce efforts already underway in the area of MPC&A equipment training for personnel handling nuclear material. Ironically, due to pressures from Congress to provide "countable" metrics, many opportunities to conduct this kind of work are missed.

Fortunately, some funding was provided on a one-time basis through DOE in FY 2002 to improve nonproliferation education in Russia. This single effort succeeded in establishing new nonproliferation courses at technical institutes and schools in a number of closed Russian nuclear cities-including Snezhinsk, Novouralsk, Tomsk, and Zheleznogorsk, as well as at state universities in a number of sensitive Russian regions. Through these means, major strides have been achieved in efforts to promote sustainability of nonproliferation norms within the Russian nuclear complex and build a lasting "nonproliferation culture."

Today, there is no Congressionally mandated funding for nonproliferation education. Congress would be well served to provide modest new funding in this area, given the tremendous multiplier effect of these courses, which can help hundreds of young specialists each year to understand the importance of nonproliferation practices. Such education builds an internal "lobby" group over time for these norms within Russian facilities themselves. Moreover, the Departments of Energy and State should be tasked with the responsibility to include educational efforts in their nonproliferation programs, rather than being encouraged to promote only technical training. Small amounts of funding can go a long way in this area toward changing old, Soviet-era mindsets and creating a cadre of young specialists in Russia who share American views regarding the high priority that should be accorded to proliferation prevention efforts.

A related challenge is that posed by brain drain. One of the more successful efforts at preventing threats in this area has been the so-called "science centers" sponsored by a consortium of international countries. Over 60,000 NIS scientists have been funded to conduct civilian research projects, involving over 620 institutes. But as time passes, the rules that originally governed this program have become obsolete. That is, by requiring that more than 50 percent of participants in each project funded by the United States be made up of former weapons scientists, Congressional rules are forcing an outmoded standard (and, in some cases, a counterproductive one) on these projects. At certain at-risk facilities-including in the biological weapons area-there are few scientists left who actually worked in Soviet weapons programs, yet there is abundant know-how among remaining scientists and often highly dangerous pathogen cultures within their laboratories. By denying these scientists access to the science center research funds, these old restrictions may be encouraging them to seek support from countries of concern. Until these facilities are safeguarded from theft or diversion and greater progress made in converting them to civilian purposes, it is in U.S. interests to make science center programs accessible to these researchers.

Finally, there have been unnecessary (and undesirable) delays in the implementation of critical Nunn-Lugar programs in the past year due to the necessity of presidential certification of Russia’s full compliance with its arms control obligations and verifiable shutdown of all WMD development activities. Given questions of access in the biological weapons area, certification has been difficult to obtain. However, while in the early years of Nunn-Lugar activities the certification may have made sense due to questions related to Russian policies in a variety of areas, these concerns have now narrowed considerably. Thus, it is time for Congress to provide a permanent waiver of the certification requirement. The reason is simple: these programs serve U.S. security interests even if (indeed, especially if) we cannot verify full compliance with WMD restrictions. Indeed, without Nunn-Lugar programs, Russian compliance with its WMD commitments (particularly in the chemical weapons area) will surely decline-to the detriment of U.S. security interests. By steadily reducing Russia’s stockpile and making it less vulnerable to theft and diversion, Nunn-Lugar programs are steadily enhancing U.S. security.

Addressing these issues could be achieved quickly by Congressional review and the revision of instructions to the executive agencies in charge of fulfilling these programs. Such moves would heighten the effectiveness of these programs in meeting U.S. security objectives under current circumstances, which have evolved since many of these guidelines were developed.

Improvements Requiring Russian Action

In several areas related to proliferation prevention, improvements in the effectiveness and positive impact of programs require Russian action or combined action involving both U.S. and Russian policy shifts.

Although the United States decided recently to adopt Russia’s preferred policy on plutonium disposition (mixed-oxide [MOX] fuel production), the mounting costs of pursuing this option and the concomitant risks of creating new demands for plutonium (to power MOX-adapted reactors) make this option less attractive than it once seemed. For Russia and the United States to spend multiple billions of dollars to create MOX fuel and convert reactors to operate on it makes little sense, given the negative precedent (of creating financial incentives to generate plutonium) it sets. The United States should reopen the vitrification option with the Russian government, in which weapons-grade plutonium would be mixed with radioactive waste and stored. While not perfect, this option is far more affordable and could more rapidly remove separated plutonium from possible theft.

Another area of concern is in regards to the U.S. program to convert Russia’s remaining plutonium-producing reactors. Unfortunately, due to regional needs for the heat and electricity generated by these reactors, Russia wants to continue their operation until they are finally replaced by conventional power plants later in the decade. However, in the meantime, these reactors continue to produce more than a metric ton of plutonium annually. One immediate way to reduce this build-up by 25 to 30 percent would be to shut the reactors during the summer months, when their heat output is not needed and their electrical output is in excess of local needs. The United States should try to initiate this reform as soon as possible.

Finally, another problem area requiring greater efforts is the ongoing dispute between Western assistance providers and the Russian government over issues of liability, taxation of assistance, and access, which has threatened to derail the signing of new proliferation prevention agreements, as well as the renewal of existing agreements. A recent examination of the liability question, authored by Douglas Brubaker, a U.S. lawyer based in Norway, and my CNS colleague, Leonard S. Spector, calls for a new approach to this problem. The authors suggest that progress in this vexing area could be accomplished by treating liability as a field where a "cooperative insurance" approach is needed. I would call your attention to their recent article.

New Initiatives for Addressing Emerging Proliferation Threats (NIS and Global)

In order for U.S. efforts to be effective in ensuring our national security, U.S. proliferation prevention programs need to be constantly adapted to emerging threats. With this goal, let me now turn to a few areas where high-priority attention should be turned to new problems emerging both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Working in cooperation with relevant governments, the United States could initiate moderate bilateral or multilateral efforts to prevent of the emergence of dangerous threats.

One area where high-level U.S. policy attention needs to be focused is impending Russian exports of naval nuclear reactors. The United States has made a strong case against further commercial reactor trade with Iran (particularly in light of recent revelations about its enrichment activities) and (to a lesser extent) with non-NPT member India. However, an emerging problem that has not been discussed is attempts by Russia’s Minatom and the shipbuilding industry to export floating reactors and nuclear submarines. Specifically, Minatom is in the process of developing new deals for the export of small, mobile, floating reactors for use in power generation. According to Russian sources, a deal is already in the works with China and the technology is also on offer to Indonesia. These reactors are based on submarine reactors designed in Nizhniy Novgorod and will run on HEU fuel. At a time when the world is trying to reduce the proliferation of HEU and convert existing HEU research reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU), such exports should be strongly discouraged, if not banned altogether.

Similarly, as noted, Russia’s shipyards are beginning to promote the export of nuclear attack submarines, benefiting from a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which failed to ban such exports. But besides being capable of carrying nuclear-tipped torpedoes and possible cruise missiles, Russian nuclear attack submarines carry two nuclear reactors that operate on HEU fuel. A deal is currently in the works to lease two nuclear submarines under construction (one at Severodvinsk and one at Komsomolsk-na-Amure) to India. Given India’s status as an outlaw to the NPT and a country that recently refused an offer by Pakistan to engage in joint dismantlement of their nuclear weapons programs, one has to assume that India will use Russian technology to build up its own nuclear navy. Such developments are neither in U.S. security interests nor in the interests of international nonproliferation efforts.

In the context of these difficulties, another issue requiring attention is Russia’s continued accumulation (as in Japan and France) of separated civilian plutonium, which is growing at a rate of more than one metric ton annually as a result of reprocessing fuel from its VVER-440 nuclear power plants. Such material could produce as many as 120 nuclear weapons annually. As in the case of surplus weapons plutonium, a more viable and better near-term option would be for Russia to store this material, before it is reprocessed. Such a policy should be strongly backed by the United States. Support for this approach can be found in the December 2002 U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which declares: the United States "will continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium…."

As I mentioned in my introduction, biological weapons pose difficult challenges. Russia continues to block access to a number of sensitive laboratories suspected of involvement in the former Soviet biological weapons program. Indeed, scientists from these organizations are eager to work with Western firms but have been blocked from doing so by the Russian Ministry of Defense. New efforts are needed to try to engage these scientists and promote the process of the conversion of these laboratories to peaceful purposes, in part by increasing transparency at these facilities. In the absence of progress toward a verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Nunn-Lugar efforts could assist this process. What is needed is a push by Presidents Bush and Putin, in coordination with investment plans from U.S., other Western, and Russian companies. At the same time, increasing efforts need to be made both in other former Soviet states and in Russia to improve safety and security of pathogen cultures, which are now often guarded by nothing more than wax seals on laboratory refrigerators. Such efforts are underway in Central Asia. New efforts must be made to expand programs in Russia.

Sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia remain a problem for at least two reasons. One, they are not subject to formal treaty reductions or elimination because they currently fall only under U.S. and Soviet/Russian unilateral presidential declarations made in 1991 and 1992, pledging to remove them from deployed status to central storage and to eliminate all but air-delivered weapons. Due to lack of funding and storage capabilities, it appears that Russia has met neither pledge. Of particular concern-according to Russian and U.S. military sources-is the fact that large numbers of these weapons remain at forward-based storage areas that are literally overflowing with warheads. However, current U.S. policy opposes providing assistance to help improve safety at these sites. Clearly, this policy is not serving its ends and must either be amended or abandoned altogether.

Moving to the global context, a common problem that faces U.S. global nonproliferation efforts is the widespread lack of understanding of nonproliferation concepts and goals. Government officials, scientists, educators, members of the media, and military personnel need to be able to identify weak links in their existing proliferation prevention efforts and understand the consequences (for their own security) if they do not. A first step in trying to inculcate a culture of nonproliferation in regions of concern in these countries is training. The establishment of courses in the national language in nonproliferation studies and the development of course materials would help create domestic impetus behind such policies, leading over time to an increasing percentage of officials and relevant parties responsible for nuclear materials having had such critical training. Such efforts need to be begun in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia, and other regions. The fostering of indigenous non-governmental organizations to conduct this work (possibly drawing on local university faculty) could promote the development of civil societies within these countries and provide other sources of information besides official government channels.

Going back as far as 1978, with the establishment of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program, the United States has been concerned about the presence of large numbers of research reactors across the globe that operate on HEU fuel. While conversions of a number of reactors to more proliferation-resistant LEU fuel have been made, over 100 HEU reactors still remain in a variety of countries. U.S. and multilateral efforts to continue to convert (and, where possible, shut down) these reactors should be intensified given the new threats since 9/11. At the same time, enhanced efforts to return HEU fuel from these and other locations-many of which lack adequate physical protection and technical safeguards-to the countries of origin need to be made.

An even more widespread yet very serious proliferation concern is the presence of significant amounts of commercial radioactive source material internationally. One of the key problems in seeking to combat the threat of radiation dispersal devices (or RDDs, which include so-called "dirty bombs") is the sheer quantity of such sources, which literally number in the millions. A recent study by my CNS colleague Charles Ferguson and two co-authors (Tahseen Kazi and Judith Perera) notes that a major problem is the lack of safe storage of these materials after their use. Fortunately, the authors note that "only a small fraction of these are in the high-risk category." Besides locating and upgrading safety at these sites, their report calls for the establishment of end-user certification requirements as a condition of export for all future sales of high-risk radioactive source material. The United States, they argue, should lead this effort and help convince other states to join them in combating this dangerous proliferation risk.

Most of these at-risk sources are located in the NIS. Unfortunately, Russia’s handling of Soviet-era radioactive source material has not been impressive. Since Russia is a likely location for such an attack, given continuing tensions with Chechen rebels, strengthening Russia’s response capability is important. Once problem is that, besides medical and industrial sources, there are hundreds of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs, mostly powered by strontium-90) that are operating in unsafe conditions or whose status is simply unknown. These RTGs pose risks to unwitting NIS citizens who might find them, but they also could be stolen by criminals or terrorists for use in dirty bombs.

In June 2002, a trilateral project linking DOE, Minatom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency began to work on tracking down and securing high-risk radioactive sources in the NIS. This year, DOE is seeking an increase of $19.7 million to get this job done. Congress should encourage this work while also ensuring that DOE addresses problems that cause radioactive material to be abandoned in the first place: a lack of adequate regulatory measures (requiring full accountancy and safe storage after use), both in the NIS and in other countries.

In a related program, Norway has nearly completed conversion-to conventional power sources-of a small number of Russian lighthouses near its coastline currently operating on RTGs. Other countries should contribute to the expansion of this effort. For example, it would be desirable for Japan to conduct a similar program in the Far East, perhaps with U.S. or Canadian assistance, within the context of the Global Partnership.

Finally, a related problem is the lack of capable response mechanisms in many countries with radioactive source materials, including in the former Soviet Union. Creating an initiative to train and integrate first responders and to build an international network of teams capable of identifying proliferation sensitive materials and enacting rapid and effective public responses could go a long way toward mitigating the possible implications of attempted assembly or use of an RDD in the future.

Conclusion: Suggestions for New Policies

In summary, much has been accomplished, yet much remains to be done. Greater cooperation is needed internationally to solve many WMD proliferation problems. Increased activities by other G-8 states and by participants in the Global Partnership (such as Norway) are already improving implementation of existing programs and helping to fill gaps in U.S. efforts. At the same time, there are domestic measures-both in the United States and in the NIS-that could improve implementation of existing programs. In several areas noted above, new programs are called for.

I would ask the members of your two House subcommittees to consider the following list of "action items," based on my testimony. Each of them, if implemented, would heighten the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to prevent WMD proliferation:

The following actions should be considered to improve implementation of existing programs:

These new initiatives should be considered to address emerging proliferation threats:

As a final point, any review of U.S. proliferation prevention measures must take into account internal U.S. policies and their impact on global developments. Other nations look to the United States to lead by example. This means that we must begin to pay attention to how U.S. nuclear policies reflect the priority we place on our international proliferation prevention objectives. With these goals in mind, therefore, we need to continue moving in a careful yet resolute manner to reduce our nuclear arsenal, while at the same time working to ensure the safety and the deterrent orientation of our remaining deployed forces (through such measures as the de-alerting of weapons). Internationally, we must work to strengthen taboos against WMD use and expand verification mechanisms to prevent WMD development. If we make progress on these fronts, we are likely to find a receptive global audience for effective nonproliferation efforts and a ready coalition of countries to enforce them against any possible rule-breakers.

I thank the chairmen of your two subcommittees for the opportunity to share my views on these important issues. I would welcome any questions.