Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Statement
by the Honorable Fred C. Iklé
before the Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

June 4, 2003

Next Steps for US Nonproliferation Policy
and What This Committee Might Chose to Address

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be invited to testify at this hearing. I hope you won’t consider it presumptuous if I advocate some specific actions without much elaboration. We need to attend to the most urgent and important priorities first since nonproliferation policies are so complex. Like the US Tax Code, these policies are burdened by history, hobbled by conflicting interests, and impossible to simplify.

I have three points to offer on the question of priorities.

First, what should be the priority among different weapons of mass destruction?

In my view, nuclear weapons are of highest priority. For several reasons they are more attractive weapons for any nation or terrorist group that wishes to plan a purposeful campaign.

Second, which countries should receive priority in our nonproliferation policy?

North Korea, I believe, now should be at the top of the list. It is opening a fundamental breach in the Nonproliferation Treaty. By having signed onto the NPT it received technical assistance and now it is exploiting this assistance while openly defying all the treaty obligations. Such behavior cuts the NPT into shreds.

Yet, KEDO, the project to donate and build two nuclear reactors in North Korea , is still continuing. As long as this project continues, North Koreans will receive more and more technical reports on nuclear reactors and even receive training on how to operate our reactors. Thus, at the same time while we are correctly condemning North Korea for pursuing its nuclear weapons programs, we are supporting -- and wit h Congressional approval keep financing – this build-up of North Korea’s knowledge and engineering skills in nuclear technology. And keep in mind, when these donated reactors are completed, their initial plutonium production can easily be diverted to build dozens of bombs.

What on earth is going on here?

Mr. Chairman, this is an issue on which your Committee might decide to do something that would close a gaping hole in the dike against nuclear proliferation. This Committee could lend support to an amendment to HR 6 (the Energy Policy Act) that the House has passed. That amendment has been sponsored by Congressmen Markey and Cox and has been adopted by the House 247 to 175. It would, in essence, preclude the completion of these dangerous reactors in North Korea by relying on existing Congressional powers to control nuclear exports. But the Senate still needs to accept this provision in conference. Since the problem is so clearly a central issue for international relations, Mr. Chairman, a way might be found for this Committee to make sure the amendment will become part of the bill. Or failing that, the amendment must be included in other legislation.

Third, which technological aspects or projects deserve top priority in our nonproliferation policy?

Technologies that ought to be given a high priority are instruments and other means to detect dangerous nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, so as to reduce the risk of theft from storage areas, laboratories, or research reactors, and above all to provide the tools for timely detection of attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons or materials into this country. Several members of Congress have sought to push the development of such detection devices and have proposed increased funding, but their proposals have not been adopted and the current effort remains woefully inadequate.

Other technology programs, by contrast, ought to be discouraged or stopped. In particular, further steps must be taken to halt and to reverse the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors or for other ostensibly peaceful applications.

Similarly, a new program that could do great harm to nonproliferation is the plan to use surplus weapons plutonium from Russia and also from the United States, to fuel power reactors throughout the world. This plutonium is to be converted into so-called mixed oxide fuel (MOX) by means of specially built reactors. The safety of the converted MOX fuel has to be questioned more carefully since the shipments of tons of plutonium could pose serious terrorist risks. Moreover, this worldwide project will encourage other expanding uses of plutonium, for instance breeder reactors. Over ten, twenty years, the world would thus increasingly adopt plutonium uses for energy production in facilities that would be scattered over thousands of locations with far-flung transportation requirements. This could well mean the death knell for non-proliferation.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, Congress is being asked to authorize hundreds of millions of dollars for these uses of MOX type plutonium, and the Administration is proceeding to conclude various international agreements that will create political commitments to build a global plutonium economy. This "death knell project " for nuclear nonproliferation is enormously complex, based on many technical judgments that are highly contentious. Congress, and perhaps your Committee, ought to initiate a careful review before the momentum of committed bureaucracies and special interests becomes irreversible.