Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Testimony of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation
Lisa Bronson
Before the House International Relations Committee
Subcommittees on Europe; Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Human Rights

May 8, 2003

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense (DoD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.

Why the CTR Program Exists

The CTR program is a result of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, which directed DoD to assist the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in dismantling, destroying, consolidating and securing Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. Since then, Congress has continued to support DoD in implementation of this program. CTR activities seek to increase national security by addressing WMD threats at their source.

In the Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress authorized DoD to provide assistance through CTR programs to achieve the following broad objectives:

The FY 1997 NDAA remains the primary authority for conducting CTR assistance activities. The CTR program was subsequently modified to prohibit CTR assistance to:

Who is Involved in the CTR Program

DoD implements the CTR Program through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, pursuant to policy guidance provided by the Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. DoD coordinates implementation of CTR activities closely with the National Security Council staff and the U.S. Government agencies that provide nonproliferation assistance to FSU states.

DoD is authorized to provide CTR assistance only to FSU states, subject to annual certification of eligibility. The current states eligible for CTR assistance include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. DoD has requested the authority to use up to $50 million in CTR funds annually for non-proliferation activities outside of the FSU. We believe this will provide the flexibility to respond to evolving national security threats that will not duplicate other authorities.

Initial CTR assistance focused on the states that inherited the bulk of the Soviet Union's nuclear and chemical weapons: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Over time, DoD extended the CTR program to address the dangerous remnants of the Soviet arsenal in other FSU states such as Uzbekistan, Moldova and Georgia. In addition, DoD recognized the opportunity to address the threat of biological weapons proliferation with the CTR program.

What the CTR Program Includes

In the beginning, DoD's CTR Program enabled FSU states to accomplish what they would not have been able to do otherwise. CTR assisted cash-strapped Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in removing nuclear weapons from their soil and eliminating strategic infrastructure. CTR also facilitated Russia's efforts to draw down the massive strategic nuclear weapons arsenal remaining at the end of the Cold War. This assisted Russia in addressing its arms control commitments faster than Russia would have done on its own. The CTR program helped reduce the threat posed by the former Soviet nuclear arsenal by consolidating thousands of nuclear weapons in secure storage in Russia and eliminating strategic bombers, ballistic missiles, fixed silos and strategic submarines.

Accomplishments Over the Past 12 Years

Since its inception in 1991, the CTR Program has facilitated the following reductions in strategic arms in FSU states:

The CTR Program also has helped enhance the security of nuclear and chemical weapons storage facilities in Russia; demilitarized chemical weapons production and research facilities in Russia and Uzbekistan; removed and secured tons of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and Georgia; enhanced the security of dangerous pathogen collections in Russia and Kazakhstan; demilitarized the world's largest anthrax production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan; inhibited access to 181 nuclear test tunnels at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan; and destroyed residual pathogens at the former Soviet BW test site on Vozrozhdeniye Island, Uzbekistan.

Where the Program Is Going

The CTR Program continues to fund several classic WMD elimination projects. These include assisting Russia with elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, fixed and mobile missile launchers, strategic submarines, and chemical weapon nerve agents. The program also assists Ukraine to eliminate strategic bombers and air to surface missiles.

In the beginning, a central concern of the CTR Program was the potential threat to U.S. security posed by residual WMD weapons and forces in Russia. The danger that Russia might employ these forces against the U.S., our allies, or global interests has declined dramatically. Today, the more significant threat to U.S. security stems from the possibility that WMD-related materials in the FSU might fall into the hands of terrrorists or rogue states. The porous borders of the FSU states offer the potential for illicit transit of WMD and related materials to terrorist organizations and their sponsors. The September 2002 National Security Strategy and the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction highlighted the critical role that nonproliferation assistance programs must play in addressing these threats. Accordingly, DoD has adapted the CTR Program to address this evolving threat. We have refocused CTR to redouble our efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials, technologies and expertise in support of the Global War on Terrorism.

We are working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to implement comprehensive security upgrades at numerous nuclear weapons storage sites. Thus far, CTR- provided "Quick Fix" fencing and sensors have been installed at more than 30 sites by MOD as an interim measure. In the next year, we plan to initiate comprehensive security upgrade projects at nine nuclear weapons storage sites, recently identified by MOD. We also are assisting the MOD to enhance the security of Russian nuclear weapons while in transit from operational bases to dismantlement or consolidated storage facilities.

We are expanding CTR efforts to prevent biological weapons (BW) proliferation by:

The WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative is designed to address the vulnerability of the FSU's porous borders. This initiative will enhance the capability of FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. The initiative will provide equipment, training, infrastructure and logistics support to help recipient countries develop the comprehensive capabilities required to develop an indigenous, self sustaining capability to prevent the trafficking of WMD materials across their borders. This initiative is being implemented in close coordination with other U.S. Government agencies to ensure it complements and reinforces other related US assistance projects.

Finally, we are looking beyond the Soviet WMD legacy. As mentioned above, the Administration has proposed legislation that would give the President authority to use up to $50 million annually in CTR funds outside the FSU to resolve critical emerging proliferation threats, or to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals. This proposal recognizes that the world has changed since CTR began and that the program should change with it to best serve U.S. global efforts to combat WMD and terrorism. We would use this authority where DoD has a sizable presence, and in close coordination with other departments to maximize the expertise U.S. agencies can bring to bear against a proliferation threat.

Lessons Learned and Impediments

The past 17 months have been challenging for the CTR Program. In early 2002, we learned from Russian officials that a facility begun in 1994 and built with approximately $106 million in CTR assistance would have no use. The missile propellant (heptyl) that it was intended to neutralize had been diverted to the Russian commercial space program. The waste in U.S. tax dollars represented by the "heptyl" facility situation was inexcusable.

This heptyl situation was a wake-up call. We impressed on the Russian government at all levels the gravity of the situation that their negligence had created. In addition, we looked inward at how CTR has been managed, and found ways to better protect CTR investments.

Another illustration of the difficulty of dealing with another country's infrastructure relates to local politics. DoD officials were informed that local leaders in Russia's Udmurt Republic had reversed their prior position and would bar construction of a solid-rocket motor destruction facility. This facility was intended to support the ambitious decommissioning schedule for Russia's mobile SS-24 and SS-25 missiles. CTR had invested some $14 million in the Udmurt site, near the city of Votkinsk. CTR had also invested approximately $85 million in designs and testing for the rocket motor disposal facility to have been built at Votkinsk.

The Votkinsk situation is similar to the heptyl situation in one respect. A significant US non-proliferation investment was jeopardized.

However, the Votkinsk situation is different in many other ways. Our information is that the Russian central government made significant attempts to secure the necessary land and environmental permits from local officials. In addition, the Russian executive agent has come up with its own alternatives to the Votkinsk facility, as well as some of its own funding. Moreover, Russian officials were fully transparent with us regarding the local political problems as soon as they began brewing last year. Finally, over 400 SS-24 and SS-25s are still scheduled to begin decommissioning later this year. As opposed to the heptyl incident, there remains a proliferable commodity here that the U.S. has an interest in destroying.

A final decision on whether or how CTR might provide additional assistance to facilitate these goals has not been made. Yet, we are again confronted with a potentially significant loss of a CTR investment.

The past year has been extremely frustrating. It serves as a reminder that we need to do better internally; I think we have moved quickly to put better management controls in place. But, the past year also highlights how hard it is to pursue this type of program in a country like Russia, even if we do everything correctly.

In addition to the oversight changes described above, we are in the process of scrutinizing all ongoing and planned CTR projects to determine if they still serve U.S. nonproliferation and security interests; if the original rationale for their implementation remains valid; and if there might not be better, more effective ways to achieve the original goals the respective projects. We anticipate this review of CTR projects will result in more efficient and effective implementation, and revalidate the necessary link between a CTR project and current threats to US security.

One of the key lessons learned is that CTR recipients are not always all alike. The Administration's recent implementation of the program recognized that in the case of Russia, we cannot conduct business as usual. For example, for Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, Russia was not certified as eligible for CTR assistance, while all other states for which funding was requested were certified.

Russia was not certified in both Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 because the Administration had continuing concerns over Russia's commitment to comply with biological and chemical weapons arms control agreements. This was a departure from years past. As a result, all new assistance for Russia was suspended until August of 2002 when, in order to continue CTR efforts to reduce and prevent the proliferation of WMD, the President exercised the first waiver granted by Congress. In Fiscal Year 2003, he executed a second waiver. In Fiscal Year 2003, he also exercised his authority to waive certification requirements on the CTR project to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia. The Administration urges the Congress to make both waiver authorities permanent. We will, of course, examine closely each year recipients' records in meeting certification requirements before recommending any exercise of a certification waiver to the President. The same will be true regarding the conditions on the Shchuch'ye project.

FY 2004 Budget Request

Russia. The United States would like to see Russia become a full partner in the Global War on Terrorism and combating WMD proliferation; comply fully with its arms control and nonproliferation obligations; and safely and securely store its nuclear weapons, fissile material and dangerous pathogens. This is a vision for Russia, parts of which CTR may help realize. The reality tells us that we must be very cautious, and find new ways to protect US investment in CTR projects.

Russia: Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE). The FY 2004 budget request includes $57.6 million for SOAE, a $12.5 million decrease from FY 2003, reflecting a carryover of unobligated funds from previous years. The carryover results principally from the 2002 delay in certifying Russia for CTR assistance. SOAE assists Russia in eliminating strategic delivery systems and infrastructure. SOAE assistance is framed as an incentive for Russia to draw down its former Soviet nuclear forces. One of the larger project areas under SOAE relates to Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination, where $25.9 million is requested for FY 2004. The termination of the Solid Rocket Motor Disposition Facility has resulted in a reassessment and potential restructuring of this project. $18.7 million is requested for SLBM Launcher Elimination and SSBN Dismantlement. This is a $7.3 million increase from FY 2003, resulting from our plan to dismantle two SSBNs in FY 2004 as opposed to one in FY 2003.

CTR's Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program assists Russia with safe and secure storage for nuclear warheads. We requested $48.0 million in the FY 2004 budget for this program. The bulk of the funds, $47.9 million, are directed toward the Site Security Enhancements project, which provides urgently needed security enhancements to Ministry of Defense (MOD) nuclear weapons storage sites and temporary transshipment points for movement of deactivated warheads. As noted above, we concluded agreements with the MoD last month that will guarantee CTR personnel the access necessary to oversee security upgrades at these sites.

We have requested $23.2 million for the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program, which provides safe and secure transport of nuclear warheads from deployed sites to dismantlement or enhanced security storage sites. This is a $3.6 million increase over the FY 2003 budget. The increase will support Russia's improved efforts to draw down its nuclear stockpile pursuant to the Moscow Treaty. The FY 2004 budget request for the Weapons Transportation Safety Enhancements project area is $5.7 million greater than for FY 2003. This will enhance safe and secure transport, to include purchase of ten replacement warhead transportation cars. Russia agreed to destroy two unusable warhead transport cars at its own expense in exchange for each new car CTR provides.

To assist Russia in providing a secure, centralized storage facility for fissile material removed from nuclear weapons, CTR is building a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak. This project is over 90 percent complete and requires no additional funding. DoD is negotiating a transparency agreement to ensure that only weapons-grade material is stored at the FMSF.

Russia: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). Overall funding requested for the BWPP program remains roughly at the FY 2003 level, $54.2 million. FY 2003 increases in BWPP funding reflected the Administration's interest in combating biological weapons proliferation as part of the war on terrorism. DoD anticipates obligating approximately $31 million in FY 2004 for BWPP activities in Russia.

These activities will include additional cooperative research projects with Russian scientists and institutes that are designed to prevent proliferation of BW expertise, enhance transparency, improve standards of conduct and leverage the extensive expertise of the former Soviet bioweapons complex. Additional efforts are planned to dismantle and eliminate BW infrastructure in Russia as well as projects to enhance security against theft or accidental release of dangerous pathogens.

Russia: Chemical Weapons Destruction. The budget request for the Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) program in Russia is $200.3 million, an increase of $67.4 million. This reflects the President's direction to accelerate progress at the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facililty (CWDF) project in Shchuch'ye ($190.3 million). The Shchuch'ye project is a CW destruction facility for nerve agent-filled, man-portable, tube and rocket artillery and missile warheads. This facility will be able to destroy 1700 metric tons of nerve agent per year. $126.6 million of FY 2003 funds and $35.0 million in FY 2002 funds have been obligated for Shchuch'ye as a result of Russia's recent agreement to destroy all nerve agent weapons at Shchuch'ye. The President sought and Congress granted authority to waive certification requirements related to the Shchuch'ye project. The President exercised this authority on January 10, 2003 because of proliferation concerns about the types of munitions to be eliminated there. However, the Administration continues to press Russia for a full and complete accounting of its chemical weapons stockpile, in addition to completing a practical plan for eliminating nerve agents.

CTR continues to assist Russia with dismantling and demilitarizing the former CW production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk. CTR is also enhancing security for highly proliferable chemical weapons stored at Planovy/Shchuch'ye and Kizner. DoD already has provided interim security enhancements, and is in the process of installing comprehensive security upgrades that will be completed this year.

Non-Russian FSU States. As with Russia, the vision for CTR assistance in the other FSU states is tempered by a mixed record of responsiveness. There are a number of areas in which certain FSU states have demonstrated a significant commitment to cooperation and transparency. For example, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are free of nuclear weapons with the help of CTR assistance.

Non-Russia FSU States: Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms and WMD Infrastructure. Ukraine. We have requested $3.9 million for CTR's Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination program area in Ukraine. DoD has successfully removed all SS-24 missiles from their silos, and eliminated all launchers and launch centers. The SS-24s have been disassembled and the proliferable components destroyed. There is no longer a proliferation threat from these systems. CTR also will use prior year funds to continue elimination of Tu-142 Bear and Tu-22M Backfire bombers and KH-22 nuclear capable air-to-surface missiles in Ukraine.

For DoD's WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area in Ukraine, no new funds are requested for FY 2004. DoD will use FY 2003 funds to eliminate additional nuclear weapons storage sites.

Kazakhstan. CTR's WMD Infrastructure Elimination program area assists Kazakhstan in providing safe and secure storage of fissile material and in destroying former nuclear weapons and liquid propellant storage sites. We are requesting no additional funding in FY 2004 and will rely instead on FY 2003 funds.

Non-Russian FSU States: Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). DoD has concluded Biological Threat Reduction Implementing Agreements with Uzbekistan and Georgia and negotiated an agreement with Ukraine. We are also providing BWPP assistance to Kazakhstan under the WMD Infrastructure Elimination agreement. DoD already conducts BWPP projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and is planning to begin activities in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI). $39.4 million is requested in FY 2004 to support this initiative, which is designed to enhance non-Russian FSU capabilities to prevent, deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and related materials. DoD is collaborating with other US agencies to develop an overarching US government strategic plan for export control and border security assistance to FSU states that will encompass assistance provided through this initiative. This initiative will build on the foundation created by the CTR Defense and Military Contacts program.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks, subsequent discoveries of terrorist plans to obtain WMD, and the need for a rapid expansion of border security efforts in Central Asia underscored the role that DoD could play through CTR in support of the war on terrorism. This initiative is designed to develop self-sustaining capabilities, not merely to provide equipment and services. This vision will require close coordination with other US agencies to ensure that recipient countries are developing the law enforcement and regulatory capabilities necessary for a comprehensive approach to WMD border security.

In implementing the WMD-PPI, DoD has developed projects designed to produce comprehensive operational capabilities based on the interagency approved US strategic plan and country/regional requirements. These projects will provide not only equipment and related training, but also self-sustaining operations and maintenance capabilities.

DoD is developing the following projects through the WMD Proliferation Prevention initiative:

Conclusion

Since its inception, the CTR Program has assisted with deactivation or elimination of a total of 6032 nuclear warheads and 846 ballistic missile launchers, 109 strategic bombers, 26 strategic ballistic missile submarines, 554 air-to-surface missiles and 888 ballistic missiles. These are important achievements. The Administration also is acutely aware of the difficulties encountered by the program. The reality is that this program, which we undertake for our own national security purposes, comes with costs that we must bear if we continue to take advantage of this approach to threat reduction. This Administration believes that it is worth the cost. As we urge your continued support we pledge our efforts to ensure that additional non-proliferation achievements within, as well as outside, the FSU are won through responsible stewardship of US resources.