Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Opening statement of Honorable Doug Bereuter
CTR Programs

Today the Europe Subcommittee, along with the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, will hold the second of two hearings on the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. Last week we received testimony from representatives of the Bush Administration.

Today we will receive testimony regarding threat reduction and non-proliferation programs from representatives of four of the most prominent organizations in the country which address this issue.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose, in my view, the most serious threat to international security and the security of the United States that we face. Today, the international community is confronted with thousands of nuclear weapons and tons of fissile material and chemical toxins which in the hands of a rouge nation or terrorist group determined to possess and use such weapons could kill thousands and spread panic on a global basis.

When the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the new Russian government inherited the largest supply of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), material and expertise in the world.

As I said last week, while much is known about nuclear and chemical weapons, the nature and extent of Russia’s massive and diverse arsenal of biological weapons has yet to be fully revealed, but from what I have learned, it constitutes one of the most terrifying threats to the survival of the planet.

Recognizing the potentially dangerous situation in 1991, the Congress responded by initiating what has become known as the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Over the years, the CTR program has evolved into a billion dollar, multi-agency effort to secure and dismantle nuclear, chemical and biological stockpiles and infrastructure as well as to prevent weapons scientists and specialists from providing their expertise to the highest bidder.

Assessments we have seen suggest that over the past twelve years the CTR program has achieved a respectable level of success. Weapons systems have been decommissioned or eliminated. The transport and storage of nuclear weapons has been made more secure. Warhead control and accounting has been improved. Security of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium has been tightened. Some weapons grade uranium has been eliminated.

Despite these success stories, much remains to be done. Undoubtedly there could be improvements in the current programs as well as additional resources devoted to this absolutely vital effort.

Many of the large number of unemployed and under-employed weapons scientists have not been transitioned to suitable alternative research or employment. Russia has not always provided its share of the funding for these programs and that it has been less than forthcoming in providing access to nuclear sites and certainly not all biological weapons and research facilities.

As we heard last week from the Administration witnesses, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and skills needed to make them is the mission of the Agencies involved in the CTR effort. Today’s hearing is intended to review the exiting programs, to take stock of the accomplishments thus far, to review the problems incurred in implementing the programs, and to determine what is needed as we go forward to ensure that these programs are efficient and effective in accomplishing their goals.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.