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STATEMENT BY
MR. PATRICK J. WAKEFIELD
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION AND THREAT REDUCTION)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS, AND TECHNOLOGY

 BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON THE U.S. CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM

  OCTOBER 30, 2003  

Mr. chairman and Distinguished Committee Members, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the United States Chemical Demilitarization Program.  I am Patrick Wakefield, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction.  I am the single focal point within the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for the oversight, coordination and integration of the Chemical Demilitarization Program; the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternative (or ACWA) Program; Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Treaties; and Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts in the countries now referred to as the Former Soviet Union.  With regard to the Chemical Demilitarization Program mission, my Primary goals and objectives are:

• To ensure that the leadership of the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program maintains an enhanced culture of safety within the workplace, and to confirm our requirements are clearly communicated to, understood by, and acted upon by our contractors and not in conflict with the overall chemical weapons destruction mission; 

• To increase transparency and openness with the public and the international community, and to work for cooperation from special interest groups in accomplishing our mission, and

• To meet our Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty requirements.

The mission of the U.S. Chemical Demilitarization Program is to destroy all U.S. Chemical Warfare related material while ensuring maximum protection of the public, personnel involved in the destruction effort, and the environment.  At first glance, this appears to be a fairly straightforward mission, easily achievable provided reasonable resources and effort.  What we have seen since 1986, when congress mandated the destruction of our chemical weapons stockpile, is there are many unexpected and substantial challenges that must be overcome while conducting a national-scale chemical weapons destruction program.  As the GAO recently highlighted, it is obvious that many of these challenges corresponding to program management.  The Department has already taken and is in the process of taking additional steps to rectify program management issues and continue to provide rigorous program oversight.

Recent Program Changes

Today I would like to highlight for you the major changes the Department of Defense is implementing with respect to the United States Chemical Demilitarization program.  Earlier this year, the Army consolidated the program manager for Chemical Demilitarization and its Chemical Weapons Storage Mission under a New Agency, the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, otherwise known as the CMA.  The creation of the CMA allows us to streamline our overall efforts with respect to Chemical Weapons Destruction, and will significantly improve our program management in the long term.  This will be accomplished by consolidating accountability, simply going the chain of command, restructuring and combining organizational functions to reduce redundancies, and aligning the program under the checks and balances of the acquisition community through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, with continued oversight by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The creation of the CMA allows us to streamline our overall efforts with respect to chemical weapons destruction, and will significantly improve our program management in the long term.  This will be accomplished by consolidating accountability, simplifying the chain of command, restructuring and combining organizational functions to reduce redundancies, and aligning the program under the checks and balances of the acquisition community through the assistant secretary of the army for acquisition, logistics and technology, with continued oversight by the office of the Secretary of Defense.

Additionally, the Department of Defense has now selected destruction technologies at all of our chemical weapons sites.  On July 16, 2002, the department selected "neutralization followed by biotreatment" as the technology to pilot test the destruction of chemical weapons at the Pueblo, Colorado chemical depot.  On February 3, 2003, the department selected "neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation" as the technology to pilot test the destruction of chemical weapons at the Blue Grass Army depot in Richmond, Kentucky.  These chemical weapons destruction sites are currently being managed by the program manager for ACWA as mandated by public law 107-248.

The GAO recently found that the division of the program management structure, currently bifurcated between the CMA and the program manager for ACWA, is a significant program deficiency.  The Department of Defense agrees with the GAO's assertion.  While the Department has operated strictly under the tenets of public law requiring office of the Secretary of Defense management of the ACWA Program, we are looking at further streamlining the management of the chemical demilitarization program through statutory change.  The program manager for ACWA completed his original charter by successfully demonstrating alternatives to the incineration process, and the department now desires his consolidation under the CMA.  This consolidation would significantly improve the overall management of the chemical demilitarization program by making the executive agent of the program, the army, responsible for the program in its entirety.  We ask for your full support of this proposal and can provide you more detailed information upon request.  

PROGRAM STATUS  

This year the chemical demilitarization program has entered a critical phase, with the Aberdeen, Maryland and Anniston, Alabama sites operational.  Within the next year, we also expect to commence operations at three additional sites: Umatilla, Oregon; Newport, Indiana; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

Due to unfortunate circumstances, the Army destroyed little chemical agent over the past year and a half.  This is a primary cause of why the U.S. asked the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons in September for an extension to the chemical weapons convention intermediate 45% destruction deadline.  I am pleased to report that the organization granted our extension request late last week.  While we are assured with a high degree of confidence this will occur by December 2007, we expect to achieve this milestone sooner.  We also expect to have to request an extension to the convention 100% destruction deadline in 2006.  The convention allows a maximum five year extension of the 100% deadline (until April 2012 at the latest).  As the chemical demilitarization program matures over the next few years, the Department will be better prepared to determine the specific length of extension required.

PROGRAM ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Within the next several years, our most significant challenge will likely be a result of our success.  As we get our chemical weapons destruction sites on-line, the army will have to manage simultaneously, up to six separate sites, each operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in four separate time zones, destroying multiple agents, with different technologies, and different contractors.  As you could surmise, this will be a significant challenge for the army, though we are confident they will perform this task exceptionally.

Other factors could also present formidable challenges in our chemical weapons destruction program:

• Although we take every known precaution to prevent them, accidents and safety incidents may occur, sometimes crippling our destruction efforts.  We have considerable strengthened our safety program to mitigate any accidents to counter any future risks.

• We also face continued opposition from special interest groups through litigation.

• Requirements for the chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program (or CSEPP), continue to grow.  The federal emergency management agency and the army will continue to validate the states' CSEPP requirements and ensure that they meet the 'maximum protection' criteria codified in U.S. Code 50, Chapter 32, Section 1521.

• And, new environmental permitting and monitoring requirements can influence our program.  These regulatory changes introduce improvements which affect baseline costs and schedules, though presently this a manageable key component of our overall chemical weapons destruction program.

Finally, at this crucial time in which many destruction facilities are coming on-line, effective resource management will be a critical influence over our overall destruction strategy.

FINAL REMARKS

In conclusion, I want to emphasize the department's intention to address chemical demilitarization program management issues underscores our commitment to strengthening and improving overall organizational effectiveness.  Change has already begun at the top, with future changes expected to positively impact different aspects and levels of program management.  We have many distinctive challenges; however we are also poised to work each and every issue to bolster our overall efforts in this prominent national security program.  I welcome your comments on all aspects of our program's progress.  I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee for the opportunity to testify today.  I look forward to working with you to advance out common goal of the safe and complete destruction of our national chemical weapon stockpile.

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