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STATEMENT BY
DR. DALE KLEIN
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CONCERNING
COUNTERING THE THREAT OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

MARCH 19, 2003  

  

Chairman and Distinguished Members:  I was appointed by President Bush in November 2001, following Senate advice and consent, to my present position.  Within the Department of Defense, I have responsibility for all matters concerning the formulation of policy and plans for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs.  However, I will focus most of my remarks on chemical and biological defense programs rather than on my nuclear responsibilities.  While the committee has asked our panel to appear in the connection of terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), our concern includes any WMD threat against our women and men in uniform.  It is not just enough to consider terrorism-we must also consider traditional acts of war, industrial or transportation accidents, weather-induced releases, operator errors or other potential predicates for WMD release.  The warfighting commander does not need to consider if a trucker failed to close a valve or if lightning struck a toxic industrial chemical storage site or if al Qaeda operatives are releasing toxins near an overseas base.  In each case, the warfighting force needs protection.  The experts before you today develop technology solutions; work on new concepts to improve tactics, techniques, and procedures; provide WMD combat support expertise; and manage the fulfillment of our chemical and biological defense equipment requirements with the industrial base of our nation and our allies.  Due to the support of the Congress and with the help of the resources you have made available to the Department; our fighting forces are equipped and trained far better than in 1991 during OPERATION DESERT STORM.  The priority placed on, and concern taken with, chemical and biological defense shows a focus at a high level.  In fact my boss, Pete Aldridge, commented that for a period of time, he was spending more of his personal attention on anthrax vaccine than on the Joint Strike Fighter which may become the largest program in DoD history!  I want to assure members and our citizens we are supporting our troops and that the equipment they will use has been designed and tested to withstand enemy chemical or biological attack.  Our logistics experts have made sure that the right equipment has been supplied to the right units at the right time.  Commanders have conducted numerous training drills simulating WMD attacks and our troops have practiced their individual protection actions.  I am confident we are as ready as we can be given the technology available today. 

Congress has called for and we have delivered on a number of initiatives which significantly improve our ability to protect our fighting forces in the field, at sea, or in the air.  We have improved detection and identification technologies; individual protection systems; decontaminants; biological medical protection; and, warfighter awareness of the threat.  Our commanders in the field have the benefits of those improvements.  I will describe, in specifics, Force Protection Initiatives, Biological Detection Capabilities, Chemical and Biological Protection Ensembles and Biological Defense Vaccines.

Force Protection Initiatives

In fiscal year 2003, $32.9 million was allocated for installation protection equipment within the Chemical and Biological Protection Program.  The Chemical and Biological Installation Protection Equipment is an integrated suite of highly effective sensors and related equipment to be installed at nine stateside military installations.  The equipment suite will provide tiered sampling and collection, detection, identification and warning capabilities.  It is designed to provide early, indoor and outdoor collection, detection, presumptive identification, and warning.  Confirmatory identification and enhanced medical surveillance capability is also included.

In the Fiscal Year 2004 President's Budget, we have requested a significant force protection initiative.  This program will provide chemical and biological protection coverage to 200 DoD installations.  This protection will include sensors to detect radiological threats.  The equipment to be deployed will be integrated in the base operational command and control infrastructure.  Bio-detection equipment will consist of automated Joint Biological Point Detection Systems and Portal Shield systems along with manual dry filter unit samplers.  Support from laboratories will consist of tiered, multi-technology, confirmatory testing protocols.  Chemical detection will be provided by Automatic Chemical and Agent Detector Alarms and the Joint Chemical Agent Detector integrated with base command and control systems.  The program will procure initial detection agent consumables, new equipment training, spares, contractor logistics support and operators.

Biological Detection Capabilities

Aside from a sick person requesting medical aid, biological detection capabilities available in 1991 were very limited.  The primary system available included assays that were manually operated, capable of detecting only a few pathogens and were susceptible to false readings.  Over the past several years, the Department has fielded several new biological detection capabilities.  With the Army's Biological Detection Companies, the Biological Integrated Detection System or BIDS, will provide a multi-technology point detection system.  The Navy has installed the Interim Biological Agent Detector on ships deploying to the Persian Gulf.  In addition, we have fielded the Portal Shield network sensor system for protection of critical fixed sites.  We have also fielded the Biological Weapon Sampling Kit which includes hand-held immunochromatographic assay, a simple, antibody-based test used as a quick screen to presumptively identify biological agents from environmental samples.  The M93A1 NBC Reconnaissance System provides a variety of capabilities including the new Chemical and Biological Mass Spectrometer and improved warning and reporting systems to reduce reaction time throughout the theater.

The comment I heard on my first visit to the field and one I have heard frequently, involves the need for standoff detection of biological agents.  I want to be especially candid:  the problem of stand-off detection of biological pathogens in near-real-time remains an extremely difficult challenge.  We can detect many important kinds of dangerous radiological and chemical threats at stand-off distances in near-real-time.  However, there are many interfering biological signals present in the environment; we must be able to distinguish between the dangerous and benign strains; and we will have to determine if threat organisms will remain viable and pathogenic as they traverse the space between their current location and the deployed military force.  We are investigating techniques such as multi-spectral laser-based technologies to provide earlier warning to our warfighters.

Chemical and Biological Protective Ensembles

Beginning in 1996, an improved individual protective ensemble known as the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) first became available.  JSLIST, or in Marine parlance, Saratoga, replaced the Battle Dress Overgarment (BDO), used in OPERATION DESERT STORM, as our first choice in individual protection.  While BDOs remain fully effective and available as a backup, they are heavier than the JSLIST.  My wife actually wore the BDO during her service in OPERATION DESERT STORM.  She told me the carbon protective element of the BDO would leak through the inner liner and provide a thin and unattractive coating of black dust on her skin.  This characteristic didn't make wearing the BDO popular!  The JSLIST provides a greater duration of protection once presented with a chemical threat and it may also be laundered.  As you know, the Department discovered defective BDOs purchased before the JSLIST became available.  We were able to locate 600,000 defective BDOs before issue to units.  All units were advised to use the remaining, already distributed, defective BDOs for unit training use only and remove them from war reserve stocks.  Three different times, the Army has tasked units to search for and remove from war reserve stocks any defective BDOs identified by lot number.  Much has been made of the possibility that defective BDOs remain in the logistics pipeline because we did not account for every defective BDO as it was used in training.  While I cannot fully eliminate the possibility that in a locker somewhere there might be a small handful of defective BDOs, I believe the possibility is quite low and I am confident this issue has been resolved.

Since initial fielding, there has been increased emphasis to field JSLIST to the entire force and to phase out the BDO entirely.  Our procurement strategy, supported by Congressional authorization and appropriations, has permitted the Department to ensure that all of our forces in the region will have two JSLIST each and Marines will have three each.  Continued production in JSLIST procurement is needed to fully replace the BDO, and to replace any JSLIST used if hostilities occur.

The Department is committed to improving the design of the JSLIST.  We are investing in our science and technology base to find non-carbon based materials to reduce weight and thereby improve comfort and mobility.  We are attempting to develop self-detoxifying clothing that will allow our personnel to better sustain operations in a contaminated environment with reduced risk.  Additionally, improved masks and filters are being designed to increase protective margins, improve visual awareness, and improve weapon system compatibility.

Biological Defense Vaccines  

Medical protection is crucial to military operations and success in the field.  In 1991, we had very limited stocks of vaccines and no way to surge production.  Currently we have a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved production line for anthrax vaccine.  FDA approval was not obtained without a strong effort by both the government and the contractor members of the team.  All deploying forces receive smallpox and anthrax vaccines.  DoD supplies anthrax vaccine to other federal agencies once DoD requirements are fulfilled.  The Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program is working to fulfill defense biological vaccine requirements including maintenance of a military vaccine stockpile.  The Department is working with the private sector, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Homeland Security to establish a national approach to assured vaccine supplies both for homeland security and homeland defense missions.

Summary    

DoD places a very high emphasis on protecting our warfighters from chemical and biological agents.  We are ready for combat operations in southwest Asia.  We are working many approaches:  arms control, cooperative international programs, combat operations, and consequence management operations, to name just a few.  We intend to reduce, eliminate, or secure WMD sources.  We will predict, detect, and interdict the transmission of WMD to the extent possible.  Finally when we are targeted, we will protect our people and facilities and follow with effective decontamination.  We are better prepared on all fronts:  battle management, contamination avoidance, individual and collective protection, medical countermeasures, and decontamination.  We deeply appreciate the support of the Committee and the members and we are grateful for the sacrifices of our troops, their families, and our coalition partners.

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