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Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I am Brigadier General Dan Mongeon, Commander of the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to address questions concerning individual protective equipment used against a chemical/biological attack. Let me begin with some brief background information on the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia.

The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia is one of the Defense Logistics Agency's four supply management centers. Our mission is to ensure the combat readiness and sustainment of America's Fighting Forces by providing world class logistical support in peace and war. We also support other Federal agencies and some foreign governments. We are the providers of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, food, general and industrial items, and clothing and textile products. Our mission encompasses support to the full spectrum of military operations, ranging from support of non-war activities such as disaster relief and humanitarian aid, to provision of logistics support to major regional war. Most critically, we must be able to maintain capabilities which can seamlessly transition from every-day support requirements to the escalating support dimensions of crisis events. We have 33 branch offices throughout the United States, Europe, and the Pacific. On an annual basis we buy and sell over $5 billion in products representing the commodity groups I mentioned earlier.

In its invitation to testify, the Subcommittee requested that we address four specific questions which were: 1) whether the Defense Logistics Agency is complying with recommendations made by the DoD Inspector General in two specified audit reports, 2) what types of individual protective equipment are in DLA's inventory and where they are located, 3) what quality control procedures are in place for acceptance of individual protective equipment from vendors, and 4) how DLA tracks the shelf life of individual protective equipment. I will answer these questions in the order they were presented.

Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General Audit Report, Inventory Accuracy at the Defense Depot Columbus, Ohio, Report No. 97-102, dated February 28, 1997, found that the Defense Depot Columbus, Ohio, found discrepancies in the inventory records for chemical protective suits (specifically, battle dress overgarments). The Inspector General recommended that the Commander, Defense Depot, Columbus, Ohio improve inventory procedures in certain specific ways, and the Agency concurred in those recommendations. Subsequent to the completion of the audit and as the result of the Base Realignment and Closure process, all inventories of battle dress overgarments in the possession of the Defense Logistics Agency were transferred to Defense Depot, Albany, Georgia.

Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General Audit Report, Assuring Condition and Inventory Accountability of Chemical Protective Suits, Report Number D-2000-086, dated February 25, 2000, found that inventory problems identified in Report Number 97-102 had not been corrected as we had previously thought. It also found that the Defense Criminal Investigative Service had found that chemical protective suits manufactured under Isratex, Incorporated contracts DLA100-89-C-0429 and DLA100-92-C-0427 contained major defects which would cause "degradation in the wearer's performance and the potential loss of life while working in a chemical-biological contaminated environment" and these potentially defective suits had not been properly segregated. The report recommended that the Defense Depot, Albany, Georgia, complete efforts to identify potentially defective suits and remove them from inventory; alert other DoD activities to remove potentially defective suits from inventory; perform a complete wall-to-wall inventory of all chemical protective suits; conduct research to determine causes for the inventory inaccuracy; and make appropriate adjustments to the accountable records. The Defense Logistics Agency concurred in the recommendations. In September 1999, (and prior to the release of Report Number D-2000-086) a wall-to-wall inventory of all chemical protective items at Defense Depot, Albany, Georgia, was begun. The inventory was completed in January 2000 with the result that all items were counted, and based on date of manufacture, placed on separate pallets and stored in distinct locations. In addition, all chemical protective suits that were potentially defective were physically segregated. The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia alerted its customers of the potentially defective suits in December 1999 and in February 2000 advised that the suits should be used only for training purposes. We sent out another advisory in May 2000, based upon another audit that we performed during that month.

Although the Subcommittee's question did not specifically raise the issue of suits produced by Isratex, Incorporated, Report D-2000-086 does raise that issue, and I will take this opportunity to address it. During the manufacturing process and prior to acceptance of the completed units, the suits manufactured by Isratex were subjected to inspection by DoD quality assurance representatives. Those inspections, based upon statistically valid samplings of the firm's production, gave us assurance that the suits were in compliance with the applicable specifications, and therefore, able to provide the requisite level of protection to Service members. However, in the case of the Isratex contracts, it is evident that with the requisite motivation our quality control system can be subverted. A criminal investigation into Isratex's business operations revealed the company did, in fact, engage in illegal activity to get around our quality assurance protections. Although we are not privy to all the information gathered during the investigation, prosecution, and ultimate guilty pleas, we have since learned from the audits performed in 1996, 1999, and 2000 of representative samples of the battle dress overgarments that the suits did not meet the contractual quality requirements. Clearly, this experience has demonstrated there is room for improvement. We have taken steps to effect that improvement as I will make clear in my response to your question on our quality assurance procedures.

Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to discuss the procedures that are in place for alerting our customers to serious problems related to chemical protective equipment such as those presented by the Isratex suits. In 1998, responsibility for notifying users of chemical protective suits about such problems passed from the Army (the proponent for the battle dress overgarment) to the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia. The Isratex suits represented the first instance in which we needed to use the notification procedures. Once we had all the required information, we did effect notification. To be sure, there were some initial problems in ensuring all the affected parties were notified. However, those issues have been resolved, and we are confident the process will work smoothly in the future. In fact, we made successful use of the procedure in May 2000 to advise our customers of additional suits that should be used exclusively for training.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe the actions we have taken fully address the issues raised in the two audit reports and demonstrate our complete commitment to ensuring the Service member is provided with equipment that affords the intended level of protection.

The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia manages a wide range of individual protective equipment items. Chief among these are the battle dress overgarment chemical protective suit (which is still in use but no longer being acquired since it is being phased out); the black vinyl overshoe; chemical protective gloves (in three thicknesses); and the joint service lightweight integrated suit technology chemical protective suit, which is the replacement for the battle dress overgarment. These items are stored principally in Defense Depots Albany, Georgia; Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; and San Joaquin, California.

A comprehensive set of quality control procedures is in place for the acceptance of individual protective equipment from vendors. We require our manufacturers maintain an approved quality control system; many use either ANSI or ISO 9000 standards that are widely used in the private sector. The Defense Contract Management Agency sends its quality assurance representatives into our manufacturers' plants to perform contract quality assurance. These representatives evaluate the contractor's quality system, such as ANSI or ISO 9000, for compliance with the contractual standard. They identify all key high-risk processes and evaluate them to assure they are adequate to produce the required results. They perform product audits on the outputs of high and moderate risk key processes to assess product conformance with contractual requirements. They perform data analyses on all key contractor processes to verify process performance. Based upon confidence derived from this surveillance, the representatives authorize shipment of completed items.

In addition, because these items are considered "life and limb" (meaning their failure could result in serious injury or death for the user) and must provide chemical protection, they are all subject to specialized testing. The battle dress overgarments are no longer being produced for DLA, and contractual testing is no longer being performed on them. The joint service lightweight integrated suit technology suit (successor to the battle dress overgarment) is currently in production and is subjected to both component testing and system testing. For components such as thread and zippers the contractor provides Certificates of Conformance that certify that they meet the Government standards established for that item. For the charcoal liner material used in the suit, the contractor provides test data from an approved laboratory with each lot demonstrating compliance. Lots of outer shell material are randomly sampled at the place of manufacture by the Government quality assurance representative, and sent to the Defense Logistics Agency Product Testing Center, co-located with the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, where physical property tests such as tear strength, breaking strength, and material weight are performed to ensure they meet the applicable standard. In order to facilitate performance of system testing, the assigned quality assurance representative randomly pulls an appropriate number of samples from each lot of suits that has been prepared for shipment (the larger the lot, the more samples that are drawn). These are forwarded to the Battelle Memorial Institute Hazardous Research Material Center. Swatches from every lot are challenged with both nerve gas and blister chemical agents. The results from this test are compared to the benchmark swatch tests conducted on this material as a candidate in the joint service lightweight integrated suit technology development program. Once every 4 months a lot from each manufacturer is also chosen at random for extended testing, which entails laundering each sample six times and challenging it with nerve and blister agents, as well as checking for seam integrity and color fastness. Only after satisfactory results are received from both the Defense Logistics Agency Product Testing Center and the Battelle Center does the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia authorize acceptance and shipment of the lot. In addition, based upon our experience with the Isratex suits, we have issued a letter of instruction to the quality assurance representatives in the plants in which these suits are being manufactured. We have tightened procedures aimed at preventing product substitution; we have precluded shipment of suits prior to completion of all testing; and we have insisted upon visual and dimensional inspection of each lot prior to shipment while calling out specific defects that must be emphasized during the inspection. We feel this will go a long way toward providing the assurances our customers require.

The black vinyl overshoe is also subjected to component and end item testing. The rubber compounds used to make the boots are tested to assure proper formulation, and the finished overshoes are tested by the contractor (with verification testing by the Government) for leakage, tensile strength, hardness, and other physical properties. The Government also performs live agent chemical testing on the boots at Edgewood Arsenal.

Shelf-life surveillance is the responsibility of the Military Service assigned as the proponent for each item. For the battle dress overgarment, which is no longer being produced, but will not reach complete shelf-life expiration until 2007, the Army is the proponent. This item was designed to deliver a minimum shelf-life of 5 years. Each year, the Army's Soldier Systems Center purchases battle dress overgarments from the Army unit that has the most varied inventory of suits more than 5 years old. Those suits are subjected to visual inspection, physical property testing, and chemical property testing. The results are reviewed by a team composed of a textile technologist, chemical engineers, and a statistician. The team formulates a recommendation that is sent through the Product Manager - Soldier Equipment for concurrence and then to the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia for worldwide release. The results of the audits performed over the years have been that the shelf-life for suits manufactured under all contracts have been extended beyond the original 5 years (in most cases, well beyond 5 years). An absolute limit for shelf-life of 14 years has been established (beyond which no further testing is conducted and the suits are considered usable only for training). All battle dress overgarments in inventory will reach shelf-life expiration no later than 2007 and will be replaced by the joint service lightweight integrated suit technology suit. Shelf-life surveillance for the chemical protective gloves and for the black vinyl overshoe is performed by the Army in a manner similar to that used for the battle dress overgarment.

The Marine Corps is responsible for shelf-life surveillance of the joint service lightweight integrated suit technology chemical protective suits. Suits from each production lot are randomly selected by the quality assurance representative and shipped to the surveillance program manager at the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, Georgia. These suits have an established shelf-life of 5 years based upon the performance of the Marine Corps Saratoga suit, which has already exceeded the 5 year shelf life. The plan is to begin testing the suits as they approach the 5 year point and extend the shelf-life 1 or more years at a time based upon the chemical test results. If suits drawn from a specific lot become suspect or fail chemical testing, that lot will be suspended from use. This plan will allow for positive control of the suits by managing shelf-life very accurately by specific lot, and long-term quality control and assurance will be maintained for the life of the suit.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the Defense Logistics Agency takes very seriously its responsibility to provide the Military Services with individual protective equipment that affords them the best available protection. In our efforts to do so, we work closely with the Services and the Defense Contract Management Agency to ensure we only take delivery of products which fully meet the needs of the Services and the level of protection provided by the equipment retained in inventory (by us and the Services) is carefully monitored over time.