TESTIMONY
IO Assistant Secretary C. David Welch
NEA Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Beth Jones
House International Relations Committee
March 23, 2000
Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss U.S.
policy toward Iraq. I shall open with a brief statement on behalf of
us both. As Assistant Secretary for International Organization
Affairs, I deal primarily with aspects of Iraq policy that involve the
Security Council. This includes the oil-for-food program and UNMOVIC.
My colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones, represents the Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau, which manages overall policy toward Iraq. This
includes the over-arching policy of containment and our efforts to
foster regime change by supporting the Iraqi opposition.
We will be glad to address questions on any aspect of U.S. policy
toward Iraq, but I will focus in these introductory remarks primarily
on two areas:
First, the humanitarian situation in the country, including the
balance between the impact of sanctions and the benefits of the
oil-for-food program;
Second, a few words on what we expect from UNMOVIC over the next few
months.
The humanitarian situation in Iraq is a complex subject, and we are
concerned that the recent flow of misinformation and biased assertions
from various sources has made it difficult to maintain sight of what
U.S. policy really is and what really is happening on the ground in
Iraq. I hope we can provide some clarification today.
U.S. policy toward Iraq has followed a consistent course since the
liberation of Kuwait in January 1991; and whatever you might have read
in the papers lately, there is no sea-change in the offing. Our policy
is based on the objective judgment that the regime of Saddam Hussein
poses a continuing threat to regional peace and security, which must
be contained. And, again, despite what you might have seen in the
press, containment remains a cost-effective and successful policy. UN
sanctions are extremely important and must continue until Iraq
complies with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions.
Let me state, for the record, that we do not expect Iraq to meet that
standard anytime soon. In fact, we doubt that Iraq will take the
sensible steps necessary to obtain the lifting, or the suspension, of
sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power.
Those sanctions do not target the civilian population, however, and in
fact have never restricted the importation of basic medicines and
food. Moreover, the United States has focused on addressing
humanitarian needs in Iraq since the immediate aftermath of Operation
Desert Storm in 1991, when brutal military repression displaced tens
of thousands of civilians in northern Iraq. We responded with
Operation Provide Comfort, an U.S.-led coalition effort that provided
food, shelter and other forms of disaster assistance on a massive
scale.
The coalition also instituted a no-fly zone in the north in 1991, and
another in southern Iraq in 1992. That policy has contained the Iraqi
military and prevented any repetition of large-scale use of force
against civilians.
In the Security Council, we have championed the humanitarian interests
of the Iraqi people and continue to do so today. Let me cite a few
examples:
In April 1991, we helped shape Security Council resolution 688, which
demanded an end to Iraqi repression of civilians and provided part of
the rationale for the no-fly zones.
In August 1991 we played a leading role in drafting resolution 706,
which included the original oil-for-food program -- a program Iraq
promptly rejected.
In May 1995 we co-sponsored resolution 986, which expanded and fleshed
out the oil-for-food concept. You will recall the tragically slow
evolution of that concept: Iraq rejected it outright for four years,
and then slow-rolled it for another year and a half, so that the first
delivery of humanitarian goods did not occur until March 1997. Some
critics are attempting now to portray oil-for-food as part of the
humanitarian problem in Iraq. In fact, it is a solution whose
implementation was long delayed by the Iraqi regime, and whose full
potential is only now being approached.
In February 1998 we supported resolution 1153, which expanded the
program to $5.2 billion in oil export revenues during each six-month
phase.
In December 1999 we supported resolution 1284, which removed the
ceiling on the value of oil exports authorized to meet humanitarian
needs in Iraq. That resolution also included numerous provisions to
improve the efficiency of oil-for-food.
I want to emphasize that the need to balance the impact of sanctions
and the benefits of the oil-for-food program is not a new challenge
for U.S. policy. Sanctions were imposed for valid reasons, have been
in place for nine and a half years, and are likely to continue for
some time. Oil-for-food has been in place almost exactly three years,
during which oil prices have fluctuated and the program itself has
been constantly reassessed and adjusted. That process of assessment
and adjustment is ongoing, as reflected in resolution 1284, and will
certainly continue.
Sanctions are not aimed at the Iraqi people, and the bottom line is
this: we believe that oil-for-food, properly managed, can effectively
mitigate the impact of sanctions on Iraq's civilian population for as
long as sanctions on the Iraqi regime remain in effect. Success will
require the UN to do the best possible job of administering the
program. Similarly, Iraq will have to be pressed to do its part --
cooperating with the program rather than seeking to discredit it, to
circumvent it, and eventually to eliminate it. Maintaining the proper
balance will never be easy; but we believe it is an achievable result,
and certainly a result worth the utmost effort over the long haul.
Criticism of sanctions is understandable, but we believe much of the
recent criticism has been misplaced. In particular, those who see
negative consequences from sanctions and advocate lifting sanctions as
the only solution overlook at least three important points:
First, the regime headed by Saddam Hussein is among the most brutal
and systematic violators of human rights on the face of the earth. The
most recent report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights noted
that the gravity of the human rights situation in Iraq has few
parallels since the end of World War II.
Second, sanctions deprive Saddam Hussein of the financial wherewithal
to pursue his manifest goal of acquiring, and using, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Saddam deploying WMD would be the worst imaginable
humanitarian outcome for the Iraqi people and for all the peoples of
the region.
Third, lifting sanctions would enable Saddam to rebuild his military
and put his WMD programs on the fast-track, but would not guarantee a
better life for the average Iraqi. On the contrary, conditions for
many Iraqis -- especially in the north -- would deteriorate
dramatically if oil-for-food and the UN presence disappeared.
Providing resources to Saddam Hussein would not mean relief for the
Iraqi people. Conversely, providing relief to the people is not the
same as helping Saddam. Let me explain.
First, Saddam Hussein's perennial spending priority is military
development and WMD rather than civilian well being. Lifting sanctions
would simply enrich Saddam and enable him to pursue his spending
priorities. Therefore, lifting sanctions would not help the Iraqi
people.
Second, we also hear criticism from the other side, from those who say
oil-for-food is in fact helping Saddam Hussein. Just as providing more
resources to the Iraqi regime -- e.g. by lifting sanctions -- would
not benefit the Iraqi people, oil-for-food resources provided to the
people do not benefit the Iraqi regime. On the contrary, providing
humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people is essential to
maintaining international support for sanctions on the regime.
Oil-for-food is having a clear and measurable impact on the ground in
Iraq. Nutrition has improved. Per capita intake is up from 1,300
calories per day before the program began to over 2,000 now, thanks to
a UN ration basket, which is augmented by locally grown food. Food
imports are now at about pre-war levels. In the year before the
program began, Iraq imported about $50 million worth of medicines.
Over the past three years more than $1 billion worth of medicines have
been approved. Similarly, over a billion dollars worth of goods for
the water, sanitation, electrical and agricultural sectors have been
approved.
The impact has been greatest in the three northern provinces, where
the UN manages the program without interference from the regime. For
example, an UNICEF study last year showed that infant mortality in the
north had fallen below pre-war levels. Yet in south/central Iraq,
where the Iraqi government handles distribution of oil-for-food goods,
the study revealed a disturbing rise in child mortality -- to more
than double the pre-war level. These numbers show that oil-for-food
can meet the needs of the Iraqi people if the regime's cynical
manipulation can be overcome.
Finally, let me say a few words about the U.S. approach to making the
oil-for-food program more effective. We have been accused recently of
having too many holds, or of having the wrong holds, on contracts
proposed under this program. Of course there are those in Baghdad, and
in the Security Council, who seem to believe that neither the United
States nor any other member of the Iraq Sanctions Committee should put
any contract on hold for any reason.
Our goal is to help the oil-for-food program succeed. With that in
mind, we want to approve every contract we can and do it as quickly as
we can.
But there is another goal which is equally important: to deny Saddam
Hussein inputs for his WMD programs. That goal makes a heavy demand on
us, as it can mean the painstaking review of each and every contract.
We take this responsibility seriously.
Our rigorous and responsible approach has won plaudits from some
smaller countries in the UN's Iraq Sanctions Committee -- countries
which lack the resources and the expertise which the United States can
apply to the process. It has also elicited criticism from some larger
members of the Committee which have the resources and expertise, but
have chosen to turn a politically, or commercially, blinded eye to
possible dual-use items included in oil-for-food contracts. Three
Security Council member states have about one-third of all
oil-for-food contracts. They orchestrate the complaints about holds,
often joined by others who are motivated by commercial gain.
Our holds now involve about 10% of all oil-for-food contracts. The
number has mounted over the past year for a variety of reasons. Some
contracts lack adequate information, and we are unable to act on them
until we receive further details from the submitting companies. More
broadly, program revenue has grown as oil prices have risen over the
past year, and the accelerating flow of incoming contract and crowded
our review pipeline. However, we believe our holds have had a minimal
impact on the humanitarian bottom line to date.
Nonetheless, while we must be vigilant, we must also strike a balance
with legitimate humanitarian concerns. We are currently examining our
contract review procedures to ensure that they appropriately reflect
our twin priorities: maximizing assistance to the Iraqi people while
denying the Iraqi regime access to goods it could use to reconstitute
its WMD programs. We are also seeking to enhance the UN's capacity to
monitor potentially sensitive items -- such as electricity generating
equipment or water purification plants -- to ensure that such items,
once approved, are installed in the approved location and used for the
approved purpose.
A major portion of resolution 1284 deals with the creation of UNMOVIC
-- the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission -- as a
subsidiary body of the Security Council and successor to UNSCOM. After
consultation with Council members, the UN Secretary General appointed
Hans Blix to serve as Executive Chairman of the new body.
Robert Einhorn, Assistant Secretary for Non-Proliferation, and I had
the opportunity to meet with Dr. Blix shortly before he took up his
duties on March 1. As former head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, Dr. Blix is fully qualified for the sizeable task he faces,
and he has adopted a serious and methodical approach which seems well
suited to that task.
Dr. Blix is currently structuring the organization and assembling his
staff, and will submit an organizational plan to the Security Council
in mid-April. He will then proceed with lining up potential inspectors
with the requisite technical expertise to resume inspection and
monitoring activities on the ground in Iraq. Baghdad has publicly
rejected resolution 1284 and ruled out the return of UN-mandated
weapons inspection teams, but that is unlikely to be the final word.
Should Iraq reconsider -- as it has on several previous resolutions --
and allow UNMOVIC in, we expect Dr. Blix and his teams to be robust,
in carrying out the mission it has inherited from UNSCOM. The United
States will, of course, provide all possible support.
We await your questions on any aspect of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
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