Rose Gottemoeller
Department of Energy
assistant secretary of energy for nonproliferation and national security
Laura Holgate
Department of Energy
director of the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition
Senate Armed Services Committee's Strategic Subcommittee
February 25, 2000
(begin excerpts)
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, we are pleased to appear
before you to discuss the FY 2001 budget request for the fissile
materials disposition activities of the Department of Energy. Before I
address our budget request, I would like to advise you that on March
1, 2000, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation
and National Security will be re-designated as the Office of the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. The Office
of Fissile Materials Disposition will be incorporated within this
Office. The Assistant Deputy Administrator for Fissile Materials
Disposition will also serve as the Special Secretarial Negotiator for
Plutonium Disposition recognizing the continuing high level visibility
of this important nonproliferation mission.
The Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is responsible for
disposing of inventories of surplus U.S. weapons-usable plutonium and
highly enriched uranium as well as providing technical support for and
ultimately implementation of efforts to obtain reciprocal disposition
of surplus Russian plutonium. These disposition activities, along with
other efforts to dismantle weapons delivery systems, secure nuclear
materials, and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons knowledge, are
part of the United States government's strategy to reduce the global
danger from weapons of mass destruction.
We have made significant progress this past year. We transferred
quantities of surplus highly enriched uranium to the United States
Enrichment Corporation for down-blending and peaceful use as
commercial reactor fuel. We entered into contracts with the private
sector for the design of the two key plutonium disposition facilities
to disassemble and convert surplus plutonium pits to oxide and to
fabricate mixed oxide fuel. We continued to demonstrate our capability
to disassemble various types of nuclear weapons pits at the Los Alamos
prototype ARIES facility. And, most importantly, this past January,
the Department of Energy issued a Record of Decision to construct and
operate three new plutonium disposition facilities at the Savannah
River Site in South Carolina. Under this decision, the Department will
immobilize approximately 17 metric tons of plutonium and use up to 33
metric tons of plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for irradiation in
existing domestic, commercial reactors.
On the international front, as part of the President's Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative, we have continued to conduct a number of
technology demonstrations of key plutonium disposition technologies in
partnership with Russia. These demonstrations will enable the Russians
to accelerate efforts to design and construct plutonium disposition
facilities. We have conducted extensive negotiations with Russia over
the past year on a bilateral plutonium disposition agreement.
Implementation of this agreement is essential to enable surplus
plutonium disposition to proceed in both countries and is a key
objective of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Following eleven rounds of
formal negotiations, I am pleased to report that the United States and
Russia are very close to completing this agreement. Both sides are
pushing hard to have this agreement available for signature early this
spring.
The FY 2001 budget request for U.S. and Russian disposition activities
is $223 million, an increase of $22 million over the FY 2000
comparable amount. The increase will enable us to begin Title I design
of a facility to immobilize surplus non-pit plutonium; incorporate
aqueous processing in the design for the mixed oxide fuel fabrication
facility; fund MOX lead test assembly activities and advanced gas
reactor and reactor fuel qualification work in Russia; and hire
additional federal staff necessary to oversee these fissile material
disposition activities.
U.S. PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
Pit Disassembly and Conversion
The United States has declared approximately 50 metric tons of
plutonium as surplus to national defense needs. Approximately one half
of this amount is in the form of classified nuclear weapons components
called "pits." Before weapons plutonium from pits can be disposed of,
it must first be converted from a weapon component to an unclassified
oxide form suitable for disposition and international inspection. We
plan to use the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System
(ARIES), a low-waste, modular pyro-chemical process, to convert the
pits to plutonium oxide.
In November 1998, the Department began operation of an integrated pit
disassembly and conversion prototype system using the ARIES process at
Los Alamos National Laboratory. This facility will demonstrate the
capability to safely disassemble the various pit types comprising the
surplus inventory. The Department has continually operated this system
since 1998, and plans to continue production mode testing through
2001, at which time the disassembly of all surplus pit types in the
U.S. inventory will have been demonstrated. This demonstration will
provide important information for designing and operating a full-scale
pit disassembly and conversion facility, as well as for training
facility personnel.
In August 1999, the Department signed a contract with Raytheon
Engineers & Constructors, Inc. for the design of the full-scale pit
disassembly and conversion facility to be located at the Savannah
River Site. Title I design activities commenced upon contract award
and will continue through 2000.
The FY 2001 budget request for pit disassembly and conversion
activities is $40.4 million. The portion of this request for
technology development activities is $20.4 million. This funding will
allow us to continue production-mode testing of the integrated
prototype system at Los Alamos. The remainder of the request, $20
million, is being sought to begin Title II design of the pit
disassembly and conversion facility, and to initiate procurement of
long-lead equipment for the full-scale facility. The long-lead
equipment procurement needs to be initiated in 2001 in order to obtain
necessary equipment design information to support the facility design,
and to ensure that the equipment is available to support the facility
construction schedule. Contingent on signature of the bilateral
agreement with Russia on plutonium disposition, as well as successful
demonstration of the prototype, a full-scale facility, capable of
processing thousands of pits per year, is planned to be operational at
Savannah River in 2006....
U.S. URANIUM DISPOSITION
The program will continue to dispose of as much as possible of the
U.S. highly enriched uranium, which is excess to defense needs, by
down-blending it with other uranium to make low enriched uranium,
which is commercially usable as power reactor fuel. This approach
advances U.S. nonproliferation goals, reduces storage and security
costs, and provides revenues to the Treasury. The remaining surplus
highly enriched uranium which is unsuitable for commercial use will be
disposed of as waste.
To date, about 174 metric tons of highly enriched uranium have been
declared excess to national security needs. Because of the various
forms of highly enriched uranium and the varying availability dates
from weapons dismantlement and site cleanup operations, down blending
will take place over an estimated 15-to-20 year time period.
The Department shipped 7 metric tons of highly enriched uranium to the
United States Enrichment Corporation for down blending in 1999 and
will ship up to an additional 4 metric tons to the United States
Enrichment Corporation through the end of 2000. An additional 33 to 38
metric tons of off-specification highly enriched uranium material, not
saleable on the open market because it contains a higher percentage of
U-236 than normal reactor fuel, is expected to be down-blended and
transferred to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for use in its
reactors between 2002 and 2007. To support this effort, lead test
assemblies fabricated from off-specification highly enriched uranium
are currently undergoing testing in TVA's Sequoyah reactor.
Recent vulnerability assessments and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety
Board technical assessments have identified environmental, safety and
health vulnerabilities associated with the Department of Energy's
current U-233 inventory, located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
and the Idaho National Environmental and Engineering Laboratory. The
Department is currently determining a path forward for the disposition
of this material.
The portion of the FY 2001 budget for U.S. uranium disposition
activities is $3.4 million. This funding will allow us to continue to
facilitate and dispose of surplus highly enriched uranium by shipping
9 metric tons to the United States Enrichment Corporation in 2001,
down-blending off-specification highly enriched uranium and
irradiating that material in TVA reactors ($38 million for irradiation
of off-specification material in TVA reactors is funded in the
Department's Environmental Management budget in FY 2001), initiating
preparations for down-blending additional lots of highly enriched
uranium, and continuing to determine the path forward for the future
disposition of U-233....
WORK WITH RUSSIA
Our work with Russia is aimed at attaining reciprocal Russian
strategies, actions and outcomes for the disposition of Russia's
excess plutonium. In July 1998, the U.S. and Russian governments
signed an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation to govern
our joint activities in plutonium disposition. Since then, the U.S.
and Russia have conducted studies and pilot-scale tests and
demonstrations of a host of technologies needed to dispose of surplus
weapon-grade plutonium. This work will confirm the viability of
certain technologies that might be used for disposition of surplus
Russian plutonium, subsequent to a plutonium disposition agreement
between the United States and Russia.
Last fall, the United States and Russia agreed on a plutonium
disposition roadmap, or logic flow, and an associated nominal schedule
for the Russian program. This schedule would allow Russia to achieve
the December 2007 start date envisioned in our bilateral plutonium
disposition agreement. The early parts of this roadmap focus on
technology development in the areas of plutonium conversion and
nondestructive assay, irradiating MOX fuel in reactors, and
immobilization. Key elements of this work include:
-- Assisting Russia to design and build a demonstration facility for
converting weapons-origin plutonium metal to an oxide form suitable
for use in MOX fuel and for international inspection.
-- Developing a MOX fuel fabrication process that would be compatible
with surplus weapons-grade plutonium, testing the resulting fuel, and
qualifying it for use in a VVER-1000 and BN-600 reactors.
-- Along with Japan, assisting Russia to assess the feasibility of
converting Russia's BN-600 reactor, a fast-neutron reactor, into a net
burner of plutonium.
-- Working with Russian institutes and private industry to develop gas
turbine, modular helium reactor technology as an option to supplement
Russia's existing reactor capacity to dispose of surplus plutonium.
-- Assisting Russia in developing glass and ceramic technologies
suitable for immobilizing plutonium-containing materials at Russian
sites.
Last month, the Department of Energy safely and successfully shipped
test MOX fuel pins to Canada for future testing with similar MOX fuel
pins from Russia in a Canadian research reactor at Chalk River.
Irradiating MOX fuel in Canadian nuclear reactors is one of several
options being examined to expand Russia's capacity to dispose of
surplus weapons plutonium.
Collectively, this cooperative work with Russia supports President
Clinton's Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative to reduce the global
danger from weapons of mass destruction. We continue to conduct a
number of technology demonstrations of key plutonium disposition
technologies in Russia because we believe the development of these
technologies will enable the Russians to accelerate efforts to dispose
of their surplus plutonium upon signature of the bilateral plutonium
disposition agreement.
Our total FY 2001 budget for this cooperative work with Russia is $40
million. This request includes $10 million for continuation of the gas
reactor technology development. This amount will be spent on gas
reactor development only if international partners provide similar
funds to continue the research and development for the nuclear fuel
and power conversion system for this program. If international support
is not forthcoming, the $10 million will be used to support other
elements of the Russian plutonium disposition program. The remaining
request of $30 million will allow us to assist Russia to begin
facility upgrades for a demonstration-scale system test facility for
conversion of Russian plutonium, complete final design of equipment
for the manufacture of Russian MOX lead test fuel assemblies, continue
Russian reactor analysis and licensing activities, and continue
initial development of a large-scale test system for immobilization,
and provide oversight of work performed in Russia.
In addition to the funds for this cooperative work with Russia,
Congress provided $200 million in a FY 1999 emergency supplemental
appropriation for Russian plutonium disposition. This year, we will
select a contractor to begin implementing projects to be supported by
these funds in Russia.
BILATERAL PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AGREEMENT
Along with technology development, we have conducted extensive
negotiations with Russia over the past year on a bilateral plutonium
disposition agreement to dispose of 68 (34 U.S. plus 34 Russian)
metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium withdrawn from nuclear weapon
programs. Negotiations have been led on the U.S. side by the
Department of State with key negotiation and technical support
provided by the Department of Energy. The Russian side has been led by
the Ministry of Atomic Energy with support provided by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Conclusion of this agreement is essential to enable
surplus plutonium disposition to proceed in both countries and is a
key objective of U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Key provisions of the
agreement include:
Material covered. The Presidents' summit statement called for the
disposition, in stages, of up to 50 metric tons of surplus plutonium.
The bilateral agreement will commit the sides to dispose of the first
34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium in each country. Should
additional material be declared excess in the future, the agreement
allows the two sides to dispose of it in accordance with the terms of
this agreement.
Disposition techniques. The agreement allows for disposition either by
irradiating the plutonium as MOX fuel in nuclear reactors or by
immobilizing the plutonium in glass or ceramic form surrounded by
vitrified high-level radioactive waste. The United States will use a
combination of both technologies to dispose of our surplus plutonium.
Russia plans to dispose of almost all of its plutonium by irradiating
the plutonium as fuel in reactors, but may immobilize small amounts
that are unsuitable for use in reactors.
Disposition rates. The two countries plan to begin operation of
industrial-scale disposition facilities not later than December 2007
in order to dispose of at least two metric tons-per-year of
weapon-grade plutonium. Subsequently, a plan would be developed to
seek to identify additional reactor capacity inside and/or outside
Russia to permit at least a doubling of the disposition rates in both
countries.
Financing. Russia has made clear that proceeding with plutonium
disposition is dependent on assistance from the United States and
other nations. The $200 million provided by the U.S. Congress in FY
1999 will assist Russia in jump-starting the effort needed for
plutonium disposition. Preliminary estimates indicate construction of
plutonium conversion and MOX fabrication facilities and modification
of Russian nuclear reactors will cost in excess of one billion
dollars. Russia will need to contribute some resources, and the United
States government is working with members of the international
community to finance the remainder of this program. In the past year,
representatives from the U.S. government have met with government and
industry officials from France, Germany, England, and Japan to
encourage provision of additional financial and technical assistance.
Inspection, monitoring and nonproliferation conditions. The agreement
will include provisions for monitoring and inspection activities to
confirm that the facilities are being dedicated to disposition of this
excess weapon plutonium, that the disposition rates are being met, and
that the disposed plutonium meets certain agreed standards. Both
parties intend to work towards allowing certain bilateral inspection
and monitoring rights to be satisfied by equivalent IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) verification measures, to the
extent practicable.
PROGRAM DIRECTION
Program Direction provides the overall federal management, oversight,
staffing, and administrative support necessary to carry out the
Fissile Materials Disposition Program. The portion of the FY 2001
budget for Program Direction is $9.9 million and represents an
increase of $2.6 million over FY 2000. This increase will provide for
eight additional full-time equivalent staff over the FY 2000 level for
field oversight and project management for the design of three U.S.
disposition facilities and gas reactor activities, and for
headquarters support of the Russian program. The increase also
includes office support costs for sixteen Field full time equivalent
positions. The $9.9 million level for Program Direction represents a
modest 4.4% of the total Fissile Materials Disposition Program budget
request.
CONCLUSION
This is an important year for the U.S. program as well as for work in
Russia. We have decisions and systems in place, and upon signature of
the bilateral agreement with Russia, we will move ahead promptly to
actually construct the facilities and to actually dispose of surplus
U.S. and Russian plutonium. The U.S. commitment to this program sends
a clear message to Russia and the rest of the world that we consider
the disposition of surplus fissile materials to be one of our highest
national priorities. We believe the time, is right to seize this
momentum and finish this important job to reduce the global danger
from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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