Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Statement of Rose Gottemoeller

Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (Acting)

U.S. Department of Energy

Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to present this statement for the record on programs of the Office for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.  I look forward to working with you, and with the rest of the subcommittee members, as we address some of the many serious challenges facing our nation today.

 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, on March 1, 2000, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security, which I led, became the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.  On March 1, I was designated by Secretary Richardson to serve as the Office=s Acting Deputy Administrator.  This new Office also incorporates the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.  Laura Holgate, the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Fissile Materials Disposition, will also serve as the Special Secretarial Negotiator for Plutonium Disposition, recognizing the continuing high-level visibility of this important nonproliferation mission.

 

It has been more than a decade since the Berlin Wall fell, opening a new era in history.  While the Soviet threat is gone, dangers arising from the global spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles for their delivery, remain with us.  These dangers are real and increasingly unpredictable.  As President Clinton recently declared, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction Acontinues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."  As a nation, we may face no greater challenge than to prevent these weapons from falling into the hands of those who would use them against us or our allies.

 

The Clinton Administration has put in place a robust agenda to stem the proliferation tide.  The Department of Energy, under the leadership of Secretary Richardson, plays an important and unique role in implementing this agenda, working in partnership with other U.S. government agencies, as well as governments and organizations worldwide.  Our contributions to national security are extensive -- from developing technologies to better prepare for possible chemical or biological weapons attacks; to securing at-risk plutonium in North Korea and Kazakhstan; to checking the spread of nuclear weapon-usable materials, technologies and expertise from Russia and Newly Independent States.

 

Against this backdrop, I would like to share with the members of this panel the many programs my Office administers to advance important nonproliferation and national security goals.  Before doing so, however, I would like to use this opportunity to describe an important new initiative, developed by Secretary Richardson, that I believe will greatly boost our cooperative work with Russia to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

 

LONG-TERM NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM WITH RUSSIA

 

A key part of the Administration=s nonproliferation strategy is the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, a multi-dimensional and multi-agency effort to address proliferation risks that arose with the Soviet Union=s collapse.  The President=s FY 2001 budget request includes a proposed $100 million program to improve our ability to respond the most serious dangers presented by Russian nuclear facilities and weapons-usable materials, bringing our cooperation with Russia to an entirely new level.

 

The new program has two core elements: the first attempts to plug gaps in our efforts to manage fissile material from the civil side of the nuclear fuel cycle; the second part addresses proliferation vulnerabilities in Russia=s nuclear infrastructure.

 

Under the first part of this new initiative, we propose to work with Russia to prevent the further accumulation of separated civil plutonium.  To facilitate a moratorium on the separation of plutonium from spent power reactor fuel in Russia, we have offered to assist in the construction of a new facility for the dry storage of spent fuel.  This initiative is important; once implemented, it would cap Russia=s stockpile of civil plutonium, which is currently more than 30 metric tons and growing at a rate of 2 additional tons per year.

 

We would also propose to conduct collaborative research into modern nuclear reactor technologies and fuels, with the aim of devising more proliferation-resistant systems.  In light of our continuing concerns about Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, we will undertake no major investments in this area until those concerns are met.  Finally, we would explore permanent disposition options for spent nuclear fuel and high level waste in Russia.

 

The second part of the initiative expands our excellent cooperative work addressing problems of the nuclear weapons infrastructure -- for example working with the Russian Navy to help secure their stocks of nuclear fuel for the submarine fleet and ice breakers.  We will also accelerate programs with Russia to consolidate and convert fissile materials to non-weapon-usable forms and to facilitate the closure nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly plants at Avangard and Penza-19.

 

Let me now turn to a number of our existing, core nonproliferation activities.

 

SECURING WEAPONS EXPERTISE

 

I wish to start by discussing our flagship Abrain drain@ prevention programs: the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP).  As you may know, Secretary Richardson and Minister for Atomic Energy Adamov established the NCI in late 1998 to cooperate with Russian efforts to create peaceful, commercial jobs for displaced nuclear weapons scientists and engineers in Russia=s ten Aclosed@ cities.  NCI is a new type of Abrain drain@ program in that it is focused on nuclear workers slated to leave the nuclear weapons complex as facilities, and their jobs, are eliminated.  Our initial focus has been on three municipalities: Sarov (Arzamas-16), Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70), and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26).

 

This program is a on track.  Since April 1999, when my Office was first authorized to spend funds, we have commissioned an Open Computing Center in Sarov, an International Business Development Center in Zheleznogorsk (with similar centers to open soon in Snezhinsk and Sarov), upgraded telecommunications systems in all three cities, and signed an agreement at the end of December 1999 with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to open small business loan centers in the three cities, providing access to millions of dollars in potential financing.  Just this month, I am pleased to report, the first loan was approved for a small retail business in Zheleznogorsk owned by a former weapons complex employee turned entrepreneur.

 

We have also initiated high-level strategic planning efforts with the Ministry for Atomic Energy to establish goals, costs, and timelines for workforce reduction and facility closures in each of the three cities.  The Sarov strategic plan was completed last September; it identifies the reduction of as many as 6,000 employees of the Institute of Experimental Physics, a nuclear weapons design institute.  Through the plan, we have also agreed to the accelerated shutdown of weapons assembly and disassembly at the Avangard plant: weapons assembly will halt by the end of 2000; weapons disassembly will halt by the end of 2003.  To implement this accelerated shutdown, a commercial agreement for the production of kidney dialysis equipment was also recently completed, linking Avangard (home of a Russian nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly plant in Sarov), a German-American medical equipment company, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  Similar private industry partnerships are under development in other closed cities.

 

I am proud to say that NCI is already working to create jobs.  The Open Computing Center will have close to 100 new contract research employees this year, with another 500 jobs expected by 2001.  A separate center in Sarov for nonproliferation analysis has opened and will employ 30 or so workers displaced by down-sizing in the Russian nuclear weapons complex.  The kidney dialysis equipment project at Avangard could create more than 100 jobs and has the potential to bring major investments into Sarov.  In all, more than 30 civil projects, equating to more than 700 jobs, are either funded or under development across a range of commercial areas -- from laparoscopy in Sarov, to fiber optic production in Snezhinsk, to canola oil and seed processing in Zheleznogorsk.  With a funding boost in FY 2001, we expect to create hundreds of new jobs in each the three cities.

 

Like NCI, DOE=s IPP program works to secure weapons of mass destruction expertise and know how.  Since the program=s inception in 1994, more than 6,000 weapons scientists in Russia and the Newly Independent States have been supported through 400 non-military projects.  The program partners Russian and NIS scientists with specialists at the Department=s national laboratories, and concentrates aggressively on the commercialization of projects that are cost-shared with U.S. industry.  Major corporations -- such as United Technologies, DuPont, and American Home Products -- are participating in this program.  To date, U.S. industry has contributed $64 million, eclipsing the $38 million provided by the Department of Energy for cost-shared projects.  Six commercial projects have already been launched with full graduation from U.S. government financing, and another thirteen projects are poised for full commercialization by the end of 2001.

 

Improving the commercial thrust of the IPP program is just one of the recommendations suggested by the GAO in its February 1999 report^[1] that we have moved to implement quickly.  All of our IPP projects are now reviewed by the U.S. Industry Coalition, helping to promote those having genuine commercial potential.  Other issues raised by the GAO report have been addressed as well.  For example, we now use the Civilian Research and Development Foundation to avoid the payment of taxes on IPP projects in Russia; we have the agreement of the governments of Ukraine and Kazakhstan not to tax IPP payments; we vet all projects through an interagency screening process to rule out activities that might further a weapons program; and we cap the amount of IPP budgeted funds going to DOE=s national laboratories at 35 percent.

 

SECURING WEAPON-USABLE MATERIALS

 

Another core activity is our Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, an essential bulwark against the nuclear weapons aspirations of terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. Through the MPC&A program, we have built a legacy of trust, solid working relationships and cooperation with Russian agencies, institutes and scientists, facilitating our efforts to improve the security for fissile materials at highest risk throughout the Russian nuclear complex.

 

Our MPC&A efforts are progressing well.  We have improved the security hundreds of tons of fissile material at more than 30 sites in Russia.  Last October, Secretary Richardson and Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Adamov signed a government-to-government agreement that will ensure the job gets done at the remaining sites.  We are also nearing completion of a separate implementing agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense that will advance our MPC&A work at a number of very sensitive Russian Navy sites.  I have been very impressed with the unprecedented degree of cooperation and access to Department of Energy employees shown by the Russian Navy. 

 

A recent GAO report^[2] criticizes the Department for having completed security upgrades for only seven percent of the material considered at risk.  The GAO=s assertion is wrong.  In fact, we have rapidly upgraded security for 450 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, or approximately seventy percent of the estimated stock of at-risk material.  These upgrades include quick fixes -- such as fortifying entrance and exit points, placing one ton concrete blocks on material storage areas, or even just bricking up windows -- to secure these sites against terrorist or outside attack.  The next level of protection includes material tracking and accounting systems to protect against insiders siphoning off these fissile materials.  Both layers of protection are needed to secure materials well into the future.  The seven percent figure cited by the GAO refers only to those sites where we have completed both short and long term upgrades.

 

While the emphasis in our first years of operation was on the Aquick fix,@ today we are implementing a strategic plan, with an eye towards increasing efficiencies, reducing costs, and promoting sustainable operations.  A key part of this strategy is our effort to consolidate and convert highly enriched uranium into a non-weapons-usable form.  We recently completed a model project to consolidate and convert more than 200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, and plan to convert an additional 600 kilograms of this material.  Over the next two years, our goal is to convert 8-10 additional metric tons of highly enriched uranium.

 

ASustainability@ is another important part of our longer term efforts.  We must ensure that computers for nuclear materials accounting and control remain operational and that the protective locks we help to install do not rust and break away.  For this task, we will establish training centers, identify credible Russian suppliers of MPC&A equipment, and help in the development of regulations and security force procedures, as well as a central system to track amounts and locations for all of Russia=s nuclear material.

 

Our strategic plans address two additional issues raised in the GAO report that I would like to comment on: access to facilities and taxation by the Russian government.  As you might imagine, access is a sensitive point for Russia since we are working at some their most highly secretive sites.  But we are making progress.  Secretary Richardson, for example, recently established a special task force to help us better understand Russia=s requirements for approving visits by DOE personnel and to share ideas on ways to better facilitate access.  I should also stress that this not is a complex-wide problem.  In fact, I would argue that we have more access than we have money to spend.  Moreover, at major defense sites, such as Mayak, Krasnoyarsk-45, and Sverdlovsk-44, we have gained considerable access and are moving quickly to upgrade material security.  Sites that fail to grant access do not receive contracts for work.

 

Russian taxation of our MPC&A cooperation is another where are making good progress.  New Russian legislation and implementing regulations are now on the books that exempt the entire MPC&A program (and all other DOE cooperative programs with Russia) from direct Russian taxes.  I am pleased to report that the MPC&A program was one of the first to be registered as tax exempt.  This is a very positive step forward. The GAO report correctly indicates that approximately $1 million in taxes were included in a contract for MPC&A work by a particular Russian institute.  In fact, we have not paid the $1 million in taxes, and we are working on ways to avoid ever paying.  In the meantime, I have directed the MPC&A program to review all existing contracts to ensure that DOE takes full advantage of its tax-exempt status.  I have also issued updated guidance to DOE labs on this topic.

 

Our MPC&A work complements our related cooperative efforts with Russia to block illicit nuclear trade.  MPC&A is our first line of defense.  Our Asecond line of defense@ program is working to help Russia prevent unauthorized nuclear trade at nine key border crossing points and transportation centers -- many of them possible transit points to Iran or North Korea.  By the end of calendar year 2000, we plan to place radiation detection equipment at all nine points.  We are also developing a detection equipment training manual, which will guide the work of more than 30,000 front-line Russian customs officials.  These efforts are above and beyond my Office=s responsibility to support multilateral export control regimes, to administer U.S. controls over transfers of American nuclear technology to other countries, and to ensure that DOE-funded activities take place in compliance with U.S. export control laws and procedures.

 

We have additional nuclear material security programs focused on MPC&A improvements in former Soviet states outside of Russia, as well as a special project to protect plutonium-bearing spent fuel at the BN-350 reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan.  In Aktau, our Aon the ground@ efforts to can and secure more than 3,000 spent fuel rods is proceeding well.  The first phase of the operation is nearly complete.  The next phase involves placing the material in long-term storage.  Expert discussions on this issue are progressing well and we expect to launch a long-term management program in FY 2001.  We are nearing completion of a similar effort in North Korea, where we are securing large quantities of plutonium contained in more than 8,000 spent fuel rods.

 

FISSILE MATERIAL DISPOSITION

 

The transfer of the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition to the new Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is now complete and has gone extremely well.  There is a strong synergy between fissile materials disposition and my Office=s broader mission to demilitarize large stocks of U.S. and Russian fissile materials surplus to national security requirements.  This work is extremely important and advances our long-term nonproliferation and national security goals.  By assuring that hundreds of tons of fissile materials are withdrawn from U.S. and Russian stockpiles and never used again to build nuclear weapons, we are closing the door on an era of the nuclear arms race and improving security for future generations.

 

On the domestic front, we made significant progress this past year.  Substantial quantities of surplus U.S. highly enriched uranium were transferred to the U.S. Enrichment Corporation for down-blending and peaceful use as commercial fuel.  We also entered into contracts for the design of key plutonium disposition facilities.  In January 2000, Secretary Richardson issued a Record of Decision that codifies the decision to construct and operate these disposition facilities; it also calls for the immobilization of 17 metric tons of plutonium and the use of up to 33 metric tons of plutonium as mixed oxide fuel for irradiation in existing U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors.

 

On the international front, as part of the President=s Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, we continued our efforts in partnership with Russia to demonstrate a number of plutonium disposition technologies, demonstrations that will accelerate Russia=s ability to build the facilities needed to dispose of its own surplus plutonium.  We also continued extensive negotiations with Russia on a bilateral plutonium disposition agreement.  Implementation of this agreement is needed to trigger the start of actual disposition in both countries.  I am pleased to report that U.S. and Russian negotiators are now very close to a final document.  Both sides are pushing hard to have an agreement in hand this spring.

 

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM TRANSPARENCY

 

In addition to plutonium, our work Russia to convert surplus highly enriched uranium from the Russian military stockpile into a non-weapon-usable form is also progressing well.  The 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement remains one the more impressive nonproliferation achievements of the last decade.  Through the end of calendar year 1999, more than 80 metric tons of weapons grade uranium -- enough for 3,200 weapons -- had been removed from the Russian military program under this Agreement and converted to low enriched uranium for commercial sale.  Already, Russia has received close to $1.5 billion as compensation for converted HEU.  Secretary Richardson and Under Secretary Moniz have been instrumental in keeping this complex agreement on track.

 

My Office monitors the conversion and processing of highly enriched uranium at Russian facilities subject to the Agreement.  Over 70 DOE teams -- the equivalent of nearly 43,000 inspection hours -- have visited these facilities to monitor conversion operations.  During the past year, we installed a Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) at one Russian facility to provide continuous monitoring data, providing still greater assurance that our transparency objectives are being met.  Over the next two years, we will upgrade transparency measures at additional Russian blending facilities and explore new opportunities to strengthen this important activity.

 

IMPLEMENTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

 

Our work to remove plutonium and highly enriched uranium from U.S. and Russian military stockpiles complements other arms control and nonproliferation agreements.  We hope to complete a START III Agreement with Russia in 2000.  My Office is preparing for that agreement, developing, in some cases in cooperation with Russian scientists, technologies to demonstrate that warheads can be verifiably dismantled without disclosing sensitive nuclear weapons design information.  We are developing similar Ainformation barrier@ techniques for other agreements designed to promote transparent and irreversible reductions of nuclear stockpiles, including the U.S.-Russia-IAEA Trilateral Initiative and negotiations (led by the Department of Defense) with Russia to construct a weapons-origin plutonium storage facility at Mayak, as well as an associated agreement to measure that plutonium before it is converted from a weapons form.

 

PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COOPERATION

 

Reducing safety risks at the 64 operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors is another priority area for my Office.  While our FY 2000 appropriation was half of the requested amount, we nevertheless had a successful year, including a vigorous effort to prepare Russia and Ukraine, the two primary users of Soviet-design reactors, for Y2K.  We provided computer hardware and software, equipment and technical guidance to these countries, as well as experts in country for the actual rollover.  The best measure of success may have been that the Y2K rollover came and went without incident.  Our contributions to nuclear safety can be expressed by other metrics -- we installed safety parameter systems at seven nuclear power plants; we completed six simulators to model normal operating and response procedures; we provided U.S. training methods for nuclear plant operators; and we continued to provide in-depth reactor safety assessments to identify risks and prioritize safety upgrades.

 

We are encouraged not just by our progress to address nuclear safety at operating reactors, but by the early closure of older reactors as well.  Ukraine remains on track to shutdown permanently Chornobyl=s Unit 3, the sole operating reactor at the Chornobyl plant, by the end of this calendar year.  Our efforts to support the construction of a replacement heat plant at Chornobyl are also proceeding well.  In addition, Kazakhstan has shut down the BN-350 reactor and our attention is now focused on plans for decommissioning and decontamination of the reactor=s sodium coolant.  Removal of the coolant effectively bars the reactor=s restart.  And in Lithuania, the government recently called for the closure of Unit 1 at the Ignalina nuclear power plant in 2005, representing another important nuclear safety achievement.

 

NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

 

Like you, Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned that Americans will be the targets of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attacks.  Responding to this threat is extremely complex.  Not only must we be ready to mitigate the consequences of an actual attack, but we must also discriminate between real threats and the hoaxes that occur almost daily.  In 1999, the FBI investigated more than 150 threats involving anthrax.  While none of these threats proved to be real, the disruption, in terms of confusion and wasted resources, continues to be a source of concern.

 

My Office=s research and development efforts are breaking new ground in the campaign to combat proliferation and protect U.S. security.  We do this by developing and delivering field-tested, state-of-the-art technologies and systems for proliferation detection to our customers.  We are developing new technologies to counter nuclear smuggling, detect nuclear materials diversion, and prepare for new arms control verification challenges in a future START III agreement.  We are also advancing new remote systems to detect the early stages of a proliferant's nuclear weapons program.

 

In the area of nuclear test detection, we are developing new space-based systems to monitor above ground nuclear explosions world-wide and delivering a Aknowledge base@ system on regional seismicity to the U.S. Air Force that will improve our national capability to detect nuclear explosions at lower yields than could be detected using tradition, teleseismic systems.  We have also delivered a new generation of detectors to identify radioactive particulates from atmospheric nuclear explosions.  These systems and capabilities are all needed irrespective of whether a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is in force.

 

We have numerous examples of success in other areas.  Our solid state, fiber optic neutron and gamma ray sensor for nuclear materials detection was transferred to industry and selected by R&D magazine as one of the 100 most technologically significant products of the year.  For the U.S. Customs Service, we completed upgrades for an advanced nuclear smuggling detection demonstration unit.  And just recently, we launched the Multispectral Thermal Imager satellite, providing a state-of-the-art system holding great promise in both the environmental and security arenas.

 

The chemical and biological weapons threat is particularly worrisome.  To meet this threat, the Department of Energy is drawing upon the diverse and extensive expertise of its national laboratories.  Fortunately, we are making progress.  Last year at this time, I reported that we possessed no simple, portable, and reliable tools for the detection of biological agents.  Now, we are building half a dozen prototype devices that could soon be available for Afirst responders,@ that is, local police, medical and other community officials.  Our goal is to provide these first responders with advanced systems that have laboratory sensitivity for use in the field; we recently developed a battery operated, hand-held gas chromatograph, sensitive to parts per billion, that gives us that capability.  We are also demonstrating and field-testing integrated chemical and biological protection systems for high-risk infrastructure and events, whether at a subway or the Super Bowl, and developing advanced genetic and computational tools to Afingerprint@ biological agents, leveraging DOE=s investment in the Human Genome Project.