APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Selected Republican Staff Memoranda to the members of the Foreign
Relations Committee:
April 20, 1999 ``Current and Growing Missile Threats to the
United States and the Need for Ballistic Missile Defense''. 377
May 12, 1999 ``The ABM Treaty and the Need for Ballistic
Missile Defenses''......................................... 394
May 24, 1999 ``The Legal Status of the ABM Treaty''.......... 399
May 25, 1999 ``Cornerstone of Our Security?: Should the
Senate Reject a Protocol to Reconstitute the ABM Treaty
with Four New Partners?''.................................. 403
September 13, 1999 ``National Intelligence Estimate: Foreign
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the United States Through 2015''........................... 407
S. Hrg. 106-339
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
<snowflake>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
A P P E N D I C E S
----------
APPENDIX 1
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
April 20, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
Through: James W. Nance
From: Marshall Billingslea and Sherry Grandjean
Subject: Current and Growing Missile Threats to the United States and
the Need for Ballistic Missile Defense
The Committee will hold a hearing on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States and the need for a national missile defense on
Tuesday, April 20, at 9:30 AM in SD-562. The first witness will be the
Honorable Jim Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense. A second panel
will be comprised of the Honorable Bill Schneider, former
Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and
Technology, and the Honorable Jim Lilley, former Ambassador to China.
Senator Hagel will preside.
Attachment.
The Current and Growing Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Introduction and Key Judgment
The ballistic missile threat to the United States is present, and
growing. A number of countries possess the capability today to hold
U.S. cities hostage to the threat of ballistic missile attack. Both
Russia and China have long fielded nuclear intercontinental ballistic
missiles that are targeted, or are capable of being rapidly retargeted,
at the United States. Several other countries, such as North Korea,
Iran, India, and Pakistan, are making rapid progress in the development
of missile systems with intercontinental ranges. (Iraq, too, can be
expected to join this club in the absence of UNSCOM inspections).
Moreover, a large number of countries possess the capacity to mount a
ship-based, short range ballistic missile attack against the United
States and its territories.
The spread of ballistic missiles and missile production capability
is global in character, and is not limited to any specific geographic
region. Between 20 and 25 countries throughout the Middle East, Asia,
Europe, and Latin America possess (or are seeking to obtain) ballistic
missiles, and a small number of countries are pursuing acquisition of
large inventories of missiles. During testimony before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24, 1993, then-Director
of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated:
More than 25 countries, many of them hostile to the U.S. and
to our friends and allies, may have or may be developing
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons--so-called weapons of
mass destruction, and the means to deliver them. More than a
dozen countries have operational ballistic missiles, and more
have programs in place to develop them.
That judgement was echoed in a March 1995 study released by the
Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency:
At least 20 countries--nearly half of them in the Middle East
and South Asia--already have or may be developing weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems. Five
countries--North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria (see
country profiles, Annex A)--pose the greatest threat because of
the aggressive nature of their WMD programs. All five already
have or are developing ballistic missiles.
In addition, nine Third World countries also produce ballistic
missiles--Argentina, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea,
South Korea, and South Africa. Four others--Brazil, Libya, Pakistan,
and Syria--are developing the means for production.
The threat posed to the United States by ballistic missiles is
rapidly growing due to nine global trends:
The key elements of an indigenous ballistic missile program
are not overly complex, are generally related to several types
of common commercial ventures, and are increasingly available
to third world nations;
Extensive foreign assistance relating to ballistic missile
design, development, and deployment is now available, and is
accelerating missile programs;
Serious leakage of components and critical technologies is
occurring despite limitations imposed under the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR);
The United States must be concerned that a country with an
ICBM might sell a complete system, or complete stages of that
system;
Countries can rapidly reconfigure their space launch
vehicles to serve as ICBMs; moreover space launch vehicle
programs in general can enable countries to significantly
accelerate ICBM development;
A country need not engage in a lengthy flight test program
prior to deployment of an ICBM;
Development of short and medium-range missiles will enable
countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development;
Countries are today able to deploy a ship-launched, short or
medium-range ballistic missile capable of threatening the
United States; and
The possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch from
existing nuclear arsenals is serious, and could increase with
instability in Russia.
The principal cause for concern to the United States posed by
missile proliferation is the high likelihood that these systems will be
used to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against U.S. troops
abroad, to attack key allies, and ultimately to threaten U.S. citizens
at home. When mated with a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead, a
ballistic missile would enable a country to hold at risk populations
and targets in neighboring states. Moreover, several countries of
concern (e.g. North Korea, Iran, and China) are making rapid strides in
enhancing the range, accuracy, and payload capabilities of their
ballistic missiles, seemingly with the intent to hold U.S. cities at
risk.
Whereas little agreement previously existed on the extent to which
the threat of attack by ballistic missiles posed a danger to the United
States, consensus on this question has begun to emerge in the wake of
the findings by the Rumsfeld Commission, and in the aftermath of the
launch of a Taepo Dong 1 missile by North Korea.
The Rumsfeld Commission, whose formal title was The Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, was
established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (P.L. 104-201). The Commission's mandate was to ``assess the
nature and magnitude of the existing and emerging ballistic missile
threat to the United States.''
Members of the Commission were nominated by the Speaker of the
House and the Majority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leaders of
the Senate and House of Representatives, and consisted of:
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Gilead Sciences, Inc. and former Secretary of Defense;
Dr. Barry M. Blechman, Chairman and Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson
Center and former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency;
General Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic
Command and Strategic Air Command;
Dr. Richard L. Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology with
the Council on Foreign Relations;
Dr. William R. Graham, Chairman of the Board and President of National
Security Research and former Director of the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy
Dr. William Schneider, Jr., President of International Planning
Services, Inc. and former Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance;
General Larry Welch, President and CEO of the Institute for Defense
Analyses and former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force;
Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School at Johns Hopkins
University and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Honorable R. James Woolsey, Partner in the law Firm of Shea and
Gardner and former Director of Central Intelligence.
unanimous conclusions of the rumsfeld commission regarding the threat
The nine Commissioners are unanimous in concluding that:
``Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially
hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological
or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States,
its deployed forces and its friends and allies. These newer,
developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in
addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile
arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which we are not now
in conflict but which remain in uncertain transitions. The
newer ballistic missile-equipped nations' capabilities will not
match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability.
However, they would be able to inflict major destruction on the
U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a
capability (10 years in the case of Iraq). During several of
those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision
had been made.'' [emphasis added]
``The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging
capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly
than has been reported in estimates and reports by the
Intelligence Community.''
``The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and
accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is
eroding. This erosion has roots both within and beyond the
intelligence process itself. The Community's capabilities in
this area need to be strengthened in terms of both resources
and methodology.''
``The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening
ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some
plausible scenarios--including re-basing or transfer of
operational missiles, sea-and air-launch options, shortened
development programs that might include testing in a third
country, or some combination of these--the U.S. might well have
little or no warning before operational deployment.''
key unanimous policy recommendation of the rumsfeld commission
``Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses,
practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended
warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised
to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be
little or no warning.''
trends contributing to the spread of ballistic missile capability
Trend #1: The key elements of an indigenous ballistic missile program
are not overly complex, generally related to several common
types of commercial ventures, and are increasingly available to
third world nations
This is not a new trend. In 1981 a report prepared for the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency concluded:
The development and production of solid-fueled ballistic
missiles with ranges between 1000 and 2000 kilometers is
technically within the capabilities of states with experience
in the production of advanced weapons systems, and military
aircraft in particular.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Balaschak, M. et al., Assessing the Comparability of Dual-Use
Technologies for Ballistic Missile Development (Center for
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology:
Cambridge, MA, June 1981), p. iii.
This finding was based on the judgment that the design and
manufacture of a ballistic missile--whether relying primarily upon
indigenous or imported components--requires technical capabilities and
infrastructure which can be found in the manufacture of aircraft and
other advanced systems. In particular, the study found that commercial,
``off-the-shelf'' inertial navigation systems could be adapted for use
in ballistic missiles. ``Such items are usually available as spares or
replacement parts for exported aircraft, both civilian and military.''
\2\ Certainly the United States, Britain, France, China, and the Soviet
Union all used adapted materials in developing their own missile
programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid, p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
identified 12 developing countries--Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Iran, India,
Pakistan, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, South Africa, Argentina,
and Brazil--as having at least an ``incipient'' capability to produce
ballistic missiles. This list remains today a fair representation of
evolving ballistic missile production capability outside of Europe.
Nearly all of the aforementioned countries--perhaps with the
exception of Iraq--are being aided in their pursuit of the capability
to indigenously develop and manufacture ballistic missiles by the
global spread of precision machine tooling capabilities, aerospace
ventures, and modern chemical and (in the case of biological warheads)
pharmaceutical production facilities. Technological obstacles
associated with two of the primary elements of a ballistic missile
program (propulsion and guidance) have become increasingly easy to
overcome due to this trend.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A flight-test capability also is important, though less so when
a country seeks merely to utilize or adapt proven designs. Finally, if
a country wishes to develop sophisticated warheads for its missile
program, it must develop a capability to design, (or integrate, if the
warhead is acquired from abroad) a re-entry vehicle onto the missile.
These elements of a program have linkages to both commercial space
launch ventures and to the nuclear, chemical, and/or pharmaceutical
industries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The technological challenges surrounding the development of a
propulsion system are formidable, but not insurmountable. For example,
solid propellants suitable for medium- and even long-range systems are
relatively easy to produce. Any country with a chemical production
capacity suitable for manufacturing large-caliber artillery shells also
is capable of mastering long range ballistic missile propulsion
technology. Iran's experience with developing the Oghab artillery
rocket is thought to have contributed substantially to the development
of the Iran-130 short range missile. Brazil, too, is thought to have
benefitted from this linkage.\4\ Even the more complex, composite
solids--typically a combination of ammonium perchlorate and a resin--
can be produced in several Third World countries. Iraq, for example,
has been constructing three factories to produce solid-fuel rocket
components, engines, and to provide test facilities (as part of Project
395).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Carus, Seth, ``Long Range Artillery rockets in the Third
World,'' Jane's Intelligence Review (Jane's Information Group: London,
October 1991), p. 475.
\5\ Nolan, Janne, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the
Third World (Brookings: Washington, 1991), p. 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, domestic development of missile guidance technology is
also increasingly feasible. Any country with electronics and precision
tool manufacturing industries, along with engineering laboratories, is
capable of developing an inertial navigation system (INS) for use in a
ballistic missile program.
Aside from INS, even simpler forms of guidance are commercially-
available. Radio correction and strap-down systems, both of which use
equipment present in common radars and high performance radios, have
already been developed by a large number of countries--among them India
and North Korea. Despite the fact that these systems may yield large
inaccuracies at long ranges, nevertheless a number of countries have
found these systems acceptable for their purposes. For instance, China
relies exclusively upon strap-down guidance in its DF-4 ICBM. Radio
correction was sufficient to give early U.S. and Soviet ICBMs CEP
accuracies of 3 km or better over a 9000 km flight.\6\ Indeed, because
of its low cost and ease of development, a number of countries may turn
to radio corrected guidance. Additionally, radio correction saves
weight in the missile in comparison with INS systems, allowing for
increased payload or range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ MacKenzie, D.A., Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of
Nuclear Missile Guidance (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 310-
313, 428-429.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, due to the increasing availability of general production
and manufacturing equipment and commercial off-the-shelf technology,
countries with indigenous ballistic missile programs are finding it
increasingly easy to overcome key technological hurdles.
Trend #2: Extensive foreign assistance relating to ballistic missile
design, development, and deployment is now available, and is
accelerating missile programs
Not only has the past decade seen extraordinary improvements in the
indigenous production capabilities of various countries, but it also
has witnessed a dramatic increase in the availability of outside help
to countries seeking ballistic missiles. As the Rumsfeld Commission
noted: ``Foreign assistance is not a wild card. It is a fact.''
Previous analyses which overly-focused on indigenous production
capabilities produced flawed conclusions due to their failure to factor
in the availability of foreign assistance. As Former Director of
Central Intelligence, James Woolsey stated during testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 24, 1996:
. . . concentrating on indigenous ICBM development seems to
me to limit very sharply any general conclusions that might
legitimately be drawn.
. . . Indigenous development of ICBM's was of interest during
the Cold War because the Soviets sought to restrain their
client states and maintain a monopoly. But countries such as
Iraq are no longer client states of the Soviet Union, which
does not exist anymore, and they are not even client states of
Russia. They are doing what they please.
And in the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia, China, and
North Korea particularly are very much in the business of
export for many ballistic missile components and for some
technologies that relate to weapons of mass destruction.
Foreign assistance is the norm in ballistic missile development--
not the exception; this sort of help often is critical to enable
countries to solve difficult developmental obstacles. Moreover,
external assistance hinders and complicates the U.S. ability to predict
how soon a system will be deployed. The Nonproliferation Center of the
Central Intelligence Agency published an unclassified assessment in
March 1995 that summed up trends in foreign assistance:
The widening market for ballistic missiles and missile-
related technologies over the past two decades has contributed
to an increase in the types and number of suppliers. The
growing list of suppliers includes organizations in China,
North Korea, the industrialized states in Europe and South
America, and in several Third World countries. Private
consortiums are also among the suppliers of missile components
and technologies. Iraq was able to establish its ballistic
missile program through such suppliers.
Historically, countries engaged in the development of ballistic
missiles have proven more than willing to collaborate with one another
on projects. Through Soviet assistance, at least ten countries in the
Third World and four republics of the former Soviet Union field either
Soviet-made missiles or some variant, the most common of which is the
single-stage, liquid-fueled SCUD B. That missile has range of 300 km
and is capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram payload.
Russia continues in the Soviet tradition of providing ballistic
missile assistance to the developing world. Russia is one of the two
principal suppliers of components and technological assistance to
countries seeking to acquire ballistic missiles. According to a July
1997 study by the Central Intelligence Agency, while China ranked as
``the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to
foreign countries,'' Russia also supplied a variety of ballistic
missile-related items to foreign countries during the same time frame,
with the majority of the assistance going to Iran. Further, Russia also
has served as an important source for Indian and Pakistani missile
programs.
In January 1997, the Congress became aware of the widespread
assistance being given Iran's ballistic missile program by a large
number of Russian entities. According to various press reports, at
least ten Russian firms, including the state arms export agency
Rosvooruzhenie and the Russian space agency, have aided Iran in
overcoming a number of technical obstacles--in direct contravention of
Russia's obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime. The
cooperation consists of key assistance on navigation, guidance systems,
rocket motor work, and the transfer of equipment related to the Russian
SS-4 liquid-fueled, intermediate range missile. Russia has provided
wind-tunnel testing for missile nose cones, and assisted in the
development of a solid fuel project. Finally, Russian firms also are
reported to have concluded contracts for the construction of a wind
tunnel, manufacture of mock-ups, and the creation of software for
Iran's missile program. The result has been that the Iranian program is
advancing far more quickly than previously expected. This assistance
has enabled Iran to make strides that otherwise would have taken years
of research, development, and testing.
According to a September 10, 1997 story in The Washington Times,
Russian assistance has been directed towards two systems--the Shabab-3
and -4--both of which are based on North Korea's No Dong missile. The
Shahab-3 will have a range of up to 930 miles and is expected to carry
a 1,650 pound warhead. The Shahab-4 is to have a range of 1,240 miles
and a warhead of 2,200 pounds. Two additional, unnamed systems with
ranges of 5,500 km and 10,000 km respectively may also be under
development in Iran.\7\ Until these revelations, Iran was thought to be
years away from the development of a missile capable of striking Tel
Aviv or Riyadh. Now, according to various press articles, the Shahab-3
will be deployed within a year or two, and the Shahab-4 within three.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Congressional Research Service, Russian Missile Technology and
Nuclear Reactor Transfers to Iran, March 27, 1998, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia also reportedly has provided significant and varied
assistance to Chinese missile programs. During testimony before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24, 1993, then-
Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated:
. . . China continues to obtain missile technology from
Russia and Ukraine, and China is actively pursuing agreements
covering increasingly more sensitive areas. This raises concern
not only because the transfers improve China's military
capabilities, but also because it introduces the possibility
that China could, in turn, pass more advanced Russian or
Ukrainian-derived technology to other states, as Beijing has
done previously with its own technology.
China, in turn, also provides a wide variety of missile assistance
to various countries, ranging from the transfer of complete systems to
the sharing of technical data and blueprints. China has shown a
willingness to transfer ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as
related production technology, to the most troubled of regions (e.g.,
the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf). A case-in-point is
China's provision of M-11 missiles and key components to Pakistan.
Transfer of M-11's, for which Pakistan may have developed nuclear
warheads, has contributed to heightened tensions in the region.\8\
Similarly, Iran's development of medium range missiles using Chinese
technology and its equipping of various patrol craft with the C-802
anti-shipping cruise missiles (provided by Beijing) has been a source
of concern for the United States Armed Forces and key Middle Eastern
allies alike.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The Washington Post, ``Pakistan May Have Nuclear Tips for
Rockets,'' May 30, 1998, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 27, 1993, Admiral William Studeman, acting Director of
Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Glenn stating that:
China is one of Iran's primary suppliers of defense
technology. Missile-related technology cooperation, for
example, has involved China's provision of technical and
production expertise to Iran's indigenous missile development
programs. . . . More recent press reports suggest that China
may be cooperating with Iran to develop short-range ballistic
missiles.
Of course, the bulk of Chinese missile cooperation with Iran has
consisted of transfers of componentry, rather than complete systems. On
June 22, 1995, the New York Times quoted a May 1995 Central
Intelligence Agency study as concluding that China had ``delivered
dozens, perhaps hundreds, of missile guidance systems and computerized
machine tools to Iran . . .'' Other sources said rocket propellent
ingredients were provided as well. The CIA reportedly had determined
that the components would give Iran's Scud-type missiles improved
accuracy, and possibly the ability to build such missiles on its own.
On November 21, 1996, the Washington Times quoted from an alleged
October 1996 CIA report documenting China's sale to Iran's Defense
Industries Organization of gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test
equipment meant to test and upgrade various missile systems. In May of
1997, China reportedly agreed to sell Iran X-ray equipment to study
missile casings and to check for defects in solid-propellant, and a
later press report added that China had supplied telemetry equipment
which sends and collects missile guidance data during flight tests.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Washington Times, ``Russia, China aid Iran's missile
program; Prototype expected within three years of weapon that could hit
Central Europe,'' September 10, 1997, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's transfer of missile design, production, and testing
technology is particularly worrisome. By contributing to the
development of indigenous missile manufacturing capabilities, China has
enabled several countries to circumvent the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), the intent of which is to slow the spread of missile
technology by restricting missile-related transfers to a small club of
like-minded nations. It also, by transferring such technology, has
greatly complicated the United States' ability to predict when
countries will be able to field systems capable of striking the U.S.
and its allies.
The following represents a partial list of Chinese missile
proliferation behavior, as reported in the press:
China's Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation is
alleged to have sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1995 and
1996.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The Washington Times, ``U.S., China Clash Over Missile Deal,''
October 4, 1994, p. A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``A complete factory for producing M-11 missiles or systems
of similar ranges was sold to Pakistan in 1996.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ The Washington Times, ``China to Halt Missile Sales to Iran,''
January 20, 1998, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's Poly Venture's Company is alleged to have shipped
specialized metalworking presses and a special furnace to a
Pakistani missile production facility.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The Washington Times, ``China Still Shipping Arms Despite
Pledges,'' April 15, 1999, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missile patrol boats equipped with scores of advanced C-802
anti-ship cruise missiles were sold to Iran in 1996.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ibid., p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's Great Wall Corporation is alleged to have sold
``telemetry infrastructure'' and equipment to Iran. \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ The Washington Times, ``Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile
Program,'' September 10, 1997, p. A1. See also The Washington Times,
``U.S. Offers Deal to Stop China's Nuke Sales,'' October 14, 1997, p.
A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's Precision Engineering Institute New Technology Corp.
is alleged to have agreed to sell Iran's Defense Industries
Organization gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ The Washington Times, ``China Joins Forces With Iran on Short-
Range Missile,'' June 17, 1997, p. A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China is alleged to have agreed to make three deliveries of
specialty steel to Iran in 1999 and is alleged to have trained
10 Iranian engineers on inertial guidance systems in China.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The Washington Times, ``China Still Shipping Arms Despite
Pledges,'' April 15, 1999, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China is alleged to have shipped ``rocket motors and test
equipment'' to Iran for a new short-range missile ``known as
the NP-110.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ The Washington Times, ``China to Halt Missile Sales to Iran,''
January 20, 1998, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China's Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation is
alleged to have sold ``missile-related components'' to Syria's
Scientific Studies and Research Center.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The Washington Times, ``State Looks at Chinese Missile-Part
Exports,'' July 24, 1996, p. A4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China is alleged to have agreed to collaborate with North
Korea on both selling to Iran titanium-stabilized duplex steel
for its missiles, and on a variety of missile programs in North
Korea--including the sale to the DPRK of ``special steel.''
\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ The Washington Times, ``China Still Shipping Arms Despite
Pledges,'' April 15, 1999, p. A1.
In addition to Russia and China, North Korea is a major supplier of
both missiles and missile production facilities. During testimony
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on February 24,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated:
North Korea has sold Syria and Iran extended range Scud Cs
and has apparently agreed to sell missiles to Libya. Russia and
Ukraine are showing a growing willingness to sell missile
technology prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Egypt and Israel are developing and producing missiles, and
several Persian Gulf States have purchased whole systems as
well as production technology from China and North Korea. Some
have equipped these missiles with weapons of mass destruction,
and others are striving to do so.
. . . North Korea has sold extended range Scud missiles to--
among others--Iran and Syria, and is developing and actively
marketing a new, 1000 kilometer-range missile. North Korea
apparently has no threshold governing its sales--it is willing
to sell to any country with the cash to pay.
Admiral Studeman added, in response to a question by Senator Lieberman:
Iran, one of North Korea's best customers for ballistic
missiles and related technology, is likely to be one of the
first recipients of the 1,000 km No Dong (vice Dung Ho). By the
end of this decade, Iran could be able to manufacture or
assemble short-range (Scud B and C) and medium-range (No Dong)
ballistic missiles.
Several other countries also have transferred missiles or missile
production technology in the past, including Argentina, Libya, Egypt,
and various European countries. A French company, SAGEM, is believed to
have developed the guidance systems for the Condor-2 program. A German
firm has been alleged to have assisted Iraq in the development of a new
guidance system for its enhanced Scud program. The German space agency,
DFVLR, assisted Indian scientists with guidance system algorithms for
the SLV-3, Agni and Prithvi.\20\ Likewise, India's indigenous
development of rocket propulsion systems was apparently aided by French
technology and technicians. \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Karp, Aaron, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and
Technics (SIPRI: Oxford, 1996), p. 119.
\21\ Balaschak, M. et al., Assessing the Comparability of Dual-Use
Technologies for Ballistic Missile Development, p. 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, nearly every Third World ballistic missile program has
benefitted substantially from foreign assistance. In some cases, the
assistance may have been unknowing, consisting of end-use diversion of
dual-use items such as accelerometers. However, in most cases the
assistance has been deliberate and has consisted not only of the
transfer of sensitive componentry (such as German-built gyroscopes for
Iraq's Project 1728), but of production capabilities. For these
reasons, we assess that no country is significantly inhibited from
acquiring key technologies. Those that have been stymied in their
ability to obtain assistance from the West are now shopping in China,
Russia, and North Korea.
Trend #3: Serious leakage of components and critical technologies is
occurring despite limitations imposed under the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
An unclassified version of a 1993 CIA report stated: ``The MTCR has
been moderately successful at slowing the transfer of missile-related
technologies between member and nonmember countries.'' \22\ The authors
of the CIA report were careful to make clear that the MTCR did not, of
course, prevent transfers between nonmembers, such as China and Iran.
Moreover, it must be clear that the intelligence community assessed
that the MTCR has not prevented ballistic missile collaboration, but
rather has ``slowed'' its pace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Attachment to letter from CIA Director of Congressional
Affairs Stanley Moskowitz to Chairmen Dellums, Schroeder and Glickman,
November 17, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1993, then-Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, put
it another way:
A short-cut approach that is prohibited by the Missile
Technology Control Regime and by the Non-Proliferation Treaty
would be for such Third World countries to buy ICBMs or major
components covertly, together with suitable nuclear warheads or
fissile materials. Anything such as that would, of course,
speed up ICBM acquisition by such nations.
. . . If through violations of the Missile Technology Control
Regime and the Non-Proliferation Treaty countries other than
Russia and China are able to acquire components and technology
from other countries, that could make such things a concern
sooner.
An independent panel tasked with reviewing intelligence community
assessments of the missile threat (chaired by former Director of
Central Intelligence Robert Gates) warned against placing too much
stock in the MTCR. In testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee on December 4, 1996, Mr. Gates noted that: ``the panel
believes the Estimate [NIE 95-19] places too much of a burden on the
Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of limiting the flow of
missile technology to rogue states.''
This criticism would seem to be well-founded given that members of
the MTCR continue to violate their commitments. For example, in a May
10, 1996 response to questions asked by Senator Specter, the Central
Intelligence Agency stated:
Russian firms are marketing dual-use hardware and
technology--including items covered by the guidelines of the
Missile Technology Control Regime--at international aerospace
exhibitions.
Similarly, on May 6, 1996, Lt. General Patrick Hughes, Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote to Senator Specter stating that:
Russia is known to be marketing worldwide dual-use technology
which may enhance a purchasing country's ballistic missile
program. Some of the dual-use technology is most likely covered
by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex. Another
possible conduit for the transfer of ballistic missile-
applicable technology is through aerospace-related joint
ventures. Both Russia and Ukraine are pursuing such
cooperation.
He added that:
Rampant corruption and decentralized control have also
increased the potential for illegal arms exports since Soviet
military trade was consolidated under the Foreign Economic
Relations Ministry. In addition, many Russian scientists and
engineers are known to be working in/for several non-FSU
countries. These individuals were directly involved in
defensive missile system research and development programs in
the FSU and, more recently, in the successor states.
The December 1995 interdiction by Jordanian officials of advanced
Russian ballistic missile gyroscopes and accelerometers destined for an
Iraqi missile plant serves as a case in point. Indeed, in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, 1996, Secretary
of Defense Perry admitted that time needed by various countries to
deploy ballistic missiles ``could be foreshortened if any of those
nations were able . . . to get direct assistance from countries that
already have [such systems], either sending them missiles, selling them
missiles, or giving them an important component or technology
assistance.''
The Pentagon's November, 1997, proliferation threat assessment
clearly indicates that China, like Russia, continues to proliferate
missile technology in spite of its MTCR commitments:
Also, China has a bilateral agreement with the United States
under which it has agreed to ban all exports of MTCR-class
ground-to-ground missiles and to abide by the original 1987
MTCR guidelines and parameters. Nonetheless, the United States
remains concerned about continuing Chinese assistance to
missile programs in some countries of proliferation concern.
And of course, other countries which are not MTCR members continue
to provide direct assistance to Third World missile programs. With
respect to North Korea, the Pentagon's 1997 study determines:
North Korea operates a complex, integrated network of trading
companies, brokers, shippers, and banks that facilitate NBC
weapon and ballistic missile-related trade. This trade involves
complete systems, components, manufacturing equipment, and
technology . . . North Korea is not a member of the MTCR and is
not expected to join . . .
Pyongyang's policy of supplying rogue states with ballistic
missiles and related technology remains a factor in the
advancement of several Middle Eastern production programs. As
the North develops even longer range missiles and improves its
chemical warfare capabilities, the potential exists for
additional North Korea exports.
As is clear from the earlier discussion of the scope of Chinese
technical assistance to Iran and Pakistan, any assumption that the MTCR
can be counted upon to prevent, or significantly limit, ballistic
missile proliferation is flawed on its face. Serious circumvention of
the MTCR is the norm, not the exception.
Trend #4: The United States must be concerned that a country with an
ICBM might sell a complete system, or complete stages of that
system
In 1993, then-National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs,
Larry Gershwin, has stated: ``We also remain concerned that hostile
nations will try to purchase from other states ballistic missiles
capable of striking the United States.'' \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Speech to the American Defense Preparedness Association, May
18, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, then-DCI Studeman stated in his 1993 responses to
Congress:
We also remain concerned that hostile nations will try to
purchase from other states ballistic missiles capable of
striking the United States. Libya, for example, has in the past
publicly stated a desire for weapons of mass destruction that
could be delivered by ballistic missile to the United States. A
shortcut approach--prohibited by the Missile Technology Control
Regime and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty--would be to buy
ICBMs or major components covertly, together with suitable
warheads or controlled materials. The acquisition of key
production technologies would also greatly speed ICBM
development.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Letter to Senator Glenn, August 27, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Gates Panel rightly pointed out that:
``The United States cannot rule out the possibility of a
strategic change of direction or policy in Russia or China--or
in other countries--over a fifteen year span of time that might
lead to a sale of a long-range missile system to a Third World
country.''
The concerns expressed by these officials derive from the fact that
countries already have aggressively marketed medium-range missiles and
some may already have tried to sell ICBMs. China's sale of CSS-2's to
Saudi Arabia has been well publicized. Less attention was given,
however, to China's reported marketing in 1984 of the DF-5 ICBM (with a
12,000 kilometer range) for use in the Brazilian and Argentinean
``space'' programs.\25\ While China was turned down for a lack of hard
currency, Brazil does seem to have concluded an agreement with China to
develop a four-stage, solid-propellant space launch vehicle that may be
marketed for export as a ballistic missile.\26\ Numerous press reports
also indicate that Russia has sought to market variants of nearly every
one of its ICBMs for space launch purposes.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Burrows, William and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (Simon &
Schuster: New York, 1994), p. 396.
\26\ Nolan, Janne, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the
Third World, p. 19.
\27\ Anna Bakina, ``Strategic Missile Under Conversion Into Space
Booster,'' ITAR-TASS, 17 July 1995; ``RSA To Turn Swords Into
Plowshares,'' Kommersant Daily, 7 July 1995, p. 9; ``SS-19s To Be
Converted Into Rokot Space Carrier Rockets,'' FBIS Report: Arms Control
and Proliferation, FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 4 August 1995, p. 97; Vitaly
Chukseyev, ``Russia to Supply Boosters for U.S. Missiles,'' ITAR-TASS,
13 October 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under these circumstances, it would be imprudent to assume that
countries hostile to the United States would be unable to acquire a
complete missile system, particularly in the event of widespread
economic and political turmoil in Russia. While the possibility of the
transfer of a complete missile remains remote, it cannot be discounted.
Trend #5: Countries can rapidly reconfigure their space launch vehicles
to serve as ICBMs; moreover space launch vehicle programs in
general can enable countries to significantly accelerate ICBM
development
Several countries, including Japan, Ukraine, Brazil, Israel, and
India, possess space launch vehicles (SLVs) which could rapidly be
reconfigured to serve as ICBMs. While it is difficult to gauge the
likelihood of this happening, the United States must recognize that
unforeseen political circumstances might prompt such a development.
India, for example, may determine that ICBMs are necessary for any
number of reasons--perhaps as a means of deterring third party
intervention in any future Indo-Pakistani conflict. The circumstances
under which Ukraine, Japan, or Taiwan might find an ICBM-capability
advantageous also should be examined. At a minimum, an SLV program is
an incipient ICBM program.
With regard to India, Admiral Studeman noted on August 27, 1993,
that:
India could convert its space launch vehicles into IRBMs or
ICBMs quite easily. India has already demonstrated the ability
to build guidance sets and warheads, the two key ingredients
needed to convert an SLV into a ballistic missile.
. . . An ICBM based on the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle
(PSLV) would be technically feasible for the Indians. A warhead
capable of handling ICBM reentry conditions and designed for
the PSLV would need to be developed. A new IRBM or ICBM based
on the propulsion and guidance technology employed by the PSLV
would be possible.
With respect to Brazil, then-DCI Studeman noted:
Brasilia has stated repeatedly that the SLV program is
devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. Moreover, there is
widespread public support for the program because it is viewed
as making Brazil a competitor in the international space launch
market. Nevertheless, Brazilian officials admit that if Brazil
completed development of an SLV, it would have the capability
to build ballistic missiles.
India and Brazil are but two of a number of countries who either
possess or are developing SLVs capable of being converted into ICBMs.
The list grows if one considers those countries that have the
technological ``know-how'' to develop an SLV.
As General William Odom, former Director of the National Security
Agency and chairman of the SDIO Proliferation Study Team put it in a
February 1993 report:
The conclusion that the probability is quite low for the
emergence of new ballistic missile threats to the United States
during this decade or early in the next decade can be sustained
only if plausible but unpredictable developments, such as the
transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or considered of
negligible consequence.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,
February 1993, p. 1.
As far as the linkages between SLV and ICBM technologies, during
testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on
February 24, 1993, by then-Director of Central Intelligence, R. James
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Woolsey:
The space launch vehicle technology is very similar to and is
clearly applicable toward developing ballistic missiles. It was
the reason why Sputnik led to concerns for the security of the
United States back at the end of the 1950s. . . . it is
unfortunately the case that the technologies for ICBMs and
space launch vehicles are very close and in some cases
virtually identical.
According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ``the only
major difference between the space and missile variants is that the
final boost stage of the ICBM is terminated earlier, before the payload
has achieved enough velocity to enter orbit, resulting in its return to
earth.'' \29\ Indeed, of the eight essential components for an ICBM,
all but one (the warhead) are used in modified form on a space launch
vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (ACDA: Washington, D.C., 1988),
p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both the United States and the Soviet Union used ICBMs as boosters
in their space programs. The Atlas, Titan, SS-5, and SS-6 rockets were
all of military origin. Similarly, systems or stages of systems under
development in India and Brazil can be used as ballistic missiles.
Indeed, perhaps with the exception of Japan, no country has ever
embarked upon an SLV program for purely nonmilitary reasons.
On August 27, 1993, Admiral William Studeman, acting Director of
Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Glenn stating that:
Applying space launch vehicle (SLV) components or technology
to a ballistic missile program is a relatively straightforward
task. SLV and ballistic missile technologies, components, and
operations are very similar and often identical, thus no
``safeguards'' exist which could prevent conversion of SLV
components or technologies for use in ballistic missiles.
For example, India's first space launch vehicle, the SLV-3,
was based on the U.S. Scout launch vehicle. Its first stage
also serves as the first stage of the Agni medium-range
ballistic missile. This interchangeability easily allows
diversion of SLV technology into missile programs.
Any country which receives technology to manufacture SLVs
also receives the necessary technology to manufacture ballistic
missiles. By providing SLV manufacturing technology, an
inherent ballistic missile manufacturing capability is
transferred as well. For countries with little indigenous
missile technology, transfer of SLV production technology could
reduce their missile development time frame by several years.
A 1992 report by The System Planning Corporation found SLV
conversion to be ``fairly straightforward.'' \30\ Another 1992 study by
Science Applications International Corporation found that ``The
increasing availability of space launch vehicles and space launch
services could result in the ability of certain Third World countries
to threaten the continental U.S. with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical,
or biological payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat, 1992, pp.
26-28.
\31\ Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate, ``GPALS and Foreign Space
Launch Vehicle Capabilities,'' SAIC, February 1992, p. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, it is analytical folly to overlook the fact that several
countries today have the capacity to threaten the U.S. with an ICBM,
though not necessarily the intent. Second, the increasing availability
of dual-use technologies--particularly through SLV programs--will
enhance the ability of countries to produce ballistic missiles, and may
prompt other countries to pursue their own, indigenous development. The
proliferation of sensitive technologies via space programs will enable
more effective integration of ballistic missile components, will extend
the range and payload capabilities of various missiles under
development, and reduce the circular error probable (CEP), increasing
accuracy.
Even as all of this is occurring, the Intelligence Community is
finding difficult the monitoring of SLV programs to ensure that they do
not contribute to a ballistic missile program. Intent is hard to
assess, and since there is no practical capability to distinguish
between SLV and ICBM development, the U.S. may be denied timely warning
of an emerging missile threat based on SLV technology. In some cases,
the threat could emerge ``over night'' as a country simply transforms a
commercial system to a military role.
Trend #6: A country need not engage in a lengthy flight test program
prior to deployment of an ICBM. This means reduced warning time
Under the Clinton Administration the intelligence community assumed
that a flight test program lasting about 5 years is essential to the
development of an ICBM. \32\ Richard Cooper specifically noted that ``a
flight test is a sure, detectable sign of a ballistic missile program.
Normally the first flight test would provide at least five years
warning before deployment.'' He added that ``Moreover, we would almost
certainly obtain other earlier indicators of an ICBM program.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ GAO/NSIAD-96-225, Foreign Missile Threats, p. 7.
\33\ Cooper testimony, House National Security Committee, February
28, 1996, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The high degree of certainty with which NIE 95-19 judges that
indicators of an ICBM program would be detected prior to the missile's
flight testing would seem questionable in light of the Intelligence
Community's reported intelligence gaps with regard to both the Iraqi
and North Korean missile programs.
For example, according to one intelligence analyst, it was only
after Iraq's test launch of a modified Scud B (the al-Hossein) on
August 3, 1987, that the United States, ``suddenly realized we had a
missile problem in Iraq.'' \34\ According to many, the al-Hossein test
was the first indicator that Iraq had another ballistic missile program
besides the Condor II project. While the Scud-upgrade program (Project
1728), was the least technologically demanding of Iraq's missile
programs, it ranged in scope from the cannibalization of existing
Soviet Scuds to Iraqi manufacture of major components such as missile
cases. Moreover, Project 1728 entailed a massive foreign acquisition
program which obtained rocket nozzles, virtually a complete testing
plant for missile propulsion systems, a liquid rocket fuel plant (which
also could make UDMH), turbo pumps for missile fuel systems, and
gyroscopes.\35\ It therefore clearly had observable features. Yet it
went undetected (according to credible public accounts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Kenneth R. Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed
Iraq, (Boulder: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1991), p. 268.
\35\ Ibid., p. 253-255. UDMH, unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine, is a
rocket fuel additive which boosts propulsion. The ability to
manufacture or obtain rocket fuel additives, particularly for solid
fuels, may be important to the indigenous development of an ICBM
propulsion system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 29, 1988--just seven months after its first and only
flight test of the modified Scud B--Iraq began launching ballistic
missiles at Iranian cities. Yet the U.S. Intelligence Community
reportedly was at a loss to identify the type of missile being used by
Iraq. According to Kenneth Timmerman, Iranian broadcast video of
unexploded missile components had the Intelligence Community ``tied in
knots.'' \36\ Although the componentry was positively identified as
belonging to Soviet-built Scud Bs, the distance to the target in Iran
was well beyond the range of even the Scud C (which Iraq had not
received). It was only after the Iran-Iraq war that it became clear
that Iraq had cut up and rewelded Scud B fuel tanks to create longer
fuel tanks that could hold five, rather than four, tons of fuel.\37\
Iraq had additionally reduced the size of the missile warhead and had
moved air tanks from the missile's tail to the nose.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Ibid., p. 288.
\37\ Ibid.
\38\ Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez, ``Iraq's al-Hossein Missile
Program,'' Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. experience with monitoring the Iraqi missile program would
seem, at a minimum, to call into question the bold assertion that the
U.S. would ``almost certainly'' detect a ballistic missile program
prior to a flight test. It would also seem to indicate that a country
might, under certain conditions, find a way to ``cut corners'' in the
ballistic missile development process.
The U.S. experience with North Korea's Taepo Dong 1 missile is no
less telling. On August 31, 1998, North Korea stunned the United States
by firing a Taepo Dong 1 which had a third stage. ``The existence of
the third stage concerned us,'' according to Bob Walpole, the National
Intelligence officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs.\39\ ``First,
we had not included it in our earlier projections; neither had outside
experts looking at our intelligence. Second, it and potentially larger
third stages have significant implications for the Taepo Dong-2.'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ ``North Korea's Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications on the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,'' Robert Walpole, 8
December 1998, p. 2.
\40\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The launch of the Taepo Dong 1 by North Korea demonstrated
significant and unexpected progress in stage separation technology.
With only one flight test, North Korea proved that it possessed the
ability--in the words of NIO Walpole--``to deliver small payloads to
ICBM ranges . . .'' \41\ In other words, North Korea has developed an
ICBM capable of attacking the United States with a small biological or
chemical payload. It did so--not with a five year flight program--but
with only one flight test. As the North Korean example proves, in the
absence of concrete indicators regarding a Third World country's ICBM
program, a flight test may be the first and only indication we may have
of an emerging ICBM threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any assumption that the U.S. will have advance warning of an ICBM
deployment since any ICBM flight test program would last at least five
years reflects a serious analytical shortcoming: the ``mirror imaging''
of Western ICBM developmental programs.
Historically, the United States has engaged in six different types
of tests: (1) technology/componentry tests; (2) research and
development tests; (3) initial operational tests; (4) demonstration and
shakedown tests; (5) follow-on tests; and (6) aging and surveillance
tests.\42\ The first three types are those tests normally conducted
prior to deployment of a fully operational U.S. ICBM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Wilkes, Owen et al., Chasing Gravity's Rainbow: Kwajalein and
US Ballistic Missile Testing (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The
Australian National University: Canberra, 1991), pp. 75-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Depending upon circumstances, it may be technically feasible for a
country to significantly shorten the time spent on various test stages.
For instance, the purpose of technology and componentry testing is to
validate the effectiveness of advanced components or sub-assemblies
that incorporate unproven, high-risk technology. If a Third World
country acquires components that have already been validated in other
ballistic missile programs--such as with Iran's reported acquisition of
SS-4 liquid-fuel technology--the need for this type of test would be
diminished, or perhaps even eliminated altogether. In fact, a Third
World country which has acquired only a handful of inertial navigation
systems or gyroscopes may be loathe to sacrifice any of its scarce
resources in such a test.
Research and developmental tests are conducted to validate
successive stages in an ICBM design process. If, however, a country
were to rely upon proven designs, fewer such tests would be necessary.
The French missile program demonstrates how an incremental development
process which recycles proven technology may reduce the number of
developmental tests required. Relying upon components and sub-systems
proven in other systems, France was able to deploy the 2,750 kilometer
range S-2 missile in six years with only 12 test launches.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Villain, J., La Force de Dissuassion: Genese et Evolution
(Editions Lariviere: Paris, 1987), p. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korea seems to be following this pattern of development using
recycled technology. According to an April 1996 report by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Taepo Dong 2 missile is thought to be a
new combination of existing missile components--presumably derived from
the Nodong program. The same is believed to be true for the Taepo Dong
1 system. If the Taepo Dong 1 and 2 are indeed but extensions of the
Nodong program, this would explain why their rapid development may have
taken the Intelligence Community by surprise.\44\ The Taepo Dong
series' linkages to the Nodong program explains why North Korea did not
feel compelled to flight test the Taepo Dong 1 until last summer, since
the basic concept was validated in the May 1993 Nodong flight test.
Moreover, given the relative success of the Taepo Dong 1's flight test,
North Korea may not feel compelled to flight test the follow-on system
at all prior to use. At a minimum, North Korea may conduct only a
handful of operational flight tests. Under such circumstances, the
Taepo Dong 2 could easily be deployed without 5 years of rigorous
testing. Further, operational similarities between the Taepo Dong 2 and
its Nodong progenitor might foreshorten training requirements for
missile crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Barbara Starr, Jane's Defense Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is an additional concern here as well. In June, 1994, The
Washington Times reported that the United States has confirmed that
Iranian officials have been present at a number of missile tests in
North Korea, which were described as ``sales demonstrations.'' We may,
therefore, presume that Iran also has validated the Nodong's design,
having witnessed successful tests.\45\ Accordingly, if the Shahab-3 and
Shahab-4 are simply further improvements of the Nodong system, Iran
also may engage in fewer flight tests of its intermediate systems.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ This raises an interesting point. Press articles from 1994
reported that North Korea may test the Nodong missile in Iran because
``[testing facilities] don't exist for a full-range test in North
Korea.'' Obviously, were this to occur, it would shorten Iran's own
missile testing timetable. It also raises the troubling prospect that
the Intelligence Community might be uncertain, in the future, as to how
many countries are deriving technical benefit from a ballistic missile
test.
\46\ Certainly there is ample evidence to suggest that Iran's
medium-range systems utilize Nodong technology. Iranian interest in the
Nodong missile has been widely publicized. In his 1994 posture
statement, Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Edward Shaefer's
reportedly stated that ``Iranian acquisition of the No-dong system from
North Korea is possible in the future.'' (Arms Control Today, July
1994, p. 23; see also, Barbara Starr, Jane's Defence Weekly, August 6,
1994, pp. 4-6.)
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau testified on June
14, 1994, that ``We're concerned about press reports and other
intelligence that they might, at some point, sell the No-Dong missile--
with a much longer range than the Scud-B and -C.'' (The Washington
Times, June 16, 1994, p. A 13; see also, James Bruce, Jane's Defence
Weekly, July 30, 1994, pp. 23-33.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Iran is using Nodong technology for its medium-range program,
then it may use it for its longer-range, follow-on missiles. Were Iran
to stack two Nodong stages together, flight testing of the basic
conceptual design may be viewed as unnecessary. (We will assess the
feasibility of ``stacking'' stages later in the assessment.)
Finally, as the United States found in testing the MX ICBM,
successful developmental tests also could foreshorten the test series.
The U.S. conducted its first operational trial test of the MX less than
four years after it had initiated the flight test program (June 1983-
March 1987).\47\ Moreover, a significant number of the tests from
October 1984 to August 1986 were devoted to integration of the MX's re-
entry vehicle. (These types of tests may not be germane to a Third
World ICBM program, particularly if a biological warhead is to be
employed). Operational testing of the MX missile was concluded in March
1990. In other words, the United States moved from testing componentry
to certifying operational capability of its most sophisticated ICBM--it
had a longer range and higher CEP than earlier systems--in roughly
seven years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Wilkes, Owen et al., Chasing Gravity's Rainbow: Kwajalein and
US Ballistic Missile Testing, p. 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In judging that any flight test program would last at least five
years, the intelligence community previously seemed to assume that a
would-be ICBM developer in the Third World will have nearly the same
demanding requirements for payload, range, and accuracy as did the
United States at the height of the Cold War. Instead, it now seems more
likely that Third World countries will pursue intercontinental-range
missiles for their deterrent value--as a means to threaten counter-
value targets, such as cities. Under such circumstances, a far less
rigorous test program would be required. A CEP of 800 meters matters
little if the target is New York City or Honolulu. Further, given the
high cost of flight testing, the temptation to make do with fewer tests
may also foreshorten the timetable. Finally, if the country has been
able to develop a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead for the
missile, the need to test for accuracy is further reduced.
The basic rule of thumb for the U.S. missile program, stipulated by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that the number of missiles tested must
be sufficient to provide the U.S. with a 90 percent confidence that the
ICBM's reliability is not less than ten points below the success rate
of the series.\48\ This is a very rigorous standard. The United States
should contemplate the possibility that a Third World test program
might not be designed to prove with such a high degree of confidence
that every deployed system will work. Rather, testing may be designed
to confirm the mechanical integrity of a system--to prove that it can
work. One cannot dismiss the political pressures and other
imponderables which might prompt a country to deploy a missile with
little or no testing, or to foreshorten legs of the testing program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Ibid., p. 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On this point, while the Gates Panel agreed with NIE 95-19 that a
country developing an ICBM would almost certainly test it, it
nevertheless concluded that ``most important among the deficiencies of
NIE 95-19'' was the Estimate's ``failure to adequately address the
motives and objectives of the governments developing missile programs,
and how they affect technology needs.'' According to the panel:
With the ballistic missile programs we are seeing now,
however, motive matters a great deal, and can significantly
affect technology. What is required technically for a crude
terror weapon is very different than what is required for a
weapon that is militarily useful.
History is replete with examples of how motives and objectives--as
opposed to technical interests--dictated developmental and testing
timetables. For example, the pressures of the Sino-Soviet conflict
prompted China's decision to deploy the DF-5 for operational training
only two months after its first two full-range test flights into the
Pacific.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Lewis, John Wilson, and Hua Di, ``China's Ballistic Missile
Programs,'' International Security (Fall 1992), p. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most significantly, in the midst of the Cold War race to send a man
to the moon, the United States developed the Saturn-S rocket with no
flight testing at all. The rocket flew successfully for first time on
November 8, 1967 as part of the Apollo-4 mission.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Bilstein, R.E., Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of
the Apollo Saturn Launch Vehicles (NASA: Washington, D.C., 1980), pp.
349-351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 1993, the CIA explicitly recognized the likelihood--not
possibility--that a country might foreshorten an ICBM testing
timetable:
Because of the limited capabilities and likely motivations
for attacking CONUS with ICBMs--such as international coercion,
deterring US attacks, and regional influence building--it is
highly likely that any country making the decision would pursue
a high-risk development program with no (or limited) testing in
order to shorten schedules and reduce the visibility of the
program.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Attachment to Moskowitz letter to Dellums et al., November 17,
1993.
This assessment underscores the fact that the United States cannot rely
upon observation of flight tests for warning that an ICBM threat is
emerging.
Trend #7: Development of short and medium-range missiles will enable
countries to significantly accelerate ICBM development
There are numerous linkages between short- and medium-range missile
development and ICBM development. Shifting from a short or medium range
missile to a long range ICBM is a viable technological option. Such a
shift can be accomplished via two alternatives that are widely
discussed in the literature on missile proliferation: vertical stacking
and horizontal clustering of shorter or medium-range missiles.
Several assessments have taken seriously the potential for
horizontal clustering of medium-range missile components. A 1993 CIA
report found that ``clustering lower performance engines is an option
available for increasing the missile's range or payload capacity.''
\52\ Similarly, a 1992 report by the Space Systems Division of Rockwell
International determined that 13 SCUD missiles could be clustered
together--nine in the first stage, three in the second, and one in the
third--to produce an ICBM with a range of 7000 kilometers. \53\ Indeed,
the report goes on to examine other potential combinations of available
rocket boosters and finds that clustering could result in an ICBM with
a range of 14,000 km or more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Attachment to Moskowitz letter to Dellums et al., November 17,
1993.
\53\ Howe, J.R., Emerging Long-Range Threat to CONUS (Rockwell
International, Space Systems Division: Washington, D.C., Dec. 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States can ill-afford to dismiss horizontal clustering
as a technical option given the history of both U.S. and Soviet long-
range rocket designs. In the 1950s both countries progressed rapidly
from single-stage, intermediate range missiles (such as the SS-4, SS-5,
Jupiter, and Thor missiles) to the development of ICBMs (SS-6 and
Atlas) which were essentially single-stage rockets surrounded by strap-
on engines. NASA, for example, engineered the Saturn-1 and Saturn-1B
space launch vehicles out of eight Redstone boosters. Subsequently the
Saturn-S also made use of clustering.\54\ As has already been noted,
the Saturn-S was launched ``full up'' and successfully without any
prior flight testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Bilstein, R.E., Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of
the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration: Washington, DC, 1980) pp. 176-83, 323-45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significantly, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea all have experimented
with the concept. Iraq, for example, designed the ``al Abed,'' which
integrated seven boosters (at least six of which were Scuds). Although
there has been speculation that the second and third stages were
dummies, U.S. officials nevertheless took the technological
implications of the clustering design seriously. It was calculated at
the time that the al Abed could ultimately be configured to deliver
payloads over an intercontinental distance.\55\ Half a year later,
then-Secretary of Defense Cheney stated: ``The booster looked as if it
were made up of five short-range rockets. Together the rockets could
give the booster a range of 1000 kilometers.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ ``U.S. Confirms Iraq has Launched Rocket That Can Carry
Satellites,'' The New York Times, 8 December 1989.
\56\ U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, No. 294-90, 11 June
1990, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other technical option that would enable a country to develop
an ICBM using shorter range missiles would be to ``stack'' the
boosters. A 1981 study for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
examines the feasibility of this approach at length. That report
concludes that long-range ballistic missiles could be created by
combining two or three single-stage boosters into a single, multiple-
stage rocket. The report concluded that ``a two-stage system is
relatively easy to construct from the available components . . .'' \57\
In fact, the report concludes that virtually all solid propellant
rockets can be adapted to two-stage ballistic missile system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Balaschak, M. et al., Assessing the Comparability of Dual-Use
Technologies for Ballistic Missile Development, pp. 45-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 1981 ACDA-commissioned report also concludes that, ``while
technically difficult, it may be possible to stack three identical
stages together to increase the range of these rockets.'' \58\ This is
the approach taken by Brazil in its Sonda series of sounding rockets,
which according to the Defense Intelligence Agency has evolved from a
single-stage to the four stage Sonda-IV.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Ibid., p. 54.
\59\ Pumphrey, Joe D., Status of Third World Ballistic Missile
Technology (Defense Intelligence Agency: Washington, 1986), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The study provides a number of examples, including a hypothetical
missile comprised of two commercially-marketed French Mammoth boosters
(which use rocket engines similar to those licensed by the French
government for manufacture in both India and Pakistan) which could
deliver a 250 kg payload to a distance of over 1,200 kilometers.
Similarly, by stacking two commercial Ariane strap-on boosters, a
country could develop a missile with a range of nearly 3,000
kilometers.\60\ As a practical matter, India's two-stage Agni system
(with an intended range of over 2,000 km) is a two stage missile which
reportedly combines India's solid-fueled SLV-3 booster with a liquid-
fueled second stage apparently adapted from the Prithvi.\61\ It also
has been speculated that Iraq's 2000 km-range Tammuz prototype was
comprised of an al-Hossein booster and modified SA-2 surface to air
missile.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Ibid., pp. 53-61.
\61\ Nolan, Janne, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the
Third World, p. 45.
\62\ Navias, Martin, Going Ballistic: The Build-up of Missiles in
the Middle East (Brassey's: London, 1993), pp. 106-107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, press accounts indicate that North Korea's Taepo Dong 2
may be a two-stage missile incorporating the Taepo Dong 1 stacked on a
16.2 meter booster.\63\ Certainly, the stacking of the third stage on
the Taepo Dong 1 provided an increased range to that system, and also
has caused the intelligence community to rethink its assumptions about
the range and payload capacity of the Taepo Dong 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ ``U.S. Reportedly Within New North Missile Range,'' FBIS-EAS-
95-175 (September 11, 1995), p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trend #8: Countries are today able to deploy a ship-launched, short or
medium-range ballistic missile capable of threatening the
United States
According to the Gates Panel:
The Panel also believes that the possibility of a sea-based
ballistic missile of less than intercontinental range warrants
more attention than given in the Estimate [NIE 95-19]. The
Estimate's assessment of the ballistic missile threat to North
America concentrates almost exclusively on ballistic missiles
with intercontinental range. Consideration of scenarios
involving crude sea-launched ballistic missiles (e.g., Scud-
derived missiles launched from mobile launchers driven aboard
transport ships) is limited. Since developing missiles with
sufficient range was identified as one of the most difficult
technical obstacles which would have to be overcome before
North America would face an ICBM threat, the lack of serious
attention to possible SLBM threats is all the more noteworthy.
The idea of launching short-range, ballistic missiles from sea is
not new. For example, the Soviet Union deployed, beginning in 1958, the
R-11FM and R-13 ballistic missiles on its submarines. The two types of
short-range ballistic missiles (both were launched from the vessel's
sail) had a range of 150 km and 600 km respectively.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Boris Rodionov, ``First Ballistic Missiles for the Submarine
Fleet,'' Military Parade (January/February, 1996), pp. 58-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obviously, future programs may not be as complex as the Soviet
submarine system. A country just as easily could roll a mobile
transporter/erector/launcher (TEL) onto a barge or merchant ship, or
could outfit a vessel's cargo hold with a launch system. In and of
itself, this would pose minor technical challenges to most Third World
countries. One of the most critical obstacles to be overcome would be
hardening the platform against humidity and vibration.
A country might find it more difficult were it to pursue
integration of the missile's guidance system with some form of inertial
guidance on the ship (in order to correct for the unsteady sea state).
Left uncorrected, even minimal rolling or pitching by the naval vessel
could produce large missile inaccuracies down-range. Of course, for a
country intending to deliver a Scud missile tipped with a biological or
chemical warhead against a U.S. city, no guidance system correction is
necessary. Even ``getting close'' would suffice to cause immense
devastation.
In short, the requisite technology to threaten the U.S. with short-
range ballistic missile attack from the sea already exists and is
readily adaptable.
Trend #9: The possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch from
existing nuclear arsenals is increasing
On February 28, 1996, the Chairman of the National Intelligence
Council, Richard Cooper, testified before the House National Security
Committee that:
In our recent NIE, the Intelligence Community reaffirmed
earlier assessments that the current threat to North America
from unauthorized or accidental launch of Russian or Chinese
strategic missiles remains remote and has not changed
significantly from that of the past decade.
Such an assumption is at odds with the Intelligence Community's
concerns over the potential for turbulence in the former Soviet Union.
A classified CIA report issued in September 1996, entitled ``Prospects
for Unsanctioned Use of Russian Nuclear Weapons,'' seems to have been
excerpted in published media accounts. \65\ Reportedly, it concluded
that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ ``Russian Renegades Pose Nuke Danger: CIA Says Arsenal Lacks
Tight Controls,'' The Washington Times, October 22, 1996, p. A1.
The Russian nuclear command and control system is being
subjected to stresses it was not designed to withstand as a
result of wrenching social change, economic hardship, and
malaise within the armed forces . . .
. . . despite official assurances, high-level Moscow
officials are concerned about the security of their nuclear
inventory.
In evaluating several worst-case scenarios, the CIA report also
reportedly concluded that ``a severe political crisis, however, could
exacerbate existing dissension and factionalization in the military,
possibly heightening tensions between Russian political and military
leaders and even splitting the general staff or nuclear commands.'' Yet
another troubling finding of the report is that the command posts of
the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces ``have the technical capability to
launch without authorization of political leaders or the general
staff.'' Given time, the report states, ``all technical [security]
measures can be circumvented--probably within weeks or days depending
upon the weapon involved.'' Moreover, the political leadership probably
could not ``prevent the general staff (or perhaps some other national
level command post) from launching on its own.'' Additionally, the
report warns that nuclear armed units may be conspiring to commit
nuclear blackmail and that some submarine crews ``probably have an
autonomous launch capability and might have the ability to employ SLAMS
as well.''
There are at least two additional incidents which heighten concern
about the danger of accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia.
During the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, a secret order from
Russian Defense Minister Yazov led to unauthorized alert status for
Russian armed forces, including strategic nuclear forces. \66\ While
the August 1991 coup attempt was an incident of previously-unforseen
political turmoil in Russia, it is clear that Russia's political future
could see similar events in the future. The second troubling event was
the January 1995 Russian nuclear alert in overreaction to the launch of
a Norwegian meteorological rocket. \67\ This event reportedly led to
the Russian strategic nuclear force control terminals--the nuclear
``footballs''--being switched to alert mode for several minutes.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ See ``Yazov Mobilization Order,'' FBIS-SOV-91-166 (August 27,
1991), p. 59 and ``Deputy Procurator General Interviewed on Putsch,''
FBIS-SOV-92-021 (January 31, 1992), pp. 37-41.
\67\ See ``Norwegian Science Rocket Puts Russian Defense on
Alert,'' The Washington Times (January 29, 1995), p. A16; ``Russian
Radars Alert Moscow After Detecting Missile Launch,'' Agence France
Presse (January 25, 1996); and ``Yeltsin Leaves Chechnya Behind in
Lipetsk, But Takes the `Black Attache Case' With Him,'' Izvestiya
(January 27, 1995) p. 1.
\68\ See also the article by Nikolay Devyanin, designer of the
Russian nuclear force control terminals: ``All That Has Happened, Alas,
Had to Happen,'' Moskovskiye Novosti, January 29-February 5, 1995, pp.
1, 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the possibility of a large-scale nuclear exchange between
Russia and the United States may be at an all-time low, the risk of
mishap--accidental or otherwise--has not decreased proportionately to
reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal. In fact, media accounts
which have not been challenged for accuracy raise the troubling
possibility that Russian control of strategic nuclear forces is not as
secure as it was during the Cold War. The possibility of accidental or
unauthorized launch may be ``low,'' but--like the possibility of a
nuclear exchange during the Cold War--it is clearly a possibility with
severe consequences.
In the words of the Gates Panel:
With major forces of change still at play in Russia, the
Panel believes the Estimate's discussion of unauthorized launch
is superficial and may be overly sanguine. All agree that a
launch unauthorized by the Russian political leadership is a
remote possibility. But it would appear to be technically
possible.
______
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
May 12, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
Through: James W. Nance
From: Marshall Billingslea, Sherry Grandjean, and Andrew Anderson
Subject: Hearing on the ABM Treaty and the Need For Ballistic Missile
Defenses
The Committee will hold a hearing on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States and the need for a national missile defense on
Thursday, May 13, at 10:00 AM in SD-562. The witnesses will be the
Honorable Stephen Hadley, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under
President Bush; (2) the Honorable Robert G. Joseph, former Ambassador
to the ABM Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission; and (3) the
Honorable David Smith, former Chief U.S. Negotiator to the Defense and
Space Talks. Senator Hagel will preside.
Attachment.
Ballistic Missile Defense: Technological Issues
Basic Architecture Planned for a National Missile Defense
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) of the Department
of Defense has developed a national missile defense (NMD) program which
will, if ever deployed, establish a ground-based missile defense
designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile
threats. The NMD plan is intended to be layered, over time, to achieve
three successive levels of capability (called ``C1'', ``C2'', and
``C3'').
The first, most basic missile defense, C1, is meant to provide a
very ``thin'' protection against a few, technologically-simple incoming
warheads. As such, it is oriented against the North Korean threat. As
will be discussed, C1 would not be effective against the Chinese
arsenal of two dozen warheads, and certainly would not be capable of
stopping an attack by Russia. It will not be suitable for dealing with
the emerging Iranian ICBM threat due to the planned location of the
single interceptor site in Alaska. It also will be incapable of
defending against short-range ship-launched ICBMs. However, the current
intention is to deploy C2, and C1 is an intermediate step along the
way.
The second- and third-generation of defenses, C2 and C3, are meant
to provide capability against a few incoming, sophisticated warheads,
and defense against a larger number of sophisticated warheads,
respectively.
elements of the national missile defense system
There are six major technological components to the
Administration's planned NMD system:
Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) (``Missiles'')
The GBI and its associated components are the ``weapon'' of the NMD
system. Its mission is to strike and destroy by force of impact high
speed ballistic missile warheads in the midcourse or exo-atmospheric
phase of their trajectories. The GBI consists of three components:
--The missile payload, or exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV).
The EKV has its own sensors, propulsion, communications,
guidance, and computing functions which will work together to
complete the intercept.
--A booster that will propel the EKV toward the approximate
intercept location so the EKV can perform the final maneuvers
to impact and destroy the incoming warhead.
--Ground command and launch equipment needed to launch the
interceptor. This includes software and hardware to interface
with the BM/C3 system, human-in-control interfaces (consoles),
and interceptor storage sites (silos) for daily maintenance and
readiness functions and to launch the interceptor.
As of March, 1999, the administration plans for 20 interceptor
missiles in central Alaska, if a decision to deploy C1 is taken. This
is being done because technical assessments indicate that national
coverage cannot be accomplished from North Dakota alone. For C2, the
plan calls for 80 more weapons in Alaska. C3 adds a further 25
interceptors to the Alaskan site, bringing the total to 125, and calls
for a second missile defense site of 125 interceptors at Grand Forks,
North Dakota.
Forward Deployed and/or U.S.-based X-Band Radars (XBR)
The XBRs are forward deployed, ground-based, taskable, multi-
function radars. In the NMD role, they perform acquisition, tracking,
discrimination, and kill assessment of incoming warheads. XBRs use high
frequency and advanced radar signal processing technology to improve
target resolution, which permits the radar to perform more effectively
against closely-spaced warheads and debris.
For C1, the initial XBR capability would consist of the single
radar at Shemya, Alaska. C2 would add three more X-Band Radars at
Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Fylingdales, England. These radars
sites already exist, possessing early warning, surveillance
capabilities. C3 would add a further XBR in South Korea.
Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR)
U.S. early warning radars are large, fixed, phased-array
surveillance radars used to detect and track ballistic missiles
directed into the United States. Upgrades to the existing network will
provide the capability to support the NMD surveillance function. Prior
to deployment of the SBIRS (Low) satellites, the UEWRs will be used to
detect and track objects during their midcourse phase, primarily to cue
the more precise X-Band Radars. There are cases, however, where the XBR
will not possess sufficient range to conduct intercepts; in those cases
the UEWR will provide the only tracking data. However, this would not
be compliant with the ABM Treaty.
C1 will utilize a network of five existing radars. C2 would not add
any additional UEWR, but C3 would add a radar in South Korea.
Battle Management/Command, Control, and Communication (BM/C3)
BM/C3 is the ``brains'' of the NMD system. In the event of a launch
against the United States, the Commander-in-Chief of North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) will control and operate the NMD
system through the BM/C3. The BM/C3 element supports the Commander-in-
Chief with extensive decision support systems, battle management
displays, and situation awareness information. In this way, it supplies
the means to plan, select, and adjust missions and courses of action;
and it disseminates defense engagement authorization (DEA) and other
Command decisions to the NMD system elements. The In-Flight Interceptor
Communications System (IFICS) is the BM/C3 communications link to the
interceptors during flyout.
Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, mistakenly believed by many Americans
to house already a robust national missile defense, will be the BM/C3
site for the planned NMD system.
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
SBIRS is an additional element that future NMD systems will
utilize. SBIRS (High) is being developed by the Air Force as part of
the Early Warning System upgrade which will replace the Defense Support
Program (DSP) satellites. SBIRS (Low) is being developed primarily to
support both national- and theater-missile defense systems. In its NMD
mission, SBIRS (High) will detect missiles in their boost phase and the
SBIRS (Low) constellation of sensor satellites will acquire and track
ballistic missiles throughout their trajectory. This information will
provide the earliest possible trajectory estimate to the BM/C3 element.
By providing this ``over-the-horizon'' precision tracking data to the
NMD system, the effective NMD battle space is expanded to permit
interceptors to be launched before the threats come within range of the
XBRs or UEWRs. Indeed, with SBIRS (Low), no ground-based radars are
needed, though this, too, would be an ABM Treaty issue. SBIRS (Low) not
only will extend the defensive ``footprint'' of the NMD several fold,
but will be able to supplant the ground-based radars. This is critical
for effective National Missile Defense.
C1 will draw upon SBIRS (High) satellites. C2 will add SBIRS (Low).
C3 will utilize the existing C2 architecture.
In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS)
IFICS is the communication link which will pass target data from
the NMD sensors to the interceptor missile. C1 will utilize
communications nodes in central Alaska, Caribou, Maine, and Shemya,
Alaska. C2 will add a further IFICS site in Munising, Michigan. C3 adds
a fifth site in Hawaii.
All elements of the NMD system will work together to respond to a
ballistic missile directed against the United States. The U.S. Early
Warning System, consisting of Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites,
and its follow-on capability the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
satellites, will detect the launch of enemy missiles and will
subsequently track these missiles and reentry vehicles (RV). After
confirmation, this information will be sent to the Battle Management/
Command, Control, and Communications (BM/C3) system. Subsequently,
ground-based radars, Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWR) and X-Band
Radars (XBR), will acquire and track the enemy missile and will compute
an intercept point. After receiving defense engagement authority, BM/C3
will order the launch of one or more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to
the intercept point. Nearing this point, the interceptor will use on-
board sensors to acquire the threat, select the target warhead, and
guide itself to a direct, high-speed collision. During and after the
engagement, radars will continue to collect data, observe impact
results to provide ``kill assessment'' information to evaluate the
interceptor's success or failure.
technological issues associated with a national missile defense
(This section draws heavily upon an April 1997, publication by the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Exploring U.S. Missile Defense
Requirements in 2010: What Are the Policy and Technology Challenges?)
Countermeasures
A number of countries--chief among them Russia, China, and India--
have anticipated the eventual development of strategic ballistic
missile defenses. These countries are working to ensure that they will
be able to penetrate future defenses. The following types of actions
could serve as means of degrading the effectiveness of missile
defenses:
Stealth: Nearly every nation is exploring the use of radar-
absorbing or radar-reflectant paints and materials, as well as
non-reflecting angular designs, to reduce the observability of
their missiles and re-entry vehicles (RVs).
Decoys: Russia and the United Kingdom are two nations that
already have developed decoys which resemble RVs and which are
intended to provide defenses with more targets to intercept.
Decoys also might be used for radar jamming.
Coning/Corkscrewing: By introducing a ``wobble'' into an RV
as it re-enters the atmosphere, a nation can create a 10-15 G
spiraling turn (e.g. a corkscrew of 30-40 meters in diameter).
Interceptors would need on-board computational capability and/
or larger warheads to intercept this maneuver.
MIRVs and Submunitions: Multiple warheads/submunitions are
intended to overwhelm defenses. (NOTE: The ABM Treaty precludes
placing multiple intercept capabilities on a single
``defensive'' missile, making MIRVs attractive as an option). A
variation on this theme would be salvo launches designed to
saturate missile defenses.
Reduction in Infrared Signature: Several techniques could be
used to reduce heat signatures of missiles. For example, a
country could double-shroud an RV. This would allow it to shed
heat by jettisoning the outer shroud after the boost-phase.
Another technique would be the use of infrared-altering paints
on the warhead skin. These techniques are designed to make it
more difficult for an infrared seeker on a missile to find its
target.
Radar Jamming: Both RVs and decoys can be equipped with
small microwave antennas to receive, amplify, and rebroadcast
radar signals (thereby masking the position of the warhead).
Simple clouds of metallic chaff or balloons also can be used to
scatter radar signals, although they would be stripped away
from the heavier RV upon re-entry.
Salvage Fusing or Deliberate EMP Attack: Advanced warhead
designs may include backup fuses which detonate the warhead if
the RV is struck by an interceptor. This will create thermal
and radiation effects (including an electro-magnetic pulse)
which will destroy or degrade non-hardened electronic circuits
and hardware. Moreover, this will result in increased ``noise''
from persistent radiation which will reduce the effectiveness
of surviving space-sensor systems. The same effect can be
achieved by the deliberate detonation of a warhead in the
exoatmosphere.
Simple Masking: The infrared signature of an RV can be hard
to distinguish when in proximity to the larger, hotter missile
body. This becomes even more difficult when missiles ``tumble''
or break apart upon re-entry.
While all of these countermeasures are feasible they should not deter
the United States from deploying defenses. Rather, they make clear that
offensive and defensive capabilities are, and will continue to be, in a
cycle of competition. Any defensive system deployed by the United
States should be quickly upgradable, at reasonable cost, to take
advantage of new technologies to counter an adversary's counter-
measures. Given the nature of emerging counter-measure technologies,
the United States also should pursue a layered defense with a variety
of defensive attack methods to counter incoming RVs. However, this,
too, would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
Basic Constraints on the Feasibility of Countermeasures
Three basic environmental factors will assist the U.S. national
missile defense in dealing with countermeasures.
Throwweight: Ballistic missiles can only carry so much.
Countermeasures, together with the re-entry vehicles and
guidance system, must fit within the throwweight limits of the
given ballistic missile.
Exoatmospheric Flight: All ICBMs must pass through the
vacuum of the exoatmosphere. During this phase of flight,
maneuverability is severely limited and requires enormous
amounts of fuel since maneuvering thrusters will have no air
against which to push. As a result, maneuver efforts will be
limited to turns of only 2-3 Gs (as opposed to 10-15 Gs in the
lower atmosphere).
Endoatmposheric Flight: All but the most sophisticated of
penetration aids will be stripped away from the RV, generally
between 90-100 kilometers of altitude. Further, re-entering
objects are subjected to extreme heating, making their infrared
signatures much harder to conceal. Likewise, some penetration
aids, such as radar jammers, will suffer a decease in
transmitting capability during re-entry. Finally, the drag
induced on re-entry vehicles will slow the RV, allowing for
more intercept possibilities. Basic RVs have a low ``beta''
rating, meaning that their initial re-entry speed of 6-7 km/s
will slow rapidly at 25-55 kilometers altitude, resulting in an
impact velocity of less than 1 km/s. (However, as RVs become
more sophisticated, impact speeds may be greater (perhaps 3.4-4
km/s) and deceleration may not occur until 12 kilometers in
altitude.)
Counter-Countermeasures
Just as various countries are exploring countermeasures, the United
States has identified numerous techniques to counter such systems.
Laser Radars: Laser radars will enable defenses to see past
debris and clutter induced by penetration aids. Such systems,
when given the ability to measure angle, range, and range rate,
will be able to track maneuvering, coning, and tumbling RVs.
Laser radars cannot conduct wide area searches, however, and
will be vulnerable to some kinds of countermeasures such as
smoke and EMP detonations.
Multicolored Infrared Sensors: Two-color infrared seekers
will enable interceptors and satellites to track targets
regardless of whether the background is the earth (``hot'') or
space (``cold''). As infrared capabilities continue to evolve,
even further target tracking and discrimination advances will
be made. The Atmospheric Interceptor Technology Program (AIT)
will utilize a two-color infrared seeker.
Optical Signal Processing: Radar jamming is only possible as
long as radars use linear frequency modulation. The generation
of arbitrary/random wave forms of radar systems will be nearly
impossible to jam or spoof.
Spectral Band Processing: The splitting of spectral bands
can provide the ability for remote identification of objects.
Many experts are optimistic that band slices, when combined
with powerful processing techniques, will enable future defense
systems to develop a composite real-time ``picture'' of
penetration aids, RVs, and decoys, and also will enable the
United States to neutralize stealth advancements.
On-Board Sensing and Processing: Currently, cost
considerations limit the incorporation of on-board sensors and
processors, driving defense planners to rely upon communication
links to external sensors to guide the interceptor. As
miniaturization of these electronic components becomes
feasible, and more affordable, interceptors can increasingly be
made ``smart'' in their own right. For example, the
miniaturization of both laser and infrared radars, and their
emplacement in the seeker of an interceptor, will greatly
increase the discrimination and hit capabilities of the
defensive missile. The Discrimination Interceptor Technology
Program (DITP) is an example of a U.S. program seeking to
capitalize upon this technology.
Improved Sensor Integration: Advances in the ability to
merge and process information from a variety of sources
(microwave radar, laser radar, and both wide- and narrow-area
infrared search senors) will enable the United States to
discriminate better between penaids and RVs and to identify
stealthy targets. In short, stealth is more easily achieved in
one dimension; the concealment of an RV across all frequencies,
however, is far more difficult. The Advanced Sensor Technology
Program (ASTP) is an example of this type of endeavor.
Multiple Kinetic Kill Munitions: Just as offensive missiles
can be equipped with numerous RVs and decoys, so too can
defensive interceptors (if it were not for the ABM Treaty's
prohibition). One example of a multiple kinetic kill munition
is the Swarm program, which involves autonomously-guided
munitions (using a single photo detector and processor chip)
that maneuver through the use of small explosive charges on the
outer ring of the munition. This program can be used for both
endo- and exoatmospheric intercepts.
Directed Energy Weapons: As both microwave and laser
technologies continue to advance, the prospect grows for use of
lasers and microwave systems to kill both re-entry vehicles, as
well as missiles at all stages of flight. The advantages over
kinetic ``hit-to-kill'' interceptors are readily apparent.
Several programs are under development in this area.
As can be seen, while numerous countries will pursue a variety of
countermeasures, the technology associated with counter-countermeasures
is evolving rapidly as well. This has prompted senior U.S. defense
planners to assert that the U.S. NMD system will able to defeat such
penetration aids.
Basic ABM Treaty Technical Limits on Ballistic Missile Defenses
The most serious threat to the effectiveness of a U.S. national
ballistic missile defense is not enemy countermeasures. It is the
Administration's continued adherence to the ABM Treaty and the
resultant limitations imposed on the planned C1, C2, and C3
architectures. Aside from the basic prohibitions against having an NMD
that are contained in Article I and Article III of the treaty, the
treaty also contains a number of specific technological limitations:
Limits on Sites and Number of Interceptors: The ABM Treaty
would limit the United States to no more than 100 interceptors
at only one site. This makes defense of the territory of the
United States (also prohibited as a concept by Article I of the
treaty) impossible. Even C1 violates this provision.
Limit on Interceptor Capability: The ABM Treaty precludes
interceptors from carrying more than a single warhead/kill
vehicle. This makes missile defense less cost-effective. While
the EKV being tested for the missile defense only carries a
single warhead, one of the reasons that multiple kill vehicles
have not been utilized is due to the ABM Treaty. A number of
promising programs suggest that C2, and certainly C3, could
capitalize upon multiple intercept vehicles on a single
missile. The ABM Treaty, however, would preclude this.
Limits on Radars: In essence, any ABM radar handling an
intercept must be within 150 kilometers of the single allowed
site. With an expected range of no more 4,000 kilometers, the
radar will be unable to provide intercept coverage for vast
portions of the United States, regardless of where the site
(and thus the radar) ultimately is deployed. While early-
warning radars can be deployed along the periphery of the U.S.,
only the single XBR may handle intercepts (according to the
treaty). C1 will not be compliant in this respect. Neither C2
nor C3 will be, either.
Technical Limits on External Cuing: Use of space, air, or
land-based external sensors to provide early tracking
information would make it possible to launch interceptors
without the associated, local radar ever tracking the target.
This, in turn, would substantially enhance a system's coverage
potential against longer-range missile threats. However, the
ABM Treaty prohibits the conduct of an intercept using only
data from sensors other than co-located radars (e.g. conduct of
an intercept without the XBR). If this continues to be the
case, the defensive system under consideration by the U.S.: (1)
will have a much smaller defensive ``footprint'' than it could;
(2) fewer intercept opportunities for the system; and (3)
greater vulnerability to penetration aids, particularly in the
exoatmosphere where space-based terminal cuing could be used.
The current defense plan for ``C1'' relies upon five UEWR's to
alert the U.S. Space Command of an incoming missile threat. It also
relies upon one X-band microwave radar system to detect the RV,
identify it as such, and to discriminate between the RV and other
objects such as counter-measures. While the NMD system will be able to
track up to 1000 objects at a time, the reliance upon the one XBR will
make the system vulnerable to a variety of masking counter-measures. As
a result, the ``C1'' architecture will not be as effective against
technologically-sophisticated adversaries, such as Russia.
Once SBIRS (High) is included in the ``C1'' architecture and SBIRS
(Low) in the ``C2'' architecture, a number of space-based infrared
sensors will be available to assist the XBR in identifying RVs and
tracking them. This will add a basic infrared detection capability to
the XBR's microwave radar, making several types of countermeasures less
effective in hiding RVs. Once satellites are placed in both high and
low orbits, the resolution of the infrared imagery will be greatly
improved. Moreover, a number of counter-stealth technologies (e.g.,
laser radars and multi-colored infrared sensors) can only be
capitalized upon via the use of space-based platforms. However, due to
budget constraints, it does not appear that SBIRS (High) will be
available until 2006 or later.
Both SBIRS systems will provide sufficiently accurate tracking data
to allow the conduct of an intercept without the XBR being in the loop.
The current DSP constellation cannot do this. However, none of the
Administration's plans--``C1'', ``C2'', or ``C3''--calls for the use of
SBIRS in this fashion. This is due to ABM Treaty compliance
considerations.
______
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
May 24, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
Through: Steve Biegun
From: Marshall Billingslea and Sherry Grandjean
Subject: The Legal Status of the ABM Treaty
The Committee will hold a hearing on the legal status of the ABM
Treaty on Tuesday, May 25, at 2:15 PM in SD-562. The witnesses will be
Mr. Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Negotiations Policy; to be accompanied by Mr. George Miron of Feith and
Zell, P.C., Mr. David B. Rivkin, Jr.; to be accompanied by Mr. Lee A.
Casey of Hunton and Williams, and Dr. Michael Glennon, Professor of Law
at The University of California, Davis. Senator Ashcroft will preside.
Attachment.
Background
i. the senate's role in determination of the abm treaty's status
The legal status of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is
unresolved today. Indeed, the treaty remains in legal ``limbo'' until
Senate advice and consent is obtained by the executive branch to a
document establishing new treaty partners. While the President asserted
on numerous occasions the right to determine the status of the treaty
without the Senate's approval, he nevertheless agreed on May 14, 1997
to submit to the Senate for advice and consent ``any international
agreement that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the
ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty
to a multilateral treaty; or that would change the geographic scope or
coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term
`national territory' as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM
Treaty.''
This commitment was made by the President in the form of a legally-
binding certification. The President's pledge in this form was required
pursuant to Condition (9) of the resolution of ratification to the CFE
Flank Agreement. In making this commitment, the President agreed that
the legal status of the ABM Treaty, including resolution of the
question of treaty-successorship, could only be determined with the
Senate's advice and consent.
ii. inconsistencies in the president's view of the current legal status
of the abm treaty
Condition (9) is worded broadly, and captures any conceivable
international agreement to determine membership in the ABM Treaty. It
is not possible to establish any party or group of parties to the ABM
Treaty without triggering the provisions of Condition (9), and thus
triggering the requirement for submittal of the agreement in question
to the Senate. It is impossible for the United States to possess
legally-binding treaty obligations under the ABM Treaty unless it has a
partner to whom it is obligated. Because the ABM Treaty cannot be said
to be in legal force until the United States has determined its treaty
partner(s), the requirement under Condition (9) holds the ABM Treaty in
abeyance until advice and consent is obtained.
However, the Clinton Administration has provided numerous and
conflicting arguments regarding the treaty's legal status. On May 21,
1998, and again on December 17, 1998, the President wrote to the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee asserting that, despite
Condition (9), Russia is today a Party to the ABM Treaty.
This argument is politically-motivated. The Administration has
become increasingly nervous that Senate defeat of any specific
succession document (or Senate refusal to consider such a document) on
the grounds that it would reconstitute the ABM Treaty might signify
formal termination of the treaty. Certainly the Senate possesses the
Constitutional authority to reject treaties and could attach in its
rejection message to the President a formal directive giving notice of
the ABM Treaty's termination. Alternatively, the Senate could simply
indicate the intent to reject any succession arrangement to the ABM
Treaty, regardless of its composition of states, thereby indicating the
intent to hold the treaty in abeyance indefinitely.
By arguing that Russia is today an ABM Treaty partner, the
President is seeking to avoid such an impasse. His argument is designed
to allow the Administration to continue viewing the ABM Treaty as in
force, and to justify continuing U.S. treatment of Russia as a treaty
partner. It is an assertion, however, flatly inconsistent with
historical fact, the Administration's past representations regarding
the successorship issue, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on
succession itself.
What is most troubling, however, is that the President's claim that
Russia is a Party seems designed to circumvent his pledge to the
Senate, made in a treaty-related certification on May 14, 1997, that
the advice and consent of the Senate would be obtained for any
agreement adding parties to the ABM Treaty, or changing its geographic
scope.
If the Administration persists in the assertions made in the letter
of May 21, 1998, the validity of the ratification of the Document
Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, also known as the CFE Flank
Agreement, may be called into question. Certainly the assertion that
Russia is a Party directly contravenes the certification of May 14,
1997, raising the possibility that the instrument of ratification for
the CFE Flank Agreement deposited on behalf of the United States is
defective under U.S. constitutional law.
In a November 21, 1997, letter to Representative Gilman, and in
accompanying briefings by Administration lawyers, the Clinton
Administration stated that ABM Treaty succession arrangements were
``unsettled'' and would remain so in the absence of a new agreement.
Moreover, this letter takes note of no distinction between the legal
status of Russia and that of the other states proposed as ABM Treaty
parties. Indeed, the President stated in that letter:
Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM
successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet
states with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition
of all NIS states as full ABM successors would have preserved
fully the original purpose and substance of the Treaty, as
approved by the Senate in 1972.
However, in the May 21, 1998, letter, and again on December 17,
1998, the President reversed course by asserting that ``the United
States and Russia clearly are parties to the Treaty.'' Russia's desire
to become a party, its participation in the treaty's activities, and
the presence of ``ABM-Treaty related facilities''--a newly-invented
term found nowhere in the ABM Treaty--on its territory are cited as
reasons for this conclusion. The President also declined to identify
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as parties, although he asserted that
``a strong case can be made that even without the MOU, these three
states are Parties to the Treaty,'' citing substantially the same
factors that supposedly make Russia a party.
There is no basis for any distinction between the legal status of
Russia and that of the other states. In a briefing to congressional
staff on January 30, 1998, Administration lawyers were asked directly
whether Russia was the only other clear party to the Treaty. They
stated definitively that this was not the case. Numerous Administration
representations and public statements, including the State Department's
publication of ``Treaties in Force,'' have been consistent in making no
legal distinction among the former Soviet states who are potential
successors to the ABM Treaty. Article VIII of the MOU itself notes that
regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission ``shall reflect the
equal legal status of the Parties.'' Further, the record of negotiation
on the succession issue is replete with expressions by the United
States of the view that the potential successors to the Soviet Union
all have the same legal status. In short, the assertions made in the
May 21, 1998, letter have no basis in historical fact.
Moreover, the May 21, 1998, assertion that ``a strong case could be
made'' that four countries could today be parties to the treaty is
directly contradicted by Article I of the MOU, which states that the
United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia ``upon entry
into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the
Treaty.'' Very clearly, the entry-into-force of the MOU is the
triggering event--and one that has not yet occurred--by which these
states may become parties to the ABM Treaty. In short, none of the
potential successors were identified as parties to the ABM Treaty
during the period of negotiation, nor at any time preceding the
President's certification pursuant to Condition (9). Nothing has
transpired since that time that would constitute formal recognition of
any state as a party to the ABM Treaty. Certainly no document has been
submitted pursuant to Condition (9), and no document has received
Senate approval.
How the President asserts, then, that Russia is a Party to the ABM
Treaty, and that the three other states might be, is a mystery. These
claims imply that the issue of the ABM treaty's status is fundamentally
settled. Yet the matter cannot truly be settled unless and until the
Senate approves the MOU, or a similar agreement, through the exercise
of the advice and consent powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
iii. the legal status of the abm treaty: is the treaty extinct?
The Committee will hear testimony from authors of two legal studies
on the legal status of the ABM Treaty. The first memorandum was done by
George Miron and Douglas J. Feith of Feith & Zell, P.C. The second
memorandum was prepared for The Heritage Foundation by David B. Rivkin,
Jr. and Lee A. Casey of Hunton and Williams.
The Miron/Feith Memo draws the simple conclusion that when a State
ceases to exist (becomes ``extinct''), that State's treaties lapse
automatically by operation of law and do not require action by any
other treaty party.
The Rivkin/Casey Memo takes the position that the ABM Treaty could
have survived the Soviet Union's dissolution only if one or more states
survived that both continued the Soviet Union's sovereignty, its
international legal personality, and were capable of fulfilling the
terms and conditions of the original treaty ``unimpaired.'' No such
state survived the Soviet Union.
It is important to note that both studies draw the conclusion that
the President cannot bring a new treaty into force between the United
States and a successor to the extinct State without Senate advice and
consent.
A more detailed summary of each legal memorandum follows.
1. Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 remain in force after the USSR ceased to
exist in December 1991 and did it become a treaty between the
United States and the Russian Federation? by George Miron and
Doug Feith
Following the USSR's extinction, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
of 1972 did not become a treaty between the United States and the
Russian Federation. Rather the treaty lapsed when the USSR ceased to
exist.
In December 1991, new States that emerged on what had been USSR
territory declared independence, announced the formation of the
``Commonwealth of Independent States'' and proclaimed that the USSR
``as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no
longer exists.'' Soon thereafter, the United States acknowledged that
the USSR ``is no more.''
The United States has officially expressed its view that upon the
extinction of a State, its bilateral political treaties automatically
lapse, and has acted in accordance with that view in connection with
the extinction of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1898, the dissolution of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, and the dissolution
of Yugoslavia in 1992. The U.S. view is consistent with the opinion of
international legal scholars who have addressed that issue. With
consistency over more than two hundred years, scholarly writings state
that when a State ceases to exist (becomes ``extinct''), that State's
treaties lapse. The lapsing occurs by operation of law--that is,
automatically upon the State's extinction. It does not require action
by any other treaty party. (A possible exception to this rule relates
to ``dispositive'' treaties--that is, treaties that irrevocably fix a
right to particular territory, e.g., delineate borders between States.
The ABM Treaty, which is terminable by either party upon six months'
notice, is not ``dispositive.'')
President William Clinton has taken the view that the ABM Treaty of
1972 remains ``in force.'' In November 1997, he wrote that the
``succession'' issue is ``unsettled,'' adding: ``Neither a simple
recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would have
ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM interests)
nor a simple recognition of all NIS [newly independent states] as full
ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and
substance of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.'' In May
1998, President Clinton stated that the ABM Treaty is in force between
the United States and the Russian Federation. He did not state the
principle of law on which he based this conclusion. Nor did he explain
how this conclusion can be squared with his aforementioned November
1997 statement.
The pertinent sources of international law support the conclusion
that, upon the USSR's extinction, the ABM Treaty lapsed, so it no
longer has the force of international law. The United States has never
before considered itself bound by international law to accept as its
treaty partner the successor to an extinct State.
Were the President to use the recognition function to make a treaty
that would not otherwise exist, he would put the United States under a
legal obligation to other States without Senate advice and consent. The
President's recognition authority cannot be exercised in a manner that
would nullify the U.S. Senate's authority to advise and consent on the
making of a treaty.
If a foreign State ceases to exist under international law and,
consequently, a bilateral treaty between the extinct State and the
United States lapses, the President cannot bring a new treaty into
force between the United States and a successor to the extinct State
without Senate advice and consent. In other words, the President
cannot, without Senate approval, bring a lapsed treaty back to life by
declaring that a given foreign State is the successor or continuation
of an extinct State. Principles of international law govern the issue
of the extinction of States.
In sum, the ABM Treaty was a bilateral, non-dispositive treaty. In
accordance with longstanding principles of international law, expounded
with remarkable consistency by numerous officials and scholars from
various countries over hundreds of years, when the USSR became extinct,
its bilateral, non-dispositive treaties lapsed. Hence, the ABM Treaty
lapsed by operation of law--that is, automatically--when the USSR
dissolved in 1991. It did not become a treaty between the United States
and the Russian Federation.
2. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Memorandum of Law by David Rivkin
and Lee Casey
The ABM Treaty became extinct when the Soviet Union dissolved.
Treaties are a species of contract that may be rendered impossible, and
discharged as a matter of law, by the disappearance of a treaty
partner. Under the applicable rules of international and constitutional
law, the ABM Treaty could have survived the Soviet Union's dissolution
only if one or more states survived that both continued the Soviet
Union's sovereignty, its international legal personality, and were
capable of fulfilling the terms and conditions of the original treaty
``unimpaired.'' No such state survived the Soviet Union.
``The President's assertion that Russia is an ABM Treaty party is
incorrect. The Russian Federation is not merely a continuation of the
Soviet Union under a different name and system of government, as the
Soviet Union was a continuation of the Romanov Empire. When the Soviet
Union dissolved in 1991, both that empire, and the Russian state around
which it was built, collapsed. Boris Yeltsin's Russia is sui generis.
Moreover, even if today's Russia could be considered to be a
continuation of the Soviet Union, it could not itself carry out the
Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. That agreement was
based upon a number of fundamental assumptions about the parties and
their place in the world order during the Cold War. These assumptions
now are obsolete. Moreover, the ABM Treaty had a critical geographical
component, which at bottom guaranteed the United States and the Soviet
Union unrestricted access for their ICBMs to the entire territory of
the other party. The Russian Federation controls only a part of the
Soviet Union's territory, and has lost control over many of the Soviet
Union's most important population centers. Any treaty with Russia alone
would not preserve the bargain the United States originally agreed to
in 1972.
The conclusion that the ABM Treaty automatically was discharged in
1991 also is supported by application of either of the prevailing
methods of analysis governing questions of state succession to
treaties--the ``continuity'' analysis and the ``clean slate'' analysis.
Under the continuity analysis, even if one or more former Soviet
Republics was considered to continue the U.S.S.R.'s international legal
personality, the ABM Treaty could not have survived because it was a
bilateral treaty ``personal'' to the Soviet Union. Such treaties are
automatically discharged when one treaty partner disappears. Under the
clean slate analysis, one or more of the former Soviet Republics would
have to agree to undertake the Soviet Union's ABM Treaty obligations,
and the United States would have to accept this new state as a treaty
partner. This acceptance would constitute the creation of a new treaty,
and could only be effected with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Today, the ABM Treaty can be revived only with the participation of
the United States Senate. The substitution of one or more former Soviet
Republics for the Soviet Union would fundamentally change the ABM
Treaty's original bargain, to which the Senate consented. The President
cannot, on his own authority, change the ABM Treaty in so fundamental a
manner without obtaining the Senate's advice and consent again.
______
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
May 25, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
Through: Stephen E. Biegun
From: Marshall Billingslea and Sherry Grandjean
Subject: Cornerstone of Our Security?: Should the Senate Reject a
Protocol to Reconstitute the ABM Treaty with Four New
Partners?
The Committee will hold a hearing on the ballistic missile threat
to the United States, the need for a national missile defense, and the
ABM Treaty on Wednesday, May 26, at 10:15 AM in SD-562. The witness
will be the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State.
Senator Helms will preside.
Attachment.
Basic Aspects of the Changed Security Environment
A number of trends have profoundly altered the global security
environment in the post-Cold War era, calling into question traditional
assumptions about the relationship between offensive and defensive
systems, the wisdom of a U.S. strategy of mutually-assured destruction
(``MAD''), and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The following
represent the most fundamental changes with relevance to the
Committee's ongoing review of the ABM Treaty.
The technology associated with a national missile defense
has matured. The Committee has heard testimony from expert
witnesses who believe that a national missile defense is
technically feasible. An effective national missile defense,
therefore, is an achievable objective today, whereas, in 1972,
it was only a theoretical concept.
The relationship with Russia is vastly different from that
with the Soviet Union. Not only is the relationship far less
adversarial, despite flare-ups over issues such as Kosovo, but
Russia is no longer willing, nor able, to devote enormous sums
of money to the development and maintenance of an overwhelming
ICBM force.
The United States increasingly is less concerned with the
possibility of intentional missile attack by Russia, and is
more concerned with the intentions of a plethora of other
nations which either possess, or are on the verge of acquiring,
ICBM capabilities.
Extensive foreign assistance relating to ballistic missile
design, development, and deployment is now available, and is
accelerating missile programs. Not only has the past decade
seen extraordinary improvements in the indigenous production
capabilities of various countries, and the spread of commercial
launch programs, but it also has witnessed a dramatic increase
in the availability of outside help to countries seeking
ballistic missiles. As the Rumsfeld Commission noted: ``Foreign
assistance is not a wild card. It is a fact.'' This means that
the missile threat to the U.S. is growing and evolving in ways
that the U.S. intelligence community cannot always predict.
The possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch from
Russia's existing nuclear arsenals is increasing. As the
prospects for domestic turmoil grow in Russia, the security of
the mobile transporter-erector-launchers carrying nuclear ICBMs
has become an increasing concern for the United States.
The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Post Cold War World
At this point it is appropriate to make three general observations
about the ongoing revolution in military affairs. United States defense
planners are now challenged to conceptualize future conflict in an
environment undergoing dramatic transformations. A ``revolution in
military affairs'' (RMA) offers the U.S. the opportunity to capitalize
upon emerging technologies to compensate for force structure reduction
and to maximize platform capabilities. Naturally the identification of
those technologies becomes critical; failure in this respect threatens
a military with obsolescence. Similarly, this revolution offers other
countries the opportunity to offset numerical and qualitative
inferiorities vis-a-vis the U.S. military with innovation, and--in the
case of ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads--
possibly to neutralize the conventional Armed Forces of the United
States entirely.
First, military revolutions depend not only on the emergence of new
technologies, but upon the adaptation of operations and organizations
to maximize the employment of cutting-edge capabilities. For example,
German integration of aircraft and radios following the First World War
enabled them to defeat the French and British in six-weeks in a
combined arms offensive. Today's global positioning receiver, with its
utility in both ballistic and cruise missiles (as well as UAVs), holds
for the future battlefield what the radio posed for the Western Front
in 1940.
Second, the comparative advantage conferred upon a military by a
given technology tends to be short-lived. Moreover, the initial
advantage by no means suggests continued dominance, or even
competitiveness. In this environment, the balance between offensive and
defensive capabilities, and the ascendancy of one over the other, is in
a continual state of flux. Defensive technologies have now matured,
making both theater- and national-missile defenses an effective and
affordable capability.
Third, national objectives and strategic cultures prove critical
variables determining the manner in which countries capitalize upon
revolutions in military affairs. Perhaps the greatest challenge in the
next century will be posed by a regional aggressor (such as China,
North Korea, or Iran) that decides not to take the United States ``head
on'' in a conventional confrontation, but rather elects to use tactics
more common to low-intensity conflicts in order to secure its
objectives. It will be incumbent upon those who would challenge the
United States to devise strategies which take into account the changing
dimensions of the operational environment--future warfare will be waged
across a variety of fronts and in the public domain. Since the United
States has a decided, and apparent, advantage in high-intensity
conventional warfare, future aggressors may adopt strategies which are
fundamentally political in nature. If conventional military action
alone does not offer prospects for success, it will be relegated to a
secondary role. Operations will be characterized by terrorism,
subversion, and efforts at blackmail using WMD and ICBM capabilities.
An ICBM pointed at a U.S. city is, after all, a political instrument of
threatened terror--not a military weapon per se.
In other words, a future aggressor is likely to employ strategies
that tend towards the indirect and unconventional, emphasizing non-
military approaches, or at least non-traditional efforts, to deter U.S.
and/or coalition opposition and to deny opposition critical nodes from
which to operate. Those who would engage the U.S. will follow several
imperatives:
The dominance of political thinking over military interests.
The necessity to integrate various elements of power into a
cohesive strategy.
The importance of adaptability and flexibility, the
likelihood of protracted conflict.
Such a state could be expected to prove willing to assume a
disproportionate share of casualties, collateral damage, and
environmental destruction in an effort to exploit the inevitable social
tensions arising in the United States from protracted conflict.
Accordingly the most important aspects of the country's order of battle
will not be the number of main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles,
and artillery that it fields, but the number of nuclear, chemical, and
biological munitions, types of delivery systems (with particular
emphasis on long-range ballistic missiles), and access to commercial
satellite communications networks it possesses, and the way its seeks
to shield these capabilities--presumably with non-belligerents--from
the deep-strike capabilities of the U.S. Nor can we be sure that simple
notions of overwhelming and devastating nuclear retaliation will be
sufficient to deter a nation that is prepared to absorb immense
casualties and ``ride out the storm.''
An environment in which Third World powers field WMD mounted on
ballistic or cruise missiles will circumscribe the United States'
crisis response capability. The use of forward-based tactical platforms
will become more difficult with the increased likelihood that U.S.
forces will be detected and engaged at their points of entry into the
theater. Indeed, the fact that a number of regional powers are actively
seeking ballistic missiles with WMD warheads ultimately will preclude
the U.S. military from forward deployments unprotected by theater
ballistic missile defenses. It is in this vein that Andrew Marshall,
Director of the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment, has
warned against the creation of ``large, juicy targets.'' Future
regional aggressors will be well aware that U.S. casualties are of
greater political significance than military consequence. Moreover, as
the ability to inflict devastation via ICBMs grows ever more available,
the United States homeland itself will become an inviting target. Thus
U.S. forward deployments also might be circumscribed unless a national
missile defense can neutralize a threat to U.S. citizens.
Deterrence during the Cold War was based upon assumptions of
rationality which allowed the United States and Russia to predict each
others reactions with a fair degree of success. Moreover, communication
and the centralization of command control allowed for mutual
familiarity between the United States and the Soviet Union over one
another's plans for reaction in crisis situations. The potential for an
action-reaction spiral was controlled by a strategic parity of sorts at
the top of the escalatory ladder. The post-Cold War era has none of the
predictability or parity of its balanced, bipolar predecessor. Indeed,
the role of the conventional/nuclear balance seems to have reversed
completely. Whereas strategic forces were previously essential to the
U.S. as a means of countering the conventional superiority of the
Warsaw Pact, now the commitment of conventional forces may prove
critical to countering or reversing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in the Third World. In parallel, the acquisition of WMD may be
accelerated by desires to counter conventional imbalances. This shift
was poignantly enunciated by Les Aspin in 1992, when he recognized that
while nuclear weapons may still serve as ``great equalizers,'' it is
now the United States that is the potential ``equalizee.''
From Cold War Theories of Deterrence to Modern Notions of Compellance/
Warfighting Use
China is a case study in how countries increasingly are thinking
about the warfighting utility of ballistic missiles vis-a-vis the
United States. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) views advanced
ballistic and cruise missile capability as an essential element of its
future warfare plans. Indeed, the PLA seems to regard missile
development as more important than the acquisition of any other single
capability, including air or naval forces. This preeminence certainly
is reflected in China's developing strategy and doctrine. PLA doctrine,
as it concerns the role of missiles, has migrated conceptually from
Cold War notions of deterrence (e.g., the use of nuclear missiles to
deter other nuclear powers) to an approach that foresees a wide range
of active/compellant uses, both tactical and strategic, for ballistic
and cruise missiles. In other words, China has increasingly begun to
think of the operational utility of nuclear-armed missiles (as well as
non-nuclear armed systems).
An advanced ballistic and cruise missile capability is important to
the PRC for several reasons:
First, this capability is meant to avert United States intervention
in Asia in an effort to thwart Chinese regional ambitions. By
developing a variety of nuclear and nonnuclear missiles, the PLA hopes
to compel the United States to refrain from supporting Taiwan or
projecting power in Asia. Continuing U.S. adherence to the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the resultant policy of deliberate
vulnerability to nuclear missile attack, have only played into the
hands of this strategy, and reinforced the determination of the PRC to
emphasize the aggressive role of ballistic missiles to offset U.S.
conventional superiority.
A clear indication of Chinese thought on this matter was given
during a 1995-1996 winter visit to China by former Pentagon official
Charles Freeman (during which a Chinese official asserted that the
United States would not challenge China militarily over Taiwan because
American leaders ``care more about Los Angeles than they do about
Taiwan''). In other words, the PLA may believe that China's strategic
deterrent would give it the ability to act against Taiwan with
impunity. At a minimum, the ability to place U.S. cities at risk during
a crisis would--in the view of the PRC--prompt the U.S. to think twice
about intervening.
In other words, the primary motivation for acquiring such systems,
in this case, is not military in nature, but political. Nor is China
the only country that has drawn such conclusions about the utility of
missile systems. Iranian defense planners, for example, have oriented
their country's military towards a posture presumably designed to deter
the United States from engaging in military activities in the Gulf.
Iranian analysts have openly claimed that missile systems represent a
critical deterrent to outside attack, arguing that Iran should ``build
up its own short, medium and long-range surface-to-surface was well as
surface-to-air missiles.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Preparing for Protection of our National Interests,''
Resalat, December 3, 1990.
Second, missiles allow the PLA to exploit the vulnerabilities of
the military forces of the United States and other Asian adversaries,
none of whom have effective defenses against theater or tactical
ballistic or cruise missiles. Modernization of missile capabilities,
coupled with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), provides China the
ability to threaten the United States' center of gravity.
Presumably the PRC has recognized, as a result of the Gulf War, the
need to deny the United States access to forward-based facilities, and
to hold U.S. naval power projection capabilities (i.e., the aircraft
carriers) at risk. Advanced missile capabilities not only accomplish
this objective, but also provide China with the means to strike targets
in Taiwan, U.S. military facilities in Korea and Japan, and to hold
locations throughout the region at risk.
China recognizes that, if properly used, its ballistic and cruise
missile delivery systems may circumscribe the United States' crisis
response capability. Indeed, the prospect of devastating attack on a
U.S. city might, if communicated properly, deter the U.S. from
responding at all. As Sun Tzu put it, the objective is ``to defeat the
enemy without fighting.''
China's possession of a full spectrum of missile capabilities also
makes the use of forward-based tactical platforms more difficult, since
U.S. forces can be attacked at their points of entry into the Asian
theater. Aircraft carriers will be forced to operate further at sea,
and certainly would be precluded from entering the Strait of Taiwan.
Indeed, the fact that China is actively seeking a robust nuclear
missile capability suggests a desire to preclude the U.S. military from
forward deployments at all. The PRC is well aware that U.S. casualties
are likely to be of greater political significance than military
consequence. For this reason, China views its growing missile
capability as an instrument of intimidation and blackmail, in addition
to a valuable military weapon.
China's emphasis on missiles also is eminently practical, from a
military standpoint. China cannot today field a modern air force or
navy, but they certainly can build a variety of ultra-modern missiles.
Faced with a Taiwanese air force comprised of the most sophisticated
combat aircraft on the world market, China has little choice in
overcoming Taiwan's tactical air superiority but to rely on waves of
short-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
For this reason China has been examining the use of combined GPS/
Inertial and Terrain-Contour Matching (TERCOM) guidance systems to give
high accuracy to its cruise missiles and is interested in building
cluster munitions for ballistic or cruise missile to disable runways.
Finally, missiles are a critical element of a strategy for modern
information warfare. China recognizes the importance of information
dominance in a future conflict. Thus improvements in China's space
launch and ballistic missile program (actually two sides of the same
coin) will translate into an increased ability to launch more
sophisticated reconnaissance and communication satellites. Further,
China may also intend to use missiles to attack satellites in an effort
to disrupt command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)
systems. The PLA understands the U.S. military's dependence on
reconnaissance and communications satellites, and realizes that, in
absence of nuclear testing, the United States has ceased to ``harden''
these systems. PLA literature on future warfare is replete with
discussions of the need for a range of systems to deny the enemy's use
of space.
the evolution of china's limited deterrence concept, and the
corresponding risk to the united states of ballistic missile attack
As has been noted, warfighting requirements factor heavily in
China's military and deterrence strategy. The concept, which began to
evolve in the late 1980s, has been termed by Chinese strategists as
``limited deterrence'' (you xian wei she). At its core, this notion of
deterrence stresses the role of sufficient counterforce and
countervalue tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter
the escalation of conventional or nuclear war.
In other words, the PRC seems to place less stock than either the
United States or Russia did in the notion that a nuclear deterrent, and
the prospect of mutually-assured destruction, will avert any major
conflict. Accordingly, Chinese doctrine stresses the operational role
of nuclear weapons to deter further escalation once a conflict begins,
and--in the event that such fails--to ``strive to fight and win a
nuclear war'' (li zheng da ying he zhanzheng).
The war-fighting orientation of ``limited deterrence'' is apparent
in various publications which suggest acceptable types of targets for
China's missile forces. The consensus seems to be that China's limited
deterrent ought to be able to perform the following operational
missions:
to strike enemy strategic missile bases and weapons
stockpiles, major naval and air bases, heavy troop
concentrations, and strategic reserve forces, and thus destroy
the enemy's strategic attack capabilities;
to strike the enemy's strategic warning and defense systems;
to strike the enemy's rail hubs, bridges, and other
important targets in its transportation networks;
to strike basic industrial and military industrial targets;
to strike selectively at several political and economic
centers so as to create social chaos; and
to launch warning strikes in order to undermine the enemy's
will to launch nuclear strikes, and thereby contain nuclear
escalation.
As such, it is clear that China thinks quite differently about the
utility of nuclear ICBMs than did the Soviet Union. Moreover, the
matter of Taiwan--viewed by China as an internal matter--is unique to
the U.S.-Chinese relationship. For these reasons, and doubtless many
others not mentioned here, it would be ill-advised for the United
States to assume that Cold War formulations such as MAD (mutually-
assured destruction) will introduce strategic stability into the U.S.-
Chinese relationship. Indeed, because of the emphasis in Chinese
doctrine on compulsion, rather than deterrence, the United States'
vulnerability under the ABM Treaty is actually a destabilizing factor
(encouraging China in its pursuit of advanced ballistic missile
capabilities).
______
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
September 13, 1999.
MEMORANDUM
To: Republican Members, Committee on Foreign Relations
Through: Stephen E. Biegun
From: Sherry Grandjean and Marshall Billingslea
Subject: National Intelligence Estimate: ``Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Through 2015''
The Committee will hold a hearing on the recent National
Intelligence Estimate entitled ``Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015'' on
Thursday, September 16, 1999, at 2:30 PM in SD-419. The witness will be
Mr. Bob Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
Nuclear Programs at the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Helms will
preside.
Attachment.
Significant Conclusions from the National Intelligence Estimate:
``Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States Through 2015''
Key Judgement
``We project that during the next 15 years the United States most
likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea,
probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat,
although significantly reduced, will continue to be the most robust and
lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China, and orders of
magnitude more than that potentially posed by other nations, whose
missiles are likely to be fewer in number--probably a few to tens,
constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable and accurate than
their Russian and Chinese counterparts.''
Case-by-Case Analysis
North Korea
``North Korea could convert its Taepo Dong-1 space launch
vehicle (SLV) into an ICBM that could deliver a light payload
(sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon) to the United
States, albeit with inaccuracies that would make hitting large
urban targets improbable.''
``North Korea is more likely to weaponize the larger Taepo
Dong-2 as an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram
payload (sufficient for early generation nuclear weapons) to
the United States. Most analysts believe it could be tested at
any time, probably initially as an SLV, unless it is delayed
for political reasons.''
Iran
``Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-
hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in
the last half of the next decade using Russian technology and
assistance.''
``Most analysts believe it could test an ICBM capable of
delivering a lighter payload to the United States in the next
few years following the North Korean pattern. Analysts differ
on the likely timing of Iran's first test of an ICBM that could
threaten the United States--assessments range from likely
before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (although an SLV with
ICBM capability probably will be tested in the next few years)
to less than an even chance of an ICBM test by 2015.''
Iraq
``Iraq could test a North Korean-type ICBM that could
deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States
in the last half of the next decade depending on the level of
foreign assistance.''
``Although less likely, most analysts believe it could test
an ICBM that could deliver a lighter payload to the United
States in a few years based on its failed SLV or the Taepo
Dong-1, if it began development now. Analysts differ on the
likely timing of Iraq's first test of an ICBM that could
threaten the United States--assessments range from likely
before 2015, possibly before 2010 (foreign assistance would
affect capability and timing) to unlikely before 2015.''
Russia
``Its strategic force will remain formidable through and
beyond 2015, but the size of this force will decrease
dramatically--well below arms control limits--primarily because
of budget constraints.''
``By 2015, Russia will maintain as many nuclear weapons on
ballistic missiles as its economy will allow but well short of
START I or II limitations.''
China
``By 2015, China is likely to have tens of missiles capable
of targeting the United States, including a few tens of more
survivable, land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller
nuclear warheads--in part influenced by U.S. technology gained
through espionage.''
``China tested its first mobile ICBM in August 1999.''
Forward-Based Threats
``A short- or medium-range ballistic missile could be
launched at the United States from a forward-based sea platform
positioned within a few hundred kilometers of U.S. territory.
If the attacking country were willing to accept significantly
reduced accuracy for the missile, forward-basing on a sea-based
platform would not be a major technical hurdle. The reduced
accuracy in such a case, however, would probably be better than
that of some early ICBMs.''
``A commercial surface vessel, covertly equipped to launch
cruise missiles, would be a plausible alternative for a
forward-based launch platform. This method would provide a
large and potentially inconspicuous platform to launch a cruise
missile while providing at least some cover for launch
deniability.''
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