September 16, 1999
Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States Through 2015
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 347
Walpole, Robert D., National Intelligence Officer for Strategic
and Nuclear Programs, Central Intelligence Agency.............. 348
Prepared statement of........................................ 355
Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States Through 2015--summation of
annual report to Congress.............................. 361
S. Hrg. 106-339
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
<snowflake>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
FOREIGN MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AND THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH 2015
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senator Helms.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. The Ranking
Minority Senator, Senator Biden, hopes that he will be able to
come a little later.
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee welcomes Mr.
Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and
Nuclear Programs. He has graciously agreed to testify today in
an open, unclassified session regarding the recent National
Intelligence Estimate on Foreign Missile Threats to the United
States. I might add parenthetically that this is a subject that
the public, that is to say the American people, need to know
more about than they know, and to understand better than they
do.
In any case, sir, I will state at the outset that you have
done outstanding work. The unclassified report is clearly and
succinctly written and possesses none of the criminally
misleading caveats and hidden assumptions of previous estimates
that I can identify. For these reasons, the National
Intelligence Estimate will prove of enormous worth to the U.S.
Senate, and I thank you in advance for that.
Now then, four and a half years ago, the President, Mr.
Clinton, vetoed critical Republican legislation to deploy
immediately a national missile defense, and he used as a
pretext as I recall a foreign-drafted, shortsighted and in my
personal view politically skewed intelligence estimate 9519.
Now, I and many other Republican Senators, and some Democrats,
decried the President's incredible position both before this
committee and on the Senate floor, citing the fact that North
Korea was known, and even in 1995, to be developing a missile
capable of striking U.S. cities.
Four and a half years have passed since then, and every day
since the President killed the concept of the deployment of a
missile defense for the American people, the North Koreans have
been working overtime on their missiles. Now, sir, I wish you
had been on the job in 1995. Certainly if you had been, the
President would have been unable to use the intelligence
community as he did as an excuse. Mr. Walpole today will tell
this committee, the U.S. Senate, and the American people, I
believe, that one of our worst fears has materialized, and he
will make absolutely clear, I believe, that North Korea right
now could convert its Taepo Dong-I missile to drop anthrax on
the United States and that an even larger, more precise missile
could be flight tested at any time.
Now, in anticipation of receiving your shocking report, I
find myself deeply regretful that the Clinton-Gore
administration has squandered so much time that should have
been spent deploying a system to protect the American people.
Instead of fulfilling his highest constitutional obligation, to
protect the American people, the President has spent his time
in various dalliances, some well-known, some not, not the least
has been his ``love affair'' with the ABM Treaty.
And in addition to his thorough appraisal of the rapidly
emerging missile threat, there is one other important aspect of
the National Intelligence Estimate, and that is on page 16, I
believe it is. It states unequivocally, and I am quoting,
``Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs, short range ballistic missiles, from
China.'' Now, this wording expresses the absolute certainty
that China has, in fact, transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
Now, this statement by the intelligence community stands in
stark contrast to the evasive pronouncements of officials of
the State Department, who have desperately sought to avoid
their legal obligation to impose missile sanctions upon
Communist China for this transfer. I point out, for instance,
that on April 10, 1997, in a hearing before the Governmental
Affairs Committee, Senator Levin asked Robert Einhorn, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation a
question, and Levin's question was, ``Have you concluded
whether or not full missiles, in effect, were transferred?''
And in response, Mr. Einhorn delivered the following
statement which I regard as gobbledygook. He said, ``We have
not reached a conclusion based on the high standard of evidence
that we require that complete missiles were transferred. We
have not concluded one way or another because our level of
confidence is not sufficient to take a decision that has very
far-reaching consequences.'' If you can make heads or tails of
that statement, I want to see you after this meeting.
In any case, first we wish that the Department of State had
been as candid and forthright as you and your experts have
been, but I must say to all who are listening, enough is
enough. The National Intelligence Estimate is the last straw. I
could not agree more with then-CIA Director John Deutch, who
once said about the M-11 issue, ``If you are not satisfied with
the intelligence on this, you will never be satisfied with any
intelligence on anything else.'' Quote, unquote.
Now then, I am taking up more time than I intended, but let
it be clear that I am not inclined to stand back in silence, as
any administration, including the present one, continues to
dodge the Arms Export Control Act and break the law without
suffering the consequences.
The NIE makes it absolutely clear that there is zero doubt
about China's having transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and
I want to make it absolutely clear here today that from here on
out, the administration has a choice. The administration can
adhere to the MTCR law, which it has been flouting for the past
6 years, or it can make do without any Assistant Secretary of
State for Nonproliferation Affairs. That I think I can assure
you.
The choice is plain and simple. On the day that the
Clinton-Gore administration demonstrates that it deserves an
Assistant Secretary on these issues, we will try to cooperate
then, but not before.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee welcomes Robert
Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear
Programs. Mr. Walpole has graciously agreed to testify today in an
open, unclassified session regarding the recent National Intelligence
Estimate on Foreign Missile Threats to the United States.
Mr. Walpole, I will state at the outset that--as the National
Intelligence Officer for this estimate--you have done outstanding work.
The unclassified report is clearly and succinctly written, and
possesses none of the criminally-misleading caveats and hidden
assumptions of previous estimates. I especially applaud your decision
to (1) assess the threat to the entire United States (as opposed to the
continental United States); (2) to include China and Russia in your
``key judgment'' of the threat; and (3) to adopt the reasonable
standard of ``first flight test'' as the initial indicator of a threat.
For these reasons, and others, this National Intelligence Estimate will
prove of enormous worth to the United States Senate.
Four and a half years ago, President Clinton vetoed critical
Republican legislation to deploy immediately a national missile
defense. In his veto message for the 1996 Defense Authorization Act,
President Clinton flatly and explicitly objected to having a missile
defense to protect the American people. At that time, I--and many other
Republican Senators--found beyond belief the fact that the President of
the United States could arrive at such a decision, all in the name of a
defunct arms control treaty.
I decried the President's incredible position both before this
committee and on the Senate floor, citing the fact that North Korea was
known, even in 1995, to be developing a missile capable of striking
U.S. cities.
Four and a half years have passed since then, and every day since
the President killed the deployment of a missile defense, the North
Koreans have been working overtime on their missiles.
Mr. Walpole today will tell this committee, the U.S. Senate, and
the American people, that one of our worst fears has materialized. He
will make absolutely clear that North Korea, right now, could convert
its Taepo Dong-I missile to drop anthrax on the United States, and that
an even larger, more precise missile could be flight tested at any
time.
In anticipation of receiving Mr. Walpole's shocking report, I find
myself deeply regretful that the Clinton-Gore administration has
squandered so much time that should have been spent deploying a system
to protect the American people. Instead of fulfilling his highest
Constitutional obligation--to protect the American people--the
President spent his time in various dalliances, not the least of which
has been his ``love affair'' with the ABM Treaty.
I remind my colleagues that President Clinton made a legally-
binding commitment to the Senate on May 14, 1997 (well over 2 years
ago) to submit a revised ABM Treaty to the Senate. So far, Mr. Clinton
has refused to keep his promise. And until we have these documents, and
the opportunity to clear away the ABM Treaty obstacle, the American
people will remain defenseless against incoming missile attacks.
In addition to its thorough appraisal of the rapidly emerging
missile threat, there is one other important aspect of the National
Intelligence Estimate upon which I feel obliged to comment: on page 16
the NIE states unequivocally: ``Pakistan has M-11 SRBM's [short range
ballistic missiles] from China.'' This wording expresses the absolute
certainty of the U.S. intelligence community that China has, in fact,
transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan. (This statement builds upon
previous testimony by Dr. Gordon Oehler, who testified that the
intelligence community was ``virtually certain'' that complete M-11's
had been transferred. I also note that a 1998 publication of the
National Air Intelligence Center specifically lists Pakistan as
possessing ``fewer than 50'' M-11 missile systems.)
These statements by the intelligence community stand in stark
contrast to the evasive pronouncements of officials of the State
Department, who have desperately sought to avoid their legal obligation
to impose missile sanctions upon Communist China for this transfer.
I point out, for instance, that on April 10, 1997, during a hearing
before a Governmental Affairs subcommittee, Senator Levin asked Robert
Einhorn, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation,
``[H]ave you concluded whether or not full missiles, in effect, were
transferred?'' In response, Mr. Einhorn offered the following
goobledigook: ``We have not reached a conclusion based on the high
standard of evidence that we require that complete missiles were
transferred. . . . We have not concluded one way or another because our
level of confidence is not sufficient to take a decision that has very
far-reaching consequences.''
Well, Mr. Walpole, I fervently wish that the Department of State
had been as candid and forthright as you and your experts. But I must
say to all who will listen: enough is enough. The National Intelligence
Estimate is the last straw. I could not agree more with then-CIA
Director John Deutch, who once said about the M-11 issue: ``If you're
not satisfied with the intelligence on this, you will never be
satisfied with any intelligence on anything else.''
I am not inclined to stand back in silence as the Clinton
administration continues dodging the Arms Export Control Act and
breaking the law without suffering the consequences. The National
Intelligence Estimate on Missile Threats makes it absolutely clear that
there is zero doubt about China's having transferred M-11 missiles to
Pakistan. I want to make it absolutely clear here today, from here on
out, the administration has a choice.
The administration can adhere to the MTCR law which it has been
flouting for the past 6 years, or it can make do without any Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Affairs. The choice is plain
and simple. On the day that the Clinton-Gore administration
demonstrates that it deserves an Assistant Secretary for these issues,
we will try to cooperate.
With that said, Mr. Walpole, I welcome you here today, and I turn
to Senator Biden for his comments.
The Chairman. And with that, sir, we again welcome you here
today, and we will await Senator Biden's statement after you
have completed. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. WALPOLE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
FOR STRATEGIC AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Walpole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today in an open session to
discuss the intelligence community's National Intelligence
Estimates. We refer to them as NIE's. It is just shorter. This
one covers the ballistic missile threat through the year 2015.
Following that statement, I will try to answer any questions
you have without providing important information to foreign
countries on how they could hide more weapons developments from
us. Thus, you will understand that in some cases, I may not be
able to answer a question more fully than I really would like
to. In such cases, though, I can provide a classified answer
for the record if you like.
My statement for the record, which I think you have a copy
of, does not cover all of the important information that the
unclassified paper does.
The Chairman. Suppose we make that officially a part of the
record.
Mr. Walpole. I was going to ask that both of those in fact
be included as part of the record. I am going to just summarize
the statement for the record.
Congress has requested the intelligence community to
provide annual reports on ballistic missile developments
worldwide. We did the first of those reports in March 1998, and
then following the October 1998 launch of the North Korean
Taepo Dong-I space launch vehicle, we did an update memorandum.
We did not feel that that could wait for this NIE to be
covered.
Our 1999 report, as you have noted, is a National
Intelligence Estimate, in that we examined future capabilities
for several countries that have or have had ballistic missiles
or space launch programs or even the intentions.
Our approach for this year's report differs in three major
ways from previous reports. First, we project the missile
developments through the year 2015. Prior reports have only
gone to 2010, so we have added five more years for development.
That is important.
Second, with expertise inside and outside the intelligence
community, we examined ways that a country could acquire an
ICBM and assessed the likelihood that they would do so. Earlier
intelligence reports only focused on what the country is likely
to do, our best estimates of what they would like to do. The
Rumsfeld Commission report only looked at what a country could
do and didn't discuss likelihoods. We thought it was time the
two were put together in one document so that people could see
what they were capable of doing, these countries were capable,
as well as see what we judged they were likely to do. Although
I will note, in fairness to one agency, they believe the
prominence given by this approach to missiles countries could
develop gives more credence than is warranted to developments
that may prove implausible.
Third, countries could threaten to use ballistic missiles
against the United States following very limited flight
testing, in fact, only one test. So we used the first
successful flight test to indicate an initial threat
availability. A nation may decide that the ability to threaten
with one or two missiles is sufficient for its needs. I should
note that our projections of future ICBM developments are based
on limited information and engineering judgment. Adding to our
uncertainty is that many countries surround their ballistic
missile programs with secrecy and some employ deception. Recall
that we did not know that the Taepo Dong-I had a third stage
until a few days after the flight. That is one of the reasons
that we have to keep some of this information classified. I do
not think anybody in the American public wants us to tell the
foreigners how to hide more from us. They hide plenty now.
I should also note that we incorporated the results of
several expert academic and contractor efforts, including
recommendations from former members of the Rumsfeld Commission,
assistance from politico-economic experts to help examine
potential ICBM sales, and assistance from multiple missile
contractors to help postulate potential ICBM configurations
that rogue states could pursue.
Let me mention a couple of comments about the proliferation
environment we find ourselves in. Worldwide ballistic missile
proliferation has continued to evolve during the past 18
months. The capabilities of the missiles that we are seen are
growing, a fact underscored by North Korea's Taepo Dong launch.
The number of missiles is increasing. Medium and short range
ballistic missiles already pose a significant threat to U.S.
interests, military forces and allies overseas. We have seen
increased trade and cooperation among countries that have been
recipients of the missile technologies, and finally, some
countries continue to work on longer range missiles, including
ICBM's.
Projecting political and economic developments that could
alter the nature of the missile threat many years into the
future is virtually impossible. The threat ultimately will
depend on our changing relations with foreign countries, the
political and economic situation in those countries and other
factors that we cannot predict with confidence.
I note, for example, that 15 years ago, the United States
and the former Soviet Union were superpower adversaries in the
midst of the cold war posturing forces against each other in
Europe. 15 years ago, Iraq shared some significant common
interests with the United States. Finally, we do not know if
some of the countries that, I will not mention names, would
even exist 15 years from now or even as suppliers of
technology.
Understanding those uncertainties, we project that during
the next 15 years the United States will most likely face a
ballistic missile threat from Russia, China, and North Korea,
probably from Iran and possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat,
although significantly reduced, will continue to be the most
robust and lethal, much more so than China's and orders of
magnitude more than the threat posed by others.
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, will have fewer ICBM's, probably
on the order of few to tens, constrained to smaller payloads.
They will be less reliable, less accurate and they will not
have the payload capability; I think I mentioned that.
The new missile threats are far different from that of the
cold war during the last three decades. During that period, the
ballistic threat involved relatively accurate, survivable,
reliable missiles deployed in large numbers. By contrast, the
new missile threats involve states with considerably fewer
missiles, less accuracy, yields, survivability, reliability and
payload capability. Even so, they threaten in different ways.
First, although the majority of systems being developed and
produced today are short and medium range missiles, North
Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-I space launch vehicle launch
demonstrated Pyongyang's potential to cross the ICBM threshold
if it develops a survivable weapon for that system. Other
nations could cross that threshold during the next 15 years.
Second, many of the countries that are developing longer
range missiles probably assess that the threat of their use
would complicate American decisionmaking during a crisis. Over
the last decade the world has observed that missiles less
capable than the ICBM's that the United States and others have
deployed can affect another nation's decisionmaking process.
Third, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass
destruction will be used against U.S. forces or interests is
higher today than during most of the cold war. Ballistic
missiles, for example, were used against U.S. forces during the
Gulf war. More nations now have longer range missiles and
weapons of mass destruction. While the missiles used in several
conflicts over the past two decades did not have weapons of
mass destruction, some of the regimes controlling the missiles
have exhibited a willingness to use those weapons in other
ways.
Thus acquiring long range ballistic missiles armed with
weapons of mass destruction probably will enable weaker nations
to deter, constrain and harm the United States. The missiles do
not need to be deployed in large numbers. They do not need to
be highly accurate. They do not need to be highly reliable,
because their strategic value is derived primarily from the
threat of their use, not their certain outcome of their use. In
many ways, such weapons may be viewed more as strategic weapons
of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The progress of countries in Asia and the Middle East
toward acquiring long-range ballistic missiles has been
dramatically demonstrated over the past 18 months, most
notably, the Taepo Dong-I launch I just mentioned. Pakistan
flight tested the 1,300-kilometer range Ghauri missile. Iran
tested the 1,300-kilometer range Shahab-3. India recently
flight tested the 2,000-kilometer range Agni II and China
conducted its first flight test of a mobile ICBM, the DF-31,
just last month.
Now let us turn to the threats. On North Korea: After
Russia and China, North Korea is the most likely to develop
ICBM's capable of threatening the United States during the next
15 years. With an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle
capable of surviving ICBM flight, a converted Taepo Dong-I
space launch vehicle could deliver a light payload to the
United States. In these cases about two-thirds of the payload
mass would be required for the reentry vehicle structure. The
remaining mass is probably too light for an early generation
nuclear weapon, but could deliver a biological or chemical
warfare agent.
Most analysts believed that North Korea probably would test
a Taepo Dong-II this year unless, as we have now seen, it is
delayed for political reasons. A two-stage Taepo Dong-II could
deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii
and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States.
A three-stage Taepo Dong-II could deliver a several hundred
kilogram payload anywhere in the United States. North Korea is
much more likely to weaponize the more capable Taepo Dong-II
than the Taepo Dong-I as an ICBM.
Iran is the next hostile country most capable of testing an
ICBM that could deliver a weapon to the United States during
the next 15 years. Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a
several hundred kilogram payload to many parts of the United
States in the latter half of the next decade using Russian
technology and assistance. Iran could pursue a Taepo Dong type
ICBM and could test either a Taepo Dong-I or a Taepo Dong-II,
possibly with North Korean assistance, in the next 2 years.
Iran is likely to test a space launch vehicle by the year 2010
that, once developed, could be converted to an ICBM. Beyond
that, analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's first
flight test.
What you will find in our, both the unclassified and the
classified papers, we get more agreement on what the countries
could do than what they are likely to do. That is because what
they could do is based on the infrastructure, what we have seen
happen in the past, capabilities. What they are likely to do,
we have factors that are just fraught with a lot of
uncertainty, but there is a spread of views on Iran. Some
analysts believe that Iran is likely to test an ICBM before
2010 and very likely before 2015, and in fact probably will
test a space launch vehicle like the Taepo Dong-I in the next
few years. Some analysts believe there is no more than an even
chance of an ICBM test from Iran by 2010 and a better than even
chance by 2015. And still others believe less than an even
chance by 2015.
Now let us shift to Iraq. Although the Gulf war and
subsequent U.N. activities destroyed much of Iraq's
infrastructure, Iraq could test an ICBM capable of reaching the
United States in the next 15 years. After observing North
Korean activities, Iraq would likely pursue a three-stage Taepo
Dong-II type approach to an ICBM. If they got North Korean
assistance with engines, they would be able to do it much
faster than if they had to do it on their own. But in either
case it would be the latter half in the next decade.
Although much less likely, they could try to test a much
less capable ICBM patterned after one of their failed SLV prior
to the Gulf war using Scud components or to try to copy a Taepo
Dong-I. Now again, analysts differ on likelihood. Assessments
include unlikely before the year 2015, likely before 2015,
possibly before 2010 if foreign assistance were involved.
Russia's forces are experiencing serious budget
constraints, but will remain a cornerstone of their military
power. Russia has about 1,000 strategic ballistic missiles with
4,500 warheads. They will maintain as many strategic missiles
and warheads as they feel their budget will allow, but it would
be well short of START I or START II limits. If Russia ratifies
START II with its ban on multiple warheads on ICBM's, it would
probably be able to maintain only about half the number of
weapons it could maintain without a ban. We judge that an
unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian strategic
missile is highly unlikely so long as current technical and
procedural safeguards are in place.
Now let me shift to China for a moment. China's doctrine
calls for a survivable long-range missile force that can hold a
significant portion of the U.S. population at risk in a
retaliatory strike. China's current force of about 20 CSS-4's
can reach targets all over the United States. China is
developing two road-mobile ICBM's. The first I mentioned
earlier was tested last month and we are expect they are
developing a longer range mobile ICBM to be tested sometime in
the next decade to be targeted primarily against the United
States. They are also developing the JL-2 submarine launched
ballistic missile, which we expect to be tested in the next
decade as well.
By the year 2015 China will likely have tens of missiles
targeted against the United States, having added a few tens of
more survivable land and sea-based mobile ICBM's. When I
delivered this paper to the, to a press backgrounder, I was
asked what tens meant and what few tens meant. I said I am not
going to declassify the numbers we have, but I will say this.
Tens is more than 20 because we put the number 20 in there and
it is less than 100, and few tens is less than tens. So
somewhere in there people can play with the numbers and go with
it.
China has had the technical capability to develop multiple-
RV payloads for 20 years, has not done so, but if they wanted
one, they could use the reentry vehicle from the recently
tested mobile ICBM and have either a multiple-RV or a multiple
independently targeted RV system in a few years. But we expect
that MIRV'ing a mobile system would take many years. China is
also significantly improving its theater missile capabilities
opposite Taiwan and is significantly increasing the number of
missiles deployed off of Taiwan. We assess that an unauthorized
or unaccidental launch of a Chinese strategic missile is highly
unlikely.
You have mentioned foreign assistance. I mention that as
well. It continues to have demonstrable effects on missile
defenses around the world. Russian missile assistance continues
to be significant. China continues to contribute to missile
programs in some countries. North Korea may expand its sales
and some recipients are now sharing more with others and are
pursuing cooperative missile ventures.
Moreover, changes in the regional and international
security environment, in particular, Iran's Shahab-3 test and
the Indian and Pakistani missile tests and nuclear tests are
probably fueling regional interest in missiles and weapons of
mass destruction. Sales of ICBM's and space launch vehicles
which have inherent ICBM capabilities could further increase
the threat.
North Korea continues to demonstrate a willingness to sell.
Projecting the likelihood of a Russian or Chinese sale 15 years
into the future is very difficult, nevertheless, we continue to
judge it unlikely that Moscow or Beijing would sell a complete
ICBM, SLV or technologies tantamount to an ICBM. That will all
be driven by really unpredictable future economic conditions,
how Moscow will perceive its position vis-a-vis the West, and
future Russian and Chinese perceptions of U.S. ballistic
missile defenses.
A lot has been said about warning times and the
intelligence community's ability to warn. That ability depends
highly on our collection capabilities from country to country.
Our monitoring and warning about North Korea's efforts is an
excellent case study on warning. In 1994, we were able to give
5 years' warning of North Korea's efforts to acquire an ICBM
capability. In hindsight, however, we had overestimated when
North Korea would test both the Taepo Dong-I and the Taepo
Dong-II. We had correctly projected the timing of their
developing a system that could deliver small payloads to the
United States, but we had underestimated the capabilities of
the Taepo Dong-I, primarily because we missed the third stage.
North Korea demonstrated intercontinental range booster
capabilities roughly on the timetable we projected in 1994 but
with a completely unanticipated vehicle configuration. Thus
detecting or suspecting a missile development program and
projecting a timing of the emerging threat, although difficult,
are easier than forecasting the missile's performance or
configuration.
We continue to judge that we may not be able to provide
much warning if a country purchased an ICBM or if the country
already had a space launch vehicle. Nevertheless, we would view
a space launched vehicle in the hands of a hostile country as a
potential ICBM program. We also judge that we may not be able
to provide much, if any, warning of a forward-based ballistic
missile or cruise missile threat.
Several other means for delivering weapons of mass
destruction have probably been devised. Some more reliable than
the ICBM's we have talked about. Most of these means, however,
do not provide the same prestige and degree of deterrence or
coercive diplomacy associated with long-range missiles. Several
countries would be capable of deploying a short-range ballistic
missile or if they develop one, a cruise missile on a surface
ship. If they are not worried about accuracy, it is not that
difficult and even reduced accuracy in many cases would be
better than some of the systems that we have been looking at
for ICBM's.
Finally, I should make some comments about nonmissile
threats. Although nonmissile means of delivering weapons do not
provide the same prestige, degree of deterrence or coercive
diplomacy associated with an ICBM, such options are of
significant concern. Countries or nonstate actors could pursue
nondelivery missile options, most of which are less expensive
than ICBM's, can be covertly developed and employed, probably
would be more reliable, probably would be more accurate than
emerging ICBM's during the next 15 years, probably would be
more effective in disseminating biological warfare agent and
certainly would avoid missile defenses.
Foreign nonstate actors, including some known terrorist or
extremist groups, have used, possessed, or are interested in
weapons of mass destruction or the materials to build them.
Most of these groups have threatened the United States or its
interests. We cannot count on obtaining warning of all planned
terrorist attacks, despite the high priority we assign to this
goal.
The proliferation of medium-range missiles, driven
primarily by North Korean No Dong sales, has created an
immediate, serious and growing threat to U.S. forces, interests
and allies in the Middle East and Asia, and it has
significantly altered the strategic balances in these regions.
As you noted, our report said that Pakistan has M-11 SRBM's
from China and Ghauri MRBM's from North Korea. We assess that
both may have a nuclear role. India has Prithvi I SRBM's and
recently began testing the Agni II MRBM. We assess, again, both
may have a nuclear role.
We judge that countries developing missiles view their
regional concerns as a primary factor in pursuing the programs.
They see short- and medium-range missiles not only as
deterrents, but as force-multiplying weapons of war.
On penetration agent countermeasures, we were asked
specifically to address that in this year's annual report. We
assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also
develop various responses to U.S. theater and national
defenses. Russia and China each have developed numerous
countermeasures and are probably willing to sell some of the
technologies.
Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, probably
would rely initially on readily available technology--
separating RV's, spin-stabilized RV's, RV reorientation, radar
absorbing material, booster fragmentation, low-power jammers,
chaff, and simple balloon decoys to develop these penetration
aids and countermeasures. These countries could develop
countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they
flight test their missiles.
Finally, I should close with a comment on espionage.
Foreign espionage and other collection efforts are likely to
increase. We did the damage assessment earlier this year. I was
responsible for that, and we did an unclassified set of key
findings on that. In that we noted that China has obtained
significant nuclear weapons information from espionage, contact
with scientists from the United States and other countries,
publications and conferences, unauthorized media disclosures,
and declassified U.S. weapons information. We assess that
China, Iran and others are also targeting U.S. missile
information.
So with that, I am ready to take whatever questions you
have and I am sorry that took a while to go through, but I
think it is kind of important to get the whole story.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walpole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert D. Walpole
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss, in an open session,
the Intelligence Community's recent National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on the ballistic missile threat to the United States through the
year 2015. Following my statement, I will try to answer your questions
without providing important information to countries seeking to hide
weapons developments from us. Thus, you'll understand that if I cannot
answer a question more fully, it's not that I do not want to. In such
cases, I could provide a classified answer for the record if you would
like.
My statement for the record does not cover all the important
material published in our recent unclassified paper on this subject.
Moreover, in the interest of time I would like to summarize my
statement verbally, so I would like to submit both the unclassified
paper and my written statement for the record.
Congress has requested that the Intelligence Community produce
annual reports on ballistic missile developments worldwide. We produced
the first report in March 1998 and an update memorandum in October 1998
on the August North Korean launch of its Taepo Dong-I space launch
vehicle. Our 1999 report is a classified NIE, but we summarized it in
the unclassified paper I just mentioned. You have copies of that paper
for this hearing.
This year we examined future capabilities for several countries
that have or have had ballistic missiles or space launch programs or
intentions. Our approach for this year's report differs with past
efforts in three major ways.
First, we have projected missile developments through the
year 2015; previous reports projected the threat through 2010.
Thus, we have added five years of further development.
Second, using intelligence information and expertise inside
and outside the Intelligence Community, we examined scenarios
by which a country could acquire an ICBM and assessed the
likelihood of various scenarios. (Earlier intelligence reports
have focused on scenarios we judged as most likely; the
Rumsfeld report focused only on what a country could do. We
decided it was time to combine both approaches, although one
agency believes that the prominence given by this approach to
missiles countries ``could'' develop gives more credence than
is warranted to developments that may prove implausible.) We
did not attempt to address all of the potential political,
economic, and social changes that could occur. Rather, we
analyzed the level of success and the pace countries have
experienced in their development efforts, technology transfers,
political motives, military incentives, and economic resources.
From that basis, we projected possible and likely missile
developments by 2015 independent of significant political and
economic changes.
Third, because countries could threaten to use ballistic
missiles following limited flight-testing and before a missile
is deployed in the traditional sense, we use the first
successful flight test to indicate an ``initial threat
availability.'' Emerging long-range missile powers do not
appear to rely on robust test programs to ensure a missile's
accuracy and reliability or to intend to deploy a large number
of long-range missiles to dedicated, long-term sites. A nation
may decide that the ability to threaten with one or two
missiles is sufficient. With shorter flight test programs--
perhaps only one test--and potentially simple deployment
schemes, the time between the initial flight test and the
availability of a missile for military use is likely to be
shortened. Using the date of the first projected flight test as
the initial indicator of the threat recognizes that an
adversary armed with even a single missile capable of
delivering a weapon of mass destruction may consider it
threatening. Using the first flight test also results in threat
projections a few years earlier than those based on traditional
definitions of deployment.
I should note that our projections are based largely on limited
information and engineering judgment. Adding to our uncertainty is that
many countries surround their ballistic missile programs with secrecy,
and some employ deception. Although some key milestones are difficult
to hide, we may miss others, at least until flight testing; recall that
we did not know until its launch that North Korea had acquired a third
stage for its Taepo Dong-I.
I should also note that we incorporated the results of several
expert, academic and contractor efforts, including the recommendations
of former members of the Commission to Access the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States, assistance from politico-economic experts
to help examine future environments that might foster ICBM sales, and
the expertise of missile contractors to help postulate potential ICBM
configurations others could pursue.
the evolving missile threat in the current proliferation environment
Worldwide ballistic missile proliferation has continued to evolve
during the past 18 months. The capabilities of the missiles are
growing, a fact underscored by North Korea's Taepo Dong-I launch. The
number of missiles is increasing. Medium- and short-range ballistic
missile systems, particularly if armed with weapons of mass
destruction, already pose a significant threat to U.S. interests,
military forces, and allies overseas. We have seen increased trade and
cooperation among countries that have been recipients of missile
technologies. Finally, some countries continue to work toward longer-
range systems, including ICBMs.
Projecting political and economic developments that could alter the
missile threat many years into the future is virtually impossible. The
threat facing the United States in the year 2015 will depend on our
changing relations with foreign countries, the political situation
within those countries, economic factors, and numerous other factors
that we cannot predict with confidence.
For example, 15 years ago the United States and Soviet Union
were superpower adversaries in the midst of the Cold War, with
military forces facing off in central Europe and competing for
global power.
Fifteen years ago Iraq shared common interests with the
United States.
Finally, we do not know whether some of the countries of
concern will exist in 15 years.
Understanding the uncertainties, we project that during the next 15
years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia,
China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The
Russian threat, although significantly reduced, will continue to be the
most robust and lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China,
and orders of magnitude more than that potentially posed by the others,
whose missiles are likely to be fewer in number--probably a few to
tens, constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable and accurate.
The new missile threats confronting the United States are far
different from the Cold War threat during the last three decades.
During that period, the ballistic missile threat to the United States
involved relatively accurate, survivable, and reliable missiles
deployed in large numbers. Soviet--and to a much lesser extent
Chinese--strategic forces threatened, as they still do, the potential
for catastrophic, nation-killing damage. By contrast, the new missile
threats involve states with considerably fewer missiles with less
accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and range-payload
capability than the hostile strategic forces we have faced for 30
years. Even so, the new systems are threatening, but in different ways.
First, although the majority of systems being developed and
produced today are short- or medium-range ballistic missiles,
North Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-I SLV demonstrated
Pyongyang's potential to cross the ICBM threshold if it
develops a survivable weapon for the system. Other potentially
hostile nations could cross that threshold during the next 15
years.
Second, many of the countries that are developing longer-
range missiles probably assess that the threat of their use
would complicate American decision-making during crises. Over
the last decade, the world has observed that missiles less
capable than the ICBMs the United States and others have
deployed can affect another nation's decision-making process.
Third, the probability that a missile with a weapon of mass
destruction will be used against U.S. forces or interests is
higher today than during most of the Cold War. Ballistic
missiles, for example, were used against U.S. forces during the
Gulf war. More nations now have longer-range missiles and
weapons of mass destruction. Missiles have been used in several
conflicts over the past two decades, although not with weapons
of mass destruction. Nevertheless, some of the regimes
controlling these missiles have exhibited a willingness to use
such weapons.
Thus, acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with a weapon
of mass destruction probably will enable weaker countries to do three
things that they otherwise might not be able to do: deter, constrain,
and harm the United States. To achieve these objectives, the missiles
need not be deployed in large numbers; with even a few such weapons,
these countries would judge that they had the capability to threaten at
least politically significant damage to the United States or its
allies. They need not be highly accurate; the ability to target a large
urban area is sufficient. They need not be highly reliable, because
their strategic value is derived primarily from the implicit or
explicit threat of their use, not the near certain outcome of such use.
Some of these systems may be intended for their political impact as
potential terror weapons, while others may be built to perform more
specific military missions, facing the United States with a broad
spectrum of motivations, development timelines, and resulting hostile
capabilities. In many ways, such weapons are not envisioned at the
outset as operational weapons of war, but primarily as strategic
weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The progress of countries in Asia and the Middle East toward
acquiring longer-range ballistic missiles has been dramatically
demonstrated over the past 18 months:
Most notably, North Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-I SLV has
inherent, albeit limited, capabilities to deliver small
payloads to ICBM ranges. The much more capable Taepo Dong-II
could be flight tested this year, unless it is delayed for
political reasons.
Pakistan flight-tested its 1,300 km range Ghauri missile,
which it produced with North Korean assistance.
Iran flight-tested its 1,300 km range Shahab-3--a version of
North Korea's No Dong, which Iran has produced with Russian
assistance.
India flight-tested its Agni II MRBM, which we estimate will
have a range of about 2,000 km.
China conduced the first flight test of its DF-31 mobile
ICBM in August 1999; it will have a range of about 8,000 km.
potential icbm threats to the united states from five countries
North Korea. After Russia and China, North Korea is the most likely
to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the United States during the
next 15 years.
With an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle capable
of surviving ICBM flight, a converted Taepo Dong-I SLV could
deliver a light payload to the United States. In these cases,
about two-thirds of the payload mass would be required for the
reentry vehicle structure. The remaining mass is probably too
light for an early generation nuclear weapon but could deliver
biological or chemical (BW/CW) warfare agent.
Most analysts believe that North Korea probably will test a
Taepo Dong-II this year, unless delayed for political reasons.
A two-stage Taepo Dong-II could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to
the western half of the United States. A three-stage Taepo
Dong-II could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload
anywhere in the United States.
North Korea is much more likely to weaponize the more
capable Taepo Dong-II than the three-stage Taepo Dong-I as an
ICBM.
Iran. Iran is the next hostile country most capable of testing an
ICBM capable of delivering a weapon to the United States during the
next 15 years.
Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in the
latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology and
assistance.
Iran could pursue a Taepo Dong-type ICBM and could test a
Taepo Dong-I or Taepo Dong-II-type ICBM, possibly with North
Korean assistance, in the next few years.
Iran is likely to test an SLV by 2010 that--once developed-
could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a
several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States.
Beyond that, analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's
first flight test of an ICBM that could threaten the United
States. Assessments include:
--likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (noting that
an SLV with ICBM capabilities will probably be tested within
the next few years);
--no more than an even chance by 2010 and a better than even
chance by 2015;
--and less than an even chance by 2015.
Iraq. Although the Gulf war and subsequent United Nations
activities destroyed much of Iraq's missile infrastructure, Iraq could
test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States during the next 15
years.
After observing North Korean activities, Iraq most likely
would pursue a three-stage Taepo Dong-II approach to an ICBM
(or SLV), which could deliver a several-hundred kilogram
payload to parts of the United States. If Iraq could buy a
Taepo Dong-II from North Korea, it could have a launch
capability within months of the purchase; if it bought Taepo
Dong engines, it could test an ICBM by the middle of the next
decade. Iraq probably would take until the end of the next
decade to develop the system domestically.
Although much less likely, most analysts believe that if
Iraq were to begin development today, it could test a much less
capable ICBM in a few years using Scud components and based on
its prior SLV experience or on the Taepo Dong-I.
Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first flight
test of an ICBM that could threaten the United States.
Assessments include unlikely before 2015; and likely before
2015, possibly before 2010--foreign assistance would affect the
capability and timing.
Russia. Russia's strategic offensive forces are experiencing
serious budget constraints but will remain the cornerstone of its
military power.
Russia currently has about 1,000 strategic ballistic
missiles with 4,500 warheads.
Russia will maintain as many strategic missiles and
associated nuclear warheads as it believes it can afford, but
well short of START I or II limitations.
--If Russia ratifies START II, with its ban on multiple
warheads on ICBMs, it would probably be able to maintain only
about half of the weapons it could maintain without the ban.
We judge that an unauthorized or accidental launch of a
Russian strategic missile is highly unlikely so long as current
technical and procedural safeguards are in place.
China. Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a survivable
long-range missile force that can hold a significant portion of the
U.S. population at risk in a retaliatory strike.
China's current force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs can reach
targets in all of the United States.
Beijing also is developing two new road-mobile, solid
propellant ICBMs.
--It conducted the first flight test of the mobile DF-31 ICBM
in August 1999; we judge it will have a range of about 8,000 km
and will be targeted primarily against Russia and Asia.
--We expect a test of a longer range mobile ICBM within the
next several years; it will be targeted primarily against the
United States.
China is developing the JL-2 SLBM, which we expect to be
tested within the next decade. The JL-2 probably will be able
to target the United States from launch areas near China.
By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted
against the United States, having added a few tens of more
survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller
nuclear warheads--in part influenced by U.S. technology gained
through espionage.
China has had the technical capability to develop multiple
RV payloads for 20 years. If China needed a multiple-RV (MRV)
capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31-type RV
to develop and deploy a simple MRV or multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) for the CSS-4 in a few years.
MIRVing a future mobile missile would be many years off.
China is also significantly improving its theater missile
capabilities and is increasing the size of its SRBM force
deployed opposite Taiwan.
We assess that an unauthorized launch of a Chinese strategic
missile is highly unlikely.
foreign assistance
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on
missile advances around the world.
Russian missile assistance continues to be significant.
China continues to contribute to missile programs in some
countries.
North Korea may expand sales.
Some countries that have been recipients of technology are
now sharing more amongst themselves and are pursuing
cooperative missile ventures.
Moreover, changes in the regional and international security
environment--in particular, Iran's Shahab-3 missile test and the Indian
and Pakistani missile and nuclear tests--probably will fuel missile and
WMD interests in the region.
Sales of ICBMs or SLVs, which have inherent ICBM capabilities,
could further increase the number of countries that will be able to
threaten the United States. North Korea continues to demonstrate a
willingness to sell its missiles. Projecting the likelihood of a
Russian or Chinese ICBM transfer 15 years into the future is very
uncertain, driven in part by unpredictable future economic conditions,
how Moscow will perceive its position vis-a-vis the West, and future
Russian and Chinese perceptions of U.S. ballistic missile defenses.
Nevertheless, we continue to judge it unlikely that Moscow or Beijing
would sell a complete ICBM., SLV, or the technologies tantamount to a
complete ICBM.
warning times and our ability to forecast missile development and
acquisition
Our ability to provide warning for a particular country depends
highly on our collection capabilities. For some countries, we have
relatively large bodies of evidence on which to base our assessments;
for others, our knowledge of the programs being pursued is limited. Our
monitoring and warning about North Korea's efforts to achieve an ICBM
capability constitute an important case study on warning. In 1994, we
were able to give five years warning of North Korea's efforts to
acquire an ICBM capability. In hindsight, however, we had overestimated
that North Korea would begin flight testing the Taepo Dong-I and Taepo
Dong-II missiles years earlier than turned out to be the case;
projected correctly the timing of a North Korean missile with the
potential to deliver payloads to the ICBM range of 5,500-km; and
underestimated the capabilities of the Taepo Dong-I by failing to
anticipate the use of the third stage.
North Korea demonstrated intercontinental-range booster
capabilities roughly on the timetable we projected in 1994, but with a
completely unanticipated vehicle configuration. Thus, detecting or
suspecting a missile development program and projecting the timing of
the emerging threat, although difficult, are easier than forecasting
the vehicle's configuration or performance with accuracy. Furthermore,
countries practice denial and deception to hide or mask their
intentions--for example, testing an ICBM as a space launch vehicle.
We continue to judge that we may not be able to provide much
warning if a country purchased an ICBM or if a country already had an
SLV capability. Nevertheless, the initiation of an SLV program is an
indicator of a potential ICBM program. We also judge that we may not be
able to provide much, if any, warning of a forward-based ballistic
missile or land-attack cruise missile (LACM) threat to the United
States. Moreover, LACM development can draw upon dual-use technologies.
We expect to see acquisition of LACMs by many countries to meet
regional military requirements.
space launch vehicle (slv) conversion
Nations with SLVs could convert them into ICBMs relatively quickly
with little or no chance of detection before the first flight test.
Such a conversion would include the development of a reentry vehicle
(RV).
If the country had Russian or Chinese assistance in a covert
development effort, it could have relatively high confidence
that a covertly-developed RV would survive and function
properly.
If a country developed an untested RV without foreign
assistance, its confidence would diminish, but we could not be
confident it would fail. Significant amounts of information
about reentry vehicles are available in open sources. The
developing country could have some confidence that the system
would survive reentry, although confidence in its proper
delivery of the weapon would be lower without testing.
alternative threats to the united states
Several other means to deliver WMD to the United States have
probably been devised, some more reliable than ICBMs that have not
completed rigorous testing and validation programs. The goal of an
adversary would be to move the weapon within striking distance without
a long-range ICBM. Most of these means, however, do not provide the
same prestige and degree of deterrence or coercive diplomacy associated
with long-range missiles, but they might be the means of choice for
terrorists.
Several countries are technically capable of developing a missile-
launch mechanism to use from forward-based ships or other platforms to
launch SRBMs and MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles against the
United States. Some countries may develop and deploy a forward-based
system during the period of the next 15 years. A short- or medium-range
ballistic missile could be launched at the United States from a
forward-based sea platform positioned within a few hundred kilometers
of U.S. territory. If the attacking country were willing to accept
significantly reduced accuracy for the missile, forward-basing on a
sea-based platform would not be a major technical hurdle. The reduced
accuracy in such a case, however, would probably be better than that of
some early ICBMs. A concept similar to a sea-based ballistic missile
launch system would be to launch cruise missiles from forward-based
platforms. A country could also launch cruise missiles from fighter,
bomber, or commercial transport aircraft outside U.S. airspace.
Although non-missile means of delivering weapons of mass
destruction do not provide the same prestige or degree of deterrence
and coercive diplomacy associated with an ICBM, such options are of
significant concern. Countries or non-state actors could pursue non-
missile delivery options, most of which:
Are less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs.
Can be covertly developed and employed; the source of the
weapon could be masked in an attempt to evade retaliation.
Probably would be more reliable than ICBMs that have not
completed rigorous testing and validation programs.
Probably would be more accurate than emerging ICBMs over the
next 15 years.
Probably would be more effective for disseminating
biological warfare agent than a ballistic missile.
Would avoid missile defenses.
Foreign non-state actors, including some terrorist or extremist
groups, have used, possessed, or are interested in weapons of mass
destruction or the materials to build them. Most of these groups have
threatened the United States or its interests. We cannot count on
obtaining warning of all planned terrorist attacks, despite the high
priority we assign to this goal.
Recent trends suggest the likelihood is increasing that a foreign
group or individual will conduct a terrorist attack against U.S.
interests using chemical agents or toxic industrial chemicals in an
attempt to produce a significant number of casualties, damage
infrastructure, or create fear among a population. Past terrorist
events, such as the World Trade Center bombing and the Aum Shinrikyo
chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system, demonstrated the
feasibility and willingness to undertake an attack capable of producing
massive casualties.
immediate theater missile threats to u.s. interests and allies
The proliferation of MRBMs--driven primarily by North Korean No
Dong sales--has created an immediate, serious, and growing threat to
U.S. forces, interests, and allies in the Middle East and Asia, and has
significantly altered the strategic balances in the regions.
Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs from China and Ghauri MRBMs from
North Korea; we assess both may have a nuclear role.
India has Prithvi I SRBMs and recently began testing the
Agni II MRBM; we assess both may have a nuclear role.
We judge that countries developing missiles view their regional
concerns as one of the primary factors in tailoring their programs.
They see their short- and medium-range missiles not only as deterrents
but also as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with
conventional weapons but with options for delivering biological,
chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons.
penetration aids and countermeasures
We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also
develop various responses to U.S. theater and national defenses. Russia
and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are
willing to sell the requisite technologies.
Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably
would rely initially on readily available technology--including
separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar
absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power
jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys--to develop
penetration aids and countermeasures.
These countries could develop countermeasures based on these
technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.
espionage
Foreign espionage and other collection efforts are likely to
increase. China, for example, has been able to obtain significant
nuclear weapons information from espionage, contact with scientists
from the United States and other countries, publications and
conferences, unauthorized media disclosures, and declassified U.S.
weapons information. We assess that China, Iran, and others are
targeting U.S. missile information as well.
That concludes my opening statement and I am prepared to take your
questions.
______
Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States Through 2015
preface
Congress has requested that the Intelligence Community produce
annual reports on ballistic missile developments. We produced the first
report in March 1998 and an update memorandum in October 1998 on the
August North Korean launch of its Taepo Dong-I space launch vehicle
(SLV). Our 1999 report is a classified National Intelligence Estimate,
which we have summarized in unclassified form in this paper.
This year we examined future capabilities for several countries
that have or have had ballistic missiles or SLV programs or intentions
to pursue such programs. Using intelligence information and expertise
from inside and outside the Intelligence Community, we examined
scenarios by which a country could acquire an ICBM by 2015, including
by purchase, and assessed the likelihood of various scenarios. (Some
analysts believe that the prominence given to missiles countries
``could'' develop gives more credence than is warranted to developments
that may prove implausible.) We did not attempt to address all of the
potential political, economic, and social changes that could occur.
Rather, we analyzed the level of success and the pace countries have
experienced in their development efforts, international technology
transfers, political motives, military incentives, and economic
resources. From that basis, we projected possible and likely missile
developments by 2015 independent of significant political and economic
changes. Subsequent annual reports will be able to account for such
changes.
Our projections for future ICBM developments are based on limited
information and engineering judgment. Adding to our uncertainty is that
many countries surround their ballistic missile programs with secrecy,
and some employ deception. Although some key milestones are difficult
to hide, we may miss others. For example, we may not know all aspects
of a missile system's configuration until flight testing; we did not
know until the launch last August that North Korea had acquired a third
stage for its Taepo Dong-I.
We took into account recommendations made in July 1998 by the
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
and incorporated the results of several academic and contractor
efforts, including politico-economic experts to help examine future
environments that might foster ICBM sales and missile contractors to
help postulate potential ICBM configurations that rogue states could
pursue.
key points
We project that during the next 15 years the United States most
likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea,
probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat,
although significantly reduced, will continue to be the most robust and
lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China, and orders of
magnitude more than that potentially posed by other nations, whose
missiles are likely to be fewer in number--probably a few to tens,
constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable and accurate than
their Russian and Chinese counterparts.
We judge that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would view their ICBMs
more as strategic weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy than as
weapons of war. We assess that:
North Korea could convert its Taepo Dong-I space launch
vehicle (SLV) into an ICBM that could deliver a light payload
(sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon) to the United
States, albeit with inaccuracies that would make hitting large
urban targets improbable. North Korea is more likely to
weaponize the larger Taepo Dong-II as an ICBM that could
deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload (sufficient for
early generation nuclear weapons) to the United States. Most
analysts believe it could be tested at any time, probably
initially as an SLV, unless it is delayed for political
reasons.
Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in the last
half of the next decade using Russian technology and
assistance. Most analysts believe it could test an ICBM capable
of delivering a lighter payload to the United States in the
next few years following the North Korean pattern.
--Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's first test
of an ICBM that could threaten the United States--assessments
range from likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015
(although an SLV with ICBM capability probably will be tested
in the next few years) to less than an even chance of an ICBM
test by 2015.
Iraq could test a North Korean-type ICBM that could deliver
a several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States in the
last half of the next decade depending on the level of foreign
assistance. Although less likely, most analysts believe it
could test an ICBM that could deliver a lighter payload to the
United States in a few years based on its failed SLV or the
Taepo Dong-I, if it began development now.
--Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first test
of an ICBM that could threaten the United States-assessments
range from likely before 2015, possibly before 2010 (foreign
assistance would affect capability and timing) to unlikely
before 2015.
By 2015, Russia will maintain as many nuclear weapons on
ballistic missiles as its economy will allow but well short of
START I or II limitations.
By 2015, China is likely to have tens of missiles capable of
targeting the United States, including a few tens of more
survivable, land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller
nuclear warheads--in part influenced by U.S. technology gained
through espionage. China tested its first mobile ICBM in August
1999.
Sales of ICBMs or SLVs, which have inherent ICBM capabilities and
could be converted relatively quickly with little or no warning, could
increase the number of countries able to threaten the United States.
North Korea continues to demonstrate a willingness to sell its
missiles. Although we judge that Russia or China are unlikely to sell
an ICBM or SLV in the next fifteen years, the consequences of even one
sale would be extremely serious.
Several other means to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the
United States have probably been devised, some more reliable than ICBMs
that have not completed rigorous testing programs. For example,
biological or chemical weapons could be prepared in the United States
and used in large population centers, or short-range missiles could be
deployed on surface ships. However, these means do not provide a nation
the same prestige and degree of deterrence or coercive diplomacy
associated with ICBMs.
The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)--
driven primarily by North Korean No Dong sales-has created an
immediate, serious, and growing threat to U.S. forces, interests, and
allies, and has significantly altered the strategic balances in the
Middle East and Asia. We judge that countries developing missiles view
their regional concerns as one of the primary factors in tailoring
their programs. They see their short- and medium-range missiles not
only as deterrents but also as force-multiplying weapons of war,
primarily with conventional weapons, but with options for delivering
biological, chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons. South Asia
provides one of the most telling examples of regional ballistic missile
and nuclear proliferation:
Pakistan has Chinese-supplied M-11 short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) and Ghauri MRBMs from North Korea.
India has Prithvi I SRBMs and recently began testing the
Agni II MRBM.
We assess these missiles may have nuclear roles.
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on
missile advances around the world, particularly from Russia and North
Korea. Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients
of foreign missile technology are now sharing more amongst themselves
and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures.
We assess that countries developing missiles also will respond to
U.S. theater and national missile defenses by deploying larger forces,
penetration aids, and countermeasures. Russia and China each have
developed numerous countermeasures and probably will sell some related
technologies.
discussion
Introduction
The worldwide ballistic missile proliferation problem has continued
to evolve during the past year. The proliferation of technology and
components continues. The capabilities of the missiles in the countries
seeking to acquire them are growing, a fact underscored by North
Korea's launch of the Taepo Dong-I in August 1998. The number of
missiles in these countries is also increasing. Medium- and short-range
ballistic missile systems, particularly if armed with weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) warheads, already pose a significant threat to U.S.
interests, military forces, and allies overseas. We have seen increased
trade and cooperation among countries that have been recipients of
missile technologies from others. Finally, some countries continue to
work toward longer-range systems, including ICBMs.
We expect the threat to the United States and its interests to
increase over the next 15 years. However, projecting political and
economic developments that could alter the nature of the missile threat
many years into the future is virtually impossible. The threat facing
the United States in the year 2015 will depend on our changing
relations with foreign countries, the political situation within those
countries, economic factors, and numerous other factors that we cannot
predict with confidence.
For example, 15 years ago the United States and the Soviet
Union were superpower adversaries in the midst of the Cold War,
with military forces facing off in central Europe and competing
for global power. Today, by contrast, the differences that
separated the two countries during that period have been
replaced by differences expected between modern nation states.
Iraq is another example; 15 years ago it shared common
interests with the United States. Since Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990, Washington and Baghdad have been in numerous
military and diplomatic conflicts.
Finally, we do not know whether some of the countries of
concern will exist in 15 years in their current state or as
suppliers of missiles and technology.
Recognizing these uncertainties, we have projected foreign
ballistic missile capabilities into the future largely based on
technical capabilities and with a general premise that relations with
the United States will not change significantly enough to alter the
intentions of those states pursuing ballistic missile capabilities.
Future annual reports will be able to take account of any contemporary
information that alters our projections.
The Evolving Missile Threat in the Current Proliferation Environment
The new missile threats confronting the United States are far
different from the Cold War threat during the last three decades.
During that period, the ballistic missile threat to the United States
involved relatively accurate, survivable, and reliable missiles
deployed in large numbers. Soviet--and to a much lesser extent
Chinese--strategic forces threatened, as they still do, the potential
for catastrophic, nation-killing damage. By contrast, the new missile
threats involve states with considerably fewer missiles with less
accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and range-payload
capability than the hostile strategic forces we have faced for 30
years. Even so, the new systems are threatening, but in different ways.
First, although the majority of systems being developed and
produced today are short- or medium-range ballistic missiles, North
Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-I SLV demonstrated Pyongyang's potential
to cross the 5,500-km ICBM threshold if it develops a survivable weapon
for the system. Other potentially hostile nations could cross that
threshold during the next 15 years. While it remains extremely unlikely
that any potential adversary could inflict damage to the United States
or its forces comparable to the damage that Russian or Chinese forces
could inflict, emerging systems potentially can kill tens of thousands,
or even millions of Americans, depending on the type of warhead, the
accuracy, and the intended target.
Classification of Ballistic Missiles by Range:
Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)................ Under 1,000 km
Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)..............1,000 to 3,000 km
Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)........3,000 to 5,500 km
Intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM)..... Over 5,500 km
Second, many of the countries that are developing longer-range
missiles probably assess that the threat of their use would complicate
American decision-making during crises. Over the last decade, the world
has observed that missiles less capable than the ICBMs the United
States and others have deployed can affect another nation's decision-
making process. Though U.S. potential adversaries recognize American
military superiority, they are likely to assess that their growing
missile capabilities would enable them to increase the cost of a U.S.
victory and potentially deter Washington from pursuing certain
objectives. Moreover, some countries, including some without hostile
intent towards the United States, probably view missiles as a means of
providing an independent deterrent and war-fighting capabilities.
Third, the probability that a WMD-armed missile will be used
against U.S. forces or interests is higher today than during most of
the Cold War. Ballistic missiles, for example, were used against U.S.
forces during the Gulf war. More nations now have longer-range missiles
and WMD warheads. Missiles have been used in several conflicts over the
past two decades, although not with WMD warheads. Nevertheless, some of
the regimes controlling these missiles have exhibited a willingness to
use WMD.
Thus, acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with WMD will
enable weaker countries to do three things that they otherwise might
not be able to do: deter, constrain, and harm the United States. To
achieve these objectives, these WMD-armed weapons need not be deployed
in large numbers; with even a few such weapons, these countries would
judge that they had the capability to threaten at least politically
significant damage to the United States or its allies. They need not be
highly accurate; the ability to target a large urban area is
sufficient. They need not be highly reliable, because their strategic
value is derived primarily from the threat (implicit or explicit) of
their use, not the near certain outcome of such use. Some of these
systems may be intended for their political impact as potential tenor
weapons, while others may be built to perform more specific military
missions, facing the United States with a broad spectrum of
motivations, development timelines, and resulting hostile capabilities.
In many ways, such weapons are not envisioned at the outset as
operational weapons of war, but primarily as strategic weapons of
deterrence and coercive diplomacy.
The progress of countries in Asia and the Middle East toward
acquiring longer-range ballistic missiles has been dramatically
demonstrated over the past 18 months:
Most notably, North Korea's three-stage Taepo Dong-I SLV has
inherent, albeit limited, capabilities to deliver small
payloads to ICBM ranges. Although the Taepo Dong-I satellite
attempt in August 1998 failed, North Korea demonstrated several
of the key technologies required for an ICBM, including
staging. As a space launch vehicle, however, it did not
demonstrate a payload capable of surviving atmospheric reentry
at ICBM ranges. We judge that North Korea would be unlikely to
pursue weaponizing a three-stage Taepo Dong-I as an ICBM,
preferring instead to pursue the much more capable Taepo Dong-
II, which we expect will be flight tested this year, unless it
is delayed for political reasons.
Pakistan flight-tested its 1,300 km range Ghauri missile,
which it produced with North Korean assistance. (Pakistan also
flight-tested the Shaheen I SRBM.)
Iran flight-tested its 1,300 km range Shahab-3--a version of
North Korea's No Dong, which Iran has produced with Russian
assistance.
India flight-tested its Agni II MRBM, which we estimate will
have a range of about 2,000 km.
China conduced the first flight test of its DF-31 mobile
ICBM in August 1999; it will have a range of about 8,000 km.
Many of these countries probably have considered ballistic missile
defense countermeasures. Historically, the development and deployment
of missile defense systems have been accompanied by the development of
countermeasures and penetration aids by potential adversaries, either
in reaction to the threat or in anticipation of it. The Russians and
Chinese have had countermeasure programs for decades and are probably
willing to transfer some related technology to others. We expect that
during the next 15 years, countries other than Russia and China will
develop countermeasures to Theater and National Missile Defenses.
Threat Availability Before ``Deployment''
Emerging long-range missile powers do not appear to rely on robust
test programs to ensure a missile's accuracy and reliability--as the
United States and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Similarly,
deploying a large number of long-range missiles to dedicated, long-term
sites--as the United States and the Soviet Union did--is not
necessarily the path emerging long-range missile powers will choose. In
many cases, a nation may decide that the ability to threaten with one
or two long-range missiles is sufficient for its doctrinal or
propaganda needs. China, for example, has only about 20 ICBMs; its
doctrine requires only that it be able to hold a significant portion of
an aggressor's population at risk.
With shorter flight test programs--perhaps only one test--and
potentially simple deployment schemes, the time between the initial
flight test and the availability of a missile for military use is
likely to be shortened. Once a missile has performed successfully
through its critical flight functions, it would be available for the
country to use as a threat or in a military role. Thus, we project the
year for a first flight test rather than the projected date for a
missile's ``deployment'' as the initial indication of an emerging
threat. Moreover, using the date of the first projected flight test as
the initial indicator of the threat recognizes that emerging long-range
missile powers may not choose to deploy a large number of missiles and
that an adversary armed with even a single missile capable of
delivering a WMD-payload may consider it threatening. Using the first
flight test results in threat projections a few years earlier than
those based on traditional definitions of deployment, which may not
apply as well to the emerging threats.
Potential ICBM Threats to the United States
We project that during the next 15 years the United States most
likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea,
probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq, although the threats will
consist of dramatically fewer weapons than today because of significant
reductions we expect in Russian strategic forces.
The Russian threat will continue to be the most robust and
lethal, considerably more so than that posed by China, and
orders of magnitude more than that posed by the other three.
Initial North Korean, Iranian, and Iraqi ICBMs would
probably be fewer in number--a few to tens rather than hundreds
or thousands, constrained to smaller payload capabilities, and
less reliable and accurate than their Russian and Chinese
counterparts.
Countries with emerging ICBM capabilities are likely to view
their relatively few ICBMs more as weapons of deterrence and
coercive diplomacy than as weapons of war, recognizing that
their use could bring devastating consequences. Thus, the
emerging threats posed to the United States by these countries
will be very different than the Cold War threat.
North Korea. After Russia and China, North Korea is the most likely
to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the United States during the
next 15 years.
North Korea attempted to orbit a small satellite using the
Taepo Dong-I SLV in August 1998, but the third stage failed
during powered flight; other aspects of the flight, including
stage separation, appear to have been successful.
If it had an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle
capable of surviving ICBM flight, a converted Taepo Dong-I SLV
could deliver a light payload to the United States. In these
cases, about two-thirds of the payload mass would be required
for the reentry vehicle structure. The remaining mass is
probably too light for an early generation nuclear weapon but
could deliver biological or chemical (BW/CW) warfare agent.
Most analysts believe that North Korea probably will test a
Taepo Dong-II this year, unless delayed for political reasons.
A two-stage Taepo Dong-II could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii, and a lighter payload to
the western half of the United States. A three-stage Taepo
Dong-II could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload
anywhere in the United States.
North Korea is much more likely to weaponize the more
capable Taepo Dong-II than the three-stage Taepo Dong-II as an
ICBM.
Iran. Iran is the next hostile country most capable of testing an
ICBM capable of delivering a weapon to the United States during the
next 15 years.
Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in the
latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology and
assistance.
Iran could pursue a Taepo Dong-type ICBM. Most analysts
believe it could test a three-stage ICBM patterned after the
Taepo Dong-I SLV or a three-stage Taepo Dong-II-type ICBM,
possibly with North Korean assistance, in the next few years.
Iran is likely to test an SLV by 2010 that--once developed--
could be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a
several-hundred kilogram payload to the United States.
Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's first flight
test of an ICBM that could threaten the United States.
Assessments include:
--likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (noting that
an SLV with ICBM capabilities will probably be tested within
the next few years);
--no more than an even chance by 2010 and a better than even
chance by 2015;
--and less than an even chance by 2015.
Iraq. Although the Gulf war and subsequent United Nations
activities destroyed much of Iraq's missile infrastructure, Iraq could
test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States during the next 15
years.
After observing North Korean activities, Iraq most likely
would pursue a three-stage Taepo Dong-II approach to an ICBM
(or SLV), which could deliver a several-hundred kilogram
payload to parts of the United States. If Iraq could buy a
Taepo Dong-II from North Korea, it could have a launch
capability within months of the purchase; if it bought Taepo
Dong engines, it could test an ICBM by the middle of the next
decade. Iraq probably would take until the end of the next
decade to develop the system domestically.
Although much less likely, most analysts believe that if
Iraq were to begin development today, it could test a much less
capable ICBM in a few years using Scud components and based on
its prior SLV experience or on the Taepo Dong-I.
If it could acquire No Dongs from North Korea, Iraq could
test a more capable ICBM along the same lines within a few
years of the No Dong acquisition.
Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first flight
test of an ICBM that could threaten the United States.
Assessments include unlikely before 2015; and likely before
2015, possibly before 2010--foreign assistance would affect the
capability and timing.
Russia. Russia's strategic offensive forces are experiencing
serious budget constraints but will remain the cornerstone of its
military power. Russia expects its forces to deter both nuclear and
conventional military threats and is prepared to conduct limited
nuclear strikes to warn off an enemy or alter the course of a battle.
Russia currently has about 1,000 strategic ballistic
missiles with 4,500 warheads.
Its strategic force will remain formidable through and
beyond 2015, but the size of this force will decrease
dramatically--well below arms control limits--primarily because
of budget constraints.
Russia will maintain as many strategic missiles and
associated nuclear warheads as it believes it can afford, but
well short of START I or II limitations.
--If Russia ratifies START II, with its ban on multiple
warheads on ICBMs, it would probably be able to maintain only
about half of the weapons it could maintain without the ban.
We judge that an unauthorized or accidental launch of a
Russian strategic missile is highly unlikely so long as current
technical and procedural safeguards are in place.
China. Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a survivable
long-range missile force that can hold a significant portion of the
U.S. population at risk in a retaliatory strike.
China's current force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs can reach
targets in all of the United States.
Beijing also is developing two new road-mobile, solid
propellant ICBMs.
--It conducted the first flight test of the mobile DF-31 ICBM
in August 1999; we judge it will have a range of about 8,000 km
and will be targeted primarily against Russia and Asia.
--We expect a test of a longer range mobile ICBM within the
next several years; it will be targeted primarily against the
United States.
China is developing the JL-2 SLBM, which we expect to be
tested within the next decade. The JL-2 probably will be able
to target the United States from launch areas near China.
By 2015, China will likely have tens of missiles targeted
against the United States, having added a few tens of more
survivable land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller
nuclear warheads--in part influenced by U.S. technology gained
through espionage.
China has had the technical capability to develop multiple
RV payloads for 20 years. If China needed a multiple-RV (MRV)
capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31-type RV
to develop and deploy a simple MRV or multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) \1\ for the CSS-4 in a few
years. MIRVing a future mobile missile would be many years off.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An MRV system releases multiple RVs along the missile's linear
flight path, often at a single target; a MIRV system can maneuver to
several different release points to provide targeting flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China is also significantly improving its theater missile
capabilities and is increasing the size of its SRBM force
deployed opposite Taiwan.
We assess that an unauthorized launch of a Chinese strategic
missile is highly unlikely.
Foreign Assistance
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on
missile advances around the world. Moreover, some countries that have
traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now
sharing more amongst themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile
ventures.
Russian missile assistance continues to be significant.
China continues to contribute to missile programs in some
countries.
North Korea may expand sales.
Moreover, changes in the regional and international security
environment--in particular, Iran's Shahab-3 missile test and the Indian
and Pakistani missile and nuclear tests--probably will fuel missile and
WMD interests in the region.
Sales of ICBMs or SLVs, which have inherent ICBM capabilities,
could further increase the number of countries that will be able to
threaten the United States with a missile strike. North Korea continues
to demonstrate a willingness to sell its missiles and related
technologies and will probably continue doing so, perhaps under the
guise of selling SLVs. In the past, we judged that political conditions
made the sale of a Russian or Chinese ICBM unlikely and that the
geopolitical situation would not change enough for either to decide
that the sale of an ICBM would be in its national interest. We have not
detected the transfer of a complete ICBM by Russia or China, nor do we
have any information to indicate either plans to transfer one.
Projecting the likelihood of such a transfer 15 years into the future
is very uncertain, driven in part by unpredictable future economic
conditions, how Moscow will perceive its position vis-a-vis the West,
and future Russian and Chinese perceptions of U.S. ballistic missile
defenses. As we attempt to project the politico-military-economic
environment for that period, we continue to judge it unlikely that
Moscow or Beijing would decide that the financial and perhaps strategic
inducements to sell a complete ICBM, SLV, or the technologies
tantamount to a complete ICBM, would outweigh the perceived political
and economic risks of doing so.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The sale of an ICBM is prohibited by the START Treaty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Warning Times and our Ability to Forecast Missile Development and
Acquisition
In our 1998 annual report, we stated we had high confidence that we
could provide warning five years before deployment that a potentially
hostile country was trying to develop and deploy an ICBM. Because
countries of concern could threaten to use ballistic missiles following
limited flight-testing and before a missile is deployed in the
traditional sense, we broadened our warning in the 1998 update
memorandum to encompass the first successful flight test as the
beginning of an ``initial threat availability.''
Our ability to provide warning for a particular country is depends
highly on our collection capabilities. For some countries, we have
relatively large bodies of evidence on which to base our assessments;
for others, our knowledge of the programs being pursued is limited. Our
monitoring and warning about North Korea's efforts to achieve an ICBM
capability constitute an important case study on warning. In 1994, we
were able to give five years warning of North Korea's efforts to
acquire an ICBM capability. At that time, the Intelligence Community
judged that:
The Taepo Dong-I was a two-stage, medium-range missile that
could be tested in 1994 and deployed as early as 1996.
The Taepo Dong-II was a larger two-stage missile that would
provide Pyongyang and other countries the potential to deliver
nuclear weapons to parts of the United States, and biological
and chemical weapons further. The Community judged that the
Taepo Dong-II flight test program would begin within a few
years of 1994 with initial deployment in 2000 or later.
Thus, the Intelligence Community warned that North Korea was
pursuing an ICBM capability and would flight test an ICBM (the Taepo
Dong-II) in the mid- to late l990s. When North Korea did not flight
test either Taepo Dong missile until 1998, and then used the Taepo
Dong-I as a space launch vehicle, it became clear that the Intelligence
Community had:
Overestimated that North Korea would begin flight testing
the Taepo Dong-I and Taepo Dong-II missiles years earlier than
turned out to be the case.
Projected correctly the timing of a North Korean missile
with the potential to deliver payloads to the ICBM range of
5,500-km.
Underestimated the capabilities of the Taepo Dong-II by
failing to anticipate the use of the third stage.
North Korea demonstrated intercontinental-range booster
capabilities roughly on the timetable projected in 1994, but with a
completely unanticipated vehicle configuration. The Intelligence
Community had expected North Korea to achieve an ICBM-range capability
initially with the two-stage Taepo Dong-II, not the Taepo Dong-II with
an unguided third stage. North Korea's use of the Taepo Dong-I with a
third stage as a space launch vehicle was completely unexpected. Until
the flight test, the Intelligence Community was unaware of the third
stage and the intended use of the Taepo Dong-I as a space launch
vehicle.
Detecting or suspecting a missile development program and
projecting the timing of the emerging threat, although difficult, are
easier than forecasting the vehicle's configuration or performance with
accuracy. Thus, we have more confidence in our ability to warn of
efforts by countries to develop ICBMs than we have in our ability to
describe accurately the missile configurations that will comprise that
threat, especially years prior to flight testing. Furthermore,
countries practice denial and deception to hide or mask their
intentions--for example, testing an ICBM as a space launch vehicle.
We continue to judge that we may not be able to provide much
warning if a country purchased an ICBM or if a country already had an
SLV capability. Nevertheless, the initiation of an SLV program is an
indicator of a potential ICBM program. North Korea and other countries,
such as Iran and an unconstrained Iraq, could develop an SLV booster,
then flight-test it as an ICBM with a reentry vehicle (RV) with little
or no warning. Thus, we consider space launch vehicles, especially in
the hands of countries hostile to the United States, to have
significant ballistic missile potential.
We also judge that we may not be able to provide much, if any,
warning of a forward-based ballistic missile or land-attack cruise
missile (LACM) threat to the United States. Moreover, LACM development
can draw upon dual-use technologies. We expect to see acquisition of
LACMs by many countries to meet regional military requirements.
Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) Conversion
Nations with SLVs could convert them into ICBMs relatively quickly
with little or no chance of detection before the first flight test.
Such a conversion would include the development of a reentry vehicle
(RV). A nation could try to buy an SLV with the intent to convert it
into an ICBM; detection of the sale should provide a few years of
warning before a flight test, although we are not confident that we
could detect a covert sale. Finally, many SLVs would be cumbersome as
converted military systems and could not be made readily survivable, a
task that in many cases would be technologically and economically
formidable.
Countries might mask their ICBM developments as SLV programs. They
could test the complete booster and in most cases the guidance system,
which would have to be reprogrammed to fly a ballistic missile
trajectory. They could not mask a warhead reentry under the guise of a
space launch. Nevertheless, they could develop RVs and maintain them
untested for future use, albeit with significantly reduced confidence
in their reliability.
If the country had Russian or Chinese assistance in a covert
development effort, it could have relatively high confidence
that the RV would survive and function properly.
If a country developed an untested RV without foreign
assistance, its confidence would diminish, but we could not be
confident it would fail. Significant amounts of information
about reentry vehicles are available in open sources. A low
performing RV with high flight stability would be a logical
choice for developing an ICBM RV with minimal, or no, testing.
The developing country could have some confidence that the
system would survive reentry, although confidence in its proper
delivery of the weapon would be lower without testing.
Alternative Threats to the United States
Several other means to deliver WMD to the United States have
probably been devised, some more reliable than ICBMs that have not
completed rigorous testing and validation programs. The goal of an
adversary would be to move the weapon within striking distance without
a long-range ICBM. Most of these means, however, do not provide the
same prestige and degree of deterrence or coercive diplomacy associated
with long-range missiles, but they might be the means of choice for
terrorists.
Forward-Based Threats
Several countries are technically capable of developing a missile-
launch mechanism to use from forward-based ships or other platforms to
launch SRBMs and MRBMs, or land-attack cruise missiles against the
United States. Some countries may develop and deploy a forward-based
system during the period of the next 15 years.
A short- or medium-range ballistic missile could be launched at the
United States from a forward-based sea platform positioned within a few
hundred kilometers of U.S. territory. If the attacking country were
willing to accept significantly reduced accuracy for the missile,
forward-basing on a sea-based platform would not be a major technical
hurdle. The reduced accuracy in such a case, however, would probably be
better than that of some early ICBMs. The simplest method for launching
a ship-borne ballistic missile would be to place a secured TEL onboard
the ship and launch the missile from its TEL. If accuracy were a major
concern, the missile and launcher would be placed on a stabilization
platform to compensate for wave movement of the ocean, or the country
would need to add satellite-aided navigation to the missile.
A concept similar to a sea-based ballistic missile launch system
would be to launch cruise missiles from forward-based platforms. This
method would enable a country to use cruise missiles acquired for
regional purposes to attack targets in the United States.
A country could launch cruise missiles from fighter, bomber,
or commercial transport aircraft outside U.S. airspace. U.S.
capability to detect planes approaching the coast, and the
limited range of fighter and bomber aircraft of most countries,
probably would preclude the choice of military aircraft for the
attack. Using a commercial aircraft, however, would be feasible
for staging a covert cruise missile attack, but it still would
be difficult.
A commercial surface vessel, covertly equipped to launch
cruise missiles, would be a plausible alternative for a
forward-based launch platform. This method would provide a
large and potentially inconspicuous platform to launch a cruise
missile while providing at least some cover for launch
deniability.
A submarine would have the advantage of being relatively
covert. The technical sophistication required to launch a
cruise missile from a submarine torpedo or missile tube most
likely would require detailed assistance from the defense
industry of a major naval power.
Non-Missile WMD Threats to the United States
Although non-missile means of delivering WMD do not provide the
same prestige or degree of deterrence and coercive diplomacy associated
with an ICBM, such options are of significant concern. Countries or
non-state actors could pursue non-missile delivery options, most of
which:
Are less expensive than developing and producing ICBMs.
Can be covertly developed and employed; the source of the
weapon could be masked in an attempt to evade retaliation.
Probably would be more reliable than ICBMs that have not
completed rigorous testing and validation programs.
Probably would be more accurate than emerging ICBMs over the
next 15 years.
Probably would be more effective for disseminating
biological warfare agent than a ballistic missile.
Would avoid missile defenses.
The requirements for missile delivery of WMD impose additional,
stringent design requirements on the already difficult technical
problem of designing such weapons. For example, initial indigenous
nuclear weapon designs are likely to be too large and heavy for a
modest-sized ballistic missile but still suitable for delivery by ship,
truck, or even airplane. Furthermore, a country (or non-state actor) is
likely to have only a few nuclear weapons, at least during the next 15
years. Reliability of delivery would be a critical factor; covert
delivery methods could offer reliability advantages over a missile. Not
only would a country want the warhead to reach its target, it would
want to avoid an accident with a WMD warhead at the missile-launch
area. On the other hand, a ship sailing into a port could provide
secure delivery to limited locations, and a nuclear detonation, either
in the ship or on the dock, could achieve the intended purpose. An
airplane, either manned or unmanned, could also deliver a nuclear
weapon before any local inspection, and perhaps before landing.
Finally, a nuclear weapon might also be smuggled across a border or
brought ashore covertly.
Foreign non-state actors, including some terrorist or extremist
groups, have used, possessed, or are interested in weapons of mass
destruction or the materials to build them. Most of these groups have
threatened the United States or its interests. We cannot count on
obtaining warning of all planned terrorist attacks, despite the high
priority we assign to this goal.
Recent trends suggest the likelihood is increasing that a foreign
group or individual will conduct a terrorist attack against U.S.
interests using chemical agents or toxic industrial chemicals in an
attempt to produce a significant number of casualties, damage
infrastructure, or create fear among a population. Past terrorist
events, such as the World Trade Center bombing and the Aum Shinrikyo
chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system, demonstrated the
feasibility and willingness to undertake an attack capable of producing
massive casualties.
Immediate Theater Missile Threats to U.S. Interests and Allies
The proliferation of MRBMs--driven primarily by North Korean No
Dong sales--has created an immediate, serious, and growing threat to
U.S. forces, interests, and allies in the Middle East and Asia, and has
significantly altered the strategic balances in the regions.
Iran's flight test of its Shahab-3, which is based on the No
Dong, and Indian and Pakistani missile and nuclear tests may
fuel additional interest in MRBMs.
Pakistan has M-11 SRBMs from China and Ghauri MRBMs from
North Korea; we assess both may have a nuclear role.
India has Prithvi I SRBMs and recently began testing the
Agni II MRBM; we assess both may have a nuclear role.
We judge that countries developing missiles view their regional
concerns as one of the primary factors in tailoring their programs.
They see their short- and medium-range missiles not only as
deterrents but also as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with
conventional weapons but with options for delivering biological,
chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons.
Penetration Aids and Countermeasures
We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also
develop various responses to U.S. theater and national defenses. Russia
and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are
willing to sell the requisite technologies.
Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably
would rely initially on readily available technology--including
separating RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar
absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power
jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys--to develop
penetration aids and countermeasures.
These countries could develop countermeasures based on these
technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.
Foreign espionage and other collection efforts are likely to
increase. China, for example, has been able to obtain significant
nuclear weapons information from espionage, contact with scientists
from the United States and other countries, publications and
conferences, unauthorized media disclosures, and declassified U.S.
weapons information. We assess that China, Iran, and others are
targeting U.S. missile information as well.
The Chairman. That proves fascinating and frightening to
me. I hope that everybody here is aware that you were
emphasizing that North Korea is a threat now. And it will be an
even bigger threat in a couple of years. Iran will be a threat
in the next 10 years and Iraq might be.
But I do not understand people who say, well, we do not
need any missile defense in the United States because we have
all these treaties. Sam Rayburn used to laugh as he told about
Will Rogers, and everybody here that is not old enough to
remember Will Rogers, he was a popular American entertainer, he
used to say at that time that ``the United States never lost a
war or won a treaty.'' And that was about right.
Mr. Walpole, a commission chaired by former Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld released a study last year which found in part
between Iran and Iraq, and I am quoting specifically and
precisely, ``all of these would be able to inflict major
destruction on the United States within about 5 years of a
decision to acquire such capabilities.'' Then he said 10 years
in the case of Iraq. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Walpole. I know they have since modified their Iraq
judgments, and backed that back to 5 years as well. As you can
see from our unclassified piece and you would see in the
classified report as well, we have the countries having the
capability of testing an ICBM well within that 5-year period of
time, actually earlier than that. But that is what I said
before about the Rumsfeld report; it talked about what the
country could do and did not walk through the likelihood. And
as you can see from our judgment, we certainly have countries
that could do things sooner. We think they are likely to take a
little longer.
The Chairman. Do you know Don Rumsfeld personally?
Mr. Walpole. Yes; in fact, as we started this report, we
decided to use the former commissioners as some outside experts
to read through the report, and let us know what they thought.
We thought here is a ready-made group of people who know all
the intelligence; they have worked it inside and out. And while
we did not agree on everything, and Don will tell you that, I
just got a fax from him today saying he thought the report was
great.
The Chairman. He said what?
Mr. Walpole. I did not bring the letter with me, but he
said he thought it was a very good report. Now, all he had at
this point was the unclassified. We will provide him next week
with the classified.
The Chairman. What did the Rumsfeld report say? As I
understood, it said that the United States may have less than 5
years in which to deploy a missile defense to protect the
American people, but you said that you do not always agree. How
does your National Intelligence Estimate contrast with the
Rumsfeld report with regard to the timeliness of emergence of
Iranian, North Korean and Iraqi threats? Do you have a
difference with them, or do you agree with them, or what?
Mr. Walpole. On what the country could do, we probably had
the countries getting weapons even faster than what they were
suggesting. On what the country was likely to do, they did not
address that. They did not address what Iran was likely to do
or what Iraq was likely to do, so I do not know how they would
view that, other than their comments to us as we were walking
through this. Their report did not address that.
The Chairman. Some of the questions I am asking, I know
what your answer is going to be, but I want you to answer them
for the record. One is, should the Senate, U.S. Senate where I
work, be concerned about continuing reports that China may be
pursuing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles,
that is to say MIRV's; should we be concerned about this?
Mr. Walpole. Part of that would defend on how you would
define concern. They have had the technical capability to put
multiple reentry vehicles on the CSS-4 for quite a while and
have not pursued that. They probably view the silos as
vulnerable, our systems, that is why they want to move to a
mobile system.
The Chairman. Which they are.
Mr. Walpole. Which they are. So I do not know whether we
should be concerned that they would do that because they may
view it just as throwing good money after bad, on the side they
are vulnerable. At the same time, they certainly are capable of
doing that and that is why I pointed out in my statement here
that they could do a multiple payload off that CSS-4 in just a
matter of a few years if they really thought they needed to.
The Chairman. Well, I have seen three or four recent
intelligence assessments, and none of them paid a great deal of
attention to the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized
launch from the former Soviet Union. How do you feel? Do you
believe that the danger of such a launch has increased,
decreased, or remained substantially the same during the past 5
years?
Mr. Walpole. Again, as I said, we judge an accidental or
unauthorized launch from both Russia and China as highly
unlikely. In the case of Russia, obviously we would want to
watch for turmoil that could erupt, that could cause some
problems with procedural safeguards, but the way things are and
the way we see them, at least for the foreseeable future that
is highly unlikely.
The Chairman. Now, the NIA 9519 assumed that the missile
technology control regime will continue significantly to limit
international transfers of missiles and components and related
technology. Now does the current NIE make such an assumption?
Mr. Walpole. It does not. That is actually an interesting
question not only for me as having worked the estimate, but
personally back in my career. For a number of years, I was an
intelligence analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
in the Department of State and then later was Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Defense in Arms Control, and in both those
capacities, I ended up working to help stop the Condor II
program. Which, for those that do not know, that was a program
being worked on by Argentina, Iraq, and Egypt, and had it
completed to fruition, it would have made the No Dong and the
Taepo Dong-I--it would have been a much better system.
And so there I think we have had an example where
nonproliferation efforts, the MTCR, worked extremely well and
put a stop to the program. We did not make an assumption in our
estimate that nonproliferation efforts were going to succeed
and stop programs. We based our judgments on what the countries
are capable of doing, what technology transfers we see going on
today, and projecting those types of transfers out into the
future. It would be wonderful if those transfers were absent,
but my perception of proliferation is, there are four aspects.
There is preventing acquisition. There is rollback, which I
think is the case of the Condor II. There is deterring use,
which we would like to continue to see occurring between India
and Pakistan, and then there is making sure we have the ability
to operate against the systems and at least deal with the
systems in one way or another.
So that is really the perception that we took in the
report, is that it is going to have an effect in some areas, in
some cases people are going to skirt these restrictions, and
the program is going to proceed.
The Chairman. Well, you talk a lot about, in the report and
elsewhere, about China's commitment to the missile technology
control regime. How do you evaluate it, China's commitment to
the missile technology control regime?
Mr. Walpole. I am trying to figure out how to answer that
one. In part, I am the wrong guy to be asking that of because
it is really more directed toward policy. From an intelligence
perspective, as I indicated, China's assistance to foreign
countries continues to be of concern to us.
The Chairman. How about Russia?
Mr. Walpole. The same.
The Chairman. Now the NIE 9519 assumed that no country with
ICBM's will sell them. Does the current NIE make such an
assumption?
Mr. Walpole. The current NIE judges that it is unlikely
that a country would sell them, but notes that there are
conditions that we have to continue to monitor. That it is
extremely uncertain to project that far, 15 years into the
future. That is why we have right up front, both in the
statement and the NIE to remind us that--15 years ago you and I
were in the same group talking about the IMF treaty. Now, I was
sitting back behind Secretary Shultz at the time. But that was
a totally different Soviet Union than we are facing today. And
I do not know that 15 years from now if it will be totally
different again. So it is hard to project that.
The Chairman. I do not know whether we will be here 15
years from now, since I do not know whether we will be paying
enough attention to it.
You know, it seems to me that the increasing availability
of dual-use technologies, particularly through the space launch
programs, is enhancing the ability of governments to produce
ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles? What do you think
about that?
Mr. Walpole. If I may take that a piece at a time. To
produce the boosters, the answer is yes. Really there is not a
whole lot of difference between a space launch vehicle and a
missile. There can be if you design them differently, but there
does not have to be. The primary difference is the missile has
a reentry vehicle. It has a weapon on top; the space launch
vehicle does not. You have to modify, you have to reprogram the
guidance system to fly a different trajectory if you do not
want to put your RV in orbit, if you are trying to hit some
target somewhere.
So countries that do not already have a robust missile or
space launch vehicle program would gain a lot from working with
someone else that already has that, on a space launch program
that could help them with the missile program.
The Chairman. I want you to talk about that because I have
a question about the limitations contained in the START Treaty.
Russia had been constrained in its ability to set up space
launch facilities in foreign countries such as Iran and China,
but the Clinton administration has offered to change the START
Treaty and give Russia the opportunity to locate as many as
three new space launch facilities outside of its own territory.
What will be the impact on U.S. intelligence capabilities if
Russia were allowed to locate or designate a space launch
facility in, say, China or in Iran?
Mr. Walpole. It would provide Russia an ability to share
technologies in a manner that would look like it was all for
space launch, that could help the country with missiles. And so
discerning whether it was missile or space launch alone would
be difficult. I think that is best exemplified by what we
called the Taepo Dong-I last year. When it first flew we called
it a missile. For a couple of days we kept calling it a
missile. Now you hear it is being called a space launch
vehicle. That should tell you something about the difference
between the two. So yes, it would make our job more difficult
in being able to explain to someone whether something that was
transferred was purely for space launch or was going to be used
for a missile.
The Chairman. Why are such a large number of countries
including Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, India and
Pakistan pursuing long-range ballistic missile systems? All of
a sudden, they are on the front pages. Why are they doing this?
Mr. Walpole. Well, they view them as force-multiplying
weapons of war. They have regional concerns. They want to be
able to reach regional adversaries. Now, in some cases, the
countries are going to want to reach a little further, and that
is where we lead in with North Korea and Iran. There is an
interest there in being able to reach the United States. Now
whether they do that under the guise of a space launch vehicle
program or an outright show of an ICBM remains to be seen.
The Chairman. I was very much interested when Pakistan did
their little bit, everybody was concentrating on the dispute
between India and Pakistan, and they were planning on who is
going to produce a nuclear blast. But I think that their fear
and apprehension about China had as much to do with that as
anything, but there is also an opinion about why they want to
possess such a capability. Do you have any additional opinions
that you want to state for the record? Why would they spend the
money? Why would they do this?
Mr. Walpole. Well again, it is a force-multiplying weapon
of war. If they can purchase the missiles from somebody else
they do not have to go through long development time to get
there, and right now, Pakistan's missiles do not reach all of
India. So they may want to go after something that would give
them a little longer range, then they could cover those
targets.
The Chairman. Then we sit back in the United States while
they figure out long-range missiles and say we do not need a
missile defense system. That is what some Senators are telling
me. They are trying to push me into paying more attention to
the ABM Treaty and the treaty that the President is considering
at this time. But, the President made a commitment to me in
writing that he would send ABM up maybe 2 years ago and I am
going to hold him to his word. And he has not mentioned a
syllable about that, nor has any spokesman.
The black market countries, they pay well. I think that is
a given, is it not?
Mr. Walpole. Now we are getting into an area where I do not
want to tread into classified information. But let us say that
some of the assistance that we see from multiple countries,
some of it appears that the government leaders might be aware
of it and in other cases government leaders are not aware of
it. It is just entities in the country working on it. Let me
just leave that one at that.
The Chairman. I have enjoyed this. I have been able to be
candid about it, I have enjoyed having you to myself, even
though I know that the other Senators will probably want to
file some questions in writing, and I know you will respond to
them in writing.
I have one final question. If you will not answer it, I
will understand. But as a United States citizen in this year of
our Lord, do you, sir, want to create a national missile
defense for the United States of America?
Mr. Walpole. I do not think as an intelligence officer I
even get to answer that question. I might answer that within
the walls of my own home to my wife, but that is probably as
far as that one goes.
The Chairman. I will not push you further. I know that Joe
Biden would have enjoyed an exchange with you, as well as the
rest of the Senators. But just speaking for myself, I certainly
appreciate the efforts you have made to come here today and to
be so helpful in making a record for us, which we are trying to
do. I often say that the best speeches that I make are ones
that I do not make until I get in the car going back home at
night. I wish I could have one to deliver now. Do you have
anything else to add to what you have said?
Mr. Walpole. No. I think I built everything into the
statement.
The Chairman. Well, I think you have done exceedingly well.
And I compliment you, sir. I thank you for coming.
Mr. Walpole. Thank you.
The Chairman. And there being no further business, the full
committee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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