BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE

Appendix 3
Related Documents:
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems (May 26, 1972)................... 424
Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral
Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (May 26, 1972)... 427
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a
Standing Consultative Commission (December 21, 1972)....... 430
Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (July 3, 1974) 431
Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or
Destruction and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and
Their Components (July 3, 1974)............................ 432
Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures
Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and
Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components
of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976)......................... 433
Agreed Statements of November 1, 1978........................ 434
Statement by U.S. SCC Commissioner Buchheim.................. 436
Statement by Soviet SCC Commissioner Ustinov................. 437
Common Understanding of June 6, 1985......................... 438
Standing Consultative Commission Documents (September 26,
1997)...................................................... 438
Five-Year ABM Treaty Reviews................................. 440
Public Law 106-38--July 22, 1999, Short-Titled the ``National
Missile Defense Act''...................................... 453
Statement by the President of the United States on Signing
Public Law 106-38.......................................... 454
Statement by Senator Thad Cochran on the Statement of the
President of the United States on Signing Public Law 106-38 454
Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.......... 456
June 16, 1997 Letter from Chairman Gilman to President
Clinton and November 21, 1997 response from the President.. 476
March 3, 1998 Letter from Chairman Gilman and Chairman Helms
to President Clinton and May 21, 1998 response from the
President.................................................. 479
August 14, 1998 Letter from Chairman Gilman to President
Clinton, October 5, 1998................................... 481
Letter from Senators Lott, Helms, Nickles, Mack, Craig,
Coverdell, Kyl, and Smith to President Clinton, and
December 17, 1998 response from the President.............. 482
Presidential Message 35 (May 14, 1997)....................... 484
Presidential Message 36 (May 14, 1997)....................... 485
Condition #9 of Executive Report 105-1, Resolution of
Ratification for the Flank Document to the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.............................. 485

S. Hrg. 106-339
BALLISTIC MISSILES: THREAT AND RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 15 AND 20, MAY 4, 5, 13, 25, 26, AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
<snowflake>
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-777 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)

APPENDIX 3
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972
Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3, 1972
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have
devastating consequences for all mankind,
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic
missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in
strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of
outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic
missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the
limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the
creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on
limiting strategic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective
measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and
general and complete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension
and the strengthening of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions
of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense
of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a
defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual
region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
Article II
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles
constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested
in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed
for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for
an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this
Article include those which are:
(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
Article III
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their
components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of
one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Partys
national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one
hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM
interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within
no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex
being circular and having a diameter of no more than three
kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of
one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo
launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM
launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles
at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars
comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational
or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in
an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers,
and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a
potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-
mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.
Article IV
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to
ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and
located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party
may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.
Article V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or
mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM
launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time
from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them
with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or
semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM
launchers.
Article VI
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on
ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party
undertakes:
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars,
capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their
elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM
mode; and
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along
the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
Article VII
Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and
replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.
Article VIII
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or
outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or
their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or
dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed
period of time.
Article IX
To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each
Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy
outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited
by this Treaty.
Article X
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations
which would conflict with this Treaty.
Article XI
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for
limitations on strategic offensive arms.
Article XII
1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical
means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national
technical means of verification of the other Party operating in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification by national technical means of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall
not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or
overhaul practices.
Article XIII
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions
of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing
Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the
obligations assumed and related situations which may be
considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either
Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance
with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with
national technical means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which
have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or
dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases
provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further
increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals
for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this
Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures
aimed at limiting strategic arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may
amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative
Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant
matters.
Article XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed
amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures
governing the entry into force of this Treaty.
2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-
year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review
of this Treaty.
Article XV
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have
the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized
its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the
other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice
shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
Article XVI
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance
with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall
enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
for the united states of america:
richard nixon
President of the United States of America
for the union of soviet socialist republics:
l. i. brezhnev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
______
AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS
REGARDING TILE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILES
1. Agreed Statements
The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the Heads
of the Delegations on May 26, 1972 (letter designations added):
Agreed Statements Regarding the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
[A]
The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be
deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the
Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of
signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for
defense of the national capital may be retained.
[B]
The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted
power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the
two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of
Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to
be three million.
[C]
The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment
area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system
deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be
separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.
[D]
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the
Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other
physical principles and including components capable of substituting
for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created
in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their
components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article
XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
[E]
The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes
obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for
the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one
independently guided warhead.
[F]
The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential
(the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square
meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles
III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking
objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of
verification.
[G]
The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the
obligation of the United States and the USSR not to provide to other
States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for
the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the
Treaty.
2. Common Understandings
Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was
reached during the negotiations:
A. Location of ICBM Defenses
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:
Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system
deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system
deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have
registered agreement on the following statement: ``The Parties
understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered
on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment
area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated
by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.'' In this connection, the
U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM
silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered
in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area. (See Agreed
Statement [C].)
B. ABM Test Ranges
The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:
Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that ``the limitations provided
for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components
used for development or testing, and located within current or
additionally agreed test ranges.'' We believe it would be useful to
assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges.
It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within
which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S.
ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll,
and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in
Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for
range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM
test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to ``additionally
agreed test ranges'' to mean that ABM components will not be located at
any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments
that there will be such additional ABM test ranges.
On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common
understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types
of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited
under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to ``additionally
agreed'' test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means
permitted identifying current test ranges.
C. Mobile ABM Systems
On January 29, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an
undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM
systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated
that, in its view, a prohibition on development of mobile ABM systems
and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and
radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for
the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with
the U.S. sides interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?
On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common
understanding on this matter.
D. Standing Consultative Commission
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:
The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to
initial implementation of the ABM Treatys Article XIII on the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the
Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,\1\
agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-
on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following
arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation
desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the
two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements
for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through
diplomatic channels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of
Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.
E. Standstill
On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:
In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet
Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will
in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the
ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.
In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20,
1972:
The United States agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on
May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of
signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this
means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would
take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered
into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence
of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed
with ratification or approval.
The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.
3. Unilateral Statements
The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the
negotiations by the United States Delegation:
A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:
The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government
attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on
strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on
an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation
of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an
objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and
reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our
respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also
indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without
the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations
on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial
agreements would be steps toward the achievement of complete
limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more
complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within
five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that
occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
The United States does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do
we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a
situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches
to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive
arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with
Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.
B. Tested in an ABM Mode
On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term ``tested in an ABM
mode,'' in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain
obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should
have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that
the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to
testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not
to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would
amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous
Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S.
view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM
components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components,
and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.
To clarify our interpretation of ``tested in an ABM mode,'' we note
that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be ``tested in
an ABM mode'' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a
launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an
interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has
a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic
missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the
test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test
range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with
interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a
radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind
referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its
trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM
interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used
for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt
from application of these criteria.
C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty
On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-
explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that
the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever
provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic
Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is
a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.
D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars
On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:
Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars]
can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances,
they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the United States
would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-
air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement.
______
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STANDING CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION
I.
The Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby establish a Standing
Consultative Commission.
II.
The Standing Consultative Commission shall promote the objectives
and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty between the USA and
the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,
1972, the Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain
Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of
May 26, 1972, and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of
Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USA and the USSR of September 30,
1971, and shall exercise its competence in accordance with the
provisions of Article XIII of said Treaty, Article VI of said Interim
Agreement, and Article 7 of said Agreement on Measures.
III.
Each Government shall be represented on the Standing Consultative
Commission by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, assisted by
such staff as it deems necessary.
IV.
The Standing Consultative Commission shall hold periodic sessions
on dates mutually agreed by the Commissioners but no less than two
times per year. Sessions shall also be convened as soon as possible,
following reasonable notice, at the request of either Commissioner.
V.
The Standing Consultative Commission shall establish and approve
Regulations governing procedures and other relevant matters and may
amend them as it deems appropriate.
VI.
The Standing Consultative Commission will meet in Geneva. It may
also meet at such other places as may be agreed.
Done in Geneva, on December 21, 1972, in two copies, each in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government For the Government
of the of the
United States of America Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics
______
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate November 10, 1975
Ratified by U.S. President March 19, 1976
Instruments of ratification exchanged May 24, 1976
Proclaimed by U.S. President July 6, 1976
Entered into force May 24, 1976
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
signed on May 29, 1972,
Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26,
1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further
measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to
strengthening international peace and security,
Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-
ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the
completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures
for the limitation of strategic offensive arms,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area
of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and
accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its
components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas
permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one
permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this
Protocol.
2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this
Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system
or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by
Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an
ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers as permitted by Article 111(b)
of the Treaty.
Article II
1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its
ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are
presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the
alternative area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that
prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord
with the procedure agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission,
during the year beginning October 3, 1977, and ending October 2, 1978,
or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter,
those being the years of periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in
Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.
2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States
would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its
components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy
an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as
permitted by Article III(a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would
have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its
components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM
system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as
permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty.
3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or
their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in
accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to
in the Standing Consultative Commission.
Article III
The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in
force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent
modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM
system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited
by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty.
Article IV
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with
the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force
on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall
thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty.
DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
for the united states of america:
richard nixon
President of the United States of America
for the union of soviet socialist republics:
l.i. brezhnev
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
______
PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR
DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR
COMPONENTS
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, and the Agreed Statements regarding that Treaty, the Parties
thereto have within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission agreed upon procedures governing replacement, dismantling or
destruction, and notification thereof, for ABM systems and their
components limited by that Treaty, as formulated in the Attachment
hereto which constitutes an integral part of this Protocol.
The Parties have also agreed on the following general
guidelines:
1. The attached Procedures shall apply only to systems or
their components to be replaced and dismantled or destroyed
pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty;
2. Any replacement of ABM systems or their components shall
be on the basis of Article VII of the Treaty and applicable
Agreed Statements; dismantling or destruction of ABM systems or
their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas
specified by the Treaty shall be on the basis of Article VIII
of the Treaty and applicable Agreed Statements;
3. Dismantling or destruction procedures for ABM systems or
their components, related to implementation of the provisions
of Article VII regarding replacement of those systems or their
components and Article VIII of the Treaty, shall ensure that
those systems or their components and facilities associated
with those components, except for facilities at test ranges,
would be put in a condition that precludes the possibility of
their use for ABM purposes; shall ensure that reactivation of
units dismantled or destroyed would be detectable by national
technical means; shall be such that reactivation time of those
units would not be substantially less than the time required
for new construction; and shall preclude unreasonable delays in
dismantling or destruction;
4. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall be formulated separately for above-ground and silo ABM
launchers and for ABM radars;
5. Replacement and dismantling or destruction procedures
shall ensure that adequate verification can be accomplished by
national technical means in accordance with Article XII of the
Treaty;
6. After dismantling or destruction in accordance with the
attached Procedures, facilities remaining at ABM launch or ABM
radar sites may, at the discretion of the Parties, be used for
purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty and
applicable Agreed Statements; and
7. Through timely and appropriate procedures, the Parties
shall notify each other of the number and type (above-ground or
silo) of ABM launchers and of the number of ABM radars on which
dismantling or destruction has been completed and is in
process, and of the number of ABM launchers and ABM radars used
for replacement.
This Protocol and the attached Procedures shall enter into force
upon signature of this Protocol and remain in force for the duration of
the Treaty, and may be amended by the Standing Consultative Commission
as it deems appropriate.
DONE at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and
Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
OF AMERICA: SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Secretary of State Minister of Foreign Affairs
______
SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING
REPLACEMENT, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, AND NOTIFICATION THEREOF, FOR
ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS OF JULY 3, 1974
Pursuant to the provisions and in implementation of the Treaty
between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Agreed Statements
regarding the Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty of July 3, 1974,
the Parties thereto have, within the framework of the Standing
Consultative Commission and in implementation of the provisions of the
Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or
Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their
Components of July 3, 1974, agreed upon procedures governing
replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for
ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty, as formulated
in the Attachment to this Supplementary Protocol.
This Supplementary Protocol and the attached Procedures shall
constitute an integral part of the Protocol on Procedures Governing
Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for
ABM Systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 and shall be
considered the second attachment to that Protocol. The attached
Procedures shall enter into force upon signature of this Supplementary
Protocol and remain in force for the duration of the Treaty, and may be
amended by the Standing Consultative Commission as it deems
appropriate.
DONE at Geneva on October 28, 1976, in duplicate, in the English
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
COMMISSIONER, COMMISSIONER,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
______
Geneva--November 1, 1978
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
agreed statement
Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges
Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto have, within
the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached mutual
understanding regarding the following:
I.
test ranges referred to in article iv of the treaty
1. The test ranges referred to in Article IV of the Treaty are
any test ranges at which an ABM system or at least one ABM launcher,
regardless of whether or not it contains an ABM interceptor missile, or
one ABM radar is located or constructed for purposes of testing.
2. Any other types of weapons or military equipment may also be
located at such test ranges for testing according to their mission or
for range safety purposes. Such location, testing, or use of these
other types of weapons or military equipment, provided it is consistent
with the provisions of the Treaty, shall not constitute a basis for
considering them ABM system components.
3. The current test ranges referred to in Article IV of the
Treaty are those test ranges which each Party had on the date of
signature of the Treaty, that is, on May 26, 1972. Both the USA and
USSR had on May 26, 1972, and have at the present time, two current
test ranges: for the USA in the vicinity of White Sands, New Mexico,
and on Kwajalein Atoll and for the USSR in the vicinity of Sary Shagan,
Kazakhstan, and on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
4. Each Party may establish test ranges referred to in Article IV
of the Treaty as ``additionally agreed'' and locate therein for testing
ABM systems or their components as they are defined in Article II of
the Treaty, provided that the establishment of such ranges is
consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and, in
particular, with the obligations of each Party provided for in Article
I of the Treaty not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the
territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense.
5. In the event of establishment of an additional test range by
either Party, the Party carrying out such action shall provide, within
the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, notification of
the location of such a test range no later than thirty days after the
beginning of any construction or assembly work, other than earthwork
(excavation), associated with locating or constructing at that test
range an ABM launcher or antenna (array), ABM radar antenna structures,
or an antenna pedestal support which is not a part of an ABM radar
building. After presentation of such notification and, if necessary,
clarification in the Standing Consultative Commission of any aspects of
this notification which are not clear to the Party being notified, the
test range being newly established will be considered an ``additionally
agreed test range,'' referred to in Article IV of the Treaty.
II.
the term ``tested in an abm mode'' used in the treaty
1. The term ``tested in an ABM mode,'' which is used in Article
II of the Treaty for defining ABM system components, refers to ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, which are tested in
an ABM mode separately or in conjunction with other ABM system
components after the date of signature of the Treaty, that is after May
26, 1972. The term does not refer to components which were tested by
the Parties in an ABM mode prior to that date.
2. Testing in an ABM mode is the testing, which, in accordance
with the provisions of Articles III and IV of the Treaty regarding
locations of ABM systems or their components, is carried out only at
test ranges or in an ABM system deployment area, for the purpose of
determining the capabilities of an ABM system or its individual
components (ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars) to
perform the functions of countering strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory.
3. As applied to testing of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars, the term ``strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory,'' used in the Treaty, also refers
to ballistic target-missiles which, after being launched, are used for
testing these ABM system components in an ABM mode, and the flight
trajectories of which, over the portions of the flight trajectory
involved in such testing, have the characteristics of the flight
trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements.
4. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' used in Article II of the
Treaty refers to:
(a) an ABM interceptor missile if while guided by an ABM radar
it has intercepted a strategic ballistic missile or its
elements in flight trajectory regardless of whether such
intercept was successful or not; or if an ABM interceptor
missile has been launched from an ABM launcher and guided by an
ABM radar. If ABM interceptor missiles are given the capability
to carry out interception without the use of ABM radars as the
means of guidance, application of the term ``tested in an ABM
mode'' to ABM interceptor missiles in that event shall be
subject to additional discussion and agreement in the Standing
Consultative Commission;
(b) an ABM launcher if it has been used for launching an ABM
interceptor missile;
(c) an ABM radar if it has tracked a strategic ballistic
missile or its elements in flight trajectory and guided an ABM
interceptor missile toward them regardless of whether the
intercept was successful or not; or tracked and guided an ABM
interceptor missile; or tracked a strategic ballistic missile
or its elements in flight trajectory in conjunction with an ABM
radar, which is tracking a strategic ballistic missile or its
elements in flight trajectory and guiding an ABM interceptor
missile toward them or is tracking and guiding an ABM
interceptor missile.
5. The provisions of paragraph 4 of this Section shall be applied
taking into account Article VI, subparagraph (a), of the Treaty
concerning the obligations of the Parties not to give missiles,
launchers, or radars, other than ABM system components, capabilities to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to
radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, or to
radars, including phased-array radars, used for the purposes of
tracking objects in outer space or as national technical means of
verification.
6. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to
radars, including phased-array radars, which are constructed and used
only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons
or military equipment.
7. The term ``tested in an ABM mode'' shall not be applied to a
radar, including a phased-array radar, which is not an ABM radar or a
radar referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, if strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements passed through the field of view
of the radar while it was operating in accordance with its mission, and
it was not, at that time, performing functions inherent only to an ABM
radar, and it was not functioning in conjunction with an ABM radar. In
the event that ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of
the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to individual radars which track
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,
the Parties, in accordance with Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, will
consider such questions in the Standing Consultative Commission and
resolve them on a mutually acceptable basis.
8. Deployment of radars of a type tested in an ABM mode, except
as provided in Articles III and IV of the Treaty, to carry out any
functions would be inconsistent with the obligation of each Party not
to provide a base for an ABM defense of the territory of its country.
III.
utilization of air defense radars at the test ranges referred to in
article iv of the treaty
1. Utilization of air defense radars located at or near a test
range to carry out air defense functions, including providing for the
safety of that range, is not limited by the provisions of the Treaty
and is independent of the testing carried out at that range.
2. When air defense components and ABM system components are co-
located at a test range, the Parties, in order to preclude the
possibility of ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, will refrain
from concurrent testing of such air defense components and ABM system
components at that range.
3. In utilizing air defense radars as instrumentation equipment
at test ranges the Parties will not use such radars to make
measurements on strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in
flight trajectory.
______
STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER BUCHHEIM
November 1, 1978
Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement
regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed.
FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of
November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term ``tested in an ABM
mode'' shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars,
which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for
testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to
such radars the Parties understand that:
(a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three
million may be located only at the test ranges referred to, in
Article IV of the ABM Treaty;
(b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding
three million and which make measurements on strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may
be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of
the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic
missiles are launched for testing;
(c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding
three million and which do not make measurements on strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may
be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not
inconsistent with the ABM Treaty;
(d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for
instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM
Treaty.
SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the
Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM
radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack,
radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national
technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used
only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons
or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their
missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.
In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other
radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions.
When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions,
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the
fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars
will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and
cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases
the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.
If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the
term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to individual radars which track
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or
regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or
radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to
consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with
Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.
THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement
Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common
understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in
their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning
on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR
SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in
connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this
common understanding constitutes a component part of the general
understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain
provisions of the ABM Treaty.
______
STATEMENT BY COMMISSIONER USTINOV
November 1, 1978
Mr. Commissioner, I would like to make the following statement
regarding the Agreed Statement which we have just initialed.
FIRST, in paragraph 6 of Section II of the Agreed Statement of
November 1, 1978, the Parties agreed that the term ``tested in an ABM
mode'' shall not be applied to radars, including phased-array radars,
which are constructed and used only as instrumentation equipment for
testing of any types of weapons or military equipment. With respect to
such radars the Parties understand that:
(a) phased-array radars which have a potential exceeding three
million may be located only at the test ranges referred to in
Article IV of the ABM Treaty;
(b) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding
three million and which make measurements on strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may
be located only at the test ranges referred to in Article IV of
the ABM Treaty, or at locations to which strategic ballistic
missiles are launched for testing;
(c) phased-array radars which have a potential not exceeding
three million and which do not make measurements on strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory may
be located anywhere for instrumentation or other purposes not
inconsistent with the ABM Treaty;
(d) non-phased-array radars may be located anywhere for
instrumentation or other purposes not inconsistent with the ABM
Treaty.
SECOND, in connection with paragraph 7 of Section II of the
Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, the Parties understand that ABM
radars, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack,
radars used for tracking objects in outer space or as national
technical means of verification, as well as radars constructed and used
only as instrumentation equipment for testing of any types of weapons
or military equipment can, when operating in accordance with their
missions, perform the function inherent to them of tracking strategic
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory.
In addition to the aforementioned radars, both Parties have other
radars, including phased-array radars, intended for various missions.
When these radars are operating in accordance with their missions,
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements might pass through the
fields of view of these radars. The passing of strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements through the fields of view of such radars
will not be equated with tracking of such missiles by these radars and
cannot give grounds for either Party to consider that in these cases
the radars are being tested in an ABM mode.
If ambiguities arise in the future regarding application of the
term ``tested in an ABM mode'' to individual radars which track
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or
regarding determination of whether these radars are ABM radars or
radars which are not ABM radars, such questions will be subject to
consultation in the Standing Consultative Commission in accordance with
Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.
THIRD, the Parties, in connection with the Agreed Statement
Regarding Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty, have the common
understanding that the Agreed Statement will be used by the Parties in
their implementation of those provisions of the ABM Treaty, beginning
on the date of initialing of the Agreed Statement by the U.S. and USSR
SCC Commissioners, that is, November 1, 1978. Like the statements in
connection with paragraphs II.6 and II.7 of the Agreed Statement, this
common understanding constitutes a component part of the general
understanding reached between the Parties with regard to certain
provisions of the ABM Treaty.
______
Geneva--June 6, 1985
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
COMMON UNDERSTANDING
related to paragraph 2 of section iii of the agreed statement of
november 1, 1978, regarding certain provisions of articles ii, iv, and
vi of the treaty between the united states of america and the union of
soviet socialist republics on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile
systems of may 26, 1972, and the utilization of air defense radars at
the test ranges referred to in article iv of that treaty
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties thereto, in further
development of the agreement recorded in paragraph 2 of Section III of
the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, with a view to precluding the
possibility of ambiguous situations at the test ranges referred to in
Article IV of the Treaty, have, within the framework of the Standing
Consultative Commission, additionally agreed that:
each Party will refrain from launching strategic ballistic
missiles to the area of such a test range or from launching ABM
interceptor missiles at that test range concurrent with the
operation of air defense components located at that range;
in agreeing to the foregoing the Parties recognize the
possibility of circumstances--the appearance of a hostile or
unidentified aircraft--in which, for the purpose of providing
for air defense, a necessity for the operation of air defense
components, located at the test range for carrying out air
defense functions including providing for range safety, may
arise unexpectedly during the launch of a strategic ballistic
missile to the area of the test range or during the launch of
an ABM interceptor missile at that range. Should such an event
occur, the Party which had such a concurrent operation will, as
soon as possible, but within thirty days, provide notification
to the other Party describing the circumstances of the event.
It will, if necessary, on a voluntary basis, also inform the
other Party about the event or hold consultations with it
within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission,
as provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty and paragraph 4
of the Regulations of the Standing Consultative Commission.
This Common Understanding constitutes a component part of the
agreement reached between the Parties with regard to the provisions of
paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978,
and does not affect other provisions of that Agreed Statement or the
provisions of the common understandings thereto reached by
Commissioners in the Standing Consultative Commission on November 1,
1978.
The provisions of this Common Understanding will be used by the
Parties in their implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the
Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, beginning on the date of
signature of this Common Understanding, that is, June 6, 1985.
COMMISSIONER, COMMISSIONER,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
______
September 26, 1997
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972
The United States of America, and the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, hereinafter
referred to for purposes of this Memorandum as the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) Successor States,
Recognizing the importance of preserving the viability of the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, with the aim of
maintaining strategic stability,
Recognizing the changes in the political situation resulting from
the establishment of new independent states on the territory of the
former USSR,
Have, in connection with the Treaty, agreed as follows:
Article I
The United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, upon entry
into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the
Treaty.
Article II
The USSR Successor States shall assume the rights and obligations
of the former USSR under the Treaty and its associated documents.
Article III
Each USSR Successor State shall implement the provisions of the
Treaty with regard to its territory and with regard to its activities,
wherever such activities are carried out by that State, independently
or in cooperation with any other State.
Article IV
For purposes of Treaty implementation:
(a) the term ``Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'' shall mean
the USSR Successor States;
(b) the terms ``national territory'' and ``territory of its
country'' when used to refer to the former USSR shall mean the
combined national territories of the USSR Successor States, and
the term ``periphery of its national territory'' when used to
refer to the former USSR shall mean the periphery of the
combined national territories of those States; and
(c) the term ``capital'' when used to refer to the capital of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article III of the
Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, shall continue
to mean the city of Moscow.
Article V
A USSR Successor State or USSR Successor States may continue to
use any facility that is subject to the provisions of the Treaty and
that is currently located on the territory of any State that is not a
Party to the Treaty, with the consent of such State, and provided that
the use of such facility shall remain consistent with the provisions of
the Treaty.
Article VI
The USSR Successor States shall collectively be limited at any
one time to a single anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system deployment
area and to a total of no more than fifteen ABM launchers at ABM test
ranges, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and its
associated documents, including the Protocols of July 3, 1974.
Article VII
The obligations contained in Article IX of the Treaty and Agreed
Statement ``G'' Regarding the Treaty shall not apply to transfers
between or among the USSR Successor States.
Article VIII
The Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as
the Commission, shall function in the manner provided for by the Treaty
and the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Standing
Consultative Commission of December 21, 1972, as well as by the
Regulations of the Conmiission, which shall reflect the multilateral
character of the Treaty and the equal legal status of the Parties in
reaching decisions in the Commission.
Article IX
1. This Memorandum shall be subject to ratification or approval
by the signatory States, in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of those States.
2. The functions of the depositary of this Memorandum shall be
exercised by the Government of the United States of America.
3. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date when the
Governments of all the signatory States have deposited instruments of
ratification or approval of this Memorandum and shall remain in force
so long as the Treaty remains in force.
4. Each State that has ratified or approved this Memorandum shall
also be bound by the provisions of the First Agreed Statement of
September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second
Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972.
DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
for the united states of america:
Madeleine Albright
for the republic of belarus:
I. Antonovich
for the republic of kazakhstan:
K. Tokayev
for the russian federation:
Y. Primakov
for ukraine:
H. Udovenko
______
September 26, 1997
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
FIRST AGREED STATEMENT RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972
In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty have,
within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, reached
agreement on the following:
1. Land-based, sea-based, and air-based interceptor missiles,
interceptor missile launchers, and radars, other than anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars, respectively, shall be deemed, within the meaning
of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty, not to have been
given capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory and not to have been tested
in an ABM mode, if, in the course of testing them separately or
in a system:
(a) the velocity of the interceptor missile does not
exceed 3 km/sec over any part of its flight trajectory;
(b) the velocity of the ballistic target-missile does
not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight
trajectory; and
(c) the range of the ballistic target-missile does not
exceed 3,500 kilometers.
2. The Parties have additionally agreed on reciprocal
implementation of the confidence-building measures set forth in
the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to
Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic
Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997.
3. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force
simultaneously with entry into force of the Memorandum of
Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems of May 26, 1972.
DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
for the united states of america:
Stanley Riveles
for the republic of belarus:
S. Agurtsou
for the republic of kazakhstan:
K. Zhanbatyrov
for the russian federation:
V. Koltunov
for ukraine:
0. Rybak
______
COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS RELATED TO THE FIRST AGREED STATEMENT OF
SEPTEMBER 26, 1997, RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION
OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972
I.
The term ``interceptor missile,'' as used in the First Agreed
Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to
the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a
missile:
(a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or
(b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or
(c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a
ballistic target-missile.
With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile
shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches.
II.
The provisions of paragraph 1 of the First Agreed Statement of
September 26, 1997, do not supersede or amend any provision of the
Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, and do not alter the meaning of
the term ``tested in an ABM mode'' as that term is used in the Treaty,
including the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978.
III.
The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First
Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor
missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target-missile shall be
determined in an earth-centered coordinate system fixed in relation to
the Earth.
IV.
The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the First
Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space-based
interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec.
These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to
the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute
an integral part thereof.
______
September 26, 1997
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
SECOND AGREED STATEMENT RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972
In connection with the provisions of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties to the Treaty,
Expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability
and international security,
Emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic
offensive arms,
Recognizing the fundamental significance of the Treaty for the
above objectives,
Recognizing the necessity for effective systems to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles,
Considering it their common task to preserve the Treaty, prevent
its circumvention and enhance its viability,
Relying on the following principles that have served as a basis
for reaching this agreement:
the Parties are committed to the Treaty as a cornerstone of
strategic stability;
the Parties must have the option to establish and to deploy
effective systems to counter ballistic missiles other than
strategic ballistic missiles, and such activity must not lead
to violation or circumvention of the Treaty;
systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic
ballistic missiles may be deployed by each Party which will not
pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of
another Party and which will not be tested to give such systems
that capability;
systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic
ballistic missiles will not be deployed by the Parties for use
against each other; and
the scale of deployment--in number and geographic scope--of
systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic
ballistic missiles by any Party will be consistent with
programs for ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic
missiles confronting that Party;
Have, within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission, with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other
than strategic ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose
velocity exceeds 3 km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory,
hereinafter referred to as systems covered by this Agreed Statement,
reached agreement on the following:
1. Each Party undertakes that, in the course of testing,
separately or in a system, land-based, sea-based, and air-based
interceptor missiles, interceptor missile launchers, and
radars, of systems covered by this Agreed Statement, which are
not anti-ballistic missile (ABM) interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars, respectively:
(a) the velocity of the ballistic target-missile will
not exceed 5 km/sec over any part of its flight
trajectory; and
(b) the range of the ballistic target-missile will not
exceed 3,500 kilometers.
2. Each Party, in order to preclude the possibility of
ambiguous situations or misunderstandings related to compliance
with the provisions of the Treaty, undertakes not to develop,
test, or deploy space-based interceptor missiles to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles, or
space-based components based on other physical principles,
whether or not part of a system, that are capable of
substituting for such interceptor missiles.
3. In order to enhance confidence in compliance with the
provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall implement the
provisions of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures
Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than
Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, hereinafter
referred to as the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, with
respect to systems covered by this Agreed Statement and not
subject to the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement on the
date of its entry into force. Each such system shall become
subject to the provisions of the Confidence-Building Measures
Agreement no later than 180 days in advance of the planned date
of the first launch of an interceptor missile of that system.
All information provided for in the Confidence-Building
Measures Agreement shall initially be provided no later than 30
days after such a system becomes subject to the provisions of
the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement.
4. In order to ensure the viability of the Treaty as
technologies related to systems to counter ballistic missiles
other than strategic ballistic missiles evolve, and in
accordatice with Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties
undertake to hold consultations and discuss, within the
framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, questions or
concerns that any Party may have regarding activities involving
systems covered by this Agreed Statement, including questions
and concerns related to the implementation of the provisions of
this Agreed Statement.
5. This Agreed Statement shall enter into force simultaneously
with entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of
September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26,
1972.
DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
for the united states of america:
Stanley Riveles
for the republic of belarus:
S. Agurtsou
for the republic of kazakhstan:
K. Zhanbatyrov
fpr the russian federation:
V. Koltunov
for ukraine:
O. Rybak
______
COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS RELATED TO THE SECOND AGREED STATEMENT OF
SEPTEMBER 26, 1997, RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION
OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972
I.
The term ``interceptor missile,'' as used in the Second Agreed
Statement of September 26, 1997, shall refer to any missile subject to
the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article VI of the Treaty if such a
missile:
(a) has been developed by a Party as a missile to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or
(b) has been declared by a Party as a missile to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles; or
(c) has been tested by a Party even once with the use of a
ballistic target-missile.
With respect to subparagraphs (a), (b), or (c), such a missile
shall be considered an interceptor missile in all its launches.
II.
The Parties have agreed that, for the purposes of the Second
Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of an interceptor
missile as well as the velocity of a ballistic target-missile shall be
determined in an earth-centered coordinate system fixed in relation to
the Earth.
III.
The Parties have agreed that for the purposes of the Second
Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the velocity of space-based
interceptor missiles shall be considered to exceed 3 km/sec.
IV.
For systems to counter ballistic missiles other than strategic
ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3
km/sec over any part of their flight trajectory, that become subject to
the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement in accordance with paragraph
3 of the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, the Parties
understand that, in connection with the provisions of paragraph 2(b) of
Section IV of the Confidence-Building Measures Agreement, detailed
information on such systems shall be provided in a form and scope as
agreed upon by the Parties.
These Common Understandings shall be considered an attachment to
the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, and shall constitute
an integral part thereof.
______
September 26, 1997
AGREEMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES RELATED TO SYSTEMS TO COUNTER
BALLISTIC MISSILES OTHER THAN STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES
The States that have signed this Agreement, hereinafter referred
to as the Parties,
Desiring to promote reciprocal openness, greater trust between
the Parties, and the preservation of strategic stability,
Declaring their intention to implement, on a reciprocal basis,
confidence-building measures with respect to systems to counter
ballistic missiles other than strategic ballistic missiles,
Have agreed as follows:
I. General Provisions
1. Systems subject to this Agreement shall be: for the United
States of America--the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
System and the Navy Theater-Wide Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
Program, known to the other Parties by the same names; for the Russian
Federation--the S-300V system, known to the United States of America as
the SA-12 system; for the Republic of Belarus--the S-300V system, known
to the United States of America as the SA-12 system; for Ukraine--the
S-300V system, known to the United States of America as the SA-12
system; and other systems as agreed upon by the Parties in the future.
2. The Parties shall conduct an initial exchange of information
and notifications, as provided for in this Agreement, no later than 90
days after entry into force of this Agreement, reflecting the status as
of the date of its entry into force, and update this information
annually, unless otherwise agreed. Information shall be updated
reflecting the status as of January 1 of each year and provided no
later than April 1 of each year.
II. Notifications
1. Each Party shall provide notifications to the other Parties of
test ranges and other test areas where launches of interceptor missiles
of systems subject to this Agreement will take place. Notifications of
test ranges and other test areas shall include the names of ranges
(test areas) and their locations. Such notifications shall be provided
either within 30 days after entry into force of this Agreement, or no
later than 90 days in advance of the first launch of an interceptor
missile of a system subject to this Agreement at each test range (test
area).
2. Each Party shall provide notification to the other Parties of
each launch of an interceptor missile of systems subject to this
Agreement, if during that launch a ballistic target-missile is used. In
this connection:
(a) an interceptor missile launch notification shall specify
the name of the test range (test area) where the interceptor
missile launch will take place; the type (designation) of the
interceptor missile; the planned date of the interceptor
missile launch; the planned launch point of the interceptor
missile (geographic coordinates; for air-based systems the
geographic coordinates of the projection of the planned launch
point of the interceptor missile onto the Earth's surface shall
be specified); the planned launch point of the ballistic
target-missile (geographic coordinates);
(b) each interceptor missile launch notification shall be
provided no later than 10 days in advance of the planned date
of the interceptor missile launch and shall be effective for
seven days beginning with the planned date of that launch; and
(c) if the launch of the interceptor missile will not occur or
has not occurred within the specified 7-day period, the Party
that planned to carry out the launch of the interceptor missile
shall provide a notification thereof no later than 24 hours
after the expiration of the 7-day period. Such a notification
shall state that the interceptor missile launch has not
occurred and shall either specify a new launch date, which will
establish the beginning of a new 7-day period, or state that a
notification of a new launch date will be made in accordance
with the procedure specified in subparagraph (b) of this
paragraph.
III. Demonstrations of Systems and Observations of Tests
Any Party may on a voluntary basis arrange, for any other Party
or Parties, a demonstration of its systems or their components subject
to this Agreement or an observation of their tests. In each specific
case, the participating Parties shall agree in advance on the purpose
of, and the arrangements for, such demonstrations and observations.
IV. Assurances
Each Party shall provide assurances that it will not deploy
systems subject to this Agreement in numbers and locations so that
these systems could pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear
force of another Party. The measures used to provide such assurances
shall include:
1. Each Party shall provide to the other Parties, in a form and
scope as agreed upon by the Parties, an assessment of the programs with
respect to the development, testing and deployment of ballistic
missiles, other than strategic ballistic missiles, confronting that
Party.
2. For each of its systems subject to this Agreement, each Party
shall provide the following information:
(a) the name, type (designation), and basing mode of the system
as well as of its interceptor missiles, launchers, and
associated radars;
(b) the general concept of operation; the status of plans and
programs; and, in addition, for systems in testing, the number
of systems it plans to possess; the information shall be
provided in a form and scope as agreed upon by the Parties;
(c) the class and type of basing platform:
(i) for land-based systems: the number of launchers in
a battalion;
(ii) for sea-based systems: the class and type of each
ship, and the number of launchers on a ship of that
class capable of launching interceptor missiles of each
type;
(iii) for air-based systems: the type of each aircraft,
and the number of interceptor missiles each aircraft is
capable of carrying;
(d) the number of interceptor missiles of a fully loaded
launcher.
3. For components of each of its systems subject to this
Agreement, each Party shall provide the following information:
(a) for a completely assembled interceptor missile: the number
of stages, the length, the maximum diameter, the type of
propellant (solid or liquid), maximum velocity demonstrated
during launches, and the length and diameter of the interceptor
missile launch canister;
(b) for the interceptor missile launcher: the maximum number of
interceptor missiles of a fully loaded launcher; and
(c) for the radar: the frequency band (in designations adopted
by the International Telecommunication Union) and potential,
expressed as a value that is not exceeded by the radar's
potential. The potential of a radar shall mean the product of
its mean emitted power in watts and its antenna area in square
meters.
V. Additional Voluntary Measures
Each Party may provide on a voluntary basis any other information
or any other notifications not specified elsewhere in this Agreement.
The topics, amount, and time frame for such information and
notifications shall be such as each Party determines.
VI. Implementation of the Agreement
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions
of this Agreement, the Parties, within the framework of the Standing
Consultative Commission established in accordance with the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, shall consider:
(a) issues concerning implementation of the obligations assumed
under this Agreement, as well as related situations which may
be considered ambiguous; and
(b) amendments to the provisions of this Agreement and other
possible proposals on further increasing its viability.
2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
channels or the equivalent government-to-government communications
links for providing the notifications and for exchanging the
information provided for in Sections II, IV and V of this Agreement.
VII. Confidentiality
Each Party undertakes not to release to the public the
information provided pursuant to this Agreement except with the express
consent of the Party that provided such information.
VIII. Entry into Force and Duration
This Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with entry
into force of the First Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997,
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Second Agreed Statement of
September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and shall remain in
force so long as either of those Agreed Statements remains in force.
DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
for the united states of america:
Stanley Riveles
for the republic of belarus:
S. Agurtsou
for the republic of kazakhstan:
K. Zhanbatyrov
for the russian federation:
V. Koltunov
for ukraine:
O. Rybak
______
September 26, 1997--New York City
STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT ON THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF
PLANS AND PROGRAMS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMS TO COUNTER BALLISTIC
MISSILES OTHER THAN STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES
1. The Parties understand that in implementing the provisions of
paragraph 2(b) of Section IV of the Agreement on Confidence-Building
Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than
Strategic Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, each Party will
provide information annually on the status of its plans and programs
with respect to systems to counter ballistic missiles other than
strategic ballistic missiles that includes:
(a) whether or not that Party has plans before April 1999 to
test, against a ballistic target-missile, land-based, sea-based
or air-based interceptor missiles whose velocity exceeds 3 km/
sec over any part of their flight trajectory;
(b) whether or not that Party has plans to develop such systems
with interceptor missiles whose velocity over any part of their
flight trajectory exceeds 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-
based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems; and
(c) whether or not that Party has plans to test such systems
against ballistic target-missiles with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles or against reentry vehicles
deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic
missiles.
2. The Parties understand that should any Party have questions or
concerns regarding activity related to any change in the statement on
plans of any other Party, the Parties will, in accordance with Article
XIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, Relating to the
Treaty, and Section VI of the Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures
Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic
Ballistic Missiles of September 26, 1997, conduct consultations, within
the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission, to discuss such
questions or concerns, as well as possible proposals for further
increasing the viability of the Treaty, including possible proposals to
amend the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997.
S.R. (United States of America)
S.A. (Republic of Belarus)
K.Z. (Republic of Kazakhstan
V.K. (Russian Federation)
O.R. (Ukraine)
______
September 26, 1997
REGULATIONS OF THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
In accordance with Article VIII of the Memorandum of
Understanding of September 26, 1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, the
United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine have agreed as follows:
I.
1. Each Party shall have the right to be represented on the
Standing Consultative Commission, hereinafter referred to as the
Commission.
2. Each Party shall designate a Commissioner, a Deputy
Commissioner, and such members, advisors, and experts of its delegation
to the Commission as it deems necessary.
3. Each Party shall have the right to participate in all
activities of the Commission.
II.
1. At any time, Commissioners may raise for discussion any matter
that is within the competence of the Commission.
2. Commissioners may also, at any time, transmit to or request
from the other Commissioners, oral or written communications.
3. Commissioners shall, when possible, inform each other in
advance of matters to be raised for discussion in the Commission.
4. Commissioners shall alternately preside over the meetings of a
session of the Commission, unless otherwise agreed.
5. Each Party may direct that the authorities and functions of a
Commissioner may be exercised by a Deputy Commissioner or other
authorized person.
6. The Commission may establish working groups to undertake such
activities as it may direct, including studying and preparing specific
matters.
III.
1. The Commission shall be convened for sessions no less than
twice a year. Such sessions proposed during the intersessional period
shall be convened on a date, no later than 45 days after the date
initially proposed, and with a duration agreed to by the United States
of America and at least one other Party.
2. Agreement on the commencement date and duration of a
forthcoming session may be reached by consensus during a session in
progress.
3. During the intersessional period, any Commissioner may propose
convening a session of the Commission by making a proposal or counter-
proposal to the other Commissioners on the commencement date and
duration of the forthcoming session at least 30 days in advance of the
proposed commencement date of the session.
4. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall include all
matters proposed by any Commissioner and communicated to the other
Commissioners in advance of the session. Any matter raised during the
session by any Commissioner may be considered in the Commission.
5. Sessions of the Commission shall be held in the city of
Geneva, unless otherwise agreed.
IV.
1. Any matter within the competence of the Commission may be the
subject of an agreement.
2. Agreements may be recorded in any form acceptable to the
Parties participating in the session.
3. The negotiation of the text of an agreement during a session
of the Commission shall be done on the basis of consensus of the
Parties participating in the session.
4. The United States of America shall notify, through diplomatic
channels, all Parties not represented in a session of the Commission,
of the final text of an agreement no later than 15 days after the final
text has been negotiated in that session of the Commission.
5. A Party shall approve an agreement negotiated in the
Commission by signing it in the Commission or by submitting an
instrument of approval. In addition, an agreement shall be considered
approved by a Party if it fails to submit a diplomatic note in
accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of this Section, or if its objections
are withdrawn pursuant to subparagraph 7(b) or paragraph 8 of this
Section.
6. Each agreement negotiated in the Commission shall be
considered adopted when all Parties have approved the agreement in
accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section and shall enter into force
on the date of its adoption, unless all Parties have agreed on a later
date.
7. A Party that has not approved an agreement negotiated during a
session of the Commission shall be bound by the agreement in one of two
ways:
(a) if it submits an instrument of approval to all other
Parties; or
(b) if it fails to submit a diplomatic note, specifying its
objections to the agreement, to all other Parties within 30
days after receipt of a notification pursuant to paragraph 4 of
this Section. Withdrawal of all of its objections by a Party
shall be regarded as its approval of that agreement.
8. Any diplomatic note submitted in accordance with subparagraph
7(b) of this Section shall include the express intention of the
objecting Party to address its objection in the next session of the
Commission. Failure of an objecting Party to attend such session shall
be considered its withdrawal of its objection unless that objection is
renewed by diplomatic note to all other Parties prior to the closing of
that session.
9. If the text of an agreement, negotiated in the Commission in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section, is amended in order to
resolve any Party's objection or for any other reason, the amended
agreement shall constitute a new agreement subject to the provisions of
paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Section.
V.
1. Matters raised and discussed in the Commission, as well as the
results of discussions, and any agreements reached, may be recorded in
documents which shall be done in English and Russian, both texts being
equally authentic, and each Party shall be provided with a complete set
of such documents.
2. The Commission shall conduct its proceedings in private and
may not make its proceedings public without the express consent of all
Commissioners. The texts of agreements adopted by the Parties may be
made public, unless otherwise agreed.
3. The official languages of the Commission shall be English and
Russian.
4. Each Party shall bear the expenses connected with its
participation in the Commission.
VI.
1. These Regulations shall supersede the Regulations of the
Standing Consultative Commission approved in accordance with the
Protocol of May 30, 1973. The provisions of the Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding
the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21,
1972, shall apply to the extent that they are consistent with the
provisions of these Regulations.
2. These Regulations shall enter into force simultaneously with
entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding of September 26,
1997, Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972. The Commission may revise,
repeal, or replace these Regulations to the extent and in such manner
as the Commission deems necessary.
DONE at New York City on September 26, 1997, in five copies, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
for the united states of america:
Stanley Riveles
for the republic of belarus:
S. Agurtsou
for the republic of kazakhstan:
K. Zhanbatyrov
for the russian federation:
V. Koltunov
for ukraine:
O. Rybak
______
Geneva--November 21, 1977
COMMUNIQUE OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON THE
REVIEW OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC
MISSILE SYSTEMS OF MAY 26, 1972
In accordance with the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, and was amended
by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, the Parties to the Treaty,
together conducted a review of the Treaty after five years of its
operation. By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted
from November 4 to November 21, 1977, in a special session of the
Standing Consultative Commission which was convened for that purpose.
The Parties agree that the Treaty is operating effectively, thus
demonstrating the mutual commitment of the USA and the USSR to the goal
of limiting nuclear arms and to the principle of equal security, serves
the security interests of both Parties, decreases the risk of outbreak
of nuclear war, facilitates progress in the further limitation and
reduction of strategic offensive arms, and requires no amendment at
this time.
The Parties note, in connection with the conduct of the review,
that during the aforementioned period of operation of the Treaty
consultations and discussions have been held in the Standing
Consultative Commission on matters pertaining to promoting the
implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty. These
consultations and discussions have been productive and useful in
clarifying the mutual understanding of the Parties concerning certain
provisions of the Treaty, in working out appropriate procedures for
implementation of its provisions, and in resolving a number of
questions related to complete and precise implementation of the
provisions of the Treaty.
Mindful of their obligation to conduct together a review of the
Treaty at five-year intervals, the Parties will continue the process of
consultation concerning the implementation, as well as the enhancement
of the viability and effectiveness, of the provisions of the Treaty.
The Parties reaffirm their mutual commitment to the objectives
and provisions of the Treaty and their resolve to maintain and further
increase the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.
______
Geneva--December 15, 1982
COMMUNIQUE OF THE US-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON THE
SECOND REVIEW OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-
BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Pursuant to the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, and was amended
by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, the Parties together conducted
a review of the Treaty after its second five-year period of operation.
By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted from
November 9, 1982, to December 15, 1982, in a session of the Standing
Consultative Commission specially convened for that purpose.
During the course of the review, the Parties carefully examined
the Preamble and Articles of the Treaty and Protocol and evaluated
their implementation in the period covered by the review.
The United States and the Soviet Union each reaffirmed its
commitment to the aims and objectives of the Treaty, and to the process
of consultation within the framework of the Standing Consultative
Commission to promote the implementation of the objectives and
provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974.
______
Geneva, Switzerland--August 31, 1988
United States Unilateral Statement Following ABM Treaty Review
The United States and the Soviet Union conducted the third Review
of the ABM Treaty as required at five-year intervals by the provisions
of that Treaty. The Review was conducted from August 24, 1988 to August
31, 1988. The U.S. Delegation was led by William F. Burns, Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
During the Review, the United States emphasized the importance of
Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which are a threat to the
viability of the Treaty. Throughout the Review Conference, the Soviet
Union gave no indication that it was prepared to correct the violations
without linking their agreement to do so to unacceptable demands.
Specifically, the United States discussed with the Soviets its
serious concern that the Soviet Union's deployment of a large phased-
array radar near Krasnoyarsk constitutes a significant violation of a
central element of the ABM Treaty. Such radars take years to build and
are a key to providing a nation-wide defense--which is prohibited by
the Treaty. The Treaty's restrictions on the location, orientation, and
functions of such radars are, thus, essential provisions of the Treaty.
Hence, the Krasnoyarsk violation is very serious, particularly when it
is recognized that the radar constitutes one of a network of such
radars that have the inherent potential for attack assessment in
support of ballistic missile defense.
In order for the Soviet Union to correct this violation, the
Krasnoyarsk radar must be dismantled. The United States has been urging
the Soviet Union for more than five years, both in the Standing
Consultative Commission established by the Treaty and in other
diplomatic channels, to correct this clear violation by dismantling the
radar. During the Review, the U.S. outlined the specific Soviet actions
necessary to correct this violation in a verifiable manner. The United
States has also made clear that the continuing existence of the
Krasnoyarsk radar makes it impossible to conclude any future arms
agreements in the START or Defense and Space areas. The United States
has observed a slowdown in construction, but this slowdown, or even a
full construction freeze, would not be sufficient either to correct the
Treaty violation or to meet U.S. concerns about the significant impact
of the violation.
The United States cannot continue indefinitely to tolerate this
clear and serious Treaty violation. The violation must be corrected.
Until the Krasnoyarsk radar is dismantled, it will continue to raise
the issue of material breach and proportionate responses. Nothing that
occurred during the Review Conference or its completion should be
interpreted as derogating in any way from rights the U.S. has under
international law with regard to any Soviet violation of the Treaty.
Since the Soviet Union was not prepared to satisfy U.S. concerns with
respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar violation at the Review Conference,
the United States will have to consider declaring this continuing
violation a material breach of the Treaty. In this connection, the
United States reserves all its rights, consistent with international
law, to take appropriate and proportionate responses in the future.
During the ABM Treaty Review, the United States also discussed
the violation of the ABM Treaty involving the illegally deployed radars
at Gomel. The U.S. also reserves its rights to respond to this
violation in an appropriate and proportionate manner. The United States
also discussed with the Soviet Union a number of ABM-related compliance
concerns, the totality of which suggests that the Soviet Union may be
preparing a prohibited ABM territorial defense. This is a particularly
serious concern. As the President has noted, such a development ``would
have profound implications for the vital East-West balance. A
unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of
the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its
capability.''
The U.S. continues to have deep, continuing concerns about the
implications of the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with the ABM
Treaty. As President Reagan observed in December 1987:
No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor
matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country
can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will
comply with. . . . correcting their violations will be a true
test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive
relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our
two countries on security matters.
The U.S. will not accept Soviet violations or a double standard
of Treaty compliance, and reserve the right to take appropriate and
proportionate responses in the future.
______
September 1, 1988
Soviet Statement in Connection with the Third Review of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty Between the USSR
and the United States on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, talks were held in Geneva August 24-31, 1988 between
representatives of the USSR and the United States to review the Treaty
after another five years of its operation.
The Soviet side proceeded on the basis that the review should
lead to the strengthening of the ABM Treaty, which is of key
significance for ensuring further progress in the disarmament sphere
and strengthening strategic stability and international security. The
preservation and strengthening of this Treaty is the common concern of
its participants--the USSR and the United States.
The USSR delegation conducted all the discussions in a non-
confrontational spirit, with the aim of seeking mutually acceptable
decisions both as regards the political reaffirmation of the sides'
commitment to the objectives and tasks of the Treaty, and as regards
the quest for concrete technical decisions that could lead to the
removal of mutual concerns in unclear situations that have arisen in
the exchange of opinions between the sides.
The Soviet delegation sought to ensure that the reaffirmation of
commitment to the Treaty and the agreed outlines concerning ways of
eliminating the two sides' concerns would be reflected in a joint
statement or communique, that would be published as a result of the
review of the Treaty's operation. Unfortunately, this proved impossible
because of the American side's reluctance to give practical
consideration to the Soviet side's concerns and its desire to reduce
the entire review of the operation of the ABM Treaty to the acceptance
by the Soviet side of the American demand for the dismantling of the
Kranoyarsk radar station, which does not yet exist.
On the basis of the results of the discussion, the American side
published a unilateral statement which gives an unobjective assessment
of the existing situation.
The present statement by the USSR delegation sets forth the facts
that give a true picture of the situation as regards compliance with
the ABM Treaty and the nature of the discussions that took place.
On the question of the radar station under construction in the
Krasnoyarsk region, the Soviet side once again confirmed that this
station is intended for the tracking of space objects and does not come
under the ABM Treaty restrictions. Despite this, the United States
continues to attribute missile attack warning functions to it. These
American claims are based not on facts, but on assumptions, and
subjective evaluations.
In order to show goodwill, and in an attempt to remove the
concern that had arisen on the part of the United States, we expressed
readiness to dismantle the equipment of this station in a way that
would be verifiable and would cause the United States no doubts, if an
accord were reached on compliance with the ABM Treaty in the form in
which it was signed in 1972.
The American side also expressed concern in connection with the
relocation of individual components of radar stations known in the
United States as ``Pawn Shop'' and ``Flat Twin'' from the Sary Shagan
testing range to the Gomel region, which the American side regards,
without foundation, as the start of the deployment of ABM radar
stations.
On the basis of the facts we cited and a visit by U.S. official
representatives to the Gomel region, the American side saw for itself
that in fact the individual components of the ``Flat Twin'' radar
station and the ``Pawn Shop'' van are being used in the region in
question in order to set up measurement testing grounds for the testing
and tuning of mirror antennas that are used widely in the country's
national economy. These operations are in no way contrary to the ABM
Treaty.
At the same time, we stated that in the context of removing the
two sides' concerns over questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty,
the Soviet side would be prepared for a radical solution to the
question of the remaining individual components of the ``Flat Twin''
radar station and the ``Pawn Shop'' van to which the American side
refers.
The American side once again raised the question that the Soviet
Union could be preparing an ABM defense system for its territory. Here,
the assertions cited earlier were enumerated, assertions to which the
Soviet side had supplied the necessary replies. Neither any one of the
questions raised individually nor all of them together provide grounds
for the expression of such concern by the United States.
The Soviet side also submitted a number of constructive proposals
which, in the event of their implementation, would promote the
resolution of other questions raised on both sides, namely:
To draw up an accord to the effect that the sides would
inform each other beforehand about plans for the construction
of large phased-array radar stations and indicate their
purpose.
To agree on features making it possible to distinguish ABM
radar stations from other radar stations.
To draw up procedures for the dismantling or destruction of
ABM radar stations on testing ranges.
To permit Soviet representatives to visit the American radar
station in Greenland and the construction of a launch site for
``balloon rockets'' on Shemya Island, to enable the Soviet
Union to study on the basis of factual material .U.S actions
which, according to the information available, it assesses
either as a violation of the Treaty (the Greenland radar
station) or as a situation causing concern (the Shemya Island
construction site).
Unfortunately, our proposals did not meet with a positive
response from the American side. Contrary to the true state of affairs,
it continues to issue unfounded denials or to claim that it does not
see that serious Soviet concerns exist with regard to U.S. compliance
with Treaty commitments. The American side did not respond to some of
our proposals, and its answers on the other questions cannot be deemed
satisfactory.
Nor did the American side show willingness to take any steps to
rectify the violations of the ABM Treaty which it has conmiitted.
Since 1975, the Soviet side has been expressing concern over the
U.S. deployment of large phased-array radar stations of the ``Pave
Paws'' type on U.S. territory and elsewhere. The essence of our concern
is that these large radar stations have parameters sufficient to carry
out the tasks of ABM radar stations. In conjunction with the radar
station at the Grand Forks base, these stations could provide a radar
base for an ABM defense of US territory, which is incompatible with the
provisions of Article 1 of the ABM Treaty prohibiting the creation of a
base for ABM defense of the country's territory.
Particular concern is caused on the Soviet side by the U.S.
violation of the ABM Treaty in the deployment of a new ``Pave Paws''
large phased-array radar station in Greenland after the Treaty came
into force, and the construction of a similar radar station in Britain.
Under the ABM Treaty, the deployment of large phased-array radar
stations having a potential exceeding 3 million watts is strictly
regulated, taking into account the purpose of such radar stations.
Missile attack warning radar stations with the above characteristics
are permitted to be deployed only on the periphery of the national
territory, oriented outward.
The American large phased-array radar station at Thule
(Greenland) has a potential considerably in excess of 3 million watts.
The Thule region does not constitute a position on the perimeter of
U.S. national territory. The American side itself has indicated that
the radar station at Thule is intended for missile attack warning.
Consequently, the deployment of a large phased-array radar station in
the Thule region is a violation of the ABM Treaty.
The construction that has begun of a similar radar station at
Fylingdales (Britain) is a similar violation.
The Soviet side also expressed other concerns with regard to U.S.
compliance with the provision of the ABM Treaty.
Seeking to find solutions to the specific issues that have
arisen, the Soviet side demonstrated in practice its readiness to
eliminate the two sides' concerns. Naturally, the quest for solutions
should take place on a reciprocal basis and should not distract
attention from the most important thing--the sides' reaffirmation of
their commitment to the objectives and provisions of the ABM Treaty.
Through no fault of ours, it proved impossible to achieve
positive solutions to the questions examined at the talks. However, the
Soviet side believes that joint efforts with the aim of seeking
fundamental solutions could be continued, and we will work toward this.
In particular a mechanism established by the Treaty exists for the
examination of concerns expressed by the sides--the Standing
Consultative Commission. The next session of the Soviet-American
Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva in the fall of this year
should be used specifically for this work, including work in accordance
with instructions that could be given to the Standing Consultative
Commission as a result of the forthcoming meeting between the USSR
Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State.
______
October 1, 1993
JOINT COMMUNIQUE: FOURTH REVIEW OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM)
TREATY
The Fourth Review of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems was conducted in Geneva, Switzerland, from
September 27 to October 1, 1993. The delegations that were present at
the Review, representing the Republic of Belarus, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, exchanged views
on the operation of the Treaty, on rights and obligations under the
Treaty, and on the question of state succession. Commitment to the ABM
Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability
of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains
important. The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to
strengthen the ABM Treaty.
______
PUBLIC LAW 106-38--JULY 22, 1999
113 STAT. 205
Public Law 106-38
106th Congress
An Act
To declare it to be the policy of the United States to deploy a
national missile defense.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``National Missile Defense Act of
1999''.
SEC. 2. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of
appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National
Missile Defense.
SEC. 3. POLICY ON REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES.
It is the policy of the United States to seek continued
negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.
Approved July 22, 1999.
_______________________________________________________________________
legislative history H.R. 4 (S. 257) (S. 269):
house reports: No. 106-39, Pt. 1 (Comm. on Armed Services).
senate reports: No. 106-4 accompanying S. 257 (Comm. on Armed
Services).
congressional record, Vol. 145 (1999):
Mar. 18, considered and passed House.
May 18, considered and passed Senate, amended, in lieu of S.
257
May 20, House concurred in Senate amendment.
weekly compilation of presidential documents, Vol. 35 (1999):
July 23, Presidential statement.
______
For Immediate Release--July 23, 1999
THE WHITE HOUSE
office of the press secretary
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
I have signed into law H.R. 4, the ``National Missile Defense Act
of 1999.'' My Administration is committed to addressing the growing
danger that rogue nations may develop and field long-range missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction against the United
States and our allies.
Section 2 of this Act states that it is the policy of the United
States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective
National Missile Defense (NMD) system with funding subject to the
annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of
funds for NMD. By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to
the authorization and appropriations process, the legislation makes
clear that no decision on deployment has been made. This
interpretation, which is confirmed by the legislative record taken as a
whole, is also required to avoid any possible impairment of my
constitutional authorities.
Section 3 of the Act states that it is the policy of the United
States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear
forces. Thus, section 3 puts the Congress on record as continuing to
support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, reaffirming my
Administration's position that our missile defense policy must take
into account our arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives.
Next year, we will, for the first time, determine whether to
deploy a limited National Missile Defense, when we review the results
of flight tests and other developmental efforts, consider cost
estimates, and evaluate the threat. Any NMD system we deploy must be
operationally effective, cost-effective, and enhance our security. In
making our determination, we will also review progress in achieving our
arms control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the
ABM treaty that may be required to accommodate a possible NMD
deployment.
______
Statement of Senator Thad Cochran on the Statement of the President of
the United States on Signing Public Law 106-38
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT (Senate--July 26, 1999)
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, this morning I noticed in the
Washington Times newspaper that President Clinton has signed the bill
we authored here in the Senate, the National Missile Defense Act. This
is very important legislation which the Senate passed after a lot of
debate. The House and the Senate then reconciled differences between
the House-passed measure and the Senate bill and sent the bill to the
President.
The President made a statement in connection with his signing the
bill which raises some questions that I thought should be addressed by
a comment this morning. After talking about the fact that he is signing
the bill to address the growing danger that rogue nations may develop
and field long-range missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction against the United States and our allies, he then has this
to say in his message. He is referring to the fact that authorization
and appropriations measures will be a part of the process in terms of
when and how and to what extent the funding is available for national
missile defense.
This interpretation, which is confirmed by the legislative
record taken as a whole, is also required to avoid a possible
impairment of my constitutional authorities.
The President is suggesting that the bill doesn't mean what it
says. I think that has to be brought to the attention of the Senate.
The bill is very clear. It provides that it is the policy of the United
States, upon enactment of this law, to deploy a national missile
defense system as soon as technologically possible. That is
unequivocal. It does not say ``but if.'' It is a change in policy of
our Government. It has passed both Houses by a large majority, and now
the President has signed the statute.
It seems to me the President is trying to reinterpret the bill to
justify changing his position on this issue. He signed the bill; he
didn't veto it. This is not a veto message. He could have vetoed the
bill, if he disagreed with the terms, and given Congress an opportunity
to review that veto message and override the veto or sustain it, as the
Congress' will dictates.
I point this out to suggest that it is clear we have changed our
policy, irrespective of the President's qualms about the new policy,
and we now are committed as a nation to deploy a national missile
defense system. We will do so in the orderly course of authorization
and appropriation bills that we pass, as required. We have an annual
appropriations bill funding all of the activities of the Department of
Defense. But it is clear that one of those activities will be the
continued research, development, and deployment of a national missile
defense system.
I think it is very timely to point this out because the Prime
Minister of Russia is coming to the United States. There will be talks
this week with the President.
I am hopeful, and I urge the President to be honest with the
Russian leadership about the need to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty because the first part of that treaty says that neither
signatory will deploy a missile defense system to protect the territory
of its nation. But we have just changed the law of the United States to
say that is our intention. We are committed to deploying a missile
defense system that will protect the territory of the United States.
So, insofar as that is inconsistent with the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, the treaty needs to be changed, and our President should say
that to the Prime Minister of Russia unequivocally--not we ``may''
change our mind when it comes time to authorize a deployment or to fund
a deployment.
The decision has been made to deploy a system, and when technology
permits us to deploy an effective missile defense system under the
terms of this act, we are going to do it irrespective of the provisions
of that treaty. So we must change the treaty. And we want to assure the
Russians that we are not targeting them. We are not trying to create a
new era of tension or competition or to make this a more dangerous
relationship--just the opposite; we want to be aboveboard, candid, and
honest with the Russians.
______
Report of the
COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pursuant to Public Law 201--104th Congress
July 15, 1998
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States,
Washington, DC, July 15, 1998.
The Honorable Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: In accordance with section 1323 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201), we
hereby submit the report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States.
The Commission was established to ``assess the nature and magnitude
of the existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United
States'' and to ``submit to the Congress a report on its findings and
conclusions.''
The Commission's report is unanimous.
It has been an honor to serve.
Respectfully submitted,
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman
Barry M. Blechman
G. Lee Butler
Richard L. Garwin
William R. Graham
William Schneider, Jr.
Larry D. Welch
Paul D. Wolfowitz
R. James Woolsey
[Copies to:]
The Honorable Trent Lott,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
The Honorable Tom Daschle,
Minority Leader,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
The Honorable Richard A. Gephardt,
Minority Leader,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Enclosure.
Members of The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States
were nominated by the
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Majority Leader of
the U.S. Senate and the Minority Leaders of the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman
Dr. Barry M. Blechman
General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Dr. Richard L. Garwin
Dr. William R. Graham
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.
General Larry D. Welch, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz
The Honorable R. James Woolsey
and appointed by the
Director of Central Intelligence
I. Charter and Organization
a. statutory charter of the commission
The Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States was established pursuant to Public Law 104-201, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Section 1321.
The mandate of the Commission was as follows:
``The Commission shall assess the nature and magnitude of the
existing and emerging ballistic missile threat to the United
States. In carrying out its duties, the Commission should
receive the full and timely cooperation of the Secretary of
Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and any other
United States Government official responsible for providing the
Commission with analyses, briefings and other information
necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. The
Commission shall, not later than six months after the date of
its first meeting, submit to the Congress a report on its
findings and conclusions.''
The Commission examined the ballistic missile threat posed to the
50 states. Our assessment included threats posed by ballistic missiles:
Deployed on the territory of a potentially hostile state.
Launched from a surface vessel or submarine operating off
the coasts of the U.S. or from an aircraft.
Deployed by a potentially hostile nation on the territory of
a third party to reduce the range required of its ballistic
missiles to strike the United States.
The Commission examined the potential of both existing and emerging
powers to arm ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction. The
examination included the domestic design, development and production of
nuclear material and nuclear weapons as well as the potential for
states to acquire--through clandestine or covert sale, transfer or
theft--either technology; material or weapons. The Commission examined
biological and chemical weapons programs of the ballistic missile
powers, as well as the potential means for delivering such agents by
ballistic missiles.
The Commission reviewed U.S. collection and analysis capabilities
to gain an appreciation for the capability of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, today and into the future, to warn of the ballistic missile
threat.
The Commission did not examine in detail the threat posed to U.S.
territories or possessions or to U.S. forward-deployed forces, allies
and friends. Nevertheless, a short discussion of the threat to U.S.
forward deployed forces, allies and friends is presented. The
Commission did not assess the cruise missile threat. A detailed
examination would have taken it beyond its charter. However, the
Commission is of the view that cruise missiles have a number of
characteristics which could be seen as increasingly valuable in
fulfilling the aspirations of emerging ballistic missile states. The
Commission did not address in detail the impact of ballistic missile
threats on U.S. military strategy and doctrine, but noted the
difficulty the U.S had in dealing with Iraqi missiles during the
Persian Gulf War. A brief discussion is presented of the possible
impact of the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem on the ballistic missile threat.
A brief discussion is also presented of the relationship of ballistic
missile threats to the ongoing revolution in military affairs.
The Commission was not asked to address the policy issues on which
its assessment would bear. Responses to the threat as assessed by the
Commission are matters of considerable public interest. Debate and
agreement on the appropriate responses to the ballistic missile threat
are needed. The Commission hopes that the following assessment will be
helpful in that regard.
b. organization of the report
This is an unclassified Executive Summary of the classified Report
of the Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States, which runs to more than 300 pages, including text and graphics.
The full Report is accompanied by two classified appendices and one
unclassified appendix (the table of contents of Appendix III is listed
in Attachment 2).
The full Report includes discussions of a number of additional
states, such as Libya and Syria, which are not included in this
Executive Summary. The full Report includes as well a discussion of the
full range of supplier states, particularly Western powers, including
the United States.
II. Executive Summary
a. conclusions of the commissioners
The nine Commissioners are unanimous in concluding that:
Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially
hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological
or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States,
its deployed forces and its friends and allies. These newer,
developing threats in North Korea, Iran and Iraq are in
addition to those still posed by the existing ballistic missile
arsenals of Russia and China, nations with which the United
States is not now in conflict but which remain in uncertain
transitions. The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations'
capabilities will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy
or reliability. However, they would be able to inflict major
destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision
to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq).
During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that
such a decision had been made.
The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities
is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been
reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence
Community.
The Intelligence Community's ability to provide timely and
accurate estimates of ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is
eroding. This erosion has roots both within and beyond the
intelligence process itself. The Community's capabilities in
this area need to be strengthened in terms of both resources
and methodology.
The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening
ballistic missile deployments are being reduced. Under some
plausible scenarios--including re-basing or transfer of
operational missiles, sea- and air-launch options, shortened
development programs that might include testing in a third
country, or some combination of these--the U.S. might well have
little or no warning before operational deployment.
Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices
and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of
deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the
reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning.
b. the commission and its methods
The Commissioners brought to their task the perspectives of former
senior policymakers from outside the Intelligence Community who have
decades of experience and a variety of views as users of the
Intelligence Community's products. We shared an informed understanding
of intelligence processes. In making our assessment, we took into
account not only the hard data available, but also the often
significant gaps in that data. We had access to both data and experts
drawn from the full array of departments and agencies as well as from
sources throughout the Intelligence Community. We also drew on experts
from outside that Community and on studies sponsored by the Commission.
Our aim was to ensure that we were exposed to a wide range of opinion
and to the greatest possible depth and breadth of analysis.
We began this study with different views about how to respond to
ballistic missile threats, and we continue to have differences.
Nevertheless, as a result of our intensive study over the last six
months we are unanimous in our assessment of the threat, an assessment
which differs from published intelligence estimates.
This divergence between the Commission's findings and authoritative
estimates by the Intelligence Community stems primarily from our use of
a somewhat more comprehensive methodology in assessing ballistic
missile development and deployment programs. We believe that our
approach takes more fully into account three crucial factors now
shaping new ballistic missile threats to the United States:
Newer ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) development programs no longer follow the patterns
initially set by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These programs
require neither high standards of missile accuracy, reliability
and safety nor large numbers of missiles and therefore can move
ahead more rapidly.
A nation that wants to develop ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction can now obtain extensive technical
assistance from outside sources. Foreign assistance is not a
wild card. It is a fact.
Nations are increasingly able to conceal important elements
of their ballistic missile and associated WMD programs and are
highly motivated to do so.
c. new threats in a transformed security environment
The Commission did not assess nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons programs on a global basis. We considered those countries about
which we felt particular reason to be concerned and examined their
capabilities to acquire ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction.
All of the nations whose programs we examined that are developing
long-range ballistic missiles have the option to arm these, as well as
their shorter range systems, with biological or chemical weapons. These
weapons can take the form of bomblets as well as a single, large
warhead.
The knowledge needed to design and build a nuclear weapon is now
widespread. The emerging ballistic missile powers have access to, or
are pursuing the acquisition of, the needed fissile material both
through domestic efforts and foreign channels.
As our work went forward, it became increasingly clear to us that
nations about which the U.S. has reason to be concerned are exploiting
a dramatically transformed international security environment. That
environment provides an ever-widening access to technology, information
and expertise that can be and is used to speed both the development and
deployment of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It
can also be used to develop denial and deception techniques that seek
to impede U.S. intelligence gathering about the development and
deployment programs of those nations.
1. Geopolitical Change and Role for Ballistic Missiles
A number of countries with regional ambitions do not welcome the
U.S. role as a stabilizing power in their regions and have not accepted
it passively. Because of their ambitions, they want to place restraints
on the U.S. capability to project power or influence into their
regions. They see the acquisition of missile and WMD technology as a
way of doing so.
Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical environment and the
roles of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction have both
evolved. Ballistic missiles provide a cost-effective delivery system
that can be used for both conventional and non-conventional weapons.
For those seeking to thwart the projection of U.S. power, the
capability to combine ballistic missiles with weapons of mass
destruction provides a strategic counter to U.S. conventional and
information-based military superiority. With such weapons, these
nations can pose a serious threat to the United States, to its forward-
based forces and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies.
Whether short- or long-range, a successfully launched ballistic
missile has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target
compared to other means of delivery. Emerging powers therefore see
ballistic missiles as highly effective deterrent weapons and as an
effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the
United States.
2. Russia
With regard to Russia, the principal cloud over the future is
lingering political uncertainty. Despite enormous changes since the
break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia is in an uncertain, in some ways
precarious, transition. It may succeed in establishing a stable
democracy allied with the West in maintaining peace and extending
freedom. Or it may not. Or it might be torn by internal struggles for
an extended period. In its present situation, accurate U.S.
intelligence estimates are difficult to make.
Russia continues to pose a ballistic missile threat to the United
States, although of a different character than in the past. The number
of missiles in its inventory is likely to decline further compared with
Cold War levels in that large numbers of Soviet strategic missiles
deployed in the 1970s and 1980s are scheduled to be retired. Still,
Russian ballistic missile forces continue to be modernized and
improved, although the pace of modernization has been slowed from
planned schedules by economic constraints. The Russian ballistic
missile early warning system and nuclear command and control (C2)
system have also been affected by aging and delays in planned
modernization. In the context of a crisis growing out of civil strife,
present early warning and C2 weaknesses could pose a risk of
unauthorized or inadvertent launch of missiles against the United
States.\1\
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\1\ An unauthorized launch is one that has not received the
required authorizations from senior political leaders and that might be
conducted by elements within the General Staff or subordinate
commanders. An inadvertent launch is one resulting from a mistaken
assessment of sensor data, including from ballistic missile early
warning systems, or a misinterpretation of the strategic situation or
some combination of the two, especially in times of crisis generated
either by domestic or international events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the Cold War ended, the likelihood of a deliberate missile
attack on the U.S. from Russia has been greatly lessened but not
entirely eliminated. However, Russia's leaders issued a new national
security policy in 1993 that places greater reliance on nuclear
deterrence, very likely in response to Russia's economic difficulties
and decline in its conventional military capabilities. At the same
time, the risk of an accident or of a loss of control over Russian
ballistic missile forces--a risk which now appears small--could
increase sharply and with little warning if the political situation in
Russia were to deteriorate.
Also, quite apart from these risks, Russia poses a threat to the
U.S. as a major exporter of enabling technologies, including ballistic
missile technologies, to countries hostile to the United States. In
particular, Russian assistance has greatly accelerated Iran's ballistic
missile program.
3. China
As in the case of Russia, China's future is clouded by a range of
uncertainties. China, too, is going through a transition, but one which
has been going on for 20 years. The improvement in Sino-U.S. relations,
interrupted in 1989, has resumed. Although the U.S. and China are
developing a more cooperative relationship, significant potential
conflicts remain, and China is less constrained today by fear of Russia
than it once was by fear of the Soviet Union. Taiwan is an obvious
potential flashpoint. Other flashpoints could arise as China pursues
its drive for greater influence in Asia and the Western Pacific. Even
now China has conflicts with several of its neighbors, some of which
could involve the U.S. in a confrontation.
China is modernizing its long-range missiles and nuclear weapons in
ways that will make it a more threatening power in the event of a
crisis. China's 1995-96 missile firings in the Taiwan Strait, aimed at
intimidating Taiwan in the lead-up to its presidential election,
provoked a sharp confrontation with the United States. For example, a
pointed question was posed by Lt. Gen. Xiong Guang Kai, a frequent
spokesman for Chinese policy, about U.S. willingness to trade Los
Angeles for Taipei. This comment seemed designed to link China's
ballistic missile capabilities with its regional priorities.
China also poses a threat to the U.S. as a significant proliferator
of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling
technologies. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid-
fueled ballistic missile program. It has supplied Pakistan with a
design for a nuclear weapon and additional nuclear weapons assistance.
It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi
Arabia (the 3,100-km-range CSS-2) and Pakistan (the 350-km-range M-11).
The behavior thus far of Russia and China makes it appear unlikely,
albeit for different reasons--strategic, political, economic or some
combination of all three--that either government will soon effectively
reduce its country's sizable transfer of critical technologies, experts
or expertise to the emerging ballistic missile powers.
4. Countries With Scud-Based Missile Infrastructures
The basis of most missile developments by emerging ballistic
missile powers is the Soviet Scud missile and its derivatives. The Scud
is derived from the World War II-era German V-2 rocket. With the
external help now readily available, a nation with a well-developed,
Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure would be able to achieve
first flight of a long-range missile, up to and including
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) range,\2\ within about five
years of deciding to do so. During several of those years the U.S.
might not be aware that such a decision had been made. Early production
models would probably be limited in number. They would be unlikely to
meet U.S. standards of safety, accuracy and reliability. But the
purposes of these nations would not require such standards. A larger
force armed with scores of missiles and warheads and meeting higher
operational standards would take somewhat longer to test, produce and
deploy. But meanwhile, even a few of the simpler missiles could be
highly effective for the purposes of those countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ An ICBM has a range greater than 5,500 km.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The extraordinary level of resources North Korea and Iran are now
devoting to developing their own ballistic missile capabilities poses a
substantial and immediate danger to the U.S., its vital interests and
its allies. While these nations' missile programs may presently be
aimed primarily at regional adversaries, they inevitably and
inescapably engage the vital interests of the U.S. as well. Their
targeted adversaries include key U.S. friends and allies. U.S. deployed
forces are already at risk from these nations' growing arsenals. Each
of these nations places a high priority on threatening U.S. territory,
and each is even now pursuing advanced ballistic missile capabilities
to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory.
a. North Korea
There is evidence that North Korea is working hard on the Taepo
Dong 2 (TD-2) ballistic missile. The status of the system's development
cannot be determined precisely. Nevertheless, the ballistic missile
test infrastructure in North Korea is well developed. Once the system
is assessed to be ready, a test flight could be conducted within six
months of a decision to do so. If North Korea judged the test to be a
success, the TD-2 could be deployed rapidly. It is unlikely the U.S.
would know of such a decision much before the missile was launched.
This missile could reach major cities and military bases in Alaska and
the smaller, westernmost islands in the Hawaiian chain. Light-weight
variations of the TD-2 could fly as far as 10,000 km, placing at risk
western U.S. territory in an arc extending northwest from Phoenix,
Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin. These variants of the TD-2 would
require additional time to develop and would likely require an
additional flight test.
North Korea has developed and deployed the No Dong, a medium-range
ballistic missile \3\ (MRBM) using a scaled-up Scud engine, which is
capable of flying 1,300 km. With this missile, North Korea can threaten
Japan, South Korea and U.S. bases in the vicinity of North Korea. North
Korea has reportedly tested the No Dong only once, in 1993. The
Commission judges that the No Dong was operationally deployed long
before the U.S. Government recognized that fact. There is ample
evidence that North Korea has created a sizable missile production
infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerable
numbers of No Dongs have been produced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ An MRBM has a range of 1,000 to 3,000 km.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the considerable difficulties the Intelligence
Community encountered in assessing the pace and scope of the No Dong
missile program, the U.S. may have very little warning prior to the
deployment of the Taepo Dong 2.
North Korea maintains an active WMD program, including a nuclear
weapon program. It is known that North Korea diverted material in the
late 1980s for at least one or possibly two weapons. North Korea's
ongoing nuclear program activity raises the possibility that it could
produce additional nuclear weapons. North Korea also possesses
biological weapons production and dispensing technology, including the
capability to deploy chemical or biological warheads on missiles.
North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and
potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major
proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses--
missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs)
and underground facility expertise--to other countries of missile
proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and
others.
b. Iran
Iran is placing extraordinary emphasis on its ballistic missile and
WMD development programs. The ballistic missile infrastructure in Iran
is now more sophisticated than that of North Korea, and has benefited
from broad, essential, long-term assistance from Russia and important
assistance from China as well. Iran is making very rapid progress in
developing the Shahab 3 MRBM, which like the North Korean No Dong has a
range of 1,300 km. This missile may be flight tested at any time and
deployed soon thereafter.
The Commission judges that Iran now has the technical capability
and resources to demonstrate an ICBM-range ballistic missile, similar
to the TD-2 (based on scaled-up Scud technology), within five years of
a decision to proceed--whether that decision has already been made or
is yet to be made.
In addition to this Scud-based long-range ballistic missile
program, Iran has acquired and is seeking major, advanced missile
components that can be combined to produce ballistic missiles with
sufficient range to strike the United States. For example, Iran is
reported to have acquired engines or engine designs for the RD-214
engine, which powered the Soviet SS-4 MRBM and served as the first
stage of the SL-7 space-launch vehicle. Iran is known to have an
interest in even more advanced engines. A 10,000 km-range Iranian
missile could hold the U.S. at risk in an arc extending northeast of a
line from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to St. Paul, Minnesota.
Iran has also developed a solid-fueled rocket infrastructure; it
already produces short-range solid-fueled rockets. It is seeking long-
range missile technology from outside sources, purportedly for a space-
launch vehicle. Both contribute directly to Iran's ballistic missile
technology base. Iran is known to rely heavily on imports of missile
technology from foreign sources, particularly Russia and North Korea.
These imports have allowed Iran's missile programs to proceed swiftly,
and they can be incorporated into Iran's domestic infrastructure as
well.
Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction. It has a nuclear
energy and weapons program which aims to design, develop and, as soon
as possible, produce nuclear weapons. The Commission judges that the
only issue as to whether or not Iran may soon have or already has a
nuclear weapon is the amount of fissile material available to it.
Because of significant gaps in our knowledge, the U.S. is unlikely to
know whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons until after the fact. While
Iran's civil nuclear program is currently under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, it could be used as a source of
sufficient fissile material to construct a small number of weapons
within the next 10 years if Iran were willing to violate safeguards. If
Iran were to accumulate enough fissile material from foreign sources,
it might be able to develop a nuclear weapon in only one to three
years. Iran also has an active chemical weapon development and
production program and is conducting research into biological weapons.
c. Iraq
Iraq has maintained the skills and industrial capabilities needed
to reconstitute its long-range ballistic missile program. Its plant and
equipment are less developed than those of North Korea or Iran as a
result of actions forced by United Nations (U.N.) Resolutions and
monitoring. However, Iraq has actively continued work on short-range
(under 150 km) liquid- and solid-fueled missiles, programs allowed by
the U.N. Resolutions. Once U.N.-imposed controls are lifted, Iraq could
mount a determined effort to acquire needed plant and equipment,
whether directly or indirectly. Such an effort would allow Iraq to pose
an ICBM threat to the United States within 10 years. Iraq could develop
a shorter range, covert, ship-launched missile threat that could
threaten the United States in a very short time.
Iraq had a large, intense ballistic missile development and
production program prior to the Gulf War. The Iraqis produced Scuds and
then modified Scud missiles to produce the 600-km-range Al Hussein and
900-km-range Al Abbas missiles. The expertise, as well as some of the
equipment and materials from this program remain in Iraq and provide a
strong foundation for a revived ballistic missile program.
Prior to the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq could have had
nuclear weapons in the 1993-1995 time frame, although it still had
technical hurdles to overcome. After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq began
a crash program to produce a nuclear device in six to nine months based
on highly enriched uranium removed from the safeguarded reactor at
Tuwaitha. Iraq has the capability to reconstitute its nuclear weapon
program; the speed at which it can do so depends on the availability of
fissile material. It would take several years to build the required
production facilities from scratch. It is possible that Iraq has hidden
some material from U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspection or that
it could acquire fissile material abroad (from another ``rogue'' state,
for example). Iraq also had large chemical and biological weapons
programs prior to the war and produced chemical and biological warheads
for its missiles. Knowledge, personnel and equipment related to WMD
remain in Iraq so that it could reconstitute these programs rapidly
following the end of sanctions.
5. India
India is developing a number of ballistic missiles from short-range
to those with ICBM-class capabilities, along with a submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) and a short-range, surface ship-launched
system. India has the infrastructure to develop and produce these
missiles. It is aggressively seeking technology from other states,
particularly Russia. While it develops its long-range ballistic
missiles, India's space-launch vehicles provide an option for an
interim ICBM capability. India has detonated several nuclear devices,
and it is clear that it is developing warheads for its missile systems.
India has biological and chemical weapons programs. Since the Pakistani
nuclear tests, India has announced its intention to increase its
spending on missiles and nuclear weapons.
India's program to develop ballistic missiles began in 1983 and
grew out of its space-launch program, which was based on Scout rocket
technology acquired from the United States. India currently has
developed and deployed the Prithvi short-range ballistic missile \4\
(SRBM), and is developing longer range, liquid- and solid-fueled
missiles. They include the Prithui II SRBM, the Agni, Agni-Plus and
Agni-B intermediate-range ballistic missiles \5\ (IRBMs), a sea-
launched ballistic missile and an SLBM, the Sagarika.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ An SRBM has a range of less than 1,000 km.
\5\ An IRBM has a range of 3,000 to 5,500 km.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, conducted a test series
in May 1998, and it is clear that it is developing warheads for its
missile systems. Indian leaders recently declared that India has
developed nuclear weapons for deployment on the Prithui SRBM and the
Agni Plus MRBM.
India his acquired and continues to seek Russian, U.S. and Western
European technology for its missile programs. Technology and expertise
acquired from other states, particularly from Russia, are helping India
to accelerate the development and increase the sophistication of its
missile systems. For example, Russian assistance is critical to the
development of the Indian SLBM and its related submarine. But India is
rapidly enhancing its own missile science and technology base as well.
Many Indian nationals are educated and work in the U.S., Europe and
other advanced nations; some of the knowledge thereby acquired returns
to the Indian missile program. While India continues to benefit from
foreign technology and expertise, its programs and industrial base are
now sufficiently advanced that supplier control regimes can affect only
the rate of acceleration in India's programs. India is in a position to
supply material and technical assistance to others.
6. Pakistan
Pakistan's ballistic missile infrastructure is now more advanced
than that of North Korea. It will support development of a missile of
2,500-km range, which we believe Pakistan will seek in order to put all
of India within range of Pakistani missiles. The development of a
2,500-km missile will give Pakistan the technical base for developing a
much longer range missile system. Through foreign acquisition, and
beginning without an extensive domestic science and technology base,
Pakistan has acquired these missile capabilities quite rapidly. China
and North Korea are Pakistan's major sources of ballistic missiles,
production facilities and technology.
Pakistan currently possesses nuclear-capable M-11 SRBMs acquired
from China, and it may produce its own missile, the Tarmuk, based on
the M-11. In 1998, Pakistan tested and deployed the 1,300-km-Ghauri
MRBM, a version of the North Korean No Dong, and the Commission
believes Pakistan has acquired production facilities for this missile
as well.
Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons that employ highly-enriched
uranium and conducted its first nuclear weapon test series in May 1998.
A new Pakistani nuclear reactor has been completed that could be used
for the production of plutonium. In addition to its nuclear weapons,
Pakistan has biological and chemical weapons programs. Chinese
assistance has been crucial to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
India and Pakistan are not hostile to the United States. The
prospect of U.S. military confrontation with either seems at present to
be slight. However, beyond the possibility of nuclear war on the
subcontinent, their aggressive, competitive development of ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses three concerns in
particular. First, it enables them to supply relevant technologies to
other nations. Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical
assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers--
India from Russia, Pakistan from North Korea and China--because of the
threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties
about China, combined with their mounting international isolation.
Third, their growing missile and WMD capabilities have direct effects
on U.S. policies, both regional and global, and could significantly
affect U.S. capability to play a stabilizing role in Asia.
d. a new non-proliferation environment
Since the end of the Cold War a number of developments have made
ballistic missile and WMD technologies increasingly available. They
include:
A number of nations have chosen not to join non-
proliferation agreements.
Some participants in those agreements have cheated.
As global trade has steadily expanded, access has increased
to the information, technology and technicians needed for
missile and WMD development.
Access to technologies used in early generations of U.S. and
Soviet missiles has eased. However rudimentary compared to
present U.S. standards, these technologies serve the needs of
emerging ballistic missile powers.
Among those countries of concern to the U.S., commerce in
ballistic missile and WMD technology and hardware has been
growing, which may make proliferation self-sustaining among
them and facilitate their ability to proliferate technology and
hardware to others.
Some countries which could have readily acquired nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles--such as Germany, Japan and South Korea--have
been successfully encouraged not to do so by U.S. security guarantees
and by non-proliferation agreements. Even though they lack such
security guarantees, other countries have also joined nonproliferation
agreements and abandoned development programs and weapons systems. Some
examples are Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and the former Soviet
republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
1. Increased Competence of and Trade Among Emerging Ballistic Missile
Powers
Conversely, there are other countries--some of which are themselves
parties to various non-proliferation agreements and treaties--that
either have acquired ballistic missile or WMD capabilities or are
working hard to do so. North Korea, Iran and Iraq, as well as India and
Pakistan, are at the forefront of this group. They now have increased
incentives to cooperate with one another. They have extensive access to
technology, information and expertise from developed countries such as
Russia and China. They also have access through commercial and other
channels in the West, including the United States. Through this trade
and their own indigenous efforts, these second-tier powers are on the
verge of being able to provide to one another, if they have not already
done so, the capabilities needed to develop long-range ballistic
missiles.
2. U.S. as a Contributor to Proliferation
The U.S. is the world's leading developer and user of advanced
technology. Once it is transferred by the U.S. or by another developed
country; there is no way to ensure that the transferred technology will
not be used for hostile purposes. The U.S. tries to limit technology
transfers to hostile powers, but history teaches that such transfers
cannot be stopped for long periods. They can only be slowed and made
more costly, and even that requires the cooperation of other developed
nations. The acquisition and use of transferred technologies in
ballistic missile and WMD programs has been facilitated by foreign
student training in the U.S., by wide dissemination of technical
information, by the illegal acquisition of U.S. designs and equipment
and by the relaxation of U.S. export control policies. As a result, the
U.S. has been and is today a major, albeit unintentional, contributor
to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated weapons of
mass destruction.
3. Motives of Countries of Concern
Recent ballistic missile and nuclear tests in South Asia should not
be viewed as merely a sharp but temporary setback in the expanding
reach of non-proliferation regimes. While policymakers may try to
reverse or at least contain the trends of which these tests are a part,
the missile and WMD programs of these nations are clearly the results
of fundamental political calculations of their vital interests. Those
nations willing and able to supply dangerous technologies and systems
to one another, including Russia, China and their quasi-governmental
commercial entities, may be motivated by commercial, foreign policy or
national security interests or by a combination thereof. As noted, such
countries are increasingly cooperating with one another, perhaps in
some instances because they have reciprocal needs for what one has and
the other lacks. The transfer of complete missile systems, such as
China's transfer to Saudi Arabia, will continue to be available. Short
of radical political change, there is every reason to assume that the
nations engaged in these missile and WMD development activities will
continue their programs as matters of high priority.
4. Readier Market Access to Technology
In today's increasingly market-driven, global economy, nations so
motivated have faster, cheaper and more efficient access to modern
technology. Commercial exchanges and technology transfers have
multiplied the pathways to those technologies needed for ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These pathways reduce
development times and costs, lowering both technical and budget
obstacles to missile development and deployment.
Expanding world trade and the explosion in information technology
have accelerated the global diffusion of scientific, technical and
industrial information. The channels--both public and private, legal
and illegal--through which technology; components and individual
technicians can be moved among nations have increased exponentially.
5. Availability of Classified Information and Export-Controlled
Technology
Trends in the commercial sector of a market-driven, global economy
have been accompanied, and in many ways accelerated, by an increased
availability of classified information as a result of:
Lax enforcement of export controls.
Relaxation of U.S. and Western export controls.
Growth in dual-use technologies.
Economic incentives to sell ballistic missile components and
systems.
Extensive declassification of materials related to ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
Continued, intense espionage facilitated by security
measures increasingly inadequate for the new environment.
Extensive disclosure of classified information, including
information compromising intelligence sources and methods.
Damaging information appears almost daily in the national and
international media and on the Internet.
e. alternative ballistic missile launch modes
In evaluating present threats, it is misleading to use old patterns
of development as guides. The history of U.S. and Soviet missile and
WMD development has become irrelevant. Approaches that the U.S.
considered and specifically rejected on grounds of safety, reliability,
accuracy and requirements for high volume production are in many cases
well-suited to nations less concerned about safety and able to meet
their needs with only a few, less accurate, less reliable weapons.
Analytical approaches the Intelligence Community could realistically
rely on in the past need to be restudied and reevaluated in light of
this newer model.
The Commission believes the U.S. needs to pay attention to the
possibility that complete, long-range ballistic missile systems could
be transferred from one nation to another, just as China transferred
operational CSS-2s to Saudi Arabia in 1988. Such missiles could be
equipped with weapons of mass destruction.
One nation's use of another nation's territory also needs to be
considered. The U.S. did this during the Cold War and the Soviet Union
tried to do it in Cuba in the early 1960s. For example, if Iran were to
deploy ballistic missiles in Libya, it could reduce the range required
to threaten the U.S. as well as Europe. Given the existing patterns of
cooperation the Commission has already seen, both testing by one
country on the territory of another and deriving data from other-
country tests are also distinct possibilities.
Sea launch of shorter range ballistic missiles is another
possibility. This could enable a country to pose a direct territorial
threat to the U.S. sooner than it could by waiting to develop an ICBM
for launch from its own territory. Sea launching could also permit it
to target a larger area of the U.S. than would a missile fired from its
home territory. India is working on a sea launch capability. Air launch
is another possible mode of delivering a shorter range missile to U.S.
territory.
The key importance of these approaches is that each would
significantly shorten the warning time of deployment available to the
United States.
f. erosion of warning
Precise forecasts of the growth in ballistic missile capabilities
over the next two decades--tests by year, production rates, weapons
deployed by year, weapon characteristics by system type and circular
error probable (CEP)--cannot be provided with confidence. Deception and
denial efforts are intense and often successful, and U.S. collection
and analysis assets are limited. Together they create a high risk of
continued surprise.
The question is not simply whether the U.S. will have warning of an
emerging capability, but whether the nature and magnitude of a
particular threat will be perceived with sufficient clarity in time to
take appropriate action.
Concealment, denial and deception efforts by key target countries
are intended to delay the discovery of strategically significant
activities until well after they had been carried out successfully. The
fact that some of these secret activities are discovered over time is
to the credit of the U.S. Intelligence Community. However, the fact
that there are delays in discovery of those activities provides a sharp
warning that a great deal of activity goes undetected.
Both technical and human intelligence are inherently more difficult
to collect in those countries where the U.S. has limited access, which
include most of the ballistic missile countries of concern. The U.S. is
not able to predict and anticipate with confidence the behavior and
actions of emerging ballistic missile powers and their related
political decision-making.
Their ballistic missile programs often do not follow a single,
known pattern or model, and they use unexpected development patterns.
These are not models of development the U.S. follows or that
intelligence analysts expect to see. For example, Pakistan's test
launch in April 1998 of its Ghauri MRBM--its version of the North
Korean No Dong--could not be predicted on the basis of any known
pattern of technical development either for MRBMs generally or Pakistan
in particular. Similarly, North Korea's decision to deploy the No Dong
after what is believed to be a single successful test flight is another
example. Based on U.S. and Russian experience, the Intelligence
Community had expected that a regular test series would be required to
provide the confidence needed before any country would produce and
deploy a ballistic missile system. Yet North Korea deployed the No
Dong.
The Commission believes that the technical means of collection now
employed will not meet emerging requirements, and considerable
uncertainty persists whether planned collection and analysis systems
will do so.
g. methodology
In analyzing the ballistic missile threat, the Commission used an
expanded methodology. We used it as a complement to the traditional
analysis in which a country's known program status is used to establish
estimates of its current missile capabilities. We believe this expanded
approach provides insights into emerging threats that the prevailing
approaches used by the Intelligence Community may not bring to the
surface.
To guide our assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the
United States, we posed three questions:
What is known about the ballistic missile threat, including
the domestic infrastructure of a ballistic missile power; the
efforts of a power to acquire foreign technology, materials and
expertise; and the scale, pace and progress of its programs?
What is not known about the threat in each of those three
categories?
Can a power intent on posing a ballistic missile threat to
any part of the United States, including the use of but not
limited to ICBM-range missiles, use the open market, the black
market and/or espionage to secure the needed technology and
expertise and then carry out its program in ways that will
minimize the interval between the time the U.S. becomes aware
of the threat and the fielding of that capability?
In seeking answers to these questions, we familiarized ourselves
with the current state of knowledge as well as the depth of analytic
capability within the Intelligence Community related to ballistic
missile and WMD threats. The Commission used its broad access to
individuals, special compartmented intelligence and special access
programs. We consulted with experts in the broader government and
private analytic and policy communities. We reviewed the strengths,
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of current and planned human and
technical collection efforts and capabilities, especially in light of
the increasingly sophisticated means and methods available to target
countries to hide from U.S. intelligence collection. We reviewed with
scientists, engineers and program managers from the public and private
sectors the technical issues associated with the design, development
and testing of ballistic missiles and the means and methods available
to the emerging ballistic missile powers to meet the challenges
associated with long-range ballistic missile development and testing.
The Commission analyzed the available information in order to
develop an understanding of the threat from three perspectives:
We examined the known size and quality of the deployed
forces, the doctrine and the command and control systems that
govern the forces and the availability of weapons of mass
destruction to arm the forces. We reviewed the infrastructure
supporting the programs and the extent of past and present
foreign assistance available to those programs from Russia,
China and other countries, including the West.
We examined the ways in which the programs of emerging
ballistic missile powers compared with one another. For
example, we traced the development histories of the related
programs of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan and the
relationships among them. This comparison helped in identifying
the similarities between programs, the extent to which each had
aided one another in overcoming critical development hurdles
and, importantly, the pace at which a determined country can
progress in its program development.
We reviewed the resources (``inputs'') available and the
ways in which they provide indicators of the prospects for
successful missile development.
By integrating these perspectives, we were able to partially bridge
a significant number of intelligence gaps. Emphasizing inputs makes two
important contributions to the analysis. Inputs include domestic
opportunity costs, the foreign technology and expertise sought and
obtained, the urgency with which facilities are constructed both above
and below ground and the willingness to absorb cost and time penalties
in order to hide activities from detection by U.S. intelligence.
Attention to inputs across all elements of a program helps develop an
understanding of the scale and scope of a program before traditional
output indicators, such as testing and production rates, can be
observed and evaluated. When combined with observed outputs and the
application of engineering judgments, the understanding of the scale
and scope of a program that this provided helped us to measure the
probable pace and magnitude of a program and its potential products. We
were then able to make what we believe to be reasonably confident
estimates of what the various programs can achieve.
Rather than measuring how far a program had progressed from a known
starting point, the Commission sought to measure how close a program
might be to demonstrating the first flight of a long-range ballistic
missile. This approach requires that analysts extrapolate a program's
scope, scale, pace and direction beyond what the hard evidence at hand
unequivocally supports. It is in sharp contrast to a narrow focus on
the certain that obscures the almost-certain. The approach helps reduce
the effects of denial and deception efforts. When strategically
significant programs were assessed by narrowly focusing on what is
known, the assessments lagged the actual state of the programs by two
to eight years and in some cases completely missed significant
programs.
We chose to focus on what is left to be accomplished in the
programs of potentially threatening ballistic missile powers and
alternative paths they can follow to attain their goals. We reviewed
program histories and current activities, including foreign assistance,
to determine whether a ballistic missile program acquired the means to
overcome its identified problems. We considered the multiple pathways
available for completing its development given the combination of
expertise and technology available to it and the circumstances in which
it is operating. This approach accepts as a basic premise that a power
determined to possess a long-range missile, knowing that the U.S. is
trying to track its every action but aware of U.S. intelligence methods
and sources, will do its best to deny information and to deceive the
U.S. about its actual progress.
Because of these options available to emerging ballistic missile
powers, the Commission, unanimously recognizing that missile
development and deployment now follows new models, strongly urges the
use of an expanded approach to intelligence that assesses both inputs
and outputs in other countries' ballistic missile programs. We believe
this approach is needed in order to capture both sooner and more
accurately the speed and magnitude of potential ballistic missile
proliferation in the post-Cold War world and to assess, in time, the
various threats this proliferation poses to the United States.
The Commission's key judgments are derived from applying this
methodology and examining the evidence in light of the individual and
collective experience of the nine Commissioners.
h. summary
Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat
to the United States. This is not a distant threat. Characterizing
foreign assistance as a wild card is both incorrect and misleading.
Foreign assistance is pervasive, enabling and often the preferred path
to ballistic missile and WMD capability.
A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile
powers the capacity through a combination of domestic development and
foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within
about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years
in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not
be aware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative
means of delivery can shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to
zero.
The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing and
emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities from the
U.S. and to deceive the U.S. about the pace, scope and direction of
their development and proliferation programs. Therefore, we unanimously
recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on
expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as
appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which
there may be little or no warning.
Attachment 1.
a. year 2000 (y2k) computer problem
The widely-discussed Year 2000 (Y2K) problem concerns computer
hardware with embedded clocks and software with date recognition
functions that still designate years with only two digits and are
programmed to interpret ``00'' as the year 1900 rather than 2000. The
tasks of reprogramming are immense and complex, and uncertainties
surrounding their pace and outcome plague many aspects of life and
commerce. The Commission judges that military and intelligence
operations are not immune to the effects of the Y2K problem.
Not only at the millennium but for some undetermined time before
and after it the Y2K problem can affect U.S. and Russian ballistic
missile forces and, to a lesser extent, those of China, the United
Kingdom (U.K.) and France. The U.S. particularly and Russia somewhat
less so depend on computer-based and computer-aided intelligence and
surveillance and on automated processes to assure that their ballistic
missile forces will function under all conceivable circumstances. The
Y2K problem can potentially upset some of those calculations by
interfering with the capacity of the U.S. and Russia to:
Monitor the activities of each other at the strategic level,
including the disposition and posture of their conventional
military forces.
Provide tactical warning of military operations,
particularly ballistic missile operations, through collection
of data from space-, air- and ground-based sensors.
Process and fuse the data received from sensors in the
command and control nets.
Maintain positive control over ballistic missile forces and,
if automated responses to false data and warnings are
triggered, retain or regain control by the national military
and political leadership.
Y2K problems are complex and not easy to deal with. Efforts are
underway to isolate critical systems from the problem, but they may not
totally eliminate vulnerabilities for two reasons:
No system is completely isolated. Command centers may have
new software installed, but if the support services--electric,
water, gas and communications, for example--are not self-
contained the center may fail. Even if support services are
self-contained, the need for the center to function via
computer or by computer-dependent communication systems makes
it vulnerable to Y2K problems up or downstream from it.
Efforts to correct the problem provide their own attractive
opportunities for unfriendly agents and powers to tamper with
mission-critical software. Errors can be programmed which are
designed to appear only much later and in circumstances that
cannot be anticipated. The Commission is troubled by the amount
of Y2K software work being performed in foreign countries,
particularly India, for U.S. industry and for the U.S.
Government--including elements of the Intelligence Community.
b. revolution in military affairs and information warfare
The term ``Revolution in Military Affairs'' (RMA) is used to
describe the impact of leading-edge military technologies and
information warfare on the conduct of military operations from the
tactical to the strategic level. Key RMA technologies include
precision-guided munitions, stealth technology and the use of space-
based assets for command, control, communications, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as modern computational
capabilities to integrate these functions.
The U.S. military is adopting new weapon systems and tactical,
operational and strategic concepts based on the elements of the RMA.
The objective is to make U.S. forces lighter but more lethal so that
fewer personnel with less equipment can strike over longer distances
and with a far more powerful effect. This gives prospective adversaries
greater incentives to find new ways of offsetting the new RMA-based
capabilities of the U.S. and in particular to come up with new
``asymmetric'' strategies--that is, strategies that can cripple U.S.
ability to use its forces without the adversary having to confront
those forces directly.
These asymmetric strategies of potential adversaries of the U.S.
could well include ballistic missile operations against ports,
airfields, communications centers or urban and industrial areas.
Attacking ports and airfields the U.S. might use could severely hamper
operations and could undercut the military advantages U.S.
technological superiority provides. Interrupting communications
channels would make it more difficult to plan, organize and conduct
operations. Strikes by an adversary on urban and industrial centers
could change the nature of the conflict from what the U.S. prefers--one
confined to precision attacks against military forces in the field and
point targets in urban and industrial settings--to one of
indiscriminate damage to civilians and the infrastructure supporting
them.
In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraqi ballistic missiles threatened
to undermine the coalition's political strategy, and the coalition's
military responses failed to halt Iraqi ballistic missile attacks.
Doctrinal shifts in Russia and China have placed added emphasis on
ballistic missile operations. Together, these highlight the
vulnerability to such operations of the U.S., its forces and its
allies, whether conducted by Russia, China or emerging ballistic
missile powers. A number of other nations are incorporating technical
features of the RMA into their forces. These features include space-
based surveillance and reconnaissance. They also include communications
using either space-based networks (perhaps using civilian assets) or
land-based fiber-optic networks, guidance from the space-based global
positioning system/global navigation satellite system (GPS/GLONASS) to
increase the accuracy of missiles and the computational capabilities
needed to plan, organize and conduct operations. Their capacity to
conduct asymmetric operations with ballistic missiles, including
attacks on RMA sites in the U.S., will increase.
Attachment 2. Unclassified Working Papers
table of contents for appendix iii: unclassified working papers
Roundtable Topics, Panelists and Summaries of Panelists' Remarks:
Iran/Iraq: W. Seth Carus, Michael Eisenstadt, Ken Katzman and Ken
Timmerman
Russia/Ukraine: Bruce Blair, Stephen Blank, Daniel Goure and Nadia
Schadlow
China/Japan/Korea: Gerrit W. Gong, Selig Harrison, Robert Manning and
David Wright
India/Pakistan: Daniel Goure, Michael Krepon and David Tanks
North Africa/Israel: W. Seth Carus and Dov Zakheim
Technology Transfers: David C. Isby, John M. Myrah and Henry Sokoiski
Pathways for Transfer: Dennis M. Gormley, Aaron Karp and Richard T.
Cupitt
Supplier Nations: Robbin Laird, Tim McCarthy, Keith Payne and David
Smith
Roundtable Papers:
Bruce Blair, ``The Plight of the Russian Military and Nuclear Control''
Stephen J. Blank, ``Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Proliferation in
Russian Strategy''
W. Seth Carus, ``Ballistic Missiles in Iran and Iraq: 1988-1998''
W. Seth Carus, ``Israeli Ballistic Missile Developments''
Richard T. Cupitt, ``Export Controls and Missile Technology Transfer''
Michael Eisenstadt, ``Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
in Iraq and Iran: Current Developments and Potential for Future
Surprises''
Gerrit W. Gong, ``Assessing the Ballistic Missile Threat: China-Japan-
Korea-Taiwan Issues''
Dennis M. Gormley, ``Transfer Pathways for Cruise Missiles''
Daniel Goure, ``The Evolution of Russian Nuclear Forces: Working to a
Plan''
Daniel Goure, ``WMD and Ballistic Missiles in South Asia''
Selig S. Harrison, ``Missile Capabilities in Northeast Asia: Japan,
South Korea and North Korea''
David C. Isby, ``Barriers to Proliferation and Pathways to Transfer:
Building Ballistic Missile Capabilities Under MTCR''
Aaron Karp, ``Technology Pathways to Ballistic Missiles in Iran''
Kenneth Katzman, ``Iran's Long-Range Missile Capabilities''
Kenneth Katzman, ``Iraq's Long-Range Missile Capabilities''
Michael Krepon, ``India, Pakistan and the Ballistic Missile Threat''
Robbin Laird, ``Rethinking the Role of Western States as Supplier
Nations''
Robert A. Manning, ``Missile Proliferation Threats in Northeast Asia''
John M. Myrah, ``The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: What Should
We Do to Stop It?''
Keith Payne, ``The Missile Technology Control Regime: European
Involvement and Compliance Issues''
Nadia Schadlow, ``Patterns of Ukrainian Conduct''
David J. Smith, ``Friendly Countries and Missile Proliferation: Dealing
With Different Perceptions''
Henry Sokolski, ``Space Technology Transfers and Missile
Proliferation''
David R. Tanks, ``Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: Are ICBMs a Future
Possibility?''
Kenneth R. Timmerman, ``Rogue States and Ballistic Missiles: Lessons
and Prospects''
David C. Wright, ``An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program''
Additional Papers:
Kurt Guthe and Keith Payne, ``The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles
for Deterrence and Coercion: The Chinese Case''
Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, ``The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles
for Deterrence and Coercion''
Gilbert Siegert, ``The Chinese Space Program''
Gilbert Siegert, ``Potential Threats from Global Commercial Space
Capabilities''
System Planning Corporation, ``Non-Proliferation Issues''
1. France
2. Great Britain
3. Germany
4. Japan
5. South Korea
Attachment 3.
a. resumes of commission members
The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Chairman
Mr. Rumsfeld is Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gilead
Sciences, Inc. Previously he served in a variety of government posts,
including: Naval Aviator (1954-57), Member of Congress (1963-69), U.S.
Ambassador to NATO (1972-74), White House Chief of Staff (1974-75),
Secretary of Defense (1975-77) and Presidential Envoy to the Middle
East (1983-84). He also served as Chairman of the Rand Corporation
(1981-86; 1995-96) and as Chairman and CEO of G. D. Searle & Co. (1977-
85) and of General Instrument Corporation (1990-93). He received the
Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977.
Dr. Barry M. Blechman
Dr. Blechman is the president and founder of DFI International (in
1984) and chairman and co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center
beginning in 1989. He served as Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (1977-80). He was previously affiliated
with the U.S. Army (1964-66), the Center for Naval Analyses (1966-71)
and Brookings Institution (1971-77). He also was affiliated with the
Carnegie Endowment (1980-82) and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (1982-84). He is the author of Face Without War
and The Politics of National Security, among others. Dr. Blechman has a
Ph.D. in international relations.
General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
General Butler served as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
Strategic Command and Strategic Air Command (1992-94) and as the
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(1989-91). In 1987, he was the Director of Operations at USAF
Headquarters and served as the Inspector General of the Strategic Air
Command (1984-86). From 1982 to 1984, he was the Commander of the 96th
and 320th Bomb Wings. General Butler was an Olmsted Scholar.
Dr. Richard L. Garwin
Dr. Garwin is a Senior Fellow for Science and Technology with the
Council on Foreign Relations. He has been an IBM Fellow Emeritus at the
Thomas J. Watson Research Center since 1993 and was a Fellow from 1952
to 1993. He has served as a member of the President's Science Advisory
Committee twice, from 1962 to 1965 and from 1969 to 1972, and he served
on the Defense Science Board (1966-69). In 1996, the U.S. Foreign
Intelligence Community awarded him the R.V. Jones Award for Scientific
Intelligence, and the President and the Department of Energy awarded
him the Enrico Fermi Award. Dr. Garwin has a Ph.D. in physics.
Dr. William H. Graham
Dr. Graham is the Chairman of the Board and President of National
Security Research (1996 to present). He previously was the Director of
the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy (1986-89) and the
Deputy Administrator of NASA (1985-86). He has a Ph.D. in electrical
engineering.
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.
Dr. Schneider is the President of International Planning Services,
Inc. (1986 to present). He previously served as the Under Secretary of
State for Security Assistance (1982-86) and the Chairman of the
President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament
(1987-93). He has a Ph.D. in economics.
General Larry D. Welch, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
General Welch is the President and CEO of the Institute for Defense
Analyses (1990 to present). He previously served as the Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Air Force (1986-90) and the Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Strategic Air Command (1985-86).
Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz
Dr. Wolfowitz is Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (1994 to present). He
previously served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (1989-
93), the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia (1986-89), the Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1982-86) and
Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff (1981-82). He
was a member of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the
United-States Intelligence Community (1995-95). He has a Ph.D. in
political science.
The Honorable R. James Woolsey
Mr. Woolsey is a partner in the law firm of Shea & Gardner (1995 to
present, 1991-93, 1979-89). He previously served as Director of Central
Intelligence (1993-95), Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the
Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (1989-91) and Under
Secretary of the Navy (1977-79). He was a Delegate-at-Large to the
U.S.-Soviet START and Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (1983-85). He served
as a member of the Scowcroft Commission (Presidential Commission on
Strategic Forces, 1983) and the Packard Commission (Presidential Blue
Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1985-86).
b. resumes of core staff of the commission
Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Staff Director. Senior Fellow, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (1993 to present). Director,
Strategic Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (1990-93);
Deputy Director of Strategic Analysis, SRS Technologies (1986-90);
Staff Analyst, Los Alamos National Laboratory (1982-86). Ph.D. in
political science.
Dr. Steven A. Maaranen. Policy Planning Staff, Los Alamos National
Laboratory (1980 to present). Chief, Defense and Space Division, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1987-88); Assistant Professor,
Claremont McKenna College (1976-80). Ph.D. in political science.
Eric Desautels. Member of Technical Staff TASC, Inc. (1994-98).
Masters in international security.
David H. Dunham. Member of Technical Staff TASC, Inc. (1994-98);
Assistant Director of the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute (1994);
Special Assistant, Safe and Secure Dismantlement Delegation; Deputy
Executive Director, General Advisory Committee, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (1991-94).
Jason W. Roback. Analyst with the National Institute for Public
Policy and National Security Research, Inc. (1997 to present). M.S. in
defense and strategic studies.
Bernard C. Victory. Analyst at the National Institute for Public
Policy (1988 to present). Congressional Research Service (1987-88).
M.A. in international affairs.
Delonnie Henry. Administrative Assistant, National Defense
University (1993-98). M.Ed.
dci liaison
Richard Haver. Chief of Staff of the National Intelligence Council.
Formerly: National Intelligence Officer for Special Activities,
Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs, Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy and Deputy Director for
Naval Intelligence.
c. commission meetings and agendas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Subject or Activity Visitor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan. 14 Organization of Commission .............................................
Jan. 15 U.S. Technical Collection Capabilities .............................................
Simulation, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), .............................................
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Foreign Instrumentation Signals .............................................
Measures and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) .............................................
Jan. 29 Russia .............................................
Changing Political and Economic Circumstances .............................................
Military Changes .............................................
Nuclear Doctrine .............................................
Strategic Force Projections .............................................
Warning, Inadvertent Launch, Anti-Ballistic .............................................
Missile Status
C3I, Unauthorized and Accidental Launch .............................................
Jan. 30 China .............................................
Political Overview Taiwan .............................................
Economic Overview .............................................
Military Overview .............................................
China's Space Program .............................................
Nuclear Doctrine .............................................
Force Structure and Projections .............................................
Chinese C3I .............................................
Feb. 4 Deception and Denial .............................................
Analytic Depth: China .............................................
Feb. 5 External Proliferation Concerns .............................................
Technology Transfer and End Use .............................................
China .............................................
Hard Target .............................................
Missile Program and .............................................
Russian Assistance .............................................
Infrastructure and Government Oversight .............................................
Feb. 9 Nuclear Programs .............................................
Feb. 19 Nonproliferation Center and Methodological .............................................
Challenges of Proliferation
Russia .............................................
The Spread of Underground Facilities .............................................
Hard Target .............................................
Military Missile and Technological .............................................
Infrastructure
External Proliferation Concerns .............................................
The Russian-Iranian Connection .............................................
Mar. 4 Iran .............................................
Collection Challenges .............................................
Ballistic Missile Program .............................................
Engine Testing .............................................
Missile Infrastructure .............................................
Alternate Launch Modes .............................................
Nuclear Program .............................................
Biological Weapons .............................................
Chemical Weapons .............................................
Buyer, Seller, Broker .............................................
Mar. 5 North Korea .............................................
Collection Challenges .............................................
Ballistic Missile Program .............................................
Buyer, Seller, Broker .............................................
Forces and Doctrine .............................................
Chemical Weapons .............................................
Biological Weapons .............................................
Nuclear Program .............................................
Mar. 19 The Honorable George Tenet Director of Central Intelligence
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus Ambassador of Sweden to the U.S.
The Honorable Andrew Marshall Office of Net Assessment, Office of the
Secretary of Defense
David Osias Defense Intelligence Officer
David Ivry Director-General, Israeli Ministry of Defense
(Ret.)
Mar. 24 Saudi Arabia .............................................
Algeria .............................................
Egypt .............................................
Libya .............................................
Syria .............................................
Mar. 25 Meeting of Commissioners at the National .............................................
Security Agency
Mar. 30 Iraq .............................................
Collection Overview .............................................
IAEA/UNSCOM Inspection Program .............................................
Missile Program .............................................
Chemical Weapons .............................................
Biological Weapons .............................................
Nuclear Program .............................................
Mar. 31 India and Pakistan .............................................
Hard Target .............................................
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Motivations, .............................................
Decisionmakers and Doctrine
Missile Systems: Capabilities and Production .............................................
India's Naval Development .............................................
India's Space Program .............................................
Foreign Proliferation Assistance .............................................
Missile Forces in 2015 .............................................
Chemical & Biological Weapons .............................................
Nuclear Programs .............................................
Broker and Seller: Issues of Safety and .............................................
Security
Collection Overview .............................................
Apr. 7 Intelligence Process .............................................
The Honorable Edward C. ``Pete'' Aldridge, Jr. President and CEO, Aerospace Corporation
Project West Wing .............................................
Iranian and North Korean Ballistic Missile .............................................
Program
Ballistic Missile Technical Hurdles and Work-a- .............................................
Rounds
6Apr. 8 Deception and Denial .............................................
Yamantau and Russian Underground Activity .............................................
Apr. 16 Admiral William Studeman, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
Hurdles of Long-range Ballistic Missiles and .............................................
Work-a-Rounds:
1. Liquid Rocket Propulsion .............................................
2. Solid Rocket Propulsion .............................................
3. Aerodynamics, Reentry Vehicle .............................................
4. Design and Missile Materials .............................................
Russian Command and Control Modernization .............................................
Apr. 20 Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles, U.S. Air Force Director, Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization
Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, U.S. Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dr. Fred Ikle Former Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)
Analysis of Pakistan's Ghauri/No Dong Launch .............................................
Apr. 21 Emerging Long-Range Threat to the U.S Boeing Corporation
Ambassador Frank Wisner Former U.S. Ambassador to India and Special
Ambassador to Russia
Apr. 27 Counterintelligence Brief Industrial Espionage .............................................
Legal Snooping
1993 No Dong Flight .............................................
Foreign Missile Threats .............................................
Scope of Ballistic Missile Proliferation .............................................
Activities
Non-Proliferation Methodologies .............................................
Dr. Sidney Drell Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center
May 7 Foreign Missile Assessment Lockheed Martin Corporation
Payload Fabrication and Delivery .............................................
Commercial Space-Launch Vehicles, Peacekeeper Orbital Sciences Corporation
Conversion
Contemporaneous History of Iran's Missile .............................................
Programs
May 8 Gordon Oehler Former Director, Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence Nonproliferation Center
The Honorable William Reinsch Undersecretary of Commerce for Export
Administration
May 18 Naval Intelligence Briefing .............................................
Contemporaneous History of North Korea's .............................................
Missile Program Assessment of a Hypothetical
Taepo Dong III
Dr. William J. Perry Former Secretary of Defense
Lt. General William Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.) Former Director of the National Security
Agency
May 19 Drafting of Final Report .............................................
May 27 Dr. James Schlesinger Former Secretary of Defense and Director of
Central Intelligence
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 3 Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 4 Dr. Harold Brown Former Secretary of Defense
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 11 Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 16 The Honorable Caspar Weinberger Former Secretary of Defense
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 17 Office Call with the Honorable William S. Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon
Cohen
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 23 Information Warfare .............................................
Dr. John Deutch Former Director of Central Intelligence
Brief on Israel .............................................
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 24 General Colin Powell, U.S. Army (Ret.) Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Air Force Former National Security Advisor to the
(Ret.) President
Cruise Missiles .............................................
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 29 Office Call with General Henry H.Shelton, U.S. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon
Army
Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jun. 30 Drafting of Final Report .............................................
Jul. 7 Office Call with the Honorable Samuel R. Assistant to the President for National
``Sandy'' Berger Security, The White House
Foreign Students in the United States .............................................
Jul. 8 Information Warfare .............................................
Space Reconnaissance .............................................
Y2K Problem in Russia .............................................
Collection Capabilities .............................................
Jul. 15 Deliver Report to Congress Senior Leadership of the U.S. Senate and U.S.
House of Representatives, The Capitol
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. site visits \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All sites except the National Air Intelligence Center were
visited by one or more Commissioners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 6: National Air Intelligence Center Wright Patterson Air Force
Base, Dayton, Ohio
March 10: Sandia National Laboratories, Kirtland Air Force Base,
Albuquerque, New Mexico
March 16: Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, California
March 25: National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland
April 3: Center for International Security Affairs, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico
April 22: National Reconnaissance Office, Sterling, Virginia
May 6: Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, Andrews Air Force Base,
Suitland, Maryland
May 15: Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Redstone Arsenal,
Huntsville, Alabama
June 5: U.S. Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
Colorado
June 8: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California
e. interviews
Dr. Edward C. ``Pete'' Aldridge, Jr., former Secretary of the Air Force
and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office
The Honorable Samuel R. ``Sandy'' Berger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The Honorable Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Dr. John Deutch, former Director of Central Intelligence
and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Dr. Sidney Drell, Deputy Director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States
Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, U.S. Army, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency
David Ivry, former Director-General of the Ministry of Defense of
Israel
Dr. Frederick Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense
David A. Kier, Deputy Director for the National Reconnaissance Office
Lieutenant General Lester Lyles, U.S. Air Force, Director, Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization
The Honorable Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of
the Secretary of Defense
Barbara McNamara, Deputy Director, National Security Agency
Lieutenant General William Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Director of
the National Security Agency
Gordon Oehler, former Director Nonproliferation Center, Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence
David Osias, Defense Intelligence Officer for Acquisition Support,
Counter-proliferation and Arms Control
The Honorable Dr. William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense
General Colin A. Powell, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and National Security Advisor to the President
The Honorable William A. Reinsch, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export
Administration
The Honorable Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense,
Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Energy
Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former
National Security Advisor to the President
General Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral William Studeman, U.S. Navy (Ret.), former Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and Director, National Security Agency
The Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
Ambassador Frank Wisner, former U.S. Ambassador to India
f. acknowledgments
The Commissioners wish to express their appreciation to the men and
women of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Over 300 of them took time to
meet with the Commissioners on the subject of the ballistic missile
threat to the United States.
In particular, the Commissioners express their thanks to the
Honorable George Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence, and to the
directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office, National Imagery and Mapping Agency and
the Office of Naval Intelligence for making the time of their analysts
available to the Commission and for providing a level of access to
information infrequently granted.
Special thanks are extended to Rich Haver, the DCI's liaison to the
Commission. His knowledge of the issues, familiarity with the ways of
the Intelligence Community and his unfailing good humor made the task
of the Commission far easier than it might otherwise have been. The
Commissioners would like to thank those analysts and managers of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State), Defense
Technology Security Administration (Department of Defense), CIA, DIA,
NSA, NRO and NIMA who served as the points of contact for their
respective agencies. Their efforts to schedule briefings and to provide
information is greatly appreciated.
The Commissioners would also like to thank the support staff
provided by the Central Intelligence Agency who served in the
Commission office and those in the Multimedia Production Group,
Cartography Department and Printing and Photography Group who assisted
in the design and publication of the final version of the Report.
______
U.S. Congress,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC, June 16, 1997.
The President
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President:
Last week the House of Representatives approved H.R. 1758, the
``European Security Act of 1997.'' I originally introduced this
legislation on April 24th of this year with the cosponsorship of Dick
Armey, Jerry Solomon, Porter Goss, Curt Weldon, and others to address a
number of issues bearing on U.S. relations with Russia.
Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the European Security Act as
passed by the House has been appended to H.R. 1757, the ``Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 and 1999.'' Inasmuch
as the Senate companion measure to H.R. 1757 is scheduled for Senate
floor action this week, it appears likely that the European Security
Act will be addressed in a House-Senate conference committee in the
very near future.
As we prepare for conference on the European Security Act, we find
it necessary to ask for additional information relevant to one of the
bill's provisions relating to multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Section 6(c)(1) of the European Security Act states that:
It is the sense of the Congress that until the United States
has taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty
remains a bilateral treaty between the United States and the
Russian Federation (such state being the only successor state
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed or
realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense
system), no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered
for approval for entry into force with respect to the United
States. . . .
I am aware that, subsequent to the introduction of the European
Security Act, the Senate on May 14th approved Treaty Doc. No. 105-5, a
resolution advising and consenting to ratification of the CFE Flank
Agreement. Condition 9 of this resolution required the President to:
. . . certify to Congress that he will submit for Senate advice
and consent to ratification any international agreement . . .
that would add one or more countries as States Parties to the
ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a
bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty . . .
I am further aware that, on May 15th, you submitted to Congress the
certification required by Condition 9 of Treaty Doc. No. 105-5.
In order to help the conferees on the European Security Act
understand the degree to which section 6(c)(1) of that bill has been
addressed (and perhaps rendered unnecessary) by Condition 9 of Treaty
Doc. 105-5, I would appreciate receiving your prompt response to the
following questions:
1. In the view of the Administration, what countries in addition to
the United States are today parties to the ABM Treaty?
2. What countries sent representatives to the most recent meeting
of the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva?
3. To the extent that the list of countries identified in response
to question no. 1 includes countries in addition to those identified in
response to question no. 2, does the Administration believe that those
additional countries have the legal right to send representatives to
meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission and otherwise
participate in the administration of the ABM Treaty? .
4. To the extent that the list of countries identified in response
to question no. 1 includes countries in addition to those identified in
response to question no. 2, why are those additional countries not
currently participating in the Standing Consultative Commission? Are
those additional countries aware that, in the view of the United States
Government, they are parties to and are bound by the ABM Treaty? On
what date were they informed of this fact by the United States
Government?
5. To the extent that the list of countries identified in response
to question no. 2 includes countries in addition to those identified in
response to question no. 1, what is the legal justification for the
participation of those additional countries in the Standing
Consultative Commission?
6. Does the Administration currently intend to conclude with
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, or any other of the newly
independent states an agreement or agreements regarding ABM Treaty
succession?
7. In the event that the Senate fails to act on an agreement
submitted to it by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession,
what countries in addition to the United States will, in the view of
the Administration, be parties to the ABM Treaty?
8. In the event that the Senate votes to reject an agreement
submitted to it by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession,
what countries in addition to the United States will, in the view of
the Administration, be parties to the ABM Treaty?
9. Apart from the consequences that would flow from Senate approval
of, rejection of, or inaction on an agreement submitted to it by the
Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession, what other
developments, if any, may lead to a change in the list of countries
that are today parties to the ABM Treaty?
10. Apart from the consequences that would flow from Senate
approval of, rejection of, or inaction on an agreement submitted to it
by the Administration regarding ABM Treaty succession, what other
developments, if any, may lead to a change in the list of countries
legally entitled to send representatives to meetings of the Standing
Consultative Commission and otherwise participate in the administration
of the ABM Treaty?
I appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman.
______
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
November 21, 1997
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty succession arrangements. As you know, after discussion
between our staffs, we deferred this formal response to your letter
pending completion of the ABM-related agreement, including the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM Treaty succession. These
documents were signed on September 26, 1997, and mark, along with the
START II documents that were signed the same day, a significant step
forward. The MOU, as well as the agreements relating to the demarcation
between theater and strategic ballistic missile defense systems, will
be provided to the Senate for its advice and consent. Thus, the
Congressional concerns that you raised related to approval of these
agreements have been directly addressed.
You raised a number of questions on ABM Treaty discussion
generally. Let me make a few background points. The MOU on succession
was the result of detailed negotiations spanning several years. When
the USSR dissolved at the end of 1991, it became necessary to reach
agreement as to which former Soviet states would collectively assume
its rights and obligations under the Treaty (which clearly continued in
force by its own terms). The United States took the view that, as a
general principle, agreements between the United States and the USSR
that were in force at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union
would be presumed to continue in force as to the former Republics. It
became clear, however, particularly in the area of arms control, that a
case-by-case review of each agreement was necessary.
In dealing with matters of succession, a key U.S. objective has
been to preserve the substance of the origina1 treaty regime as closely
as possible. This was true with respect to the elaboration of the MOU
as well. Accordingly, the MOU works to preserve the original object and
purpose of the Treaty. For example, it restricts the four successor
states to only those rights held by the former Soviet Union by limiting
them collectively to no more than 100 interceptors on 100 launchers at
a single ABM deployment area and precluding the transfer of ABM systems
and components to states that are not Party to the Treaty. Neither a
simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which would
have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM
interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS states as full ABM
successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and
substance of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.
Our willingness to work with key successor states, in addition to
Russia, on strategic arms control issues has served, and will continue
to serve, U.S. national security interests. Under the Lisbon Protocol
to the START I Treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, the
successor states on whose territory, all strategic offensive arms of
the former Soviet Union were based and all declared START-related
facilities were located, assumed the rights and obligations of the
former Soviet Union under the START I Treaty. The Protocol also
obligated Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to adhere to the Treaty on
the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Both the Bush Administration
and Clinton Administration engaged in major diplomatic initiatives to
ensure implementation of the Lisbon Protocol, especially with respect
to the removal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan, the accession at these successor states to the
Nonproliferation Treaty, and the entry into force of START I.
For certain key successor states to the former Soviet Union, ABM
Treaty succession was, and remains, a priority issue. Ukraine, in
particular, has made clear to us that it considers Ukraine's legal
status under the ABM Treaty to be the same as under the INF Treaty (to
which it is considered a Party) and that, in its view, its succession
status with regard to both Treaties should be the same.
There are many complex factors in our strategic relationship with
the former Soviet states. Had we been unwilling to engage with states
in addition to Russia on key arms control agreements (START, INF and
ABM), it is unlikely that we would have achieved the kind of
comprehensive resolution of issues related to the disposition of
strategic assets that has been achieved. A change in course at this
time that would exclude key successor states from the ABM succession
formula could place at risk continued progress on strategic arms and
other nuclear matters.
Since the last review of the ABM Treaty in 1993, (required every
five years by the terms of the Treaty, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Ukraine--each of which have ABM Treaty-related assets on its
territory--have been the only former Soviet republics that have
participated in the ABM Treaty-related discussions held in the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC). While the other eight former Soviet
republics have been informed of SCC sessions, none has participated,
and three--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova--have expressed their lack
of interest in being considered as Parties to the Treaty. Indeed, it
became clear over the past four years of negotiations that, in addition
to Russia, the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine have substantial interest in the specific subject matter of the
Treaty. For these reasons, prior to the signing of the MOU, the United
States notified the other eight new independent states of our
intentions to bring the succession issue to closure and to sign the MOU
with Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine,
recognizing that these four successor states, along with the United
States, constitute the Parties to the ABM Treaty.
Upon its entry into force, the MOU will confirm the four former
Soviet states participating in the SCC as the successor states to the
Soviet Union for purposes of the Treaty. This does not constitute a
substantive modification of rights and obligations under the Treaty;
rather, it is a recognition of the status of those former Soviet
republics in light of the dissolution of the USSR. As a practical
matter, the recently signed SCC regulations make clear that the
increased SCC participation will be structured in a way similar to, and
having the same effect as, that which has been successful for the
United States in working with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine
in implementing the START and INF Treaties.
As to your question regarding the possibility that the Senate might
fail to act upon or might reject the MOU on succession, we believe that
the case for all the ABM-related agreements, including the MOU on
succession, will prevail on its merits. We further believe that the
package of agreements serves U.S. national security and foreign policy
objectives. If, however, the Senate were to fail to act or to disagree
and disapprove the agreements, succession arrangements will simply
remain unsettled. The ABM Treaty itself would clearly remain in force.
We appreciate this opportunity to clarify the record in this area
and look forward to future opportunities to communicate and consult
with you on these matters.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
______
U.S. Congress,
Washington, DC, March 3, 1998.
The President
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President:
We appreciate your response of November 21, 1997, to Chairman
Gilman's letter of June 16, 1997, regarding the proposed
multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We
appreciate as well your making Administration lawyers available to meet
with congressional staff on January 30, 1998, to elaborate on your
November 21st response.
The most important legal question that arises in connection with
multilateralization of the ABM Treaty is the first question posed in
Chairman Gilman's letter: In the view of the Administration, what
countries in addition to the United States are today parties to the ABM
Treaty?
Your response to this question appears to be: Until an agreement on
succession to the ABM Treaty comes into force, the identity of the
other party or parties to the ABM Treaty is ``unsettled.'' Indeed, when
asked on January 30th whether Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, or any other
country that emerged from the Soviet Union is today prohibited by the
ABM Treaty from deploying an ABM system at more than one site,
Administration lawyers stated repeatedly that it is ``unclear'' whether
any of these countries is so bound.
The Administration's response is profoundly disturbing. If it is
unclear as a matter of law whether Russia or any other country that
emerged from the Soviet Union is today bound by the ABM Treaty, then it
also should be unclear whether the United States is so bound. Yet the
Administration has insisted for years that the United States remains
fully bound by the ABM Treaty.
With regard to ballistic missile defense, for example, the
Administration has argued consistently that the United States should
not test or deploy certain systems that could provide our nation highly
effective protection against ballistic missile attack because such
systems would violate our nation's obligations under the ABM Treaty. It
now appears, however, that the Administration views the United States,
at least for the time being, as the only country that is clearly
subject to those obligations.
It is obvious to us, however, that under basic principles of
international law a treaty requires more than one state party in order
to give rise to binding legal obligations. If the Administration is
unable to identify any country in addition to the United States that is
today clearly bound by the ABM Treaty, then there is no country that
the United States can look to today to uphold the obligations
previously imposed on the Soviet Union by the Treaty, and no country
that today is entitled to complain if the United States fails to uphold
the Treaty.
If, in fact, the Administration does not consider the United States
to be the only country that is today clearly bound by the ABM Treaty,
we would appreciate your identifying for us the other country (or
countries) that is today party to--and bound by--the Treaty. In the
absence of such clarification, we will have no choice but to conclude
that the ABM Treaty has lapsed until such time as the Senate approves a
succession agreement reviving the Treaty.
Thank you for your attention to this inquiry.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman,
Committee on International Relations.
Jesse Helms, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations.
______
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
May 21, 1998
The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty succession arrangements. As I said in my letter of
November 21, 1997, the Administration will provide to the Senate for
its advice and consent the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM
Treaty succession, which was signed on September 26, 1997. Moreover,
the MOU will settle ABM Treaty succession. Upon its entry into force,
the MOU will confirm Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine as the
successor states to the Soviet Union for purposes of the Treaty and
make clear that only these four states, along with the United States,
are the ABM Treaty Parties.
In your letter of March 3, you state that if the Administration is
unable to identify any country in addition to the United States that is
clearly bound by the Treaty, then you would have no choice but to
conclude that the Treaty has lapsed until such time as the Senate
approves a succession agreement reviving the Treaty.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, ten of the twelve
states of the former Soviet Union initially asserted a right in a
Commonwealth of Independent States resolution, signed on October 9,
1992, in Bishkek, to assume obligations as successor states to the
Soviet Union for purposes of the Treaty. Only four of these states have
subsequently participated in the work of the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC), and none of the other six has reacted negatively when
we informed each of them that, pursuant to the MOU, it will not be
recognized as an ABM successor state. A principal advantage of the
Senate's approving the MOU is that the MOU's entry into force will
effectively dispose of any such claim by any of the other six states.
In contrast, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine each has ABM Treaty-
related assets on its territory; each has participated in the work of
the SCC; and each has affirmed its desire to succeed to the obligations
of the former Soviet Union under the Treaty. Thus, a strong case can be
made that, even without the MOU, these three states are Parties to the
Treaty.
Finally, the United States and Russia clearly are Parties to the
Treaty. Each has reaffirmed its intention to be bound by the Treaty;
each has actively participated in every phase of the implementation of
the Treaty, including the work of the SCC; and each has on its
territory extensive ABM Treaty-related facilities.
Thus, there is no question that the ABM Treaty has continued in
force and will continue in force even if the MOU is not ratified.
However, the entry into force of the MOU remains essential. As I
pointed out in my letter of November 21, the United States has a clear
interest both in confirming that these states (and only these states)
are bound by the obligations of the Treaty, and in resolving
definitively the issues about ABM Treaty succession that are dealt with
in the MOU. Without the MOU, ambiguity will remain about the extent to
which states other than Russia are Parties, and about the way in which
ABM Treaty obligations apply to the successors to the Soviet Union.
Equally important, maintaining the viability of the ABM Treaty is key
to further reductions in strategic offensive forces under START II and
START III.
I appreciate this further opportunity to clarify the record in this
area.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
______
U.S. Congress,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, DC, August 14, 1998.
The President
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President:
Thank you for your letters of November 21, 1997 and May 21, 1998,
responding to inquiries from me and Chairman Helms about succession to
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. As stated in our letter to you
of March 3, 1998, the most important question that arises in this
connection is the following: In the view of the Administration, what
countries in addition to the United States are today parties to the ABM
Treaty?
I understand from your letter of May 21st that the Administration's
answer to this question is that Russia ``clearly'' is a party to the
Treaty, and that with regard to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, ``a
strong case can be made that . . . these three states are Parties to
the Treaty.'' In other words, you draw a distinction between Russia on
the one hand and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on the other, and
believe that Russia succeeded automatically to the USSR's obligations
under the ABM Treaty, while Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may not
have succeeded automatically to those obligations. But you do not rule
out the possibility that, upon further consideration, the
Administration may conclude that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
automatically succeeded as well.
This answer raises several additional questions that are set forth
below:
1. To the degree that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine may have
succeeded automatically under international law to the obligations of
the USSR under the ABM Treaty, would that succession result in a series
of bilateral ABM Treaties (U.S.-Belarus, U.S.-Kazakhstan, and U.S.-
Ukraine, as well as U.S.-Russia), or one multilateral ABM Treaty to
which all of these countries are parties?
2. If the response to the previous question is that the result of
automatic succession by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would be one
multilateral ABM Treaty, please identify the historical precedents, if
any, for such a succession. In other words, please describe any other
bilateral treaties that, upon the dissolution of one of the parties to
the treaty, were converted automatically by operation of international
law into multilateral treaties involving two or more of the successor
states.
3. Will Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine participate in future
meetings of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and in the next
five-year review conference of parties to the ABM Treaty?
4. If the response to the previous question is that Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine will participate in future SCC meetings and the
next five-year review conference, what will be the legal basis for such
participation? To the degree that such participation does not rest on a
conclusion that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine succeeded
automatically under international law to the ABM Treaty, please explain
why such participation is not inconsistent with (1) Article IX(3) of
the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty of
September 26, 1997, and (2) your certification to the Congress of May
15, 1997, in accordance with Condition 9 of the Senate resolution
advising and consenting ratification of the CFE Flank Agreement (Treaty
Doc. No. 105-5).
I look forward to your prompt response to these questions.
With warmest regards,
Sincerely,
Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman.
______
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, October 5, 1998.
The President
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President:
Your May 21, 1998, letter regarding the status of the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is clearly at odds with historical fact,
your administration's past representations regarding this issue, and
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on succession itself.
Moreover, your letter seeks to repudiate your pledge to the Senate,
made in a treaty-related certification on May 14, 1997, that you would
respect your Constitutional obligation to seek the advice and consent
of the Senate for any agreement adding parties to the ABM Treaty, or
changing its geographic scope.
If your administration persists in the assertions made in the
letter of May 21, 1998, the validity of the ratification of the
Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, also known as the CFE
Flank Agreement, will be called into question. Your recent letter
directly contravenes your certification of May 14, 1997, raising the
inescapable conclusion that the instrument of ratification for the CFE
Flank Agreement deposited on behalf of the United States is defective
under U.S. constitutional law. Failure to reconsider your position not
only will make further cooperation between Congress and your
Administration on arms control matters difficult; it will undermine
both the credibility of your administration, and of the United States,
in the international affairs of the nation.
In a November 21, 1997 letter to Representative Gilman, and in
accompanying briefings by Administration lawyers, your administration
stated that ABM Treaty succession arrangements were ``unsettled'' and
would remain so in the absence of a new agreement (which you certified
you would submit for Senate approval). Moreover, your letter to Mr.
Gilman takes note of no distinction between the legal status of Russia
and that of the other states proposed as ABM Treaty parties. Indeed,
you stated in that letter:
Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM
successor (which would have ignored several former Soviet
states with significant ABM interests) nor a simple recognition
of all NIS states as full ABM successors would have preserved
fully the original purpose and substance of the Treaty, as
approved by the Senate in 1972.
However, in your May 21, 1998, letter, you reversed course by
asserting that ``the United States and Russia clearly are parties to
the Treaty.'' Russia's desire to become a party, its participation in
the treaty's activities, and the presence of ``ABM-Treaty related
facilities''--a newly-invented term found nowhere in the ABM Treaty--on
its territory are cited as reasons for this conclusion. You also
decline to identify Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as parties,
although you assert that ``a strong case can be made that even without
the MOU, these three states are Parties to the Treaty,'' citing
substantially the same factors that supposedly make Russia a party.
Mr. President, there is no basis for any distinction between the
legal status of Russia and that of the other states you mention. In a
briefing to congressional staff on January 30, 1998, Administration
lawyers were asked directly whether Russia was the only other clear
party to the Treaty. They stated definitively that this was not the
case. Numerous Administration representations and public statements,
including the State Department's publication of ``Treaties in Force,''
have been consistent in making no legal distinction among the former
Soviet states who are potential successors to the ABM Treaty. Article
VIII of the MOU itself notes that regulations of the Standing
Consultative Commission ``shall reflect the equal legal status of the
Parties.'' Further, we are confident that the record of negotiation on
the succession issue is replete with expressions by the United States
of the view that the potential successors to the Soviet Union all have
the same legal status. In short, your recent letter has no basis in
historical fact.
Moreover, your May 21, 1998, assertion that ``a strong case could
be made'' that four countries could today be parties to the treaty is
directly contradicted by Article I of the MOU, which states that the
United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia ``upon entry
into force of this Memorandum, shall constitute the Parties to the
Treaty.'' Very clearly, the entry-into-force of the MOU is the
triggering event--and one that has not yet occurred--by which these
states may become parties to the ABM Treaty. In short, none of the
potential successors were identified as parties to the ABM Treaty
during the period of negotiation, nor at any time preceding your
certification. Nothing has transpired since that time that would
constitute formal recognition of any state as a party to the ABM
Treaty.
Your assertion that Russia is a Party to the ABM Treaty, and your
claim that the three other states might be, imply that the issue of the
ABM treaty's status is fundamentally settled. Mr. President, this
matter is most definitely not settled unless and until the Senate
approves the MOU, or a similar agreement, through the exercise of the
advice and consent powers assigned to it by the Constitution. It is the
Senate's constitutional responsibility, and its duty, to advise on and
consent to treaty arrangements made on behalf of the United States. Any
such arrangements are invalid without the Senate's consent.
Consent was given to the CFE Flank Agreement on condition that you
would certify to the Congress of the United States that you would
submit for the advice and consent of the Senate:
. . . any international agreement (i) that would add one or
more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or
otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a
multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic
scope or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the
meaning of the term ``national territory'' as used in Article
VI and Article IX of the ABM Treaty.
On May 14, 1997, you made this certification.
Since it is impossible to resolve the ABM Treaty's status without
meeting one of these two conditions, your certification put to rest any
question about whether ABM Treaty succession requires the advice and
consent of the Senate. Your assertion now that Russia, and perhaps
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are parties to the ABM Treaty ``even
without the MOU'' is, a repudiation of your certification. It implies
that Senate advice and consent is not only unnecessary, but also
irrelevant, and that these states may already have succeeded to the
Treaty without Senate approval.
The Senate's advice and consent powers are not ceremonial or pro
forma. They do not exist for the convenience of the executive branch in
order to clarify ``ambiguity,'' as your letter states. They are the
powers by which the legislative branch--and the legislative branch
alone--decides whether, how, and with whom the United States is bound
by treaty.
In light of the numerous and irreconcilable inconsistencies between
your letters of November 21, 1997, and May 21, 1998, the internal
contradictions within your most recent letter, the disregard for the
negotiating record and historical fact, and other contrivances without
basis in the treaty, we have no choice but to conclude that the ABM
Treaty did not survive the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Accordingly, it is our position that the ABM Treaty has lapsed and is
of no force and effect unless the Senate approves the MOU, or some
similar agreement, to revive the treaty.
We strongly urge that you reconsider your position of May 21, 1998,
and reaffirm your pledge of more than a year ago.
Sincerely,
Trent Lott
Jesse Helms
Don Nickles
Connie Mack
Larry E. Craig
Paul Coverdell
Jon Kyl
Bob Smith
______
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
December 17, 1998
The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your letter concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty succession arrangements. As I said in my two previous
letters on this subject, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM
Treaty succession, which was signed on September 26, 1997, will be
provided to the Senate for its advice and consent.
While I respect the fact that the MOU will not enter into force
without the advice and consent of the Senate, there is no question the
ABM Treaty has continued in force following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. If the Senate were to fail to approve the MOU, ambiguity
would remain about the extent to which states other than Russia are
Parties; however, the ABM Treaty would continue in force.
The United States has a clear interest in resolving definitively
the issues about ABM Treaty succession that are dealt with in the MOU.
I am confident that any differences of views regarding the MOU, or
additional questions you may have, will be debated fully as the Senate
considers the MOU. In the interim, I suggest our staffs continue their
dialogue regarding the technical legal aspects of ABM Treaty
succession.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
______
Presidential Message 35 (May 14, 1997)
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
In accordance with the resolution of advice and consent to
ratification on the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990
(``the CFE Flank Document''), adopted by the Senate of the United
States on May 14, 1997, I hereby certify that:
In connection with Condition (2), Violations of State Sovereignty,
the United States and the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom have issued a
joint statement affirming that (i) the CFE Flank Document does not give
any State Party the right to station (under Article IV, paragraph 5 of
the Treaty) or temporarily deploy (under Article V, paragraphs 1 (B)
and (C) of the Treaty) conventional arms and equipment limited by the
Treaty on the territory of other States Parties to the Treaty without
the freely expressed consent of the receiving State Party; (ii) the CFE
Flank Document does not alter or abridge the right of any State Party
under the Treaty to utilize fully its declared maximum levels for
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty notified
pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty; and (iii) the CFE Flank Document
does not alter in any way the requirement for the freely expressed
consent of all States Parties concerned in the exercise of any
reallocations envisioned under Article IV, paragraph 3 of the CFE Flank
Document.
In connection with Condition (6), Application and Effectiveness of
Senate Advice and Consent, in the course of extension of the period of
provisional application of the CFE Flank Document or a change of a
minor administrative or technical nature; (ii) secure the adoption of a
new United States obligation under, or in relation to, the CFE Treaty
or the CFE Flank Document, unless such obligation is solely of a minor
administrative or technical nature; or (iii) secure the provision of
assurances, or endorsement of a course of action or a diplomatic
position, inconsistent with the principles and policies established
under conditions (1), (2), and (3) of the resolution of advice and
consent to ratification of the CFE Flank Document.
In connection with Condition (7), Modifications of the CFE Flank
Zone, any subsequent agreement to modify, revise, amend or alter the
boundaries of the CFE flank zone, as delineated by the map entitled
``Revised CFE Flank Zone'' submitted to the Senate on April 7, 1997,
shall require the submission of such agreement to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, if such changes are not solely of a
minor administrative or technical nature.
In connection with Condition (9), Senate Prerogatives on
Multilateralization of the ABM Treaty, I will submit to the Senate for
advice and consent to ratification any international agreement (i) that
would add one or more countries as States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or
otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a
multilateral treaty; or (ii) that would change the geographic scope or
coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term
``national territory'' as used in Article VI and Article IX of the ABM
Treaty.
In connection with Condition (11), Temporary deployments, the
United States has informed all other States Parties to the Treaty that
the United States (A) will continue to interpret the term ``temporary
deployment,'' as used in the Treaty, to mean a deployment of severely
limited duration measured in days or weeks or, at most, several months,
but not years; (B) will pursue measures designed to ensure that any
State Party seeking to utilize the temporary deployments provision of
the Treaty will be required to furnish the Joint Consultative Group
established by the Treaty with a statement of the purpose and intended
duration of the deployment, together with a description of the object
of verification and the location of origin and destination of the
relevant conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
and (C) will vigorously reject any effort by a State Party to use the
right of temporary deployment under the Treaty (i) to justify military
deployments on a permanent basis; or (ii) to justify military
deployments without the full and complete agreement of the State Party
upon whose territory the armed forces or military equipment of another
State Party are to be deployed.
William J. Clinton
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 14, 1997.
______
Presidential Message 36 (May 14, 1997)
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I am gratified that the Senate has given its advice and consent to
the ratification to the CFE Flank Document and I look forward to the
entry into force of this important agreement. It will reaffirm the
integrity of one of the CFE Treaty's core provisions and will
facilitate progress on CFE adaptation and, thus, NATO enlargement, key
elements for advancing United States and European security.
I must, however, make clear my view of several of the Conditions
attached to the resolution of advice and consent to ratification,
including Conditions 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 11. These Conditions all
purport to direct the exercise of authorities entrusted exclusively to
the President under our Constitution, including for the conduct of
diplomacy and the implementation of treaties. The explicit limitation
on diplomatic activities in Condition 3 is a particularly clear example
of this point. As I wrote the Senate following approval of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, a condition in a resolution of ratification cannot
alter the allocation of authority and responsibility under the
Constitution. I will, therefore, interpret the Conditions of concern in
the resolution in a manner consistent with the responsibilities
entrusted to me as President under the Constitution. Nevertheless,
without prejudice to my Constitutional authorities, I will implement
the Conditions in the resolution.
Condition (9), which requires my certification that any agreement
governing ABM Treaty succession will be submitted to the Senate for
advice and consent, is an issue of particular concern not only because
it addresses a matter reserved to the President under our Constitution,
but also because it is substantively unrelated to the Senate's review
of the CFE Flank Document. It is clearly within the President's
authorities to determine the successor States to a treaty when the
original Party dissolves, to make the adjustments required to
accomplish such succession, and to enter into agreements for this
purpose. Indeed, throughout our history the executive branch has made a
large number of determinations concerning the succession of new States
to the treaty rights and obligations of their predecessors. The ABM
Succession MOU negotiated by the United States effectuated no
substantive change in the ABM Treaty requiring Senate advice and
consent. Nonetheless, in light of the exceptional history of the ABM
Treaty and in view of my commitment to agree to seek Senate approval of
the Demarcation Agreements associated with the ABM Treaty, I have,
without prejudice to the legal principles involved, certified,
consistent with Condition (9), that I will submit any agreement
concluded on ABM Treaty succession to the Senate for advice and
consent.
William J. Clinton
THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 14, 1997.
______
Condition #9 of the Executive Report 105-1, Resolution of Ratification
for the Flank Document to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty
(9) Senate prerogatives on multilateralization of the abm
treaty.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following
findings:
(i) Section 232 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public
Law 103-337) states that ``the United States
shall not be bound by any international
agreement entered into by the President that
would substantively modify the ABM Treaty
unless the agreement is entered pursuant to the
treaty making power of the President under the
Constitution''.
(ii) The conference report accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) states ``. . .
the accord on ABM Treaty succession,
tentatively agreed to by the administration,
would constitute a substantive change to the
ABM Treaty, which may only be entered into
pursuant to the treaty making power of the
President under the Constitution''.
(B) Certification required.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to the Senate that he will
submit for Senate advice and consent to ratification
any international agreement--
(i) that would add one or more countries as
States Parties to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise
convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty
to a multilateral treaty; or
(ii) that would change the geographic scope
or coverage of the ABM Treaty, or otherwise
modify the meaning of the term ``national
territory'' as used in Article VI and Article
IX of the ABM Treaty.
(C) ABM treaty defined.--For the purposes of this
resolution, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in Moscow on May 26,
1972, with related protocol, signed in Moscow on July
3, 1974.
______
Condition 9: Senate prerogatives on multilateralization of the ABM
Treaty
Condition (9) protects the Senate's constitutional prerogatives by
requiring the President to agree that any agreement to multilateralize
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would be submitted to the Senate
for advice and consent since any such agreement would, by definition,
substantively alter the rights and obligations of the United States and
others under the ABM Treaty.
This condition builds upon a clear and unambiguous legislative
history. The Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act requires that
any agreement that ``substantively modifies'' the ABM Treaty must be
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The
conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1997 Defense
Authorization Act states that any agreement to add signatories to the
ABM Treaty would constitute a substantive change to the treaty
requiring Senate advice and consent.
The majority of the committee views multilateralization of the ABM
Treaty as a substantive modification requiring Senate advice and
consent for a variety of reasons. (This was the one condition with
which questions were raised.) The committee noted with interest a June
6, 1996 study by the American Law Division of the Library of Congress.
While the study concludes that ``an apportionment of the rights and
obligations of the USSR under the ABM Treaty to its successor states
would not, in itself, seem to require Senate participation,'' it does
not contemplate just how those rights and obligations are to be
apportioned. Indeed, the study does not seem even to take into account
the actual Memorandum of Understanding relating to ABM Treaty
successorship.
Accordingly, the sentence preceding the June 6, 1996, study's
conclusion is highly relevant, stating that ``a multilateralization
agreement could include matters that would alter the substance of the
ABM Treaty and require Senate advice and consent.'' Thorough analysis
of how the addition of new States Parties to the ABM Treaty would alter
its functioning reveals a number of problems which must be addressed by
the Senate.
First, new Parties to the ABM Treaty cannot be added without
specially-negotiated, limited rights, but there is no way to do this
within the existing provisions of the treaty. Yet such is necessary if
the United States does not want to entitle each new successor to an
ABM-system and ABM test-ranges. Thus the multilateralization agreement
must add or alter provisions in the current treaty to ensure that ABM
capabilities on the territory of the Soviet Union are not multiplied.
Second, multilateralization inevitably will change the amount of
territory covered by the ABM Treaty. In so doing, it will also change
the geographic scope and coverage of the ABM Treaty. Since several
fundamental limitations in the treaty (such as location of ABM radars)
are defined in terms of ``national territory,'' any change to this
definition changes the basic limitation in the treaty. For example,
Russia continues to operate large-phased array radars which used to be
``on the periphery'' of the Soviet Union (as required by Article VI(b))
but which are now in Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Kazakhstan. A new
agreement would conflict with ABM periphery requirements if Russia (or
another country) were suddenly able to build a new string of radars
along its borders. But if Russia is forbidden to do this, then the
agreement must necessarily ``grandfather'' Russia's continued owning
and operating of radars in other countries. By providing Russia
extraterritorial treaty-rights and a military presence in another
country, this agreement would most certainly constitute a significant
change to the treaty (and a major legal/political issue for countries
which want Russian troops withdrawn from their territories).
Further, if a country of the former Soviet Union opts not to join
the multilateralization agreement, the committee is concerned to know
whether they would be free (in the future) to develop ABM systems. If
so, this too significantly alters the geographic coverage of the
treaty.
Third, multilateralization of the ABM Treaty cannot be done without
permanently, and significantly, altering United States rights under the
treaty. New Parties doubtless will be given an official say at the
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which interprets and
administers the ABM Treaty. Under the bilateral ABM Treaty, the United
States may take actions as approved through bilateral agreements. Yet
with multilateralization, the United States presumably will no longer
have this ability. Expanding the bilateral consensus arrangement into a
multilateral consensus process means that, in the future, one country
(such as Belarus) could effectively block U.S. actions or demand U.S.
concessions even if Russia and the others agreed with the United
States. A second alternative would be to alter the SCC to operate by
means of a majority vote. Yet, if this occurs the United States could
find itself overruled on matters where currently it cannot be.
The history of succession agreements to the various treaties
concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union further
supports the case for Senate consideration of any ABM successorship
document. The United States has engaged in a case-by-case review of
treaty successorship issues. In the one case of the INF Treaty, where
the treaty carried a negative obligation--namely to not possess any
intermediate-range nuclear missiles--the treaty could be
multilateralized without Senate advice and consent. No treaty terms
were altered and the United States incurred no modification or new
treaty rights or obligations. Thus advice and consent was not
necessary.
Multilateralization of the START Treaty under the Lisbon Protocol,
on the other hand, required Senate advice and consent. In this case,
multilateralization had clear implications for the treaty's text and
object and purpose. The Lisbon Protocol determined the extent to which
countries other than Russia would be allowed to possess strategic
nuclear weapons. Similarly, ratification of the Lisbon Protocol also
effectively determined successorship questions to the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Under the protocol, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed to a legally-binding commitment to join
the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Finally, the Senate specifically
considered the question of multilateralization of the treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) under Condition (5) of the
resolution of ratification for the CFE Treaty.
Moreover, the ABM Treaty specifically provides that any amendment
to the treaty be considered under Senate advice and consent procedures.
Article 14 of the Treaty states that ``agreed amendments shall enter
into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into
force of this Treaty.'' In other words, An amendment is to be adopted
through the ratification process.
Under Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the
Senate holds a co-equal treaty making power. John Jay made one of the
most cogent arguments in this respect, noting that ``of course,
treaties could be amended, but let us not forget that treaties are made
not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both, and
consequently that as the consent of both was essential to their
formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter * * *
them.''
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