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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

FAILED POLICY ON IRAQ (Senate - February 25, 1999)

[Page: S1996]

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the primary reason I came to the floor this afternoon is to speak about the administration's failed policy on Iraq. I say it is a failed policy. I wish that weren't the case, but it is. It is a failed policy.

The administration, this administration, President Clinton, inherited a situation where President Bush and the Secretary of State had won the war with Iraq. We achieved our military objective, which was to get Iraq out of Kuwait. We stated that was our objective. We accomplished that objective. We came home. We implemented sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. We had a total embargo on Iraqi products, including oil. Oil was the No. 1 product, or commodity, that Iraq exported. It provided 95 percent, I believe, of its foreign currencies.

We put that embargo on because they invaded a neighbor. And, frankly, they probably intended to invade other neighbors--maybe Saudi Arabia--and really became the dominating power in the Persian Gulf. We didn't think that was right. We sent 550,000 troops. We stopped them. We kicked them out of Kuwait, and we imposed sanctions to make sure that we would get rid of their weapons of mass destruction, because we knew they were building chemical and biological weapons and possibly nuclear weapons.

And so we set up an international regime called UNSCOM to inspect to make sure they wouldn't be doing this again, that they wouldn't be building these weapons of mass destruction to cause more problems for their neighbors and surrounding countries in the foreseeable future. The entire world community supported us, applauded us in that effort. I think we had 30 countries that were involved in the coalition aligned against Iraq in 1990, 1991, 1992. That is what President Clinton inherited.

Well, what has happened since? Let me walk you through what has happened since.

Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis and the Iraqi Government have really baffled the Clinton administration and, in my opinion, they have beaten the Clinton administration if you look at their objectives.

I will show you. The war was in 1991. They were producing over 2 million barrels of oil per day in 1990. After the embargo, they averaged--in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, about 4- or 500,000-barrels per day. We really curtailed their production. Basically, we had the implied reward that said, if you will allow arms control inspectors--if we know that you are not building weapons of mass destruction, we will allow you to produce more oil, there won't be an embargo, but we have to know that you are not building weapons to export throughout the world.

What did this administration do? Well, we had a conflict. Actually it happened in 1994 and 1995; Iraq amassed about 80,000 troops near the Kuwaiti border. We started activating troops. We said, well, we wouldn't let this stand; we will respond militarily, if necessary, and then the problem went away. How did they go away? In April of 1995, the United Nations approved Resolution 986, and this resolution allowed Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every 6 months, $4 billion of oil per year.

Well, you might notice, all right, this happened in April of 1995. Their oil infrastructure took awhile to be rebuilt, but, as a result of the U.N. resolution, a couple of years later they doubled their oil production. And this was supposedly to get their cooperation. We didn't have to go to war at the time. We were able to, supposedly, have arms control inspectors, and so they had a little cooperation.

In March of 1996, Iraq blocked inspections. In June of 1996, we passed U.N. Resolution 1060 that deplores the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by UNSCOM. In August, Iraq launched a campaign against the Kurds. The United States launched a few cruise missiles. The crisis continues. Our arms control inspectors are continually denied access.

In June of 1997, Iraq demands that UNSCOM finish their business. In June, the United Nations passed a resolution that demands--demands--Iraq comply fully with UNSCOM. In October of 1997, Iraq bars American inspectors totally. In October, the United Nations passed Resolution 1134 which condemned Iraq's refusal to allow UNSCOM access to certain sites. Boy, the United Nations is standing tough.

In November of 1997, we passed another resolution, Resolution 1137. We, again, condemned Iraq because they wouldn't allow these arms control inspectors to have access. We are getting close to finding their weapons of mass destruction.

Now, this is only a year ago. A year ago in January this administration was sending 35,000 troops to the Persian Gulf. We are getting ready to go to war again. We are going to have a significant strike. We had significant debate in this body: Is this the right thing to do? Will this bring about compliance? The administration is getting close to going to war. And then what happened? The standoff continues. The inspectors are not allowed access to any of these sites. And then you might remember, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, well, he flies to Baghdad and they come to an agreement. Peace is at hand. Arms control inspectors will be allowed back in.

Well, guess what. There was a little deal made that not too many people were aware of. I venture to say there weren't two

colleagues in the Senate who were aware the administration already cut a deal with Iraq and on U.N. Resolution 1153, they allowed Iraq to sell $5.2 billion worth of oil every 6 months; in other words, allowed Iraq to more than double its oil sales.

This is in February of last year. One year ago, February of 1998, the administration signed a deal. We are getting ready to go to war with Iraq because they wouldn't let us have our arms control inspectors in, and all of a sudden we delegate the authority to the Secretary General. He runs to Baghdad. They signed a deal. Everybody is shaking hands. War is avoided. Everybody can be at ease--no real problems now. We have an agreement. We have Kofi Annan's signature. We have the Iraqis saying they are going to comply; they are going to let in arms control people. And, yes, there was a little deal that they could double oil sales, the Iraqis could double their oil exports to as much as $5.2 billion of oil every 6 months. That was February, a year ago, 12 months from this time.

What happened last August? Let's see. Last August, the Iraqis stopped inspectors again. Now, they have done this repeatedly.

What happened in September and October? They announced they would no longer cooperate. We withdrew the inspectors because they weren't doing anything. They were sitting in hotel rooms. They weren't allowed to have any inspections. And so we started saying this is not satisfactory.

President Clinton, again, he is talking tough--we are going to go to war. We are going to bomb them. We have the international community on our side now because they kicked the arms control inspectors out. We have the international community on our side. We are ready to go.

Well, the administration wasn't ready to go to war so we will give peace a little more of a chance. And we gave peace a little more of a chance, but they still didn't cooperate. We negotiated more. And so in September the United Nations passed another resolution demanding Iraq cooperate. That was in September.

In November, we passed another resolution, U.N. Resolution 1205. We demanded that Iraq cooperate. And then in December we had 3 days of bombing, December 17, 18, and 19. Iraq didn't cooperate. We had 3 days of bombing. Some people called them the impeachment bombings. They happened to be on the day of impeachment. Maybe that is coincidence; maybe it isn't. I don't know.

So we had 3 days of bombing. Boy, that taught them a lesson because they weren't complying, and we are going to make sure they are going to comply. So we bombed them for 3 days. And then what happened? And I don't know if anybody can read this or not, but then on December 23 `U.S. Offers To Raise Crude Sales Cap.' Just days after the bombing, Clinton administration officials are negotiating to lift the oil sales cap.

My point is that we have rewarded Iraq three times in the past for noncompliance with arms control inspectors by raising the oil sales cap. In April of 1995, we allowed them to go from a total embargo to where they could sell $2 billion of oil every 6 months.

That was in April of 1995. Why? Because they weren't allowing the inspectors. Then in February of 1998--again, we are ready to go to war, Kofi Annan, negotiates this deal that will allow them to double it again. So, yes, we had a promise that the inspectors would be allowed to have access. Maybe they had access for a few months. The inspectors start getting close to finding something and Saddam Hussein kicks them out again. We threatened to go to war again. This time we actually did bomb them for 3 days and then, guess what. Days later, we can't wait; we run back and say, hey, we are going to reward you for your noncompliance. That has been the administration's policy dealing with Iraq. Let's reward their noncompliance with arms control inspectors. Let's reward them; we will let them sell more oil. And that is exactly what has happened.

This was the administration's statement days after the bombing. But it is interesting. And this was made by Tom Pickering.

Incidentally, I might mention, Mr. President, we are trying to get the administration to testify at a hearing, and they have been very reluctant to do so. But I think we have a commitment from Secretary of Energy Richardson, and I hope we will have Secretary Albright, or at least Under Secretary Pickering to testify, to explain this position.

His statement is interesting. It says:

[Page: S1997]

Outlining U.S. policy in the wake of last week's airstrikes against Iraq, Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering said the United States would be prepared to review the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gives guaranteed cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors. If not, the sanctions will remain in place in perpetuity and the United States will use force as needed to block weapons development.

In other words, if Iraq doesn't give cooperation, we are going to guarantee that those sanctions will remain in place forever. That was our administration's policy on December 23, just days after the bombing.

Well, guess what. I am critical of this administration. Their policy here, 3 weeks later, on January 14--again in the Washington Post, it says, `Gore Signals Flexibility on Iraq Sanctions; France Proposes Ending Oil Embargo, Changing Weapons Inspections.'

But guess what. Vice President Gore proposed eliminating weapons sanctions. That is our own Vice President who said that. Three weeks after we said we would never lift sanctions unless we had total cooperation, we had the Vice President of the United States talking about--I will just quote part of the article:

A ceiling on how much oil Iraq can sell to provide humanitarian aid to its people should be lifted and the approval process streamlined, Vice President Gore said tonight. . . .

`The ceiling should be lifted.' He didn't say in exchange for cooperation. He didn't say in exchange for having arms control inspectors in. He just said we should lift it. That is very inconsistent, totally overriding what the Under Secretary said 3 weeks before, but totally consistent with what this administration has done.

What this administration has done--Saddam Hussein has tested them. He has pushed them up to the edge of going to war, defied arms control, defied the international community and the arms control community--by kicking the inspectors out. We would talk tough, and then at the last second we would say, `Well, wait a minute, just give us a little inspection, let us have some inspections, let us do it, and you can sell more oil.'

So what has happened? The Iraqis have done just that. Their oil sales have gone way up. Guess what. They have no inspections--none--zero. They are selling as much oil today as they were prior to the war. That is 95 percent of their currency that they earn for all sorts of things.

The administration will say this is only used for food or humanitarian reasons. Hogwash. Money is fungible. If they are ready to take care of humanitarian needs with this money, that means with the other money they have, they can use that to buy arms and weapons and anything else they desire--maybe more castles that they happen to have.

So the administration's policy has been a total disaster. Here is just the oil production charts. It shows for years, 1996 and so on, they were only producing 550,000 barrels a day. Then the administration policy where they allow more and more changes--and you notice now we are up to over 2 1/2 million barrels per day, exactly 2 million barrels a day more than it was in 1996. That has also had the consequence of glutting an already flooded market and is driving a lot of producers totally out of business--totally out of business.

We have a depression going on right now in the oil industry. You have 111 oil rigs running today. Last year we had 372. You go from 370 rigs to 111 in 12 months, and part of the reason happens to be this administration's policy dealing with Iraq.

So I have some concern on what is happening with the domestic oil industry. But my biggest concern is that the administration has had a habit of rewarding Iraqi noncompliance with more oil sales. Now the administration's policy, as stated by the Vice President of the United States, is we should not have a cap on oil sales.

Incidentally, we do not need--or, they don't say this, but we do not have arms control inspectors in; so there is no connection. We are not saying, `Hey, you can sell all the oil you want to; all you have to do is make sure we have access, have arms control inspection; then we'll take all the embargo off.' That should be our policy. But until they do that, we should keep the embargo on. Let's put a little squeeze on.

I said, `What are we doing today?' We are flying daily flights over the no-fly zones. They are shooting at our pilots. Thank goodness they haven't been successful yet. But how successful is our policy? We have already proven to Saddam Hussein, if he denies us, we will reward him. That is what we have done. This is what this administration has done throughout their policy.

Our administration policy has been pretty poor in dealing with Iraq. We have continued to reward their noncompliance, going all the way back to April 1995, and I think it has made the world a lot more dangerous as a result. Saddam Hussein is able to produce all the oil he wants. He is able to generate the moneys he needs, able to build the weapons of mass destruction without anybody checking him whatsoever--not the United States, not the United Nations. As a result, the world is a much more dangerous place.

The administration should be held accountable for their failed policies in Iraq. I also think it is important that we speak up now so we don't have failed policies in Kosovo.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the newspaper articles and tables to which I referred printed in the Record, and I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[Page: S1998]

From the Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1998


U.S. Offers to Raise Iraqi Crude Sales Cap


The Clinton administration offered yesterday to allow Iraq to export more crude oil to raise money for food and medicine, but held out little prospect that Iraq can escape from other U.N. economic sanctions any time soon.

Outlining U.S. policy in the wake of last week's airstrikes against Iraq, Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering said the United States would be prepared to review the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein gives guaranteed cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors. If not; the sanctions will remain in place `in perpetuity' and the United States will use force as needed to block weapons development, he said.

Given the administration's conviction that Saddam Hussein will never give the inspection force known as UNSCOM the unfettered access that the United States and Britain demand--a view supported by official Iraqi pronouncements this week--Pickering's statement amounted to a declaration that Russia, France and other advocates of modifying the inspection system and the economic sanctions will confront strong U.S. and British opposition.

Senior U.S. officials have made clear that they will not return to the previous situation in which Iraq promised to cooperate with inspectors and then obstructed their work, controlling the agenda and forcing Washington to choose between military force or breaking its word to defend the inspections.

Pickering's tone, however, was conciliatory toward the Security Council. He welcomed Russia's announcement that its ambassador to Washington, recalled last week for `consultations,' will return this week.

He also raised the possibility of U.S. assent to an increase in the amount of crude oil Iraq is allowed to sell through U.N.-supervised channels to buy food and medicine. Now Iraq is permitted to sell $5.2 billion of oil every six months.

Administration officials described Pickering's remarks as part of an effort to assuage anger in the Security Council about the four days of U.S. and British airstrikes.

Russia in particular has complained that the strikes circumvented the will of the Security Council and violated international law. Foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said in Moscow yesterday that `there is now a chance to reaffirm the leading role of the Security Council,' an important objective for Russia because its veto in the council is one of its few sources of diplomatic leverage over Washington.

France, which also opposed the strikes, has proposed a modification of the inspection system to make it more palatable to Iraq. Both countries have called for the replacement of UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler, who is anathema to the Iraqis.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-Va.) said the president should `seize the initiative' to make a deal with the Russians, French and other nations to restructure UNSCOM.

But Pickering said UNSCOM was created to be a technically competent weapons inspection force and should not be replaced by an alternate mechanism developed for political reasons.



From the Washington Post, January 14, 1999


Gore Signals Flexibility on Iraq Sanctions--France Proposes Ending Oil Embargo, Changing Weapons Inspections


United Nations, Jan. 13--A ceiling on how much oil Iraq can sell to provide humanitarian aid to its people should be lifted and the approval process streamlined, Vice President Gore said tonight as Security Council members searched for agreement on how to deal with Iraq in the aftermath of a U.S.-led bombing campaign.

France proposed ending the embargo on Iraqi oil sales and replacing intrusive weapons searches by the United Nations with a plan that would ensure that Iraq does not acquire more of the weapons of mass destruction forbidden by the council following Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Until now, the focus of U.N. efforts has been on locating and destroying any prohibited weapons in Iraq's existing arsenal.

Iraqi resentment of that policy caused President Saddam Hussein's government to defy the inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and led to American and British air and missile strikes against Iraq from Dec. 16 to 19. Since then, the defiant Iraq government has refused to permit UNSCOM to return, and the U.N. council has been divided about how to coax or force Iraq to resume cooperation.

The division has been especially deep among the Security Council's five permanent members, each with the power to veto any decision. Gore's speech tonight to the Israel Policy Forum in New York was designed to show U.S. openness to the flexibility France, Russia and China have sought as a way to ease the crippling economic sanctions.

`The United States is looking at ways to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian programs in Iraq, including lifting the current ceiling on funds which can be used to purchase food and medicine,' Gore said of the oil-for-food program, now capped at slightly more than $5 billion a year.

The goal is twofold: to keep the permanent Security Council members, which also include Britain, united, and to demonstrate that the fight is with President Saddam Hussein, whom Gore called `a ruthless dictator ruling unjustly,' and not with the Iraqi people themselves.

`It was Saddam's regime that for four long years, at great cost and human suffering, refused to allow his people the benefits of this program,' Gore said. `Saddam has consistently shown he has cared more about developing weapons of mass destruction than developing the welfare of his people.'

Gore's remarks reflected a position stated by other administration officials soon after the bombings began last month: The United States would agree to lift the ceiling on oil exports for humanitarian needs but will not go as far as lifting the sanction entirely. Gore added that U.N. approval of what Iraq can purchase with its modest oil profits, which can take weeks or months, should be revised to speed the approvals.

Earlier today, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said the French proposal contains `some positive elements that deal with the essential task of ensuring that Iraq does not rearm and is disarmed.'

The French plan calls for:

Long-term weapons monitoring under a `renewed control commission' that would either replace or substantially modify UNSCOM `so that its independence will be ensured and its professionalism strengthened.' Monitoring `would no longer be retrospective but would become preventive,' relying on sensors and television cameras to keep track of what Iraq does in the future.

Ending the embargo on Iraq's sales and exports of oil, its principal commodity. Under present council resolutions, the sanctions are supposed to remain in place until the council determines that Iraq no longer has prohibited weapons.

A program of strict economic and financial controls allowing the United Nations to monitor Iraqi oil sales and ensure that export revenue is not used to acquire new military equipment or dual-use items. However, this monitoring would not interfere with the purchase of legitimate civilian goods and services.



From the Washington Post, January 15, 1999


U.S. Seeks to Alter Iraq `Oil for Food' Program


United Nations, Jan. 14--The United States tried today to defuse growing international criticism of American-backed sanctions on Iraq by proposing eliminating the ceiling for how much oil Iraq can sell abroad as long as the proceeds are used to buy food and medicine.

The proposal was presented by acting U.S. Ambassador A. Peter Burleigh as the Security Council renewed its search for agreement on how the United Nations should deal with Iraq in the aftermath of last month's U.S.-led bombing campaign. The U.S. plan followed a more far-reaching proposal by France that would end the embargo on Iraq oil sales and replace intrusive U.N. weapons searches with a program to monitor any future attempts by Iraq to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

The 15-nation council's consensus on Iraq, intact through most of the decade since Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait was repelled by U.S.-led forces in the Persian Gulf War, has crumbled in recent months because of differences among the five permanent members with the power to veto any decision. The divergences have pitted the United States and Britain, both insistent on maintaining a hard line, against Russia, France and China, which advocate a more flexible and tolerant approach.

Burleigh told reporters that Washington does not regard its proposals as `an alternative to the French plan' because the U.S. ideas deal only with humanitarian issues and do not address the question of how best to pursue Iraqi disarmament. He said the United States disagrees with France's approach to arms inspections, which would shift the focus of U.N. efforts away from locating and destroying prohibited weapons in Iraq's existing arsenal.

`The U.S. government does not believe that it is documented that the disarmament process for Iraq has been completed,' he said. `It appears that the French proposal makes that assumption--either that Iraq is disarmed or that there is nothing further to be known.'

The United States, he added, believes that overseeing Iraqi
disarmament should continue to be the responsibility of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the two organizations originally assigned that job by the Security Council. The UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors left Iraq before last month's bombing, and Iraq has vowed that those from UNSCOM, which it charges are American spies, will not be allowed to return.

The U.S. proposals would overhaul aspects of the `oil for food' program designed to allow Iraq to reduce suffering caused by the broad U.N. sanctions on the economy. In addition to liberalizing Iraq's opportunities for oil sales, the U.S. proposals call for streamlining procedures for approving Iraqi contracts to buy food and medicine, and allowing Iraq to borrow money from an escrow account held by the United Nations to finance such purchases on condition the funds are repaid when Iraqi oil sales reach a higher level. The plan also would expand U.N. programs for the health and welfare of Iraqi children and make it easier for Iraqi Muslims to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

But the most important U.S. proposal was to end restrictions on how much oil Iraq can sell under the oil-for-food exemption. At present, Iraq may sell $5.25 billion worth of oil every six months under tight U.N. controls. As a practical matter, its oil industry, which is badly in need of repair and modernization, has been barely able to produce and sell about $3 billion worth of oil each six months.

To help alleviate that problem, Burleigh said, the United States is willing to relax the scrutiny it has applied to contracts for spare parts and other equipment needed to get the Iraqi industry working better. But he warned that Washington opposes any equipment purchases that would increase Iraq's ability to refine its oil domestically because the refined product could be smuggled out of the country, with the proceeds being pocketed by the regime rather than put to humanitarian purposes.

`Our problem is with the Iraqi government; we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people,' Burleigh told reporters. He repeated the frequent U.S. contention that Saddam Hussein's government has failed to take advantage for the oil-for-food program in order to use the propaganda value of the populace's deprivation to win international support for ending sanctions.

The growing sense in many countries that the sanctions have outlived their usefulness seemed a major factor in spurring the U.S. proposals. It is an open secret that a growing majority of countries on the Security Council favor or are leaning toward lifting the sanctions. If the trend continues, many diplomats here believe the United States soon may be so isolated that it would be able to maintain the sanctions only by using its veto. In that case, the same diplomats predict, it would be only a matter of time before Arab countries and possibly France and Russia, which are in line to win concessions in the Iraqi oil industry,
start to break the embargo.

By proposing measures that could relieve substantially the shortages and hardships affecting the Iraqi people, the United States hopes to turn aside the mounting pressure for ending sanctions. And if the Iraqi government, which has accepted the oil-for-food program with great reluctance, fails to take advantage of any liberalized opportunities, Washington, would be able to argue that the continued plight of the people is the fault of Saddam Hussein.

Whether the U.S. move will succeed was not immediately clear. Delegates from other council nations said they would have to study the U.S. proposals more closely and consult with their governments before making any judgments. Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations, Nizar Hamdoon, was quoted by Reuters as saying the U.S. proposal was meaningless. `It is a cover up for their entire Iraq policy,' he said.

Most attention for the moment was on the French plan, whose elements were made known to council members earlier in the week and have been the subject of informal discussion among various delegations. Delegates said privately that given the strong U.S. opposition to ending sanctions outright and Washington's continued insistence on tough inspections, there seems little chance of the French plan being accepted in anything like its present form.

But as French diplomats said, the potential value of their plan is as `a catalyst' that might stimulate fresh thinking about Iraq and eventually lead to a narrowing of the differences that recently have paralyzed the council.


Iraq                                                          US response                                                                                                       

Aug: Iraq invades Kuwait                                      UN Resolution 661 bars the export of oil.                                                                         
October--Iraq amasses 80,000 troops on the Iraq/Kuwait border April 1995--approved UN Resolution 986. This resolution allows Iraq to sell $2 billion in oil every six months.   
March--Iraq blocks inspections                                June--UN Resolution 1060 deplores the refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by UNSCOM. 
Aug: Iraq launches a campaign against the Kurds               Sept: U.S. launches cruise Missile attacks.                                                                       
June--Iraq demands UNSCOM finish                              June--UN Resolution 1115 `Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with UNSCOM.'                                         
Oct: Iraq bars American inspector                             Oct: UN Resolution 1134 condemned Iraq's refusal to allow UNSCOM access to certain sites.                         
                                                              Nov: UN Resolution 1137, another condemnation of Iraq's action.                                                   
Jan: Iraq continues standoff                                  Feb: UN Resolution 1153 allows Iraq to sell $5.2 billion in oil every six months.                                 
Aug: Iraq stops inspections of new facilities                 Sept: UN Resolution 1194 demands Iraq cooperate.                                                                  
Oct: Iraq announces it will no longer cooperate with UNSCOM   Nov: UN Resolution 1205 demands Iraq cooperate.                                                                   
                                                              Dec: Three day bombing campaign.                                                                                  
No UNSCOM activity                                            Press reports possible removal of oil sale caps.                                                                  


[In thousand barrels per day]

               Persian Gulf Nationsa Selected Non-OPEC Producers                                                                                 Total Non-OPEC   World 
                                                          Canada  China Egypt Mexico Norway Former U.S.S.R.  Russia United Kingdom United States                        

1973 average                  20,668                       1,798  1,090   165    465     32           8,324      NA              2         9,208         25,050  55,679 
1974 average                  21,282                       1,551  1,315   150    571     35           8,912      NA              2         8,774         25,366  55,716 
1975 average                  18,934                       1,430  1,490   235    705    189           9,523      NA             12         8,375         26,058  52,828 
1976 average                  21,514                       1,314  1,670   330    831    279          10,060      NA            245         8,132         27,018  57,334 
1977 average                  21,725                       1,321  1,874   415    981    280          10,603      NA            768         8,245         28,814  59,707 
1978 average                  20,606                       1,316  2,082   485  1,209    356          11,105      NA          1,082         8,707         30,694  60,158 
1979 average                  21,066                       1,500  2,122   525  1,461    403          11,384      NA          1,568         8,552         32,094  62,674 
1980 average                  17,961                       1,435  2,114   595  1,936    528          11,706      NA          1,622         8,597         32,994  59,600 
1981 average                  15,245                       1,285  2,012   598  2,313    501          11,850      NA          1,811         8,572         33,595  56,076 
1982 average                  12,156                       1,271  2,045   670  2,748    520          11,912      NA          2,065         8,649         34,703  53,481 
1983 average                  11,081                       1,356  2,120   727  2,689    614          11,972      NA          2,291         8,688         35,759  53,256 
1984 average                  10,784                       1,438  2,296   822  2,780    697          11,861      NA          2,480         8,879         37,047  54,489 
1985 average                   9,630                       1,471  2,505   887  2,745    788          11,585      NA          2,530         8,971         37,801  53,982 
1986 average                  11,696                       1,474  2,620   813  2,435    870          11,895      NA          2,539         8,680         37,952  56,227 
1987 average                  12,103                       1,535  2,690   898  2,548  1,022          12,050      NA          2,406         8,349         38,149  56,666 
1988 average                  13,457                       1,616  2,730   848  2,512  1,158          12,053      NA          2,232         8,140         38,413  58,737 
1989 average                  14,837                       1,560  2,757   865  2,520  1,554          11,715      NA          1,802         7,613         37,792  59,863 
1990 average                  15,278                       1,553  2,774   873  2,553  1,704          10,975      NA          1,820         7,355         37,371  60,566 
1991 average                  14,741                       1,548  2,835   874  2,680  1,890           9,992      NA          1,797         7,417         36,932  60,207 
1992 average                  15,970                       1,605  2,845   881  2,669  2,229              --   7,632          1,825         7,171         35,814  60,212 
1993 average                  16,715                       1,679  2,890   890  2,673  2,350              --   6,730          1,915         6,847         35,119  60,238 
1994 average                  16,964                       1,746  2,939   896  2,685  2,521              --   6,135          2,375         6,662         35,482  60,992 
1995 average                  17,208                       1,805  2,990   920  2,618  2,768              --   5,995          2,489         6,560         36,327  62,331 
January                       17,265                       1,788  3,115   920  2,795  3,085              --   5,839          2,600         6,495         36,964  63,455 
February                      17,340                       1,718  3,100   920  2,800  3,165              --   5,944          2,625         6,577         37,271  63,856 
March                         17,390                       1,814  3,050   920  2,870  2,990              --   5,830          2,570         6,571         37,019  63,704 
April                         17,180                       1,854  3,020   920  2,860  3,160              --   5,839          2,467         6,444         37,104  63,559 
May                           17,190                       1,768  3,195   920  2,875  2,980              --   5,866          2,512         6,394         37,037  63,558 
June                          17,305                       1,829  3,205   920  2,880  3,150              --   5,839          2,457         6,458         37,225  63,885 
July                          17,395                       1,808  3,150   920  2,870  3,201              --   5,813          2,537         6,338         37,236  63,976 
August                        17,325                       1,872  3,130   920  2,830  3,022              --   5,857          2,385         6,360         36,886  63,646 
September                     17,425                       1,854  3,140   920  2,860  3,095              --   5,826          2,517         6,482         37,271  64,111 
October                       17,385                       1,936  3,165   920  2,860  3,005              --   5,813          2,642         6,481         37,528  64,468 
November                      17,355                       1,889  3,190   930  2,860  3,210              --   5,909          2,743         6,476         37,966  64,926 
December                      17,842                       1,905  3,115   930  2,900  3,198              --   5,830          2,760         6,506         37,989  65,501 
Average                       17,367                       1,837  3,131   922  2,855  3,104              --   5,850          2,568         6,465         37,290  64,054 
January                       18,040                       1,874  3,210   885  2,940  3,268              --  E5,789          2,693         6,402         37,941  65,676 
February                      18,245                       1,920  3,240   885  2,970  3,263              --  E5,729          2,660         6,514         38,041  65,041 
March                         18,460                       1,900  3,215   890  2,970  3,063              --  E5,772          2,638         6,452         37,883  66,018 
April                         18,615                       1,823  3,230   890  2,945  3,388              --  E5,893          2,515         6,441         38,171  66,571 
May                           18,385                       1,737  3,275   880  2,990  3,194              --  E5,902          2,315         6,474         37,738  65,908 
June                          17,980                       1,835  3,220   870  3,005  3,025              --  E5,902          2,135         6,442         37,343  65,128 
July                          17,965                       1,889  3,190   880  3,035  3,194              --  E5,923          2,447         6,409         37,786  65,576 
August                        18,975                       1,895  3,190   870  3,080  2,890              --  E5,945          2,407         6,347         37,534  66,474 
September                     19,005                       1,930  3,195   860  3,105  2,927              --  E5,958          2,483         6,486         37,907  66,827 
October                       19,045                       1,956  3,195   860  3,087  3,209              --  E5,954          2,610         6,467         38,301  67,361 
November                      18,810                       1,970  3,158   860  3,085  3,192              --  E5,945          2,602         6,459         38,342  67,207 
December                      18,416                       1,985  3,090   860  3,056  3,229              --  E5,893          2,700         6,531         38,536  67,007 
Average                       18,496                       1,893  3,200   874  3,023  3,153              --  E5,884          2,517        E6,452         37,955  66,317 
January                       19,061                       1,912  3,240   860  3,085  3,293              --  E5,979          2,597        E6,438         38,514  67,458 
February                      19,513                       1,944  3,155   860  3,140  3,230              --  E5,997          2,583        E6,538         38,578  67,989 
March                         19,380                       1,952  3,170   860  3,160  3,123              --  E5,962          2,600        E6,465         38,468  67,863 
April                         19,680                       1,988  3,140   860  3,140  3,160              --  E5,876          2,602        E6,484         38,361  67,674 
May                           19,680                       1,943  3,210   870  3,149  2,917              --  E5,789          2,499        E6,384         37,923  67,168 
June                          19,225                       1,932  3,260   870  3,050  3,140              --  E5,928          2,495        E6,290         38,188  66,888 
July                          19,290                       2,045  3,200   880  3,120  3,120              -- RE5,923          2,525        E6,322        R38,290 R66,855 
August                        19,250                      R2,016 R3,180  R870  3,055  2,440              --  E5,910         R2,536        E6,276        R37,487 R65,772 
September                     19,385                       2,033  3,160   870  2,906  2,896              --  E5,902          2,632        E6,069         37,567  65,932 
9-Mo. Avg                     19,383                       1,974  3,191   867  3,090  3,033              --  E5,918          2,563        E6,362         38,149  67,059 
1997 9-Mo. Avg                18,408                       1,866  3,218   879  3,005  3,133              --  E5,869          2,476         6,440         37,808  66,022 
1996 9-Mo. Avg                17,313                       1,812  3,123   920  2,849  3,093              --   5,850          2,519         6,457         37,110  63,748 

[Footnote] aThe Persian Gulf Nations are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Production from the Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is included in `Persian Gulf Nations.'
[Footnote] R=Revised. NA=Not available: =Not applicable. E=Estimate.
[Footnote] Notes: (1) Crude oil includes lease condensate but excludes natural gas plant liquids. (2) Monthly data are often preliminary figures and may not average to the annual totals because of rounding or because updates to the preliminary monthly data are not available. (3) Data for countries may not sum to World totals due to independent rounding. (4) U.S. geographic coverage is the 50 States and the District of Columbia.


[Page: S2000]

Mr. ABRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. ABRAHAM. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. Abraham pertaining to the introduction of S. 482 are located in today's Record under `Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.')

Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.


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