The Proliferation Primer
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee
United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
A Majority Report - January 1998
Missile Proliferation in the Information Age
Our case studies have observed proliferation that is reminiscent of Errol Flynn style intrigue, with border smuggling, disguises, and chases at sea amid the thrust and parry of traditional diplomacy. But in the twentyfirst century proliferation will oftentime be invisible, for its perpetrators are likely to be masters of the new information technology. Those trying to defend against it will have to cope with rapid changes as they struggle to prevent nuclear, chemical, and biological blackmail, and the horror of war.
There is within the United States a vast amount of openly available information and hardware useful to anyone who wants to build a long-range ballistic missile. Because of this, it is difficult to predict how quickly other nations will obtain ballistic missile technology, components, or entire systems, and how soon our country will face a long-range ballistic missile threat.
The American ExperienceThe development of America's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Atlas, began in 1955; it was successfully flight tested in 1957 and declared operational in 1959. 1 General Bernard Schriever, who was the Atlas program manager and later commander of the Air Force Systems Command, described in Senate testimony three main technical challenges to ICBM building in the 1950's: attaining intercontinental range, accurate guidance, and system integration. All of these challenges are readily solvable today.
The Atlas program built on the success of the existing Thor intermediate-range ballistic missile. One of the fundamental challenges was to extend Thor's reach from 2,800 kilometers to intercontinental range. 2 According to General Schriever, extending a missile's range "... is among the easiest and most straightforward things to do. One need only add additional boosters -- either on the top or on the sides of an existing missile." 3 That was the technique used to build Atlas, which added an upper stage to extend Thor's range to 8,300 kilometers. 4 This technique is standard practice today, with all of America's space
launch vehicles and ICBM's using some form of stacked or strap-on boosters. While the Atlas is long retired, the Atlas II, a direct descendant of General Schriever's first ICBM, is today an Air Force medium-lift space-launch booster and still features a stacked booster configuration. 5
The Atlas program's second challenge was accurate guidance over intercontinental distances. General Schriever described its initial requirement as an accuracy of 1,500 meters, but after the development of lightweight, high-yield nuclear weapons, this was relaxed to 3-5 miles. 6 Schriever noted this requirement was specific to the destruction of military targets with a high degree of confidence. "If the only requirement is to hold population centers at risk," General Schriever stated, "accuracy requirements can be even further relaxed." 7 In the 1950's, solutions to such problems had to be inventive, Schriever testified; today they are routine. To deliver weapons of mass destruction, "... guidance becomes a relatively straightforward problem to solve -- made even easier through the commercial availability of global positioning system signals." 8 Furthermore, General Schriever said, "... commercially available inertial systems alone can do this job." 9 Today, inertial measurement systems of far greater accuracy than those of 1959 are widely used in commercial aerospace, and controls on their export have been imperfect. Moreover, machine tools which facilitate the manufacture of highly accurate guidance components are widely available.
General Schriever's final challenge, system integration, was serious "... due to the fact that virtually all of the components and subsystems were first-of-a-kind items." 10 Because the U. S. had never built an ICBM, the Atlas team had to pioneer many subsystem testing techniques that are taken for granted today. "Such testing is now well refined and procedures are systematic and well known. In addition, today components and many of the key subsystems are available for purchase on the open market -- leaving little question as to their operability," General Schriever testified. 11 The Atlas team, he said, lacked even basic knowledge of crucial phenomena such as re-entry conditions. The lack of analytical modeling capability required much integrated testing. "Both the physics and analytical capability are readily available" and much of the integrated testing of the Atlas program "could today be done using computer analysis," according to General Schriever. 12
Of course, there are other important differences between the Atlas of the 1950's and today's potential rogue nation ICBM. Atlas, as the general pointed out, was part of an evolving and complex nuclear force structure to deter war and prevail should deterrence fail. Therefore, the weapon had strict requirements for readiness, maintainability, and reliability. 13 A rogue state might eventually desire such characteristics, but initially an ICBM in the hands of a rogue would have no such requirements. Its purpose would be served if it were believed capable of getting off the ground and to the target with its mass destruction weapon. Moreover, as General Schriever noted, his team used "slide rules and vacuum tube computers," while today desktop PC's have "capabilities orders of magnitude greater." 14 And it is important to note that today's ICBM builder has "... the certain knowledge that long range ballistic missiles can and have been built." 15
Availability of Information and Other Resources
Much of the knowledge necessary to build an ICBM is available to anyone who looks for it. In testimony before the Senate, Dr. William Graham, Science Advisor to Presidents Reagan and Bush and former Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), noted that while ballistic missile technology was treated by governments as a secret field of research immediately after World War II, today "... the need to educate, train and maintain a large cadre of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle specialists, together with a relaxation of government restrictions on the dissemination of ballistic missile technology, hardware, software, and trained personnel, have made useful knowledge of the subject widely available." 16 Indeed, as General Schriever stated in his testimony, "[ t] he mysteries we worked our way through 40 years ago are today taught as engineering problems in any good graduate school." 17 The solutions to those mysteries are readily at hand, and they are taught in American universities to an increasing number of foreign students.
EducationTypical engineering courses in American universities today include many that are directly relevant to building a ballistic missile. A sample from the course listing of a well-known private university include: Atmospheric Entry, Space Systems Engineering, Spacecraft Design, Design Of Composite Structures, Inertial And Radio Navigation, Global Positioning System, Space Mechanics, and Rocket Propulsion. The existence of such courses as a routine part of undergraduate and graduate study at American universities has transformed what was once arcane and highly specialized technical expertise into what is now part of the body of general scientific knowledge. This evolution from phenomenal to commonplace characterizes many technological advancements of the last half century, especially in computers and telecommunications.
Today's ICBM builder has "the certain knowledge that long range ballistic missiles can and have been built."
-- Dr. William R. Graham Former White House Science Advisor
Foreign Students in the United StatesAccording to the National Science Foundation, most foreign students in the U. S. study science and engineering. 18 In 1991-1992, nearly half the 400,000 foreign students in U. S. colleges and universities studied these disciplines, twice the percentage for American students. 19 Foreign students are even more disproportionately enrolled in advanced degree programs. In 1993, non-Americans earned about 2.7% of bachelor's degrees, 12% of master's degrees, and 26% of doctorates, despite their 3% share of total advanced education enrollments. 20
In 1977, foreign students earned 11% of all American master's degrees awarded in mathematics and computer science and 22% of those awarded in engineering. 21 By 1993, the numbers had risen to 35% and 33%, respectively. 22 At the doctoral level, foreign students earned 18% of computer science and math degrees and 29% of engineering degrees in 1977. In 1993, it was 44% and 51%, respectively. 23 Those figures are for students holding temporary visas. If non-citizens with permanent residence were included, doctoral figures would be 47% in math and computer science and 57% in engineering. 24
The figures are even higher for some countries of origin. In 1981, China had no doctoral candidates in the U. S.; by 1991, there were 1,596. 25 Today, 83% of Chinese students are enrolled in science and engineering fields, and nearly two-thirds study at the graduate level. 26 Chinese students comprise approximately 10% of all foreign students studying in U. S., the highest percentage of any country. 27
China is not the only proliferant state that sends students to obtain the technical expertise available in American universities. According to the Visa Office of the State Department's Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the following number of Category F (student and dependent) visas have been issued since 1984 for the countries indicated:
North Korea 98 Iran 16,854 Iraq 2,007 Libya 408 Syria 9,308 China 121,952 28
The State Department tracks only numbers of visas, not the students themselves. Until recently, the U. S. government made no attempt to monitor activities of foreign students; what they study, who finances their education, and where they go afterward. 29 In response to questions about the World Trade Center bombing, the INS reported, "[ a] t present, foreign students in the U. S. are not subject to continuing scrutiny, tracking, or monitoring when they depart, drop out, transfer, interrupt their education, violate [their visa] status, or otherwise violate the law." 30 Congress subsequently authorized a pilot program, begun in June of 1997, to determine the feasibility of collecting data on foreign students studying in the U. S., but it covers only about two percent of the foreign students estimated to be in the U. S. 31 The U. S. has issued student visas to nearly 10,000 residents of terrorist states since the Gulf War who have studied primarily in technical fields. 32 The following data show the percentage of each country's students in the United States who studied science and engineering during the 1995-96 academic year:
Iran 71.9% Iraq 65.0% Libya 47.5% Sudan 53.9% Syria 68.5% 33
Publicly Available InformationPotential proliferators need not enroll in a doctoral program to acquire America's vast technical expertise because so much is available at their fingertips. As Senator Thad Cochran noted, "The Internet puts the vast technical resources of the U. S. -- and those of other countries -- at the disposal of anyone with a telephone line," and each day more resources are available on-line. 34
Visitors to NASA's homepage on the World Wide Web are greeted thus by Administrator Goldin: "NASA is deeply committed to spreading the unique knowledge that flows from its aeronautics and space research...." 35 To organize that unique knowledge NASA has established the "Scientific and Technical Information (STI) Program," which promises "ready access to over 3 million aerospace and related citations. Powerful search capabilities offer access to both the latest and most important historical information about aerospace, aeronautics and related topics." 36 STI includes the Center for AeroSpace Information, or CASI. "The CASI Technical Reports Server (RECONselect) is a field searchable WAIS [Wide Area Information Server] database which contains NASA produced technical reports and aerospace-related open literature from 1970 through current...." 37 A NASA fact sheet describes CASI's functions as follows:
The program displays an abstract and locates the document. Most can be ordered from NASA. 28 While many are, of course, decades old, so is the ICBM. Rogues don't need the most modern ICBM's. They would find the Atlas of 40 years ago more than sufficient for their purposes. While much material in a database this size would be irrelevant to an ICBM builder, useful items can be located easily.
NASA is not the only on-line source. The U. S. Patent Office has a searchable database of patents dating from 1976. A search on the term "missile and guidance" produced:
missile: 4422 occurrences in 1661 patents.
guidance: 5083 occurrences in 3196 patents.
(missile AND guidance): 257 patents.
Search Time: 1.85 seconds. 257 results
Among the 257 results were the following:Patent Number and Title 5,554,994 Self-surveying relative GPS (global positioning system) weapon guidance system 5,544,843 Ballistic missile remote targeting system and method 5,457,471 Adaptively ablatable radome 5,451,014 Self-initializing internal guidance system and method for a missile 5,435,503 Real time missile guidance system 5,397,079 Process for the autonomous positional control of guided missiles 5,379,966 Weapon guidance system (AER-716B)
The system provides a patent abstract, information on the number of associated drawings, links to related patents and to other on-line resources, and ordering information. Patent offices of numerous other countries are also available on-line. Publicly available information virtually built the Soviet space shuttle. When the "Buran" (Russian for "snowstorm") was unveiled in 1988, observers were stunned at its resemblance to its American counterpart. 40 The similarity was not accidental. In what was called "one of the first cases of Internet espionage," the KGB systematically collected public information and mined open commercial and government databases for information on the U. S. shuttle program. 41 According to a CIA report,
From the mid-1970's through the early 1980's, NASA documents and NASA-funded contractor studies provided the Soviets with their most important source of unclassified material in the aerospace area. Soviet interests in NASA activities focused on virtually all aspects of the space shuttle. Documents acquired dealt with airframe designs (including the computer programs on design analysis), materials, flight computer systems, and propulsion systems. This information allowed Soviet military industries to save years of scientific research and testing time as well as millions of rubles as they developed their own very similar space shuttle vehicle. 42
Other intelligence officials said the Russians saved "billions" by on-line spying. 43
Soviet-exploited databases include those maintained by the DoD's Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and the Commerce Department's National Technical Information Service (NTIS), both of which provide technical reports purchasable from the Government Printing Office (GPO). 44 According to intelligence officials, until they were cut off by the Reagan administration, the Soviets simply bought DTIC and NTIS documents from the GPO office in Washington. 45 This overt information gathering took place in the earliest days of the Internet and the personal computer with tools that were relatively primitive compared to those available today.
The Internet is only the beginning. Modern computers can put entire libraries on a desktop. Commercial databases such as The Aerospace Database are available on CD-ROM. As described by its publisher,
The Aerospace Database... contains abstracts of reports issued by NASA, other U. S. government agencies, international institutions, universities, and private firms.
Dating back to 1962, the online Aerospace Database contains more than 2 million references that you can search and retrieve easily and cost effectively. And you can quickly access them on a modem-equipped computer terminal. Once you've located the reference you want, you can obtain a photocopy or microfiche of the full text ...
The CD-ROM version of our database is the cost-effective solution for frequent database users. An especially good bargain for international subscribers, it lets you avoid the telecommunications requirements and costly connection charges of online service...
Updated monthly, the Aerospace Database online is perfect for monitoring aerospace markets in other countries, gaining access to the work of international aerospace leaders, staying abreast of new products and trends, keeping up with emerging technologies. In just seconds the Aerospace Database lets you search more than 30 years of accumulated knowledge in aerospace and related sciences. You'll find in-depth coverage of aeronautics, astronautics, space sciences, chemistry and materials, geosciences, life sciences, mathematics, and computer sciences.
You'll have the convenience of using the CDROM at your desktop. No costly connection charges. Just an easy to use CD-ROM for your own personal use... 46
Also available commercially are cheap but sophisticated mathematics, design, engineering and manufacturing software programs which give potential proliferators needed tools to design and build ballistic missiles. NASA even maintains a World Wide Web site devoted to distributing such software. COSMIC, "NASA's Partner for Software Technology Transfer," 47 is an internet service whose "... role as part of the NASA Technology Transfer Network is to ensure that industry, other government agencies, and academic institutions will have access to the advanced computer software technology which is produced for NASA projects." 48 Items in the COSMIC catalog, including high-fidelity missile modeling software, may be ordered via phone, fax, or e-mail. Numerous universities and laboratories offer technical software useful for ballistic missiles, including programs for three-dimensional fluid dynamics, finite element analysis, aerodynamic design, and combustion modeling, directly downloadable without restriction. 49
ExpertiseExpertise too is for sale. With steep reductions in the ballistic missile forces of Belarus, Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Russia, there is a large, skilled technical force of scientists and engineers who are available to those who may need their assistance. The transition from a command economy toward a market-oriented one has left many of these workers unemployed and impoverished. So dire has the situation become that in 1995, the director of the noted Russian nuclear weapons laboratory, Arzamas-16, committed suicide when he was unable to pay his scientists, engineers, and technicians for months on end. 50 Press reports in August of 1997 described Russian scientists, displaced from Cold War-era jobs, who were working in Iran on medium- range missiles capable of striking Central Europe. 51 Neither the Russian government nor U. S. intelligence agencies have conclusive data on how many people like these are employed in other countries. 52
Hardware and Materials
Given Russia's economic problems, impoverished military, and pervasive lawlessness, the security of Russian military hardware is problematic. Some troubling evidence was found in 1995 on the bottom of the Tigris River in Iraq, where United Nations inspectors discovered precision gyroscopes that had been removed from Russian long-range missiles. 53 Similar equipment was intercepted in Jordan enroute to Iraq. 54 Russian officials denied involvement, but could not explain how missile equipment disassembled under the START Treaty got to Iraq, although a Washington Post article said the devices were protected in storage only by "a lock, and one person." 55
Lax Russian security is not the only source of hardware. In 1996, a U. S. News and World Report/ 60 Minutes investigation reported the disarray in the U. S. Defense Department's disposal of surplus military hardware, run by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS). Surplus materials are coded for destruction or "demilitarization" (rendering the equipment militarily useless) before sale from warehouses (called "DRMO's") and marketed on the internet. According to Defense Department officials, however, most equipment is improperly coded, and much dangerous hardware, including attack helicopters, missile guidance equipment, and computers storing top secret nuclear weapons data, has been sold. The nuclear weapons information was contained in a computer purchased by China, DRMS's "biggest customer," 56 and was concealed in scrap metal bound for Shanghai when intercepted by the U. S. Customs Service. 57 In the fall of 1997, a Minuteman ICBM test console was listed for sale in the DRMS catalog, coded as not requiring demilitarization. After Senate staff inquiries, the equipment was removed from the on-line catalog but its final disposition could not be determined. A diligent caste of middlemen buy from DRMS and resell indiscriminately. At one California surplus store, a shopper paid $100 cash for each of two working rocket engines -- engines used to steer General Schriever's Atlas ICBM. 58
In the fall of 1997, a Minuteman ICBM test console was listed for sale in the DRMS catalog, coded as not requiring demilitarization. After Senate staff inquiries, the equipment was removed from the on-line catalog but its final disposition could not be determined.
The end of the Cold War has complicated surplus equipment management. DRMO workers and managers describe themselves as "... overloaded with equipment from the massive military drawdown," worth more than $20 billion annually in recent years. 59 Much of it is new and increasingly sophisticated. A Defense Department investigator told 60 Minutes, "[ t] he types of property that these DRMO's are receiving has changed. It's no longer the obsolete materials... Now it's state-of-the-art, hightech, sensitive military equipment that they're receiving." 60 However, as Senator Cochran observed, "[ t] he fact is that the U. S. can be threatened by technology other than the most advanced." 61 The Atlas ICBM of 40 years ago would still be a formidable weapon for today's rogue state.
Sophisticated hardware is increasingly obtainable commercially. While the Global Positioning System (GPS) began as a U. S. military navigation tool, it is commonly used today by civilians. GPS receivers accurate to within 50 feet are available by mail for under $100. 62 An innovative team of junior Air Force engineers built a guidance system for a cruise missile using commercially procured GPS receivers and microprocessors. They bought numerous components once available only to military organizations, including radar absorbing material, inertial measurement units, small rocket motors, heat shield materials, sophisticated ceramics, and more, all on the open market. 63
One item with implications for proliferation is the ballistic missile's fraternal twin, the space launch vehicle (SLV). Technologically, there is "no real difference" 64 between the two; all current U. S. expendable space launch vehicles began life as ballistic missiles. 65 The reverse is the case with the Indian Agni missile, which is based on an SLV. 66 According to Dr. William Graham, "[ i] f you take space launch vehicle technology and add to it the reentry vehicle, you have an ICBM." 67 How to add the reentry vehicle is well understood, documented and disseminated, especially if there is no requirement for high accuracy, and expert assistance is plentiful and available.
The increased demand for satellites leads to a concomitant one for new space launch capabilities. The telecommunications explosion, for example, has increased demand for personal communication services best met by space-based satellite systems. Iridium is a commercial venture placing in orbit 66 satellites to form a global, wireless communications network which "... will enable subscribers to communicate using handheld telephones and pagers virtually anywhere in the world," beginning in 1998. 68 Teledesic, a consortium led by Microsoft Corporation chairman Bill Gates, has still more ambitious plans to create a constellation of several hundred satellites for worldwide wireless internet and telecommunications access. 69 Small dish antennae, high-quality digital signals, and inexpensive receiving equipment have created high demand for Direct Broadcast Satellite television of which nearly six million systems have been installed in the U. S. in just over three years. 70 Even car manufacturers offer GPS-based navigation systems. All these forces create high space launch demand, and as Dr. Seth Carus notes, "[ n] ew space launch vehicles under development generally require fewer people to operate, often are designed to be fired from mobile launchers, and are designed to be operated with minimal preparation.... Unfortunately, these same characteristics are useful for ballistic missiles as well as space launch vehicles." 71 This increased demand can result only in greater diffusion of space launch knowledge. As commercial space launch becomes more commonplace, so will its technology and hardware.
Anticipating the ThreatEasy access to technology is not the only troublesome aspect of tomorrow's WMD and delivery systems threat. History demonstrates that it is difficult for intelligence agencies to obtain an accurate understanding of when such threats will materialize.
First Soviet Atomic ExplosionOn July 1, 1949, the CIA issued its top secret annual report on the Soviet atomic energy project which concluded, "their first atomic bomb cannot be completed before mid-1951" and declared mid-1953 as the "most probable date." 72 Eight weeks later the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device. 73 Misjudgments about ballistic missiles also go back a half-century and continue today.
British Estimates Regarding the German V-2 Ballistic Missile
The V-2 was the first successful long-range missile, the prototype of all modern ballistic missiles, and the first guided missile used in war. Between September 1944 and March 1945, over 2,500 V-2's killed several thousand people. More ballistic missiles were launched during these months than in all subsequent conflicts combined, including the Iran-Iraq "War of the Cities" and the Persian Gulf War. 74 The V-2 fathered missile proliferation as well. After World War II, the U. S., the Soviet Union, France, and Britain competed for captured V-2 technology, research, and personnel.
The Treaty of Versailles, while banning German heavy artillery, placed no restrictions on missiles. The German Ordnance Office adjusted, substituting ballistic missiles for the illegal artillery (a cautionary tale for arms controllers). Ballistic missiles were also intended to deliver chemical agents against enemy troops.
Military specifications for the V-2 were set in 1936. Work began at Peenemunde, on the Baltic, in 1937. Testing commenced in mid-1942, with the first completely successful launch in October of that year. Production started roughly a year later.
Late in 1939, an anonymous source gave British intelligence a report mentioning the missile-related activity at Peenemünde, although the lead was not pursued for three years. In the winter of 1942-43, additional intelligence, including the secret recording of a conversation between two captured generals, again alerted the British to the German ballistic missile program. This time, a major collection and analysis effort acquired much photographic, human, and signals intelligence on the German work. But only in August 1944, weeks before the V-2 began to rain on London, did British intelligence arrive at a reasonable understanding of the V-2's propellant, missile and warhead size, and firing method. 75
On September 7, 1944, after three months of buzz bomb strikes, the British Government announced the end of V-1 attacks on London. Officials felt safe enough about V-2's to keep even their invention secret from war-weary Britons. After all, no launch sites had been detected, and in any event the Allied advance would surely push them south, out of range.
Once again, the experts were wrong. On September 8, the first of over 500 V-2s hit London.
East European SS-23 MissilesIn March of 1990, after the fall of East Germany, its successor government revealed it possessed two dozen SS23 ballistic missiles and their associated transporters, launchers, and support equipment. 76 As these 500 kilometer range missiles had been banned by the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, arms controllers were surprised by the discovery. Prior to the INF agreement, the USSR had transferred SS-23's not only to East Germany, but also to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Afterwards they argued this had not violated the INF treaty, saying it applied to Soviet and American missiles, not those of other "sovereign" nations. 77
Western intelligence agencies were said to be unaware of the missile transfers, even though, as Dr. Seth Carus points out, these missiles were a "priority target" for NATO intelligence organizations and "... there were few areas of the world subject to more intensive intelligence surveillance than Eastern Europe in the 1980's." 78 Yet the redeployment of these nuclear capable missiles might never have been discovered in the absence of the economic and political collapse.
Saudi Purchase of CSS-2 Missiles from China
In March of 1988, the U. S. announced Saudi Arabia had obtained several dozen CSS-2 (DF-3) Dong Feng (" East Wind") missiles from the People's Republic of China. The announcement came more than a year after the Saudis began their effort to obtain the missiles. 79
Iran's aggressive initiatives in the Iran-Iraq war alarmed Saudi leaders: a quasi-successful ground offensive, the "Tanker War" against Saudi shipping in the Persian Gulf, and missile attacks on Iraq. 80 According to Saudi General Khaled Bin Sultan,
It was against this background of Iranian violence and persistent belligerence that, I assume, King Fahd decided that we needed a weapon to improve the morale of our armed services and our people; a deterrent weapon not intended to be used, except as a last resort when it should be able to demoralize the enemy by delivering a painful and decisive blow; a weapon which, once launched, could not be jammed or intercepted; a weapon which would make an enemy think twice before attacking us. The challenge was to find a country able to supply such a weapon at speed and without constraining conditions. 81
When the Saudis were unable to purchase American short-range Lance missiles and F-15E strike fighters, they looked elsewhere for missiles. 82 In 1986, the Saudis began secret negotiations with China to buy CSS-2's, a missile whose range has been estimated at up to 3,000 kilometers, placing Israel and Iran within reach. The Saudis maintained operational security using small teams of hand-picked officers, hidden facilities, cover stories, decoys, and tight security practices. 83 Between 50 and 60 CSS-2's were purchased; 84 25 missiles arrived in the fall of 1987, and 25 more in the spring of 1988. 85
In March 1988, the Saudis claimed an undisclosed number of CSS-2's. 86 While they assured the U. S. the missiles would be armed only with conventional warheads, observers feared an escalation to nuclear warheads. Partly to ameliorate these concerns, Saudi Arabia has since joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
U. S. intelligence had no apparent awareness of the CSS-2 purchase before the fall of 1987. 87 The Saudi acquisition became more obvious in January of 1988, when trucks carrying imported Chinese missiles ostensibly destined for Iraq were observed traveling south, rather than north, from Saudi ports. 88
The late discovery of the CSS-2 purchase is widely regarded as a U. S. intelligence failure. William Safire wrote, "the Chinese-Saudi missile deal stunned Washington, which mistakenly thought that neither Beijing nor Riyadh would alter the balance of power in the Middle East without checking with the U. S." 89 Even the Saudi director of the project was surprised this secret was kept so long. Saudi Prince Sultan writes, "it was rumored that five CIA people had been fired for the intelligence failure, but this may have been bluff." 90
Iraqi Extended-Range Scud MissilesThe Iraqi regime faced a problem during its war with Iran in 1986: Iranian Scud-B missiles regularly bombarded Baghdad, while Tehran, about 500 kilometers from the Iraqi border, was beyond the range of Iraq's own Scud-B's. Saddam Hussein therefore undertook a crash program to extend the range of his Scuds.
He used two expedients: the payload (warhead) size was reduced, and the missile's fuselage and fuel tanks were lengthened for increased volume. 91 The modifications gave the new missile, the Al Hussein, twice the 300 kilometer range of the Scud-B, sufficient to reach Teheran from Iraq. The modifications were apparently made by cannibalizing Scud-B's, with two Al-Husseins built from three Scud-B's. East Germany, Egypt, and North Korea may have assisted in the modification. 92 West Germans may also have helped construct and operate the production facilities, and build the missile itself. 93 Less than two years after Iranian Scuds hit Baghdad, the Iraqis were ready to respond with their improvedrange Al-Hussein.
On February 29, 1988, Baghdad announced Iraq would continue to attack cities in Iran until the Iranians agreed not to attack Iraqi cities. 94 From February to April, about 190 Al-Husseins were fired at six Iranian cities; 135 hit Tehran. The missiles, too inaccurate to use against military targets, killed 2000 and wounded 4000, amid significant other damage. Some 25 to 60 percent of Tehran's population of 10 million fled in response to the Iraqi barrage. 95 The Al-Hussein strikes persuaded Iran to cease firing their Scud-B's at Baghdad. The "War of the Cities" ended on April 20, 1988. The AlHussein had achieved Saddam's objective. 96
The Iraqis' ability to double their Scud-B range was apparently unanticipated by the U. S. According to the 1993 Air Force-sponsored Gulf War Air Power Survey, "[ b] y all indications, Western intelligence agencies were unaware of this program until scores of Al-Husseins began hitting Iranian cities." 97 While Iraq publicly announced the existence (and a test) of the Al-Hussein as early as August of 1987, this "was discounted as bluster by most foreign observers." 98 Testimony by a former Director of the National Security Agency indicates the intelligence community had not been tasked by policymakers to determine whether Iraq was extending the range of its existing missile force. 99
The Iraqis' ability to double their Scud-B range was apparently unanticipated by the U. S. According to the 1993 Air Forcesponsored Gulf War Air Power Survey, "[ b] y all indications, Western intelligence agencies were unaware of this program until scores of Al-Husseins began hitting Iranian cities." While Iraq publicly announced the existence (and a test) of the Al-Hussein as early as August of 1987, this "was discounted as bluster by most foreign observers."
The Al-Hussein, and perhaps other upgraded variants of the Scud-B like the 800 kilometer Al-Abbas, were later used against Israel, Saudi Arabia, and U. S. forces in the Gulf War. In November of 1997 Defense Secretary Cohen said Saddam had been working on a 3,000 kilometer range ballistic missile which would have reached most of western Europe and "... was trying to extend the range even further and possibly reach parts of the U. S." 100
Iraqi Launch of the Al-Abid Space Launch Vehicle
On December 7, 1989, Iraq announced it had two days earlier launched a rocket capable of carrying satellites into space. The 80-foot, 3-stage rocket, called AlAbid (" the Worshipper"), weighed 48 tons and employed Scud technology. The first stage consisted of four or five Scud or Al-Hussein missiles strapped together. The second was two Scud/ Al-Hussein missiles, and the third was either a single Scud, a modified Soviet surface-to-air missile, or possibly a small rocket of Brazilian design. 101 In the 1989 test, the first stage reached an altitude of about 12 kilometers, but the other two stages either failed to separate or may not have been activated. 102 Baghdad television broadcast the launch, showing the countdown and liftoff and tracking the rocket as it rose. 103
Iraq claimed this missile could serve either as a satellite launch vehicle or as a 2,000 kilometer range ballistic missile. 104 The planned ballistic-missile variant of the AlAbid was probably the Tammuz I, whose existence was announced by Baghdad on December 14, 1989. 105 Despite Iraqi claims to the contrary, the Tammuz I does not seem to have been flight tested. This missile, with a 750 kilogram (1650 lb.) payload, appears to have been in the research and development stage during the Gulf War. 106
U. S. and other intelligence services evidently were surprised again, not only by the Al-Abid test launch, but by the very existence of the system. Defense analysts W. Seth Carus and Juan Bermudez, citing contemporary stories in the New York Times, 107 wrote:
Western intelligence officials appear to have known nothing about the Al-Abid. Even when Iraq publicly announced the test, two days after the launch, U. S. officials were unaware of the existence of the Al-Abid or that it had been fired. Indeed, many U. S. officials were skeptical of the reports. As the U. S. scrambled to find out what had happened, a number of reporting errors were made. The U. S. Department of Defense claimed that the third stage of the booster went into a low earth orbit for several revolutions. Although this claim was incorrect, it clearly demonstrates the confused response by officials in the United States to the Iraqi launch. 108
According to then-Senator Cohen, "[ t] hey [the Iraqis] surprised many, including most, I would suggest, within the intelligence community that they were able to achieve what they did. They came close to putting a payload in orbit. Now that came as a surprise." 109
Secretary Cohen could have made that point about each foregoing example. Those failures in anticipation do more to expose the nature of this difficult problem than to condemn the U. S. Intelligence Community. Predictions of cultural, political, or economic change are routinely inaccurate. Predictions of technical change are even less reliable, particularly when combined with deception. For diverse reasons -- successful deception, uncommon ingenuity, deficiency of intelligence, or simple failure -- technological surprise has always been a fact of life, one likely to become more commonplace in the information age.
The 1995 National Intelligence EstimateIn 1995, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) issued a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years" which concluded, "[ n] o country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada." 110 Although the Gates Commission, headed by former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, found that the NIE made "... a strong case that for sound technical reasons, the United States is unlikely to face an indigenously developed and tested intercontinental ballistic missile threat from the Third World before 2010," others were skeptical because of the inherent difficulty in prediction, because the U. S. Intelligence Community has missed innovations in the past, and because of the assistance countries like Russia and China are providing to rogue nations, particularly Iran, thus making the qualifier "indigenously" of indeterminate value.
The 1995 NIE was criticized on numerous methodological grounds by the General Accounting Office (GAO): For wording its main conclusion with unwarranted certainty, for failing to quantify the level of certainty for "... nearly all of its key judgments," for failing to identify its assumptions, and for failing to develop less likely "alternative futures." 111 The GAO did not examine the NIE substantively. Had it done so, it would have found more shortcomings.
The NIE relegated foreign assistance to rogue state ICBM programs to the category of "a wild card" which "... can hinder our ability to predict," but did not conclude or even estimate how much this "wild card" would shorten a rogue's ICBM development or acquisition time. 112 The NIE did not quantify in how much less time than "the next 15 years" a rogue could develop an ICBM with, for example, guidance technology from abroad. With more and better tools becoming increasingly accessible, outside assistance means "indigenous" development grows easier every day. As former Under Secretary of State William Schneider said in Senate testimony, the difficulty "... facing potential proliferators has evolved from a problem of basic scientific design to one of industrial processes." 113
The MTCR: Inadequate to the TaskThe Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the Administration's primary tool for impeding the spread of ballistic missiles and weighed heavily in the NIE's conclusion that the 48 contiguous states would not face a ballistic missile threat in the next 15 years. While some analysts say it has played "... an important role in slowing the spread of ballistic missile technology," there are serious weaknesses in this regime. 114 First, it is not a treaty but a voluntary arrangement, which diminishes its legal efficacy. 115 While U. S. domestic law requires sanctions on persons or companies who violate the MTCR, the regime itself has no formal enforcement mechanisms. 116 Membership in this suppliers' group has grown from the original G-7 members in 1987 to 29 nations today, but there are important absentees, including North Korea and China. China, while pledging to adhere to MTCR guidelines, has not always done so, and although Russia is a member, its missile commerce with Iran raises serious questions about its respect for MTCR provisions.
The increasingly popular space launch vehicle challenges the MTCR's ability to control proliferation. Escalating demand for space-based telecommunications has created a corresponding demand for launch capability, and new consortia plan to launch hundreds of small satellites in the next few years. As the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency acknowledges, "... the technology used in an SLV is virtually identical to that used in a ballistic missile." 117 The MTCR explicitly considers "missiles" to include SLV's, but is "... not designed to impede national space programs." 118 Senator Carl Levin noted this inherent tension in a Senate hearing, observing that retarding proliferation by restricting SLV's "increases the chance people aren't going to join the MTCR because every country has a right to engage in space launches." 119 According to Seth Carus, another important weakness arises from the Clinton Administration's interpretation of MTCR requirements:
Predictions of cultural, political, or economic change are routinely inaccurate. Predictions of technical change are even less reliable, particularly when combined with deception. For diverse reasons -- successful deception, uncommon ingenuity, deficiency of intelligence, or simple failure -- technological surprise has always been a fact of life, one likely to become more commonplace in the information age.
The text of the MTCR requires that SLV's be treated as restrictively as ballistic missiles. However, the current administration, while requiring new MTCR members that are not nuclear weapon states to eliminate MTCR-proscribed ballistic missiles, allows such new states to continue SLV programs and to receive assistance on those programs from other MTCR members. 120
As demand for launch capacity increases, the SLV problem will worsen.
The MTCR, then, offers hope for impeding missile proliferation. But it is less an obstacle than originally hoped.
Intelligence AnalysisAnother limiting factor in the Intelligence Community's predictions of technological innovation by rogue states is the tendency to assume that these states employ American-style testing in their development programs. The NIE reportedly states, "[ d] evelopmental flight testing would normally provide a minimum of five years warning before deployment." 121 This is true of U. S. missiles, with their stringent requirements for accuracy, reliability, maintainability, and safety, but not for rogue states. A North Korean defector, Colonel Choi Ju-hwal, stated, "unlike U. S. missiles... North Korean missiles are not designed for such surgical precision. What they are targeting is a general region rather than specific facilities.... Therefore, the precision of the missiles is not a... matter of great importance.... So for that reason, they do not need multiple testings. One testing would be enough." 122 The No-Dong's history confirms that. Despite having only a single flight test, its deployment apparently has begun. 123
Similarly, claims that rogues would not use ICBM's for fear of overwhelming U. S. retaliation suggest that analysts are assuming rogue states are driven by the same logic and strategic considerations as U. S. policymakers. An ICBM need not be used to be useful; the threat of a launch could be enough to constrain the U. S. in a crisis.
In a confrontation, it would affect the calculus of U. S. leaders. One need not postulate an "irrational" rogue, but only understand that he might calculate his moves differently. What is viewed as a "cost" in Washington may appear to be otherwise in Tehran, Pyongyang, or Baghdad, among other places.
Dr. Graham has suggested a technique to mitigate this problem which he calls "intelligence anticipation." As he describes it, "[ r] ight now, intelligence only tells us about what people see, and you are not going to see anything that is going to lead to substantial consequences ten years from now. So we should be... trying to analyze how countries with various stated intentions could act if they wished" to carry out those intentions. 124
As part of this idea, Graham has also suggested "try intelligence" or "TRYINT:"
[R] ather than just watching to see if some country does something, if we think it is possible for a developing world country to do something, let's get a group together with the resources and education and access of that third world country and let them try to do it and see what they come up with. That has actually been done a few times, not, as far as I know, by the intelligence community, but by other organizations in the government and the results have been startling and I believe profound. 125
The Air Force is conducting at least two such programs, which examine missile threats to the U. S. The results are indeed startling and illustrate not just the value of "TRYINT" but the degree to which public information and materials can support missile programs (see box on opposite page).
"TRYINT" IN ACTION
The CHOP and HTD Programs
Examples of Sources Exploited by the Programs
The Importance of WillDevelopment of an ICBM is no trivial undertaking for anyone. If it were, missile threats to the U. S. would be far more numerous and long-established. But the steady march of technology, and the trend toward the normalization and increased civilian use of space, has transformed the once exotic technology of ballistic missiles into the commonplace. Corresponding improvements in information technology ensure this technology is spread widely and rapidly. These developments are not to be lamented. The growing use of space has brought incalculable benefits to mankind. Information technology advances are exhilarating and essential to societies which value the free exchange of information and ideas. The widespread dissemination of knowledge will inevitably include information relevant to military capabilities, and we should understand, even expect, that some will put it to dangerous use. Such is the price of freedom.
The solution, then, is not to try to restrict the free flow of information and technology, though of course there is a place for controlling militarily specific and dualuse exports and classifying certain information. Rather, the U. S. must recognize the potential uses of such information, and prepare to deal with its consequences.
When asked to explain how he built America's first ICBM so quickly, General Schriever singled out one factor: "determination." He said the program succeeded because the U. S. was determined it would. Given the rapidly progressing Soviet missile program, Atlas had been designated "a matter of the highest national priority" and the will to succeed was central in overcoming technical obstacles the project encountered. "Experience has taught me that necessity is the mother of invention," Schriever testified. 127
Long range missiles can deliver any weapon of mass destruction available and consequently are sought by many countries with interests inimical to those of the U. S. Since the first American ICBM's flew forty years ago, their existence has become commonplace and their technology is everywhere, from college textbooks to World Wide Web sites to the local electronics store. Export controls and arms control may slow but cannot stop the spread of missile technology, and growing demand for dual-use platforms such as space launch vehicles threatens to make such strategies increasingly ineffectual.
The question is not whether, but when a rogue state will summon the will to threaten the U. S. with an ICBM. America's track record of predicting such events suggests that this threat may appear sooner than expected. When the inevitable threat appears, the question will then be, are retaliatory threats alone enough to protect America and American interests?
ENDNOTES1 Telephone interview with Office of the STRATCOM Historian, November 18, 1997. 2 Ibid. 3 U. S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, hearing on September 22, 1997, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, 105th Cong., Sess. 1, 1997, p. 31. Hereafter cited as Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age. 4 Ibid. 5 Space and Missile Systems Center, Fact Sheet: Atlas IIA Launch Vehicle Program, http://www.laafb.af.mil/SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/atl2_fs.html, November 24, 1997. 6 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 32. 7 Ibid. This argument was echoed by two North Korean defectors who testified at another hearing of the subcommittee.
8 Ibid.9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 18. 16 Ibid., p. 12. 17 Ibid., p. 2. 18 The U. S. Government maintains no systematic statistics on foreign students in the United States. The figures used by the National Science Foundation are derived from data compiled by the Institute for International Education, a private organization which receives some public funding to administer student exchange programs.
19 National Science Board, Science & Engineering Indicators, 1996, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1996. (NSB 96-21), pp. 2-23, and Appendix Table 2-7.20 Ibid., pp. 2-23 and Appendix Tables 2-19, 2-27 and 2-29. 21 Ibid., Appendix Table 2-27. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., Appendix Table 2-29. 24 Ibid., pp. 2-19. 25 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age., p. 14. 26 National Science Board, Text Table 2-11. 27 Ibid. 28 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 4. 29 Hillary Mann, Open Admissions: U. S. Policy Toward Students from Terrorism-Supporting Countries in the Middle East, Research Memorandum Number ThirtyFour, The Washington Institute for Middle East Studies, September 1997, p. 5. 30 U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Controls Governing Foreign Students and Schools That Admit Them, Final Report on Foreign Student Controls, December 22, 1995, 1-1, cited in Mann, p. 5. 31 Mann, p. 5. 32 The figures are for Iran (4789), Iraq (467), Libya (104), Sudan (1404) and Syria (3003). Mann, p. 6. 33 Ibid. 34 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 1. 35 National Aeronautics Space Administration, NASA Homepage, http://www.nasa.gov/, November 11, 1997. 36 NASA Scientific and Technical Information Program, NASA Scientific and Technical Information Server, http://www.sti.nasa.gov/STI-homepage.html, November 11, 1997. 37 Ibid. 38 NASA Fact Sheet, "What is the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information (CASI)?," undated. 39 One example is a report entitled "Design and Testing of Ballistic Missiles," a Russian language text covering propulsion, structures, system engineering, design of missile complexes, and testing. John London, "National Intelligence Estimate On Emerging Missile Threats to North America; Comments, Assessments, Cautions," Briefing, Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, April 4, 1996. 40 Robert Windrem, "How Soviets stole a shuttle, Part 2: Codename: Farewell," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/news/112811.asp, November 4, 1997. 41 Robert Windrem, "How Soviets stole a shuttle, Part 1: Paranoia and online espionage," MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/news/112796.asp, November 4, 1997. 42 Quoted in Windrem, "How Soviets stole a shuttle, Part 1." 43 Ibid. 44 According to its homepage (http://www.fedworld.gov/ntis/ntishome.html), NTIS is "the official resource for government-sponsored U. S. and worldwide scientific, technical, engineering, and business-related information." According to its web site (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/about.html), "In a nutshell, DTIC provides information -- records of planned, ongoing, or completed Defense-related research -- to U. S. Government agencies and their contractors." Because of the nature of the information that DTIC handles, users must qualify for service from DTIC. However, a significant portion of DTIC held information is available to the general public from the National Technical Information Service. Additionally, DTIC provides several World Wide Web sites, including DefenseLINK, the official DoD Home Page, as well as anonymous ftp sites to anyone on the public Internet. 45 Windrem, "How Soviets stole a shuttle, Part 1." 46 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, "AIAA Aerospace Database," http://www.aiaa.org/publications/database.html. 47 COSMIC University of Georgia, COSMIC Ğ "NASA's Partner for Software Technology Transfers," http://www.cosmic.uga.edu/. 48 COSMIC University of Georgia, "About COSMIC and our Services," http://www.cosmic.uga.edu/pub/cosinfo.html.
49 London, pp. 8-16.50 David Hoffman, "Russian Turmoil Reaches Nuclear Sanctum," Washington Post, December 22, 1996, p. A29. 51 Steven Erlanger, "U. S. Tells Moscow to Halt Ballistic Missile Aid to Iran," New York Times, August 22, 1997. 52 Telephone conversation, subcommittee staff member with CIA official, August 29, 1997. 53 David Hoffman, "Russian Missile Gyroscopes Were Sold to Iraq," Washington Post, September 12, 1997, p. A1. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Peter Cary, "How Surplus American Arms Get Into the Wrong Hands," U. S. News & World Report, December 9, 1996, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/9ARMS.HTM. 57 "SNAFU: Military and weapon components coded for destruction before demilitarization are available at auctions and through locator services to civilians," 60 Minutes, December 1, 1996. 58 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 16. 59 Cary, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/9ARMS. HTM. 60 Ibid. 61 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 2. 62 Bruce D. Norwall, "GPS Success Sparks New Concerns for Users," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 1, 1997, p. 58. Also see http: www. magellangps .com for a description of available hand-held GPS receivers.
63 Memorandum to Subcommittee for International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services from Capt. Steven A. Leonard, Air Force Countermeasures Branch Chief, August 28, 1997.64 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 28. 65 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 41. The Atlas II was derived from the Atlas, the Titans II and IV from the Titan II ICBM, and the Delta from the Thor IRBM. 66 Ibid. 67 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 40. 68 "Seventh Successful Launch for Iridium LLC; Five Additional Satellites Now in Orbit," Iridium press release, http:// www. iridium. com, November 8, 1997. 69 Teledesic LLC, http://www.teledesic.com/overview/html, November 14, 1997. 70 U. S. Congress, House Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection Hearing on October 30,1997, Video Competition, 105th Cong., Sess. 1, 1997, p. 1. "Primestar ranks highest in J. D. Power and Associates 1997 Cable/ Satellite subscriber satisfaction survey", October 1, 1997, http://www.primestar.com/ezget/ezget-f.htm, November 1, 1997. 71 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 9. 72 Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun; the Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon & Schuster), 1995, p. 363. 73 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival, (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 197. 74 U. S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Comittee Hearing, Worldwide Threat to the United States, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 1995, p. 66. 75 The V-2 was thought to have a solid propellant (cordite), when, in fact, it was liquid fueled (liquid oxygen and alcohol). British ballistics experts were relatively unfamiliar with research on liquid propulsion. Their own experiments involved solid fuel. An intelligence official wrote after the war that "where our experts were wrong was in assuming that the Germans were trying to make an enormously enlarged version of a schoolboy rocket." See R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945, (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978), p. 343. Accurate photo interpretation combined with this inaccurate assumption about propulsion yielded large overestimates of the weight of the missile and its warhead. The V-2 was believed to weigh as much as 60-100 tons and to carry a 2-8 ton warhead. In actuality, the V-2 was a 13-ton missile with a 1-ton warhead. Prime Minister Churchill's chief scientific adviser argued that a missile weighing tens of tons would be impossible to launch and therefore the whole business was a hoax to divert attention from some real weapon under development. Those who believed the missile was not a hoax expected, again on the basis of British experiments, that it would be launched from a "long projector" or large gun. A half dozen huge concrete structures in northern France were identified as launch sites for the missile and attacked by allied bombers. Two of these facilities actually had been built to support the V-2. After the initial attacks, however, they were abandoned. The Germans made some cosmetic repairs for deception purposes, but planned to fire the V-2 from mobile launchers. Despite the largescale allied air offensive (Operation Crossbow) to eliminate the V-2 and the V-l armed, pilotless aircraft (the buzz bomb), "[ t] here is no convincing evidence that a V. 2 [sic] launching-platform ever received a direct hit." Basil Collier, The Battle of the V-Weapons, 1944-1945 (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1965), p. 139. 76 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 5. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Apparently the United States obtained evidence of the CSS-2 transfer, which was sufficiently clear to make the official announcement, in January 1988. The Saudis made initial overtures to the Chinese in 1985 and received agreement in principle to the sale in July 1985. Detailed negotiations about the sale began no later than December 1986. David B. Ottaway, "Saudis Hid Acquisition of Missiles," Washington Post, March 28, 1988, p. Al; HRH General Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior. A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 138. 80 Sultan, pp. 142-145. 81 Ibid., p. 145 82 "Saudi Purchase of Chinese Missiles Changes Middle East Military Balance," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 22, 1988, p. 30; Ottaway, "Saudis Hid Acquisition of Missiles," p. A13. 83 Sultan, pp. 138-141, 145-149. 84 Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The Politics and Technics (Oxford: SIPRI, 1996), p. 92. 85 Bill Gertz, "State, Pentagon worry about Saudi missiles," Washington Times, May 12, 1988, p. A3. 86 Bill Gertz, "Saudis building launch bases for nuclear-capable missiles," Washington Times, March 18, 1988, p. Al. 87 Ibid., p. Al. 88 Ottaway, "Saudis Hid Acquisition of Missiles," p. A13. 89 William Safire, "Those Chinese Missiles," New York Times, February 23, 1989, and U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989, p. S5448. 90 Sultan, p. 150. 91 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War. Volume IV: The Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 850. The authors cite various estimates for the Al Hussein's warhead size, ranging from 300 kilograms (660 pounds) to as low as 250 pounds (about 113 kilograms ). 92 W. Seth Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability, Policy Focus Research Memorandum number six, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1988, p. 11, and U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and on International Economic Policy and Trade, Hearing on July 12, 1989, Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime), 1990, p. 123. 93 Michael Elleman and John Harvey, "The Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: What is the Threat?" in Kathleen C. Bailey and Robert S. Rudney, Proliferation and Export Controls (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), p. 33. 94 W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iraq's Al Husayn Missile Programme (part 2)" Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, June 1990, p. 242. 95 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 6. The Department of Defense states that almost one-third of the population of Tehran evacuated the city in response to the missile attacks. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, April 1992), p. 13. 96 Gregory S. Jones, The Iraqi Ballistic Missile Program: The Gulf War and the Future of the Missile Threat (Marina del Rey, CA: American Institute for Strategic Cooperation, Summer 1992), p. 16; Carus and Bermudez, p. 242. 97 Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993), Volume II, Part 2, p. 318. 98 Steven Zaloga, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Scud and Beyond," International Defense Review, November 1988, p. 1425. See also Carus and Bermudez, "Iraq's Al Husayn Missile Programme, (part 1)," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1990, p. 207. 99 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearings on Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U. S. Policy Options and Implications, 1990, p. 488. 100 This Week, ABC News, November 16, 1997. 101 Karp, pp. 852-853, and Cordesman and Wagner, pp. 852-853 102 Cordesman and Wagner, Ibid. 103 Ibid., and Subhy Haddad (Reuters), "Iraq Announces Launch of Three-Stage Rocket," Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8, 1989, p. A25. 104 Jones, p. 68. 105 Carus and Bermudez, p. 246.
106 Cordesman and Wagner, pp. 852-853.107 Michael R. Gordon, "Iraq Announces Test of a Rocket; U. S. Fails to Confirm Launching," New York Times, December 8, 1989, p. A14; Michael R. Gordon, "U. S. Confirms Iraq Has Launched Rocket That Can Carry Satellites," New York Times, December 9, 1989, p. 7. 108 Carus and Bermudez, p. 247. 109 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Hearings, Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U. S. Policy Options and Implications, 1990, S. Hrg. 101-1071, p. 489. 110 Foreign Missile Threats: Analytical Soundness of Certain National Intelligence Estimates, U. S. General Accounting Office, GAO/ NSIAD-96-225, August 30, 1996, p. 3. 111 Ibid, p. 2. 112 Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19, U. S. General Accounting Office, GAO/ T-NSIAD-97-53, December 4, 1996. 113 U. S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Hearing, Proliferation and U. S. Export Controls, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., June 11, 1997, p. 47. 114 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 28. 115 The Missile Technology Control Regime, ACDA Fact Sheet, http:// www. acda. gov/ factshee/ exptcon/ mtcr96. htm, September 15, 1997. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 39. 120 Ibid., p. 9. 121 "Do We Need a Missile Defense System?" The Washington Times, May 14, 1996, p. A15. 122 U. S. Congress, Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Hearing, North Korean Missile Proliferation, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., October 21, 1997, p. 14. 123 Bill Gertz, "North Korea Cited For Missile Activity," Washington Times, Sept 27, 1997. 124 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 43. 125 Ibid. 126 Leonard, Memorandum to Subcommittee. 127 Hearing, Missile Proliferation in the Information Age, p. 3.
The Proliferation Primer
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee
United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
A Majority Report - January 1998
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