TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM &
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
THE IRAQI WMD CHALLENGE --
Myths and Reality
February 10, 1998
*
Nobody likes the idea of Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and missiles capable of delivering their lethal warheads. The
ramifications of their potential use in anger -- the numbers of fatalities
and injured they might inflict -- are horrendous. However, as the US is
getting ready to bomb in Iraq in order to address the challenge of that
country's remaining WMD arsenal, one should examine dispassionately what
might be conceivably accomplished, and what would be the ramifications of the
massive bombing campaign the Clinton Administration is advocating.
Despite Baghdad's protestations, Iraq does have a small but very lethal
operational arsenal of WMD and platforms capable of delivering them
throughout the Middle East and even beyond. Although Iraq has been subjected
to an unprecedented regimen of UN inspection and destruction of strategic
military programs since the end of the Gulf War in the Spring of 1991, the
international community has proven incapable of learning the entire scope of
the Iraqi programs for fielding weapons of mass destruction, let alone
eliminate these programs as mandated by the Security Council.
Significantly, the first major independent study of the possible magnitude
of the Iraqi undeclared and concealed WMD arsenal was not conducted until the
Summer of 1994. For this study, the BND (German Intelligence) relied on KNOWN
Iraqi post-Gulf War illegal acquisitions of technology, sub-systems, and
strategic materials in Western Europe (mainly Germany, Austria and
Switzerland) to assess what could be done with these acquisitions. Even
without taking into consideration such diverse inputs as Iraqi acquisitions
from countries of the former Soviet Union, the PRC and Iran, as well as
rumored but unproven acquisitions in Europe, the results of the BND study
were startling for they pointed to several specific programs that not only
had the UN inspectors been unaware of in mid 1994, but they have so far
proven unable to discover and stop. For example, the Iraqi purchase of a
special kind of igniter, with a short shelf-life, for SCUD-type warheads,
strongly suggested that the Iraqis used these igniters for operational SCUD-
type missiles, as they are capable of increasing the range. The BND thus
concluded that it was "difficult to assess" the magnitude of the current
Iraqi weapons program. There was no doubt that not only "some of the material
equipment" was excluded from discovery and destruction by the UN, but certain
projects were being revived and run clandestinely.
A new approach to studying the Iraqi WMD programs was adopted in the
aftermath of the "defection" of Lt.Gen. Hussein Kamal in the Summer of 1995.
Originated as an audacious ploy to destroy the anti-Saddam movement from
within, the "defection" went sour when Baghdad panicked over reports of
contacts between Kamal and the CIA in Amman. Consequently, Baghdad was
compelled to surrender to the UN large quantities of material Kamal might
have divulged while in Amman. Consequently, Kamal and his brother were lured
back to Baghdad where they were promptly assassinated. Meanwhile, the entire
perception of the extent of the Iraqi WMD program had to be reevaluated.
Most important was the realization that there is an on going Iraqi program
the UN inspections team is highly unlikely to discover and stop. In January
1996, the assessment of the Israeli Military Intelligence was that within the
next four years, Iraq would have ten SCUD launchers and some 150 SCUD-type
missiles. Some of these missiles are to be equipped with warheads containing
WMD. A major aspect of the Iraqi program as of the mid-1990s was the
organization of a highly mobile transportation system for the operational
elements. Thus, by late 1997, the Iraqis were capable of transferring a few
thousand liters of biological materials to new concealed sites within two or
three weeks without supervision. As far as Baghdad was concerned, once the
materials were hidden, supervision may be permitted to resume as usual.
Another indication of an anticipated expansion of Iraq's ballistic missile
activities came in late 1997/early 1998 with the appointment of two senior
officers -- Abd-al-Rizzaq Shihab of the Army and Muzahm Tassab al-Hassan of
the Air Force -- as deputy heads of the Military Industries authority. Both
generals held senior command positions of Iraqi missile forces during the
Gulf War and are considered Iraq's leading experts in ballistic missile
operations. Moreover, during 1997, Iraqi military units conducted several
simulated deployments and launching of ballistic missiles of the type and
range Iraq is not permitted to have.
Meanwhile, despite the ongoing presence of UN inspectors and the threat of
resumed bombing, the Iraqi strategic arsenal continued to expand as the
current British Government's threat assessment testifies. In early 1998, Iraq
is known to possess 48 SCUD-type missiles and six launchers. (Gen. Wafiq
Samarraj, the former chief of Iraqi Military Intelligence, knew of at least
45 SCUD-type missiles with range of over 600 km and several others being
repaired at the time of his defection in 1994.) A large portion of the 45 BW
warheads/bomb containers Iraq acknowledged constructing in the late 1980s are
believed to have survived the Gulf War and still elude the UN inspectors. The
British Government estimates that the Iraqis still have 30 warheads capable
of carrying chemical and\or biological weapons' material. For these warheads
and other weapons, Iraq has at least 8,400 liters of Anthrax, as well as 600
tons of chemicals that are sufficient for the production of 200 tons of VX
nerve gas -- where a single droplet can kill. (Samarraj reported that in 1994
Iraq concealed 200 containers with biological weapons, more than half of
which are still considered in operational condition.)
And while public attention is focused on ballistic missiles, Iraq has even
more effective and lethal platforms of the delivery of its weapons of mass
destruction. In late December 1996, German intelligence confirmed that Iraqi
weapons technicians developed a drone described as "the little guy's cruise
missile." This unmanned aircraft is made of plastics and plywood -- simple
and cheap to produce without any tell-tale equipment that can attract the UN
inspectors. The drone has a range of about 700 kilometers and is equipped
with a very accurate GPS navigation system illegally purchased in the West.
Each drone can carry 30 to 40 kilograms of biological or chemical warfare
agents to the intended target. It is almost impossible to detect this drone
by radar because of its size, slow speed and lack of metal parts. The BND's
experts are most alarmed by the Iraqi fielding of a version of this drone
that can be also launched from ships. Consequently, one cannot rule out the
possibility of an Iraqi-controlled commercial ship suddenly launching these
drones outside the coasts of Europe -- from where these missiles can reach
and threaten London, Paris or Berlin -- as well as the Atlantic coast of the
US.
Another type of chemical weapons known to be in the Iraqi arsenal is
"Agent 15" nerve agent. According to British Government sources, Agent 15 is
a non-lethal psychochemical nerve gas designed to stupefy enemy forces. It
is a derivative of BZ. The agent can be disseminated in various forms -- from
artillery and rocket warheads to pouring into water supplies. Depending on
the concentration, Agent 15 can cause weakness, dizziness, disorientation,
hallucinations and loss of co-ordination. At the level of concentration
likely to affect unprotected troops on a battlefield, Agent 15 is expected
to disorientate and disable soldiers for a relatively short time (measured
in hours). Iraq is known to have experimented with BZ and various derivatives
since at least 1985. The British learned that Iraq had built up large stocks
of an operational version -- Agent 15 -- only in late 1997.
Thus, Iraq still has a small, diverse, but very deadly operational arsenal
of WMD. If used operationally, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction can
cause heavy casualties among both civilian population and military forces not
just in the Middle East, but even in the US. The key warhead and bomb
components are very small and can be easily moved from one place of
concealment to another. Furthermore, if the bulky protective measures of
these components are removed, at a risk to the Iraqi troops and nearby
population, the movement and concealment of these key warhead and bomb
components becomes even more easy. Moreover, it is then virtually impossible
to distinguish from afar between these warheads and comparable high-explosive
systems -- say, artillery shells.
Assuming that the US located these clandestine WMD, it is still far from
certain the US will be able to bomb and destroy all the Iraqi operational
weapons. And this has nothing to do with the accuracy of aircraft or the
penetrability of smart munitions. The problem lies in the ruthlessness of
Saddam's regime and his desperate clinging to power. For example, what if the
bulk of the chemical warhead components are stored in, say, the Baghdad
Presidential Palace -- two miles southeast of the edge of the Baghdad West
Airport. The eruption of any such warhead, let alone a larger storage
container, as a result of bomb damage will devastate the heart of Baghdad --
killing countless innocent people. Is this a legitimate outcome of a US
bombing campaign? The argument that Saddam is to be blamed for such a tragedy
just because he had placed these weapons at the heart of Baghdad carries
water only up to a certain point. Besides, Washington should dread the
reverberations of such a justifiable act throughout the Muslim World. And
what about an Iraqi "retaliation" against a US city using terrorists or a
ship-borne drone?
*
Significantly, however, even if the US and its allies will have managed to
destroy the bulk of Saddam WMD operational arsenal, this will provide only
a short term solution. No bombing campaign against Iraq, and even an
occupation of that country for that matter, is capable of destroying the hard
core of Saddam Hussein's primary WMD development and production programs. The
reason is that under current conditions these programs are run outside of
Iraq -- mainly in Sudan and Libya, as well as Algeria (storage of some hot
nuclear stuff). Thus, once the bombing campaign is over, the Iraqis can be
expected to smuggle new weapons from Iraq's development sites and production
lines - sites that remain untouched by allied bombing as well as unchecked
by UN inspection teams. And, for as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power,
this charade called disarming Saddam will continue.
One should not be surprised by this sad state of affairs.
The transfer of Iraqi WMD overseas started even before the outbreak of the
Gulf War. Back in late 1990, when Baghdad realized Iraq would be subjected
to intense bombing, key sensitive elements were smuggled out. Then, in the
Spring of 1991, once the extent of the post-War inspection regime became
clarified, especially given the type and amount of data provided to the West
by numerous defectors, a second round of hasty smuggling took place.
Essentially, the core of the next-generation projects of the Iraqi WMD
programs was moved to safe-havens. A lot of know-how and key subsystems were
shipped out with the idea of building alternate production facilities in the
host countries.
Most important are the programs transferred to Libya and Sudan -- two of
Iraq's closest allies during the Gulf War that have strong aspirations for
WMD of their own. Libya, long struggling to overcome embargoes and the
cancellation of arrangements for the supply of technology and systems from
Western Europe, has been looking for the Iraqi embargo-busting knowledge and
for Iraqi proven solutions for Libyan problems. Sudan needs WMD in order to
hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the
Islamist terrorism empire. Hence, Iraq found eager and willing partners for
its efforts to circumvent the world's campaign against its WMD.
While the initial movements of WMD stuff were emergency measures or by-
products of other considerations, Baghdad reexamined its posture by late
1993. By then, Saddam Hussein had already realized that the UN inspections
were not going away, and that the US remained determined to continue the
policy of containment and sanctions. Moreover, the US retaliation for the
June 1993 narrowly averted an attempt on the life of former President Bush
by Iraqi intelligence convinced Baghdad that there would be no reconciliation
with the US in the foreseeable future. Hence, Baghdad adopted a long term
strategy to endure the global pressure. In March 1994, Babil (a newspaper run
by Saddam Hussein's eldest son Uday) declared that it would be "desirable for
the leaders of Iraq, Libya and Sudan to hold a summit meeting ... and adopt
a common stance" to meet the challenges facing the Arab World.
Meanwhile, Iraq was reviving the international support system for its WMD
development and production programs. By late 1994, Iraq's secret purchasing
system was completely restored. It was operating energetically not only to
just restore previous capabilities but to support new projects -- mostly
outside Iraq. Anticipating that the sanctions would be lifted from Iraq, many
European firms were rushing to grab a good share of what used to be a very
lucrative market. Presently, the Iraqi-run system is made up of an endless
and redundant web of Western firms and technology plants, liaison people,
banks and financial institutes, secret merchants and middlemen -- so that it
is virtually impossible to discover all components, let alone bring down the
system. The procurement system of the Iraqi intelligence has been
resurrected, it functions, and it feels good. The present system has not only
arose on the ruins of the previous one, but it has learned and overcome all
the errors of the system of the 1980s. Significantly, virtually all the firms
and plants that had worked for Iraq before the Gulf War have already found
their way into the fold of the new system. This time however, many support
and sustain programs in Libya and Sudan, as well as in third countries from
where the Iraqis ship the goods on their own. Thus, when Lt.Gen. Hussein
Kamal "defected" in the Summer of 1995, he was bringing data of what was left
behind in Iraq -- not on the wave of the future already being constructed in
Sudan and Libya.
*
SUDAN
The Iraqi-Sudanese strategic cooperation dates back to the close alliance
between the two countries during the Gulf War. The Iraqi-Sudanese alliance
has endured the close relations between Khartoum and Tehran. Originally, Iraq
established a major expeditionary force in Sudan in order to strike Egypt and
western Saudi Arabia. In late August 1990, the Iraqi deployment included
several South African made G-5 155mm guns equipped with both high-explosive
and chemical shells, as well as 14 SCUD-B launchers with several missiles
each that were originally deployed along the Red Sea coast across from Yanbu
and Jeddah. In early January 1991, the Iraqis delivered additional SCUD
launchers to Sudan and handed them over to the government. The Sudanese armed
forces deployed these launchers in northern Sudan. These SCUDs targeted
southern Egypt, including the Aswan High Dam. (By 1995, Sudan would ask
Russia for spares and expert technicians to fix its own SCUD missiles and
other sub-systems. The serial numbers and other technical data provided by
Khartoum proves that the Sudanese SCUD systems had been sold originally to
Iraq.)
In March/April 1991, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz requested
permission from Sudan's President Umar al-Bashir to move Iraqi chemical
weapons and additional SCUD missiles to Sudan in order to circumvent their
destruction by the UN. Al-Bashir agreed. Thus, in the Summer of 1991, as UN
inspections became inevitable, Iraq transferred a large number of SCUDs,
estimated at about 400 missiles, and chemical weapons, for "safekeeping" in
Yemen and Sudan. Soon afterwards, with Saudi pressure on Yemen growing, the
Iraqi ballistic missiles were shipped from Yemen to Sudan. In 1993, Iraq sent
additional chemical weapons to Sudan, this time through Iran.
Meanwhile, Iraq also transferred in the Summer of 1991 some nuclear
material to Sudan for temporary storage. This program continued into mid 1992
with fissionable material, documents, and weapons' sub-systems being shipped
via Jordan utilizing Sudanese diplomatic mail privileges. For example, a
truck carrying "furniture" from the Sudanese Embassy in Iraq to Khartoum in
mid January 1992 was actually loaded with barrels of uranium. Among the Iraqi
material sent to Sudan were approximately 27.5 pounds of 93% U-235 which had
been originally supplied to Iraq by France for use in the French-built Osiraq
research reactor. (However, since there are no nuclear facilities in Sudan,
the bulk of the nuclear materials was shipped forward to the Algerian reactor
in Ain-Oussera -- a PRC-built reactor with military/weapons development
capacity. Algeria is still storing the Iraqi nuclear equipment and
radioactive materials.)
With the UN inspections continuing, Baghdad committed itself to bolstering
the regime in Khartoum -- a key storage site for Iraq's strategic systems.
By the Fall of 1993, a large number of Iraqis moved into the area of the Red
Sea mountain range -- in Madabay in Khawr Ashraf, Port Sudan, in the region
of Dalawat on the Red Sea near Hala'ib, and the city of Tawker in region of
Karnakanat. The Iraqis brought into these installations high-tech equipment
and computers, missiles, defense systems, anti-aircraft systems and radar
systems. By late 1993, the regions surrounding these installations were
experiencing strict security measures and 24-hour armed patrols roam around
it. In some areas, such as in the Port Sudan area, shepherds and nomads were
completely removed from security zones with a 60 km circumference.
The Spring-Summer of 1995 saw the emergence of an Iraqi-Iranian-Sudanese
Axis. This Axis was the outcome of secret contacts between Iraq and Sudan,
culminating in the visit to Khartoum by the Iraqi Social Affairs Minister
Latif Nusayyif Jasim. In order to implement this Axis agreement, about 20
intelligence officers were added to the Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum (second
only to the 26 operatives assigned to the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan).
Many of these intelligence officers are involved in sanctions busting via
Sudan and Africa. Baghdad and Khartoum also reached an agreement to implement
a comprehensive plan for strategic cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the
Middle East. The agreement included provisions for the dispatch of Iraqi Air
Force officers and other military experts specialized in missiles, artillery,
and ground battles in order to assist Sudan in meeting the ramifications of
the mounting crisis with Egypt. Baghdad committed itself to supporting the
Sudanese regime in what the Iraqis term "a cover for foreign interference in
Sudan."
Providing Sudan with rudimentary chemical warfare capabilities was a major
request from Bashir that Saddam Hussein authorized. The deal followed a visit
to Sudan of a high-level Iraqi delegation, led by the Chief of the Chemical
Weapons Directorate of the Iraqi Defense Ministry. The delegation surveyed
the sites Iraqi experts would have to operate in. On their return to Baghdad,
the delegation recommended a prudent approach to meeting the needs of the
Sudanese. Saddam conveyed the message to Bashir and both presidents reached
an agreement on CW cooperation.
Meanwhile, teams of Iraqi intelligence, military and commando officers
arrived in Khartoum in the Summer of 1995 to assist the Sudanese armed forces
against what the Iraqis now called "foreign intervention in Sudan."
Officially, the Iraqi expeditionary units had two tasks: (1) to supervise and
maintain the Iraqi strategic weapons and military equipment stored in Sudan
away from the UN inspection teams; and (2) train the Sudanese in intelligence
work and help reorganize the Sudanese Army along the same lines as the Iraqi
Republican Guard. By the Fall, the impact of the Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation
was apparent in the performance of units fighting in the south and deployed
near the Egyptian border in the north-east.
Moreover, Iraqi Republican Troops were sighted by rebels in southern Sudan
in the Fall of 1995, fighting in the Pibor area. About 120 Iraqi crews
arrived in the area in stages along with tanks bearing the insignia of Iraqi
Republican Guard units. Iraqi artillery forces were involved in the shelling
of SPLA camps in Torit with Napalm bombs, killing or wounding 260 people.
Uthman Abd-al-Qadir visited Baghdad -- reminding the Iraqis of Sudan's
support during the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War and requesting massive
military support for Khartoum. Indeed, Iraqi military equipment and supplies
soon arrived in Khartoum, as additional Republican Guard forces were
preparing for direct participation in the war in the south along with the
Sudanese units they had trained. Significantly, following Abd-al-Qadir's
visit, Iraq deployed to Sudan some 50 "advanced SCUD launchers" and a similar
number of al-Hussayn missiles. In October 1995, Iranian and Iraqi engineers,
including some missile experts, were upgrading an old airfield in East Sudan
for the arrival and storage of additional strategic weapons from Iraq. The
majority of the Iraqi SCUD-type missiles were stored in a well protected and
well concealed site within the Port Sudan military compound in late
1997/early 1998.
The first joint Iraqi-Sudanese WMD project was facilities initially
readied for the handling and service of CW munitions and ultimately the
production of basic CW agents. The CW facility was built during 1995 in an
area near Wau, in the Bahr-el-Ghazal Province in south-western Sudan, some
300 kilometers from the Uganda border. The key CW facility is located in a
big fruit production factory taken over by the military. Although the Wau
facility is controlled by the Sudanese military, Iraqi technicians work there
to supervise safety and security procedures. Iraqi officers are also in
charge of the gas storage site.
At first, the Iraqis sought to exhaust stockpiles of mustard gas they had
stored in Sudan since the Gulf War. With a plausible Sudanese source for
these munitions -- the Wau facility -- the Iraqis began using chemical
munitions in the Fall of 1995, months before the Wau facility became
operational. At first, planes piloted by Iraqis dropped crude chemical
munitions around Kadugli and in the Namang mountains in southern Sudan.
According to Sudanese opposition sources, witnesses reported that "deaths and
injuries occurred among residents" and that "there was a big change in the
color of the corpses and of animals and trees." Comparable sightings were
reported in Afghanistan and South-East Asia. It was impossible to retrieve
samples and more precise details because of the region's remoteness.
Intelligence reports identified the agents used as low-quality Mustard taken
from an early consignment shipped from Iraq to Sudan immediately after the
Gulf War.
Meanwhile, Iraq and Sudan built the chemical weapons factory at a secret
location near Wau. Production began in the Fall of 1995. At first, an Iraqi
team manufactured the Mustard gas. Gradually, they handed over production to
the Sudanese military. However, Iraqi technicians remained responsible for
final phases of the manufacture of the gas and its safe storage. The Wau
factory gave Khartoum the capability of using "home-grown" mustard gas
against the rebels, thus not implicating its allies in chemical warfare.
Toward the end of 1995, the Iraqi technicians were able to develop a crude
but reliable delivery system for the Mustard Gas produced at Wau. Hence, the
Iraqis could stop using their old bombs which were now implicating Baghdad.
Instead, the Sudanese introduced crude canisters which they rolled off the
back of An-24/An-26 transport aircraft. Most of these canisters missed their
targets because of poor coordination between Sudanese ground forces and the
aircraft.
Soon after production started in Wau, the Sudanese Armed Forces used
Mustard Gas canisters against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) on
at least two occasions in late 1995: The first was at Nimule and the second
was at Kuya -- both sites are near Juba, Sudan's southern capital then was
defended by tens of thousand of government troops against a tightening siege
by the SPLA forces. Since late 1995, there have been several reports alleging
the use of chemical weapons in southern Sudan, and with varying degrees of
independent corroboration and specificity of technical details. In 1997,
several reports of use of Mustard Gas canisters during bombing raids in
eastern Sudan, mainly in the Tulushi/Tulus mountains area, were corroborated
independently.
Meanwhile, the Iraqis and the Sudanese continued to maintain the Iraqi
clandestine arsenal in operational status. Some of the Iraqi equipment
concealed in Sudan was examined and tested in early 1996, and then buried in
several underground sites west of Khartoum. One such site is in Soba. The
Iraqis and the Sudanese also carried out tests of chemical agents in the
desert not far from the Al-Thoura district of Omdurman. In May, residents got
sick when winds shifted suddenly and carried residues into the city.
A new phase in the Iraqi cooperation with Sudan began in early 1997. In
mid January, Baghdad officially termed the fighting in southern Sudan a
US-Zionist conspiracy. "Washington does not hide its intention to destroy
Sudan and it has already taken a series of hostile steps against Sudan,
taking advantage of certain well-known developments that have emerged." The
Iraqi propaganda machine stated that "Khartoum is being subjected to a
US-Zionist scheme that seeks to achieve long-range objectives. Most prominent
among these objectives is to ignite a civil war to divide this country, as
a prelude to completely destroying Egypt and suffocating it by taking control
of the Nile River water." Significantly, Baghdad concluded that "Sudan's
national security is a vital part of pan-Arab security. What Sudan is
undergoing is a dangerous episode in a series played by the enemies of the
Arab Nation and the Muslims. These enemies are trying to destroy any hope for
pan-Arab renaissance, scientific advancement, and unity. They are setting the
appropriate conditions to establish Zionist-US hegemony over the Arab world."
These were not empty words. In late February, ships began arriving in Port
Sudan loaded with Iraqi weapons removed from a storage in Yemen. The first
ship to arrive was the al-Obied under the command of Captain Naji Asam Maki.
It arrived from Mukalla (in Yemen) carrying, among other arms, 600 anti-tank
weapons. Sudan officially denied the arrival of Iraqi weapons.
However, soon afterwards, in early March 1997, Sudan and Iraq pledged
mutual support during talks here between Umar al-Bashir and the visiting
Iraqi presidential envoy Shabib al-Malik. Bashir asked Malik to assure Saddam
Hussein of Sudan's "support for Iraq and its rejection of attempts for UN
sanctions against that Arab country." Malik expressed Iraq's support for
Sudan "against the aggression it is facing" and promised military and other
help. Most important was the conclusion reached by Iraqi military experts
that only a ruthless total war has a chance of defeating the Black rebels in
southern Sudan. Now, Malik assured Bashir that Iraq was ready to support and
facilitate the required escalation given certain specific conditions -- Iraq
would build in Sudan sophisticated factories for chemical and biological
weapons from systems presently hidden in Iraq and Sudan, as well as
components acquired in the West and share some of the products with the
Sudanese Armed Forces.
Consequently, in early May 1997, Iraq began to secretly transfer to Sudan
equipment and materials for the production of weapons of mass destruction.
Saddam Hussein authorized the dispatch to Sudan of various components he had
so far kept hidden in Iraq as a strategic reserve. Further more, Iraqi
experts arrived in Sudan to begin preparing the storage and production of
biological weapons that Saddam originally planned to use against the Kurds.
At the same time, Iraqi teams conducted simulation training on firing
long-range SCUD missiles even though Iraq is authorized to manufacture and
own only short-range un-guided missiles.
By the Summer of 1997, Khartoum completed the building of a new and far
more sophisticated chemical weapons production factory in the region of
Kafuri, north of Khartoum on the banks of the Blue Nile. A key strategic
installation, the Kafuri facility is under the direct command of Brigadier
Bakri Hassan Salih, Sudan's Chief of Security Forces. Moreover, two NIF
"ideological officials" -- Imad Hussayn and Jamal Zaatan -- supervise the
activities in Kafuri on behalf of Hassan al-Turabi. The Kafuri facility is
comprised of five separate departments -- laboratories and test-run/prototype
production sites for both chemical weapons (including nerve agents) and
biological weapons, as well as storage sites for both bulk chemicals and
loaded weapons (both chemical and biological). Initial test runs of some of
the production processes of chemical weapons, most likely nerve agents,
already has taken place. Among the chemical weapons tested in Kafuri are
122mm and 152mm artillery shells as well as rocket and tactical missile
warheads. In building this factory, the Sudanese relied on technical
assistance from Iraq and Iran. Additional expertise was provided by experts
and technicians from Egypt, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Russia who were recruited
by Iraqi intelligence on behalf of the Sudanese. The key experts are residing
in a luxurious dormitory inside the compound.
The Iraqis also construct a separate facility for the production and
weaponization of large quantities of chemical agents. In the Spring of 1996,
work already started on a production facility in the Yarmook facility in the
Mayu area, south of Khartoum. The first phase of the complex was commissioned
on August 15, 1996, and the entire complex was in virtual operational status
in the Fall of 1997. Formally known as The Yarmook Industrial Complex, the
military-controlled strategic installations cover an area of 10x20 kms in al-
Shagara, beyond southern Khartoum. There are over 300 small buildings and
sheds in seven clusters in the compound. The complex includes a production
line for chemical agents, as well as production facilities for military
equipment and weapons connected with the use of chemical weapons (warheads,
bombs, and cannisters, as well as protective gears, special modifications to
combat vehicles carrying these weapons, etc.).
The Yarmook production lines for chemical agents are a derivative of
comparable facilities built in Iraq. The key production facilities are
comprised of German-made machines acquired by Iraqi intelligence and smuggled
via Bulgaria. Additional equipment, mainly computers, were purchased by the
Iraqis in France. In addition, the compound includes a special medical
clinic, sport facilities, a mosque, a high security living site where Muslim
foreign experts from Iraq, Iran, and Bulgaria live in two dormitories, guest
houses for senior officials from Iraq and Iran (who are involved in these
projects and make frequent visits to Sudan), as well as a small farm ensuring
the supply of fresh milk, vegetables and dates (independent of the chronic
shortages afflicting Sudan).
Anticipating large volume production, the Sudanese authorities and the
Iraqi experts also began the construction of well protected underground
storage sites south of Jebel Awlia (White Nile Province), the Kerari area
(north of Omdurman) Shambat al-Araadi (north of Khartoum North), an area west
of the Hrriyya bridge (Khartoum), an area near the Horse Race Course Club (in
Khartoum South), Green Village (New Development area near Khartoum), as well
as in Gedaref, al-Fau, and Shendi. The Sudanese military has recently begun
training pilots and artillery officers in the maintaining and use of chemical
weapons in a special school set up in the Wadi Seidna military compound
(north of Omdurman). Another unique center for the development of chemical
weapons for use by Islamist terrorists, mainly those affiliated with Usamah
bin-Ladin, is being built near the Islamic Center in Soba (soth west of
Khartoum). According to Sudanese opposition sources, Khartoum's plans call
for the Kafuri and Mayu installations to go into full production sometimes
in 1999. The Iraqi and Iranian experts anticipate the Kafuri installations
to be largely operational in the first half of 1999, and the Mayu production
and weaponization facilities to be operational in the second half of that
year.
Khartoum's self-confidence in its growing chemical warfare capabilities
came to light in mid November 1997. Sudan formally threatened Uganda with
strikes with chemical weapons if it continued to support the Christian Black
rebels. This warning came despite Kampala's previous denials of cooperation
with the sudanese rebels and Khartoum's adamant denials of CW capabilities
or use.
*
LIBYA
Although ultimately decisive, the Iraqi involvement in the Libyan WMD
program has been complex and at times contradictory. Back during the 1980s,
the Libyans ran a massive development and production program of their own.
For a while, the Libyans closely cooperated with both the Iranians and the
Syrians -- both enemies of Iraq. At the same time, however, Libya relied on
the same West European suppliers as Iraq did. Moreover, key middlemen, such
as Ihsan Barbouti, served both the Iraqi and the Libyan WMD programs. During
the mid-1980s, the Libyans were out-spending the Iraqis, and recruiters of
Libyan intelligence were offering huge payments in effort to entice key
Egyptian, Iraqi and European scientists working in Iraq to transfer to Libya.
Baghdad was apprehensive about the Libyan practices.
By the time the Gulf Crisis erupted in 1990, several Iraqi researchers
were already working in Libya as individuals, as were several foreign
scientists who had worked in Iraq beforehand. Most were working on Chemical
weapons projects, primarily in Rabta. At first Saddam reluctant to share with
Qadhafi some of the unique achievements of the Iraqis. However, with pressure
from UN inspections mounting, and with intelligence leaking from defectors,
Iraq had no alternative but to transfer more and more sensitive projects to
Libya as the sole venue for their continuation. Although Sudan was glad to
receive anything Iraq had to offer, it had such an abysmal scientific-
technological infrastructure that it could not sustain the more sophisticated
Iraqi programs. Thus, with not too many takers of the Iraqi systems, Libya
would have to do. Meanwhile, Qadhafi was most interested in receiving
extensive help from Iraqi scientists for his own covert, biological, weapons
program and conditioned his support for Saddam on cooperation in this field.
Thus, since the early 1990s, Iraqi scientists have been working in Libya in
order to continue the key Iraqi research and production programs into
advanced and next generation CW and BW.
At first, Baghdad considered the cooperation with Tripoli a temporary
necessity. For a while, in the early 1990s, Iraq did not transfer complete
projects to Libya. Consequently, several scientists and engineers from the
Iraqi military industries were commuting between Iraq and Libya via Amman.
They were using new passports with false names and occupations. However, as
the contacts were expanding and the Libyans were being exposed to a wider
variety of Iraqi programs, Tripoli decided to formalize and expand the
cooperation. A special committee of the Libyan defense establishment arrived
in Baghdad and negotiated a comprehensive agreement on expanded cooperation
in conventional, chemical and biological weaponry. In accordance with these
agreements, the Libyans signed contracts with several Iraqi military industry
experts. These contracts were drawn as if they were academic invitations for
Iraqi professors to lecture in Libyan universities and institutions. At the
same time, however, the key Iraqi program equipment, systems and elements
remained concealed inside Iraq in anticipation for the end of the UN
inspections so that WMD development and production can be resumed.
Meanwhile, Baghdad at first drew the line concerning the Iraqi nuclear
program. Lingering doubts concerning Libya's long-term strategic cooperation
with Syria and Iran prevailed, and Iraq would take no chances. In 1991-92,
Iraqi intelligence feared a Libyan use of financial enticements as an
inducement for defections of Iraqi nuclear scientists to the point of
undertaking extreme measures to prevent such a trend.
For example, in July 1992, Iraqi agents shot and killed in Amman, Jordan,
Muayad Hassan Naji Janabi -- an Iraqi nuclear scientist. Janabi worked for
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission until 1986, when he was transferred to the
Ministry of Military Industries. In 1992, Janabi was on vacation in Jordan.
However, he was shot when on his way to pick up Tunisian visas for transit
to Libya. He had been offered a "teaching position" at "an atomic institute"
in Libya. Baghdad must have been worried because Janabi was supposed to
return to Iraq a week earlier and rumors surfaced he had attempted to get to
the UK and the US, and failed to get academic visas. By then, Saddam Hussein
had banned key personnel in the military-industrial system from leaving Iraq
without permission, and fearing that Janabi would not reveal Iraqi nuclear
weapons program secrets, he was shot by two Iraqi agents. The two Iraqis were
arrested for the assassination but quickly released and sent to Baghdad.
However, by the mid 1990s, Baghdad could no longer be selective in its
cooperation with Libya. The BND's 1994 studies of the Iraqi procurement
system in Europe was unsettling for it threatened Iraq's ability to revive
key WMD programs just as the Iraqi system was being restored to its pre-Gulf
War magnitude. Moreover, the UN inspection regime was beginning to grasp the
complexity of the Iraqi challenge. Indeed, even before the Summer 1995
"defection" of Lt.Gen. Hussein Kamal, the UN was increasing its efforts to
locate hidden stuff. As discussed above, Kamal's "defection" was prompted by
Baghdad's apprehension that the UN was capitalizing on data provided by
genuine defectors in order to zero in on Iraq's hidden WMD facilities. For
example, Iraq's biological facilities were first subjected to a meaningful
inspection in April 1995, on the eve of the "defection." Even though by then,
Baghdad had already hidden its biological weapons cache and destroyed all
evidence of its existence, the mere UN visit to the abandoned sites was too
close for comfort.
Meanwhile, with the Iraqi-Libyan cooperation in chemical weapons
development and production going well, Saddam authorized already in the
Summer/Fall of 1994 the move of other weapons programs to Libya. Arrangements
for closer cooperation were quickly made.
In January 1995, Iraq and Libya signed a major agreement whereby Iraqi
specialists will work at a secret Libyan establishment on the development of
a long-range ballistic missiles with range of about 1,000 km. A senior Iraqi
Trade Ministry official, Hajem Attiya Salma arrived in Tripoli for final
discussions with AbdAllah Hijazi, the head of Libya's Scientific Research
authorities. In the agreement reached, Qadhafi agreed to pay the salaries of
the Iraqi experts -- some $1,200 a month -- as well as finance the
acquisition of Western technology. Moreover, the Iraqis were promised access
to the Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean missile technology Libya had
already acquired. Baghdad promised to share all the experience acquired in
the Gulf War. Iraq did not have much alternative. Incapable of working, the
Iraqi design teams built around experts trained at the best European and
Russian establishments were falling apart. Now Qadhafi was offering to fund
and provide cover for the revival of the al-Hussein and Badr missiles under
the cover of the Libyan al-Fatakh program.
Meanwhile, the Libyans were most interested in the Iraqi experience with
biological weapons, particularly the advanced stages of the militarization
projects. In the ensuing negotiations, Baghdad acknowledged that Iraq still
possessed several biological weapons and warheads for them. The Iraqis would
share these technologies with the Libyans provided that Tripoli agreed to
also sustain and fund the revival of the Iraqi military nuclear program. By
1995, some of the Iraqi nuclear materials were being held in Algeria while
the key systems and design elements were being hidden all over Iraq in
dormant state. Iraqi experts were apprehensive that the lack of proper
maintenance and storage conditions under the sand in desert temperatures were
destroying the sophisticated equipment. Hence, the Iraqi negotiators
suggested that Iraqi nuclear fuel could reach Libya by sea within weeks after
the signing of an agreement, and that Iraqi experts in Libya would then be
able to begin enriching it after installing more small or medium-sized
kilns/furnaces.
As expected by the Iraqis, the lure of nuclear weapons was irresistible
for Qadhafi. A high-level Libyan delegation led by Major Raad Bin-Id al-Daffi
from the Libyan Engineering and Military Industrialization arrived in Baghdad
on August 30, 1995. They negotiated with the Iraqis a comprehensive agreement
that still serves as the cornerstone of the Iraqi-Libyan strategic and
military cooperation. The agreement stipulated the extent to which Libya
would go to assist Iraq in the expansion of the Iraqis' own WMD programs as
well as in evading the UN stringent surveillance of Iraq's military plants.
The first step was the quick transfer to Libya of an Iraqi military
nuclear project that numerous Arab and European experts described as being
"in its final stages". By then, after Kamal's "defection" went sour, Saddam
gave up on keeping the key elements of the WMD programs in Iraq and ordered
their swift transfer to Libya before the UN closed in on them. Hence, several
experts and equipment were immediately dispatched to Libya to prepare for the
transfer of the nuclear program.
The main item Baghdad was adamant on saving was a limited quantity of
semi-enriched nuclear fuel transferred to the Aba Agricultural and Scientific
Research Center, east of Baghdad, under the direct supervision of Lt.Gen Amir
Rashid, director the Iraqi Military Industrialization Organization (MIO). The
initial transfer was made possible by the suspension of UN surveillance of
this center after the Iraqis had moved its equipment to Abu-Ghurayb region
near Baghdad. In the meantime, Iraq was hiding the nuclear fuel in large
underground storage facilities near the Aba center. After conditioning the
nuclear material for transportation, it was sent by sea to Libya within
weeks.
Meanwhile, a high-level MIO delegation headed by Dr. Jafar Diya Jafar, one
of Iraq's leading nuclear scientists, arrived in Libya in mid October 1995
to oversee the installation of the small nuclear furnaces. The Iraqi nuclear
program would be located at Sidi Abu Zurayq in the desert 380 km southwest
of Tripoli. By the end of 1995, the MIO experts began enriching the Iraqi
nuclear material having successfully installed the small- and medium-sized
kilns/furnaces there.
The most important indication of the intimate strategic cooperation
between Baghdad and Tripoli was in Western Europe. Since the mid 1990s, Iraqi
intelligence has been diverting purchases of dual-use and sensitive
technologies in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland to Libya. In the process,
Libyan intelligence was given access to the Iraqis' most secure shipment
routes -- where exported goods are shipped to Bulgaria where local companies
are identified as the end-users, and from where the goods are forwarded
illegally to Iraq and now also Libya. Furthermore, starting the mid 1990s,
Iraqi intelligence has been assisting Russian and other ex-Soviet scientists
to acquire third-country passports in Central and Latin America so they can
travel to and work in Iraq. Following the new cooperation agreements, Iraqi
intelligence began sending these scientists to Libya for work on the joint
Iraqi-Libyan WMD projects. Honduras was the site of a major program in
1995-96. Additional Iraqi intelligence operatives, all experts in the
procurement of high-technology, arrived in Germany in early 1996. They began
a still ongoing effort to revive dormant relationships as well as establish
new ones. However, the reorganized Iraqi procurement system is now diverting
the bulk of the goods to Libya rather than Iraq.
The first results of the January 1995 ballistic missile agreement were
already showing by the Summer of that year. Using Western-made systems and
computers smuggled from both Iraq and Europe, the highly experienced Iraqis
succeeded to make sense in the Libyan convoluted missile program --
integrating the inputs and technologies from the numerous and often
incompatible foreign sources. In the second half of 1996, the Iraqi
scientists and know-how provided such a boost to the Libyan ballistic missile
program, that NATO's threat assessment had to be revised. The new assessment,
NATO Report MC 161/96, concludes that Libya could be in possession of
medium-range ballistic nuclear missiles pointed at the NATO Mediterranean
flank by the year 2006. The NATO study predicts that within a decade,
Qadhafi's Libya will have medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of
between 1,000 and 3,000 km that can be fitted with nuclear, chemical, or
bacteriological warheads.
In late 1995, Saddam Hussein finally relented and authorized the transfer
to Libya the secrets of Iraq's most sensitive armament programs --
particularly the biological weapons program, which Qadhafi's wanted most.
With the UN inspections now expected to remain in Iraq for the foreseeable
future, Baghdad decided to retain in Iraq only the operational biological
bombs and warheads, as well as the equipment required to sustain them in
operational posture. In early 1996, Saddam ordered that the surviving
sophisticated development and production systems as well as the extensive
know how and related documentation would be transferred to Libya.
The large extent of the Iraqi biological warfare effort and the huge
magnitude of the systems and documentation that have eluded the UN
inspections can be deduced from the fact that it took the Iraqis more than
a year to collect their material and prepare it for clandestine shipment to
Libya. Only then, once Baghdad was ready to begin the transfer of the BW
program to Libya, was Tripoli notified. The framework for the new deal
between Libya and Iraq was signed in May during a visit to Baghdad by members
of a Libyan industrialists' organization. Soon afterwards, high-level Libyan
delegations arrived in Baghdad in mid 1997 to discuss the modalities of the
upgrading of the Iraqi support for, and participation in, the Libyan WMD
program. On the basis of these discussions, Baghdad and Tripoli finalized the
signing of the May 1997 agreement that still dominates their expanding
strategic cooperation.
Between late 1997 and early 1998, on the basis of this latest agreement,
Iraq undertook two distinct moves that, once completed, would dramatically
alter Libya's WMD capabilities.
First, starting late 1997, Baghdad moved to dramatically upgrade the
Libyan Chemical Weapons programs. Senior Iraqi scientists with experience in
CW production joined other Iraqi researchers some of whom have been in Libya
since the 1991 Gulf War, working on CW projects first in Rabta and presently
in the plant inside a mountain at Tarhunah, 60 km south-east of Tripoli. The
Iraqis are experts in the production of nerve agents and other chemical
weapons. The Iraqis' primary contribution is in expediting the move from the
research and development phase to the mass production of operational weapons.
Once integrated into the Libyan CW program, the Iraqi expertise will enable
Libya to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of chemical weapons.
Given the current pace of construction in the underground chemical production
plant near Tarhunah, the plant can become operational by the year 2000.
The second move was providing Libya with the key to operational Biological
Weapons. About a dozen Iraqi scientists involved in biological research
arrived in Libya around the beginning of 1998, where special living quarters
have been arranged for them. They are to help the Libyans develop a new
biological warfare complex under the guise of a Tripoli-area medical facility
called General Health Laboratories. The Libyan biological warfare program is
believed to be codenamed Ibn Hayan. Since this program will be based in its
entirety on the Iraqi covert program to develop biological weapons, the Iraqi
experts are expected to reach the weaponization phase quite quickly. Libya
is interested in bombs and missile warheads with anthrax and botulism agents.
For the running of the Ibn Hayan project, Qadhafi established a special
office within the Libyan Ministry of Defense that reports directly to him.
The program has been given the highest possible priority by Qadhafi and both
Libyan and Iraqi procurement operatives throughout the world have been told
to spare no funds in order to expedite the purchase of the sub-systems the
Iraqi experts require for the "weaponization" programs.
*
And so, the US is planning an instant-gratification bombing campaign that
would neither destroy Iraq's WMD operational capabilities nor touch its main
WMD production lines in Libya and Sudan.
At the same time, the strategic mega-trends in the Middle East,
exacerbated by the current crisis environment, entice a dramatic breakout in
the form of a regional war. Saddam Hussein is not the only local leader
aspiring for war as the best way out of a political deadlock. In the case of
Iraq, with the entire Iraqi Armed Forces -- from tanks and artillery pieces
to aircraft, and from ammunition stockpiles to fuel dumps -- high on the US
target list, Baghdad has a special incentive to "lose" them in heroic
martyrdom -- say, spearheading and instigating a regional war with Israel --
rather than have them destroyed by US bombs and missiles. There are enough
non-state entities -- from Arafat's pro-Iraq al-Fatah forces to the Islamist
HAMAS, HizbAllah and Islamic Jihad -- who would gladly provide the
spectacular and lethal provocation required to spark the cataclysmic
eruption.
No WMD are required to set the Muslim World ablaze.
Meanwhile, the panic afflicting Israel only reduces Jerusalem's ability to
make a realistic threat assessment, and formulate its strategy in a cool and
calculated manner. And the US bombing campaign will only add some explosives
and fuel to the flames.
Yossef Bodansky
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