STATEMENT BY DR. KURT M. CAMPBELL Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Asian and Pacific Affairs) HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Senate Committee on Foreign Relations September 10, 1998 Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to represent the Department of Defense in this hearing on U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. I would begin my statement by emphasizing that in a time of uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the 44-year old U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea serves as a bulwark against any forces that would seek to disturb the existing peace. The stability fostered by this close security relationship has benefited not only the U.S. and South Korea, but has also permitted much of the Asia-Pacific region to pursue economic growth and democratic development. In deterring aggression from an often unpredictable and highly militarized North Korea, the U.S. has helped create an environment in which Asian states could pursue a development course compatible with American values and beliefs. This is particularly true in the case of South Korea. As a result, the security alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea is more than a treaty commitment -- it is a close, mutually beneficial partnership built on a shared stake in democracy and free markets. Our alliance is an essential element of the strategy for achieving our long-standing security goal -- a non-nuclear, democratic, and peacefully reunified Korean Peninsula. Even after the North Korean threat passes, the U.S. will coordinate fully with the ROK to maintain a strong bilateral alliance in the interest of regional security. The need for a combined U.S.-ROK military command and force structure to protect our common values is more compelling than ever. Today the United States and South Korea confront twin security challenges on the Korean Peninsula -- deterrence of armed conflict and preparation for crises short of war. On the first challenge, North Korea's large conventional military forces continue to threaten the security of the Republic of Korea. Two-thirds of its 1.1 million military personnel are positioned within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone, with a substantial artillery force capable of striking Seoul with little advance notice. In addition, as North Korea demonstrated by its recent missile launch, it possesses missiles that not only range the entire Peninsula but reach far beyond it as well. The U.S. and ROK continue to focus their security cooperation on deterring the use of this military capability, whether in an all-out attack on South Korea or in a more limited military provocation. At the same time, deteriorating economic conditions within North Korea and a serious food shortage rooted in the structural failure of the North's agricultural management system raise questions about future developments in the North. In this setting, it would be irresponsible for the U.S. and ROK not to consult closely and be prepared for a range of contingencies that could occur on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean state and its security apparatus still exercise absolute control over their country and show no sign of loosening their grip. But the U.S. and ROK cannot ignore the possibility, given the trajectory of North Korean domestic developments, that potentially destabilizing conditions could arise in the North in the form of famine, massive refugee flows, or other disturbing scenarios. The U.S. and ROK would seek to address such situations in a way that was least disruptive to regional stability and to resolve them at the lowest level of tension possible. Without a close defense alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, we would not be able to respond effectively to these challenges to our security interests. It is also important in a time of transition and uncertainty that we give no signals to North Korea that the calculus of the U.S.-ROK security relationship, which has served us so well, is changing. We will continue to strongly counter any perception in Pyongyang that it can drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK on security issues. U.S.-ROK combined forces are well-equipped and prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression. But maintaining capable and ready forces is a constant process. The U.S. is engaged in ongoing efforts to modernize its Peninsular force of about 37,000 military personnel with the latest military equipment. These measures have been complemented by ROK efforts to outfit its military with the most modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, and fighter aircraft. The ROK commitment of resources to defense has been impressive, even during the current economic crisis. The ROK maintains 670,000 personnel in uniform and has pledged more than $1 billion in cost-sharing support for U.S. military forces on the Peninsula from 1996-1998. Our security objectives in Korea have been greatly aided by diplomatic breakthroughs during the past several years. In particular, the engagement process begun by the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, which froze the North's nuclear program at Yongbyon and its destabilizing potential, has defused the most immediate source of tension and deflected what could have been a military confrontation with North Korea. With the agreement and our underlying security commitment, we have preserved stability on the Peninsula and created an opening to pursue the Four Party peace proposal and other issues of concern, such as missile proliferation and the recovery of Korean War remains. The Agreed Framework has also provided greater access to North Korea and some North-South contacts. At the same time, the Agreed Framework has been under stress as a result of irresponsible and provocative North Korean acts. We are determined to address these concerns with the DPRK and ensure its full compliance with the agreement. Permanent peace on the Peninsula will be accomplished only through diplomatic/political means, and the Agreed Framework and Four Party peace proposal begin that process by laying a groundwork for uncoerced reconciliation between South and North Korea. We must recognize, however, that these are only initial steps in a long and difficult course. Our desire for a long-term, stable peace on the Peninsula will not be realized overnight, but that reality does not diminish the value of current initiatives toward North Korea. The alternative could very well be direct conflict with the North, which would take a devastating toll in lives and resources. For this reason, it is important for the U.S. to back the Agreed Framework, and the international consortium that implements its provisions, with the resources that will permit it to succeed. Until North and South Korea find a peaceful solution to their differences, we remain committed to the terms of the 45-year old Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreement and its mechanisms must remain until an appropriate arrangement supersedes them. Only South and North Korea can resolve the division of Korea; therefore, replacement of the Armistice by an appropriate agreement can come about only through direct dialogue between South and North Korea. The U.S., while addressing near-term security concerns, has worked hard to promote such a dialogue. (end text)
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