UNSCOM inspections program in Iraq Martin S. Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs September 9 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee I welcome this opportunity to be here to discuss United States policy towards Iraq. In recent weeks, there have been a lot of charges leveled at the Administration, and at the Secretary of State personally, for supposedly pursuing a "duplicitous" policy towards Iraq. I welcome the opportunity to set the record straight. The objective of Operation Desert Storm was to roll back Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait. In that, it succeeded brilliantly due to strong leadership from President Bush and the courage and skill of coalition forces, led by the United States. But as President Bush recalls in his new book, the war did not end like World War II, with the surrender of the beaten Army and the punishment of the villainous enemy leaders. Although humiliated and weakened, Saddam Hussein and his military survived. We have been dealing with the consequences ever since. From the outset, our goal and that of the UN Security Council has been to deny Iraq the capacity ever again to threaten international peace and security. Our tools have included: -- the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was authorized by the Security Council: 1) to carry out inspections to verify Iraq's declared programs for chemical and biological weapons and missiles, and to seek out what Iraq would not declare; 2) to destroy those programs or render them harmless, and 3) to monitor Iraq in order to deter any attempt to revive these programs; -- inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to accomplish the same tasks in the nuclear weapons area; and -- economic sanctions, which create an incentive for Iraq to comply with weapons inspection and monitoring activities, as well as its other obligations under Security Council resolutions. This effort has paid dividends. Year by year, Iraqi efforts to conceal its weapons of mass destruction programs have been unmasked. Slowly but surely, the world has learned more about the extent of Saddam's preparations for biological warfare, the use of poison gas and the development of nuclear weapons. In the process, UNSCOM and the IAEA have forced the destruction of more Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capacity than was destroyed during the entire Gulf War. Throughout this period, Iraq has tried and failed to undermine Security Council unity on the key points of compliance and sanctions. At the same time, with our allies, we have constrained Iraq's military options through Operations Southern and Northern Watch and, when necessary the reinforcement of our military presence in the Gulf. As a result, the military threat posed by Iraq has been effectively contained. But that threat has by no means been eliminated. Despite the best efforts of UNSCOM and the IAEA, Iraq has not disclosed the full truth about its chemical and biological weapons programs. UNSCOM believes Iraq is probably concealing SCUD missiles. And questions remain about Iraq's nuclear programs. As long as Baghdad is under its present leadership, we must expect that Iraq will reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction if given the opportunity. Iraq's goal is to gain relief from sanctions without revealing more about its weapons programs. To this end, Baghdad has repeatedly probed for weaknesses in the Security Council's resolve. It has sought to create divisions among Council members. It has exploited with breathtaking cynicism the suffering of its own people. It has appealed to Arab solidarity. And, most tellingly, it has tried to portray itself as the victim in a confrontation with a runaway UNSCOM being ordered about by an arrogant and callous United States. To dramatize this charge, Iraq has halted cooperation with UNSCOM on three occasions during the past year, most recently at the beginning of August. Throughout, we have countered Iraq's outrageous propaganda with plain truth. We have backed UNSCOM's efforts to expose the contradictions between Iraqi declarations and the physical and documentary evidence. We have stressed the importance of full compliance with Security Council resolutions. We have led the effort -- which Saddam Hussein resisted for years -- to establish the Oil-for-Food program that is addressing the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. And last spring, we threatened to use force -- as we have on three separate occasions since the end of the Gulf War -- if Iraq did not permit UNSCOM inspections to resume. In the face of that threat, it did. Over the past year, senior Administration officials have probably had more conversations with our foreign counterparts on these subjects than any other. In Washington and in capitals abroad, we have relentlessly advanced the U.S. position that the consequences of Iraqi noncompliance are unacceptable and that firmness is the only language Saddam understands. Many governments agree with that, but others have a different view. It is worth recalling that the international coalition assembled by the Bush Administration in 1990 came together to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, and not for any more far-reaching purpose. As former National Security Adviser Scowcroft recalls, even before the ground war against Iraq began, "the political situation was volatile and the coalition perhaps deteriorating." Today, as a result of vigorous diplomacy conducted by two Presidents and four Secretaries of State, backed by bipartisan leaders in Congress, there remains an international consensus that Iraq must comply with UN Security Council resolutions and cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. There also remains agreement that sanctions should continue until these conditions are met, but some on the Security Council would like to weaken the conditions and weaken UNSCOM to achieve that purpose. And there never has been, and is not now, a consensus about whether or in what circumstances force should be used in an effort to compel Iraqi compliance with the Council's postwar resolutions. Some countries that supported the use of force to roll back Iraq's brutal and blatant aggression in 1990 simply feel less threatened today by a weakened Iraq and do not see failure to comply with UN inspections as a "bombing" offense. Others argue that military strikes would backfire because they would engender sympathy for Iraq while not restoring the effective operation of UNSCOM or ending Iraq's ability to build chemical and biological arms. Some governments are content, perhaps for commercial reasons, just to sit on the sidelines and let the United States assume the full costs and consequences of dealing with Saddam Hussein. Some nations, including some historic allies of the United States, argue that our goal is simply to keep sanctions on Iraq forever, and that we are not providing Baghdad with any real incentive to cooperate. Finally, there exists a perception in parts of the Arab world that the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions reflects a double standard. We have tried our best to rebut that presumption, but it persists nevertheless. This, then, is the diplomatic context within which we must operate if our goal of eliminating the security threat posed by Iraq is to be achieved. Aspects of it were mirrored in our discussions here in the United States about the wisdom of taking military action during a similar confrontation with Iraq last winter. The widely disparate advice provided to the Administration by Senators from these two committees and by others is a symptom of the difficulties involved. The choices we face are not those of some ideal world in which our perceptions are universally shared, the American people are united, all our allies are on board, the road to success is clearly marked and the consequences of our decisions are fully predictable. Rather, we face hard choices in the real world, in which every event affects the next, and the political terrain shifts with each passing day. It is a world in which the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action must be considered with deliberation, for they are not obvious. In fact, it is precisely this complexity which led to the events which bring us here today. In recent weeks, some have suggested that the United States has not done enough to support the work of UNSCOM. It has even been suggested that we have tried to prevent UNSCOM from discovering the truth about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. The people who level these charges are undoubtedly well-intentioned. In particular, we have nothing but respect for Scott Ritter's work. We are, after all, on the same side. But Mr. Ritter works from a different set of facts and as Chairman Butler told the New York Times today, the testimony he gave as to these facts was often inaccurate in chronology and detail and was therefore misleading. He was given a mission by the Security Council and, like his UNSCOM colleagues from many nations, has made diligent efforts to fulfill it. The Administration has to work on the basis of a broader set of facts. First is the fact that the United States has been by far the strongest international backer of UNSCOM. For years, we have provided indispensable technical help, expert personnel, sophisticated equipment, vital diplomatic backing and logistics and other support. Nothing has changed in that regard. For example, in May of this year, the White House instructed the heads of all relevant U.S. agencies to issue new directives ensuring that UNSCOM and IAEA inspections would receive high priority support throughout our government. The Secretary of State issued that directive to State Department officials on June 23, 1998. On the "diplomatic front, we have taken the lead in rebutting and disproving Iraq's contentions in disputes with UNSCOM before the Security Council. We have pushed and pushed and pushed some more to help UNSCOM break through the smokescreen of lies and deception put out by the Iraqi regime. Secretaries Albright and Cohen and the rest of the President's foreign policy team have traveled the world attempting to keep the heat on Iraq and demanding that it cooperate with UNSCOM. The suggestion that we urged other governments not to support UNSCOM turns the truth on its head; it is exactly the opposite of what we have been doing. A second fact is that, Iraqi intransigence aside, UNSCOM's inspection efforts have continued to make important progress. For example, just this summer, UNSCOM was able for the first time to conduct inspections of sensitive sites where it found new evidence that Iraq had lied about the size of its chemical weapons stocks. A third fact we have to take into account is the importance of maintaining Security Council and coalition unity in dealing with Iraq. There is a very hardheaded reason for this. Unless we are prepared unilaterally to send tens of thousands of American ground troops into Baghdad to remove Saddam and destroy Iraq's military infrastructure, we are not going to eliminate by force Iraq's ability to conceal and possibly reconstitute weapons of mass destruction. If we are not prepared to take such action, we will have to rely on the help of others through sanctions, support for inspections, and acceptance of the need to use military strikes for limited objectives if necessary. This has an influence on the tactical decisions we make. As I suspect the veterans among you would agree, there is great value in any confrontation in being able to choose your own timing and terrain. Saddam's provocations are designed with political purposes in mind: to spark a reaction, divide the security Council, isolate the United States and diminish support for sanctions. Our strategy is to deny Saddam that opportunity, and to keep the world spotlight not on what we do, but on what Iraq is failing to do -- which is comply with its obligations. A fourth fact, related to the third, is the importance of maintaining the integrity and independence of UNSCOM. The continuation of UNSCOM's work is essential if we are to achieve our goal, and the world's goal, of moving beyond containment to the elimination of Iraq's capacity to pose a serious military threat. Unfortunately, if UNSCOM is to succeed, it must, among others things, both be and be perceived to be independent. It is ironic that Scott Ritter, whom we respect, and Saddam Hussein, whom we deplore, both argue that UNSCOM's independence has been compromised by the United States. If we were to agree with Scott Ritter on that point, we would be conceding a very key point to Saddam Hussein. It may be precisely the opposite of his intention, but Mr. Ritter's allegations have profoundly undermined the perception that UNSCOM is independent. And that will make it much harder for UNSCOM to do its job. As UNSCOM Chairman Butler has repeatedly affirmed, the United States has never impinged on UNSCOM's integrity or attempted to dictate its decisions. But UNSCOM's purpose is to assure that there are no prohibited weapons in Iraq. So it is not hard for us to work together towards that common long-term goal. And, make no mistake, the purpose of every conversation and contact we have had with UNSCOM has been to move us closer to achieving that goal. For seven years, through Republican and Democratic Administrations alike, U.S. policy has not changed. We want Iraqi compliance. This does not mean our tactics are rigid. If a climber scaling a cliff finds one route blocked and switches to another, that is not lack of resolve, nor is it inconsistency, it is common sense. In pursuing our goal of Iraqi compliance, we have sometimes made tactical suggestions to UNSCOM about questions of timing and procedure. This is entirely appropriate and is done by other Council members, as well, on a regular basis. Over time, we found that some of our suggestions were accepted, others were not. Most often, our discussions with UNSCOM have focused on where more vigorous inspection activity might be productive, on how Iraqi lies might be exposed, or on when an inspection might best catch Iraqi efforts at deception by surprise. No nation has done more to encourage UNSCOM to be thorough, unyielding and aggressive in its inspections, and no nation has done more to support UNSCOM's dogged and, at times, dangerous efforts in this regard. I call to your attention a letter from Chairman Butler to the Washington Post on August 26 in which UNSCOM's Executive Chairman writes that: "I have never had any reason to doubt the United States commitment to the need for Iraq to comply with the decisions of the Security Council, which are binding in international law, and in particular, the United States insistence upon the requirements imposed by those resolutions upon Iraq to the effect that they must be disarmed of their weapons of mass destruction." It is also true, that on a few occasions, our advice to UNSCOM was more cautious. For example, this past January when our military preparations were incomplete and the Muslim Holy season of Ramadan was under way, was not the right time for a major confrontation. I note, in this regard, that Mr. Ritter told this Committee last week that he had objected to a planned inspection of the Ministry of Defense because he thought it was "probably heading down a slippery slope of confrontation which could not be backed up by UNSCOM's mandate." This was precisely the kind of question we also sometimes found occasion to raise. Given the importance of Security Council unity, we have been concerned in recent months that the responsibility for any resumption of Iraqi non-cooperation fall where it belongs, on the shoulders of Saddam Hussein, not UNSCOM. We had questions, which Chairman Butler had answered, about a particular intrusive inspection planned by UNSCOM in July. But it is important to note that other intrusive inspections were going on at the same time as we were raising these questions. And we made clear our support for the inspections Scott Ritter was to have led in August. The issue became moot however, when Iraqi officials informed UNSCOM on August 5 that they were halting any further cooperation. At that point, we believed it was best to let the onus fall clearly on Saddam Hussein. Chairman Butler agreed. We also knew that some in the Security Council were planning to blame UNSCOM for the renewed breakdown in cooperation. To summarize, if the allegation is that we sought to influence the pace of UNSCOM inspections, we did. But we did it in order to have the greatest long-term chance of overcoming Iraqi efforts at deception. If we hadn't, we would not have been doing our jobs. If the allegation is that we have undermined the effectiveness and independence of UNSCOM; the answer is no On the contrary, we have been the foremost backer of UNSCOM. If the allegation is that we have retreated from our determination to achieve our goals in Iraq, the answer is that we have not and will not. In the Security Council, even the members who have been most sympathetic to Iraq's point of view can find no excuse -- or even any sense -- in Saddam's latest actions. Accordingly, we are pressing Council members to take the steps necessary to enforce their Resolutions. Iraq's latest refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM is a direct challenge to the Council's authority. As a Council member, the United States is seeking a firm and principled response. We recognize that this has put us back on the ladder of potentially escalating confrontation with Iraq. So be it. We will not accept the indefinite blockage by Iraq of the inspection activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA. And we will insist that Iraq live up to its commitment to cooperate with UNSCOM's monitoring activities. For all its bluster, Iraq remains within the strategic box Saddam Hussein's folly created for it seven years ago. As we look ahead, we will decide how and when to respond to Iraq's actions based on the threat they pose.to Iraq's neighbors, to regional security and to U.S. vital interests. Our assessment will include Saddam's capacity to reconstitute, use, or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. The bottom line is that if Iraq tries to break out of its strategic box, our response will be swift and strong. But we will act on our own timetable, not Saddam Hussein's. From the perspective of our own security, we are in a position of strength. Our ability to project force in the region is significantly more robust now than it was a year ago. We have added a rapid reinforcement capability. With our allies, we are maintaining a close eye on Iraqi troops through the enforcement of Operations Northern and Southern Watch. The multi-national Maritime Interception Force is keeping the teeth in UN sanctions, having seized more than 30 vessels since January. And let us remember that, since 1991, sanctions have deprived Saddam Hussein's coffers of more than $120 billion. Although it is not an end in itself, the sanctions regime is what denies Baghdad the resources it needs to rebuild its military, and its weapons of mass destruction programs. In closing, let me say in fairness to our critics that the diplomatic language we have used to describe our policy towards Iraq may have sometimes lacked clarity. Let me be clear now. To Saddam Hussein, my message is: Do not miscalculate. Do not misread our public debates, which are an expression of the freedoms we enjoy in America, as a sign of fundamental weakness or disunity. We have our differences. But on the central issues of upholding law and responding to aggression, the American people are united. To the Members of the Security Council, my message is that, together, we must meet our responsibility. We must be firm, united and determined in our insistence that Iraq meet its obligations and in the actions we take to back up that insistence. The integrity and credibility of the Security Council is at stake. To the American people, I say that we will be true to our principles, our interests and our character. We are not spoiling for a battle. We are not eager to put our fighting men and women at risk. We do not wish to shoulder burdens and assume costs that others, by right, should share. But we will not allow the scorpion that bit us once to bite us again. We have not ruled out any options. If Saddam provokes a fight, he will get one, and he will lose. Finally to the Iraqi people, let me say that the United States looks forward to the day when Iraq can rejoin the family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member. And to those Iraqis inside and outside the country who want to build a democratic future for their nation: I say the United States is on your side. The new Radio Free Iraq is preparing to broadcast directly to the Iraqi people. We are gathering information regarding the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein to help the Iraqi exile community in its campaign to bring him to justice. And we are intensifying our efforts to help Iraqi opposition groups -- whether Arab or Kurd, Shiite or Sunni -- to develop a deeper sense of common purpose and a more effective strategy for achieving a democratic and pluralist Iraq. Obviously, these measures are no panacea. It would not be responsible to raise false hopes or expectations. But neither can we turn our backs and resign ourselves to the indefinite continuation of a belligerent and lawless regime in Baghdad. America and the world should stay focused on the task President Bush set with such good reason in the aftermath of the Gulf War: denying Saddam the capacity to strike again at Iraq's neighbors and the world. In so doing, we must avoid wishful thinking -- either the naive hope that Saddam has learned his lesson and can now be trusted, or the understandable, but unrealistic, hope that Saddam's reign of terror in Baghdad can quickly and cleanly be brought to a close. That may not be the ideal situation. But that's the situation with which we must deal. And I am confident that we can and will do so in a way that protects America's vital interests, upholds American principles and reflects American character. Thank you very much. (End Text)
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