Crisis in South Asia: India's Nuclear Tests Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 13, 1998 MR. HELMS: I am astonished that the Indian government was able to catch the U.S. intelligence capability sound asleep at the switch, revealing the stark reality that the Clinton Administration's six-year cozying up to India has been a foolhardy and perilous substitute for common sense. A small squadron of cabinet officers have visited in the past two years and President Clinton has been planning a trip later this year. Even so, the Indian government has not shot itself in the foot -- it has most likely shot itself in the head. By conducting five nuclear tests, India has made a major miscalculation, not merely about the United States, but about India's own capability. The Indian government has deluded itself into the absurd assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons will make India "a superpower," at a time when hundreds of millions of India's people are in poverty. The fact is that India is tangled in economic knots, disease and misery are rampant -- hence the absurd assumption that a big boom will make them a big power. This mentality is not merely dangerous, it is incredible. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons is certainly no laughing matter. Pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, all manner of U.S. assistance to India, ranging from foreign aid to U.S. support for India in global financial institutions, has been terminated. For whatever it is worth, I have hoped that India would march sensibly, and with caution, into the 21st century. I have tried to be a friend to India. But, as long as there is breath in me, I will never support the lifting of the Glenn amendment sanctions on India unless they abandon all nuclear ambitions. Regarding Pakistan in all of this, I understand the position that Pakistan is in today. They are threatened, politically and militarily, and no doubt the Pakistanis feel enormous pressure to act. To Prime Minister Sharif, I offer my advice, for whatever it is worth. This is the moment of truth for Pakistan as a nation. It can be a partner to the United States in fighting nuclear proliferation, or it can be a schoolyard rival to India, and engage in the folly of nuclear weapons testing. I hope Pakistan will choose to be our partner. Additionally, India's actions demonstrate that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), from a non-proliferation standpoint, is scarcely more than a sham. I hope that the Clinton Administration has learned from its mistakes sufficiently to refuse to allow India to paper over its actions by signing the CTBT. I, for one, cannot and will not agree to any treaty which would legitimize de facto India's possession of these weapons, just so long as they are not caught further testing them. The appropriate U.S. response must be vigorous international sanctions against India to be lifted only after India's nuclear program has been rolled back. And, mind you, there are aspects of India's nuclear detonations, which are extremely troubling. Today's two tests were clearly intended to fall below any seismic detection threshold, a clear indication that India intended to remain a nuclear power at all costs, which demonstrates India's intent to exploit the verification deficiencies of the CTBT by testing new designs in an undetectable fashion. I will be particularly interested in what the former Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey, thinks about all of this. Indeed, if the Administration plans to pressure India regarding arms control treaties, it should focus on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indian ratification of that treaty, as a non-nuclear weapons state, will do infinitely more than Indian ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We don't need to worry about Indian nuclear tests if India has agreed not to have these weapons in the first place. India's nuclear testing is compelling, additional evidence pointing to the need for a national missile defense to protect the United States. Because India has a space-launch capability which can be readily configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), India's actions clearly constitute an emerging nuclear threat to the territory of the United States. It is high time that the antiquated 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- which prohibits a national missile defense, and which hamstrings even U.S. theater missile defenses -- is relegated to the ash bins of history. Finally, India's actions underscore how vital the U.S. nuclear deterrent is to our national security. What is needed, at this time, is not a scramble for an arms control treaty that prohibits the United States from guaranteeing the safety of the American people and the reliability of its nuclear stockpile. What is needed is a careful, top-to-bottom review of the state of our own nuclear infrastructure, and there should be no further delay in getting about it. (End text)
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