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[Page: H4949]

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am taking out this special order here today in conjunction with my friend and colleague from Texas (Mr. Frost) to discuss H.R. 2709, the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. The President must decide tomorrow whether or not to veto H.R. 2709, which was sent to him on June 10.

This is legislation which Congress and the administration have discussed and debated again and again. It was first introduced in October 1997, followed by hearings and briefings with the administration, including at least two lengthy meetings between Vice President Gore and congressional sponsors of the legislation. In June it was sent to the President after a 392 to 22 vote.

The Senate passed this legislation 90 TO 4. It has such great support in the Congress because it is aimed at halting one of the major threats to international stability, Iran's program of developing missile delivery systems for its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons program.

There is no doubt about the Iranian program. Iran's Shihab-3 and Shihab-4 missiles are being designed with external help, reportedly primarily but not exclusively Russian, to a range of 930 to 1,250 miles. There have been additional reports that the Iranian objective is to develop a multistage, intercontinental missile with a range of 3,500 miles.

I agree with the Secretary of State that we should engage Iran. We should not let the memory of the taking of American hostages in our Embassy in Tehran almost 20 years ago forever determine our relationships with Iran. We should seek to expand our person-to-person contacts and work to resolve differences that separate us.

However, it is important to note that while President Khatami is pursuing more moderate domestic policies, it is not clear how much control he exercises or what his real intentions are with respect to foreign and defense policy. We cannot ignore the threat Iran's weapons programs and support for terrorism pose to regional peace and American interests in people. We should not change our policy toward Iran without seeing significant changes in Iran's behavior.

Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs continue to be of grave concern. U.S. officials have said publicly that Iran has a large and increasingly self-sufficient chemical weapons program and probably has produced biological warfare agents as well. Administration officials have publicly confirmed that Iran is trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

And while Iranian President Khatami has categorically rejected terrorist attacks against civilians, he has yet to back his words with action. According to State Department's most recent report on terrorism, Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Last fall Iran hosted representatives of numerous terrorist groups at a conference of liberation movements where they discussed greater coordination and support for some of the groups.

When the administration waived the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, sanctions on European companies and Malaysia, it said that it did so because it wanted to focus on preventing proliferation rather than preventing investments in the Iranian oil industry. While I do not endorse the administration's rationale for the ILSA sanctions waiver, I cannot help but note that the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act does what the administration says it wants. It focuses on proliferation.

It would be incongruous for the administration to veto this bill, because we can already see the consequence of the administration's waivers of the ILSA sanctions. The President should welcome this legislation, not decry it.

[Page: H4950]

[TIME: 2100]

On too many occasions in the past 3 1/2 years, the leadership in this House has tried to tie the President's hand in foreign policy and overrule his prerogative to lead on national security matters. This is not such an effort.

Although the President must make a classified report to Congress of `credible information on foreign entities which have transferred missile technology to Iran,' it is the President who determines what is credible. Thirty days later he must impose sanctions on those entities. These sanctions are not targeted against any country or government, but are narrowly targeted against the companies themselves, and the President may waive the imposition of sanctions, either because he is persuaded that the information contained in the report to Congress is incorrect or if he determines that the waiver is essential to the national security. And what are the sanctions that we are talking about? Simply that the entity or company that has proliferated this missile technology to Iran faces the loss of exports.

• The bill has been significantly improved since it was first introduced. First, it is no longer retroactive beyond January 1998. Second, it allows for a classified report to be submitted to the Congress and permits the President to suspend sanctions. Third, it is limited to the transfer of items already contained on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) list--goods which are widely considered as benefiting a missile system--or additional items which the President determines to be of concern.

• When this bill was debated last November in the House, the Administration suggested that the standard of evidence was so low that the US would be forced to impose `erroneously' sanctions on foreigners. I find this to be a difficult argument to accept. The concept of this or any Administration `rushing to an erroneous judgment' on any issue subject to the availability and evaluation of intelligence data is hard to imagine. Is `credible information' so weak a standard that it would result in the erroneous imposition of sanctions when the President has the discretion to determine whether or not the information is credible? If the President has evidence that seemingly credible information is not accurate, then by definition the information is no longer credible.

• With a great deal of evidence accumulated since 1994, the Administration still has not determined whether or not to sanction China for transferring entire M-11 missiles to Pakistan.

• Yes, there are existing sanctions laws which attempt to restrict weapons proliferation. This bill is different from some existing laws because, unlike the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, and unlike existing law, the President must report to the Congress credible information about a violation and then he has thirty days to impose a sanction unless he uses the waiver procedure. There is no doubt that this legislation makes it more difficult for the President to evade responsibility for imposing sanctions. Some may think it best to make it easier for the President to evade the intent of the Congress. That is not my view.

• This bill should not be construed as anti-Russian--it applies to companies anywhere that aid Iran. Administration officials say that this legislation will damage our relationship with Russia at a time when Moscow is tightening controls over sensitive exports. If, indeed, the Russians are taking steps that comply with the Act's provisions, they will not be sanctioned. Even if Russian companies are sanctioned, U.S.-Russian relations will survive because our two countries have many shared interests and concerns. We cannot afford to stop working with each other. And the United States remains committed to strengthening Russia's democratic transition. The bill now comports with Russian law and should be construed as a cooperative tool in our joint struggle to stop the dangerous flow of illegal technology to Iran.

• The Russian Government has taken many positive steps to restrict sensitive exports. On May 5th the Deputy Head of Administration of the Russian President stated that `Military and dual purpose technologies constitute the national treasure of Russia, which has been created by successive generations of our people. Therefore the export control shall completely exclude any possibility of squandering unique domestic technologies, materials, parts, intellectual property, and prevent leaks of classified state and military data.' This is a very helpful statement and the additional measures that the Russians have taken to control exports are also praiseworthy. They are a tribute to the seriousness with which the Russians take this issue and a tribute to the Administration, especially Vice President Gore, who has worked extraordinarily hard with the Russians to come to a common understanding of the seriousness of the Iranian threat and to a common approach to confronting that threat.

• Vetoing this bill would be a mistake, sending instead a signal that the Administration is not as committed as it claims to be in preventing Iran from threatening its neighbors and the world.

• The strong support that this legislation has received indicates that should the President veto this bill, his veto will be over-ridden. This legislation makes a substantial contribution to the fight against proliferation and has the overwhelming support of the U.S. Congress.

END