105th Congress Treaty Doc.
SENATE
1st Session 105-28
_______________________________________________________________________
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY
__________
MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AND SIGNED
BY THE UNITED STATES AT NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996. TREATY INCLUDES
TWO ANNEXES, A PROTOCOL, AND TWO ANNEXES TO THE PROTOCOL
September 23, 1997.--Treaty was read the first time, together with the
accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
ordered to be printed for use of the Senate
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1997
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, September 22, 1997.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the
Senate to ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (the ``Treaty'' or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and
signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 1996.
The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to
the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I
transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of
the Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by-
Article analysis of the Treaty.
Also included in the Department of State's report is a
document relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on
the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, adopted by
the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19, 1996. The
Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization in preparing detailed procedures for implementing
the Treaty and making arrangements for the first session of the
Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular,
by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be
responsible for ensuring that the verification regime
established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at
such time as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration
has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an
analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with
section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended.
Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty
also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate
action.
The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
is a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject
of the Treaty is one that has been under consideration by the
international community for nearly 40 years, and
thesignificance of the conclusion of negotiations and the signature to
date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty
creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon
test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. Specifically,
each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any
nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and
to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in
the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion.
The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime,
based on the provision of seismic, hydroaucoustic,
radionuclide, and infrasound data by a global network (the
``International Monitoring System'') consisting of the
facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data provided by
the International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed,
and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated
operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will
be part of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The verification regime
includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections,
provisions for consultation and clarification, and voluntary
confidence-building measures designed to contribute to the
timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from
possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to
chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has
carried out. Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify
the Treaty, the text specifically provides for the right of
States Parties to use information obtained by national
technical means in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law for purposes of
verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an
on-site inspection request. The verificationregime provides
each State Party the right to protect sensitive installations,
activities, or locations not related to the Treaty. Determinations of
compliance with the Treaty rest with each individual State Party to the
Treaty.
Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the
Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980,
negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but
ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon
states called for test-ban negotiations, the United States
urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ``CD'') to devote its
attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance
with such a ban and developing elements of an international
monitoring regime. After the United States, joined by other key
states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban
negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty,
negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the
CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of a
comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996
resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in
conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of
that Treaty, of ``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament'' that listed the conclusion of a
CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action.
On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a
``zero yield'' CTBT, I stated that:
. . . As part of our national security strategy, the
United States must and will retain strategic nuclear
forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign
leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from
acting against our vital interests and to convince it
thatseeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In
this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear
stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States. ``I
am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear
weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear
deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship
program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such
a program almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the
support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied to a new certification
procedure. In order for this program to succeed, both the
Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan
support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and
beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this
support.
While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship
program will be successful, as President I cannot
dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the
program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore,
in addition to the new annual certification procedure
for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also
establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define
the conditions under which the United States can enter
into a CTBT . . .
The safeguards that were established are as follows:
The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship
program to ensure a high level of confidence in the
safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active
stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of
effective and continuing experimental programs.
The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory
facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory
nuclear technology that will attract, retain, and
ensure the continued application of our human
scientific resources to those programs on which
continued progress in nuclear technology depends.
The maintenance of the basic capability to resume
nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should
the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this
Treaty.
The continuation of a comprehensive research and
development program to improve our treaty monitoring
capabilities and operations.
The continuing development of a broad range of
intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and
operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear
weapons development programs, and related nuclear
programs.
The understanding that if the President of the United
States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear
Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons
laboratories,and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability
of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be
critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the
President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to
withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national
interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be
required.
With regard to the last safeguard:
The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the
safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile
as a matter affecting the supreme interests of the
country and will regard any events calling that
confidence into question as ``extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of the treaty.'' It will
exercise its rights under the ``supreme national
interests'' clause if it judges that the safety or
realibility of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be
assured with the necessary high degree of confidence
without nuclear testing.
To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of
Defense ad Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons
Council or ``NWC'' (comprising representatives of DOD,
JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons
laboratories and the commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command--will report to the President annually, whether
they can certify that the Nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a
high degree of confidence, safe andreliable, and, if
they cannot do so, whether, in their opinion and that of the NWC,
testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the
adequacy of corrective measures to assure the safety and reliability of
the stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state the
reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any
minority views.
After receiving the Secretaries' certification and
accompanying report, including NWC and minority views,
the President will provide them to the appropriate
committees of the Congress, together with a report on
the actions he has taken in light of them.
If the President is advised, by the above procedure,
that a high level of confidence in the safety or
reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to the
Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified
without nuclear testing, or that nuclear testing is
necessary to assure the adequacy of corrective
measures, the President will be prepared to exercise
our ``supreme national interests'' rights under the
Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.
The procedure for such annual certification by the
Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S.
Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons
laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.
As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became
apparent that one member of the CD, India, would not join in a
consensus decision to forward the text to the United Nations
for its adoption. After consultations among countries
supporting the text. Australia requested the President of the
U.N. GeneralAssembly to convene a resumed session of the 50th
General Assembly to consider and take action on the text. The General
Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was
adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and
I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first
to sign the Treaty.
The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its
implementation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (the ``Organization''), to be established in
Vienna. The Organization, of which each State Party will be a
member, will have three organs: the Conference of the State
Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical
Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the
operation of and provide technical support for the
International Monitoring System, operate the International Data
Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site
inspections. The Treaty also requires each State Party to
establish a National Authority that will serve as the focal
point within the State Party for liaison with the Organization
and with other States Parties.
The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit
of instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed
in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years
after its being opened for signature. If, 3 years from the
opening of the Treaty for signature, the Treaty has not entered
into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his
capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a conference
of the states that have deposited their instruments of
ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this
conference the participants will consider what measures
consistent with international law might be undertaken to
accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the
early entry into force of the Treaty. Their decision on such
measures must be taken by consensus.
Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the
Treaty are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the
Protocol and its Annexes so long as they are not incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the
Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the States
Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment
Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such
amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by
all States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment
Conference.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a
``supreme interests'' clause entitling any State Party that
determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice.
Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a
Review Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's
entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals
thereafter if the Conference of the States Parties so decides
by a majority vote (or more frequently if the Conference of the
States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote).
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular
significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear
proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. Its
conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority item
on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda.
Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which
further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be
soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end
of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear
weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their
commitment to meaningful arms control measures.
The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of
the CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-
related treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear
explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next
several years to meet these challenges. Even with these
enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion
scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National
Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's
verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the
United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively
verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States:
will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the
totality of information available in public and private
channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty)
for addressing compliance concerns and imposing
sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and
will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether
the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear
explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests)
that could damage U.S. security interests and
constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
(b) take prompt and effective counteraction.
My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also
reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be
undermined by possible nuclear testing that the United States
might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the
United States will derive substantial confidence from other
factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national interests'' clause, the
annual certification procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile,
and the U.S. Safeguards program.
I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is
in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will
significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms
control objectives and strengthen international security.
Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable
consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to
ratification as soon as possible.
William J. Clinton.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
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Department of State,
Washington, September 20, 1997.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Treaty, or CTBT),
opened for signature at New York on September 24, 1996, and
signed by the United States of America and 145 other countries
to date.
The Treaty includes as integral parts, two Annexes and a
Protocol (on verification) with two Annexes. Accompanying this
Report for the information of the Senate, is an Article-by-
Article analysis of the Treaty.
introduction
The Treaty represents the culmination of nearly four
decades of efforts, beginning during the Eisenhower
Administration, to ban completely all nuclear weapon test
explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, wherever they
might be carried out. Since 1963, the carrying out of a nuclear
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the
atmosphere, in outer space or underwater has been prohibited by
the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water (the Partial or Limited Test-Ban
Treaty, or LTBT), done at Moscow August 5, 1963. More than 120
states are party to the LTBT, but importantly two of the
formally acknowledged nuclear weapon states, China and France,
are not. During the 1977-1980 time frame, trilateral
negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were carried out by
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
These negotiations reached an impasse over a number of issues,
including seismic monitoring. They continued following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in early December 1979 and were
adjourned in November 1980.
In the decade that followed, efforts to explore the
verification needs for a comprehensive test ban were undertaken
by the Group of Scientific Experts, a group of the Conference
on Disarmament (the CD), while strong calls were made for
negotiations on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon states.
In making their case for negotiation of a test ban, these non-
nuclear weapon states repeatedly referred to the preambular
expressions of support for continued negotiations on a test ban
contained in the LTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), done at Washington, London, and
Moscow July 1, 1968.
Since December 11, 1990, the United States and the Russian
Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union) have been legally
precluded from conducting nuclear explosions with yields
greater than 150 kilotons in the one environment to which the
1963 LTBT was not applicable, beneath the surface of the earth,
by the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests (TTBT) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions
for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on July 3, 1974 and May
28, 1976 respectively. Following signature of these Treaties
and pending their entry into force, the United States and the
Soviet Union in 1976 each publicly stated its intention to
observe the 150 kiloton limit, provided that the other did
likewise. Following agreement on new verification Protocols,
the two Treaties were ratified and entered into force on
December 11, 1990.
The CTBT will prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions
and any other nuclear explosion, however small, and it does so
in each and every environment, without exception.
The text of the Treaty was negotiated in Geneva, between
January 1994 and August 1996, in the CD. Nearly all of the
member states of the CD, initially numbering 38, but
subsequently expanded to 61 in June 1996, participated actively
in the negotiations. On behalf of the United States,
representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the
Department of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Intelligence Community, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Department of Energy all played important
roles in the development of the Treaty through participation in
the negotiations in Geneva and the development of policy in
Washington. Throughout the negotiating process, the United
States consulted and worked closely with its Western Allies in
the CD, as well as with Israel and withthe non-Western nuclear
weapon state members of the CD, Russia and China.
background information
When the United States made the decision in mid-1993
actively to pursue conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban
treaty it did so in an environment, both international and
domestic, significantly different from that in which
negotiations of a test ban had taken place from 1977 to 1980.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the appreciation of the
magnitude of the security threat posed by the possible
proliferation of states having nuclear weapon capabilities
fostered a new look at the impact a comprehensive test-ban
could have on constraining such threats. Additional factors
included the redress of the major imbalance in conventional
forces in Europe brought about by the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), done at Paris December
19, 1990, which greatly reduced the levels of tanks, armored
combat vehicles, artillery, attack aircraft, and helicopters,
and the major reduction in the strategic forces of the United
States and the former Soviet Union resulting from the START
negotiations. Finally, it was determined that the United States
had no current military requirement for new-design nuclear
warhead production. Accordingly, the constraints of a test ban
could be accepted. In contrast to earlier comprehensive test
ban negotiations, all the negotiating parties were willing to
accept relatively intrusive verification measures, including
extensive in-country sensors and on-site inspections.
In addition, legislation was signed into law by President
Bush in 1992 that directed the United States to stop all
testing by September 30, 1996, provided no other state tested
after that date, and to engage in negotiations to achieve a
comprehensive test-ban by that date. In the meantime, the
legislation (sponsored by Senators Hatfield, Exon, and
Mitchell) precluded the expenditure of funds for more than 15
nuclear weapon tests (including three for the United Kingdom)
and permitted the expenditure of appropriated funds for such
tests only if they were found by the Executive Branch to be
necessary for the sole purpose of maintaining the reliability
and safety of the existing nuclear weapon stockpile.
As regards the international climate that contributed to
the U.S. decision actively to support negotiation and
conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban, the then forthcoming
1995 Review and Extension Conferenceof the NPT focused new
light on the importance of a comprehensive test-ban to the member
states of the NPT and to the continued viability of the
nonproliferation regime. The United States was deeply committed to the
indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and it became clear
that a comprehensive test-ban could make a major contribution to
achievement of the NPT's permanent extension. The decision to support a
concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test-ban was thus based on
the careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the
benefits to United States nonproliferation and other security
objectives in constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon
capabilities. However, the U.S. decision to pursue actively a
comprehensive test-ban was conditioned on having the capability to
ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the
U.S. stockpile and to achieve an effective verification regime for the
Treaty. At the same time, the United States sought to ensure protection
of U.S. interests with respect to the scope, membership, and
termination provisions of the Treaty.
The negotiations in the CD continued throughout 1994, 1995,
and most of 1996. The CD was working to meet a target date for
signature of the Treaty in the fall of 1996 set by the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution unanimously adopted
in December 1995. The objective was for the CD to forward the
agreed-upon text to a resumed 50th session of the UNGA, which
could then request the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for
signature. As the 1996 CD session drew close to an end it
became clear that one state, India, would block consensus
action by the CD to forward the text to the UNGA. The member
states of the CD that supported the text thereupon began to
consider other means by which the text that had resulted from
the deliberations within the CD's AD Hoc Committee on a Nuclear
Test-Ban might be forwarded to the UN. Australia took the lead
in its individual capacity, not as a member of the CD, and
formally requested that the UNGA President convene a resumed
session of the 50th General Assembly for the purpose of
considering and acting upon the text of a comprehensive test-
ban treaty. At its resumed session the General Assembly adopted
the text of the Treaty by a vote of 158 to 3 with 5
abstentions. Thereafter the Secretary-General opened the Treaty
for signature on September 24, 1996. At the same time, the
Signatory States held a series of consultations regarding the
Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization that had
been developed at the CD. At a meeting of SignatoryStates of
the CTBT on November 19, 1996, the Signatory States, at that time
numbering 130, adopted by acclamation the Text, thereby establishing
the Preparatory Commission for the Organization. This document provides
the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission, which is the
entity responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing
the Treaty and for laying the foundation for the operation of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the Organization)
that is established by the Treaty and will come into being once the
Treaty enters into force. The Text, which is relevant to but not part
of the Treaty, is enclosed for the information of the Senate. On
November 20, 1996, the Preparatory Commission convened its first
meeting (which was reconvened and concluded in March 1997), and began
the process of developing Rules of Procedure, Financial Regulations,
and other necessary measures for the future operation of the
Organization in implementing the Treaty.
the treaty: its structure and content
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty consists of a
Preamble, 17 Articles, and two Annexes, as well as the Protocol
to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Verification
Protocol) having three Parts and two Annexes. The basic
obligations of the States Parties are set forth in Article I.
Specifically, each State Party undertakes: (a) not to carry out
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion; (b) to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear
explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and
(c) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in the carrying out of any such nuclear explosion
by anyone else. The prohibitions and undertakings thus apply to
geographic areas (i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or
control of a State Party), as well as to the activities of a
State Party (e.g., the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion) wherever such
activity might take place.
organizational bodies
The Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty Organization (the Organization, or CTBTO) located in
Vienna, Austria, as the body that is charged with achieving the
object and purpose of the Treaty and overseeing implementation
of the provisions of the Treaty and the international
verification system described in the Protocol to the CTBT. Each
State Party to the Treaty is a member of the Organization,
which itself has threeorgans: the Conference of the States
Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.
The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) is
the body responsible for overseeing implementation of the
Treaty, the activities of the Executive Council and the
Technical Secretariat, and the States Parties' compliance with
the Treaty's provisions. It is charged with considering and
reviewing scientific and technological developments that could
affect the operation of the Treaty, and with taking the
necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to
redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the
provisions of the Treaty.
The Executive Council is composed of 51 member states,
elected by the Conference of the States Parties. Annex 1 to the
Treaty assigns each potential State Party to one of six
geographical regions. Each region will present to the
Conference designations of States Parties for seats on the
Executive Council. Designations will be based, inter alia, on a
State Party's nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as
well as the number of monitoring facilities and financial
contributions to the Organization. The United States expects to
serve continuously on the Executive Council. The Executive
Council is the executive body of the Organization, responsible
for the supervision of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive
Council serves as the liaison with the National Authority of
each State Party, and carries out the preparatory and follow-up
work for sessions of the Conference. The Executive Council has
important functions with respect to verification and
compliance: it is directed to facilitate cooperation among the
States Parties through the exchange of information; to
facilitate consultations among States Parties; to receive,
consider, and act on requests for on-site inspections; and to
take action on the reports of such inspections. It may make
recommendations to the Conference based on the results of on-
site inspections, or, if a case is urgent, take a matter
directly to the United Nations.
The Technical Secretariat is responsible, inter alia and
most importantly, for supervising the operation of the
International Monitoring System (the IMS), operating the
International Data Center (the IDC), and the conduct of on-site
inspections. It is headed by a Director-General, appointed by
the Conference, who will serve a four-year term and not more
than two terms. Data from the monitoring stations in the IMS is
provided by States directly or through their own national data
centers, tothe IDC, where it is processed, analyzed and stored,
and made available to all States Parties. The IDC products that will be
made available to all States Parties at no cost include: standard
screened event bulletins, executive summaries of data acquired, and
integrated lists of all signals detected by the IMS.
national implementation measures
In addition to the implementing organs established by the
Treaty itself, the Treaty requires each State Party to
establish a National Authority to serve as a focal point for
liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.
States Parties are also expressly required to take the steps
necessary to prohibit natural and legal persons on their
territory and natural and legal persons in any other place
under their jurisdiction or control, from undertaking any
activity that the State Party itself is prohibited from
undertaking. In addition, they are required to prohibit their
nationals from undertaking such activities anywhere. These
prohibitions complement the basic obligation of each State
Party under Article I to ``prohibit and prevent'' nuclear
explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
verification of compliance
The verification regime established by the Treaty has four
separate but interdependent components: an international
monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures,
on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The
Protocol to the Treaty contains the specific objectives,
authorities, functions, and requirements for the international
monitoring system, on-site inspections, and confidence-building
measures. The Treaty also provides for the States Parties to
take measures necessary to ensure compliance and to redress a
situation that contravenes the Treaty, including the
possibility of the imposition of sanctions. In conjunction with
States Parties' obligations to provide data and accept on-site
inspections, provision is made for the protection of sensitive
facilities and confidential information and data provided by
States Parties. The Treaty also specifically recognizes States
Parties' rights to use information obtained by national
technical means in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law, including the
respect for the sovereignty of states, for purposes of
verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an
on-site inspection request.
Each State Party is required to maintain and operate, in
accordance with agreements or arrangements between it and the
Organization, those facilities for seismological, radionuclide,
hydro- acoustical, and infrasound monitoring comprising the
IMS, as well as laboratories and related communication
facilities, listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol, located on its
territory or for which it is otherwise responsible. The
Organization is also authorized to enter into similar
agreements or arrangements with states not party to the Treaty
as necessary.
For the purpose of clarifying whether a nuclear explosion
has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, each State
Party has the right to request an on-site inspection. Within
specific time frames an inspection request must be processed
and referred to the Executive Council, which must take action
within 96 hours from the time the request is first received.
Approval of the request requires at least 30 affirmative votes
of the 51 members of the Executive Council. If the request is
approved, the inspection team must arrive at the point of entry
no more than six days following the Executive Council's receipt
of the request. Following the inspection, an inspection report
is provided to all States Parties, and the Executive Council
reviews the report and must address any concerns expressed by a
State Party as to whether any non-compliance with the Treaty
has occurred and whether the right to request an on-site
inspection has been abused. If the Executive Council determines
that further actions may be necessary, it may make
recommendations to the Conference on measures to redress the
situation.
Recognizing that signals from non-nuclear explosions might
create ambiguities, the Treaty calls upon each State Party, on
a voluntary basis, to participate in a number of confidence-
building measures, including the provision of information
relating to any chemical explosions using over 300 metric tons
of TNT-equivalent blasting material that it intends to carry
out.
entry into force, duration, and withdrawal from the treaty
Annex 2 to the Treaty names the 44 states that are members
of the Conference on Disarmament and that are also listed in
Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996
edition of ``Nuclear Power Reactors in the World'' or listed in
Table I of the IAEA's December 1995 edition of ``Nuclear
Research Reactors in the World.'' Pursuant to paragraph 1 of
Article XIV of theTreaty, these 44 states are those whose
ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Once those
states have ratified, the Treaty will enter into force 180 days
following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification by the 44,
or two years after September 24, 1996 (the date on which the Treaty was
opened for signature), whichever is later.
By virtue of this Article XIV provision, each of the 44
named states could effectively block the entry into force of
the Treaty. The Treaty therefore provides that three years
after the opening of the Treaty for signature, if it has not
yet entered into force, a majority of the states that have
deposited their instruments of ratification can request the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (the designated
Depositary for the Treaty) to convene a conference to consider
what measures, consistent with international law, might be
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to
facilitate the Treaty's entry into force. This conference would
not, however, have the authority to waive the requirement for
ratification by the 44 designated states.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty contains a
``supreme interests'' clause, in accordance with which a State
Party may withdraw from the Treaty upon six month's notice to
all the other States Parties, the Executive Council, the
Depositary, and the United Nations Security Council, if it
determines that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A
State Party exercising this right is required to provide, along
with its notice of withdrawal, a statement of the extraordinary
event or events that it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.
reservations and amendments
Reservations may not be taken to the Articles of the Treaty
or the Annexes to the Treaty. Reservations may be taken to the
Protocol and the Annexes thereto so long as they are not
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
The procedures for amendment of the Treaty, the Protocol or
the Annexes to the Protocol provide that any State party may
propose an amendment, which, if considered and adopted at an
Amendment Conference by a majority of States Parties and
without a negative vote by any State Party, shall enter into
force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of an
instrument ofratification or acceptance by all those States
Parties that voted for the amendment at the Amendment Conference.
In addition, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of
ensuring the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the
Parties may make changes of an administrative or technical
nature to Part I (dealing with the International Monitoring
System and the International Data Center) and Part III
(Confidence-Building Measures) of the Protocol, as well as the
Annexes to the Protocol, in accordance with a separate
procedure and without going through the formal amendment
process.
costs
The expenses of the Organization are to be borne by the
States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of
assessments, adjusted to take into account differences in
membership between the United Nations and the Organization. It
is anticipated that the United States share will be
approximately 25 percent. The Treaty provides that each State
Party establishing or upgrading International Monitoring
Facilities (IMS) may reduce its annual assessed contribution by
up to 50 percent pursuant to agreement with the Organization
and, if applicable, the state(s) on whose territory the
facility is based. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission
are to be divided in the same manner as the expenses of the
Organization, and provision is made for giving credit to States
Parties for their contribution to the Preparatory Commission as
offsets against their assessed contributions for the regular
budget of the Organization.
national implementation
As noted above, the Treaty requires that each State Party
establish a National Authority that will function as its
liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each
State Party is required to inform the Organization of its
National Authority upon entry into force of the treaty for it.
In order for the United States to ensure full compliance
with its obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation
will be required. Such legislation will be submitted separately
to the Congress. In addition, any environmental documentation
that may be deemed appropriate will be forwarded separately to
the Senate for its information.
conclusion
I believe that this Treaty, by banning all nuclear weapon
test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as described
above, and by establishing a comprehensive verification system
to monitor compliance and assist States Parties in making
compliance decisions, will significantly strengthen the
national security of the United States and its Allies and will
contribute to global and regional security as well. I therefore
recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible
time.
Respectfully submitted,
Madeleine Albright.
Enclosures: As stated.
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