Special Weapons-Related Excerpts
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
CONFERENCE REPORT
to accompany
H.R. 1119
October 23, 1997
105th Congress 1st Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Report 105-340
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TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
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Subtitle D--Other Matters
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SEC. 244. BIOASSAY TESTING OF VETERANS EXPOSED TO IONIZING
RADIATION DURING MILITARY SERVICE.
(a) Nuclear Test Personnel Program.--Of the amount provided in
section 201(4), $300,000 shall be available for testing described in
subsection (b) in support of the Nuclear Test Personnel Program
conducted by the Defense Special Weapons Agency.
(b) Covered Testing.--Subsection (a) applies to the third phase of
bioassay testing of individuals who are radiation-exposed veterans (as
defined in section 1112(c)(3)(A) of title 38, United States Code) who
participated in radiation-risk activities (as defined in section
1112(c)(3)(B) of such title).
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TITLE VII--HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS
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Subtitle F--Persian Gulf Illness
SEC. 761. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this subtitle:
(1) The term ``Gulf War illness'' means any one of the complex of
illnesses and symptoms that might have been contracted by members of the
Armed Forces as a result of service in the Southwest Asia theater of
operations during the Persian Gulf War.
(2) The term ``Persian Gulf War'' has the meaning given that term in
section 101 of title 38, United States Code.
(3) The term ``Persian Gulf veteran'' means an individual who served
on active duty in the Armed Forces in the Southwest Asia theater of
operations during the Persian Gulf War.
(4) The term ``contingency operation'' has the meaning given that
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code, and includes a
humanitarian operation, peacekeeping operation, or similar operation.
SEC. 762. PLAN FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR PERSIAN GULF VETERANS.
(a) Plan Required.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, acting jointly, shall prepare a plan to provide
appropriate health care to Persian Gulf veterans (and dependents
eligible by law) who suffer from a Gulf War illness.
(b) Contents of Plan.--In preparing the plan, the Secretaries shall--
(1) use the presumptions of service connection and illness specified
in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 721(d) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103 337; 10 U.S.C.
1074 note) to determine the Persian Gulf veterans (and dependents
eligible by law) who should be covered by the plan;
(2) consider the need and methods available to provide health care
services to Persian Gulf veterans who are no longer on active duty in
the Armed Forces, such as Persian Gulf veterans who are members of the
reserve components and Persian Gulf veterans who have been separated
from the Armed Forces; and
(3) estimate the costs to the Government of providing full or
partial health care services under the plan to covered Persian Gulf
veterans (and covered dependents eligible by law).
(c) Follow-up Treatment.--The plan required by subsection (a) shall
specifically address the measures to be used to monitor the quality,
appropriateness, and effectiveness of, and patient satisfaction with,
health care services provided to Persian Gulf veterans after their
initial medical examination as part of registration in the Persian Gulf
War Veterans Health Registry or the Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation
Program.
(d) Submission of Plan.--Not later than March 1, 1998, the
Secretaries shall submit to Congress the plan required by subsection
(a).
SEC. 763. COMPTROLLER GENERAL STUDY OF REVISED DISABILITY
CRITERIA FOR PHYSICAL EVALUATION BOARDS.
Not later than March 1, 1998, the Comptroller General shall submit to
Congress a study evaluating the revisions made by the Secretary of
Defense (as required by section 721(e) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103 337; 10 U.S.C.
1074 note)) to the Physical Evaluation Board criteria used to set
disability ratings for members of the Armed Forces who are no longer
medically qualified for continuation on active duty so as to ensure
accurate disability ratings related to a diagnosis of a Gulf War
illness.
SEC. 764. MEDICAL CARE FOR CERTAIN RESERVES WHO SERVED IN
SOUTHWEST ASIA DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR.
(a) In General.--Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after section 1074d the following new section:
``1074e. Medical care: certain Reserves who served in
Southwest Asia during the Persian Gulf Conflict
``(a) Entitlement to Medical Care.--A member of the armed forces
described in subsection (b) is entitled to medical care for a qualifying
Persian Gulf symptom or illness to the same extent and under the same
conditions (other than the requirement that the member be on active
duty) as a member of a uniformed service who is entitled to such care
under section 1074(a) of this title.
``(b) Covered Members.--Subsection (a) applies to a member of a
reserve component who--
``(1) is a Persian Gulf veteran;
``(2) has a qualifying Persian Gulf symptom or illness; and
``(3) is not otherwise entitled to medical care for such symptom or
illness under this chapter and is not otherwise eligible for hospital
care and medical services for such symptom or illness under section 1710
of title 38.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `Persian Gulf veteran' means a member of the armed
forces who served on active duty in the Southwest Asia theater of
operations during the Persian Gulf Conflict.
``(2) The term `qualifying Persian Gulf symptom or illness' means,
with respect to a member described in subsection (b), a symptom or
illness--
``(A) that the member registered before September 1, 1997, in the
Comprehensive Clinical Evaluation Program of the Department of Defense
and that is presumed under section 721(d) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (10 U.S.C. 1074 note) to be a
result of service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the
Persian Gulf Conflict; or
``(B) that the member registered before September 1, 1997, in the
Persian Gulf War Veterans Health Registry maintained by the Department
of Veterans Affairs pursuant to section 702 of the Persian Gulf War
Veterans' Health Status Act (38 U.S.C. 527 note).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
1074d the following new item:
``1074e. Medical care: certain Reserves who served in Southwest
Asia during the Persian Gulf Conflict.''.
SEC. 765. IMPROVED MEDICAL TRACKING SYSTEM FOR MEMBERS
DEPLOYED OVERSEAS IN CONTINGENCY OR COMBAT OPERATIONS.
(a) System Required.--(1) Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by inserting after section 1074e (as added by section 764)
the following new section:
``1074f. Medical tracking system for members deployed overseas
``(a) System Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a
system to assess the medical condition of members of the armed forces
(including members of the reserve components) who are deployed outside
the United States or its territories or possessions as part of a
contingency operation (including a humanitarian operation, peacekeeping
operation, or similar operation) or combat operation.
``(b) Elements of System.--The system described in subsection (a)
shall include the use of predeployment medical examinations and
postdeployment medical examinations (including an assessment of mental
health and the drawing of blood samples) to accurately record the
medical condition of members before their deployment and any changes in
their medical condition during the course of their deployment. The
postdeployment examination shall be conducted when the member is
redeployed or otherwise leaves an area in which the system is in
operation (or as soon as possible thereafter).
``(c) Recordkeeping.--The results of all medical examinations
conducted under the system, records of all health care services
(including immunizations) received by members described in subsection
(a) in anticipation of their deployment or during the course of their
deployment, and records of events occurring in the deployment area that
may affect the health of such members shall be retained and maintained
in a centralized location to improve future access to the records.
``(d) Quality Assurance.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a
quality assurance program to evaluate the success of the system in
ensuring that members described in subsection (a) receive predeployment
medical examinations and postdeployment medical examinations and that
the recordkeeping requirements with respect to the system are met.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 1074e (as added by
section 764) the following new item:
``1074f. Medical tracking system for members deployed overseas.''.
(b) Report.--Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to Congress an analysis of the administrative implications
of establishing and administering the medical tracking system required
by section 1074f of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).
The report shall include, for fiscal year 1999 and the 5 successive fiscal
years, a separate analysis and specification of the projected costs and
operational considerations for each of the following required aspects of
the system:
(1) Predeployment medical examinations.
(2) Postdeployment medical examinations.
(3) Recordkeeping.
SEC. 766. NOTICE OF USE OF INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS OR DRUGS
UNAPPROVED FOR THEIR APPLIED USE.
(a) Notice Requirements.--Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``1107. Notice of use of an investigational new drug or a drug
unapproved for its applied use
``(a) Notice Required.--(1) Whenever the Secretary of Defense
requests or requires a member of the armed forces to receive an
investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use, the
Secretary shall provide the member with notice containing the
information specified in subsection (d).
``(2) The Secretary shall also ensure that health care providers who
administer an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its
applied use, or who are likely to treat members who receive such a drug,
receive the information required to be provided under paragraphs (3) and
(4) of subsection (d).
``(b) Time of Notice.--The notice required to be provided to a member
under subsection (a)(1) shall be provided before the investigational new
drug or drug unapproved for its applied use is first administered to the
member, if practicable, but in no case later than 30 days after the drug
is first administered to the member.
``(c) Form of Notice.--The notice required under subsection (a)(1)
shall be provided in writing unless the Secretary of Defense determines
that the use of written notice is impractical because of the number of
members receiving the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for
its applied use, time constraints, or similar reasons. If the Secretary
provides notice under subsection (a)(1) in a form other than in writing,
the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report describing the
notification method used and the reasons for the use of the alternative
method.
``(d) Content of Notice.--The notice required under subsection (a)(1)
shall include the following:
``(1) Clear notice that the drug being administered is an
investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use.
``(2) The reasons why the investigational new drug or drug
unapproved for its applied use is being administered.
``(3) Information regarding the possible side effects of the
investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied use,
including any known side effects possible as a result of the interaction
of such drug with other drugs or treatments being administered to the
members receiving such drug.
``(4) Such other information that, as a condition of authorizing the
use of the investigational new drug or drug unapproved for its applied
use, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may require to be
disclosed.
``(e) Records of Use.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the
medical records of members accurately document--
``(1) the receipt by members of any investigational new drug or drug
unapproved for its applied use; and
``(2) the notice required by subsection (a)(1).
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) The term `investigational new drug' means a drug covered by
section 505(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
355(i)).
``(2) The term `drug unapproved for its applied use' means a drug
administered for a use not described in the approved labeling of the
drug under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21
U.S.C. 355).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``1107. Notice of use of an investigational new drug or a drug
unapproved for its applied use.''.
SEC. 767. REPORT ON PLANS TO TRACK LOCATION OF MEMBERS IN A
THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to Congress a report containing a plan for collecting and maintaining
information regarding the daily location of units of the Armed Forces,
and to the extent practicable individual members of such units, serving
in a theater of operations during a contingency operation or combat
operation.
SEC. 768. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF
SPECIALIZED UNITS FOR DETECTING AND MONITORING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND
SIMILAR HAZARDS IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, in
conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should take
such actions as are necessary to ensure that the units of the Armed
Forces deployed in the theater of operations for each contingency
operation or combat operation include specialized units with sufficient
capability (including personnel with the appropriate training and
expertise, and the appropriate equipment) to detect and monitor the
presence of chemical, biological, and similar hazards to which members
of the Armed Forces could be exposed in that theater during the
operation.
SEC. 769. REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF RESEARCH EFFORTS
REGARDING GULF WAR ILLNESSES.
Not later than March 1, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to Congress a report evaluating the effectiveness of medical research
initiatives regarding Gulf War illnesses. The report shall address the
following:
(1) The type and effectiveness of previous research efforts,
including the activities undertaken pursuant to section 743 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104
201; 10 U.S.C. 1074 note), section 722 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103 337; 10 U.S.C.
1074 note), and sections 270 and 271 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103 160; 107 Stat.
1613).
(2) Recommendations regarding additional research regarding Gulf War
illnesses, including research regarding the nature and causes of Gulf
War illnesses and appropriate treatments for such illnesses.
(3) The adequacy of Federal funding and the need for additional
funding for medical research initiatives regarding Gulf War illnesses.
SEC. 770. PERSIAN GULF ILLNESS CLINICAL TRIALS PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) There are many ongoing studies that investigate risk factors
which may be associated with the health problems experienced by Persian
Gulf veterans; however, there have been no studies that examine health
outcomes and the effectiveness of the treatment received by such
veterans.
(2) The medical literature and testimony presented in hearings on
Gulf War illnesses indicate that there are therapies, such as cognitive
behavioral therapy, that have been effective in treating patients with
symptoms similar to those seen in many Persian Gulf veterans.
(b) Establishment of Program.--The Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, acting jointly, shall establish a program
of cooperative clinical trials at multiple sites to assess the
effectiveness of protocols for treating Persian Gulf veterans who suffer
from ill-defined or undiagnosed conditions. Such protocols shall include
a multidisciplinary treatment model, of which cognitive behavioral
therapy is a component.
(c) Funding.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in section
201(1) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Army, the
sum of $4,500,000 shall be available for program element 62787A (medical
technology) in the budget of the Department of Defense for fiscal year
1998 to carry out the clinical trials program established pursuant to
subsection (b).
SEC. 771. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING GULF WAR ILLNESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Americans served in the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1991 in defense
of vital national security interests of the United States.
(2) It was known to United States intelligence and military
commanders that biological and chemical agents were in theater
throughout the conflict.
(3) An undetermined amount of these agents were released into theater.
(4) A large number of United States military veterans and allied
veterans who served in the Southwest Asia theater of operations have
been stricken with a variety of severe illnesses.
(5) Previous efforts to discern the causes of those illnesses have
been inadequate, and those illnesses are affecting the health of both
veterans and their families.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that all
promising technology and treatments relating to Gulf War illnesses
should be fully explored and tested to facilitate treatment for members
of the Armed Forces and veterans who served the United States in the
Persian Gulf conflict and are stricken with unexplainable illness.
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TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS
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Subtitle G--Other Matters
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SEC. 1078. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS FOR
TESTING OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.
(a) Prohibited Activities.--The Secretary of Defense may not conduct
(directly or by contract)--
(1) any test or experiment involving the use of a chemical agent or
biological agent on a civilian population; or
(2) any other testing of a chemical agent or biological agent on
human subjects.
(b) Exceptions.--Subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e), the
prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a test or experiment
carried out for any of the following purposes:
(1) Any peaceful purpose that is related to a medical, therapeutic,
pharmaceutical, agricultural, industrial, or research activity.
(2) Any purpose that is directly related to protection against toxic
chemicals or biological weapons and agents.
(3) Any law enforcement purpose, including any purpose related to
riot control.
(c) Informed Consent Required.--The Secretary of Defense may conduct
a test or experiment described in subsection (b) only if informed
consent to the testing was obtained from each human subject in advance
of the testing on that subject.
(d) Prior Notice to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the date
of final approval within the Department of Defense of plans for any
experiment or study to be conducted by the Department of Defense
(whether directly or under contract) involving the use of human subjects
for the testing of a chemical agent or a biological agent, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate
and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a
report setting forth a full accounting of those plans, and the
experiment or study may then be conducted only after the end of the
30-day period beginning on the date such report is received by those
committees.
(e) Biological Agent Defined.--In this section, the term ``biological
agent'' means any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses, fungi,
rickettsiac, or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious substance, and any
naturally occurring, bioengineered, or synthesized component of any such
micro-organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever its origin
or method of production, that is capable of causing--
(1) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human, an
animal, a plant, or another living organism;
(2) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or materials
of any kind; or
(3) deleterious alteration of the environment.
(f) Report and Certification.--Section 1703(b) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (50 U.S.C. 1523(b)) is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) A description of any program involving the testing of
biological or chemical agents on human subjects that was carried out by
the Department of Defense during the period covered by the report,
together with--
``(A) a detailed justification for the testing;
``(B) a detailed explanation of the purposes of the testing;
``(C) a description of each chemical or biological agent tested; and
``(D) the Secretary's certification that informed consent to the
testing was obtained from each human subject in advance of the testing
on that subject.''.
(g) Repeal of Superseded Provision of Law.--Section 808 of the
Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1520), is repealed.
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TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS
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Subtitle B--Export Controls on High Performance Computers
SEC. 1211. EXPORT APPROVALS FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.
(a) Prior Approval of Exports and Reexports.--The President shall
require that no digital computer with a composite theoretical
performance level of more than 2,000 millions of theoretical operations
per second (MTOPS) or with such other composite theoretical performance
level as may be established subsequently by the President under
subsection (d), may be exported or reexported without a license to a
country specified in subsection (b) if the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State,
or the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency objects, in
writing, to such export or reexport. Any person proposing to export or
reexport such a digital computer shall so notify the Secretary of
Commerce, who, within 24 hours after receiving the notification, shall
transmit the notification to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Energy, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
(b) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsection (a), the countries
specified in this subsection are the countries listed as ``Computer Tier
3'' eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997, subject to
modification by the President under subsection (e).
(c) Time Limit.--Written objections under subsection (a) to an export
or reexport shall be raised within 10 days after the notification is
received under subsection (a). If such a written objection to the export
or reexport of a computer is raised, the computer may be exported or
reexported only pursuant to a license issued by the Secretary of
Commerce under the Export Administration Regulations of the Department
of Commerce, without regard to the licensing exceptions otherwise
authorized under section 740.7 of title 15 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997. If no objection is raised
within the 10-day period, the export or reexport is authorized.
(d) Adjustment of Composite Theoretical Performance.--The President,
in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, and the
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, may establish a new
composite theoretical performance level for purposes of subsection (a).
Such new level shall not take effect until 180 days after the President
submits to the congressional committees designated in section 1215 a
report setting forth the new composite theoretical performance level and
the justification for such new level. Each report shall, at a minimum--
(1) address the extent to which high performance computers of a
composite theoretical level between the level established in subsection
(a) or such level as has been previously adjusted pursuant to this
section and the new level, are available from other countries;
(2) address all potential uses of military significance to which
high performance computers at the new level could be applied; and
(3) assess the impact of such uses on the national security
interests of the United States.
(e) Adjustment of Covered Countries.--
(1) In general.--The President, in consultation with the Secretary
of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the
Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, may add a country to or remove a country from the list of
covered countries in subsection (b), except that a country may be
removed from the list only in accordance with paragraph (2).
(2) Deletions from list of covered countries.--The removal of a
country from the list of covered countries under subsection (b) shall
not take effect until 120 days after the President submits to the
congressional committees designated in section 1215 a report setting
forth the justification for the deletion.
(3) Excluded countries.--A country may not be removed from the list
of covered countries under subsection (b) if--
(A) the country is a ``nuclear-weapon state'' (as defined by Article
IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the
country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; or
(B) the country is not a signatory of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the country is listed on Annex
2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
(f) Classification.--Each report under subsections (d) and (e) shall
be submitted in an unclassified form and may, if necessary, have a
classified supplement.
SEC. 1212. REPORT ON EXPORTS OF HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall provide to the congressional committees
specified in section 1215 a report identifying all exports of digital
computers with a composite theoretical performance of more than 2,000
millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to all countries
since January 25, 1996. For each export, the report shall identify--
(1) whether an export license was applied for and whether one was
granted;
(2) the date of the transfer of the computer;
(3) the United States manufacturer and exporter of the computer;
(4) the MTOPS level of the computer; and
(5) the recipient country and end user.
(b) Additional Information on Exports to Certain Countries.--In the
case of exports to countries specified in subsection (c), the report
under subsection (a) shall identify the intended end use for the
exported computer and the assessment by the executive branch of whether
the end user is a military end user or an end user involved in activities
relating to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missile technology.
Information provided under this subsection may be submitted in classified form
if necessary.
(c) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsection (b), the countries
specified in this subsection are--
(1) the countries listed as ``Computer Tier 3'' eligible countries
in section 740.7(d) of title 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as
in effect on June 10, 1997; and
(2) the countries listed in section 740.7(e) of title 15 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.
SEC. 1213. POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION OF EXPORT OF HIGH
PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.
(a) Required Post-Shipment Verification.--The Secretary of Commerce
shall conduct post-shipment verification of each digital computer with a
composite theoretical performance of more than 2,000 millions of
theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) that is exported from the
United States, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, to a
country specified in subsection (b).
(b) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsection (a), the countries
specified in this subsection are the countries listed as ``Computer Tier
3'' eligible countries in section 740.7 of title 15 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997, subject to
modification by the President under section 1211(e).
(c) Annual Report.--The Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the
congressional committees specified in section 1215 an annual report on
the results of post-shipment verifications conducted under this section
during the preceding year. Each such report shall include a list of all
such items exported from the United States to such countries during the
previous year and, with respect to each such export, the following:
(1) The destination country.
(2) The date of export.
(3) The intended end use and intended end user.
(4) The results of the post-shipment verification.
(d) Explanation When Verification Not Conducted.--If a post-shipment
verification has not been conducted in accordance with subsection (a)
with respect to any such export during the period covered by a report,
the Secretary shall include in the report for that period a detailed
explanation of the reasons why such a post-shipment verification was not
conducted.
SEC. 1214. GAO STUDY ON CERTAIN COMPUTERS; END USER
INFORMATION ASSISTANCE.
(a) In General.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall
submit to the congressional committees specified in section 1215 a study
of the national security risks relating to the sale of computers with a
composite theoretical performance of between 2,000 and 7,000 millions of
theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to end users in countries
specified in subsection (c). The study shall also analyze any foreign
availability of computers described in the preceding sentence and the
impact of such sales on United States exporters.
(b) End User Information Assistance to Exporters.--The Secretary of
Commerce shall establish a procedure by which exporters may seek
information on questionable end users in countries specified in
subsection (c) who are seeking to obtain computers described in
subsection (a).
(c) Covered Countries.--For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the
countries specified in this subsection are the countries listed as
``Computer Tier 3'' eligible countries in section 740.7(d) of title 15
of the Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on June 10, 1997.
SEC. 1215. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
For purposes of sections 1211(d), 1212(a), 1213(c), and 1214(a) the
congressional committees specified in those sections are the following:
(1) The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on International Relations and the Committee on
National Security of the House of Representatives.
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Subtitle C--Other Matters
.....................
SEC. 1229. REPORT ON HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT.
(a) Requirement.--Not later than March 31, 1998, the President shall
submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report
on the Helsinki Joint Statement on future reductions in nuclear forces.
The report shall address the United States approach (including
verification implications) to implementing the Helsinki Joint Statement,
in particular, as that Statement relates to the following:
(1) Lower aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads.
(2) Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear
warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.
(3) Deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
(4) Measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise
missiles and tactical nuclear systems.
(5) Issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term ``Helsinki
Joint Statement'' means the agreements between the President of the
United States and the President of the Russian Federation as contained
in the Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear
Forces issued at Helsinki in March 1997.
.......................
TITLE XIII--ARMS CONTROL AND RELATED MATTERS
Sec. 1301. Presidential report concerning detargeting of Russian
strategic missiles.
Sec. 1302. Limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic
nuclear delivery systems.
Sec. 1303. Assistance for facilities subject to inspection under
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Sec. 1304. Transfers of authorizations for high-priority
counterproliferation programs.
Sec. 1305. Advice to the President and Congress regarding the
safety, security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons
stockpile.
Sec. 1306. Reconstitution of commission to assess the ballistic
missile threat to the United States.
Sec. 1307. Sense of Congress regarding the relationship between
United States obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and
environmental laws.
Sec. 1308. Extension of counterproliferation authorities for
support of United Nations Special Commission on Iraq.
Sec. 1309. Annual report on moratorium on use by Armed Forces of
antipersonnel landmines.
SEC. 1301. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT CONCERNING DETARGETING OF
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MISSILES.
(a) Required Report.--Not later than January 1, 1998, the President
shall submit to Congress a report concerning detargeting of Russian
strategic missiles. The report shall address each of the following:
(1) Whether a Russian ICBM that was formerly, but is no longer,
targeted at a site in the United States would be automatically
retargeted at a site in the United States in the event of the accidental
launch of the missile.
(2) Whether missile detargeting would prevent or significantly
reduce the possibility of an unauthorized missile launch carried out by
the Russian General Staff and prevent or significantly reduce the
consequences to the United States of such a launch.
(3) Whether missile detargeting would pose a significant obstacle to
an unauthorized launch carried out by an operational level below the
Russian General Staff if missile operators at such an operational level
acquired missile launch codes or had the technical expertise to override
missile launch codes.
(4) The plausibility of an accidental launch of a Russian ICBM,
compared to the possibility of a deliberate missile launch, authorized
or unauthorized, resulting from Russian miscalculation, overreaction, or
aggression.
(5) The national security benefits derived from detargeting United
States and Russian ICBMs.
(6) The relative consequences to the United States of an
unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian ICBM that has been
detargeted and one that has not been detargeted.
(b) Definitions.--For purposes of subsection (a):
(1) The term ``Russian ICBM'' means an intercontinental ballistic
missile of the Russian Federation.
(2) The term ``accidental launch'' means a missile launch resulting
from mechanical failure.
SEC. 1302. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.
(a) Funding Limitation.--Funds available to the Department of Defense
may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1998 for retiring or
dismantling, or for preparing to retire or dismantle, any of the
following strategic nuclear delivery systems below the specified levels:
(1) 71 B 52H bomber aircraft.
(2) 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines.
(3) 500 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(4) 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(b) Waiver Authority.--If the START II Treaty enters into force
during fiscal year 1998, the Secretary of Defense may waive the
application of the limitation under subsection (a) to the extent that
the Secretary determines necessary in order to implement the treaty.
(c) Funding Limitation on Early Deactivation.--(1) If the limitation
under subsection (a) ceases to apply by reason of a waiver under
subsection (b), funds available to the Department of Defense may
nevertheless not be obligated or expended during fiscal year 1998 to
implement any agreement or understanding to undertake substantial early
deactivation of a strategic nuclear delivery system specified in
subsection (a) until 30 days after the date on which the President
submits to Congress a report concerning such actions.
(2) For purposes of this subsection and subsection (d), a substantial
early deactivation is an action during fiscal year 1998 to deactivate a
substantial number of strategic nuclear delivery systems specified in
subsection (a) by--
(A) removing nuclear warheads from those systems; or
(B) taking other steps to remove those systems from combat status.
(3) A report under this subsection shall include the following:
(A) The text of any understanding or agreement between the United
States and the Russian Federation concerning substantial early
deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery systems under the START II
Treaty.
(B) The plan of the Department of Defense for implementing the
agreement.
(C) An assessment of the Secretary of Defense of the adequacy of the
provisions contained in the agreement for monitoring and verifying
compliance of Russia with the terms of the agreement and, based upon
that assessment, the determination of the President specifically as to
whether the procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance by
Russia with the terms of the agreement are adequate or inadequate.
(D) A determination by the President as to whether the deactivations
to occur under the agreement will be carried out in a symmetrical,
reciprocal, or equivalent manner and whether the agreement will require
early deactivations of strategic forces by the United States to be
carried out substantially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic
forces by Russia.
(E) An assessment by the President of the effect of the proposed
early deactivation on the stability of the strategic balance and
relative strategic nuclear capabilities of the United States and the
Russian Federation at various stages during deactivation and upon
completion, including a determination by the President specifically as
to whether the proposed early deactivations will adversely affect
strategic stability.
(d) Further Limitation on Strategic Force Reductions.--(1) Amounts
available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1998 to implement
an agreement that results in a substantial early deactivation during
fiscal year 1998 of strategic forces may not be obligated for that
purpose if in the report under subsection (c)(3) the President
determines any of the following:
(A) That procedures for monitoring and verification of compliance by
Russia with the terms of the agreement are inadequate.
(B) That the agreement will require early deactivations of strategic
forces by the United States to be carried out substantially more rapidly
than deactivations of strategic forces by Russia.
(C) That the proposed early deactivations will adversely affect
strategic stability.
(2) The limitation in paragraph (1), if effective by reason of a
determination by the President described in paragraph (1)(B), shall
cease to apply 30 days after the date on which the President notifies
Congress that the early deactivations under the agreement are in the
national interest of the United States.
(e) Contingency Plan for Sustainment of Systems.--(1) Not later then
February 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a
plan for the sustainment beyond October 1, 1999, of United States
strategic nuclear delivery systems and alternative Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty force structures in the event that a strategic arms
reduction agreement subsequent to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
does not enter into force before 2004.
(2) The plan shall include a discussion of the following matters:
(A) The actions that are necessary to sustain the United States
strategic nuclear delivery systems, distinguishing between the actions
that are planned for and funded in the future-years defense program and
the actions that are not planned for and funded in the future-years
defense program.
(B) The funding necessary to implement the plan, indicating the
extent to which the necessary funding is provided for in the
future-years defense program and the extent to which the necessary
funding is not provided for in the future-years defense program.
(f) START Treaties Defined.--In this section:
(1) The term ``Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty'' means the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the United Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(START), signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991, including related annexes on
agreed statements and definitions, protocols, and memorandum of
understanding.
(2) The term ``START II Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3,
1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of understanding,
all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to
as the ``START II Treaty'' (contained in Treaty Document 103 1):
(A) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs
and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
(B) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers
Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (also known as the ``Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol'').
(C) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy
Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Memorandum on
Attribution'').
SEC. 1303. ASSISTANCE FOR FACILITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION
UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.
(a) Assistance Authorized.--Upon the request of the owner or operator
of a facility that is subject to a routine inspection or a challenge
inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Secretary of
Defense may provide technical assistance to that owner or operator
related to compliance of that facility with the Convention. Any such
assistance shall be provided through the On-Site Inspection Agency of
the Department of Defense.
(b) Reimbursement Requirement.--The Secretary may provide assistance
under subsection (a) only to the extent that the Secretary determines
that the Department of Defense will be reimbursed for costs incurred in
providing the assistance. The United States National Authority may
provide such reimbursement from amounts available to it. Any such
reimbursement shall be credited to amounts available for the On-Site
Inspection Agency.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The terms ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention''
mean the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force
on April 29, 1997.
(2) The term ``facility that is subject to a routine inspection''
means a declared facility, as defined in paragraph 15 of part X of the
Annex on Implementation and Verification of the Convention.
(3) The term ``challenge inspection'' means an inspection conducted
under Article IX of the Convention.
(4) The term ``United States National Authority'' means the United
States National Authority established or designated pursuant to Article
VII, paragraph 4, of the Convention.
SEC. 1304. TRANSFERS OF AUTHORIZATIONS FOR HIGH-PRIORITY
COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS.
(a) Authority.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of
Defense may transfer amounts of authorizations made available to the
Department of Defense in this division for fiscal year 1998 to any
counterproliferation program, project, or activity described in
subsection (b).
(2) A transfer of authorizations may be made under this section only
upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such action is
necessary in the national interest.
(3) Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged with and
be available for the same purposes as the authorization to which
transferred.
(b) Programs to Which Tranfers May Be Made.--The authority under
subsection (a) applies to any counterproliferation program, project, or
activity of the Department of Defense identified as an area for progress
in the most recent annual report of the Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee established by section 1605 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note).
(c) Limitation on Total Amount.--The total amount of authorizations
transferred under the authority of this section may not exceed
$50,000,000.
(d) Other Limitations and Requirements.--The provisions of subsection
(b), (c), and (d) of section 1001 shall apply to a transfer under this
section in the same manner as they apply to a transfer under subsection
(a) of that section.
(e) Construction With General Transfer Authority.--The authority
provided by this section is in addition to the transfer authority
provided in section 1001.
SEC. 1305. ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS REGARDING THE
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND RELIABILITY OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STOCKPILE.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons on earth. The
United States and its allies continue to rely on nuclear weapons to
deter potential adversaries from using weapons of mass destruction. The
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are essential to
ensure its credibility as a deterrent.
(2) On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
(3) Effective as of September 30, 1996, the United States is
prohibited by section 507 of the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102 377; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) from
conducting underground nuclear tests ``unless a foreign state conducts a
nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United
States nuclear testing is lifted''.
(4) Section 1436(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100 456; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) requires the
Secretary of Energy to ``establish and support a program to assure that
the United States is in a position to maintain the reliability, safety,
and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear
weapons designs in the event that a low-threshold or comprehensive test
ban on nuclear explosive testing is negotiated and ratified.''.
(5) Section 3138(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103 160; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) required the
President to submit an annual report to Congress which sets forth ``any
concerns with respect to the safety, security, effectiveness, or
reliability of existing United States nuclear weapons raised by the
Stockpile Stewardship Program of the Department of Energy''.
(6) President Clinton declared in July 1993 that ``to assure that
our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, we will
explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety,
reliability, and the performance of our weapons''. This decision was
incorporated in a Presidential Directive.
(7) Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103 160; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) also requires
that the Secretary of Energy establish a ``stewardship program to ensure
the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of
the United States in nuclear weapons''.
(8) The plan of the Department of Energy to maintain the safety and
reliability of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile is known as
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The ability of the
United States to maintain and certify the safety, security,
effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without
testing will require utilization of new and sophisticated computational
capabilities and diagnostic technologies, methods, and procedures.
Current diagnostic technologies and laboratory testing techniques are
insufficient to certify the safety and reliability of the United States
nuclear weapons stockpile into the future. Whereas in the past
laboratory and diagnostic tools were used in conjunction with nuclear
testing, in the future they will provide, under the Department of
Energy's stockpile stewardship plan, the sole basis for assessing past
test data and for making judgments on phenomena observed in connection
with the aging of the stockpile.
(9) Section 3159 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) requires that the
directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories and the nuclear weapons
production plants submit a report to the Assistant Secretary of Energy
for Defense Programs if they identify a problem that has significant
bearing on confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon
or nuclear weapon type, that the Assistant Secretary must transmit that
report, along with any comments, to the congressional defense committees
and to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, and that
the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council advise Congress regarding its analysis
of any such problems.
(10) On August 11, 1995, President Clinton directed ``the
establishment of a new annual reporting and certification requirement
[to] ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable under a
comprehensive test ban''.
(11) On the same day, the President noted that the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of Energy have the responsibility, after being
``advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear
weapons laboratories, and the Commander of United States Strategic
Command'', to provide the President with the information regarding the
certification referred to in paragraph (10).
(12) The Joint Nuclear Weapons Council established by section 179 of
title 10, United States Code, is responsible for providing advice to the
Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense regarding nuclear weapons
issues, including ``considering safety, security, and control issues for
existing weapons''. The Council plays a critical role in advising
Congress in matters relating to nuclear weapons.
(13) It is essential that the President receive well-informed,
objective, and honest opinions, including dissenting views, from his
advisers and technical experts regarding the safety, security,
effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(b) Policy.--
(1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States--
(A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear
weapons stockpile; and
(B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to acquire
nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent.
(2) Nuclear weapons stockpile.--It is in the security interest of
the United States to sustain the United States nuclear weapons stockpile
through a program of stockpile stewardship, carried out at the nuclear
weapons laboratories and nuclear weapons production plants.
(3) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear
forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with
access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital
interests of the United States;
(B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of
sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust
deterrent strategy; and
(C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and
Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and
reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based,
without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity.
(c) Addition of President to Recipients of Reports by Heads of
Laboratories and Plants.--Section 3159(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C.
7274o) is amended--
(1) by striking out ``committees and'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``committees,''; and
(2) by inserting before the period at the end the following: ``, and
to the President''.
(d) Ten-Day Time Limit for Transmittal of Report.--Section 3159(b) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law
104 201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended by striking out ``As soon as
practicable'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``Not later than 10 days''.
(e) Advice and Opinions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.--In
addition to a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear
weapons production plant (under section 3159 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104 201; 42 U.S.C.
7274o)), any member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council or the
commander of the United States Strategic Command may also submit to the
President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, or the
congressional defense committees advice or opinion regarding the safety,
security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile.
(f) Expression of Individual Views.--A representative of the
President may not take any action against, or otherwise constrain, a
director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons production
plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, or the Commander
of United States Strategic Command for presenting individual views to
the President, the National Security Council, or Congress regarding the
safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile.
(g) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``representative of the President'' means the following:
(A) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of
Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
(B) Any member of the National Security Council.
(C) Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(D) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget.
(2) The term ``nuclear weapons laboratory'' means any of the
following:
(A) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California.
(B) Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico.
(C) Sandia National Laboratories.
(3) The term ``nuclear weapons production plant'' means any of the
following:
(A) The Pantex Plant, Texas.
(B) The Savannah River Site, South Carolina.
(C) The Kansas City Plant, Missouri.
(D) The Y 12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
SEC. 1306. RECONSTITUTION OF COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Initial Organization Requirements.--Section 1321(g) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104
201; 110 Stat. 2712) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out ``not later than 45 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act'' and inserting in lieu thereof
``not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking out ``30 days'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``60
days''; and
(B) by striking out ``, but not earlier than October 15, 1996''.
(b) Funding.--Section 1328 of such Act (110 Stat. 2714) is amended by
inserting ``and fiscal year 1998'' after ``for fiscal year 1997''.
SEC. 1307. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Chemical Weapons Convention requires the destruction of the
United States stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions by April
29, 2007 (not later than 10 years after the Convention's entry into
force).
(2) The President has substantial authority under existing law to
ensure that--
(A) the technologies necessary to destroy the stockpile are developed;
(B) the facilities necessary to destroy the stockpile are
constructed; and
(C) Federal, State, and local environmental laws and regulations do
not impair the ability of the United States to comply with its
obligations under the Convention.
(3) The Comptroller General has concluded (in GAO Report NSIAD 97018
of February 1997) that--
(A) obtaining the necessary Federal and State permits that are
required under Federal environmental laws and regulations for building
and operating the chemical agents and munitions destruction facilities
is among the most unpredictable factors in the chemical demilitarization
program; and
(B) program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to
which States and local communities are in agreement with proposed
disposal methods and whether those methods meet environmental concerns.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President--
(1) should use the authority of the President under existing law to
ensure that the United States is able to construct and operate the
facilities necessary to destroy the United States stockpile of lethal
chemical agents and munitions within the time allowed by the Chemical
Weapons Convention; and
(2) while carrying out the obligations of the United States under
the Convention, should encourage negotiations between appropriate
Federal officials and officials of the State and local governments
concerned to attempt to meet their concerns regarding compliance with
Federal and State environmental laws and regulations and other concerns
about the actions being taken to carry out those obligations.
(c) Chemical Weapons Convention Defined.--For the purposes of this
section, the terms ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention''
mean the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force
on April 29, 1997.
SEC. 1308. EXTENSION OF COUNTERPROLIFERATION AUTHORITIES FOR
SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ.
Section 1505 of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992
(title XV of Public Law 102 484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a) is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)(3), by striking out ``or'' after ``fiscal year
1996,'' and by inserting ``, or $15,000,000 for fiscal year 1998''
before the period at the end; and
(2) in subsection (f), by striking out ``1997'' and inserting in
lieu thereof ``1998''.
.................
TITLE XIV--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER
SOVIET UNION
Sec. 1401. Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs
and funds.
Sec. 1402. Funding allocations.
Sec. 1403. Prohibition on use of funds for specified purposes.
Sec. 1404. Limitation on use of funds for projects related to
START II Treaty until submission of certification.
Sec. 1405. Limitation on use of funds for chemical weapons
destruction facility.
Sec. 1406. Limitation on use of funds for destruction of chemical
weapons.
Sec. 1407. Limitation on use of funds for storage facility for
Russian fissile material.
Sec. 1408. Limitation on use of funds for weapons storage security.
Sec. 1409. Report on issues regarding payment of taxes, duties,
and other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under Cooperative
Threat Reduction programs.
Sec. 1410. Availability of funds.
SEC. 1401. SPECIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
PROGRAMS AND FUNDS.
(a) Specification of CTR Programs.--For purposes of section 301 and
other provisions of this Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are
the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997 (Public Law 104 201: 110 Stat.
2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note).
(b) Fiscal Year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction Funds Defined.--As
used in this title, the term ``fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds'' means the funds appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations in section 301 for Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs.
SEC. 1402. FUNDING ALLOCATIONS.
(a) In General.--Of the fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction
funds, not more than the following amounts may be obligated for the
purposes specified:
(1) For strategic offensive arms elimination in Russia, $77,900,000.
(2) For strategic nuclear arms elimination in Ukraine, $76,700,000.
(3) For fissile material containers in Russia, $7,000,000.
(4) For planning and design of a chemical weapons destruction
facility in Russia, $35,400,000.
(5) For dismantlement of biological and chemical weapons facilities
in the former Soviet Union, $20,000,000.
(6) For planning, design, and construction of a storage facility for
Russian fissile material, $57,700,000.
(7) For weapons storage security in Russia, $36,000,000.
(8) For development of a cooperative program with the Government of
Russia to eliminate the production of weapons grade plutonium at Russian
reactors, $41,000,000.
(9) For activities designated as Defense and Military-to-Military
Contacts in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, $8,000,000.
(10) For military-to-military programs of the United States that
focus on countering the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and that include the security forces of the independent
states of the former Soviet Union other than Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakstan, $2,000,000.
(11) For activities designated as Other Assessments/Administrative
Support $20,500,000.
(b) Limited Authority To Vary Individual Amounts.--(1) If the
Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary to do so in the
national interest, the Secretary may, subject to paragraphs (2) and (3),
obligate amounts for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs of
subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified for those purposes in
that paragraph. However, the total amount obligated for the purposes
stated in the paragraphs in subsection (a) may not by reason of the use
of the authority provided in the preceding sentence exceed the sum of
the amounts specified in those paragraphs.
(2) An obligation for the purposes stated in any of the paragraphs in
subsection (a) in excess of the amount specified in that paragraph may be
made using the authority provided in paragraph (1) only after--
(A) the Secretary submits to Congress notification of the intent to
do so together with a complete discussion of the justification for doing
so; and
(B) 15 days have elapsed following the date of the notification.
(3) The Secretary may not, under the authority provided in paragraph
(1), obligate amounts appropriated for the purposes stated in any of
paragraphs (3) through (11) of subsection (a) in excess of 115 percent
of the amount stated in those paragraphs.
(c) Limited Waiver of 115 Percent Cap on Obligation in Excess of
Amounts Authorized for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997.--(1) The limitation
in subsection (b)(1) of section 1202 of the National Defense
Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104 106; 110 Stat.
469), that provides that the authority provided in that sentence to
obligate amounts specified for Cooperative Threat Reduction purposes in
excess of the amount specified for each such purpose in subsection (a)
of that section may not exceed 115 percent of the amounts specified,
shall not apply with respect to subsection (a)(1) of such section for
purposes of strategic offensive weapons elimination in Russia or the
Ukraine.
(2) The limitation in subsection (b)(1) of section 1502 of the
National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104
201; 110 Stat. 2732), that provides that the authority provided in that
sentence to obligate amounts specified for Cooperative Threat Reduction
purposes in excess of the amount specified for each such purpose in
subsection (a) of that section may not exceed 115 percent of the amounts
specified, shall not apply with respect to subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)
of such section.
SEC. 1403. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES.
(a) In General.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction
funds, and no funds appropriated for Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs for any prior fiscal year and remaining available for
obligation, may be obligated or expended for any of the following
purposes:
(1) Conducting with Russia any peacekeeping exercise or other
peacekeeping-related activity.
(2) Provision of housing.
(3) Provision of assistance to promote environmental restoration.
(4) Provision of assistance to promote job retraining.
(b) Limitation With Respect to Defense Conversion Assistance.--None
of the funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be obligated or
expended for the provision of assistance to Russia or any other state of
the former Soviet Union to promote defense conversion.
SEC. 1404. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROJECTS RELATED TO
START II TREATY UNTIL SUBMISSION OF CERTIFICATION.
No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be
obligated or expended for strategic offensive arms elimination projects
in Russia related to the START II Treaty (as defined in section 1302(f))
until 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits
to Congress a certification in writing that--
(1) implementation of the projects would benefit the national
security interest of the United States; and
(2) Russia has agreed in an implementing agreement to share the cost
for the projects.
SEC. 1405. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS
DESTRUCTION FACILITY.
(a) Limitation on Use of Funds Until Submission of Notifications to
Congress.--No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be
obligated or expended for planning and design of a chemical weapons
destruction facility until 15 days after the date that is the later of
the following:
(1) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress
notification of an agreement between the United States and Russia with
respect to such chemical weapons destruction facility that includes--
(A) an agreement providing for a limitation on the financial
contribution by the United States for the facility;
(B) an agreement that the United States will not pay the costs for
infrastructure determined by Russia to be necessary to support the
facility; and
(C) an agreement on the location of the facility.
(2) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress
notification that the Government of Russia has formally approved a
plan--
(A) that allows for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia; and
(B) that commits Russia to pay a portion of the cost for the facility.
(b) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Facility Construction.--No fiscal
year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds authorized to be obligated
in section 1402(a)(4) for planning and design of a chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia may be used for construction of such
facility.
SEC. 1406. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR DESTRUCTION OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
(a) Limitation.--No funds authorized to be appropriated under this or
any other Act for fiscal year 1998 for Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs may be obligated or expended for chemical weapons destruction
activities (including activities for the planning, design, or
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility or for the
dismantlement of an existing chemical weapons production facility) until
the President submits to Congress a written certification under
subsection (b).
(b) Presidential Certification.--A certification under this
subsection is either of the following certifications by the President:
(1) A certification that--
(A) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the implementation
of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement;
(B) the United States and Russia have made substantial progress
toward the resolution, to the satisfaction of the United States, of
outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming Memorandum of
Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement; and
(C) Russia has fully and accurately declared all information
regarding its unitary and binary chemical weapons, chemical weapons
facilities, and other facilities associated with chemical weapons.
(2) A certification that the national security interests of the
United States could be undermined by a United States policy not to carry
out chemical weapons destruction activities under the Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs for which funds are authorized to be appropriated
under this or any other Act for fiscal year 1998.
(c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``Bilateral Destruction Agreement'' means the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical
Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990.
(2) The term ``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related
to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on
September 23, 1989.
SEC. 1407. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR STORAGE FACILITY FOR
RUSSIAN FISSILE MATERIAL.
No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may be
obligated or expended for planning, design, or construction of a storage
facility for Russian fissile material until 15 days after the date that
is the later of the following:
(1) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress
notification that an implementing agreement between the United States
and Russia has been entered into that specifies the total cost to the
United States for the facility.
(2) The date on which the Secretary submits to Congress notification
that an agreement has been entered into between the United States and
Russia incorporating the principle of transparency with respect to the
use of the facility.
SEC. 1408. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR WEAPONS STORAGE SECURITY.
No fiscal year 1998 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds intended for
weapons storage security activities in Russia may be obligated or
expended until--
(1) the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress a report on the
status of negotiations between the United States and Russia on audits
and examinations with respect to weapons storage security; and
(2) 15 days have elapsed following the date that the report is
submitted.
SEC. 1409. REPORT ON ISSUES REGARDING PAYMENT OF TAXES,
DUTIES, AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS ON ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO RUSSIA UNDER
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on issues
regarding payment of taxes, duties, and other assessments on assistance
provided to Russia under Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. The
report shall include the following:
(1) A description of any disputes between the United States and
Russia with respect to payment by the United States of taxes, duties and
other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative
Threat Reduction program, including a description of the nature of each
dispute, the amount of payment disputed, whether the dispute was
resolved, and if the dispute was resolved, the means by which the
dispute was resolved.
(2) A description of the actions taken by the Secretary to prevent
disputes in the future between the United States and Russia with respect
to payment by the United States of taxes, duties, and other assessments
on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative Threat Reduction
program.
(3) A description of any agreement between the United States and
Russia with respect to payment by the United States of taxes, duties, or
other assessments on assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative
Threat Reduction program.
(4) Any proposals of the Secretary for actions that should be taken
to prevent disputes between the United States and Russia with respect to
payment by the United States of taxes, duties, or other assessments on
assistance provided to Russia under a Cooperative Threat Reduction
program.
SEC. 1410. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.
Funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in
section 301 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs shall be available
for obligation for three fiscal years.
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