EXCERPTS - Weapons of Mass Destruction
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-132
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
----------
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 1119
together with
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fifth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah Carolina
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois
STEVE BUYER, Indiana GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
JAMES TALENT, Missouri ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama JANE HARMAN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
HOWARD ``BUCK'' McKEON, California PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
RON LEWIS, Kentucky ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM TURNER, Texas
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee F. ALLEN BOYD, Jr., Florida
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
Carolina JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
SONNY BONO, California CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
JIM RYUN, Kansas
MICHAEL PAPPAS, New Jersey
BOB RILEY, Alabama
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
Andrew K. Ellis, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION.................. 19
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT............................................. 19
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.............................. 101
Items of Special Interest.................................. 106
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense........... 134
Overview................................................... 134
Items of Special Interest.................................. 136
TITLE II--RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION............ 140
OVERVIEW....................................................... 140
Air Force RDT&E.............................................. 202
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 211
Defense Agencies RDT&E....................................... 216
Items Of Special Interest.................................. 225
TITLE XI--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER
SOVIET UNION................................................... 413
OVERVIEW....................................................... 413
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST...................................... 413
Arms Elimination Projects in Russia........................ 413
Arms Elimination Projects in Ukraine....................... 414
Auditing of CTR Assistance................................. 414
Chemical Weapons Destruction............................... 415
Fissile Material Storage Facility.......................... 417
Nuclear Reactor Core Conversion............................ 418
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security In Russia................. 419
Other Support Programs..................................... 419
Program Overhead........................................... 420
Prohibition of Specified Activities........................ 420
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS......................................... 420
Section 1101--Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs................................................. 420
Section 1102--Fiscal Year 1998 Funding Allocations......... 420
Section 1103--Prohibition on Use of Funds for Specified
Purposes................................................. 420
Section 1104--Prohibition on Use of Funds Until Specified
Reports are Submitted.................................... 420
Section 1105--Limitation on Use of Funds Until Submission
of Certification......................................... 420
Section 1106--Use of Funds for Chemical Weapons Destruction
Facility................................................. 421
Section 1107--Limitation on Use of Funds for Storage
Facility for Russian Fissile Material.................... 421
Section 1108--Limitation on Use of Funds for Weapons
Storage Security......................................... 421
Section 1109--Report to Congress on Issues Regarding
Payment of Taxes or Duties on Assistance Provided to
Russia Under Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs....... 421
Section 1110--Limitation on Obligation of Funds for a
Specified Period......................................... 421
Section 1111--Availability of Funds........................ 421
TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS..................... 422
OVERVIEW....................................................... 422
Arms Control Implementation................................ 422
Strategic Force Reductions................................. 426
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS......................................... 427
Section 1202--One-year Extension of Counterproliferation
Authorities.............................................. 429
TITLE XXVIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS................................. 465
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST...................................... 465
Force Protection for Overseas Facilities from Chemical and
Biological Weapons....................................... 465
105th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 105-132
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
_______
June 16, 1997.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
TITLE I--PROCUREMENT
.............
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
.............
Items of Special Interest
B-1 modifications
The budget request contained $114.2 million for B-1
modifications, but did not include funding to procure a digital
data link for this aircraft.
The committee notes that the Air Force Chief of Staff's
fiscal year 1998 unfunded priority list included as the fifth
highest priority a request for funding to provide a limited
capability and to develop tactics and concepts for employment
of a digital data link on the B-1 fleet. Such a data link
allows the fighter and bomber fleets--the ``shooters''--to
receive real-time, secure, and jam-resistant targeting
information from aircraft such as the Airborne Warning and
Control System or the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System--the ``sensors.'' This linked information improves
an aircrew's situational awareness, operational coordination
among shooter aircraft, and in-flight re-targeting of emerging
higher priority targets. It also contributes to the positive
identification of both airborne and ground forces, thereby
contributing to the elimination of friendly fire. The committee
endorses the requirement to include the B-1 on the Department's
primary data link and recommends $24.0 million to install a
stand-alone Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
terminal and display on up to six B-1 aircraft for this
purpose.
B-2
The budget request contained $174.1 million for the B-2
bomber. These funds are requested for costs associated with
additional software investment, technical orders, interim
contractor support, aircrew training devices, peculiar support
equipment, program management administration, and non-recurring
costs for curtailment of the B-2 production line.
Having held two hearings on the B-2 since the committee
concluded its fiscal year 1997 authorization deliberations, the
committee is convinced of the need to continue production of
this bomber. No less than seven former secretaries of defense
have recommended doing so, as have numerous other former senior
leaders of the Air Force and the Congress. Likewise, current
Air Force leaders privately acknowledge that they would welcome
more B-2s in the bomber inventory, except that they are
``unaffordable.'' The committee rejects this ``unaffordable''
assertion and strongly believes the United States can afford
additional B-2s.
Twenty-one B-2s does not constitute an adequate force level
to deal with the many likely contingencies and crises over the
next 30-40 years, and no other military systems in existence or
on the drawing boards can adequately substitute for the
capabilities the B-2 offers. As noted in testimony presented to
the committee by the former air component commander in the
Persian Gulf war, the B-2 is the only weapon system in the U.S.
inventory free of range, survivability, and lethality
limitations, and, as such, could well be the nation's only
practical option for quickly projecting truly decisive power in
future regional crises.
On April 1, 1997, the B-2 reached its initial operational
capability milestone. According to a statement issued by the
commander of the Air Force's Air Combat Command, ``This is a
significant milestone in ensuring the future of national
defense. The combination of low observability, large payload
capacity, bombing accuracy, and long range gives America a
unique, unprecedented military capability. This combination
allows the B-2 to penetrate sophisticated defenses and threaten
an enemy's war-making capability. It gives the United States
the capability to project power to any part of the globe within
a matter of hours and deliver combat power with precision in
support of warfighting commands.'' The committee agrees that
the B-2's combination of range, payload, precision weapons
delivery, and stealth make it uniquely capable of independently
responding quickly and decisively from secure U.S. bases to
future contingencies anywhere in the world--and thus justify
its continued production. Accordingly, the committee recommends
an additional $331.2 million for the B-2. This amount
represents an increase of $353.0 million to initiate the
eventual procurement of an additional nine B-2s coupled with a
decrease of $21.8 million, which was requested for production
curtailment costs. Of the $353.0 million added, $281.0 million
is for reestablishment of those elements of the production line
that have been previously laid away and $52.0 million is for
advance procurement.
.............
Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense
.............
Items of Special Interest
Chemical agents and munitions destruction
The budget request contained $620.7 million for the defense
chemical agents and munitions destruction program, including
$472.2 million for operations and maintenance, $66.3 million
for research and development, and $82.2 million for
procurement.
Section 152 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), directed the Secretary
of Defense to conduct an assessment of the chemical stockpile
disposal program and to consider measures that could be taken
to reduce program costs, while continuing to ensure maximum
protection of the public and the environment. The results of
the assessment were to be reported to the Congress with the
submission of the fiscal year 1998 budget request. Section 142
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104-201) further required that the Secretary of
Defense conduct an assessment of alternative demilitarization
technologies (other than incineration) that could be used for
destruction of the chemical stockpile and report the results of
this assessment to the Congress by December 31, 1997. Section
8065 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1997 (Public Law 104-208) directed that the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) conduct a
pilot program to identify and demonstrate not less than two
alternatives to the baseline incineration process and appoint a
program manager for these activities who would report directly
to him.
Based upon the results of a hearing which addressed all of
the aforementioned concerns, the committee affirms its
previously-held views that the risks of continued storage of
the chemical weapons stockpile exceed those associated with
demilitarization operations. Therefore, the committee believes
that the demilitarization program should proceed expeditiously
with the current baseline incineration program until such time
as the evaluation of alternative technologies for destruction
of the stockpile is concluded. The committee also notes that
continued delays in the program will lead to further cost
increases.
However, the committee also agrees with the Department's
decision to further develop chemical neutralization
technologies for destruction of agents at the bulk-only
chemical storage sites and with its plan for assessing the
feasibility of alternative technologies for potential use at
other chemical stockpile storage sites. The committee directs
the Secretary of Defense to report to the Congress by December
31, 1997, the status of that assessment and its potential
impact on the costs and schedule for completion of destruction
operations at the Pueblo and Lexington-Blue Grass storage
sites.
Of the $63.3 million requested for research and development
activities, $40.8 million is for the non-stockpile chemical
materiel project. The committee notes that the project is to be
completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2002, and
believes that this represents too aggressive a schedule in view
of the overall uncertainties surrounding the project. The
committee expects that more time will be needed for the Army to
prove that the proposed disposal systems will safely and
effectively destroy all non-stockpile materiel and will be
accepted by the affected states and communities. Accordingly,
thecommittee recommends a reduction of $10.0 million for non-
stockpile chemical materiel research and development.
.............
Air Force RDT&E
.............
Items of Special Interest
.............
Bomber testing
The budget request contained $389.3 million in PE 65807F
for test and evaluation support of Air Force test ranges and
facilities.
The committee is aware of ongoing efforts to improve B-2
bomber testing capability at the Bark Flight Test Facility and
supports the expansion of this facility's capability to conduct
testing of other Air Force bomber aircraft. The committee
recommends an increase of $8.0 million to add test capability
to this existing facility for B-1B, B-52, and other bomber or
strike aircraft.
Conventional ballistic missile
The budget request contained $32.8 million in PE 63851F for
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) demonstration and
validation activities.
The committee notes that a number of ``rogue'' nations have
constructed hardened, deeply buried facilities. Some of these
facilities represent command and control structures and sites
at which weapons of mass destruction are developed and stored
and are therefore of great military significance. The
destruction of these sites requires a weapon that can penetrate
hardened structures or rock, while maintaining sufficient
structural integrity to detonate. The committee further notes
that the ability of the U.S. military to strike at these
targets effectively without recourse to nuclear weapons is
extremely limited.
The committee believes that a conventionally armed ICBM has
the potential to hold these targets at risk, in the near term,
and at modest cost. This proposed capability is based on a
combination of very high ICBM warhead terminal velocities,
technologies that allow precision delivery, long range,
relative invulnerability to enemy defenses, and the maturity of
current ICBM technology.
Therefore, the committee recommends $49.3 million for ICBM
demonstration and validation activities, an increase of $16.5
million. The additional funding is for the purpose of
establishing a conventional ballistic missile advanced concept
technology demonstration program. The funding is to be used to
modify an existing reentry vehicle, complete flight test plans,
and procure long lead items to support a flight test.
.............
Minuteman safety enhanced reentry vehicle
The budget request contained $137.9 million in PE 64851F
for efforts to upgrade the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) guidance and propulsion systems.
The Minuteman guidance replacement program (GRP) is
replacing 1960's vintage electronics with modern supportable
technology. The program is proceeding through engineering and
manufacturing development and the first of the upgraded
guidance systems is expected to be delivered in 1999. The GRP
also preserves the option to incorporate the Mk-21 safety
enhanced reentry vehicle on the Minuteman III ICBM if
Peackeeper ICBMs, which are now equipped with the Mk-21, are
retired.
The committee notes that the Mk-21 is the most modern,
safest, and logistically supportable reentry vehicle in the Air
Force inventory. It further notes that the Air Force is
planning to replace the older Mk-12A reentry vehicle with the
Mk-21 on 150 Minuteman III ICBMs. However, the actual design
and development efforts for the hardware and software needed
for the incorporation of the Mk-21 remain to be accomplished.
Initial engineering tests will be accomplished with additional
funding authorized and appropriated for fiscal year 1997. The
committee believes that a continuation of this effort will
reduce the risk of a potentially costly redesign and refit of
the new guidance systems. To promote the timely completion of
Mk-21 integration efforts, the committee recommends $152.9
million for PE 64851F, an increase of $15.0 million.
.............
Chemical-biological defense program
The budget request included a total of $530.9 million for
the chemical-biological defense (CBD) program of the Department
of Defense, including $320.8 million in research, development,
test, and evaluation and $210.0 million in procurement.
The committee has been advised of problems in manufacture
and qualification of new production M-40 protective masks and
is concerned about the impacts of these problems on the ability
to meet acquisition objectives for the mask. The committee
directs the Secretary of the Army to review the M-40 mask
procurement program and provide a report to the Congressional
defense committees by October 30, 1997, which addresses the
results of that review and the actions to be taken to correct
any problems discovered.
The committee notes that the Counter Proliferation Review
Committee's May 1997 Report states the Defense Advance Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) biological warfare defense program will
no longer be incorporated into the CBD program management and
oversight structure. The Committee directs the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that the DARPA biological warfare defense
program is coordinated and integrated under the program
management and oversight of the Department's CBD program.
The committee understands that the Department's policies on
anthrax vaccination of U.S. forces and support for Other than
U.S. Forces are awaiting final approval, and that these
decisions will impact total funding, vaccine production, and
storage requirements. The committee also notes the impending
award of a prime systems contract to develop new biological
defense vaccines, pursue vaccine licensing, and produce
stockpile vaccines to meet the Department's requirements.
To address funding shortfalls in the budget request for the
CBD program, the committee recommends an increase of $1.6
million in PE 63384BP for vaccine advanced development, an
increase of $858,000 in PE 64384BP for vaccine development and
an increase of $5.0 million in PE63884 to support on-going
development efforts in detectors, decontamination equipment,
and protective equipment for the Chemical-Biological Quick
Reaction Force and its components.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to address
the above issues as specific areas of interest in the next
annual report to Congress on the NBC defense program.
.............
Counter-proliferation analysis and planning system
The budget request contained $58.3 million in PE 63160D for
advanced development of counter-proliferation support
technologies.
The committee has been made aware of the counter-
proliferation analysis and planning system (CAPS) and is
supportive of its demonstrated performance as a counter-
proliferation analysis and planning tool for the intelligence
community and regional commanders-in-chief. The committee
recommends an increase of $3.0 million in PE 63160D to
accelerate the development of CAPS mission planning tools and
develop the system architecture for mission-specific data bases
and mission support.
.............
Pulsed fast neutron analysis technology demonstration
The budget request contained no funds for continuation of a
program for demonstration of the application of pulsed fast
neutron analysis (PFNA) technology to the inspection of cargo
and baggage at ports-of-entry for the presence of drugs,
explosives, nuclear and chemical agents, and weapons of mass
destruction.
Proposals have been made for the development and
operational field demonstration of a relocatable PFNA cargo
inspection system, which would be based upon Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA)'s completed demonstration of a
fixed-site PFNA system; and a total of $11.2 million was
appropriated for this purpose in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. In
March 1997, the Technical Support Working Group initiated a
contract for modification of the fixed-site PFNA demonstrator
to a relocatable system for testing in a controlled operational
environment. The committee understands, based on a recent
General Accounting Office report, that PFNA system technology
has not been adopted by the U.S. Customs Service because of
concerns about cost, size, operations, and safety issues. The
committee also understands that the fixed site system has not
yet demonstrated the ability to detect chemical agents or
special nuclear materials, that an additional $10.0 million
will be required to complete system modification and the
operational testing program, and that the Customs' Service has
not indicated any funding support for the program or intent to
field the system should operational testing be successful.
The committee believes that the ability of fixed-site PFNA
system to detect chemical agents and special nuclear materials
must be demonstrated before the program proceeds to the design
and engineering phase for a relocatable PFNA system, and
recommends no additional funding for the PFNA program in fiscal
year 1998. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a joint assessment of
the PFNA program which addresses Department of Defense and
Department of the Treasury operational requirements for a PFNA
cargo inspection system, demonstrated technical performance of
the fixed-site PFNA inspection system, the ability of a
relocatable PFNA inspection system to meet the operational
requirements, the intention of each Department regarding the
fielding of the PFNA inspection system, and recommendations and
funding requirements for the completion of the testing program
and fielding the system. The results of the assessment shall be
provided to the Congress by December 31, 1997. Should the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury jointly
recommend continuation of the program, the committee would
encourage the reprogramming of fiscal year 1998 funds for that
purpose.
Response to threats of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction
The budget request contained $49.5 million to improve
emergency response preparedness and coordination with state and
local agencies through First Responder training, interagency
exercises and technical assistance.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (Public Law 104-201) directed the President to take
immediate actions to enhance the capability of the Federal
government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, to provide enhanced
support to improve the capabilities of state and local
emergency response agencies to prevent and respond to such
incidents at both the national and local level. The committee
has reviewed the President's January 1997 report to the
Congress, which provided hisassessment of those capabilities,
and the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee's May 1997 report
that provides the details of the Department of Defense role.
The committee notes the actions taken to date by the
Department of Defense to enhance emergency domestic
preparedness and response to terrorist nuclear, biological, or
chemical attacks under the counterproliferation support program
and the CBD program. The committee notes the initial progress
that has been made and that much remains to be done to extend
the program to additional metropolitan areas and local
jurisdictions.
Chemical-biological response team
Public Law 104-201 required the Secretary of Defense to
establish and maintain at least one chemical-biological
domestic terrorism rapid response team. The committee
understands that the Department is establishing a Chemical-
Biological Quick Reaction Force (CBQRF) and directs the
Secretary of the Army, as executive agent for the domestic
emergency response program, to ensure that the plans, programs,
and budget of the CBQRF and its components are reviewed to
ensure full coordination and integration of all DOD assets. The
committee also directs the Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Program) to
ensure that all research, development, and acquisition efforts
in support of the CBQRF and its components are fully integrated
and coordinated within the Department's chemical and biological
defense program.
The committee understands that the Department of Defense is
examining a new mission for the National Guard which would
involve countering chemical and biological terrorism in the
United States. The committee notes that the Army National Guard
and the Army Reserve include a number of chemical defense units
which could be employed in response to a chemical emergency and
also notes that trained chemical incident response forces are
present at the Army's chemical munitions storage sites. The
committee believes that the availability of the National Guard
chemical defense units to State authorities would make them
particularly useful in response to a chemical or biological
incident.
The committee recommends an increase of $2.0 million in PE
63122D to accelerate the development and evaluation of
protective masks for emergency response forces that could be
used in the evacuation of casualties and other personnel from a
contaminated area.
Elsewhere in this report the committee recommends an
increase of $5.0 million to the Department's chemical and
biological defense program to support on-going development
efforts in detectors, decontamination equipment, and protective
equipment for the CBQRF and its components.
First responder training
The committee understands that an interagency training
strategy is being developed which would initially focus
training under the domestic emergency response preparedness
program on professional emergency response organizations in the
27 cities and metropolitan areas identified by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation as being at particularly high risk and
that the DOD Office of Domestic Preparedness (collocated with
the Army's Chemical-Biological Defense Command) has been
assigned responsibility for development of the first responder
training program. The program objective is to complete first
responder training for 126 major metropolitan areas and cities
within three years. The committee recommends that emphasis also
be placed on training of local volunteer emergency first
response organizations. The training program and priorities
must be coordinated with State emergency management directors.
The committee believes that support of the first responder
training program would be an appropriate mission for the
National Guard and should be considered by the Secretary of
Defense and the involved governors. The committee also believes
that in addition to the ``train the trainer'' approach being
used in the existing program, an exportable training package
should be developed that is oriented toward the training of
volunteer emergency first responders. The committee recommends
an increase of $7.0 million in PE 65160D to support the further
development of the first responder training strategy and the
development of an exportable training package suitable for use
by volunteer emergency first response organizations.
Exercise program
During the committee's review of the budget request,
several proposals were made for the establishment of major
exercise and training facilities at the national or regional
level. The committee endorses the use of training exercises to
test and improve consequence management response capabilities,
but believes that the exercise site requirements should be
based on the training and exercise needs of the agencies to be
exercised, site capabilities, frequency of use, and proximity
to participating agencies. These considerations imply the need
for an overall coordinated training exercise strategy similar
to that developed for training by the Senior Interagency Group.
The committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million in PE
65160D to support the development of a training exercise
strategy for domestic emergency response preparedness and
support of pilot training exercises in accordance with that
strategy.
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, to provide an annual assessment of progress in
the domestic emergency response preparedness program. The
report should be submitted to the Congressional defense
committees beginning with the fiscal year 1999 budget request
and extending through fiscal year 2001.
.............
Safeguard
The budget request contained $60.0 million in PE 62384BP
for exploratory development of advanced technologies for
chemical and biological defense in the areas of detection,
identification and warning, contamination avoidance, individual
and collective protection and decontamination.
The committee recommends an increase of $10.8 million to
continue the program, initiated by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, for proof-of-concept demonstration
and prototype development of multi-spectral sensors for
detection of chemical agent precursors and agents from medium
and high altitude platforms. The committee believes that the
results of the program to date indicate the potential the
technology has for stand-off detection and identification of
chemical agents on the battlefield and for detection of the
production of chemical agents and their precursor chemicals.
.............
TITLE XI--COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION WITH STATES OF FORMER SOVIET
UNION
OVERVIEW
The budget request contained $382.2 million for cooperative
threat reduction (CTR) activities, representing an increase of
$31.3 million over the amounts appropriated for fiscal year
1997. The request includes $63.0 million for core conversion
and chemical weapons production facility elimination in Russia,
and expanded defense and military contact programs throughout
the former Soviet states. Funding for these programs was not
included in last year's CTR budget request, but was authorized
separately in Title XIV of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201).
The Administration is also seeking $210.0 million within
the request for destruction and dismantlement, $100.7 million
for fissile materials and nuclear weapons safety and storage,
$41.0 million for reactor core conversion in Russia, and $30.5
million for other program support, which includes expanded
defense and military-to-military contacts.
The committee recommends a total of $284.7 million for CTR
activities in fiscal year 1998, a reduction of $97.5 million
from the budget request. The committee recommends the request
of $77.9 million for strategic offensive arms elimination
activities in Russia; $76.7 million for strategic nuclear arms
elimination in Ukraine; $7.0 million for fissile materials
storage containers in Russia; and $57.7 million for a fissile
material storage facility in Russia. The committee recommends
the following reductions to the budget request: chemical
weapons destruction ($41.0 million); reactor core conversion
($41.0 million); nuclear weapons storage security ($12.5
million); defense and military contacts ($1.0 million); and
other program support ($2.0 million). The discussion below
provides additional rationale for these reductions as well as
other matters of interest and concern to the committee.
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Arms Elimination Projects in Russia
The budget request contained $77.9 million for strategic
offensive arms elimination projects in Russia representing a
significant increase from the fiscal year 1997 appropriated
amount of $52.0 million.
The committee reiterates its support for the accelerated
dismantlement and destruction of strategic offensive weapons in
Russia under the terms of the START I Treaty. To this end, the
committee notes that the Department intends to obligate 115
percent of the appropriated fiscal year 1997 amount for
strategic offensive arms elimination programs in Russia in
accordance with section 1502 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201).
The request includes $50.0 million for new commitments made
last October by former Secretary of Defense Perry, who pledged
additional assistance to Russia as part of the Administration's
effort to encourage Russian ratification of the START II
Treaty. The new commitments pledged by Secretary Perry and
identified by the Department to the committee would be directed
toward accelerating Russian strategic offensive force
reductions to START II levels. While the committee is
supportive of CTR efforts that would directly assist Russia in
the elimination of its strategic offensive forces, the
committee believes that Russia should share in the cost of
these reductions. However, the Russian Duma has not yet given
its support to START II ratification and is unlikely to do so
anytime soon. In addition, at the recent Helsinki summit, the
United States agreed to postpone for several years the 2003
START II deadline for elimination of treaty-covered strategic
systems in another attempt to encourage Russian ratification
and to ease the near-term fiscal requirements on Russia for
eliminating strategic systems. The Russians have asserted that
they lack the fiscal resources to meet START II's reduction
timelines. However, Russia continues to invest resources in the
production of additional land-based and sea-based strategic
offensive arms. For these reasons, the committee recommends a
provision (sec. 1105) that would prohibit the obligation or
expenditure of these funds for START II-related elimination
activities until 30 days after the President certifies to
Congress that these expenditures are in the national security
interest and that the Russians have agreed to share the cost of
such elimination activities. Moreover, the committee directs
the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congressional defense
committees, within 15 days of the date of the above
certification, a report on the specific cost-sharing
arrangements that have been agreed to with Russia.
Arms Elimination Projects in Ukraine
The budget request contained $76.7 million for strategic
nuclear arms elimination projects in Ukraine, a 63 percent
increase over the fiscal year 1997 appropriated level.
This increase would fund a new project to eliminate
additional land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles,
associated silos and launch control centers, and supporting
infrastructure. The committee supports these additional efforts
and approves the requested amount for strategic nuclear arms
elimination in Ukraine.
Auditing of CTR Assistance
Under section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106), the Department
of Defense is required to submit to Congress an annual report
on CTR assistance. The committee notes that the most recent
report reflected an improvement in how the Department tracks
the provision of CTR assistance, although the report was
submitted almost one year late. The committee welcomes the
increased number of annual audits and examinations conducted by
the Department and expects that this level of effort will
continue.
The committee also notes that recent press reports indicate
Russian officials have been imposing duties and ``taxes'' on
the provision of U.S. assistance, some of which has reportedly
been used to ``pay off'' local officials and to cover various
``overhead'' costs. In particular, the committee is concerned
by reports that equipment deliveries are being taxed and that
the CTR program has been a source of funding for inappropriate
Russian activities. In light of these reports, the committee
recommends a provision (sec. 1109) that would require the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress by
September 31, 1997 providing a detailed explanation of whether
and how the CTR program has been used to support such
activities and what actionsthe Department has taken and is
prepared to take to ensure that CTR assistance is not ``taxed'' or
misused by Russia.
Chemical Weapons Destruction
The budget request contained $55.4 million for chemical
weapon destruction activities, including $20.0 million for the
dismantlement and conversion of a chemical weapons production
facility, at Volgograd, to non-weapons use.
Last year, the committee denied the request for $2.2
million in funding to initiate dismantlement of the facility at
Volgograd. In so doing, the committee noted its concern about
establishing a precedent for a new U.S. commitment and program
regarding the destruction of Russia's declared chemical weapons
stockpile despite Russia's ability to destroy such facilities
on its own. The budget request reflects a substantial increase
in funding. However, formal cost estimates of the dismantlement
work at Volgograd have not yet been accomplished. Moreover, the
Department has indicated that the $20.0 million requested for
this activity may be used for other ``Volgograd-like projects''
involving chemical or biological weapons production facilities
elsewhere in Russia.
In addition, the committee notes that the Congress has
previously disapproved the use of CTR funds for defense
conversion purposes such as envisioned in the Volgograd
project. Such activities are currently funded through the
Department of State.
Because of continuing concerns over U.S. involvement in
this project and the uncertainty over the eventual cost and
scope of this activity, the committee reiterates its belief
that Russia should proceed with the destruction of chemical
weapons production facilities on its own. Consequently, the
committee denies the request for this project.
The budget request also contained $35.4 million for the
design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction
facility to be built in Russia. Most of the technology
development for the chemical weapons destruction process is
expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 1997.
Accordingly, the budget request for this purpose is
significantly less than the fiscal year 1997 appropriated level
and is directed toward the design of the destruction facility.
However, because no specific site has yet been chosen for the
facility, actual design costs have not been reliably
determined.
In addition, the committee has a number of other concerns
regarding this project. First, the ultimate cost of the
facility may be as high as $800.0 million, a cost which the
committee views as prohibitive. A more accurate cost estimate
based on a one-third completed design is still unavailable and
is not anticipated by the Department to be available until
January 1999. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has reported
that the U.S. share of these costs remains undefined and
potentially large, and the United States has not agreed to cap
its financial contribution. Indeed, the budget request for
fiscal year 1999 for chemical weapons destruction projects in
Russia is approximately $150.0 million, an increase of 270
percent over the fiscal year 1998 request. Although detailed
cost and program information is supposed to be contained in the
Department's long-term program plan, which is required to be
submitted to Congress annually at the same time as the
President's budget request, the latest plan has only just been
received. Consequently, the committee is unable to fully
evaluate the long-term fiscal implications of this project.
Second, the committee is concerned over Russia's ability to
fulfill whatever financial commitment it makes to this project.
Although Russia has committed the equivalent of $24.0 million
for chemical weapons destruction in fiscal year 1997, none of
these funds have been expended. Russia's chemical weapons
destruction plan was rejected by the Federation Council--
Russia's upper house of parliament--in January of this year. In
April 1997, the State Duma--Russia's lower house of
parliament--refused to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), only one day after the U.S. Senate had approved it. The
Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, Vladimir
Lukin, explained the refusal by stating, ``It's simple: There's
a lack of cash.'' Foreign financing to date for this project is
extremely limited. While the United States has said it will
finance a share of the costs of building the facility only, the
Russians insist that associated infrastructure must be financed
and built as well. Without an agreement on this matter, it is
unlikely that construction can proceed.
Third, the facility is designed to destroy only 14 percent
of Russia's declared chemical weapons stockpile and will take
more than 10 years to accomplish even this modest task. It has
been estimated that Russia would need to construct six
additional sites to meet the time frames required by the CWC
for the destruction of the rest of its declared chemical
weapons stockpile.
Fourth, the committee disagrees with the United States'
retreat from its prior insistence that the facility be used to
destroy air munitions--the types of chemical munitions that are
more threatening to U.S. interests--and has agreed to Russian
demands that nerve agent contained in artillery shells be
destroyed first. Because of their deteriorating condition,
these artillery munitions are more of a Russian environmental
concern than a U.S. or allied security concern.
Finally, the committee is concerned by unclassified reports
that Russia is continuing to develop chemical weapons,
including three new and particularly lethal nerve agents. Such
activity is clearly at variance with the commitments Russia
assumed when it signed the CWC and suggests that U.S.
assistance to dismantle older chemical weapons while Russia
continues to produce newer ones amounts to a subsidy of a
lethal Russian chemical weapons modernization program.
The committee believes there are higher priority CTR
programs with potentially greater benefits to U.S. security.
The Department apparently shares this view, as it notified the
Congress that it would transfer $7.8 million of fiscal year
1997 funds obligated for this project to strategic offensive
arms elimination programs. The committee also notes that as of
May 1997, more than $70.0 million in previously appropriated
funds for this project remained unobligated, almost twice the
amount actually disbursed. Consequently, the committee
recommends a reduction of $21.0 million for this project and
does not endorse proceeding with actual construction of the
facility. The committee also recommends a provision (sec. 1106)
that would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of fiscal
year 1998 funds for chemical weapons facility planning and
design until the Secretary notifies the Congress that the
following conditions have been met:
(1) that Russia has approved a chemical weapons
destruction plan that commits it to sharing the
financial costs of this program;
(2) that the United States has agreed to cap its
financial contribution;
(3) that an agreement has been reached resolving the
issue of who will pay for construction of
infrastructure and facilities associated with the
destruction facility and required by Russia; and
(4) that a specific site has been chosen for
construction of the facility.
Fissile Material Storage Facility
The budget request contained $57.7 million for fissile
material storage activities in Russia. In particular, the funds
requested are to be used to support the design and construction
of a storage facility at Mayak to house materials from
dismantled strategic nuclear weapons. The committee continues
to support efforts to ensure the safe and secure storage of
fissile materials in Russia.
However, the committee notes that significant uncertainties
remain regarding the Mayak facility. The project is
approximately two years behind schedule and further delays are
possible in light of Russia's uncertain commitment to funding
its share of the costs. Although the United States has informed
Russia that the U.S. share of Mayak costs will be capped at
$275.0 million, the projected budget request for fiscal year
1999 reflects a significant increase in funding, including
funds for preliminary work on a second fissile material storage
facility in Russia, although the requirement for another such
facility is unclear. Significantly, a recent GAO report
(``Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program,'' GAO/NSIAD-96-222, September 1996)
notes, ``The draft CTR multiyear plan acknowledges that the
program cannot measure the impact of CTR fissile material
storage projects--such as Mayak--on CTR program objectives''
because the Department lacks the necessary information to make
such a determination. Due to the Department's delay in
submitting the latest annual CTR program plan as required, the
committee cannot fully evaluate the long-term fiscal
implications of this project.
The most significant uncertainty is the lack of any
transparency agreements that would allow the United States to
verify the quantity and type of fissile materials stored at
Mayak and the irreversibility of the dismantlements. The
committee believes such agreements are essential to ensuring
that the facility is being used for its intended purpose and
that materials stored there are not capable of being used in
the construction of additional weapons. Prior efforts to
negotiate transparency arrangements with Russia have been
unsuccessful. To date, Russia has not declared the specific
type and quantity of fissile material that will be stored at
Mayak. As the previously-cited GAO report noted, ``Until a
detailed transparency arrangement is agreed upon, the United
States does not know exactly how it will be able to insure that
Mayak is being used as intended. A failure to reach such an
agreement in the future would force the United States to choose
between curtailing support for the facility--after investing
many tens of millions of dollars--and compromising on its
access rights.''
Negotiations are expected to resume later this year, and
the Department has notified the committee of Russia's declared
commitment to agree to transparency measures. However, the
committee believes that continuing to fund this activity in
advance of a formal agreement that clarifies and codifies U.S.
rights weakens the U.S. negotiating position.
Based on the above concerns, the committee conditions its
approval of the budget request for this project on the
conclusion of a written agreement with Russia acknowledging
that the U.S. share of the ultimate cost of the Mayak facility
will be capped at $275.0 million. Moreover, the committee
recommends a provision (sec. 1107) that would prohibit the
obligation of fiscal year 1998 funds for Mayak until a
transparency agreement with Russia is signed. Finally, the
committee directs that unobligated prior-year funds not be
obligated or expended on this project until 15 days after the
Secretary provides the Congressional defense committees with a
status report on the issues and uncertainties noted above.
Nuclear Reactor Core Conversion
The budget request included $41.0 million for nuclear
reactor core conversion projects in Russia to support the
elimination of Russian plutonium production by 2000, an
important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The requested
amount is more than four times the amount appropriated for
fiscal year 1997 and is intended to begin preparations for
conversion work. However, to date no implementing agreement has
been negotiated with Russia's Ministry of Energy (Minatom) to
allow this work to proceed. Consequently, the $10.0 million
appropriated in fiscal year 1997--which Congress authorized be
transferred to the Secretary of Energy--is unable to be
obligated until such an agreement is concluded. Reiterating its
support for the goal of eliminating Russian plutonium
production, the committee believes responsibility for this core
conversion project more properly resides within the Department
of Energy (DOE), which initially began this effort in fiscal
year 1996 as a pilot project. For these reasons, the committee
denies the request for fiscal year 1998 Department of Defense
funds to pursue this project, but has added $10.0 million for
core conversion to the appropriate DOE account.
Nuclear Weapons Storage Security In Russia
The budget request contained $36.0 million for projects
designed to ensure the safe storage of nuclear weapons and
materials from dismantled strategic nuclear systems. However,
in March 1997 the Department informed Congress that the Russian
Ministry of Defense has reevaluated its requirement for
supercontainers to enhance the security of Russian nuclear
weapons during transit. As a result, the Department proposes to
reallocate $12.5 million in fiscal year 1996 CTR funds for
other ``higher priority'' weapons storage security projects.
Because these previously appropriated funds are now available
to augment other weapons storage security activities, the
committee recommends a reduction in the fiscal year 1998 budget
request of $12.5 million.
The committee reiterates its support for efforts to ensure
the safe and secure storage of fissile materials and recommends
this reduction without prejudice. However, the committee is
concerned over Russia's unwillingness to allow the United
States access to certain storage sites. This raises questions
about the U.S. ability to ensure that equipment provided is
used solely for its stated purpose.
In its March 1997 notification to Congress of intent to
obligate fiscal year 1997 funds, the Department noted that
``DOD will not be able to perform audits and examinations of
some portions of the assistance provided under these
agreements,'' but intends to impose other restrictions to
ensure that the assistance ``remains under the control of the
Russian Government.'' The committee is concerned that these
arrangements may be insufficient to guard against the improper
use of CTR assistance. Accordingly, the committee recommends a
provision (sec. 1108) that would limit the obligation and
expenditure of fiscal year 1998 funds until a formal agreement
is reached with Russia on a mutually-acceptable arrangement for
conducting audits and examinations; that agreement is provided
by the Secretary to the Congressional defense committees; and
15 days have elapsed from the date the agreement is received.
Other Support Programs
The budget request contained $1.0 million for defense and
military contacts with Belarus. In light of the recent
Presidential de-certification of Belarus as eligible for CTR
funds on the basis of human rights violations, the committee
denies this request. In addition, the committee notes that, as
of May 1997, the Department had obligated only $80.3 million of
the $117.3 million in prior-year funds notified to Congress for
CTR projects in Belarus. The committee expects that the
Department will not obligate the remaining $37.0 million for
projects in Belarus as long as Belarus remains ineligible for
additional CTR assistance.
Program Overhead
The budget request contained $20.5 million for management
and administrative costs, project development, and audits and
examinations. In light of the reductions in various CTR
programs noted above, and the logical reduction in associated
administrative costs, the committee recommends a reduction of
$2.0 million for these activities. The committee notes that the
Department unilaterally reduced the appropriated level of
fiscal year 1997 program support by more than $300,000 to cover
the costs of other higher priorities.
Prohibition of Specified Activities
The committee reiterates its belief that funding for CTR
activities should be directed toward facilitating the safe
transportation, storage, and elimination of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery vehicles, and components, and for
programs and activities deigned to prevent proliferation. The
committee does not support CTR funding for activities outside
these basic purposes. For this reason, the committee recommends
a provision (sec. 1103) that would maintain a prohibition on
the use of CTR funds for peacekeeping-related activities,
housing, environmental restoration, job retraining, and defense
conversion.
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Section 1101--Specification of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
This section would specify the kinds of programs to be
funded under this title.
Section 1102--Fiscal Year 1998 Funding Allocations
This section would allocate fiscal year 1998 funding for
various CTR purposes and activities.
Section 1103--Prohibition on Use of Funds for Specified Purposes
This section would prohibit the use of CTR funds for
specified activities, including peacekeeping-related, housing,
environmental restoration, job retraining, and defense
conversion purposes.
Section 1104--Prohibition on Use of Funds Until Specified Reports are
Submitted
This section would prohibit obligation or expenditure of
fiscal year 1998 CTR funds until 15 days after various reports
are submitted to Congress.
Section 1105--Limitation on Use of Funds Until Submission of
Certification
This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure
of fiscal year 1998 CTR funds for certain START II-related
strategic offensive arms elimination programs until the
President certifies that such expenditures are in the national
security interest and the Russians have agreed to share the
cost of these activities. It would also direct the Secretary of
Defense of submit a report on the specific cost-sharing
arrangements.
Section 1106--Use of Funds for Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility
This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure
of funds for chemical weapons destruction purposes until the
Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that certain cost-
sharing and site agreements have been reached with Russia.
Section 1107--Limitation on Use of Funds for Storage Facility for
Russian Fissile Material
This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure
of funds for a storage facility for Russian fissile material
until the Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that certain
cost-sharing and transparency agreements have been reached with
Russia.
Section 1108--Limitation on Use of Funds for Weapons Storage Security
This section would prohibit the obligation or expenditure
of funds for weapons storage security in Russia until the
Secretary of Defense notifies Congress that an agreement has
been reached with Russia regarding audits and examinations.
Section 1109--Report to Congress on Issues Regarding Payment of Taxes
or Duties on Assistance Provided to Russia Under Cooperative Threat
Reduction Programs
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to Congress on attempts by Russia to tax
assistance provided under the CTR program.
Section 1110--Limitation on Obligation of Funds for a Specified Period
This section would amend title 10, United States Code to
limit the use of all appropriated funds for CTR purposes to a
period of three years.
Section 1111--Availability of Funds
This section would make fiscal year 1998 CTR funds
available for obligation for three years.
TITLE XII--MATTERS RELATING TO OTHER NATIONS
.............
Arms Control Implementation
The fiscal year 1998 budget request contained $315.1
million for arms control implementation programs, representing
a 12 percent increase over the fiscal year 1997 budget request
and a 27 percent increase over the fiscal year 1997
appropriated level.
The budget request is based in large part on planning
assumptions regarding when various arms control treaties will
enter into force. These assumptions have changed repeatedly, as
the entry into force of several treaties--including the Open
Skies Treaty, START II, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)--has been delayed.
The committee notes that the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which was recently ratified by the United States but has
not been ratified by Russia, entered into force on April 29,
1997. This treaty places additional inspection obligations on
the United States requiring an increase in funding for CWC
activities. However, some of the requested increase in funding
is directed toward support for the 1990 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) with Russia that is separate from the CWC.
Because the Russians have refused to implement this agreement,
the committee recommends a reduction of $4.1 million for BDA-
related activities.
As has been the case in the past, delays in the entry into
force of other treaties will likely allow some reduction in the
amount of funding authorized for these arms control
implementation programs. For example, the committee believes
that planning assumptions regarding the entry into force of the
Open Skies Treaty are overly optimistic. Accordingly, the
committee recommends a reduction of $1.7 million for Open Skies
treaty implementation activities.
In addition, the budget request would almost double the
amount of funding for research and development (R&D) activities
related to monitoring, implementation, compliance, and
technical support for the CTBT over the fiscal year 1997
appropriated level. The committee is not convinced that such a
significant increase is warranted given that the treaty has not
yet been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and
that U.S. ratification is not assured. Moreover, current DOD
planning assumes that the treaty will not enter into force
until late 1999. In addition, some of the specific projects
supported by the R&D request appear to involve the procurement
of items and are not strictly ``research and development''
activities. Finally, the committee has concerns over proposed
DOD operation of seismic monitoring stations currently operated
by the U.S. Geological Survey. Although the Department has
expressed its intention to conclude agreements that delineate
the obligations of each party responsible for a treaty station,
no such agreements have yet been negotiated. Consequently, the
committee directs elsewhere in this report that $13.3 million
of the R&D budget request be fenced until 15 days after the
Secretary of Defense notifies the Congressional defense
committees that the necessary agreements have been concluded.
Moreover, the committee directs the Secretary to provide the
House National Security Committee and Senate Armed Services
Committee with a detailed report no later that September 31,
1997 on how the Department intends to use these CTBT-related
research and development funds.
Finally, the committee notes that Russia has yet to ratify
the START II Treaty. To encourage Russian ratification, the
Administration agreed at the March 1997 Helsinki summit to
postpone the START II deadline for elimination of certain
strategic offensive arms from 2003 to 2007. The committee
understands this step constitutes a substantive amendment to
the START II Treaty and that the administration intends to
submit such changes to the Congress for approval. However, the
committee notes that members of Russia's lower house of
parliament, or Duma, have indicated subsequent to the Helsinki
summit that Russian ratification of the treaty has been
deferred indefinitely. As a result of the agreed slippage in
START II elimination deadlines and the unlikely prospect for
ratification in the near-term, the committee recommends a
reduction to the budget request of $5.4 million, for a total
authorization of $303.9 million.
.............
Strategic Force Reductions
The committee notes that the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) endorsed maintaining U.S. strategic nuclear forces at
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) levels until Russia
ratifies the START II Treaty. Despite the QDR's confirmation of
current policy, the National Defense Panel has advocated
unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions to the levels
specified in the START II Treaty. Moreover, and contrary to the
QDR, Department of Defense officials also recently expressed
interest in steps that could result in unilateral U.S.
reductions.
The committee believes that strategic nuclear forces remain
central to U.S. national security, and any proposal to alter
the nation's nuclear force structure must be considered on its
own merits. The committee certainly does not believe that
unilateral reductions to nuclear forces should be considered
simply to generate savings for the military services to use to
address program shortfalls, no matter how acute.
Moreover, the committee believes that unilaterally reducing
nuclear force structure below START I levels, prior to Russia's
ratification of START II, would be counterproductive from an
arms control standpoint. Because mutual obligation is the basis
of all arms control agreements, unilateral reductions could
undermine standing agreements and future negotiations.
Unilateral U.S. nuclear force reductions would reduce Russian
incentives to approve the START II Treaty by sending an
unambiguous signal that U.S. reductions will occur with or
without reciprocal Russian action. The committee continues to
believe that any reductions to U.S. nuclear forces should be
based on calculations of national security interest and
implemented only in a mutual and balanced manner with Russia.
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
.............
Section 1202--One-Year Extension of Counterproliferation Authorities
This section would extend the authority through fiscal year
1998 for the Department of Defense to provide support to the UN
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) under the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Control Act of 1992.
.............
TITLE XXVIII--GENERAL PROVISIONS
ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Force Protection for Overseas Facilities From Chemical and Biological
Weapons
The committee is concerned about the adequacy of force
protection for military installations and facilities abroad and
is particularly concerned about the condition and ability of
overseas facilities to contribute effectively to the protection
of military personnel in the event of contingencies involving
the use of chemical or biological munitions. The committee
directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of overseas
military installations and facilities, with a particular
emphasis on facilities in the Republic of Korea, and the
capacity of those facilities to respond effectively to an
attack in which chemical or biological munitions are used. The
study should include an assessment of the military construction
required to enhance and improve overseas facilities for the
protection of military personnel from chemical and biological
attack. The Secretary shall submit a report on the Department's
findings, including any recommendations, to the congressional
defense committees by March 1, 1998.
..............
ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS
----------
DISSENTING VIEWS OF RONALD V. DELLUMS
I voted against reporting H.R. 1119 from the committee for
several reasons.
.......
Third, the committee recommendation would press forward too
rapidly with national missile defense, notwithstanding that the
committee recommendation implicitly adopts the administration's
so-called three-plus-three strategy for development and
preparation of a national missile defense system. I applaud the
committee's retreat from any effort to implicitly or to
explicitly recommend a program that would exceed the limits of
the ABM Treaty.
......
Sixth, I am also troubled at the decision to reduce funds
for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a program that is
essential to our interests in reducing or eliminating threats
that are currently posed by nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons and materials.
Ronald V. Dellums.
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