PREPARED STATEMENT MITCHEL B. WALLERSTEIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
PROLIFERATION AND U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
JUNE 11, 1997
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on the
topic of proliferation and U.S. export controls.
Secretary of Defense Cohen stated in his 1997 annual report that
technology security and export controls are an important element in
strengthening the preventive defense pillar of U.S. defense strategy.
Secretary Cohen emphasized that DOD's technology security efforts serve
two main purposes. First, they seek to prevent the proliferation.of
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of
delivery--primarily ballistic and cruise missiles. Second, export
controls seek to preserve U.S. military technological advantages by
controlling conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods, services,
and technologies.
Proliferation threatens U.S. national security interests. It can
exacerbate regional instabilities and increase the threats to U.S.
interests worldwide--particularly in regions where we may be more
likely to deploy forces, such as Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.
DOD believes that this proliferation threat can be effectively
addressed through support for nonproliferation regimes, promotion of
effective national export controls, and close export control
cooperation with foreign governments that are responsible members of
the world community and that share our concerns regarding
proliferation. We know that carefully targeted and rigorously enforced
export controls can and do dramatically slow the pace of proliferation
and raise the cost for potential proliferators.
We also believe that it is important to continue to carefully
regulate exports of potentially destabilizing conventional arms and
sensitive dual-use technologies. It is no coincidence that countries
seeking NBC weapons and missiles are also simultaneously attempting to
build up their conventional weapons capabilities.
Let me also note that DOD sees no signs that the underlying forces
which are causing WMD proliferation and destabilizing conventional arms
build-ups are abating. The post-Cold War era is characterized by global
diffusion of technology and increasing indigenous expertise contributes
to more widespread production of high technology goods in many regions.
That production, in turn, makes possible the application of advanced
civilian technologies to military uses.
Because of the increasingly diverse regional threats to our
security interests particularly in regions where U.S. forces are now or
may be deployed, the U.S. must demonstrate leadership, in part, by
maintaining a strong, effective export control system as one element of
a broader nonproliferation and regional strategy. DOD supports
effective export controls not only on armaments, such as advanced
weapons platforms, but also on enabling dual-use goods and
technologies, such as advanced machine tools and high performance
computers (including supercomputers) that are needed to manufacture,
maintain, and use these arms.
In this regard, DOD has a special responsibility to provide our
armed forces with the best and most technologically advanced equipment
for fighting future conflicts and for protecting their safety. Our
fighting men and women performed brilliantly in Desert Storm, in large
measure because they had the advanced technology needed to service and
maintain conventional superiority on the battlefield. We must continue
to provide the most advanced equipment to our fighting forces, and
ensure that this equipment is superior to that of any foe. Export
controls are essential in maintaining our technology lead in key
military systems.
Let me emphasize a few major principles that I believe should be
kept in mind in implementing export controls. First is the need for a
strong policy basis on which to control and, as required, to impose
conditions or to deny sensitive exports to any destination for reasons
of national security or foreign policy. Second is the need to retain
substantial Administration flexibility in both establishing and
implementing controls. Third is the need to maintain a sufficiently
broad basis for imposing unilateral controls under certain
circumstances, while we endeavor at the same time to make such controls
more effective by multilateralizing them to the greatest extent
possible.
I believe that we have already moved effectively to implement these
principles by improving the efficiency and transparency of the U.S.
Government export control process. In a recent Executive Order the
President has directed that there will be appropriate interagency
review of all dual-use categories of licenses, thereby addressing
Congressional concerns that the Department of Defense has, on occasion,
not been afforded the opportunity to review certain sensitive dual-use
exports. The Executive Order also imposes rigorous time constraints
that allow us to account for national security concerns, while still
providing for expeditious review of license applications. The new
Executive Order is an example of the Administration's efforts to
streamline the export control process, tightening controls where
necessary, but still ensuring that U.S. exporters are competitive in
the world market.
I also would like to point out that the multilateral export
controls framework has been enhanced by the establishment last year of
the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Arrangement complements other
existing multilateral non-proliferation regimes specifically directed
at curtailing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means
to deliver them (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Australia Group). The Wassenaar Arrangement has 33
founding members, and it is intended to increase transparency and
responsibility on worldwide transfers of munitions and sensitive dual-
use goods. Members include traditional U.S. allies, Russia, Ukraine,
and other countries of the former Warsaw Pact as well as select
countries from Asia and Latin America. A principal objective of the new
regime is to identify and block potential security problems before they
become major threats. As the first effort to establish worldwide
restraints on arms exports, the Arrangement is intended to prevent
acquisition of conventional weapons by countries that threaten
international peace and stability.
The Department of Defense also promotes more effective multilateral
controls by, among other things, emphasizing U.S. Government efforts to
help upgrade other nations' export control systems and to make more
rigorous the rules and procedures of the nonproliferation regimes. The
Administration has decided that dealing with the proliferation threat
requires effective export controls worldwide. Through legislation such
as the Freedom Support Act and subsequent funding appropriations (e.g.,
Cooperative Threat Reduction & Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund)
the Congress has also made the establishment of worldwide effective
export controls a priority of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, DOD
directly supports the Administration's and Congress's goals in this
area.
In sum, proliferation is a multi-faceted challenge that spans the
full spectrum of conflict and threatens peace and stability at
different levels--globally as well as regionally. It is not a challenge
that will soon go away. For this reason, it is appropriate and
necessary to use a wide range of national and international resources,
including effective export controls, in our attempts to control
proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal statement. I would be happy
to answer any questions that you or the other Committee members might
have.
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