FY 1998 DP BUDGET REQUEST, 03/19/1997, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19970710
- Chairperson:
- S. Thurmond
- Committee:
- Senate Armed Services
- Docfile Number:
- T970319
- Hearing Date:
- 19970319
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1998 DP BUDGET REQUEST
- Witness Name:
- V. Reis
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Dr. Victor Reis
Assistant Secretary for
Defense Programs
Department of Energy
before the
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 19, 1997
Although the threat of superpower nuclear confrontation has
receded, the United States continues to face a broad spectrum of
national security challenges. To meet these challenges,
President Clinton has stated that "the United States must and
will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any
future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic
nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to
convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In
this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable
nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United
States."
Additionally, the United States Senate START II ratification text
states that "the United States is committed to proceeding with a
robust Stockpile Stewardship program, and to maintain nuclear
weapons production capabilities and capacities that will ensure
the safety, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal at the START II level and meet requirements for hedging
against possible international developments or technical problems
in conformance with United States policies and to underpin
deterrence. "
The ability of the United States to respond effectively to the
national security challenges of the 21st century will be
determined by the decisions we make and actions we take now. The
United States has: agreed to the indefinite extension of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, ratified START II, and signed
the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Once
ratified by the 44 nuclear capable states, any nuclear weapons
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion will be banned. At
the present time 41 of the 44 states have signed the Treaty.
Within this new strategic context the Department must continue to
ensure the safety, security and reliability of the enduring
stockpile, without nuclear testing. The Department will meet
this national security challenge through the vigorous
implementation of the integrated Stockpile Stewardship and
Management program (SSMP), a scientific and technical challenge
perhaps as formidable as the Manhattan Project.
The Department's objective is to implement a program that:
Supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent with a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, without nuclear testing,
as the weapons complex is reduced in size, modernized and
made more efficient.
Preserves the core intellectual and technical competencies
of the weapons laboratories and the manufacturing
facilities; and
Ensures that activities needed to maintain the nation's
nuclear deterrent are compatible with the nation's
arms-control and nonproliferation commitments, including the
CTBT.
The Department recognizes the inherent risk in a program to
develop a surrogate for underground testing. It has been over
four years since the last nuclear test. During that time, we
have successfully addressed an issue with the Trident I (W76)
warhead by using a combination of analysis, new experimental
data, archived test and manufacturing data, and most importantly
the collective judgement of the two weapon design laboratories.
This success, using the experimental and testing tools available
today, provides confidence that the even more powerful computing
and testing tools to be developed will allow us to solve future
stockpile problems without nuclear testing. However, in the
event that testing should be required, the Department will
maintain the capability to conduct underground nuclear tests as
directed by the President and the Congress.
Last year the Administration committed to Congress that funding
for Defense Programs activities would total approximately $4
billion per year for the next 10 years. The FY 1998 request is
$3.6 billion for Weapons Activities operations and maintenance
account and $1.5 billion for the new Defense Asset Acquisition
Account for a total of $5.1 billion in FY 1998. Of this amount,
about $4 billion would be obligated in FY 1998 with the balance
obligated in future years against ongoing construction projects.
From 1998 through 2002, the President's budget requests $20.1
billion for Defense Programs activities.
The FY 1998 request allows us to build upon significant
accomplishments during FY 1996 and FY 1997. DOE's production
plants at Pantex, Savannah River, Oak Ridge, and Kansas City
continue to support the day-to-day needs of the enduring nuclear
weapons stockpile by making the necessary repairs and providing
replacement parts. The Pantex plant safely disassembled 1064
nuclear weapons in FY 1996. We recently demonstrated through
delivery of the first B-61 Modification 11 kits that the DOE
nuclear weapons complex remains capable of meeting DoD
requirements. Working with the laboratories and plants, DOE
delivered the first conversion kit in late December 1996, meeting
the accelerated schedule requested by the DoD. The B-61 Mod 11
will replace the B-53, which is the oldest bomb in the stockpile
and does not have modern safety features. The dual track tritium
program continues to make progress on the regulatory, technical
and policy activities associated with the program. A Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and DOE governing the interactions between the two agencies
was signed in May 1996. Recently the Department and the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) announced plans to conduct in-reactor tests of
reactor. The Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) program
selected a prime contractor, Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc., and
began a technical analysis of the components that would be used
in the APT. In addition, the Secretary of Energy announced that
the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) would remain on warm standby
for possible use in producing tritium. The action is being
funded by the Office of Nuclear Energy. The National Ignition
Facility (NIF) program completed Title I design of the project
and the Department selected the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory as the site for construction. The Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) program awarded two
contracts for the next generation of super
computers and accepted delivery of the world's fastest computer,
capable of performing over one trillion operations per second.
The Department also completed a number of key environmental
documents required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) including: the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS); the Nevada
Test Site Wide EIS; and the Pantex Site Wide EIS. With these
documents complete, DOE can: begin construction of the new
experimental facilities needed by the stockpile stewardship
program; establish a plutonium pit production capability at Los
Alamos; downsize the manufacturing complex while maintaining the
necessary industrial capabilities to support the stockpile;
conduct subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site; and
continue to safely store plutonium pits from dismantled weapons
at the Pantex plant.
The Department is in consultation with the DoD, revising and
updating the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP)
plan, which describes in detail our plans for maintaining the
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile in the
absence of underground testing and no new-design nuclear warheads
production. We will provide a copy of this classified plan,
known as the "Green Book" to the Congress after the Nuclear
Weapons Stockpile Plan is signed by the President. We will
continue to work closely with the DoD to refine and implement
this plan to meet fully the requirements of the President's
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan.
Annual Certification
A primary DOE responsibility is to annually certify the safety
and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. On August 11,
1995, the President announced that he would seek a zero yield
CTBT. At that time he directed the Secretaries of Defense and
Energy to advise him annually on the safety and reliability of
the nuclear weapons stockpile, in order to determine whether the
United States should continue to observe the CTBT or resume
underground nuclear testing. The two Secretaries are to be
advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command, and the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons
laboratories on whether the stockpile is safe and reliable in the
absence of nuclear testing.
All active and inactive weapon types have been assessed by the
weapons design laboratories and the DoD-led joint Project
Officers Group. The laboratory directors and the Commander of
U.S. Strategic Command have provided their advice to the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The first annual
certification was signed on February 7, 1997, by both Secretaries
certifying to the President that the stockpile is "safe and
reliable" and that "there is no need to conduct an underground
nuclear test at this time."
STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
The Stockpile Management Program continues its historic
responsibilities to provide near term and long term support for
the stockpile, and for ensuring an adequate supply of tritium.
It also includes new programs and procedures to deal with the
aging stockpile, which has an average age of 14 years. Along
with stockpile surveillance, the historic responsibilities
include: normal maintenance; corrective maintenance and system
refurbishment; and weapon dismantlement.
Almost 50 years of stockpile history have shown that continuous
surveillance, repair, and replacement of components and
subsystems are commonplace. In fact, the nine weapons types that
will comprise the START II stockpile have already been
retrofitted to varying degrees and some have had major components
of the nuclear warhead replaced. At the present time, we cannot
predict with any certainty when stockpile problems will arise in
the future, but we are addressing these issues through our
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Department is
carrying out the recommendations of the 1996 GAO report on
nuclear surveillance activities. At the requested funding level,
our goal is to eliminate most backlogs in flight and laboratory
tests within two years and all backlogs prior to the end of FY
2000.
Role of the Production Plants
The production plants at Savannah River, Pantex, Kansas City, and
Oak Ridge are essential components to the success of Stockpile
Stewardship and Management. The Department's approach to
maintain these key industrial facilities is detailed in the final
PEIS on Stockpile Stewardship and Management and supported by the
Secretary of Energy's Record of Decision issued on December 19,
1996. While ongoing production activities at the plants will
help maintain production skills, to attract and retain the next
generation of technicians DOE is establishing a fellowship
program at the plants. The plants have been directed to identify
prioritized needs for the fellowship program. Their responses
are due by mid-April 1997. None of the funds will be obligated
until the report required by section 3166 of the FY 1997 Defense
Authorization Act is provided to the Congress.
In FY 1997 the four plants will continue to produce the
replacement parts and make the necessary repairs to support the
enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. One of the most significant
accomplishments was the accelerated delivery of the conversion
kits from the Kansas City and Oak Ridge Y-12 plants for the B61
modification 11 program. The B61 modification 11 satisfies the
mission requirements of the B53 gravity bomb. The B53 is the
oldest weapon in the stockpile and does not meet modern safety
design criteria. All B53s will be retired shortly. DOE plans to
begin dismantlement of this system by FY 1999.
In FY 1998 DOE expects to demonstrate a limited plutonium pit
production capability at Los Alamos, a capability the DOE has not
had since the closing of the Rocky Flats plant in 1992. In
reestablishing war reserve support capability, DOE plans to
manufacture a Trident II (W-88) pit in FY 1998, a Peacekeeper (W-87) pit in FY 2
production capacity will be in place by FY 2003.
Although there will be downsizing of the production plants
commensurate with the needs of a smaller stockpile, none of the
plants will be closed. The Strategic Management Restructuring
Initiative (SMRI) will support implementation of the Department's
decision to downsize in place. The SMRI program involves
downsizing the following operations: (1) the weapons
assembly/disassembly and high explosives missions at Pantex; (2)
nonnuclear components production at Kansas City; (3) weapons
secondary and case fabrication at Oak Ridge Y-12; and (4)
consolidation of tritium operations at Savannah River. We will
also reestablish pit component fabrication at Los Alamos. The
DOE will make use of existing facilities at the sites which will
be upgraded, repaired and or modified to meet current
environment, safety and health requirements. DOE will, through
section 3161 of the FY 1993 National Defense Authorization Act,
mitigate the impacts of downsizing on the affected workers and
communities.
Enhanced Surveillance
Enhanced Surveillance is an integrated program involving the four
production plants and the three weapons laboratories. In this
program we will develop the predictive measures to address the
maintenance needs of the stockpile. The basic goals of the
program are: to predict in advance defects that might develop in
the enduring stockpile due to aging or other reasons; develop a
means to assess the safety and reliability impacts; and to ensure
that problems are corrected before they reduce safety or
reliability of the stockpile. The Enhanced Surveillance Program
(ESP) builds upon existing Defense Programs' research and
development activities, nonnuclear testing, nondestructive
evaluation/surveillance activities and will develop new
predictive models, new techniques for data analysis, and offers
the possibility of in-situ, real time, non-destructive monitoring
for warheads.
The ESP focuses on six major areas: 1) materials characterization
and surveillance; 2) materials aging model development; 3)
component surveillance and diagnostics; 4) component performance
models; 5) enhanced systems testing; and 6) system performance
models. The surveillance techniques, procedures, and models
developed in this program will be incorporated into the ongoing
core surveillance program when we are confident of their
validity. With these new tools, our program of stockpile
surveillance will emphasize prediction and preventive
maintenance.
The ESP is a logical step between the traditional surveillance
program and the anticipated weapons refurbishment requirements.
It will be closely coordinated and integrated with the Stockpile
Life Extension Program, the Accelerated Strategic Computing
Initiative, and the Advanced Manufacturing Design and Production
Technology programs.
Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP)
The mission of the SLEP is to ensure continued high confidence in
the performance, safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile while exercising the infrastructure and intellectual
capabilities needed to sustain the weapons as a credible
deterrent. The SLEP is a new DOE maintenance management strategy
that will continuously focus the design and manufacturing
activities required to maintain all of the stockpile warheads in
a safe and reliable condition. The SLEP establishes the
activities needed to meet nuclear weapon stockpile commitments to
DoD, and provides the basis for coordinating stockpile activities
between DOE and DoD. It builds on and enhances past practices to
maintain a viable nuclear weapons stockpile. Detailed schedules
for each weapon are being developed through weapon-specific
DoD/DOE Project Officer Groups.
The underpinning concept for the SLEP is "all components of a
nuclear weapon are limited life components." The SLEP focuses
and prioritizes the efforts of the weapons complex. The Enhanced
Surveillance program will provide data to better understand
material and component aging phenomena and determine the Life-limit of component
needed information to determine a life extension program and
sustain a safe, reliable stockpile to meet DoD performance
requirements.
The SLEP integrates stockpile management activities and
establishes requirements and priorities to support budget and
workload planning. These activities to support the stockpile are
embodied in four key functions: maintenance, surveillance,
assessment and certification, and refurbishment. The
underpinning activities for these functions rely on science and
modeling based capabilities and our ability to manufacture a
reliable product.
Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technology (ADaPT)
The Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technologies
Initiative will provide the nuclear weapons complex with advanced
capabilities for: designing, developing, and certifying
components and systems; and producing, assembling, and delivering
the components and systems products. Over the next decade ADaPT
will radically change how DOE supports the nuclear weapons
stockpile by infusing new product and process technologies, and
adopting state-of-the-art business and engineering practices.
The funding from this program to the plants and laboratories
addresses enterprise modeling, product realization, and model-based design and m
under this program is the development of a laser-cutting
workstation for application to weapon remanufacturing. In FY
1997, the ADaPT program will be integrated with existing efforts
in Process Development at the production plants, and will be
continued at essentially the same level of effort in FY 1998.
Dual Revalidation
Dual Revalidation is a new, robust form of peer review designed
to assure both DOE and DoD that the stockpile remains safe,
secure, and reliable. Under Dual Revalidation, two teams perform
independent evaluations, the first team drawn from the original
design laboratory and the second team from the alternate
laboratory. Using archived data and performing nonnuclear tests,
teams will analyze and evaluate stockpiled weapons, weapons
components, and weapons materials to determine if they still meet
military requirements. Dual Revalidation provides a baseline
assessment of the condition of the warhead today and a process to
identify future problems. The evaluation is managed by the joint
DoD/DOE Project Officers Group and is expected to take 2-3 years
for each warhead type. The W-76 is the first warhead currently
undergoing revalidation. The increased involvement in and
technical understanding of the assessment process by the DoD will
provide a basis for their confidence in the stockpile, which was
previously supplied by nuclear
testing. This new process will revalidate that the stockpile
meets its specifications delineated in the Military
Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS).
Tritium
An integral part of ensuring a viable stockpile is the capability
to provide an adequate supply of tritium, a radioactive gas
required for all U.S. nuclear weapons to operate as designed.
Tritium, with a half life of 12.3 years, decays at a rate of 5.5
percent per annum. To meet current stockpile requirements, the
Department is recycling tritium from retired and dismantled
weapons. To support the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP)
approved by the President on March 11, 1996, a new tritium
production source will be needed as early as 2005 to maintain the
START I stockpile and the associated 5-year tritium reserve, and
to maintain the ability to "hedge" to START I even when the START
II treaty enters into force.
The Department continues to make progress on a dual track tritium
strategy for developing a reliable source of tritium to meet
national security requirements. One track includes the purchase
of a commercial reactor or irradiation services. The other track
requires the development and testing of an accelerator for the
production of tritium. In addition, the FFTF is being kept on
warm standby for possible contribution to meeting tritium needs.
The funds for this action is provided by the Office of Nuclear
Energy. By late 1998 the Department will have demonstrated all
major aspects of the accelerator technology and the use of
tritium producing rods in a commercial light water reactor. The
procurement process will be structured so that a contract could
be placed to either purchase irradiation services or purchase or
lease a reactor. Based on these activities, DOE will have
refined the cost estimates for both programs. By the end of
1998, the Department, in consultation with the DoD and OMB, will
select one of these alternatives as the primary tritium
production method. The other, will comprise an assured backup
capability. In an attempt to meet congressional concerns about
tritium supply, Secretary Pea has promised to review the dual
track time line. If the decision cannot be accelerated to 1997,
DOE will notify Congress consistent with section 3133 of the FY
1997 National Defense Authorization Act. The dual track approach
has the support of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
There are no serious technical issues associated with the
production of tritium in a light water reactor, but there are
regulatory and licensing steps to be taken. The Department and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) signed a Memorandum of
Understanding last May governing the interaction between the two
agencies for target qualification and NRC reactor licensing
activities. On February 7, 1997, the DOE announced that the TVA
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1 was selected as the host utility for
the Lead Test Assembly. The Watts Bar test involves placement of
32 specially designed twelve-foot "target" rods into four of the
nearly two hundred regular fuel assemblies in the plant's reactor
core. These targets, which contain no uranium or plutonium, are
designed to replace a standard component of reactor fuel
assemblies. During the plant's normal 18-month operating cycle,
the rods will produce and retain small amounts of tritium.
Following the test, the rods will be shipped by DOE carrier to
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for disassembly and
examination.
Previously, DOE has tested smaller rod segments in one of its
test reactors with excellent results. The Watts Bar test is
intended to confirm those results using rods of the same length
as those now typically used in commercial reactors. Additional
target qualification studies are needed to support regulatory and
owner approval for their use in commercial reactors.
The Department has issued a Draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for
the purchase of one or more commercial light water reactors or
irradiation services. A final RFP is scheduled for release in
April with utility responses due in June. The DOE expects to
make a preliminary selection of one or more utilities early in
1998.
With regard to the accelerator alternative, there are several
features and portions of the technology that need to be
demonstrated at production power levels and the cost of design,
construction and operations needs to be refined. The exploration
of the accelerator concept includes: a development effort to
select between technical alternatives; testing to establish
performance and reliability; the use of industry for conceptual
and engineering design and, if built, construction and
commissioning. These efforts will narrow the design, cost and
schedule uncertainties.
Last year the Department selected a prime contractor, Burns and
Roe Enterprises Inc. teamed with General Atomics to add to the
Los Alamos and Savannah River team. Los Alamos has completed the
construction of the first test items for the accelerator and
others are being manufactured. The first of the accelerator
components, an injector, is being tested and exceeding
performance specifications. Thousands of samples of materials,
welds, and structures have been or are being irradiated to
confirm choices and projections of performance for materials for
the so-called "target-blanket" the part of the plant in which the
tritium would actually be made. First results of these tests are
currently being analyzed. The design of the accelerator has been
favorably reviewed by two external review groups. The combined
team has produced a Draft Conceptual Design report and an
associated cost estimate, which is under intense review by the
prime contractor and the Department. The Department is on track
for issuing a final Conceptual Design Report in April of this
year. We have made excellent progress on the schedule, and with
the increased funding in FY 1996 and FY 1997 provided by the
Congress. We have been able to advance some of the technology
demonstrations, which are key to proving the concept and making
an informed decision in late 1998.
Transportation of Special Nuclear Materials
The transportation of special nuclear materials remains an
important element of stockpile management as a result of weapons
dismantlement and the restructuring and consolidation of military
bases in the United States. The Department provides for the
transportation of special nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and
weapons components throughout the continental United States via
specially designed safe, secure tractors and trailers (SST's).
The Department has accumulated more than 83 million miles of
over-the-road experience with no accidents causing a fatality or
release of radioactive materials, and without damage or
compromise of the cargo. Much of this can be attributed to the
well managed, highly trained, competent, and dedicated work force
of more than 260 couriers with nationwide secure communications.
In addition, largely due to our specialized in-house training
capability, the nuclear material couriers are one of the most
highly effective protective forces in the world. Seventeen new
trailers called Safe Guard Transporters (SGT), incorporating the
latest advances in materials and transportation technology, are
currently being built at the Kansas City Plant.
Dismantlement
Since the end of World War II, the Department and its
predecessors have disassembled some 55,000 nuclear warheads in a
safe, secure, and an efficient manner. In FY 1996, 1064 weapons
were dismantled at the Pantex Plant. We expect to dismantle the
944 nuclear weapons in FY 1997 and 1200 weapons in FY 1998. The
Pantex dismantlement workload is expected to remain stable for
the next few years as we reduce the nuclear stockpile consistent
with our arms control commitments.
Emergency Response
The Emergency Response program is a national capability that
provides critical technical expertise necessary to resolve any
major radiological emergency or nuclear accident within the
United States and abroad. The all-volunteer force that makes up
the cadre of deployment forces is mostly from the nuclear weapons
laboratories.
While a nuclear weapon accident is extremely unlikely, we are
prepared to effectively mitigate the consequences of an accident.
We are in the final planning stages for a full field training
exercise scheduled for late May, where, for the first time ever,
the DOE will exercise its responsibilities as the lead federal
agency in providing command and control as well as the necessary
technical expertise to resolve the accident.
The Department plays a vitally important support role in
combating acts of nuclear terrorism, through its Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST). NEST provides the FBI with the
operational and technical assistance in response to a terrorist
nuclear or radiological dispersal threat in the United States,
and supports the State Department in a similar role overseas. We
have vigorously pursued updating this program based on the
available intelligence to counter the current nuclear threat and
trends in these activities. Our present and near term activities
include continuance of in-depth contingency planning, rigorous
training, a challenging interagency exercise program, and pursuit
of much needed improvements in the areas of nuclear search,
diagnostics, device assessment, and disablement capabilities.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
The Stockpile Stewardship program addresses the issue of
maintaining confidence in stockpile safety and reliability
without nuclear testing through a technically challenging
science-based program utilizing upgraded or new experimental and
computational capabilities. The program continues major
initiatives in high energy density research with lasers and
accelerated research and development in advanced computations to
acquire and use data to improve predictive capabilities -- the
foundation of the science-based approach. Major new experimental
facilities are planned to expand and enhance the scientific and
engineering base for stockpile stewardship, and to assure that we
can continue to attract and retain the high quality personnel
needed to make the scientific and technical judgements related to
the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence of
underground nuclear testing.
The highly qualified laboratory staffs continue to make valuable
contributions to solving scientific problems using knowledge and
technologies from the weapons programs. One example is a program
called Peregrine. Based on the computer codes developed by the
weapons labs to show how radiation affects materials, Peregrine
promises to provide the medical community with a more efficient
and effective method of administering radiation therapy to cancer
patients. Research is conducted in collaboration with Stanford
University, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Harper
Hospital (Detroit) and other cancer research centers. Peregrine
with its enhanced modeling and computing capability is expected
to provide more precise and successful treatment of complicated
tumors around eyes, sinuses, neck, mouth and in and around the
lungs. We are discussing with the DoD the possibility of
providing this technique to cancer patients in military
hospitals. Peregrine will continue to benefit from computing
advances made by the ASCI program.
Advanced Experimental Capabilities
The proposed National Ignition Facility (NIF) is designed to
produce, for the first time in a laboratory setting, conditions
of temperature and density of matter close to those that occur in
the detonation of nuclear weapons. The ability to study the
behavior of matter and the transfer of energy and radiation under
these conditions is key to understanding the basic physics of
nuclear weapons and predicting their performance without
underground nuclear testing. Experiments at the NIF will provide
data essential to test the validity of computer based predictions
and demonstrate how aged or changed materials in weapons could
behave under these unique conditions. Two JASON panels, which
are comprised of scientific and technical national security
experts, have stated that the NIF is the most scientifically
valuable of all programs proposed for science-based stockpile
stewardship.
The NIF project currently has about 300 persons involved in
design and project-specific
research and development. Title I design work for the facility
is now complete. During the
Title I process the design was refined for the Lawrence Livermore
site with additional experimental capabilities added. This has
increased the total project costs by $125.3 million. NIF will
now be constructed so that the first bundle of eight lasers will
be available for experiments two years before the project is
complete. The project will begin site preparation work in FY
1997 which will allow major construction to begin in FY 1998 and
project completion by the third quarter of FY 2003.
The FY 1998 budget request includes $31 million in operations and
maintenance funds for NIF. These funds will enable industry to
produce components (optics) for NIF. The FY 1998 budget also
requests $876 million, full funding for NIF construction under
the Defense Asset Acquisition Account, though the planned
obligations during FY 1998 will only be $198 million. The
balance of the funds will be obligated annually throughout the
construction
period until project completion in FY 2003.
Current hydrodynamic testing facilities, the Pulsed High
Explosive Radiographic Machine Emitting X-rays (PHERMEX) at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Flash
X-Ray facility (FXR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL), were adequate to meet the challenges of stockpile
stewardship in conjunction with nuclear testing. In the
absence of nuclear testing, however, more capable hydrodynamic
testing facilities such as the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility are needed. Through its dual-axis, multi-tim
provide crucial experimental data on many of the warheads in the
stockpile and will directly support performance and safety
revalidation, enhanced surveillance, and an improved predictive
capability. Furthermore as the most capable hydrodynamic testing
facility in the complex, the DARHT facility will play a central
role in developing advanced technologies for a potential next-generation Advance
DARHT was resumed last May following dissolution of the federal
court injunction which had halted all actions associated with the
facility. The FY 1998 request for DARHT totals $46 million: $22
million to complete construction of the first arm of the facility
and the balance to complete the engineering and design of the
second arm.
The Atlas facility, to be constructed at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, is another new experimental facility needed by the
stockpile stewardship program. The facility provides a pulsed
power experimental capability to address primary and secondary
weapons physics in an energy rich, high energy density
environment. Construction of Atlas is scheduled to begin later
this year. The FY 1998 budget includes $14 million. The funds
will be used to continue long lead procurement, complete building
modifications, and to install Atlas pulsed power equipment.
The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), while not a new
facility, is the most powerful neutron research facility in the
world, providing an intense source of pulsed neutrons for
experiments supporting national security and civilian research.
Neutrons are unique and valuable probes of matter on scales
ranging from the subatomic to complex materials. At low
energies, neutrons are used to study many critical weapons
materials issues. At higher energies, neutrons probe the small-scale structure
of nuclear weapons processes. At the very highest energies,
neutrons can penetrate very thick materials providing unique
surveillance capabilities. This capability will be important in
supporting the enduring stockpile and anticipating rather than
reacting to problems in the stockpile.
Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) Computations
and Information Management.
The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) and Stockpile Computing is
element of the SSMP that will provide the critical advanced simulation tools nee
and future certification and assessment of the safety and reliability of the wea
stockpile. These tools will support weapons designers and analysts who will us
and assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons. The future role o
already been demonstrated in the assessment of the W76 issue.
Aging issues drive the size of the simulation capabilities required. During the
the weapons in today's stockpile, limitations in simulation and computing were o
keeping the designs consistent in 2 dimensions and through the extensive use of
testing. We already know that the aging issues we will encounter will not be so
Cracks, gaps and material degradation are 3D effects which will require signific
simulation capabilities that previously existed. A simple calculation of the co
needed to support 3D, additional resolution, more complete physics simulation sh
computer running at well over 100 trillion floating points operations per second
required.
In addition, this level of simulation capability will be required in the 2004 ti
"test-based" weapons analysts to validate that the simulations accurately reflec
The 2004 time frame is critical because that is when we will have lost half of t
craftsmen and women" who have earned that status by learning and understanding s
issues associated with nuclear weapons and then checking themselves with an exte
of underground tests. They are "masters" at using a tool set (which included un
testing) to certify weapons and assess safety and reliability issues. With the
testing, these "masters" are now required to continue to do their jobs of certif
assessment with a new tool set, in which a major component will be large scale,
simulations. It is critical that this group of designers and analysts validate
simulation tools allow them to continue to have confidence in the weapons even i
underground testing.
While the simulation capabilities provided by ASCI in the near-term will signifi
our ability to certify and assess weapons without testing, at least 100 TeraFLOP
before full system performance and safety simulation are possible. This level i
threshold needed for validation. The simulation capabilities in excess of 100
required before the simulation tools are robust enough to be meaningful, and the
must be available by 2004 so that the Department can make a smooth transition aw
designed to provide this level of simulation capabilities in the time frame requ
With the increased funding provided by the Congress in FY 1997, we are initiatin
least 3 additional aging codes focussed on critical weapon initiation sequences,
work with the computer industry to fund large scalable memory capability on Opti
TeraFLOPS) and Option Blue (3 TeraFLOPS) computers, and by increasing alliances
universities. The FY 1998 program growth of $53.2 million will be used to susta
momentum by executing activities in the current program plan, including critical
and safety code development activities and pushing the capabilities of computer
We also have seen some significant achievements in simulation in FY 1997. This
the delivery of the largest computer in the world to support Stockpile Stewardsh
December 4, 1996 the Intel Corporation broke the long standing 1 TeraFLOPS barri
the follow-on computers are intended to move the simulation capabilities to the
level by 2004. ASCI code development has also shown a great deal of promise. Ev
ASCI is only one and one half years old, the eleven code projects have made sign
moving the simulations from 2D to 3D and on to parallel computers. This has lea
understanding of the challenges involved with simulation of aging and re-manufac
The ASCI simulation capabilities will link the experimental data from the Aboveg
Experimental facilities (AGEX), archival nuclear test data, and improved scienti
understanding to provide high-confidence predictive simulation capabilities need
decisions about the enduring stockpile. ASCI and Core Computations and Modeling
another element of SSMP, the Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP), by providi
simulation capabilities needed to predict requirements for replacement of aged c
to ensure that those replacements do not introduce new problems into the stockpi
ASCI complements and accelerates the ongoing efforts of the Defense Programs cor
program for advances in physics, material sciences, and computational modeling.
computational advances will benefit other applications including: global climate
medical and drug design each improving the quality of life.
Core Computations and Modeling are the activities, principally at the three weap
that address current stockpile operational and maintenance requirements. We wil
effective and integrated planning to incorporate the new capabilities developed
into the central stockpile computing environment. As the Stockpile Stewardship
Stewardship Management Plan are implemented, we will develop a Defense Programs
Information Architecture to meet current and future needs. This architecture wi
with the DOE, DoD and other information systems.
Test Readiness
President Clinton established a set of Safeguards under which
U.S. adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
conditioned. These safeguards include maintenance of the basic
capability to resume nuclear testing activities should the United
States deem it necessary. To this end, the Department maintains
the necessary infrastructure of the Nevada Test Site and the
specialized facilities, equipment and skilled personnel required
for nuclear testing. The Department has requested $157 million
in FY 1998 to maintain test readiness. The safe execution of a
nuclear test requires a complex series of operations that
exercise several areas of expertise including: nuclear explosive
design and fabrication; diagnostic instrument design; emplacement
and calibration; radioactive material containment; timing and
firing, data recording, etc. Certification of the personnel and
equipment to accomplish these operations will be assured by a
number of ongoing and planned experimental activities utilizing
both the Nevada Test Site and weapon laboratory facilities. The
majority of these nuclear test-related operations, however, will
be exercised through the Department's subcritical experiments at
the NTS.
Subcritical experiments use high explosives to evaluate nuclear
weapon materials (such as plutonium) by studying their behavior
under extreme pressure conditions. The experiments are designed
so the nuclear material will remain subcritical. In other words,
there will be no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction created
and, thus, they are consistent with the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). These experiments will provide currently scarce
empirical data on the high pressure behavior of weapon materials,
realistic benchmark data on the dynamic, nonnuclear behavior of
components of today's stockpile, the effects of remanufacturing
techniques, the effects of aging materials, and other technical
issues. Improving our basic knowledge of the science of
plutonium through these experiments is an essential part of our
program of stockpile stewardship without nuclear testing. The
Department is planning to conduct two of these subcritical
experiments in FY 1997 and expects to conduct four experiments in
FY 1998.
In the interest of transparency and building public confidence,
the Department requested the JASONs to review the first two
planned subcritical experiments and the results of the
Department's internal evaluations of their potential for
criticality. The JASONs have completed their review and stated
that "these particular experiments will add valuable scientific
information to our data base relevant to the performance of our
nuclear weapons, and that there is no conceivable scenario in
which these experiments lead to criticality. Therefore these
experiments are consistent with the provisions of the CTBT signed
by President Clinton on September 24, 1996."
Technology Transfer
The technology transfer program is designed to advance a broad
range of critical weapons core competencies by leveraging the
vast resources of the private sector, to cost share the
development of the best, most efficient, and affordable
technologies needed to meet the objectives of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management program. The majority of the
activities are partnership called Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs) which have been selected on the
basis of their contribution to the advanced technology needs of
the weapons complex. These technology partnerships are
supportive of a number of Defense Programs Initiatives including
the ADaPT and ASCI.
In FY 1997 Congress provided an additional $10 million for
Technology Transfer activities with direction to increase efforts
in support of the American Textile Partnerships (AMTEX) and the
Advanced Computational Technology Initiative ( ACTI)
partnerships. We also plan to support AMTEX at $10 million and
ACTI at $5 million in FY 1997. We plan to support the
Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) program at
approximately $10 million through the use of prior year balances
and Weapons Support Agreements. The FY 1998 budget continues
these activities at the following levels: AMTEX--$5.5 million,
ACTI--$12 million and PNGV--$7.5 million.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET SUMMARY
The Defense Programs request for FY 1998 totals $5.1 billion, of
which $3.6 billion is for Weapons Activities operation and
maintenance account ($1.4 billion for stockpile stewardship, $1.8
billion for stockpile management and $303 million for Program
Direction). The Defense Programs is also requesting $1.5 billion
for the Defense Asset Acquisition account, including $1,034.2
million for the transition to full construction funding.
Overall, the Defense Programs request represents an increase of
$1.2 billion above the FY 1997 appropriation. The increase is
entirely for construction of new facilities and is primarily due
to the inclusion of full funding in the FY 1998 request. Without
the required budget authority to fully fund construction
projects, the FY 1998 funding level would be $4.0 billion, a 3.4
percent increase over the FY 1997 appropriation.
Beginning in FY 1998, Defense Programs will be funded from two
appropriation accounts: (1) Weapons Activities Operations and
Maintenance; and (2) the Defense Asset Acquisition. This change
is consistent with the Administration's creation of Defense Asset
Acquisition accounts across DOE to improve Department-wide
planning and decision making for asset acquisition. This new
account provides obligational authority for expenditures on all
current year construction projects, as well as providing "up
front" budget authority for new projects. This approach will
promote more effective project planning, budgeting, and
management by helping to ensure that all costs and benefits are
evaluated when decisions are being made about providing
resources. In FY 1998, the transition year, budget authority is
requested to complete all ongoing projects begun in prior years.
The transition to up front budget authority does not affect the
annual obligations profile or anticipated outlays.
120 DAY STUDY
Section 3140 of the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act
and Section 302 of the FY 1997 Energy and Water Development
Appropriation Act requires the Secretary of Energy to develop a
plan to reorganize the field activities and management of the
Defense Programs activities. DOE's report must identify all
significant functions performed at operations and area offices
and make recommendations as to where those functions should be
performed.
The Department contracted with the Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA) to take a fresh look at the management structure of Defense
Programs, to establish a baseline of functions and
responsibilities and where they are performed, and to develop
realignment options for DOE to consider in developing a
reorganization plan.
IDA has completed their study and is preparing their final
report. The Department is reviewing IDA's draft report and will
prepare a report to Congress which will recommend specific
organizational changes.
CONCLUSION
The United States faces a broad array of national security
challenges as we enter the 21st century. The Department of
Energy is committed to using all of its unique and valuable
people, plants and laboratories to address the many challenges
that will arise. We view stockpile stewardship and stockpile
management as a single, integrated program. The critical
capabilities and competencies of both the weapons laboratories
and production plants must be maintained in the national security
interest. The Department will work with the Congress to ensure
that a complete and integrated set of capabilities and
appropriate manufacturing capacity is maintained. Through a
strong Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program the DOE will
be a strong partner with the DoD in maintaining our country's
nuclear deterrent.
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