Testimony of Siegfried S. Hecker,
Director
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Hearing of the
Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
March 19, 1997
Testimony of Siegfried S. Hecker, Director
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee. Los Alamos takes its national security responsibilities very seriously, and we stand ready to work with this committee to ensure U.S. leadership through our efforts in the stewardship and management of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, in nonproliferation and nuclear materials disposition, and in dealing with the nuclear legacy of the last 50 years.
President Clinton clearly reaffirmed the critical role nuclear weapons play in deterring war in his statement of August 11, 1995 on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:
"As part of our national security strategy, the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile."
Congress has also made it clear, through its authorization and appropriation actions, that the nuclear stockpile is an essential element of the nation's defense structure. The support of both the Congress and the Administration does a great deal to inspire the scientists and engineers at Los Alamos National Laboratory. We know that what we are doing is important to the nation, and we understand that we must succeed.
Our job is to help the U.S. Government to ensure that no one in the world doubts that the United States has the capability to project overwhelming force in the defense of its vital interests. Let me explain more fully what I mean by this statement.
The phrase "to ensure that no one in the world doubts" means that we are required to demonstrate the credibility of the science and technology that support our nation's nuclear stockpile. When the United States was conducting underground nuclear tests, any one in the world with a seismometer could measure the power of our weapons. These tests, along with missile flights and other systems tests, confirmed not only the capability of our weapons but also the strength of our resolve to maintain them in a safe and reliable condition. Now, in the absence of nuclear testing, some might be tempted to think that our capabilities and our resolve have deteriorated to the point where we would be unwilling or unable to use the weapons in our nuclear stockpile. We must not allow them that temptation.
The credibility of our stewardship activities has direct bearing on our nation's ability "to project overwhelming force in the defense of our national interests." Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to inflict massive damage to a target-swiftly and surely. These criteria place them in a category fundamentally different from conventional weapons, or even chemical and biological weapons. Nuclear weapons are the "big stick" that defends our homeland and are the ultimate deterrent force against any potential aggressor.
During the past year the U.S. Government has taken several significant steps toward defining a post-Cold War national security strategy. These steps have, in turn, allowed the Department of Energy (DOE) to move forward with its plans for the future of the nuclear weapons program. While Los Alamos remains, by Presidential Directive, able to respond to new military requirements, the Department of Defense (DoD) has indicated that it has no requirements for nuclear weapons of new design at this time. The current national security strategy, the DOE's plans for the future weapons complex, and the progress in arms control and nonproliferation efforts are all in concert with the Laboratory's central mission: reducing the global nuclear danger.
As you know, in January of last year, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II was ratified by the U.S. Senate. Although not yet ratified by the Russian Duma, the United States and Russia are on a path to the reduction of strategic nuclear systems. Last September, the leaders of the five declared nuclear weapons states signed the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in New York. By its nature, the CTBT will restrict the acquisition and development of new sophisticated nuclear weapons by nuclear and nonnuclear-weapons states, alike.
The ratification of START II and the signing of the CTBT came on the heels of the United Nations' indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) last year. The NPT helps limit the spread of nuclear weapons and helps safeguard against the diversion of weapons-grade materials and nuclear technologies and capabilities to clandestine weapons programs. These agreements, taken together, have the potential to form the foundation for a more stable future. Nonetheless, we must recognize the fact that "the nuclear genie is out of the bottle." Despite global agreements and safeguards, a rogue nation can still all too easily acquire nuclear materials for unsophisticated but devastating nuclear weapons or produce other weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological). This nation must be prepared to defend against such possibilities.
There are three points that I would like to make today.
* The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan developed jointly by the Department of Energy and the weapons laboratories is allowing us to shift from a program that relied on new production and nuclear testing to a program supported by enhanced surveillance and diagnostics of existing weapons, large-scale numerical simulations, and laboratory experiments. We are developing a critically important source of tritium for future stockpile needs. Los Alamos also has an important limited production role-we have been designated as the nation's sole production capacity for plutonium pits, the fission triggers of all nuclear weapons.
* We have an important role in other aspects of reducing the global nuclear danger, those involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disposition of nuclear materials both at home and abroad, and the cleanup of 50 years of nuclear weapons production.
* It is essential that we remain a scientific laboratory of the first rank, participating in other civilian and defense science programs funded by DOE or other federal agencies (National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Defense (DoD), and forming partnerships with universities and industry so that we are allied with the best science and manufacturing technology in the world. We must continue to attract and retain first class scientists and engineers, build new facilities, and upgrade existing sites.
The Los Alamos National Laboratory has a particularly important role in our national defense strategy: We are responsible for more than 80 percent of the enduring nuclear stockpile. I believe that we will be able to ensure the safety and reliability of the Los Alamos weapons in the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing and without new-design production through science-based stewardship and management. As Director of the Laboratory, my role in the President's new annual certification process is to personally certify that the Los Alamos weapons in the stockpile are safe and reliable. I will be in a position to meet those certification responsibilities only if Congress and the Department of Energy provide the resources that I need to keep my Laboratory vigorous and vital.
SCIENCE-BASED STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
In the past we maintained the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile by a regular series of new designs validated by underground nuclear testing. If there was a problem with a specific weapon, we were confident that there were sufficient numbers of other weapon systems to assure the credibility of our deterrent force, and we knew that a replacement for that system was already in the works.
Today, we face a greater challenge for three reasons: First, we have a smaller number of weapons and fewer types of weapons systems. A significant problem in even one system could have serious implications for the nation's overall force structure. Second, we now require that our weapons remain in the stockpile well beyond their original design lifetimes. Weapons age, and it is more difficult to assess subtle changes than it was to design the weapon in the beginning. Third, we can no longer conduct nuclear tests. Not only are the effects of aging subtle and difficult to detect and evaluate, but the measures we take to mitigate age-related effects cannot be verified through an actual test of the weapon. The cessation of underground nuclear testing has compelled us to develop a new methodology to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of the weapons.
To address this challenge, the DOE and the three defense laboratories developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (the Green Book) as a road map for assuring the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear arsenal for decades to come. The plan includes an aggressive surveillance and diagnostic program for existing weapons so that we can detect, diagnose, and plan for the repair of any aging problems in the stockpile. It also incorporates several new scientific initiatives into the existing core program, supporting both the essential aspects of the traditional weapons program and the development of innovative new capabilities. The role of the DOE weapons laboratories and plants in this plan is to carry out the technical tasks of stockpile stewardship and management; keeping those weapons deemed critical for national security safe and reliable-without nuclear testing and without major new production. Los Alamos is committed to the plan and optimistic about its success.
The Laboratory's stockpile stewardship and management activities provide the technical basis for the majority of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile. We participate in surveillance and manufacturing activities and we perform the fundamental research, the development of physical models, the integration of computer-simulation codes, the experimental validation, and some of the systems engineering activities necessary for the certification of stockpile systems. In addition, the Laboratory sets technical specifications for surveillance and manufacturing operations and for maintenance activities conducted by the Department of Defense (DoD). Effective stewardship and management rely on three interconnected areas of activity, which, together, provide the basis for continued certification and reliability assurance:
* Surveillance -- standard and enhanced techniques that allow us to diagnose and predict age-related phenomena in stockpiled weapons;
* Assessment -- experimental and calculational methods that advance our understanding of how aging and manufacturing processes affect weapon safety and performance; and
* Response -- development of appropriate measures, based on expert assessments, which may include modifications to or remanufacture of warhead components or changes to operational procedures.
As the stockpile ages and as we move further from immediate test experience, we must develop new capabilities to enhance existing core stewardship capabilities. Our weapons scientists and engineers must be able to predict with confidence whether a change observed in an aging stockpile weapon will affect its reliability or safety. We must be able to certify safety and performance to meet the system's military requirements. We will gain confidence through improved computational capabilities for modeling and simulation, through investments in specific new experimental capabilities to benchmark and validate computational models, and through expanded knowledge of fundamental materials science.
The primary challenge of stockpile stewardship is to develop an understanding of both the functioning of all aspects of a nuclear weapon and the behavior of the materials involved as they age. As weapons age, critical materials and components may deteriorate, introducing asymmetries and inhomogeneities in the materials. Because of this broken symmetry, it is more difficult to assess the effects of these changes than it is to design a new weapon. Let me give just one example: The high explosive in nuclear weapons is a mixture of high-explosive molecules and a plastic binder that provides mechanical strength and allows the parts to be shaped. Over time, this plastic component degrades, much as the plastic on the dashboard of a car degrades when exposed to sunlight. The small cracks that may appear in the explosive could affect nuclear performance. The obvious solution is to simply replace the explosive on a regular basis. We can do extensive explosive tests with mockups of weapon primaries, but in the end, we are not able to directly verify the changes we make through an actual test of the weapon. In the past, we would perform a nuclear test but without underground testing our job is harder.
Since the inception of the nuclear weapons stockpile, we have carried out a regular program of stockpile surveillance wherein we have removed random, sample units and performed detailed inspections of their components and, in the past, conducted underground tests of the complete device. I will return to our achievements in surveillance after I describe a number of new capabilities that we are developing that will help us detect and understand subtle age-related anomalies and allow us to make necessary changes well before a significant safety or reliability problem develops.
Four Focus Areas for Enhanced Capabilities
Carrying out our mission without nuclear testing requires a different set of tools than those used in the past. Our priorities include improved capabilities in four major areas:
* High-Performance Computing,
* Hydrodynamic Experimentation,
* Materials Science Research, and
* High-Energy-Density Physics Experimentation.
High-Performance Computing
We rank high-performance computing as our top priority for a very simple reason: In the absence of nuclear testing, the only way to evaluate the overall safety and performance of a nuclear weapon is through calculations. The nuclear weapons program has had a leading role in large-scale computing since the very earliest digital computers in the 1950s. Over the years, we have developed sophisticated computer programs that have employed the latest technology to produce accurate models of nuclear weapons safety and performance.
It is important, however, not to overestimate the capabilities of these tools. Nuclear weapons are incredibly sophisticated systems that reach temperatures and pressures greater than those at the center of the sun. Because the physical phenomena that occur in a nuclear weapon are so complex, we can only approximate many of them. Approximations were adequate when we were making interpolations or minor extrapolations to previously tested designs and when we had nuclear tests to validate the results of our calculations. In the future, however, we will be required to evaluate much more subtle effects, and we will not have the freedom to design around problems that are revealed during stockpile surveillance.
We have done careful estimates of what will be required to evaluate anticipated aging effects. To obtain the necessary spatial resolution in the calculations and to include the needed improvements in descriptions of the physics in nuclear weapons, we require computing power approximately 100,000 times greater than what is currently available. This is not a case of getting the answer faster; it is a case of whether we get the answer at all. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) is the most important component of our transition away from underground testing and toward the implementation of Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship.
A major landmark for ASCI occurred in November when Los Alamos signed a contract with Silicon Graphics Inc./Cray Research Inc. for the ASCI Mountain Blue computer. This computer system, scheduled for delivery at the end 1998, will have a peak speed of 3 TFLOPS (3 X 1012 floating-point operations per second), and will deliver 1 TFLOPS sustained on a hydrodynamics code. The contract calls for early delivery of a 100 GFLOPS (100 X 109 floating-point operations per second) initial system, followed by a more powerful system in late 1997. Half of the initial system was delivered on December 22, 1996, well ahead of schedule. By Christmas Eve, one of the machines was already running a large hydrodynamics code. The remaining four machines were delivered in mid-February, bringing the initial system to its full complement of 256 processors.
To date, we have been successful in installing and running test codes for stockpile assessment. These include a complex hydrodynamics code, which ran a 1-million-cell test calculation for 9 hours during first week of operation, and a Monte-Carlo neutron-transport code, which was running a few days later. Among other codes up and running is a powerful transport code being used to analyze stockpile warhead hydrodynamic tests and establish requirements for the second beam of the Dual-Axis Radiographic HydroTest facility now under construction.
Hydrodynamic Experiments
No matter how powerful the computer, calculations alone are not sufficient. Even the biggest, fastest computers produce mistakes, simply because our knowledge of some of the underlying physical phenomena is limited. Experiments are essential, but no single experimental facility can address all of the complex phenomena associated with a nuclear explosion. Through a carefully chosen suite of advanced facilities, however, we can do the best possible job of verifying our understanding of weapons physics-short of actually conducting a nuclear test.
Most weapons designers believe that the most sensitive part of a nuclear weapon is the primary, the so-called "fission trigger" that contains the high explosives and plutonium pit. Seemingly trivial changes in the shape or the condition of the primary can make the difference between a safe and reliable weapon and a problem for performance or reliability. Even after many years of nuclear testing and laboratory experiments, our understanding of primaries and the physics that governs them is inadequate for us to predict the course of weapons aging with full confidence.
Part of the reason for our lack of a full understanding is the relatively recent development of technology that will permit us to see inside extremely dense objects and gather data within the very short time available for observation. In the past we used integrated experiments, including nuclear tests, to verify what were sometimes rather ad hoc models. Now, we need solid data to underpin our estimates, and we are just getting the machines and measuring equipment that will enable us to collect such data.
First among this new class of facilities is DARHT, the Dual-Axis Radiographic HydroTest facility. DARHT is, essentially, a gigantic x-ray machine that will enable us to peer into a mock primary while it is imploding. DARHT will provide higher resolution than any existing radiographic facility, and it will also be the first facility that gives us the ability to view these complex objects from two directions simultaneously.
Looking to the future, we are beginning to examine the requirements for the next generation hydrodynamics testing facility. We are working with our sister laboratories, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia, to define the Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHF), which will allow us to image mock primaries at several successive moments in time and from several angles. Like a CAT scan, the AHF will enable us to construct three-dimensional images of a primary throughout its operation.
One promising AHF technology, proton radiography, is being developed at Los Alamos. We have always used x-rays to image primary implosion experiments. But x-rays have difficulty penetrating the very dense phase of primary performance that is most important in assessing weapons performance. Also, x-rays are most sensitive to heavy metals and cannot distinguish between lighter materials. Protons can more readily distinguish between different materials, and, potentially, their use will represent a tremendous improvement in our capabilities. We have already done several proof-of-principle experiments of proton radiography at Los Alamos and at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. The results are uniformly encouraging.
Materials Science
Another area of experimental validation is materials science. If we expect weapons to remain in the stockpile indefinitely then it is imperative that we understand how they age. All materials age, sometimes in a graceful manner and sometimes with sudden consequences. An example of the former is the progressive degradation of plastics and electronic components over time. More dramatic examples can include fractures and other catastrophic phenomena. A central element of our stockpile stewardship program is developing the necessary understanding of materials aging that will enable us to make informed decisions about component changes.
We are upgrading the capabilities of LANSCE, the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, to probe materials aging at the atomic and molecular level. We are now able to look inside welds of weapons parts to evaluate residual stress patterns resulting from welding operations. We can probe deep within weapons components to see how they are evolving without the necessity of destroying them, a particular concern as the number of weapons in the stockpile is reduced. At LANSCE, we are developing new methods to radiograph weapons and weapons components with neutrons to reveal the conditions of internal parts that cannot be assessed with x-rays or any other method, enabling inspection of the condition of low-atomic-number materials deep inside a high-atomic-number material assembly. Current work focuses on improved resolution and speed. A blind, defect-finding test on a weapon mockup will provide the ultimate test of this new technique. And, we are using these techniques to study dynamic phenomena, including the processes deep inside detonating high explosives, gathering information that was never available from looking only at the outside of the burning explosives.
The behavior of the plutonium in the pit of a primary is a particularly challenging materials science problem. Small additions of other elements can radically alter plutonium's physical and mechanical properties. These properties are further changed as the material is compressed during implosion. Further, plutonium, like high explosives, ages. It is naturally radioactive, so that over time its nuclei decay into other atoms. Eventually the accumulation of these decay products will change the behavior of the plutonium in ways that could have serious effects on the performance of the weapon. We simply must understand the properties of plutonium better if we are to maintain our stockpile into the indefinite future.
In the laboratory, we can study the fundamental structural and mechanical properties of plutonium and its response to shock waves. To study high-pressure phenomena, we plan to conduct a series of subcritical experiments underground at the Nevada Test Site. I would like to emphasize the importance of proceeding with these treaty-consistent subcritical experiments as well as our laboratory program of research into the fundamental properties of plutonium. Without the full suite of plutonium experiments, our ability to understand the functioning of primaries will be severely compromised.
After many years of work and planning, we have recently begun to acquire plutonium data from experiments using a 40-mm gas gun, fully-contained within a glove box at our plutonium facility. An operational gas gun is an important adjunct to subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site. In these experiments, compressed air accelerates a projectile to high velocity. The projectile compresses the plutonium target at impact, and the materials properties can be measured. Since December, we have conducted two experiments using plutonium as a target material; both experiments were designed to examine dynamic material strength in compression. The gas gun is only one of a suite of experimental techniques that is beginning to pay dividends in the form of data on the material properties of plutonium.
High-Energy-Density Physics
We are also investing in facilities that will enable us to look more accurately at the high-energy-density phases of weapons performance. Some phenomena of interest are intrinsically related to the size and shape of the weapon and do not scale to small size, so we can investigate these only through computation. Nevertheless, laboratory facilities can study in detail some of the processes that govern weapons performance.
At Los Alamos we are constructing Atlas, which will be the largest pulsed-power machine in the world and the first able to study the large-scale (~1 cm3) hydrodynamics of ionized materials. Atlas will deliver intense current pulses of over 36,000,000 amperes to a target which will, under the influence of the strong magnetic field produced by this current, implode in a manner analogous to weapons implosions. Using Atlas, we will be able to probe a wide range of weapons phenomena. We will also gain unprecedented capabilities for fundamental science, including the study of dense matter for astrophysics and the behavior of materials in ultrahigh magnetic fields. Sandia is currently developing a radiation source at the PBFA-II facility that we are using for weapons physics experiments. Los Alamos is also participating in the development of the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. NIF will produce the highest temperatures and densities possible in the laboratory, albeit at very small scales. It will enable important experiments in radiation transport and hydrodynamics at higher temperatures than any other technique. Once thermonuclear ignition is achieved, NIF will enable the study of some of the processes that occur during the explosion of a nuclear weapon.
Stockpile Management
Together with stockpile stewardship, the Los Alamos stockpile management responsibility for nuclear weapons maintenance, core surveillance, and refurbishment is fundamental to the DOE's strategy for continued assurance of the safety and reliability of the enduring stockpile. The DOE initiated the downsizing of the weapons complex with reconfiguration of its nonnuclear production capacity. Based on its established capabilities and facilities, selected manufacturing tasks were assigned to Los Alamos including high-energy detonators and tritium loading of targets for neutron generator tubes. With the manufacturing tasks, Los Alamos also undertook responsibility for the stockpile evaluation and surveillance of a number of components including plutonium pits. Last year I reported on the successful integration of our R&D capabilities on both the manufacturing and the surveillance fronts. Let me present some highlights from these two major work areas. It will be clear that in spite of budgetary constraints we have made respectable strides toward reestablishing important manufacturing capabilities for the nation.
Manufacturing
We are significantly ahead of schedule in supplying tritium-loaded neutron generator tube-target discs to Sandia. After accepting the assignment for the manufacture of these devices from the now closed Pinnelas plant, we observed several anomalies in the behavior of the as-manufactured discs. By applying a broad range of our research capabilities to investigate the phenomenon, we were able to successfully design and develop an alternative process for loading the targets which produced no anomalous results. After demonstrating the process with deuterium, we made the required transition to tritium in March of last year and delivered the first tritiated-target development units to Sandia in May. The first generator assembled with a tritiated target from Los Alamos was fired in June and produced the required neutron output. This success is a clear demonstration of the synergy of research expertise and manufacturing technology needed for low-volume-high-reliability components.
The demands of war reserve (WR) manufacturing are numerous. To meet these, Los Alamos has established manufacturing management and weapons quality offices and has been successful in meeting Departmental expectations in recent quality surveys. Partnerships with plants, such as Allied Signal-Kansas City, which has extensive experience with production projects, is allowing us to effectively utilize their experience in important tasks such as vendor qualification, procurement, bonded storage and part tracking. Through this partnership we are together undertaking manufacture of detonators for the W76 and W78 warheads using teams from many organizations. Using this approach, we have already delivered DOE diamond-stamped (WR quality) detonator simulants to DoD for use in warhead mock-ups designated for flight tests.
Surveillance
The practice of returning selected weapons from the stockpile for thorough evaluation and surveillance is well established and is of increasing importance as the weapons grow older and may experience age related changes. With the closure of Rocky Flats Plant, Los Alamos undertook surveillance of plutonium pits and has introduced significant improvements in methodology and, especially, in data management and reporting. This past year we performed surveillance on 20 pits, eliminating the accumulated backlog. Detonator surveillance operations began at Los Alamos last year following completion and certification of our new test firing chamber and associated diagnostic equipment. We have now eliminated the backlog for surveillance detonators from the W80 (cruise missile) warhead and B61 gravity bomb.
Plutonium Pit Manufacturing
Several years ago, Los Alamos was given the assignment to rebuild pits for replacement of those lost to the stockpile through the surveillance program. This effort was focused on the near-term and the W88 (Trident II) and W87 (MX) warheads, which are in sufficiently short supply that they must be replaced if they are destroyed during surveillance. In December, DOE finalized its plans to extend that assignment to other weapon systems and established a capacity target of 50 pits per year, to be achieved by 2003. This assignment is a significant challenge. The pit rebuild program makes extensive use of technologies and processes employed at the old Rocky Flats Plant. For the broader mission we intend to introduce improved technology that improves efficiency and reduces environmental impact and worker exposure.
The nuclear facilities at Los Alamos figure prominently in our ability to perform these tasks. It is important that we invest in them now to assure their reliability in the future. Ongoing projects to renovate the Nuclear Materials Storage Facility and upgrade the aging Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building need continuing support. The Capability Maintenance and Improvement Project, to provide needed modernization of our principal Plutonium Facility and to reconfigure it and other support facilities for the pit manufacturing assignment, requires initial funding to begin in FY-1998 if we are to meet our schedules.
Along with pit manufacturing and surveillance, we must, of course, assure that our nuclear facilities are secure and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. We must maintain our efforts to stabilize existing inventories of nuclear materials for long-term storage to minimize the risk to workers and the environment. We must conduct research into the aging of materials and enhanced surveillance technologies in support of the stockpile stewardship program. We must develop and demonstrate the technologies needed to mediate the legacy of nuclear materials production and processing during the cold war to reduce risk and restore the environment. We must perform the tasks of development and demonstration for the technologies needed for disposition of excess nuclear materials both here and in Russia. And we must maintain and enhance our fundamental understanding of the chemistry, physics, and technologies associated with the actinides and the essential underpinning for all of our tasks. All of these activities are costly. We are committed to working with the DOE to increase the cost effectiveness of our operations and balance our programs to assure that we are addressing the most pressing requirements.
Tritium Supply
Tritium is a critical material for the nation's nuclear stockpile. It is important to the performance of the fission primary of all our nuclear weapons. However, because is decays to helium at about 5.5% per year, a continuous supply must be provided to maintain the stockpile. For the present and the immediate future, tritium recovered from dismantled weapons is providing that supply, but in the longer term a new supply of fresh tritium is needed. Establishment of a long-term and reliable supply of tritium for the stockpile is an important element of stockpile management and Los Alamos has made a major institutional commitment to lead one of the approaches of the DOE's dual track strategy for ensuring that supply.
Los Alamos is leading a team, consisting of the prime contractor, Burns & Roe, and the site operator, Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation, that will design, construct, commission, and operate an Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) plant. Over the past year, the APT project has achieved major milestones that provide increased confidence in the cost and schedule for APT plant construction and operation. The conceptual design report for the plant was completed on schedule and is under review, a prototype of the first stage of the plant accelerator was completed, and its operation at production levels has been demonstrated on schedule and budget. All areas of engineering development and demonstration, including tests of components and samples under prototypic conditions at the LANSCE accelerator and development of superconducting technology, are on schedule.
Last year, Congress appropriated $150M for the dual-track DOE tritium program ($50M above the President's request). The FY-1997 APT allocation has allowed us to keep all APT milestones on schedule for the Fall 1998 DOE decision between the APT plant and the commercial light water reactor. We remain committed to meeting this decision date. If selected as the principal tritium source, the APT plant is scheduled to begin production in 2007 which is consistent with DoD requirements for the stockpile defined in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. During the past year, Los Alamos made a strong institutional commitment to DOE to lead the APT project team over the next decade to ensure that the APT production facility will be designed, constructed, and commissioned as a reliable source of tritium for our stockpile with minimal environmental impact.
Results of Stockpile Stewardship
Modification of the B61 Gravity Bomb
In order to be able to retire the B53 bomb from the stockpile, the DoD requested that we modify a limited number of B61-7 bombs to produce a weapon that is both safer and more modern than the B53, the B61-11. In December, the B61-11 was accepted as a stockpile item by the B61-11 design review and acceptance group. With this acceptance, the DOE has successfully met its delivery of conversion kits and the production of the first B61-11s on time. Qualification testing is scheduled through FY-1997 to complete certification of the B61-11 to the full range of military requirements. This project succeeded in meeting an ongoing military requirement while simultaneously enhancing the safety of the stockpile.
Annual Certification of the Stockpile
The past year saw a seminal event in the process by which we will certify the safety and performance of the nuclear stockpile. For the first time, Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories, along with the Department of Defense, performed an across the board assessment of all of the weapons systems in the stockpile. Specific attention was given to whether any of the known problems affecting specific types of weapons would require the United States to conduct a nuclear test. After a comprehensive review of all of the weapons types in the stockpile, I certified to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense in September that the Los Alamos weapons in our nuclear arsenal were safe and reliable and that nuclear testing was not required at that time to resolve any of the known problems in our weapons.
Los Alamos' Approach to Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Our approach to stockpile stewardship supports the national goals of ensuring the highest standards of confidence and reliability in our stockpile without reliance on nuclear testing. Our approach is science-based to ensure that no fundamental detail of weapons science or engineering is overlooked. This approach will be complemented by nonnuclear experiments, inspection and surveillance of stockpile weapons, and state-of-the-art calculational codes to simulate and predict every aspect of weapon performance. We will, in partnership with the plants and our DoD customer, ensure that the necessary modern manufacturing infrastructure is in place to meet the future needs of the stockpile. The Laboratory has an important role in all three key areas of surveillance, assessment, and response. By integrating our research and development capabilities with surveillance and an expanded manufacturing capability, we are demonstrating that the close integration of these tasks strengthens the program and is leading to real benefits to the nation in terms of better product and reduced risk and cost.
However, we cannot do this job without people who are both skilled and authorized to do it. Limitations on the processing of Q-clearances are threatening to cripple our ability to meet our obligations to the nation. We have been working with DOE to solve this problem for the past several months but the matter is reaching a crisis level in our operating organizations and must be solved promptly.
My responsibility as Director of the Laboratory for certifying the health of the Los Alamos warheads in the stockpile can only be met through the comprehensive, integrated program of surveillance, assessment, and response I have outlined above. I appreciate the Congress's sustained support of that program so that issues that may arise in the future can be addressed in a timely way.
PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR MATERIAL DISPOSITION, AND CLEANUP
Proliferation
This Committee deserves great credit for its attention to proliferation issues. The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act clearly identifies the challenges confronting the United States from proliferation and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)). From huge quantities of nuclear weapons and materials remaining in Russia and neighboring states left in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, to nerve gas released by terrorists in the Tokyo subway, to the clandestine and pervasive nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs discovered in Iraq, the dangers of proliferation confront the United States on many fronts. Los Alamos is proud of its record in supporting past nonproliferation efforts and is applying its multidisciplinary scientific and engineering capabilities to help meet these new challenges. For example, we lead the highly successful Lab-to-Lab effort working jointly with Russian scientists and engineers to protect their weapons-usable nuclear materials; our innovative sensors and small satellites are helping to develop new national monitoring and detection capabilities; and we are developing new capabilities to counteract terrorism threats involving the potential use of nuclear, biological or chemical agents against our civilian population. In all these activities, we work closely with our principal DOE sponsor, other federal agencies including the Departments of Defense and State, and other national laboratories to ensure efficient delivery of the best products for the nation. I want to highlight three areas I believe are particularly vital and urgent in countering the dangers of proliferation and terrorism: controlling nuclear materials in Russia and states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), early detection and warning of weapon proliferation by rogue states, and countering terrorism involving chemical or biological agents used against civilians.
Russian and FSU Nuclear Materials
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the international community has faced the threat that rogue states or terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) from the huge stocks left over in Russia and other FSU states. The use of these materials, even in a crude device, would have devastating consequences. Since its inception in the latter part of 1994 the nuclear materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) program has improved control of nuclear materials at more than 44 facilities in Russia and the FSU containing tens of tons of materials directly usable to make nuclear weapons. Many of these facilities were formerly highly sensitive and super secret parts of the vast Soviet nuclear weapons enterprise, and represent some of the greatest concerns following the collapse of the Soviet Union regarding theft or diversion of nuclear materials that could be used directly in nuclear weapons. For example, the Obninsk nuclear research center outside Moscow contains tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, including thousands of silver-dollar-sized discs convenient for carrying out in a coat pocket. In only a few short months in 1995 modern portal monitors and surveillance equipment were installed around the facilities at Obninsk. Today Obninsk is a major training center for Russian specialists in MPC&A technology and methods which have been developed over the past 30 years at Los Alamos and other national laboratories. These technologies are the world's standard for controlling nuclear materials. In FY-1998 the President's budget proposes to increase funding for MPC&A from $112M to $137M. I strongly endorse this increase to meet one of the most compelling threats facing us today. At the same time we need to shore up the ability of Russia and its neighbors to control smuggling of nuclear materials, in the event of a successful theft or diversion. The need is for better detection equipment and training for customs agents and border guards, and better capabilities to search and seize illicit nuclear materials.
Detection and Early Warning Technologies
Rogue states and terrorists operate in secrecy using tactics of deception and denial to obtain weapons of mass destruction. For example, the Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs remained a mystery until after the Gulf War. We simply must have better and more timely information to respond to and eliminate these threats before we face them on a battlefield overseas or in a devastating surprise terrorist attack against our cities. Today we are working on new sensors that have the potential to detect a would-be proliferator's activities before an arsenal can be built. Recent trials of one class of these sensors at the Nevada Test Site showed detection sensitivities orders of magnitude better than have been achieved previously. These sensors are approaching a level of performance useful for operational ground-based or airborne applications. However, because rogue states intent on developing weapons of mass destruction will continue to cloak their activities in secrecy and concealment, the grand challenge is to develop a new generation of incredibly sensitive sensors for satellite monitoring. This problem is immensely challenging. At Los Alamos we are developing not only sensors but also the advanced data and information processing methods, miniaturized electronics, and satellite technologies that could enable a new class of satellite monitors for the future. Meanwhile, we are continuing to provide the nuclear explosion detection systems needed to monitor and verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban. For more than three decades, working jointly with our sister laboratory, Sandia, and with the Air Force, we have provided a unique satellite-based capability to detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and space. Today we are designing the next generation of these sensors for deployment on new satellites after the year 2000 that will be capable of detecting low-technology nuclear weapons of the type that a rogue state might build. Our small demonstration satellite, called FORTé (Fast On-orbit Recording of Transient Events), to be launched this summer, will demonstrate one of the key new technologies needed to verify the CTBT and detect tests of low-technology nuclear devices.
Chemical and Biological Terrorism
On March 20, 1995, a Japanese religious cult attacked the Tokyo subway with Sarin, a nerve gas. Miraculously only twelve people died while thousands were injured. The terrorists involved in the World Trade Center bombing had experimented with cyanide blood agents. Had these agents been used in conjunction with explosive devices such as the one actually used in the World Trade Center attack, a significant increase in fatalities among building occupants and emergency responders could have resulted. These incidents are wake up calls. We must be able to respond to these threats, to attempt to detect them before they happen, but in the event that they do, to respond rapidly to minimize the effect on civilian lives and property. I'd like to draw a parallel to the threat of nuclear terrorism, which was recognized in the late 1960's and '70's. Beginning at that time the Nuclear Emergency Search Team was established to respond to nuclear emergencies. At the heart of this capability are the nuclear weapons experts from the laboratories. They assess the threat and devise the appropriate counter measures to disarm or disable it. We now recognize that the United States needs a similar response capability for chemical or biological emergencies. The major difference is that nuclear materials are difficult to get and nuclear weapons are technically challenging to build while chemical and biological agents can be derived from widely used materials and converting them to a crude weapon is technically easier. At Los Alamos we are applying our chemistry and life sciences capabilities to the problem posed by chemical and biological agents. We are developing detectors that can be provided to first responders to rapidly identify chemical or biological agents. We are working on cold plasma jet technology to decontaminate wide areas nondestructively with no hazardous clean up. In the future we envision the possibility of stockpiling antidotes developed through genetic research that would cover the spectrum of the most virulent biological agents. The problem is challenging but the prospects for rapid progress are promising.
Nuclear Material Disposition
The United States faces enormous challenges in managing and safeguarding the very significant quantities of nuclear materials arising from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, as well as the nuclear materials still at former production sites. These challenges involve tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in a variety of forms at numerous locations. We should move expeditiously to convert these materials to highly protected, stable forms with adequate storage and safeguards including the international verification that the President has called for.
One of these locations is the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. Los Alamos has a long history of collaboration with the former Rocky Flats Plant and the legacy materials at Rocky Flats are similar to nuclear material inventories from our own operations that we are now stabilizing. Because we have the only operating plutonium processing plant in the nation with operations that are similar to former Rocky Flats capabilities, our experience and expertise are crucial to reducing the hazards that exist in the process lines that were abruptly terminated at Rocky Flats in June 1989. As Rocky Flats moves from planning to the actual stabilization of residue materials, we are helping them move toward site closure by providing technical guidance for material stabilization projects, developing and demonstrating stabilization equipment, and providing training for the Rocky Flats operational staff.
Where weapons component disassembly is concerned, Los Alamos has a lead role in providing technology options for conversion of surplus materials. The premier example is the advanced recovery and integrated extraction system (ARIES) that uses hydrogen to convert weapons pits into an unclassified plutonium product, which is then assayed and packaged for long-term storage-all with reduced personnel radiation exposure and minimal process waste. This technology provides the important first step in moving plutonium in pits to a form suitable as feed for final disposal. Because the new material form is not classified, it allows possible placement under international safeguards and verification. The DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition has initiated a two-year demonstration program at Los Alamos for a full-scale integrated ARIES pilot line.
Our Government is also concerned with the management and disposition of excess nuclear material in Russia. Much of the technology utilized in ARIES is applicable to Russian pit disassembly and conversion. The DOE and Los Alamos have begun discussions with the Russians that we hope will lead to collaborative R&D, the construction of a Russian prototype disassembly and conversion system, and finally to operation of a plant in Russia providing a stream of excess material into safeguarded and verifiable storage pending implementation of final disposition steps.
Another technology being supported by DOE for nuclear material disposition converts excess plutonium to a blend of plutonium and uranium mixed oxide (MOX) reactor fuel that could be burned in existing commercial power reactors. Fabrication of MOX pellets from weapons material has been demonstrated at Los Alamos, which has the only facility in the nation that can process uranium and plutonium simultaneously. Russia plans to dispose of her excess plutonium in a similar way, and is developing MOX technologies as well. This work, along with the disassembly and conversion efforts, contribute to the development of trust and cooperation with the Russians in ways that would enable future nuclear arms reduction and materials disposition initiatives.
Environmental Restoration
We are continuing to provide cost-effective environmental remediation and waste management to deal with the legacy of 50 years of weapons development and production. We cleaned up fifty-three contaminated sites and completed seventeen decommissioning projects at the Los Alamos site. We also worked with the New Mexico Environment Department, the Environmental Protection Agency, Sandia National Laboratories, and DOE to develop general guidelines for determining cleanup levels, to clarify regulatory and administrative requirements, and to provide a standardized format and level of detail for documents necessary to the environmental restoration process.
Productivity improvements in 1996 allowed our waste management program to complete more work, including the decommissioning of the controlled air incinerator and disposal of some nondefense waste, for the same level of funding. The Laboratory also developed an aggressive plan to eliminate legacy waste from its defense activities within ten years and will be ready to ship waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in 1998.
In addition, we have implemented an environmental stewardship approach, which focuses on minimizing the Laboratory's impact on the environment. There is an urgent need to integrate efforts in reducing the amount of waste produced and upgrading waste processing facilities. For stockpile stewardship and management to be successful, we must address critical production risks and vulnerabilities and ensure protection of the environment. Because Los Alamos has the potential for significant waste-generating operations, waste minimization and pollution prevention play a pivotal role in all our activities. As our waste management operations become more complex, we will focus on the challenge of preventing and eliminating waste, and manage less "end-of-pipe" waste.
The national laboratories have the technical expertise and engineering capability necessary to support developing and applying advanced technology to meet near- and long-term environmental challenges across the DOE complex. Los Alamos is a leader in transuranic waste characterization. We are working with DOE's Carlsbad Area Office to apply our expertise in development of mobile characterization technologies, which will reduce cost and eliminate the need for transuranic waste characterization facilities.
We are also applying our expertise to assist the Department in its remediation and waste management efforts at other sites. We have assisted in characterization of the waste in high-level nuclear waste storage tanks at Hanford, delivering the first comprehensive estimate of the chemical contents of these tanks. This effort has resulted in new safety assessments that allow more complete characterization and eventual retrieval of tank wastes. We continue to be involved in new safety assessments for projects involving the tanks.
Los Alamos is a key player in the Environmental Management Science Program. In the first round of competition, ten Los Alamos projects totaling $8 million over three years were selected. Los Alamos technology to replace dry-cleaning solvent with supercritical carbon dioxide recently received recognition from the readers of Popular Science, who gave the technology the Reader's Choice Award for the top achievement in science and technology for the past year.
KEEPING THE LABORATORY VITAL IN THE LONG TERM
We have redirected our traditional mission in nuclear weapons to meet the demands of science-based stockpile stewardship. However, to succeed we have recognized that we cannot be only a nuclear weapons laboratory. We must remain a top scientific institution in order to underpin our national security role.
The Laboratory's identity and international recognition rests upon its sustained performance in satisfying national needs in science and technology. Programs in science and technology, supported by other DOE offices such as the Office of Energy Research, as well as work for other federal agencies in the civilian and defense sectors such as the NIH or the DoD, help support necessary capabilities. Whether in basic research, the human genome or other bioscience programs, materials research and development, energy technologies, high-performance computing, space, missile defense, or the application of Laboratory-developed technologies to commercial uses, activities in the broader sphere of research and development serve important national needs while helping to maintain the vitality of the Laboratory.
Mission research is inherently interdisciplinary and often cuts across the traditional boundaries of academic science. Many significant discoveries have emerged from the creative tension that occurs at the interface between disciplines when differing modes of thought, differing experimental approaches, and differing theoretical constructs are brought together to attack a particular problem. Indeed, much of the power of science comes from open criticism and communication across disciplinary boundaries.
University Collaborations
At Los Alamos, being at the forefront of many areas of science and having close ties with universities is imperative for carrying out our government missions. Our association with the University of California not only assists us in recruiting the best science and engineering talent, it reminds us that science and excellence must be our highest priorities. Retaining a focus on science also provides us the flexibility to adjust or anticipate changing national mission requirements. Last year, over 50 percent of the Los Alamos' roughly 1400 peer-reviewed journal articles were co-authored by academic investigators. The Laboratory also supported over 1300 students (split evenly between undergraduate and graduate students) and over 350 postdoctoral research associates. We believe that our postdoctoral program is the finest in the DOE complex and supports the recruitment of new talent to the weapons program.
Some examples of current basic research at Los Alamos are:
* The search for neutrino mass including investigations of neutrino oscillations at our large proton linear accelerator.
* Developing a self-consistent 3-D model of the geodynamo-explaining the origin of the earth's magnetic field.
* Investigating novel mechanisms of superconductivity.
* Studying protein function and structure using synchrotron radiation.
* Understanding the behavior of plutonium and other actinides under environmental conditions.
All of these projects have university collaborators and benefit from those collaborations. And, all of these areas of research have benefited from the government's investment in defense research at Los Alamos. In turn, this type of research provides significant benefit back to the defense programs by strengthening and advancing the core competencies of the Laboratory. This mutual leverage of defense and civilian research-the multiprogram nature of our laboratory-is critical to our ability to continue to respond to changing priorities.
How do we ensure that the nation gets the best R&D for its investment? A key component of the University of California's annual assessment of the Laboratory involves an evaluation of the quality of our science and technology, the Laboratory's primary product. The key to this assessment is review by external peers. The information gained from independent and impartial review is of great benefit in helping us make decisions about appropriate new directions for the Laboratory.
It is imperative that we strengthen the fundamental research component of all of our mission-oriented research and involve university faculty to a greater extent. We believe that the fundamental areas of science required for stockpile stewardship will provide very fertile ground for university research just at a time when other federal mission-driven agencies are cutting back on fundamental research. The opportunities for advances in fundamental knowledge are especially great in the following areas:
* High-performance computing, modeling, simulation and information science.
* Materials and materials properties, especially those properties that affect long-term reliability, as well as the dynamic behavior of materials.
* New tools or diagnostic capabilities to explore physical regimes of weapons interest, such as neutrons and protons at Los Alamos, the pulsed-power machines at Los Alamos and Sandia, and the large lasers at Livermore.
Let me say a few words about the exciting developments in neutron science capabilities at Los Alamos. Neutrons have always had a special place at our laboratory. Starting in 1993, we began the transition to convert the Los Alamos Meson Physics (LAMPF) facility, with its focus on medium-energy physics, to the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) with a focus on neutron scattering. To accomplish this transition, we faced significant national challenges in both funding and facility support. Since that time, our researchers have demonstrated that neutrons can play a very important role in science-based stockpile stewardship, ranging from neutron scattering for materials aging studies, to neutron radiography and neutron resonance radiography, to inferring nuclear reactivity, and to helping refine our detailed models of the fission process itself. We have also demonstrated LANSCE's potential to provide reliable and cost-effective operation for the stockpile stewardship and management program, as well as for the national neutron user research community.
Both DOE Defense Programs and the Office of Energy Research/Office of Basic Energy Sciences recognize the potential contribution of LANSCE to both defense and civilian research and have agreed to sponsor a major improvement to the short-pulse spallation source at LANSCE that will increase its neutron output by over a factor of two and will add as many as seven new spectrometers for research in materials science, engineering, and structural biology. This project will be funded at the level of $44M over the next 5 years. At the conclusion of the project, LANSCE will have capability comparable to the world's best spallation source at the Rutherford Laboratories in the United Kingdom. We anticipate that the facility will be the flagship of U.S. neutron scattering activities and function as a magnet to draw world-class researchers from academia, industry and other national laboratories to Los Alamos.
Work for Other Federal Agencies
The Laboratory has been recognized by many federal agencies other than the DOE for its capabilities in science and technology. Work for these agencies, like work for DOE civilian programs, helps support those capabilities while serving other national needs. In the biosciences, our competencies attract funding from the NIH and the DoD. In space science, the competencies developed for our proliferation detection mission attract funding from NASA. Our modeling and simulation capabilities have attracted agencies as diverse as the Department of Transportation, for understanding of transportation systems and the Department of Health and Human Services for detection of Medicare fraud.
Perhaps nowhere is the synergy between the Laboratory's competencies and other national needs more apparent than in our work for the DoD over many years. Not only has the Laboratory provided outstanding research and development for the DoD, but DoD funding has significantly contributed to the infrastructure of the Laboratory. Numerous Laboratory-derived technologies are in development for the military services across several general technological areas.
As a single example, DoD is using computer codes more extensively for system development and assessment than it has in the recent past. This increase is largely driven by the need to reduce development times, minimize environmental impacts associated with testing, and enable confident decisions early in the development cycle. One prominent example is the extensive use of continuum codes to assess interceptor lethality in missile defense. Los Alamos developed a new code whose run-efficiency and robustness make it useful for conducting evaluations across a broad set of parameters. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has adopted the new code, SPHINX, as one of the two approved lethality codes within the missile defense program.
Working with Industry
At Los Alamos, we have strongly encouraged working with industry for almost a decade. Industry performs over 70% of all of the R&D in the United States and leads in many areas of research and technology important to us today. Industry has found partnerships with national laboratories attractive because the laboratories offer an opportunity to collaborate on long-term, multidisciplinary research and development, and because they operate unique research facilities. At Los Alamos, we have over 230 collaborative agreements with American industry and have found that these partnerships help us to stay sharp technically and provide leverage for the Federal research investment in our programs and institutions.
We have learned several important lessons about developing and sustaining public-private partnerships in the last several years. Our philosophy has evolved to one of "partnering in our enlightened self-interest". The key elements of this philosophy are:
* Partnerships should be selected on the basis of whether they support your core mission.
* Don't let money be the driver. Partnerships should enhance your mission and capabilities.
* Stretch the time and risk horizon of your industrial partners; don't simply extend industry's financial reach.
* Design partnerships to provide horizontal diffusion of technology and vertical impact to the industrial partner.
* Be prepared to learn a lot from your industrial partners.
* Accept the fact that, from time-to-time, you will lose some very good people to industry.
Direct program relevance of industrial interactions is much more likely today because the DOE defense laboratories will be responsible for the future stewardship of many of the production technologies required in the nuclear weapons program, as well as for the remanufacture of some key components. The nuclear weapons production complex of the future must become a model of agile manufacturing. We have a lot to learn from industry in this area and we are convinced that working with industry will enhance our ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile.
At the same time, we must continue to demonstrate that we can have a positive effect on industry. Otherwise, there is no incentive for industrial partners to participate and to share costs with us. To this end, we must continue to build better bridges to our industrial partners. We just launched the third year of our award-winning Industrial Research Institute Industrial Fellows Program, which allows our staff to join industry for one year to learn its culture and to build such bridges.
Another indication of the Laboratory's potential for the commercial sector is our record of R&D 100 awards (given annually for the 100 best technical innovations with commercial potential as judged by R&D Magazine). Last October, our researchers picked up two such awards at the ceremony in Philadelphia, for a total of 46 over the past nine years (more than any other institution or company in the world). The R&D 100 awards at Los Alamos have been the product of research spanning a great variety of programs, ranging from our internal Laboratory-Directed Research and Development to biotechnology to defense research. Clearly, the potential for working with industry is not restricted to our defense mission. In fact, in our energy programs we view partnering with industry as a key part of our R&D strategy. The key, however, as we look more aggressively for productive industrial connections within all of our programs, is that we keep our mission clearly in sight at all times.
The nation's R&D enterprise will be strongly networked in the future. Our laboratory must be an integral part of that network. As I have said many times over the past few years, to be the best in science, we have to work closely with universities; to be the best in technology, we have to work closely with industry. As we have learned the lessons I described above, we have strengthened this resolve.
MANAGING THE LABORATORY
In 1991 the Laboratory recognized that continued successful operation would require enormous changes both in the way we conducted our operations and in the way we interacted with DOE. At that time, our five-year goal was that the Laboratory would be not only the best scientific institution in the world but also the most productive. We launched our continuous quality improvement effort in 1992 and have progressed well, reengineering many processes and restructuring Laboratory organization. However, our operations and business practices have not yet reached the level of quality necessary to fulfill our five-year goal.
To accomplish our goal we need help from the Congress and the Department of Energy. The past 10 years have seen a serious erosion of trust between the contractors that have operated the Department's facilities and the Government. This loss of trust has undermined the effectiveness of the GOCO (government-owned, contractor-operated) management relationship. The University of California has managed the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories under this relationship dating back to the Manhattan Project. The GOCO concept was an innovative, effective mechanism by which the Government was able to enlist scientific and management services typically not available in the Government to conduct an important, inherently Governmental function-the development of nuclear weapons.
Today, our mission of stockpile stewardship and management is no less important and requires scientific talents of similar magnitude. Yet, for a variety of reasons the government has taken on more and more of the management itself. The February 1995 Galvin Task Force report pointed out this major problem, "the Department is driven both to honor the prescriptions of Congress and to overprescribe in order not to be at risk of failing to be super attentive to the Congress's intentions. The net effect is that thousands of people are engaged on the government payroll to oversee and prescribe tens of thousands of how-to functions. The laboratories must staff up or reallocate the resources of its people to be responsive to such myriads of directives; more and more of the science intended resources are having to be redirected to the phenomenon of accountability versus producing science and technology benefits."
Consequently, we, the laboratories, are not as cost-effective and productive as we might be, in spite of our own best efforts to emulate what U.S. industry has achieved through quality programs and reengineering. Together with the Department we must attempt to restore the trust inherent to the GOCO partnership and move back to the owner/operator relationship we once enjoyed, away from the policeman/operator relationship that has developed over the past decade.
One of the most promising changes that should be adopted more rapidly by the Department and supported by Congress is to use performance-based contracting to provide the necessary accountability and to build continuous improvement mechanisms into GOCO contracts. These contracts require the Department to establish its performance expectations and require the contractors to develop measures and mechanisms to track their progress toward achieving these expectations. Such contracts should allow us to manage our operations based on facts, not anecdotes. They should allow us to benchmark our performance against the best in the private sector.
The University of California pioneered a performance-based contract with the Department during the last renewal cycle. Both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories have made impressive progress in improving their business and operations performance over the past four years. To achieve our goal of world-class management of operations to go with world-class science and technology we now need the Department and the Congress to support continuous improvement through performance-based contracting within the spirit of a GOCO management structure. Together, we must demonstrate that we are good stewards of the public's trust and that we are as effective and efficient as we can be.
I do want to report some significant gains in scientific productivity of the Laboratory achieved by reducing our own overhead burden. Almost two years ago now, we took one of the most wrenching steps in our history by reducing the size of our work force by nearly 1000 people (mostly from support functions). This reduction was accomplished by reducing our University of California (UC) work force and contractor work force nearly equally. Further, one half of the UC reductions were achieved through voluntary incentive programs. Unfortunately, that still left us with a painful 200-person involuntary reduction of UC staff. However, reducing our support staff reduced the overhead rates on our scientific programs by more than $60 million per year. In FY-1996 and again this year, we are therefore able to deliver $60 million more science and technology for the budget that Congress has appropriated.
Health and Safety
Although the Laboratory's long-term record for safety is impressive, in the last two years we have experienced a series of serious accidents, seemingly unrelated but suggesting weakness in the systems and structures that provide a safe working environment. On December 20, 1994, an employee of our contractor security force was killed during a training exercise when live ammunition was accidentally loaded into a weapon. On November 22, 1995, an employee lost control of a forklift and was severely injured when it rolled over. He subsequently recovered. On January 17, 1996, a contractor laborer received a severe shock when he jackhammered into a 13.5-kilovolt power line during an excavation project. He remains in a coma. On July 11, 1996, a graduate student working on energized, high-voltage equipment received a severe shock. He has recovered. As a result of these accidents, we have been subjected to intense scrutiny by DOE and the University of California.
In addition to making specific changes in response to the lessons learned from each of these accidents, we continued to make fundamental improvements to our underlying safety systems and practices. We developed, prioritized, and are tracking a set of actions that include the following:
* an integrated safety management program;
* a more effective safety communication program;
* a visible and meaningful safety-performance consequences and rewards program; and
* clear, simple, and consistently implemented safety standards and work processes across the Laboratory.
We worked closely with the other weapons laboratories, DOE, and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to develop the integrated safety management approach-a good, common-sense approach to safe operations. Notable features of the approach include input and participation from all levels of the work force and strong emphasis on behavior-based safety management approaches. A UC fact-finding group visited the Laboratory after the January 1996 accident and made recommendations consistent with our four priority areas. We take these recommendations very seriously and are implementing them. We emphasized our nuclear facilities first and have made good progress. In fact, our plutonium facility is now recognized by many as one of the best-run facilities in the DOE complex.
After the July 1996 incident, all work at the Laboratory was suspended for a Safety Day discussion among employees at all levels about workplace hazards and mitigating procedures. Because it was self-imposed and not mandated from outside the Laboratory, the Safety Day was successful, with many employees suggesting that it become a regular event. The necessary procedures, including communication plans, to create a more effective safety culture at the Laboratory are now in place. Ours is a logical and effective plan, which we must carry out with the courage of our convictions.
In October 1996 the DOE Office of Environment, Safety, and Health audited our operations, reiterated many of the same issues that the University's fact-finding group had raised, and acknowledged that we were addressing the problems in a suitable fashion. Nevertheless, DOE found many aspects of an effective safety culture lacking at the Laboratory. We continue to set a high priority on safety; for example, we made safety our primary tactical goal for the immediate future. As director, I am ultimately responsible for safety at the Laboratory, and I take that responsibility seriously. However, as mentioned above, we believe that the Department must re-examine its relationship with the laboratories in promoting a safe workplace. We need more of a owner/operator relationship and less of a policeman/operator role in this area as well.
SUMMARY
We have begun the job of science-based stockpile stewardship-putting together the expertise and the experimental and theoretical apparatus to guarantee the safety and reliability of the stockpile for the indefinite future without nuclear testing. I believe that we will be successful with vigorous management of the stockpile through surveillance, assessment, and remanufacturing if necessary. We are also beginning to address the issues of control and disposition of nuclear materials here and abroad, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the efficient cleanup of 50 years of nuclear weapons development and production.
However, science-based stockpile stewardship is a journey, not a short-term effort. If our nuclear deterrent is to remain safe, secure, and reliable, we must have the sustained support of the Congress and the Department of Energy. This support must not only take the form of financial support, but also that of an effective contracting mechanism that allows us to be cost-effective and productive. I thank you for giving me the opportunity to address these issues and I look forward to working with the Committee to assure that the our nuclear deterrent forces meet the nation's needs now and in the future.
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