Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
It is a distinct pleasure to be here today to testify again on the posture of United States Strategic Command.
When I appeared before this Committee one year ago, I had set four principal goals: (1) keeping an effective and credible deterrent; (2) actively shaping a solid and stable foundation for implementation of arms control agreements; (3) ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and (4) taking care of our people. In each of these areas, the Command and the Nation are in good shape. Nonetheless, we cannot and will not rest on our laurels; challenges remain; and each of these areas will require sustained attention and investment over the long haul.
When the U.S. Strategic Command was
created in June 1992, its Commander in Chief was tasked "to
be a four-star advocate for strategic nuclear forces." In
that capacity, I appear before you now, but not to advocate additional
force structure or more weapons. Indeed, I look forward to a
continued stable drawdown of our nuclear forces in accordance
with treaty obligations. What I do advocate is a commitment to
sustain safe, reliable, and ready forces to support a credible
deterrent and an effective warfighting posture, as well as a stable
foundation for future arms control efforts consistent with national
security interests.
The world has become in many respects a much safer place than during the Cold War. Unfortunately, it is also still a dangerous place, fraught with uncertainty. The United States bears the responsibility of leadership in shaping a more secure world amid cascading revolutionary changes. Our national strategy of engagement requires unquestioned military strength, including credible security assurances which we extend to our allies. Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. America does not have the luxury of failure - our leadership directly hinges on others' expectation of our success and their confidence in the fidelity of our commitments.
Nuclear Weapons in the Post-Cold War World
The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy has been in the headlines lately. The issues are much more complex than the public debate suggests. What the Department of Defense concluded in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review remains true today: "as long as nuclear weapons remain a factor in international life, deterrence of attack on the United States and our allies must be our objective." The mission of United States Strategic Command - "to deter ... and, if deterrence fails, to employ forces" - is fundamentally the same as that of other combatant commands. This young, post-Cold War Command boasts no battle streamers. Instead, we boast flexible, survivable, and responsive strategic forces, with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, appropriate plans for their use if directed by the President, and an underpinning of positive command and control and world class communications and intelligence capabilities.
The end of the Cold War has enabled substantial reductions in our nuclear forces and associated infrastructure. Since the mid-1980s, the number of people involved in our strategic forces has diminished by approximately one-half, and the number of military bases supporting those forces has been reduced by approximately sixty percent. Over the same period, strategic offensive forces - bombers, missiles, and submarines - have been reduced by some 45 percent and - once START II reductions are completed - by almost 60 percent.
I do not quarrel with those who seek the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, provided necessary preconditions are met. Today, those preconditions do not exist, nor are they likely to exist any time soon. In the meantime, my responsibility is to preserve a stable and effective deterrent, which in turn rests on the credible ability to employ forces in a purposeful way as directed by the President. This deterrent, as General Shalikashvili once noted, is America's "ultimate insurance policy."
Management of our strategic relationship with Russia remains a singularly important national security objective. Russia is not an enemy. Nonetheless, Russia remains capable of destroying America's way of life. By most estimates, Russia retains some 20,000-25,000 nuclear weapons, and Russian political and military leaders repeatedly stress their reliance on nuclear weapons for their own security. We continue to hope that Russia will develop into a strong democracy as well as a constructive partner in international security affairs. At the same time, Russia's future is uncertain. Many in Russia remain unconvinced that cooperation with the West is in Russia's national interest.
China is another country with a substantial nuclear capability. Significant economic growth as well as a sizable defense modernization program suggest that our relationship with China - like that with Russia - is an important long-term variable on our security horizon. This Command looks forward to beginning a conversation with the Chinese on questions related to nuclear weapons, much as we have already established strong military-to-military contacts with our counterparts in the Russian military. We also need to pay close attention as the Chinese continue their transition into the 21st century.
While the end of the Cold War saw the end of decades of East-West confrontation, the restructuring of international relationships has enabled a number of regional powers to expand their ability to threaten their neighbors as well as U.S. and allied interests. In the future, deployed U.S. and allied forces will be more likely to face threats posed by biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, as some regional powers look to such weapons to leverage their relationships. Moreover, some who possess such weapons may actually be inclined to use them.
In this environment, the United States must be prepared to pose unacceptable risks to any potential adversary seeking to gain advantage from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons offer one means of doing that, although certainly not the only or necessarily even the preferred means. Nevertheless, in the words of NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 and still relevant here, "Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable."
Strategic Force Structure
In the long run, our strategic nuclear force structure will be largely driven by restrictions established in strategic arms control agreements. The shared determination of both the Congress and the Administration to maintain START I forces until the START II Treaty enters into force is important in signaling to Russia that START II is the essential foundation for an affordable and stable strategic relationship and the possibility of further reductions.
Today, the United States has no new strategic weapons systems in design. With appropriate investments to sustain them for the long haul, our existing strategic systems should last well into the first quarter of the next century. The next generation of strategic systems need not look anything like our current systems. At the same time, we must take care to ensure our industrial base has the technological and physical capabilities needed to sustain today's systems and develop follow-on systems.
As the United States draws down its strategic nuclear forces, the strategic Triad - consisting of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and strategic bombers - will continue to be important in ensuring a stable deterrent. Each of these weapons platforms contributes unique benefits to our overall deterrent posture. For the foreseeable future, we should preserve the contributions of each of these legs as much as possible.
Ballistic missile submarines will continue to carry the largest portion of our strategic forces, regardless whether we are subject to START I or START II ceilings. With approximately eight submarines at sea at any time, our SSBN force is the most survivable leg of the Triad, providing the United States with a powerful assured retaliatory capability against any adversary. Submarines on alert, at sea, are stabilizing; by contrast, submarines in port could offer an extremely lucrative and destabilizing target in a crisis. Thus, in any foreseeable arms control scenario, the United States must preserve a large enough SSBN force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets at sea to ensure a retaliatory force capable of dissuading any potential adversary in a crisis.
In this regard, the Congress' continued support for the D-5 missile backfit program remains essential under any circumstances. The C-4 missile is already beyond its design service life and will be sustainable only at substantial cost and considerable risk by the middle of the next decade. Backfit of these submarines to carry the D-5 missile is the most cost-effective means to ensure a reliable missile for the life of the submarine.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable, relatively low cost, prompt response capability with a high alert rate. They also contribute substantially to a stable deterrent by ensuring that any potential adversary take them into serious account if contemplating a disarming first strike against the United States. Without a capable ICBM force, the prospect of destroying the bulk of America's strategic infrastructure with a handful of weapons might be too tempting to a potential adversary in a crisis.
Once the START II Treaty takes effect, the ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBM will be retired and the three-warhead Minuteman III will be converted to a single warhead missile. This will also allow us to shift the W87 warhead - with its greater effectiveness and enhanced safety features - from the Peacekeeper to the Minuteman III. With continued support from the Congress for the Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP) and Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), the United States will have an affordable, effective and reliable ICBM for another quarter century.
Strategic bombers provide the greatest flexibility within the Triad. The B-52H force with cruise missiles provides a broad range of capabilities against both strategic and theater targets. We are confident this venerable aircraft will be around for many decades to come, with only modest investments in sustainment. We are also studying what will be necessary to extend the service life of our cruise missiles.
Next month, the B-2 will become operational. We look forward to incorporating this highly capable weapons system into our warplans. This will also allow the B-1 to be re-roled to assume only conventional missions. The B-2 will provide an unparalleled capability to penetrate enemy airspace and hold at risk a variety of strategic targets. The B-2 will also be equipped to carry the B61-11 nuclear bomb, giving us an effective capability against very difficult targets with less explosive force and better safety features than the B53 nuclear bomb which will be retired.
The programmed B-52 and B-2 forces continue to be adequate to accomplish our mission regardless whether we are subject to START I or START II force levels, provided that a minimum of 56 B-52s and 16 B-2s are maintained as Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA).
Providing the President with Options
Deterrence requires that the United States maintain the perceived capability to serve a political purpose with military effect, with a range of credible options that can be controlled in their use and tailored to meet the objective. Ultimately, the President alone decides on the use of nuclear weapons, and one must expect that - in any crisis - the President will seek the widest possible range of options and the clearest understanding of the political and military consequences of each.
In the post-Cold War period, this requires not simply a range of weapons, but also strong operational, planning, and intelligence capabilities and the command and control infrastructure to support employment of forces. We continue to improve our ability to meet those requirements by developing tools that increase our planning speed and flexibility; by leveraging our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and by working within the Department of Defense to ensure connectivity with political decision makers and regional warfighters. In a crisis, Strategic Command would likely find itself one of the critical nodes in a decision process requiring free-flowing information about threats, targets, forces, and the particular consequences of decision options. Information superiority - the essential element in "Joint Vision 2010" authored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - requires faster processing and distribution of critical information in support of both the National Command Authorities and combatant commanders.
Readiness and Exercises
America's strategic forces are well trained and ready to perform their missions. Our strategic exercise program has adapted and grown substantially since the Command's inception in 1992, incorporating all our service components and task force commanders. We have also benefited from the active cooperation and participation of senior leaders and staffs from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Space Command, NORAD, Transportation Command, and several theater commands, reflecting Strategic Command's global capabilities and responsibilities.
These exercises allow us to generate forces, evaluate procedures, test systems, validate plans, and stress all aspects of our strategic operations. In the process, we have discovered that the continuing sell-off of radio frequencies will adversely impact our ability to train and exercise the way we expect to fight. We have also expanded the scope of our exercises to encompass issues of information operations and force protection.
Exercises are essential for training personnel in the complex issues of nuclear operations. They offer decision makers valuable opportunities to grapple with the difficult issues involved with managing crises and ensuring continuity of command and control.
Such exercises are also important confidence-building measures in their own right, a point affirmed to us by Russian military officers. They demonstrate both to ourselves and to others that our forces are effective, our procedures correct, our skills well honed, and our professionalism impeccable. In the nuclear business in particular, we can expect nothing less.
A stable strategic relationship with Russia continues to be a critical variable in our national security. Amid the debates in Russia about fundamental security questions, we have had good success in strengthening our relationship with the Russian military. Following an exchange of visits to Russia and the United States by American and Russian missileers, Strategic Command also hosted officers of the Russian General Staff in what we hope is only the first in a series of seminar discussions on strategic stability.
In November, I also had the honor of accompanying then Defense Secretary Perry to Moscow to meet with Defense Minister Rodionov and General Sergeyev, Commander in Chief of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. We found a recognition - at least within the Ministry of Defense and on the part of the military leadership of Russia's strategic forces - that ratification of START II makes political, economic, and military sense for Russia. As we stressed the benefits of START II, we also reaffirmed an American willingness to consider further reductions once START II enters into force.
In implementing the START I Treaty, which entered into force in December 1994, the United States and Russia have moved well down the road toward the accountable limit of 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Since the Treaty was signed in 1991, through the end of 1996, the United States and Russia had destroyed over 750 missile silos, 32 ballistic missile submarines, and almost 300 heavy bombers, achieving over 50 percent of the required warhead reductions under START I. As of last December, all three of the non-Russian nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union - Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine - were free of nuclear weapons. This significant achievement is but one testament to the tremendous success that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program has had in facilitating greater reduction of nuclear forces and control of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union.
By limiting the United States and Russia to 3,000-3,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and eliminating multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, the START II Treaty remains the essential gateway to further reductions in nuclear weapons. We hope that the Duma will ratify that Treaty in the near future. Strategic Command can support efforts to consider prudent reductions beyond START II to lower levels of strategic forces, as well as broadening the arms control agenda to encompass non-strategic nuclear forces and nuclear weapons stockpiles. We should, however, avoid unilateral reductions in our forces, lest Russia conclude that they no longer need to engage in meaningful and verifiable arms control efforts with us.
As we move beyond START II and contemplate a START III or successive agreements, we must remember that reductions in nuclear weapons are not ends in themselves, but means to improve our mutual security and to enhance the stability of our strategic relationship. Most of the public debate about arms control and nuclear weapons focuses on the numbers of warheads which a treaty should allow. Increasingly, however, reductions beyond START II will invoke questions about how remaining forces are structured and postured in peacetime and about how they might be employed in war. While the United States draws down its nuclear forces, therefore, the pace and form of those drawdowns - and the character of the remaining forces - will become more important than the numbers themselves which dominate the headlines. A stable force at lower levels is not likely to generate fiscal savings proportional to the reductions in weapons which might be reflected in treaty ceilings. Ultimately, deterrence is a package of capabilities, encompassing not just numbers of weapons, but an assured retaliatory capability provided by a diversified, dispersed, and survivable force with positive command and control and effective intelligence and warning systems.
Signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has brought additional challenges to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe and reliable. In announcing a "zero yield" test ban, the President has declared that the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile is a supreme national interest. In that context, I am also charged with reporting on my confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile as part of a new annual certification procedure directed by the President.
To meet that responsibility, I convened last year a special team of my Strategic Advisory Group to conduct - together with representatives from the Department of Energy, the Nation's nuclear weapons laboratories, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and the Services - an unprecedented examination of each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile. We will continue to refine this process to ensure we can make an accurate and effective appraisal of the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.
In conducting that assessment, we found no issues which required nuclear testing. The stockpile is safe. Preparations for next year's assessment efforts are already underway.
Our confidence in the success of
science-based stockpile stewardship will continue to depend on
how well these programs are funded and how successful we are in
the years ahead in developing the complex technological tools
and maintaining the necessary expertise in our people. It is
crucial that the Nation fully support these efforts.
The United States is clearly poised for a major debate about the size and character of its armed forces, including the role which nuclear weapons should play as we enter the next millennium. This debate is important in a free society, and it will be waged with great passion.
As we engage in this debate, it is imperative that we not forget the people on whom we depend for our security. They deploy or stand alert in remote places. They make sacrifices which we do not ask of others in our society. We require from them - especially in the nuclear business - a "zero defects" record of excellence, a degree of precision unsurpassed by any other profession. Our people - military and civilian; active duty, guard, or reserve - are America's strength. We must, above all, keep faith with them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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