THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
TESTIMONY OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE,
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you said, you
have my full statement. We noticed a couple of typographical
errors overnight, and we have a final version of it, which I
will submit. Let me summarize what it says.
Nuclear deterrence has been the subject of much debate over
the decades, and that debate has been resumed and sharpened
after the end of the Cold War. Most recently, the question has
been given special prominence by the respected individuals and
committees who advocate a radical change, setting as a policy
goal the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. And I cannot
begin without acknowledging that General Goodpaster and General
Butler are very distinguished military officers, and their
views are always entitled to great respect, although in this
case I disagree at least with an important element of what they
are saying.
These calls for reexamination of our nuclear deterrent
policy underscore the continuing American and world interest in
a deliberate process to further reduce and ultimately eliminate
nuclear weapons. The United States has embraced this commitment
for many years, and it is formally reflected in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty signed in 1968, Article VI of which
calls on the parties to undertake to ``pursue negotiations in
good faith relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
complete and general disarmament under strict and effective
international control.''
President Clinton in his speech to the United Nations this
past September said he looks forward to a new century in which
the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be further reduced
and ultimately eliminated. The United States has made
remarkable progress in fulfilling our NPT Article VI
commitment. Indeed, in an important sense, the nuclear arms
race in the sense we understood it during the Cold War has been
halted. The United States and indeed Russia have been reducing
nuclear stockpiles, both by unilateral and bilateral
initiatives.
Over the past 4 years, the Clinton administration has
worked hard on this process. We have secured the detargeting of
U.S. and Russian strategic missiles, the entry into force of
the START I Treaty, the complete denuclearization of Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakstan, the indefinite extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, United States ratification of the
START II Treaty, and work with the Russian government to
promote Duma ratification of that treaty, and successful
negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
We have also made clear that once START II enters into
force, we are prepared to work on further reductions in
strategic nuclear arms as well as on limiting and monitoring
nuclear warheads and materials. Those are important
accomplishments and there is much more to do, but we are not by
any means yet at the point where we can eliminate our nuclear
weapons. For the foreseeable future, we will continue to need a
reliable and flexible nuclear deterrent, survivable against the
most aggressive attack, under highly confident constitutional
command and control, and assured in its safety against both
accident and unauthorized use.
We need such a force because nuclear deterrence, far from
being made wholly obsolete, remains an essential ultimate
assurance against the gravest of threats. A key conclusion of
the administration's national security strategy released just a
year ago is that ``The United States will retain a triad of
strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile
foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from
acting against our vital interests and to convince it that
seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore, we will
continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and
capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by
such political and military leaders.''
To summarize the argument I will develop in more detail in
my statement, we have already made dramatic steps in reducing
U.S., Russian and indeed other nuclear arsenals and potentials.
We have also taken important steps to ensure the safety,
security, and non-diversion of remaining nuclear weapons.
Second, we can and should do more on both the reduction and
the safety and security fronts. Third, nonetheless, nuclear
weapons remain essential to deter against the gravest threats,
actual and foreseeable. Fourth, abolition of nuclear weapons,
if understood as a near-term goal rather than, as President
Clinton has stated, an ultimate aspiration, is not a wise and
surely not a feasible focus for current policy efforts. And
finally, assuring the reliability of our nuclear forces and the
nuclear stockpile, therefore, remains a high national security
priority.
In my statement, I summarize briefly the Cold War
experience with nuclear weapons. Some argued even during the
Cold War that the danger of nuclear holocaust, which is
unimaginable in its scope, was so great that the risk of
possessing these weapons far outweighed their benefits. I do
not agree, and I do not think the historical record supports
that position.
Nuclear deterrence helped us buy time, time for internal
forces of upheaval and decay to rend the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact and bring about the end of the Cold War. But the
Cold War is over, and it is important to recognize the degree
to which our nuclear deterrent and indeed that of Russia has
been transformed even during the relatively short period of
time since the wall came down. The role of nuclear weapons in
our defense posture has diminished dramatically. We in the
Department of Defense welcome this trend and expect it will
continue in the future. In the sincerest of currency, U.S.
spending on strategic forces, the emphasis has declined
dramatically. In the mid-1960's, we were spending about a
quarter of our defense budget on strategic nuclear forces. We
now spend something like 3 percent.
We have no major procurement programs for next generation
systems. We do have programs designed to sustain the
effectiveness, safety and reliability of the remaining forces,
and to ensure the continued high quality of the people who man
them.
Russian spending on strategic forces has also declined
substantially. The Russian Federation does have some strategic
systems under development, for example, a new single warhead
ICBM, the SS-X-27, and a new strategic ballistic missile
submarine, but these programs are far fewer in number, and
their development and deployment pace far slower than during
the Cold War period.
Stabilizing agreed reductions in nuclear forces have been
and continue to be a primary objective of the United States.
The United States and Russia have taken great strides in this
regard in recent years. START I will reduce each side's
deployed strategic weapons from well over 10,000 to 6,000
accountable weapons. Russia, like the U.S., is actually
somewhat ahead of schedule in meeting the START I reduction
requirements. START II, when it is ratified by the Russian Duma
and enters into force, will further reduce to 3,000 to 3,500
each side's weapons. Following START II's entry into force, we
are prepared to engage in negotiations further reducing
strategic nuclear forces.
Meanwhile, the United States has unilaterally reduced its
non-strategic nuclear weapons to one-tenth--I say again one-
tenth--of Cold War levels. Russia pledged in 1991 to make
significant unilateral cuts itself in its non-strategic forces,
and it has reduced its operational non-strategic force
substantially. It has made far less progress on this score than
the United States, and the Russian non-strategic arsenal
deployed and stockpiled is probably about 10 times as large as
ours.
In addition to START reductions, there have been
qualitative changes in our nuclear arsenal. There used to be
nuclear land-mines, nuclear artillery, nuclear infantry
weapons, tactical nuclear surface-to-surface weapons, nuclear
surface-to-air weapons, nuclear air-to-air weapons, nuclear
depth-charges, and nuclear torpedoes. All these have gone. In
1991 and 1992, the United States unilaterally stopped several
nuclear weapons programs like Lance and SRAM-A. We halted a
number of planned or ongoing development programs, which had
been the focus of passionate controversy during the 1980's,
like the Small ICBM, the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and the
Lance Follow-On Theater Missile. We took nuclear bombers off
strip alert and removed from alert as well, well ahead of the
required schedule, those ICBMs and strategic missile submarines
planned for elimination under START II. We made dramatic cuts
in our tactical nuclear forces. In 1994, further reflecting the
changed international situation, the United States and Russia
agreed to no longer target their ballistic missiles against
each other on a day-to-day basis.
In parallel with this, we have been pressing the
proliferation question. Clearly, there are serious problems,
but the picture is not all bleak. No nation has openly joined
the nuclear club since China in 1964. There are only three
unacknowledged nuclear powers. South Africa abandoned its
nuclear capability, as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan did
theirs. Argentina and Brazil have renounced the option, as
Sweden and Canada did long ago. North Korea's program is
effectively frozen. Iraq is under a special and highly
intrusive United Nations inspection regime. The vast majority
of the countries in the world support a permanent nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, which is mostly a benefit which the
non-nuclear countries confer upon each other in the world and
not a favor they do for the nuclear powers. And we have
negotiated an end to nuclear testing.
With all this, the question, however, is rightly asked:
Granted all these reductions with the end of the Cold War, why
do we need to continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent at all?
In September 1994, the Clinton administration answered this
question in its Nuclear Posture Review, the first comprehensive
post-Cold War review of nuclear policy. The NPR recognized that
with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and other dramatic
changes, the strategic environment had been transformed.
Conventional forces, therefore, could and should and would
assume a far larger share of the deterrent role. The
administration concluded nonetheless that nuclear weapons
continue to play a critical role in deterring aggression
against the United States, its overseas forces, its allies and
friends.
That conclusion is entirely consistent with NATO's
Strategic Concept, adopted in 1991 after the end of the Cold
War, which states that ``The fundamental purpose of NATO's
nuclear force is to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any
kind of war and that nuclear weapons make a unique contribution
in rendering the risks of aggression incalculable and
unacceptable.''
Why did we and why did NATO reach these conclusions? Most
importantly, because the positive changes in the international
environment are far from irreversible, and we can foresee new
dangers. There are broadly two classes of threat against which
nuclear weapons remain important as a deterrent. First, Russia.
Russia has made great progress, and we do not regard it as a
potential military threat under its present or indeed any
reasonably foreseeable government. The United States wisely
invests substantially in the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, in future arms control, and in political efforts to
maintain good relations. We share with the current Russian
leadership and indeed with most of their opponents a
determination not to let our relations ever return to the state
of hostility in which the weapons each country possesses would
be a threat to the other.
All that said, Russia continues to possess substantial
strategic nuclear forces and an even larger stockpile of
tactical nuclear weapons. And because of deterioration in its
conventional military capabilities, Russian spokesmen have
indicated that they may place even more reliance on nuclear
forces on the future. We cannot be so certain of future Russian
politics and policies as to ignore the possibility that we
would again need to deter this Russian nuclear force.
Accordingly, with respect to Russia, our nuclear policy is
what Secretary Perry called ``lead and hedge,'' leading toward
further reductions and increased weapons safety and improved
relations and hedging against the possibility of reversal of
reform in Russia. We do not believe that reversal is likely,
but we are working to manage the risk. Nonetheless, we feel it
is prudent to provide a hedge against its happening.
Second, even if we could ignore the Russian nuclear arsenal
entirely, there are unfortunately a range of other potential
threats to which nuclear weapons are needed as a deterrent. One
cannot survey the list of rogue states with potential WMD
programs and conclude otherwise. Indeed, the knowledge that the
United States has a powerful and ready nuclear capability is, I
believe, a significant deterrent to proliferators who even
contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction. That this
is so, I think, will be clear if one thinks about the
proliferation incentives that would be presented to the
Kaddafis and Kim-Chong-Ils of the world if the United States
did not have a reliable and flexible nuclear capability.
Of course, nuclear weapons are only a part of the broad
range of capabilities by which we seek to prevent, deter and if
necessary defend against threats from weapons of mass
destruction. Passive defenses, improved intelligence,
diplomatic efforts, active air, cruise missile and ballistic
missile defense, and powerful and precise conventional
capabilities, each have key roles to play, but nuclear weapons
also play a part.
In view of this, it is our conclusion that it would be
irresponsible to dismantle the well-established and much-
reduced system of nuclear deterrence before new and reliable
systems or substitute systems for preserving stability are in
place.
What about the argument that our weapons promote
proliferation? The more compelling case seems to me that
proliferant states acquire nuclear weapons not because we have
them but for reasons of their own: to counter regional
adversaries, to further regional ambitions, and to enhance
their status among their neighbors and in the world. And
insofar as our nuclear capability is an issue, if a successful
proliferator knew he would not face the nuclear potential of
the United States, that would scarcely reduce incentives to
acquire a WMD capability. The incentives to proliferate would
increase dramatically if a rogue state would through a
successful nuclear weapons program acquire a nuclear monopoly
and not just a token capability facing far stronger forces
possessed by the United States and other world powers.
Some people claim that once proliferation does occur, U.S.
nuclear forces lack any utility in deterring rogue leaders from
using those weapons because those leaders would not regard the
costs even of nuclear retaliation as sufficiently great. Of
course, their calculations of risk and rewards undoubtedly
differ from our own, and we must take that into account. But
experience suggests that few dictators are, in fact,
indifferent to the preservation of key instruments of their
State control or to the survival of their own regimes or indeed
their own persons and associates. Thus, I believe the reverse
is true. Our nuclear capabilities are more likely to give pause
to potential rogue proliferants than to encourage them.
Another important role of U.S. nuclear capability in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should not go
unnoticed. The extension of a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent
to allies and friends has been an important nonproliferation
tool. It has removed incentives for key allies in a still
dangerous world to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces,
as many are quite capable of doing from a technical point of
view. Indeed, our strong security relationships have probably
played as great a role in nonproliferation over the past 40
years as the NPT or any other single factor.
Let me address the argument that nuclear weapons should be
eliminated because they are dangerous and unsafe. Of course,
nuclear weapons are dangerous. Quite apart from their potential
to cause incalculable destruction if they are used, they
contain high explosives and fissile material. But they are not
unsafe in the sense that they are susceptible to accidental
detonation or unauthorized use. Our nuclear weapons meet the
highest standards of safety, security, and responsible
custodianship. Moreover, we place high priority on maintaining
and improving stockpile safety as well as reliability. Our
nuclear safety record is extraordinary. Although a few
accidents involving nuclear weapons have occurred, no such
accident has ever resulted in a nuclear detonation or a nuclear
yield, and the last accident of any kind was almost 20 years
ago.
We believe the likelihood of accidents has been
dramatically reduced since the end of the Cold War, and I
detail the statements which we have made to that end in the
statement. In addition, nuclear weapons security in Russia has
been a key element of the Department of Defense's Cooperative
Threat Reduction program with Russia, better known as the Nunn-
Lugar program, from the beginning. It is clear that Russian's
military and civilian leaders themselves, and for their own
reasons, place a high priority on preserving effective control
over their nuclear arsenal. It is every bit in our interest
that they should do so. $100 million in CTR assistance has been
made available for projects to enhance security of nuclear
weapons under Ministry of Defense control in Russia.
On balance, the safety risks of maintaining a smaller
nuclear arsenal are far outweighed by the security and non-
proliferation benefits that we continue to derive from nuclear
deterrence.
With respect to the general argument for abolition, I would
summarize the case for retaining nuclear weapons for the
foreseeable future as follows. First, whatever would be
desirable, there is, in fact, no reasonable prospect that all
the declared and de facto nuclear powers will agree in the near
term to give up all their nuclear weapons. But as long as one
such State refuses to do so, it will be necessary for us to
retain a nuclear force of our own.
Second, if the nuclear powers were somehow to agree to
accept abolition, that acceptance would require Congress, the
public--the U.S. Government would rightly demand--a
verification regime of extraordinary rigor and intrusiveness.
This would have to go far beyond any currently in existence or
even under contemplation, and it would have to include not
merely a system of verification, but what the International
Generals Statement calls, ``an agreed procedure for forcible
international intervention and interruption of covert efforts
in a certain and timely fashion.''
The difficulties with setting up such a system under
current world conditions are obvious. Such a regime would have
to continue to be effective in the midst of prolonged and grave
crisis between potentially nuclear-capable powers even during a
war between such powers, for in such a crisis, in an abolition
regime, the first question for all involved would be that of
whether or when to start a clandestine nuclear program so as to
avoid another beating them to the goal, for the knowledge of
how to build nuclear weapons cannot be abolished.
Finally, we who are charged with responsibility for
national security and national defense, both in the executive
branch and in Congress, must recall that we are not only
seeking to avert a nuclear war. We are seeking to avert major
conventional war as well. As I indicated earlier, during the
Cold War, nuclear weapons played a stabilizing role in that
they made the resort to military force less likely. The world
is still heavily armed with advanced conventional weapons and
will increasingly be so armed with weapons of mass destruction.
The existence of nuclear weapons continues to serve as a damper
on resort to the use of force.
Because nuclear deterrence is to remain a part of our
national security policy for the foreseeable future, the United
States nuclear deterrent has to remain credible. Weapon systems
must be effective and their warheads safe and reliable.
Quality, reliability and effectiveness of the forces
themselves, including the communication and command systems
which are essential to their functioning, and the people who
operate them, are among our top priorities in the Department of
Defense. With respect to the nuclear devices themselves, DOE,
which has the responsibility, has an aggressive, well-funded
program designed to ensure that our weapons remain safe and
reliable in the absence of nuclear testing.
The Department of Defense fully supports this program. We
also strongly support the principle that if for some reason the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy could not
certify the reliability of a critical element of our deterrent
without nuclear testing, the United States would have to give
the most serious consideration to exercising its right under
the Test Ban Treaty to withdraw from the treaty under the
supreme national interest clause for the purpose of conducting
necessary tests. We regard that possibility as very remote
given a properly supported and executed stewardship program.
In short, today and for the future, assuming that program
is carried out, we have high confidence in the safety and
reliability of our nuclear deterrent force. The Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program is designed to provide the
tools to assure this in the future.
Our objective is a safe, stable world. We must develop our
national security policy with the understanding that nuclear
weapons and the underlying technical knowledge cannot be
disinvented. In this connection, the United States will
continue to lead the way to a safer world through deep
reductions in nuclear forces undertaken in START and through
the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and other actions. At
the same time, we will maintain a smaller nuclear force as a
hedge against a future that is uncertain and in a world which
substantial nuclear arsenals remain.
Successive U.S. administrations have embraced the objective
of nuclear disarmament as our ultimate goal. What is clear is
that this ultimate goal can be reached, if at all, only through
realistic moves forward as genuine security permits, with each
step building on those before it. We will continue to strive to
make the world a safer place for our children and grandchildren
and successor generations. In this regard, we are committed to
the ultimate objective of elimination of nuclear weapons in the
context of complete and general disarmament. Until these
conditions are realized, however, I believe that nuclear
weapons will continue to fulfil an essential role in meeting
our deterrence requirements and assuring our non-proliferation
objectives. I thank you for the Subcommittee's attention.
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