THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
JOINT STATEMENT ON REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENALS: DECLINING
UTILITY, CONTINUING RISKS
By Generals Andrew J. Goodpaster and Lee Butler
As senior military officers, we have given close attention over
many years to the role of nuclear weapons as well as the risks they
involve. With the end of the Cold War, these weapons are of sharply
reduced utility, and there is much now to be gained by substantially
reducing their numbers and lowering their alert status, meanwhile
exploring the feasibility of their ultimate complete elimination.
The roles of nuclear weapons for purposes of security have been
sharply narrowed in tends of the security of the United States. Now and
in the future they basically provide an option to respond in kind to a
nuclear threat or nuclear attack by others. In the world environment
now foreseen, they are not needed against non-nuclear opponents.
Conventional capabilities can provide a sufficient deterrent and
defense against conventional forces and in combination with defensive
measures, against the threat of chemical or biological weapons. As
symbols of prestige and international standing, nuclear weapons are of
markedly reduced importance.
At the same time, the dangers inherent in nuclear weapons have
continued and in some ways increased. They include the risks of
accidents and unauthorized launches--risks which, while small,
nevertheless still exist. Seizures or thefts of weapons or weapons
materials and threats or actual use by terrorists or domestic rebels,
are of additional concern. Moreover, despite the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, nuclear weapons could spread to additional
nations, with risk of their use in crisis or war. And if they should
spread, the risks of accidents and of unauthorized, inadvertent, or
deliberate use will spread as well.
We believe the nations that possess these weapons should take the
necessary steps to align their nuclear weapons policies and programs to
match the diminished role and utility of these weapons, and the
continuing risks they involve, joining in reducing their nuclear
arsenals step by step to the lowest verifiable levels consistent with
stable security, as rapidly as world conditions permit. Taking the
lead, U.S. and Russian reductions can open the door for the negotiation
of multilateral reductions capping all arsenals at very low levels.
Added safety and an enhanced climate for negotiations would be achieved
by removing nuclear weapons from alert status and placing the warheads
in controlled storage. These arrangements should be applied to all
nuclear weapons, discarding the distinction between tactical and
strategic weapons, limiting nuclear warheads rather than launchers, and
subjecting all weapons to inspection and verification measures.
The ultimate objective of phased reductions should be the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons from all nations. No one can say today
whether or when this final goal will prove feasible, but because the
phased withdrawal and destruction of nuclear weapons from all
countries' arsenals would take many years, probably decades, to
accomplish, time will be available--for work on technical problems, for
political progress in ameliorating the conflicts and political
struggles that encourage countries to maintain or to acquire nuclear
weapons, and for building confidence in the system of safeguards and
verification measures established to support the elimination regime.
We believe the time for action is now, for the alternative of
inaction could well carry a high price. For the task that lies ahead,
there is need for initiatives by all who share our conviction as to the
importance of this goal. Steady pursuit of a policy of cooperative,
phased reductions with serious commitments to seek the elimination of
all nuclear weapons is a path to a world free of nuclear dangers.
Signed,
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) (1969-74)
General Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former Commander-in-
Chief, United States Strategic Air Command (1992-94); former Commander-
in-Chief, United States Strategic Command (1992-94)
__________
STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY INTERNATIONAL GENERALS AND ADMIRALS
We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the
national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that
the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear
powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by
others, constitutes a peril to global peace and security and to the
safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.
Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with
weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired
an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and
insecurity of our countries and peoples.
We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of
humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during
the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of
catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever--
unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.
The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear
disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet
Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles.
It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when
Belarus, Kazakhastan, and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.
Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the UN
General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-
free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these
results.
Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear
disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery
systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the
United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage,
thus creating a ``reversible nuclear potential.'' However, in the post-
Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear
threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible.
We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way
for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.
It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and
must be undertaken now:
First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are
exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;
Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and
transparently taken off alert, and their readiness
substantially reduced both in nuclear weapon states and in de
facto nuclear weapon states; and
Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based
on the declared principle of continuous, complete and
irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.
The United States and Russia should--without any reduction in their
military security--carry forward the reduction process already launched
by START: they should cut down to 1,000 to 1,500 warheads each and
possibly lower. The other three nuclear states and the three threshold
states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper
reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is
nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their
territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.
The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible
to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed.
One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program of surveillance
and inspection, including measures to account for and control
inventories of nuclear weapon materials. This will ensure that no
rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire
nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage. An agreed
procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of
covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.
The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world,
confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of
defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of
disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of
disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear-free
world. The development of regional systems of collective security,
including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction
and communication are essential for local stability and security.
The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of
their use may have deterred war--in a world that in this year alone has
seen 30 military conflicts raging--cannot be determined. It is clear,
however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not
relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less
dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is
also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now
agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.
It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing
nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their
acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of
security. Nor will they forgo acquisition if the present nuclear powers
seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.
Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily
by the declared nuclear weapons states--China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States; by the de facto nuclear states,
India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as
Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same
goal.
We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible
historic importance: The creation of a nuclear-weapons-free world. The
end of the Cold War makes it possible.
The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and a new nuclear arms
race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity.
There is no alternative.
Signed,
International Generals and Admirals who have signed statement on
Nuclear Weapons
CANADA
Johnson, Major General Leonard V., (Ret.) Commandant, National
Defense College
DENMARK
Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (Ret.) former Chief of Defense
Staff
FRANCE
Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (Ret.) former Chief of Staff,
French Fleet
GHANA
Erskine, General Emmanuel (Ret. former Commander in Chief and
former Chief of Staff, UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFII
(Lebanon)
GREECE
Capellos, Lt. General Richard (Ret.) former Corps Commander
Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (Ret.), former Chief of
Staff, Army Signals
Koumanakos, Lt. General Georgios (Ret.) former Chief of
Operations
INDIA
Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (Ret.), former military advisor
to UN Secretary General Dag Akmmerskjold and U Thant Suit, Air
Marshall N. C. (Ret.)
JAPAN
Sakonjo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research
Institute for Peace and Security
Shikata, Lt. General Toshiyuki (Ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research
Institute for Peace and Security
JORDAN
Ajeilat, Major General Shafig (Ret.) Vice President Military
Affairs, Muta University
Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (Ret.) former Deputy
Commander, Royal Jordanian Air Force
NETHERLANDS
van der Graaf, Henry J. (Ret.) Brigadier-General RNA, Director
Centre Arms Control and Verification, Member, United National
Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters
NORWAY
Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (Ret.) former Representative to
NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
PAKISTAN
Malik, Major General Ihsun ul Hag (Ret.) Commandant, Joint
Services Committee
PORTUGAL
Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (Ret.) former Commander in
Chief, Army; former President of Portugal
RUSSIA
Belous, General Vladimir (Ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhinsky
Military Academy
Gareev, Army General Makhmut (Ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR
Armed Forces General Staff
Gromov, General Boris, (Ret.) Vice Chair, Duma International
Affairs Committee; former Commander of 40th Soviet Army in
Afghanistan; former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia
Koltounov, Major General Victor (Ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Larionov, Major General Valentin (Ret.) Professor, General
Staff Academy
Lebed, Major General Alexander (Ret.) former Secretary of the
Security Council
Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (Ret.) Deputy Chief, Kouibyshev
Military Engineering Academy
Medvedev, Lt. General Vladimir (Ret.) Chief, Center of Nuclear
Threat Reduction
Mikhailov, Colonel General Georgy (Ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Nozhin, Major General Eugeny (Ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Rokhlin, Lt. General Lev, (Ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee;
former Commander, Russian 4th Army Corps
Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (Ret.) former Chief, Department of
General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Simonyan, Major General Rair (Ret.) Head of Chair, General
Staff Academy
Surikov, General Boris T., (Ret.) former Chief Specialist,
Defense Ministry
Tehervov, Colonel General Nikolay (Ret.) former Chief,
Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces
Vinogradov, Lt. General Michael S. (Ret.) former Deputy Chief,
Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff
Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (Ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy
SRI LANKA
Karunaratne, Major General Upali A. (Ret.) (Sri Lanka)
Silva, Major General C.A.M.N., (Ret.) USF, U.S.A. WC (Sri
Lanka)
TANZANIA
Lupogo, Major General H.C. (Ret.) former Chief Inspector
General, Tanzania Armed Forces
UNITED KINGDOM
Beach, General Sir Hugh (Ret.) Member, U.K. Security Commission
Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (Ret.) Commander in Chief
for East British Army (1967-1969), Chief of General Staff
(1971-73), Chief of Defence Staff (1973-76)
Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (Ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN
Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus
Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (Ret.) former Director, Air
Staff Briefing
UNITED STATES
Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (Ret.)
Burns, Maj. General William F. (USA) (Ret.) JCS Representative,
INF Negotiations (1981-88) Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear
Weapon Dismantlement (1992-93)
Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (Ret.) Deputy
Director, Center for Defense Information
Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (Ret.) Commander, I. Corps
(ROK/US) Group (Korea) 1976-78)
Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(1987-92)
Gayler, Admiral Noel (USN) (Ret.) former Commander, Pacific
Homer, General, Charles A., (USAF) (Ret.) Commander, Coalition
Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991), former Commander, U. S. Space
Command.
James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (Ret.)
Kingston, General Robert C. (USA) (Ret.), former Commander,
U.S. Central Command
Lee, Vice Admiral John M. (USN) (Ret.)
O'Meara, General Andrew (USA) (Ret.) former Commander U.S.
Army, Europe
Pursley, Lt. General Robert E., USAF (Ret.)
Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (Ret.), former Commander,
U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command
Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (Ret.), former Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-87)
Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (Ret.), former
Director Army Control and Disarmament Agency (1978-1980)
Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (Ret.) Director, Center
for Defense Information
Smith, General William Y., (USAF) (Ret.) former Deputy
Commander, U.S. Command, Europe
Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (USN) (Ret.), former Polaris
Submarine Captain
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