THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED),
CO-CHAIR, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on the subject
``The Future of Nuclear Deterrence.'' It is an issue that ranks in the
highest order of importance for American security (and that of others)
in the coming century. This hearing seems to me most timely. In that
regard, I myself have recently joined in a public statement bearing on
this matter with Gen. Lee Butler, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former
Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command and the U.S. Strategic
Command, in an initiative with which some sixty or more retired senior
military officers around the world are also associated.
My approach with regard to the whole nuclear weapons issue is quite
simple: It is that U.S. security, viewed in its fundamentals, should be
the governing priority that guides U.S. policy and action in this
field. On this basis, the future of nuclear deterrence should be seen
as one key element in a coordinated three-fold U.S. effort serving this
objective, consisting of these main components:
Cooperative nuclear threat reduction, most importantly
between Russia and the U.S.;
Non-proliferation efforts aimed at preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons to additional nations or other sources of violence;
Nuclear deterrence focussed on preventing the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons by others against the U.S. or U.S.
allies.
A great many specific actions have been taken, and more are
underway to carry these efforts forward. They should be sustained,
focussed and reinforced.
But before discussing each of them in turn, I would like to offer a
few preliminary observations.
To do what needs to be done means giving high priority to the issue
and sustained commitment to the effort, amidst a vast number of other
demands. This will not be easy. Nor can such action be taken for
granted, despite the merits of the case, when matters that seem urgent
at any moment are in an inherent battle for priority with those that
are often more fundamentally important. It will take firm top-level
decision and determined follow-up leadership over many years to move
the needed nuclear policies and action forward.
But this can and must be done. Two considerations fundamental to
security interests and possibilities should now shape the nuclear
future:
First, as so often emphasized by President Eisenhower (who
had a talent for getting to the heart of such questions) nuclear
weapons are the only thing that can destroy the United States of
America.
Second, the Cold War is over and unlikely to return; there
is opportunity if we act on it to re-orient our policies accordingly.
We therefore stand at a time that offers us a real possibility of
dealing with the nuclear weapons issue in a way that will greatly
reduce the risks they pose to U.S. security. To that end, and because
of the enormous, unique power of destruction that is concentrated in
nuclear weapons, it is my strong recommendation that we set as our
over-riding goal the reduction of this danger to U.S. security. To the
extent the existence of these weapons supports other purposes, those
consequences should be treated as secondary, and not allowed to
interfere with that primary aim. To be specific, nuclear weapons should
not be drawn into a game of balance-of-power politics. They should not
be used for political purposes to further inter-state interests beyond
reducing the nuclear danger. As stated, these weapons are different
from others in the dangers to U.S. national security they represent.
The view I am presenting today is that it is in our security
interest (and that of others, including our allies) to go as far and as
fast as we prudently can toward elimination of these weapons. I share
the view recently expressed by former Secretary of Defense William
Perry that ``fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes
America and the world safer.''
The elimination of most is realistic, beneficial in terms of
enhanced security and well worth the time, attention and best efforts
it will demand from us for a long time to come. The elimination of all,
is for the present still well beyond our grasp; no one today knows
whether, when or how it can prudently be done. But in practical terms
the United States is far from needing to make that decision. Ten years
or more will be required to dismantle the weapons already marked for
elimination--at 2,000 or so a year, roughly the same rate at which we
and the Soviets were each able to build them during the Cold War.
During the time it will take we can see how well the Non-Proliferation
Treaty succeeds, what is done with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
and how the world security environment develops, particularly as among
the major nations. During that time we should make sure that the U.S.
nuclear weapons arsenal is safe, reliable and adequate to our needs.
Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction
The safeguarded mutual downsizing of Russian and U.S. nuclear
weapons arsenals should be pursued at high priority in the coming
years. To this end, both on its own merits and for its contribution to
nuclear threat reduction, the building of a positive security
relationship with Russia should take its place in the very top rank of
our foreign policy and security policy efforts. Only the parallel
efforts to build a positive security relationship with China, and to
keep healthy and strong our security relationships with our allies are
of comparable importance. These are the ``blue chips'', as I view them,
of U.S. national interests. The vast range and on-going stream of other
U.S. foreign interests, while significant, should be kept subordinate
to these over-riding concerns. For the U.S. and Russia, the simple
proposition is that in order to reduce to a minimum the number of
nuclear weapons held by the other party, it is well worth reducing to
the same level ourselves.
START II ratification, still stalled in the Russian Duma, should be
moved off dead center, bringing the numbers of strategic weapons in
Russia and the United States down to the 3,000-3,500 the treaty
prescribes. A specific proposal with which I myself have been
associated and which is beginning to attract wider interest and
support, is to join with the Russians in preparing a ``Statement of
Principles'' for START III negotiations (as was done for START II) to
come into effect when the Duma ratifies START II. This action can
respond to Russian interest in going on down from the START II level of
3,000-3,500 weapons to a new level of 2,000--a step beneficial to both
Russia and the United States, and a useful step en route to further
reductions. Present weapons deployments in Europe could be maintained
without change as negotiations proceed, thus removing this issue as a
source of concern with regard to NATO nuclear expansion. The
verification provisions contained in START II could be readily applied
to START III.
Beyond START II and START III, what is needed is what can be termed
a Minimum Nuclear Forces Plan, the key component efforts of which would
include:
Further U.S. and Russian reductions down to a level at
which the other nuclear weapons nations--Britain, China and France--
should join in, thus opening the way to multilateral reductions;
Bringing all nuclear arsenals step by step to the lowest
verifiable level consistent with stable security, as rapidly as world
conditions permit (for consideration, a possible level of 100-200 for
each nation has been proposed);
Removing nuclear weapons from alert status, placing the
warheads in secure storage;
Applying these arrangements to all nuclear weapons,
discarding the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons,
limiting nuclear warheads rather than launchers, and subjecting all
weapons to inspection and verification procedures; and
Adopting as a common ultimate goal--the elimination of all
nuclear weapons, to be accomplished when determined to be feasible,
verifiable and consistent with the needs of stable security.
For cooperative nuclear threat reduction along these lines, there
is a great deal of work to be done--in policy-setting and negotiations,
in force restructuring, stockpile safety and reliability, verification
operations and the like. These are the places where effort and
attention need to be focussed and sustained. The Nunn-Lugar initiative
has been of tremendous value to U.S. security, and should be sustained
and augmented.
Many challenging tasks and prerequisite steps for the nations
involved are embedded in the proposals I suggest. None appear to be
unmanageable. Consultations in depth and negotiations with Russia and
other nuclear weapons states, as well as with allies such as Germany
and Japan in particular, will be needed, along with development of
verification procedures for levels of weapons below START II,
assessments of stability against potential breakout, cheating,
clandestine or terrorist challenges and the like. All will need to be
carefully evaluated and subjected to bilateral and multilateral
consideration and consultation. If we are to be serious and responsible
about reducing the nuclear danger to U.S. security, attention and
effort should now be concentrated on these practical issues. When and
if the practical issues such as those are ultimately successfully
resolved, and only then, we will have created an option, suitable for
consideration and decision at that time, of going for total
elimination.
Non-Proliferation
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), indefinitely extended in 1995,
is the cornerstone of world efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional nations. It is reinforced by the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) signed by the United States, the other declared
nuclear weapons nations and many others (although excluding India). The
principal component measures of a comprehensive non-proliferation
effort by the world's major nations, acting collectively and
individually, are by now well recognized Among the major means of
carrying out these efforts are:
Detection of actions by potential proliferants leading to
the production of nuclear weapons even if limited in numbers and crude
in design. Access to nuclear weapons materials--plutonium and/or highly
enriched uranium--is assessed to be the most critical and demanding
step such proliferants face.
Denial of weapons components, materials or means of
manufacture; this involves the sustained participation of the nations
with highest technological capabilities, as well as firm control over
existing weapons arsenals and weapons materials and components to guard
against theft, illicit sale or diversion. Such denial also involves
efforts to forestall the movement of trained weapons scientists and
technicians to the countries of potential proliferants.
Dissuasion of such potential proliferants from pursuing a
nuclear weapons course. Diplomatic and economic actions--incentive and
disincentive--are included. The examples of negative decisions--
including those of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil--provide valuable
practical support.
Deterrence from use or threat of use of these weapons,
should nations nevertheless develop them, is the next stage; it must
have as its basis, the unquestioned capabilities for massive and
quickly decisive attack, including the use of our nuclear weapons if
required.
Defeat of a nation using or threatening the use of these
weapons against us or our allies, accompanied by swift and complete
destruction of its nuclear weapons infrastructure and, so far as
possible, its delivery forces and weapons. Theater ballistic missile
defense and at least a limited national missile defense would reinforce
our attacks against the elements of such weapons capability.
It is readily evident that none of these measures can be expected
to be completely effective. Nevertheless, they warrant continued
attention and high-priority effort. Taken together, they are a powerful
contribution to reducing the nuclear danger to U.S. security.
Nuclear Deterrence
So long as nuclear weapons exist elsewhere in the world, along with
the possibility of their production, it will be essential for the
United States to maintain an arsenal of nuclear weapons of our own,
safe, reliable and secure, as well as effective and adequate in
numbers. As stated earlier, such weapons will surely exist for ten or
more years, and as far as anyone can now foresee, probably much longer.
The weapons we maintain will have to continue to fulfill two
essential roles. The first is to provide continuing high assurance that
there will be no use or threatened use of nuclear weapons against us or
our allies. The second is thereby to help deter the nations now without
nuclear weapons from building or otherwise acquiring them, by making
clear the added level of risks they would run by doing so.
An argument for a further role that is often advanced is that
nuclear weapons are also needed as a final response if other means fail
to prevent chemical or biological weapons attack against our military
forces or our public at large. Others argue to the contrary--that our
high-capability conventional forces, if properly sustained and
supported, can in combination with defensive protective measures do all
that may be required. It is an issue that perhaps cannot be finally
resolved in advance, at least in peacetime. But it need not be, since
large stocks of nuclear weapons, as previously stated, will in any case
exist for ten years or more. A much more important issue here is a
possible mistaken plan to rely on nuclear weapons as an excuse to do
less than to prepare all that is practically possible in conventional
military capability for quick and decisive action to deal with these
threats. There will always be questions, up to the moment of decision,
as to whether nuclear weapons would in fact ever be used for this
purpose.
Other arguments are also sometimes heard, in Europe for example--
that reduced arsenals would make the world safe for conventional war,
that mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United States is
in the interest of stable security for the countries of Central and
Western Europe, that lowered U.S. levels might cause Germany or Japan
to take the nuclear weapons route--but these when examined closely in
terms of security for the U.S. (and for the others as well) are far
from persuasive. More to the point is an intensified effort to build
and strengthen the positive security relationship with Russia earlier
mentioned, which the end of the Cold War has offered as an opportunity
of historic importance.
To maintain the nuclear deterrent of the effectiveness required,
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program that is being
conducted jointly by the Departments of Energy and of Defense plays an
essential role. The Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program of the
Department of Energy presents particular challenges in this regard. The
end of nuclear testing, dictated by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
calls for fundamentally deeper scientific understanding of weapons
phenomena than existed, or was needed,when assurance could be provided
through testing. The effects of aging will have to be carefully
assessed, without the confirmation provided by nuclear tests. As the
generation of weapons designers decreases in number, the depth of
understanding they embodied will decrease as well. All this means that
sustained support for the stewardship effort will be imperative.
On the military side, comparable needs exist as the U.S. nuclear
weapons posture changes with continuing weapons reductions of the kinds
contemplated. New targeting doctrines, new alert provisions, new
operational plans all require to be developed and supported at proper
levels of effectiveness, through training, force modernization, and
intelligence activities (particularly concerning potential
proliferants)--as well as tight coupling to higher decision-making and
policy echelons.
These are some of the principal prerequisites to maintaining our
nuclear deterrent at the effectiveness required providing assurance
that the weapons we possess are at all times safe, reliable and
adequate to deter (or respond to) breakout or clandestine violations of
agreements with other nations on levels and types of weapons to be
retained in stockpiles, or to take account of an adverse turn in major
nations' relations.
I would like to conclude by anticipating the difficulties likely to
be encountered in maintaining the effectiveness of our nuclear
deterrent while carrying out the sustained process of downsizing that
also lies ahead. To do so will require support at the same time for two
lines of policy and action which some may claim to be in conflict. This
is, however, no more than our country is now supporting in the whole
matter of defense, that is, keeping the force effective at reduced
total levels. It will be a test of governmental and public
steadfastness to meet the challenge successfully in this crucially
important security area of nuclear weapons policy.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
