THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED),
CO-CHAIR, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 12, 1997
General Goodpaster. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin, I might say that in addition to my service
before I retired from the military, I still have some
connection with nuclear affairs in that I serve as a member of
the President's Council of the University of California which
has oversight over the two weapons laboratories, Los Alamos and
Livermore, in addition to Berkeley Laboratory. My statement
today is a personal statement and in no way reflects views that
may be held by any of those organizations.
But I welcome the opportunity to present these views. I
think the issue is timely with regard to shaping future
programs, and it is very important to future security. I
proceed from two fundamental propositions. First, that American
security should be the basis for our nuclear weapons policies
and actions, and, second, that the central role for nuclear
weapons should be to limit and reduce the nuclear danger to
American security.
What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is make my full
statement available to the Committee and just give highlights
in the interest of time.
Senator Cochran. We appreciate that, General, and your full
statement will be made a part of the record without objection.
General Goodpaster. On the basis I just stated, I think
that the future of nuclear deterrence should be seen as one of
three components of a coordinated three-pronged effort. The
first, cooperative nuclear threat reduction, most importantly
between Russia and the United States. The second, sustained
comprehensive nonproliferation and counter-proliferation
efforts. And the third, nuclear deterrence focused on
preventing use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by others
against us or our allies.
This must be a sustained and coordinated effort, and
American leadership will be essential if this is to be moved
forward. Now the motivation for such an effort is clear, in my
opinion. And I quote from President Eisenhower, who had a
talent for getting to the heart of issues of this kind, that
nuclear weapons are the only thing that can destroy the United
States. And second, as many have said, the Cold War is indeed
over, and we have an opportunity to realign military policy and
posture to consolidate a major enhancement of American
security, which has now become possible. Secretary Perry said
that fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes the
United States and the world safer, and I very much agree.
I would like to insert both in my full statement and to
read at this time a concern that has been expressed by some of
my senior military colleagues, that by urging nuclear arsenal
reduction, we are somehow denigrating the important, vitally
important role that these nuclear-armed military forces
successfully served during the Cold War. It would be a
regrettable mistake, in my view, to be drawn into such a view.
During that time, our very survival was at stake. Our nuclear
weapons served their Cold War purpose and served it well. I
might say, as NATO's Commander-in-Chief, I had some 7,000
nuclear weapons under my responsibility, and they played a
vital part, in my opinion, in maintaining the peace in Europe
that we have enjoyed since World War II.
Security was successfully preserved. War with the Soviets
was successfully avoided. I at least and many others who served
in the military forces, including notably our highly trained,
highly skilled nuclear forces, have no doubt that our nuclear
forces played a central, crucial, indispensable role in that
process. I might say I myself was drawn on many occasions into
the argument ``better Red than dead.'' My rejoinder was always
``Better neither than either,'' and that, in fact, was the
outcome thanks in crucial part to our highly capable nuclear
weapons and nuclear forces. But the Cold War is gone, and now
it is time to look at the new possibilities and the new
opportunities of this new era.
I think we must make a very clear distinction between
eliminating most nuclear weapons and eliminating all of them.
No one now knows whether, when, how to eliminate all in a
prudent way. This can be, as our country has stated, our
ultimate goal, but it can only be an ultimate goal at this
time. On the other hand, it should be the beacon toward which
we work. At the same time, we do know how to eliminate most
nuclear weapons, and it will be in our interest to do so, and
that really is my proposal. That effort is realistic. It will
be beneficial to American security, and it will be worth the
time, the hard work, that it will demand for a long time to
come in order to make a prudent course of action.
It will take 10 years or more to get down to the START II
level of nuclear weapons. We could eliminate nuclear weapons at
the rate of about 2,000 a year, which was the rate at which
they were built. And during that time, we can see how well the
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
succeed, and how the world security environment develops, and
how far we can get with the Cooperative Nuclear Threat
Reduction programs. And at the end of that time or as that time
goes along, we should be in much better position to assess the
practical possibility and the prudence of attempts to eliminate
all. I myself regard the argument over complete abolition at
this time as diversionary and to a degree counterproductive. As
I say, no one knows whether, when, how to eliminate all nuclear
weapons in a prudent way.
What we can do now is proceed with cooperative nuclear
threat reduction and that requires in the first instance the
safeguarded mutual downsizing of American and Russian nuclear
arsenals, and that should be our top priority. We should move
the START II ratification by the Duma along, and already
discussed has been the idea of developing a statement of
principles for START III to come into effect, and the
negotiation for START III to begin when START II has been
ratified. That should provide impetus to the Duma ratification
of START II.
And there could be an agreement that there would be no
adverse change in deployments of nuclear weapons during that
process of negotiation, and that would meet another of the
concerns expressed by the Russians concerning the enlargement
of NATO nuclear deployments. Along with this, we should
continue reductions on a five-nation basis as the American and
Russian reductions proceed to what I term the lowest verifiable
level consistent with stable security to which agreed
commitment can be reached. I myself have proposed for
consideration a level of 100 to 200 weapons. That sounds like a
small number against the thousands and tens of thousands that
we have had, but it is not a small number when you think of
Hiroshima or Nagasaki or the damage at Chernobyl. I have found
that the Russians are very conscious now of what damage a
single weapon can do, and that some of the discussion about
exchanges of very large numbers of weapons is, as Eisenhower
used to say, it is just a form of insanity.
I mention that much hard work has to be done. It needs to
be done step by step in setting policy, in formulating
proposals, in carrying out negotiation, in restructuring our
forces, in new targeting plans and doctrines, in stockpile
management, in verification procedures. The Nunn-Lugar
initiative, the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative, has
been tremendously valuable and should be sustained and
extended.
The second of the three-prongs that I mentioned is
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation. I spell that out in
a bit of detail in my full remarks. We start from the
Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely extended in 1995. That is
the cornerstone, and it is reinforced by the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. There is a well-defined array of measures, both
national and international, by which nonproliferation and
counter-proliferation can be supported and extended. They
include detection, use of our intelligence means to know at an
early time what anyone else is doing, particularly what they
may be doing to acquire the weapons materials out of which the
weapons are made. That is the most demanding requirement that a
proliferant will have to meet either through developing the
materials himself or acquiring them from some other source, and
that remains extremely important. That is the second element,
which is to deny his access to materials of that kind and the
equipment and the manufacturing capabilities that would enable
him to build these weapons, to do that so far as possible.
To dissuade through incentives and disincentives is next,
and there we can draw upon the experience of Brazil and
Argentina and South Africa among others in deciding not to go
that route. But then if nevertheless he develops the weapons,
to deter him from their use, and you deter through the
capability to punish him quickly and in devastating fashion and
to defeat and destroy, destroy his capability, decisively and
devastatingly.
No single one of these would be sufficient. Together they
are a powerful contribution to American security. And those two
prongs of policy now, I think, tell us what our nuclear
deterrence policy should be. The basis for it is that so long
as nuclear weapons exist or could be produced, the United
States must maintain its own nuclear weapons arsenal that is
safe, reliable, operationally effective, and adequate in types
and numbers. Two roles for those weapons are involved. The
first is to assure that no use or threatened use of nuclear
weapons against us or our allies would occur by anybody that
has those weapons, and the second, as I mentioned earlier, is
to deter nations that are now non-nuclear from building or
otherwise acquiring them.
I myself reject giving primary status in the overall role
of our nuclear deterrent to other roles such as against
chemical and biological weapons use or threat. Our primary
reliance there should be on our conventional capability, but we
will, in fact, have nuclear weapons for many, many years, and
there will be what some have called an existential deterrent
that they provide against people using or threatening chemical
and biological attack against us if indeed we ever had to make
use of those nuclear weapons.
More important in my mind is that we should not through
reliance on nuclear weapons use that as an excuse for failing
to provide the kind of conventional capability that we ought to
have to respond to chemical or biological threat.
Other uses have also been argued, for example that if you
remove the nuclear weapons or reduce to a low level, you will
be making the world safe for conventional war. It is sometimes
said that our nuclear weapons should have the broad role of war
prevention. That, I think, is an issue that requires the
judgment of our political leaders. Does the added contribution
of going beyond preventing the use of nuclear weapons to
preventing all forms of conflict justify a continuing reliance
on nuclear weapons that can destroy the United States? It is a
hard issue, but that is an issue that will need to be
considered and decided.
A third argument is that this could cause Germany and Japan
to go nuclear. I think that all of these if they are closely
examined will be found to be unpersuasive. The constraints
against Germany and Japan going nuclear are very great. First
of all, there is no need for them, no foreseeable need for them
to do it, and, second, if that were ever to become a serious
possibility, it would be destabilizing in terms of the security
that they both now enjoy.
Out of this comes the requirement for Stockpile Stewardship
and Management, which involves, as earlier stated,
responsibilities of both the Department of Energy and the
Department of Defense. The Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship
program is of very great importance in that regard. As our
weapons age, there will not now be the capability of testing
and this will be very demanding of our nuclear laboratories. A
second point, our laboratories are called upon to maintain the
capability, the capacity, for producing new weapons. The
designers, those with experience, are like many of the rest of
us, beginning to age a bit, like the weapons themselves, and
this confronts the laboratories with another problem. So the
importance of maintaining that Science-Based Stewardship
program can hardly be overemphasized.
On the military side, there are comparable needs. As our
nuclear posture changes with continuing weapons reductions of
the kinds contemplated, there will be a need, as I mentioned,
few new targeting doctrines, new alert provisions, new
operational plans. All will need to be developed and supported
at proper levels of effectiveness through training, through
force modernization, through intelligence activities,
particularly concerning potential proliferants, as well as
tight coupling to the higher decision-making and the policy
echelons of our government.
These are some of the principal prerequisites to
maintaining our nuclear deterrent at the effectiveness
required, providing assurance that the weapons we possess are
at all times safe, reliable, and adequate to deter or respond
to breakout or clandestine violations of agreements that other
nations may have made with us on the levels and types of
weapons to be retained, or to take account of an adverse turn
in the major nations' relationships. Those are capabilities
that we should have.
I would like to conclude simply by commenting that this
poses a special challenge. It is the challenge of doing two
things at once: downsizing while maintaining effectiveness, but
that is simply comparable to the challenge that we face for our
armed forces as a whole at this time, and that is being met I
think very satisfactorily. The real point is that when you
apply this in the nuclear area, you have to realize that this
area has a special impact on American security so it becomes
all the more important that we carry out the downsizing and
maintain the effectiveness at the same time in this area. Thank
you for the opportunity to present these views, Mr. Chairman.
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