Statement of Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Full Committee Hearing: Implementation of the U.S.-China Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement: Whose Interests Are Served?
October 7, 1997
The hearing will come to order. I would like to welcome our witnesses who are here to testify on U.S.-China nuclear commerce and prospects for implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Paul Leventhal, President of the Nuclear Control Institute; Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and former State Department official; Mr. Ken Adelman, Executive Vice President of Commodore Applied Technologies and former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ms. Jennifer Weeks, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's JFK School of Government; and, Mr. Marvin Fertel, Vice President of the Nuclear Energy Institute.
Before our witnesses proceed, I have just a few remarks. We stand at a critical juncture with respect to U.S. non-proliferation policy towards China. Implementing a nuclear cooperation agreement is not a step to be taken lightly with any nation. With the Peoples' Republic of China, it is vital that we get it right.
The Administration has argued that implementation of this Agreement provides us leverage with the Chinese. Such an argument has merit. I do not oppose nuclear commerce with China, and I recognize that there is a limited window of opportunity. However, I consider the window to be a little more open than does the Administration.
A decision of this magnitude should not be driven by a desire of an Administration to have a successful summit. There is time to get it right. There is time to persuade China to strengthen its nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Administration officials have stated that no final decision has been made on whether the President will announce the implementation of this nuclear cooperation agreement at the upcoming summit.
Implementation of this agreement may be the centerpiece of this summit. Yet, barely three weeks before the event, Administration officials have said they are not sure whether they can meet the certification required under the 1985 law. If that is so, it means that the Chinese have not said the right things as regards their policy on non-proliferation.
Given China's record in refusing to own up to its past proliferation record and its outright violation of specific assurances to us, it is deeply disturbing that, so close to the summit, the Chinese are not even saying the right things to our Administration.
On the other hand, if the Administration is refusing to lay out its objectives for this summit in order to avoid criticism, they are misreading the sentiment of Congress. This Agreement involves U.S. national security. It deserves and will receive scrutiny.
While the jury may still be out on whether this Agreement can be implemented, it is clear that the President may proceed as he wishes. It should be equally clear that there are legislative options for the Congress to pursue.
Industry's views are certainly well-known and they have their allies in the Administration. However, at this point, I have yet to hear from a single non-proliferation expert outside of the Administration who endorses implementation at this time. Perhaps that will change today.
Permit me to spell out my own criteria for assessing whether we should proceed with this accord.
First, as I have stated previously, the Administration must keep the Congress appraised of its intentions with regard to the Agreement. I have urged them to regularly brief the Committee and to lay out the Administration's rationale for implementing this agreement before the summit and in open session. We have met in closed session and we are trying to work out a suitable date for a hearing. The Administration has been working with us in good faith in that regard.
Second, in order to implement the Agreement the Administration must make the required certification and report pursuant to the 1985 law. That certification must stand on its own. The Administration must adhere to the letter of the law. In part, the purpose of today's hearing is to lay out what is required in that certification and to hear the opinions of our witnesses as to whether the Administration can meet those tests.
Third, the Administration needs to convince the Congress that the time has come to change the status quo with regard to nuclear cooperation with China. In that regard, it is not only China's nuclear non-proliferation record that is on trial. Clearly we need to be assured that China is adhering to international nuclear non-proliferation norms both in terms of explaining its past behavior and why its future behavior will be different.
Members must be convinced that China has stopped assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons procurement program and Iran's efforts to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.
However, our Members also need to know that China is engaging in responsible non-proliferation behavior across the board, including all weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. That, in my mind, is what the political and substantive debate will be about in the Congress.
In addition, in passing judgement on whether we should engage in nuclear cooperation with the Chinese, the Congress needs to know exactly what assurances and commitments the Chinese have provided as we move toward the summit.
They badly want American nuclear goods and technology. That is our leverage and we should make the most of it. Let us not set the bar too low. At a minium we should require the following:
- -First, China must join the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
- -Second, China must cease proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, including missile, chemical and biological weapons; and
- -Third, China must follow through with its promise to implement an export controls system.
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