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Prepared Testimony by
Robert L. Gallucci

Dean
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

before the

House International Relations Committee Tuesday,

October 7, 1997 Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before the Committee on the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

One way to put the issue today is to ask whether or not it would be in the national interest for the President, to implement the 1985 Agreement for Cooperation with China by providing the necessary non- proliferation certifications specified in legislation. It seems to me that, put this way, the issue stimulates four additional questions: first, does evidence of Chinese nuclear activity support a conclusion that the standard of the legislation has been met?; second, even if the standard has been met, should the United States try to use the prospect of implementation to gain additional, desirable commitments from the Chinese in the nuclear area?; third, independent of Chinese behavior in the nuclear area, should the Administration take into account Chinese behavior in other areas of proliferation concern, such as chemical weapons and ballistic missile related exports?; and fourth, however persuasive the case might be for certification now, would it not be prudent for the Administration to wait significantly longer to be certain of Chinese intentions? Let me briefly address each of the questions.

First, the language in the legislation of 1985 and 1990 essentially calls upon the President to certify that China is not assisting any non-nuclear weapons state to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, he must certify that he has received from the Chinese "clear and unequivocal assurances" that they are not providing either "directly or indirectly" such assistance. The past history of reported Chinese activity raises questions about nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in the areas of uranium enrichment, unsafeguarded nuclear reactor construction, heavy water supply and nuclear weapons design. The past history of reported cooperation with Iran relates at least to nuclear reactor construction, uranium conversion and training. China supplied a third country, Algeria, with a nuclear reactor which ultimately, though not initially, came under safeguards. That history has arguably been separated from the current situation by Chinese assurances in May 1996 that it would not export to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that it would develop a national system of export controls.

The Administration has recently said that it has no evidence that China has acted in a manner inconsistent with the May 1996 assurances. Put simply, China's behavior would not meet the standard of the legislation of 1985 and 1990 if that behavior still included support for Pakistan's unsafeguarded facilities, or nuclear cooperation of any consequence with Iran, safeguarded or not. The matter of China's export control system is complicated by the fact that the system is currently being defined. That said, if China is to meet the legislative standard, it would seem prudent for the Administration to insist that China go beyond the current Zanger Committee standard to include so-called "dual-use" items as controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The second question is whether or not the Administration should go beyond the legislative standard to achieve other desirable non- proliferation commitments: to insist that China require that a country put all its nuclear activities under safeguards before agreeing to an export, so-called "full-scope safeguards" as a condition of supply; that China agree to forgo reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium; and that China accept voluntary IAEA safeguards inspections on reactors provided by the United States.

All these would be desirable step(s from a non-proliferation perspective. They are not, however, required by legislation nor, apparently, have they been pressed upon the Chinese as a condition for implementation of the Agreement for cooperation during past discussions of the issue. To raise the bar, to move the goal posts without a rationale other than the assertion that we have the leverage to do it, undermines the credibility of the United States. It does not contribute to the character of the relationship the United States has been trying to build with China.

Moreover, on substance, it is arguable that all three are achievable, even likely, if allowed to emerge from a developing relationship with China in the nuclear area -- one in which China continues to be drawn into the international non-proliferation regime. These are reasonable objectives with the Chinese, but not appropriate pre-conditions for certification.

The third question goes to Chinese behavior bearing on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, other than nuclear weapons. The history of Chinese exports related to chemical weapons and ballistic missile development is cause for serious concern. This remains true notwithstanding more recent Chinese adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and acceptance of the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. The Chinese must understand that a significant breech of international norms in these areas would inevitably destroy the United States' willingness to license any nuclear exports to China. But this is not a matter that should block certification -- unless evidence of a significant breech now exists -- it is a concern to share with the Chinese now, and an area in which leverage is to be gained once implementation of the nuclear agreement begins and licenses are potentially put at risk.

Finally, there is a question as to the wisdom of rushing to implementation now when the history of Chinese misbehavior is so long, and the record of compliance with its assurances of good behavior so short. The argument for proceeding turns on the acceptance of the proposition that American nuclear exports to China would be a good outcome: good for nonproliferation and regional security, good for the national security; and good for the economy and perhaps the global environment, that is, broadly in the national interest. The Chinese track record is indeed short and, at this point, not complete. But once the evidence supports a case for certification by the standard of the legislation of 1985 and 1992, I believe it would be prudent for the President to proceed.

If American companies were to take advantage of the implementation of the Agreement and sell nuclear reactors to China, they would join those in Russia, France and Canada who are already doing so. If the Chinese were subsequently found to be engaging in unacceptable behavior, licenses for export could be denied. In the meantime, the United States would have followed through on a dialogue with China long pursued, taken an important step in the slow process of engaging Beijing bilaterally and, with the rest of the international community, drawn China further into the web of legitimate relations between sovereign states.