Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Statement of

Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty

Director
Office of Emergency Response
Acting Director, Office of Weapons Surety Defense Programs

COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Growing concerns about the availability of materials for nuclear weapons has brought increased attention to the problem of responding to the threat presented by an adversary who employs an improvised nuclear device, a radiological dispersal device, or a nuclear weapon stolen from another nation's stockpile. The common denominator in terrorism is the use of tactics that fall outside of traditionally recognized military methods. Typical approaches that have been used by terrorists include civilian bombings, assassination, smuggling and extortion. The motives behind such acts most often include a broad mixture of terror, ethnic or religious fanaticism, and revenge. These types of threats strain the detection capability of the intelligence and the law enforcement communities ability to intervene, witnessed by the lack of success in preventing the 1993 bombing of the New York World Trade Center.

The ability of the U.S. Government to maintain security within its borders, as well as protect our interests throughout the world, may be placed in serious jeopardy by a nuclear-capable terrorist or rogue nation. When the destructive potential of a nuclear device is taken into account, successful intervention and neutralization of this threat is paramount to ensuring the safety of U.S. citizens and national security interests.

RESIDENT TECHNICAL NUCLEAR EXPERTISE

An effective defense against the nuclear threat is the U.S. Government's ability to field an integrated response with the appropriate mix of infrastructure, technology, and operational capabilities. As a result of the Department of Energy's responsibility to maintain the nuclear weapon complex, it is both logical and prudent that DOE provide the technical expertise to respond to malevolent nuclear incidents. This unique technical expertise exists exclusively at the DOE nuclear weapon laboratories: Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. This responsibility makes DOE uniquely qualified and prepared to support and respond to the resolution of nuclear terrorist incidents both in the U.S. and abroad.

As a result of the moratorium on underground nuclear weapon testing, the Department of Energy has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP) to ensure the continued safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, and to preserve the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons design production, and dismantlement. In doing so, SSMP continues to provide the necessary expertise from which the DOE nuclear counter terrorism response program draws.

It is precisely this nuclear weapon expertise and the computational simulations and experimental validation provided by the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program that are required to identify and assess the nature and seriousness of a nuclear terrorist device. The effectiveness of many technical operations can only be validated by the laboratory's technical staffs supported by computer simulations and experimental validation programs supported by SSMP.

DOE'S TECHNICAL/OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM

I would now like to focus on the Department of Energy's technical capabilities available to respond to nuclear terrorism. The DOE Emergency Response Program, the operational arm of the Department, under the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management, Defense Programs, is responsible for day-to-day program management of the Department's nuclear counter terrorism program. The Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team, more commonly known as NEST, provides the technical expertise and support to other Federal agencies, as needed. If a nuclear terrorist incident occurs in the United States, the lead Federal agency responsibility resides with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Department of State would take the lead should the incident occur overseas.

Made up of several components, NEST capabilities include search and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, and disablement and containment programs. NEST personnel and equipment are deployable at all times. They can be quickly transported by military or commercial aircraft to any location worldwide. NEST possesses the capability to render a rogue device safe and package it for transport to a secure location for follow-on disassembly operations. This program consists of an all-volunteer community composed of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the nuclear weapons design laboratories. The operational capability deployed in response to an incident of nuclear terrorism varies in size from a five person advisory team that supports specialized classified programs, to a NEST deployment with as many as 800 searchers and scientists, complemented by their technical and logistical equipment. We have developed operational programs tailored to meet the needs of our interagency partners: the FBI, and the Departments of State and Defense. We have continuously updated and modified those operational programs as the threat and needs of the supported agencies have evolved.

Our capabilities must constantly evolve commensurate with the available technology. Further, we must ensure that our operational capabilities are not limited by the capabilities of our computational or experimental testing programs.

HISTORY OF NEST

Established in the mid-seventies, NEST was designed to respond to incidents of nuclear extortion in support of the FBI. The extortion scenario allowed for planning and operations to be conducted over a period of several days because the intelligence and law enforcement communities believed that the extortionist would allow time for negotiations. The idea that a nuclear device would fall into the hands of terrorists and be detonated without notice was not deemed credible at that time. Consequently, the NEST capabilities were developed and based on large-scale deployments. This process was slow but very thorough, because it was assumed there would be sufficient time to deploy all NEST assets to meet the technical challenge.

In August, 1980, a sophisticated improvised explosive device was detonated in Harvey's Casino in State Line, Nevada. The device was exploded by a failed attempt to render it safe. While this particular device was not nuclear, it offered many of the problems that our scientists and analysts feared could be encountered in a nuclear device. It was the most sophisticated device of its type that the U.S. had encountered to date and thus became a benchmark for the development of new equipment and techniques to render safe similar devices.

In the years that followed, the nuclear threat remained relatively constant and the capabilities of the NEST program continued to be enhanced. Nonetheless, the NEST organization continued to believe that time was on their side when responding to nuclear threats.

CURRENT COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

In early 1992, based on intelligence estimates, the Department's operational planners re-evaluated the nuclear incident scenarios. While the threat of nuclear extortion did not go away, a new threat had emerged: nuclear terrorism. We now know that terrorists are willing to use large explosive devices, and devices that disburse chemical agents, without warning. We must therefore assume that nuclear terrorist devices could be placed and detonated without warning.

As a result of this assumption, the focus of DOE's efforts to combat terrorism has broadened. While DOE has not given up its technical capability to respond to an extortion scenario, we have re-directed deployment readiness and training requirements to respond more rapidly to an act of terrorism where time is not on our side. It is now commonplace for the Office of Emergency Response to plan and execute no-notice deployments of NEST assets. These deployment challenges are designed to provide a realistic technical exercise and the ability to mobilize rapidly. These no-notice exercises are coordinated with other federal agencies to familiarize them with DOE emergency response capabilities and procedures. The training program has been expanded to include exercising our capabilities against a non-U.S. nuclear weapon that falls into terrorist hands or against a homemade nuclear device.

The Department's current counter terrorism strategy is to tailor our operational assets, as necessary, to respond where nonproliferation measures fail. This strategy employs a wide variety of our scientific and technical expertise to neutralize nuclear weapons or devices aimed at United States interests by rogue states, extra-national entities, and terrorist groups. DOE's substantial capability includes detecting, locating, identifying, diagnosing, and disabling such weapons. DOE also has the capability to mitigate the blast effects of non-nuclear disablement activity.

NEST teams now practice a wide variety of deployment scenarios from table-top exercises to long-range deployments to remote locations. In conjunction with the FBI, State and DOD, we conduct smaller and more focused terrorism related exercises more frequently than in the past. The NEST exercise program has re-focused its efforts to support rapid and customized deployment to a wide range of nuclear threats. As a result of these exercises, we have enhanced interagency coordination and streamlined command and control during an incident.

COUNTER TERRORISM COMMUNITY

DOE's exercises and training programs are coordinated routinely with other government agencies. This is, however, not the only area in which the counter terrorism community interacts. The community is unique in several ways. It is small and tight-knit; we operate as a team in developing plans and procedures and are in daily contact with one another. In the last five years, a core team of terrorism experts has emerged that has studied the nation's capability to respond to acts of terrorism, and DOE has been, and continues to be, an integral part of that team. DOE routinely provides staff support to the other agencies' counter terrorism working groups to assist in internal operational planning, and this courtesy is reciprocated whenever requested. DOE is committed to interagency cooperation and will continue support strongly and provide any support necessary to ensure our operational planners have every emergency response asset available to successfully resolve any nuclear incident.

SUMMARY

NEST is perhaps the most important national technical capability available to counter the potential threat of nuclear terrorism. The Department of Energy stands ready to continue to support fully the U.S. Government's strong commitment to combat any and all acts of terrorism.