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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 16, 1997
CONTACT: Maureen Cragin
Ryan Vaart
(202) 225- 2539

OPENING STATEMENT
REP. CURT WELDON
CHAIRMAN, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
HEARING ON THE EFFECTS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE ON OUR MILITARY
SYSTEMS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

July 16, 1997
This morning, the Military Research and Development Subcommittee meets to receive testimony on the effects
of electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, on our military systems and civilian infrastructure. I have also invited the members of
the Procurement Subcommittee to attend the hearing, many of whom have expressed an interest in this subject. Wel-come
to my colleague and good friends Duncan Hunter, chairman of the Procurement Subcommittee and ranking member
Ike Skelton, and to all my friends from the Procurement Subcommittee.

Committee members were invited to a June 26 briefing by representatives of Applied Physics Lab on the impact
of an electromagnetic pulse generated by a high altitude nuclear blast. The Subcommittee is meeting here today to
explore in more detail EMP effects on our military systems and the civilian infrastructure, how confident we are that we
can predict these effects, our potential vulnerabilities, what policies and practices guide our efforts to protect our
systems, and the steps we have taken and can take to ameliorate these vulnerabilities.

EMP can be generated in several ways, but the widest effects are caused by a high altitude nuclear blast. All of
us here understand that the threats posed to our military systems and civilian infrastructure by high altitude EMP are
not new. Atmospheric nuclear tests in the 1950s revealed a number of then- unanticipated results, including electrical
and communications disruptions hundreds of miles from the test sites.

There may be, however, new dimensions and vulnerabilities that we need to look at more carefully. In the
1950s, electronic systems used vacuum tubes, not very sophisticated, but resistant to EMP. Today, computers with
more and more microcircuits packed into smaller and smaller chips are key to the efficiency of virtually all commerce in
the U. S. These have much more computing power, but are also much more sensitive to disruption and more easily
disabled by EMP. As our reliance grows, so does our potential vulnerability.

Likewise, potential military vulnerability may be growing. The revolution in military affairs has brought with it a
much greater dependence on information technologies. The ability to generate raw data, process it into useable form,
and communicate information to the right people and systems is critical to military success. Yet the sensors, computers,
and communications assets essential to this revolution could be vulnerable. For example, ninety five percent of our
military communications go through commercial channels. Are we confident that EMP won't disable or disrupt these
commercial communications systems? How confident are we that the military could continue to communicate effectively
if commercial systems are disrupted or disabled by EMP? How thoroughly do we protect our weapons systems from
EMP? Are we confident they will continue to function? 1
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At the same time our vulnerabilities may be increasing, the subcommittee is worried about complacence in this area.
It is true that the Cold War is over, and the threat of a deliberate nuclear attack by Russia is very low. That does not necessar-ily
mean we have nothing to worry about.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles continues.
If we come into conflict with a rogue nation, in possession of just a very few nuclear weapons, our adversary may use, or
threaten to use, one of those weapons to blind the US military or to damage our economy or that of an ally. Yet when we
invited the intelligence community to provide us with their most up to date material on EMP threats, we received documents
that were ten years old. We understand that no NIE has been issued on EMP since the 1980s. We also understand that some
of our EMP testing assets have been dismantled or are in disrepair.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses today and thank them for taking the time and effort to help us understand these
issues. To talk about EMP effects, we have Dr. Gary Smith, the Director of the Applied Physics Lab from Johns Hopkins
University, and Dr. George Ullrich, the Deputy Director of the Defense Special Weapons Agency. To talk about the impact of
these effects on our military systems and commercial infrastructure, we have General Robert T. Marsh, US Air Force retired,
chairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection; Hon. Gilbert I. Klinger, Acting Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Space); Dr. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory; and Dr. Jose Pina and Dr. Nelson Degangi
from the Central Intelligence Agency. 2

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