Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Statement of
The Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space
Mr. Gil I. Klinger

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is an honor for me to appear before this Committee to address the potential threat to our national security satellites posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Before I address my remarks to the topic of EMP, I would like to give you a brief background on the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space) (DUSD(Space)) and our responsibilities. This will assist in explaining the scope of our activities.

DUSD(Space) is the Secretary's principal staff assistant for space matters. We are developing the plans and architectures which will effectively lead us through the next decade. In this capacity we develop, coordinate and oversee the implementation of DoD policies and guidance for military and intelligence space activities; oversee the implementation of DoD space systems related strategy and plans; and, oversee DoD space mission and system architectures, acquisition and technology programs. We are key in analyzing and implementing the National Security Section of the National Space Policy and other Presidential space policies. We successfully lead the Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) for the Space-Based Infra-Red System keeping this major acquisition program healthy and on track. We are currently leading OIPTs on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). In accomplishing these tasks we coordinate and monitor the implementation of policies established by other DoD offices and agencies. For example, electromagnetic pulse survivability policy and standards are established by the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Defense Programs). These policies and standards are included in space systems design and acquisition appropriate to the validated threat to the system.

Hardening guidance is established by national and defense policy and the Joint Staff. Space systems are hardened consistent with this guidance. We recognize the growth in the use of space systems as articulated in Joint Vision 2010. In light of this potential massive use of space capabilities, both national security and commercial systems will require a review and study of critical infrastructure components. DUSD(Space) is heading this DoD-wide study.

In the past, National Security Space Systems have been hardened to varying degrees. This variation continues today. Hardening all systems to the maximum level incurs heavy cost penalties. We are studying a range of protection measures which will enhance the entire satellite constellation. This review will look at these protection measures with cost as an independent variable. The Joint Space Management Board (JSMB) received and approved a comprehensive space protection study conducted by the DoD Space Architect and the National Reconnaissance Office. Implementation of the recommendations contained in this study of current and projected issues is being planned.

Electromagnetic Pulse Effects on Space Systems

As Dr. Ullrich of the Defense Special Weapons Agency has explained, the most common usage of the term electromagnetic pulse (EMP) refers to the complex radio frequency waveform generated by a nuclear device being detonated in the atmosphere (also known as High Altitude EMP, HEMP). This "transmission" can contain large amounts of energy that can be "received" by a military or civilian system in unexpected ways that damage electrical components. The process is somewhat similar to the static one picks up on an AM car radio during a thunderstorm due to lightning. The amount of HEMP energy that "couples" to the system depends on many factors, specific system design and distance from the source being among the most important. The car radio analogy is still appropriate here with an FM radio being less disturbed and very distant lightning producing no static. Spacecraft are far from a HEMP event and are not damaged. The effects of HEMP on satellite ground stations can be more disruptive, and depend on a number of factors (e.g., altitude and distance of burst or design of ground station). Military communications facilities such as the National Military Command Center have HEMP hardened facilities.

Another "form" of electromagnetic pulse previously discussed is system generated EMP or SGEMP. This effect happens only in a vacuum and when X-rays produced by a nuclear device strike a satellite and displace electrons throughout the spacecraft. The movement of these electrons produces large currents in the satellite's structure and electrical systems usually with detrimental effects. An analogy would be plugging a nine-volt transistor radio in a household electrical socket. The amount of SGEMP generated in a spacecraft is dependent upon the nuclear weapon's yield, X-ray spectrum, distance to the nuclear device and, most importantly, the design of the satellite. The design and testing of military space systems for vulnerability to SGEMP effects is the responsibility of the individual program offices. The adequacy of nuclear survivability features is an item that is considered by the Defense Acquisition Board. As part of our ongoing space protection efforts, we will be looking explicitly at the issue with cost as an independent variable.

Radiation Hardened Microelectronics

The "radiation effects," discussed by Dr. Ullrich, are the result of natural and man-made sources. Natural sources are cosmic rays, charged particles trapped in the Van Allen belts and solar flares. Engineers design commercial and civil satellite electronics to withstand this naturally occurring radiation. DoD satellite systems must be designed to survive much more severe radiation environments induced either by hostile actions (JCS Level 1 hardening requirements) or high ambient radiation orbits (Global Positioning System). The specially designed and manufactured electronic components are termed to be "radiation hardened" or simply "Rad Hard." The availability of Rad Hard electronic components is crucial to survivable DoD satellite systems and receives special attention from DUSD(Space).

In December 1996 an Integrated Product Team (IPT) chaired by the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space Systems Acquisition) reported to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) on the industrial base that designs and manufactures Rad Hard components. The IPT found that:

• There is an insufficient commercial business base to support a Rad Hard industrial capability, the government, primarily DoD, is the principal customer in this "niche market,"
• Government investment in advanced radiation hardening technology is adequate but there is insufficient funding for transitioning these technologies to production
• Government and industry competency has decreased as the industry down sizes.

The IPT's Rad Hard strategy was to generate economies of scale by providing the "seed money" for Rad Hard parts development and production thereby assisting the manufacturers to remain in the business while they develop a non-DoD market. The IPT specifically recommended:

• Establishing a DoD-level group to oversee and coordinate DoD investment in Rad Hard electronics with a companion interagency coordination group
• Funding an annual Rad Hard investment program at $60 - 70 million
• Creating a graduate-level initiative to train more electrical engineers in radiation hardening technology

In May 1997 the USD(A&T) approved the IPT's recommendations and directed a DoD wide initiative implementing them. Detailed actions were assigned to DoD staff offices and to the Air Force. These tasks are currently being accomplished with the establishment of the Radiation Hardened Electronics Oversight Council being the highest priority. We will update the committee on the implementation of the DoD Rad Hard initiative and the progress in creating an interagency coordination mechanism.

These issues become more important as DoD transitions to dependence upon commercial satellite systems to provide cost effective ways of meeting mission requirements. We are studying this issue in conjunction with US Space Command and the NRO. The vulnerabilities of both National Security and commercial assets will have to be taken into account. To the extent we migrate critical space functions to commercial providers, we need to focus on protection and negotiate appropriate hardness levels.