FY 1998 BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 03/18/1997, Testimony
- Basis Date:
- 19971024
- Chairperson:
- J. Myers
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- T970318C
- Hearing Date:
- 19970318
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP
SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1998 BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
- Witness Name:
- V. Reis
-
Hearing Text:
-
Statement of Dr. Victor Reis
Assistant Secretary for
Defense Programs
Department of Energy
FY 1998 Appropriations Hearings
Although the threat of superpower nuclear confrontation has receded, the Unite
continues to face a broad spectrum of national security challenges. To meet t
challenges, President Clinton has stated that "the United States must and will
nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with
strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convin
a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard, I consider the maintenan
reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United Sta
Additionally, the United States Senate START II ratification text states that
States is committed to proceeding with a robust Stockpile Stewardship program,
maintain nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities that will ensu
reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at the START II level
requirements for hedging against possible international developments or techni
in conformance with United States policies and to underpin deterrence. "
The ability of the United States to respond effectively to the national securi
the 21st century will be determined by the decisions we make and actions we ta
The United States has: agreed to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-P
Treaty, ratified START II, and signed the zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Tr
(CTBT). Once ratified by the 44 nuclear capable states, any nuclear weapons t
or any other nuclear explosion will be banned. At the present time 41 of the
signed the Treaty.
Within this new strategic context the Department must continue to ensure the s
security and reliability of the enduring stockpile, without nuclear testing.
will meet this national security challenge through the vigorous implementation
integrated Stockpile Stewardship and Management program (SSMP), a scientific a
technical challenge perhaps as formidable as the Manhattan Project.
The Department's objective is to implement a program that:
Supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent with a safe, secure, and reliable nuc
stockpile, without nuclear testing, as the weapons complex is reduced in
modernized and made more efficient.
Preserves the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons
laboratories and the manufacturing facilities; and
Ensures that activities needed to maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent
compatible with the nation's arms-control and nonproliferation commitment
including the CTBT.
The Department recognizes the inherent risk in a program to develop a surrogat
underground testing. It has been over four years since the last nuclear test.
time, we have successfully addressed an issue with the Trident I (W76) warhead
combination of analysis, new experimental data, archived test and manufacturin
most importantly the collective judgement of the two weapon design laboratorie
success, using the experimental and testing tools available today, provides co
the even more powerful computing and testing tools to be developed will allow
future stockpile problems without nuclear testing. However, in the event that
be required, the Department will maintain the capability to conduct undergroun
tests as directed by the President and the Congress.
Last year the Administration committed to Congress that funding for Defense Pr
activities would total approximately $4 billion per year for the next 10 years
request is $3.6 billion for Weapons Activities operations and maintenance acco
billion for the new Defense Asset Acquisition Account for a total of $5.1 bill
1998. Of this amount, about $4 billion would be obligated in FY 1998 with the
obligated in future years against ongoing construction projects. From 1998 th
the President's budget requests $20.1 billion for Defense Programs activities.
The FY 1998 request allows us to build upon significant accomplishments during
and FY 1997. DOE's production plants at Pantex, Savannah River, Oak Ridge, an
City continue to support the day-to-day needs of the enduring nuclear weapons
making the necessary repairs and providing replacement parts. The Pantex plan
disassembled 1064 nuclear weapons in FY 1996. We recently demonstrated throug
delivery of the first B-61 Modification 11 kits that the DOE nuclear weapons c
remains capable of meeting DoD requirements. Working with the laboratories an
DOE delivered the first conversion kit in late December 1996, meeting the acce
schedule requested by the DoD. The B-61 Mod 11 will replace the B-53, which i
oldest bomb in the stockpile and does not have modern safety features. The du
tritium program continues to make progress on the regulatory, technical and po
associated with the program. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and DOE governing the interactions between
two agencies was signed in May 1996. Recently the Department and the Tennesse
Authority (TVA) announced plans to conduct in-reactor tests of tritium target
in a TVA operating reactor. The Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) progr
selected a prime contractor, Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc., and began a tech
of the components that would be used in the APT. In addition, the Secretary o
announced that the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) would remain on warm standby
possible use in producing tritium. The action is being funded by the Office o
Energy. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) program completed Title I desig
project and the Department selected the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
site for construction. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI)
awarded two contracts for the next generation of super computers and accepted
the world's fastest computer, capable of performing over one trillion operatio
The Department also completed a number of key environmental documents required
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) including: the Stockpile Stewardship
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS); the Nevada Test
Wide EIS; and the Pantex Site Wide EIS. With these documents complete, DOE ca
construction of the new experimental facilities needed by the stockpile stewar
establish a plutonium pit production capability at Los Alamos; downsize the ma
complex while maintaining the necessary industrial capabilities to support the
conduct subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site; and continue to safel
plutonium pits from dismantled weapons at the Pantex plant.
The Department is in consultation with the DoD, revising and updating the Stoc
Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP) plan, which describes in detail our
maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile in the
underground testing and no new-design nuclear warheads production. We will pr
copy of this classified plan, known as the "Green Book" to the Congress after
Weapons Stockpile Plan is signed by the President. We will continue to work c
the DoD to refine and implement this plan to meet fully the requirements of th
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan.
Annual Certification
A primary DOE responsibility is to annually certify the safety and reliability
nuclear stockpile. On August 11, 1995, the President announced that he would
yield CTBT. At that time he directed the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to
annually on the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, in or
whether the United States should continue to observe the CTBT or resume underg
nuclear testing. The two Secretaries are to be advised by the Nuclear Weapons
Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, and the Directors of DOE's nuclear we
laboratories on whether the stockpile is safe and reliable in the absence of n
All active and inactive weapon types have been assessed by the weapons design
and the DoD-led joint Project Officers Group. The laboratory directors and th
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command have provided their advice to the Secretar
Energy and Defense. The first annual certification was signed on February 7,
both Secretaries certifying to the President that the stockpile is "safe and r
"there is no need to conduct an underground nuclear test at this time."
STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
The Stockpile Management Program continues its historic responsibilities to pr
term and long term support for the stockpile, and for ensuring an adequate sup
tritium. It also includes new programs and procedures to deal with the aging
which has an average age of 14 years. Along with stockpile surveillance, the
responsibilities include: normal maintenance; corrective maintenance and syste
refurbishment; and weapon dismantlement.
Almost 50 years of stockpile history have shown that continuous surveillance,
replacement of components and subsystems are commonplace. In fact, the nine w
types that will comprise the START II stockpile have already been retrofitted
degrees and some have had major components of the nuclear warhead replaced.
present time, we cannot predict with any certainty when stockpile problems wil
future, but we are addressing these issues through our Stockpile Stewardship a
Management Program. The Department is carrying out the recommendations of the
GAO report on nuclear surveillance activities. At the requested funding level
eliminate most backlogs in flight and laboratory tests within two years and al
prior to the end of FY 2000.
Role of the Production Plants
The production plants at Savannah River, Pantex, Kansas City, and Oak Ridge ar
components to the success of Stockpile Stewardship and Management. The Depart
approach to maintain these key industrial facilities is detailed in the final
Stewardship and Management and supported by the Secretary of Energy's Record o
Decision issued on December 19, 1996. While ongoing production activities at
will help maintain production skills, to attract and retain the next generatio
DOE is establishing a fellowship program at the plants. The plants have been
identify prioritized needs for the fellowship program. Their responses are du
1997. None of the funds will be obligated until the report required by sectio
FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act is provided to the Congress.
In FY 1997 the four plants will continue to produce the replacement parts and
necessary repairs to support the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile. One of t
significant accomplishments was the accelerated delivery of the conversion kit
Kansas City and Oak Ridge Y-12 plants for the B61 modification 11 program. Th
modification 11 satisfies the mission requirements of the B53 gravity bomb. T
oldest weapon in the stockpile and does not meet modern safety design criteria
will be retired shortly. DOE plans to begin dismantlement of this system by F
In FY 1998 DOE expects to demonstrate a limited plutonium pit production capa
Los Alamos, a capability the DOE has not had since the closing of the Rocky Fl
1992. In reestablishing war reserve support capability, DOE plans to manufact
II
(W-88) pit in FY 1998, a Peacekeeper (W-87) pit in FY 2000 and a B61 bomb pit
2002. A larger pit production capacity will be in place by FY 2003.
Although there will be downsizing of the production plants commensurate with t
a smaller stockpile, none of the plants will be closed. The Strategic Managem
Restructuring Initiative (SMRI) will support implementation of the Department'
downsize in place. The SMRI program involves downsizing the following operati
the weapons assembly/disassembly and high explosives missions at Pantex; (2) n
components production at Kansas City; (3) weapons secondary and case fabricati
Ridge Y-12; and (4) consolidation of tritium operations at Savannah River. We
reestablish pit component fabrication at Los Alamos. The DOE will make use of
facilities at the sites which will be upgraded, repaired and or modified to me
environment, safety and health requirements. DOE will, through section 3161 o
1993 National Defense Authorization Act, mitigate the impacts of downsizing on
affected workers and communities.
Enhanced Surveillance
Enhanced Surveillance is an integrated program involving the four production p
three weapons laboratories. In this program we will develop the predictive me
address the maintenance needs of the stockpile. The basic goals of the progra
predict in advance defects that might develop in the enduring stockpile due to
reasons; develop a means to assess the safety and reliability impacts; and to
problems are corrected before they reduce safety or reliability of the stockpi
Enhanced Surveillance Program (ESP) builds upon existing Defense Programs' res
development activities, nonnuclear testing, nondestructive evaluation/surveill
and will develop new predictive models, new techniques for data analysis, and
possibility of in-situ, real time, non-destructive monitoring for warheads.
The ESP focuses on six major areas: 1) materials characterization and surveill
materials aging model development; 3) component surveillance and diagnostics;
component performance models; 5) enhanced systems testing; and 6) system perfo
models. The surveillance techniques, procedures, and models developed in this
will be incorporated into the ongoing core surveillance program when we are co
their validity. With these new tools, our program of stockpile surveillance w
prediction and preventive maintenance.
The ESP is a logical step between the traditional surveillance program and the
weapons refurbishment requirements. It will be closely coordinated and integr
Stockpile Life Extension Program, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiati
Advanced Manufacturing Design and Production Technology programs.
Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP)
The mission of the SLEP is to ensure continued high confidence in the performa
and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile while exercising the infrastr
intellectual capabilities needed to sustain the weapons as a credible deterren
a new DOE maintenance management strategy that will continuously focus the des
manufacturing activities required to maintain all of the stockpile warheads in
reliable condition. The SLEP establishes the activities needed to meet nuclea
stockpile commitments to DoD, and provides the basis for coordinating stockpil
between DOE and DoD. It builds on and enhances past practices to maintain a v
nuclear weapons stockpile. Detailed schedules for each weapon are being devel
through weapon-specific DoD/DOE Project Officer Groups.
The underpinning concept for the SLEP is "all components of a nuclear weapon a
life components." The SLEP focuses and prioritizes the efforts of the weapons
The Enhanced Surveillance program will provide data to better understand mater
component aging phenomena and determine the Life-limit of components and mater
This in turn provides the needed information to determine a life extension pro
sustain a safe, reliable stockpile to meet DoD performance requirements.
The SLEP integrates stockpile management activities and establishes requiremen
priorities to support budget and workload planning. These activities to suppo
are embodied in four key functions: maintenance, surveillance, assessment and
and refurbishment. The underpinning activities for these functions rely on sc
modeling based capabilities and our ability to manufacture a reliable product.
Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technology (ADaPT)
The Advanced Manufacturing, Design and Production Technologies Initiative will
the nuclear weapons complex with advanced capabilities for: designing, develop
certifying components and systems; and producing, assembling, and delivering t
components and systems products. Over the next decade ADaPT will radically ch
DOE supports the nuclear weapons stockpile by infusing new product and process
technologies, and adopting state-of-the-art business and engineering practices
from this program to the plants and laboratories addresses enterprise modeling
realization, and model-based design and manufacturing. An example of the work
under this program is the development of a laser-cutting workstation for appli
weapon remanufacturing. In FY 1997, the ADaPT program will be integrated with
efforts in Process Development at the production plants, and will be continued
the same level of effort in FY 1998.
Dual Revalidation
Dual Revalidation is a new, robust form of peer review designed to assure both
DoD that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable. Under Dual Revalida
teams perform independent evaluations, the first team drawn from the original
laboratory and the second team from the alternate laboratory. Using archived
performing nonnuclear tests, teams will analyze and evaluate stockpiled weapon
components, and weapons materials to determine if they still meet military req
Dual Revalidation provides a baseline assessment of the condition of the warhe
a process to identify future problems. The evaluation is managed by the joint
Project Officers Group and is expected to take 2-3 years for each warhead type
is the first warhead currently undergoing revalidation. The increased involve
technical understanding of the assessment process by the DoD will provide a ba
confidence in the stockpile, which was previously supplied by nuclear testing.
process will revalidate that the stockpile meets its specifications delineated
Characteristics (MCs) and Stockpile-to-Target Sequence (STS).
Tritium
An integral part of ensuring a viable stockpile is the capability to provide a
supply of tritium, a radioactive gas required for all U.S. nuclear weapons to
designed. Tritium, with a half life of 12.3 years, decays at a rate of 5.5 p
annum. To meet current stockpile requirements, the Department is recycling tr
retired and dismantled weapons. To support the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan
approved by the President on March 11, 1996, a new tritium production source w
needed as early as 2005 to maintain the START I stockpile and the associated 5
reserve, and to maintain the ability to "hedge" to START I even when the START
enters into force.
The Department continues to make progress on a dual track tritium strategy for
a reliable source of tritium to meet national security requirements. One trac
purchase of a commercial reactor or irradiation services. The other track req
development and testing of an accelerator for the production of tritium. In a
FFTF is being kept on warm standby for possible contribution to meeting tritiu
The funds for this action is provided by the Office of Nuclear Energy. By lat
Department will have demonstrated all major aspects of the accelerator technol
use of tritium producing rods in a commercial light water reactor. The procur
will be structured so that a contract could be placed to either purchase irrad
purchase or lease a reactor. Based on these activities, DOE will have refined
estimates for both programs. By the end of 1998, the Department, in consultat
DoD and OMB, will select one of these alternatives as the primary tritium prod
method. The other, will comprise an assured backup capability. In an attempt
congressional concerns about tritium supply, Secretary Pea has promised to re
dual track time line. If the decision cannot be accelerated to 1997, DOE will
Congress consistent with section 3133 of the FY 1997 National Defense Authoriz
The dual track approach has the support of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
There are no serious technical issues associated with the production of tritiu
water reactor, but there are regulatory and licensing steps to be taken. The
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding l
May governing the interaction between the two agencies for target qualificatio
reactor licensing activities. On February 7, 1997, the DOE announced that the
Bar Nuclear Plant 1 was selected as the host utility for the Lead Test Assembl
Bar test involves placement of 32 specially designed twelve-foot "target" rods
the nearly two hundred regular fuel assemblies in the plant's reactor core. T
which contain no uranium or plutonium, are designed to replace a standard comp
reactor fuel assemblies. During the plant's normal 18-month operating cycle,
produce and retain small amounts of tritium. Following the test, the rods wil
DOE carrier to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for disassembly and e
Previously, DOE has tested smaller rod segments in one of its test reactors wi
results. The Watts Bar test is intended to confirm those results using rods o
length as those now typically used in commercial reactors. Additional target
studies are needed to support regulatory and owner approval for their use in c
reactors.
The Department has issued a Draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for the purchase
more commercial light water reactors or irradiation services. A final RFP is
release in April with utility responses due in June. The DOE expects to make
selection of one or more utilities early in 1998.
With regard to the accelerator alternative, there are several features and por
technology that need to be demonstrated at production power levels and the cos
construction and operations needs to be refined. The exploration of the accel
includes: a development effort to select between technical alternatives; testi
performance and reliability; the use of industry for conceptual and engineerin
if built, construction and commissioning. These efforts will narrow the desig
schedule uncertainties.
Last year the Department selected a prime contractor, Burns and Roe Enterprise
teamed with General Atomics to add to the Los Alamos and Savannah River team.
Alamos has completed the construction of the first test items for the accelera
are being manufactured. The first of the accelerator components, an injector
tested and exceeding performance specifications. Thousands of samples of mate
welds, and structures have been or are being irradiated to confirm choices and
of performance for materials for the so-called "target-blanket" the part of th
the tritium would actually be made. First results of these tests are currentl
The design of the accelerator has been favorably reviewed by two external revi
The combined team has produced a Draft Conceptual Design report and an associa
estimate, which is under intense review by the prime contractor and the Depart
Department is on track for issuing a final Conceptual Design Report in April o
We have made excellent progress on the schedule, and with the increased fundin
1996 and FY 1997 provided by the Congress. We have been able to advance some
technology demonstrations, which are key to proving the concept and making an
decision in late 1998.
Transportation of Special Nuclear Materials
The transportation of special nuclear materials remains an important element o
management as a result of weapons dismantlement and the restructuring and cons
of military bases in the United States. The Department provides for the trans
special nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and weapons components throughout
continental United States via specially designed safe, secure tractors and tra
The Department has accumulated more than 83 million miles of over-the-road exp
with no accidents causing a fatality or release of radioactive materials, and
or compromise of the cargo. Much of this can be attributed to the well manage
trained, competent, and dedicated work force of more than 260 couriers with na
secure communications. In addition, largely due to our specialized in-house t
capability, the nuclear material couriers are one of the most highly effective
forces in the world. Seventeen new trailers called Safe Guard Transporters (S
incorporating the latest advances in materials and transportation technology,
being built at the Kansas City Plant.
Dismantlement
Since the end of World War II, the Department and its predecessors have disass
some 55,000 nuclear warheads in a safe, secure, and an efficient manner. In F
1064 weapons were dismantled at the Pantex Plant. We expect to dismantle the
weapons in FY 1997 and 1200 weapons in FY 1998. The Pantex dismantlement work
is expected to remain stable for the next few years as we reduce the nuclear s
consistent with our arms control commitments.
Emergency Response
The Emergency Response program is a national capability that provides critical
expertise necessary to resolve any major radiological emergency or nuclear acc
the United States and abroad. The all-volunteer force that makes up the cadre
deployment forces is mostly from the nuclear weapons laboratories.
While a nuclear weapon accident is extremely unlikely, we are prepared to effe
mitigate the consequences of an accident. We are in the final planning stages
training exercise scheduled for late May, where, for the first time ever, the
exercise its responsibilities as the lead federal agency in providing command
well as the necessary technical expertise to resolve the accident.
The Department plays a vitally important support role in combating acts of nuc
terrorism, through its Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). NEST provides th
with the operational and technical assistance in response to a terrorist nucle
dispersal threat in the United States, and supports the State Department in a
overseas. We have vigorously pursued updating this program based on the avail
intelligence to counter the current nuclear threat and trends in these activit
and near term activities include continuance of in-depth contingency planning,
training, a challenging interagency exercise program, and pursuit of much need
improvements in the areas of nuclear search, diagnostics, device assessment, a
disablement capabilities.
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
The Stockpile Stewardship program addresses the issue of maintaining confidenc
stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing through a technically
science-based program utilizing upgraded or new experimental and computational
capabilities. The program continues major initiatives in high energy density
lasers and accelerated research and development in advanced computations to ac
use data to improve predictive capabilities -- the foundation of the science-b
Major new experimental facilities are planned to expand and enhance the scient
engineering base for stockpile stewardship, and to assure that we can continue
retain the high quality personnel needed to make the scientific and technical
related to the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence of under
testing.
The highly qualified laboratory staffs continue to make valuable contributions
scientific problems using knowledge and technologies from the weapons programs
example is a program called Peregrine. Based on the computer codes developed
weapons labs to show how radiation affects materials, Peregrine promises to pr
medical community with a more efficient and effective method of administering
therapy to cancer patients. Research is conducted in collaboration with Stanf
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Harper Hospital (Detroit) and other ca
research centers. Peregrine with its enhanced modeling and computing capabili
expected to provide more precise and successful treatment of complicated tumor
eyes, sinuses, neck, mouth and in and around the lungs. We are discussing wit
the possibility of providing this technique to cancer patients in military hos
will continue to benefit from computing advances made by the ASCI program.
Advanced Experimental Capabilities
The proposed National Ignition Facility (NIF) is designed to produce, for the
laboratory setting, conditions of temperature and density of matter close to t
in the detonation of nuclear weapons. The ability to study the behavior of ma
transfer of energy and radiation under these conditions is key to understandin
physics of nuclear weapons and predicting their performance without undergroun
testing. Experiments at the NIF will provide data essential to test the valid
based predictions and demonstrate how aged or changed materials in weapons cou
under these unique conditions. Two JASON panels, which are comprised of scien
technical national security experts, have stated that the NIF is the most scie
valuable of all programs proposed for science-based stockpile stewardship.
The NIF project currently has about 300 persons involved in design and project
research and development. Title I design work for the facility is now complet
Title I process the design was refined for the Lawrence Livermore site with ad
experimental capabilities added. This has increased the total project costs b
million. NIF will now be constructed so that the first bundle of eight lasers
available for experiments two years before the project is complete. The proje
site preparation work in FY 1997 which will allow major construction to begin
and project completion by the third quarter of FY 2003.
The FY 1998 budget request includes $31 million in operations and maintenance
NIF. These funds will enable industry to produce components (optics) for NIF
1998 budget also requests $876 million, full funding for NIF construction unde
Asset Acquisition Account, though the planned obligations during FY 1998 will
$198 million. The balance of the funds will be obligated annually throughout
construction period until project completion in FY 2003.
Current hydrodynamic testing facilities, the Pulsed High Explosive Radiographi
Emitting X-rays (PHERMEX) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the
Flash X-Ray facility (FXR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), w
adequate to meet the challenges of stockpile stewardship in conjunction with n
In the absence of nuclear testing, however, more capable hydrodynamic testing
such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility are need
Through its dual-axis, multi-time viewing capability, the DARHT facility will
crucial experimental data on many of the warheads in the stockpile and will di
performance and safety revalidation, enhanced surveillance, and an improved pr
capability. Furthermore as the most capable hydrodynamic testing facility in
the DARHT facility will play a central role in developing advanced technologie
potential next-generation Advanced Hydrodynamics Test Facility. Construction
was resumed last May following dissolution of the federal court injunction whi
all actions associated with the facility. The FY 1998 request for DARHT totals
$22 million to complete construction of the first arm of the facility and the
complete the engineering and design of the second arm.
The Atlas facility, to be constructed at Los Alamos National Laboratory, is an
experimental facility needed by the stockpile stewardship program. The facili
pulsed power experimental capability to address primary and secondary weapons
an energy rich, high energy density environment. Construction of Atlas is sch
begin later this year. The FY 1998 budget includes $14 million. The funds wi
continue long lead procurement, complete building modifications, and to instal
power equipment.
The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE), while not a new facility, is t
powerful neutron research facility in the world, providing an intense source o
neutrons for experiments supporting national security and civilian research.
unique and valuable probes of matter on scales ranging from the subatomic to c
materials. At low energies, neutrons are used to study many critical weapons
issues. At higher energies, neutrons probe the small-scale structure of atomi
is important for studies of nuclear weapons processes. At the very highest en
neutrons can penetrate very thick materials providing unique surveillance capa
capability will be important in supporting the enduring stockpile and anticipa
reacting to problems in the stockpile.
Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) Computations and Information
Management.
The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) and Stockpile Computing
element of the SSMP that will provide the critical advanced simulation tools n
ongoing and future certification and assessment of the safety and reliability
the stockpile. These tools will support weapons designers and analysts who w
certify and assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons. The fut
simulation has already been demonstrated in the assessment of the W76 issue.
Aging issues drive the size of the simulation capabilities required. During t
for the weapons in today's stockpile, limitations in simulation and computing
by keeping the designs consistent in 2 dimensions and through the extensive us
underground testing. We already know that the aging issues we will encounter
accommodating. Cracks, gaps and material degradation are 3D effects which wil
significantly more simulation capabilities that previously existed. A simple
computing power needed to support 3D, additional resolution, more complete phy
simulation shows that a computer running at well over 100 trillion floating po
per second (TeraFLOPS) is required.
In addition, this level of simulation capability will be required in the 2004
"test-based" weapons analysts to validate that the simulations accurately refl
world". The 2004 time frame is critical because that is when we will have los
current "test-based" designer and analyst capability. These designers and anal
considered "master craftsmen and women" who have earned that status by learnin
understanding scientific issues associated with nuclear weapons and then check
with an extensive program of underground tests. They are "masters" at using a
included underground testing) to certify weapons and assess safety and reliabi
With the loss of underground testing, these "masters" are now required to cont
jobs of certification and assessment with a new tool set, in which a major com
large scale, complex simulations. It is critical that this group of designers
validate that the new simulation tools allow them to continue to have confiden
weapons even in the absence of underground testing.
While the simulation capabilities provided by ASCI in the near-term will signi
improve our ability to certify and assess weapons without testing, at least 10
required before full system performance and safety simulation are possible. T
critical threshold needed for validation. The simulation capabilities in exc
TeraFLOPS are required before the simulation tools are robust enough to be mea
these "robust" tools must be available by 2004 so that the Department can make
transition away from "test-based" certification and assessment. The Accelerat
Computing Initiative (ASCI) is designed to provide this level of simulation ca
time frame required.
With the increased funding provided by the Congress in FY 1997, we are initiat
least 3 additional aging codes focussed on critical weapon initiation sequence
joint work with the computer industry to fund large scalable memory capability
Red (1 TeraFLOPS) and Option Blue (3 TeraFLOPS) computers, and by increasing a
with universities. The FY 1998 program growth of $53.2 million will be used t
momentum by executing activities in the current program plan, including critic
and safety code development activities and pushing the capabilities of compute
We also have seen some significant achievements in simulation in FY 1997. Thi
seen the delivery of the largest computer in the world to support Stockpile St
December 4, 1996 the Intel Corporation broke the long standing 1 TeraFLOPS bar
and the follow-on computers are intended to move the simulation capabilities t
TeraFLOPS level by 2004. ASCI code development has also shown a great deal of
Even though ASCI is only one and one half years old, the eleven code projects
significant progress moving the simulations from 2D to 3D and on to parallel c
This has lead to a better understanding of the challenges involved with simula
and re-manufactured weapons.
The ASCI simulation capabilities will link the experimental data from the Abov
Experimental facilities (AGEX), archival nuclear test data, and improved scien
understanding to provide high-confidence predictive simulation capabilities ne
decisions about the enduring stockpile. ASCI and Core Computations and Modeli
another element of SSMP, the Stockpile Life Extension Program (SLEP), by provi
simulation capabilities needed to predict requirements for replacement of aged
and to ensure that those replacements do not introduce new problems into the s
Finally, ASCI complements and accelerates the ongoing efforts of the Defense P
research program for advances in physics, material sciences, and computational
ASCI's computational advances will benefit other applications including: globa
modeling, medical and drug design each improving the quality of life.
Core Computations and Modeling are the activities, principally at the three we
laboratories, that address current stockpile operational and maintenance requi
will provide clear, effective and integrated planning to incorporate the new c
developed through ASCI into the central stockpile computing environment. As t
Stewardship PEIS and the Stewardship Management Plan are implemented, we will
Defense Programs Information Architecture to meet current and future needs. T
architecture will be integrated with the DOE, DoD and other information system
Test Readiness
President Clinton established a set of Safeguards under which U.S. adherence t
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is conditioned. These safeguards include mainte
the basic capability to resume nuclear testing activities should the United St
necessary. To this end, the Department maintains the necessary infrastructure
Nevada Test Site and the specialized facilities, equipment and skilled personn
nuclear testing. The Department has requested $157 million in FY 1998 to main
readiness. The safe execution of a nuclear test requires a complex series of
exercise several areas of expertise including: nuclear explosive design and f
diagnostic instrument design; emplacement and calibration; radioactive materia
containment; timing and firing, data recording, etc. Certification of the per
equipment to accomplish these operations will be assured by a number of ongoin
planned experimental activities utilizing both the Nevada Test Site and weapon
facilities. The majority of these nuclear test-related operations, however, w
through the Department's subcritical experiments at the NTS.
Subcritical experiments use high explosives to evaluate nuclear weapon materia
plutonium) by studying their behavior under extreme pressure conditions. The
are designed so the nuclear material will remain subcritical. In other words,
no self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction created and, thus, they are consiste
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These experiments will provide currentl
empirical data on the high pressure behavior of weapon materials, realistic be
on the dynamic, nonnuclear behavior of components of today's stockpile, the ef
remanufacturing techniques, the effects of aging materials, and other technica
Improving our basic knowledge of the science of plutonium through these experi
essential part of our program of stockpile stewardship without nuclear testing
Department is planning to conduct two of these subcritical experiments in FY 1
expects to conduct four experiments in FY 1998.
In the interest of transparency and building public confidence, the Department
JASONs to review the first two planned subcritical experiments and the results
Department's internal evaluations of their potential for criticality. The JAS
completed their review and stated that "these particular experiments will add
scientific information to our data base relevant to the performance of our nuc
and that there is no conceivable scenario in which these experiments lead to c
Therefore these experiments are consistent with the provisions of the CTBT sig
President Clinton on September 24, 1996."
Technology Transfer
The technology transfer program is designed to advance a broad range of critic
core competencies by leveraging the vast resources of the private sector, to c
development of the best, most efficient, and affordable technologies needed to
objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management program. The majority
activities are partnership called Cooperative Research and Development Agreeme
(CRADAs) which have been selected on the basis of their contribution to the ad
technology needs of the weapons complex. These technology partnerships are s
of a number of Defense Programs Initiatives including the ADaPT and ASCI.
In FY 1997 Congress provided an additional $10 million for Technology Transfer
with direction to increase efforts in support of the American Textile Partners
and the Advanced Computational Technology Initiative ( ACTI) partnerships. We
to support AMTEX at $10 million and ACTI at $5 million in FY 1997. We plan to
the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) program at approximate
million through the use of prior year balances and Weapons Support Agreements.
1998 budget continues these activities at the following levels: AMTEX--$5.5 mi
ACTI--$12 million and PNGV--$7.5 million.
FISCAL YEAR 1998 BUDGET SUMMARY
The Defense Programs request for FY 1998 totals $5.1 billion, of which $3.6 bi
Weapons Activities operation and maintenance account ($1.4 billion for stockpi
stewardship, $1.8 billion for stockpile management and $303 million for Progra
Direction). The Defense Programs is also requesting $1.5 billion for the Defe
Acquisition account, including $1,034.2 million for the transition to full con
funding. Overall, the Defense Programs request represents an increase of $1.2
above the FY 1997 appropriation. The increase is entirely for construction of
and is primarily due to the inclusion of full funding in the FY 1998 request.
required budget authority to fully fund construction projects, the FY 1998 fun
would be $4.0 billion, a 3.4 percent increase over the FY 1997 appropriation.
Beginning in FY 1998, Defense Programs will be funded from two appropriation a
(1) Weapons Activities Operations and Maintenance; and (2) the Defense Asset A
This change is consistent with the Administration's creation of Defense Asset
accounts across DOE to improve Department-wide planning and decision making fo
acquisition. This new account provides obligational authority for expenditure
current year construction projects, as well as providing "up front" budget aut
projects. This approach will promote more effective project planning, budgeti
management by helping to ensure that all costs and benefits are evaluated when
are being made about providing resources. In FY 1998, the transition year, bu
authority is requested to complete all ongoing projects begun in prior years.
to up front budget authority does not affect the annual obligations profile or
outlays.
120 DAY STUDY
Section 3140 of the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act and Section 302
1997 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act requires the Secretary of
develop a plan to reorganize the field activities and management of the Defens
activities. DOE's report must identify all significant functions performed at
area offices and make recommendations as to where those functions should be pe
The Department contracted with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to tak
look at the management structure of Defense Programs, to establish a baseline
and responsibilities and where they are performed, and to develop realignment
DOE to consider in developing a reorganization plan.
IDA has completed their study and is preparing their final report. The Departm
reviewing IDA's draft report and will prepare a report to Congress which will
specific organizational changes.
CONCLUSION
The United States faces a broad array of national security challenges as we en
century. The Department of Energy is committed to using all of its unique and
people, plants and laboratories to address the many challenges that will arise
stockpile stewardship and stockpile management as a single, integrated program
critical capabilities and competencies of both the weapons laboratories and pr
must be maintained in the national security interest. The Department will wor
Congress to ensure that a complete and integrated set of capabilities and appr
manufacturing capacity is maintained. Through a strong Stockpile Stewardship
Management Program the DOE will be a strong partner with the DoD in maintainin
country's nuclear deterrent.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
